Abstract
While scholars have extensively explored the evolution of labor provisions in trade agreements, less attention has been paid to the institutional mechanisms that operationalize these provisions. This article addresses this gap by offering a comparative analysis of labor compliance models that are emerging across jurisdictions.
Recognizing that no institutional design is without trade-offs, this article applies the theory of comparative institutional analysis to evaluate existing models—not by asking whether they are (in)effective in the abstract, but: (in)effective compared to what? Specifically, it examines the strengths and limitations of various institutional mechanisms using benchmarks that matter to policymakers, including procedural efficiency, cost-effectiveness, legal certainty, enforceability, preservation of diplomatic and trade relations, and regulatory autonomy in labor governance.
This article advances two key arguments. First, there is no one-size-fits-all institutional model; the choice of compliance design must be context-specific. A state’s labor regulatory framework, political will to advance workers’ rights, enforcement capacity, and trade and diplomatic dynamics all influence how it values core institutional benchmarks. These priorities, in turn, shape the tradeoffs a state is willing to accept when designing or adopting a labor compliance mechanism.
Second, labor compliance mechanisms in trade agreements cannot function in isolation. Their effectiveness can be significantly strengthened through integration with broader legal and institutional frameworks—including the International Labour Organization, evolving norms on corporate accountability, and domestic capacity-building initiatives.
Recommended Citation
Yueming Yan,
Institutionalizing The Trade-Labor Nexus,
47
Mich. J. Int'l L.
329
(2026).
Available at:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol47/iss3/2