This is more a conversational gambit than an article. I address a question at the intersection of procedure and choice of law, speaking as a proceduralist rather than a choice-of-law scholar. The question - which may be two questions - addresses the potential interdependence of procedural aggregation devices and choice of law. One part of the question is whether aggregation can justifiably change the choice of law made for some part of an aggregated proceeding. The other part is whether choice-of-law principles can be adapted to facilitate procedurally desirable aggregation. Answers may be sought either in abstract theory or in theory informed by some attention to practical concerns. Either way, it seems likely that resistance to interdependent adjustments will come from the choice-of-law perspective more than the procedural perspective.
Cooper, Edward H. "Aggregation and Choice of Law." Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 14, no. 1 (2009): 12-28.