Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2026
Abstract
Despite its ancient history in philosophical and legal thought, importance to progressive social movements, and relative simplicity as a notion of fairness—if you break something, you ought to fix it—reparative justice is largely misunderstood. This is problematic given increasing calls for reparation from historically disadvantaged groups. Rather than assessing the validity of these claims, this Article addresses a fundamentally antecedent issue: what’s the point of reparation? Rejecting arguments that claim reparation is about compensation, supplementing distributive justice, and reconciliation, I argue that the point of reparation is to repair unjust social relations created by past wrongdoing. The relational theory of reparation that I sketch here will help provide clarity on other complicated issues, such as what reparation ought to look like and whether demands for reparation are morally valid. Knowing the point of reparation would also have important implications for the design of reparation programs being requested. This Article attempts to reshape how we think about reparation in scholarly and public discourse. My hope is to start a new scholarly discussion about reparation that avoid common misunderstandings. Providing a due diligence investigation into the point of reparation serves as a start to answering more general questions about the proper place of reparative justice in our theories of what we owe each other.
Recommended Citation
Fryer, Daniel. "What's the Point of Reparation?" Tulsa Law Review 61 2026: 335-359.
Comments
© 2026 Tulsa Law Review. Reproduced with permission.