We study the role of attorneys as arbitrators in securities arbitration. We ﬁnd that arbitrators who also represent brokerage ﬁrms or brokers in other arbitrations award signiﬁcantly less compensation to investor-claimants than do other arbitrators. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect for attorney-arbitrators who represent investors or both investors and brokerage ﬁrms. The relation between representing brokerage ﬁrms and arbitration awards remains signiﬁcant even when we control for political outlook. Arbitrators who donate money to Democratic political candidates award greater compensation than do arbitrators who donate to Republican can-didates. We also study the dynamics of panel interaction. We ﬁnd that the position of chair is an important factor in assessing an arbitrator’s inﬂuence, although the ﬁnancial relationships of other arbitrators may also affect arbitration awards. Coalitions with the other arbitrators are also important. If the chair and another panelist possess a common attribute, the effect on the arbitration award increases.
Pritchard, Adam C. "Attorneys as Arbitrators." S. J. Choi and J. E. Fisch, co-authors. J. Legal Stud. 39, no. 1 (2010): 109-57.