After briefly summarizing Lujan and addressing Sunstein's critique, we explore the concept of accountability underlying the creation of a single executive in Article II. We then apply our theory of the unitary executive to several examples of broad grants of statutory standing, concluding that Congress can confer standing on private citizens only if it specifically articulates and individuates the interests whose violation gives rise to a cognizable case. Although we agree with Sunstein's view that broad grants of statutory standing do not necessarily trench upon constitutional values, we ultimately side with Justice Scalia in concluding that universal citizen standing, as in Lujan itself, cannot be reconciled with the Constitution - not because of any definition of "injury," but because of Article H's establishment of a unitary executive.
Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman,
Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein,
Mich. L. Rev.
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol91/iss7/7