The conference panel at which this paper was originally presented was structured along the lines of a debate. The three speakers who were supposed to advocate the use of DNA evidence were labeled, as is customary, Proponents. But those who were supposed to take the negative side were not called Opponents. Rather they were labeled Caveators. I do not know who is responsible for this label, but I think it gets things exactly right. To my mind anyone considering DNA as criminal identification evidence should be a Caveator. The promise and utility of DNA analysis in identifying the perpetrators of such serious crimes as rape and homicide must be acknowledged, but one must also be aware of the limits of the DNA identification process as it now exists and the ways in which these limits affect what experts can reliably tell judges and jurors. In particular, I shall argue below that current practices may lead to misleading claims for reasons that to date have not been fully appreciated by the forensic science community. In making some of these arguments I shall use the Bayesian perspective which Finkelstein and Fairley long ago posited as a paradigm for thinking about identification evidence
Lempert, Richard O. "Some Caveats Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes." Cardozo Law Review 13 (1991): 303-341.