Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence

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Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence

Jill R. Horwitz and Joseph Mead*

Does tort law deter risky behavior in individuals? We explore this question by examining the relationship between tort immunity and volunteering. During the 1980s and 1990s, nearly every state provided some degree of volunteer immunity. Congress followed with the 1997 Volunteer Protection Act. This article analyzes these acts, identifying three motivations for them: the chilling effects of tort liability, limits on liability insurance, and moral concerns. Using data from the Independent Survey’s Giving and Volunteering surveys, we then identify a large and positive correlation between immunity and volunteering. We next consider the implications of the findings for tort theory and nonprofit law.

I. Introduction

Does tort law deter risky behavior? This question lies at the center of a major debate in tort law. Some scholars suggest that individuals respond to liability...
risk with increased care or by avoiding risky activities altogether. Others criticize deterrence theories as unrealistic since they assume that prospective tortfeasors understand risk and law. Despite considerable theoretical research on the deterrent effects of tort law, few empirical studies examine whether liability affects risk taking. Even these few previous studies do not lead easily to generalizable conclusions because they mostly focus on medical malpractice (which is confounded by professional duties, organizational relationships, mandatory insurance laws, and the high costs of relocating across state lines) and automobile accidents (which are muddied by insurance mandates and criminal law). An individual’s decision to volunteer, however, does not involve such complications.

Here, we examine the relationship between volunteer tort immunity and volunteering. During the 1980s and 1990s, state lawmakers worried that tort liability was harming nonprofits and responded by immunizing at least some volunteers from suit. Congress followed with the 1997 Volunteer Protection Act (VPA), which provided immunity for volunteers in states without immunity laws.\(^1\) By comparing volunteer rates across states with different liability regimes, we attempt to identify the effect of a reduction in tort exposure—a reduction in the price of volunteering—on volunteering.

We find systematic differences in volunteer rates between states with and without volunteer tort immunity. We provide new, albeit preliminary, evidence suggesting that individuals reduce their activity-level engagement by foregoing volunteering in the face of liability exposure. These results support economic deterrence theories of tort law, countering criticism that such theories do not accurately reflect human behavior and that the laws have little or no effect. Our findings are particularly interesting because they illustrate how liability exposure might influence individuals rather than corporations, which are more likely than individuals to internalize the costs of risky behavior.\(^2\)

Moreover, the results offer an approximate quantitative estimate of foregone volunteering by providing a ballpark figure for the activity-level opportunity cost of tort liability. They also suggest the economic costs if government, rather than volunteers, provides these foregone services or the indirect costs to society if it does not. Although policymakers should con-

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sider these activity-level effects, we caution that they are only one part of the equation necessary to determine the social utility of tort law. Without identifying the benefits of tort law (e.g., the accident avoided, the extra care induced by liability exposure) and other important factors, such as tort’s distributive effects, policymakers cannot determine whether suits against volunteers are worth the cost of foregone volunteering.

This study further considers whether, and under what circumstances, property rules (enacted through bargaining and contracting) or liability rules (enacted through tort) provide a better mechanism to distribute the costs of accidents. Because volunteering is not a sudden, unexpected event like a skiing or bicycling accident, volunteers have ample time to contract around tort liability. They are able to buy insurance or ask charities to indemnify them and, at least under certain circumstances, the transaction costs are probably quite low. Much volunteering, therefore, occurs under conditions in which theory predicts that people are most likely to rely on contracts to protect themselves from tort liability. Instead, we find that volunteers seek protection from tort law not by contracting but by attempting to change liability rules.

We also contribute to the research on volunteering, something almost half of Americans—donating 15.5 billion hours or the equivalent of $239.2 billion—do every year. Although many economists have studied the determinants of monetary contributions to charities, few have considered the factors influencing labor contributions, and those who have done so have focused primarily on the wage-labor tradeoff. Previous legal research is similarly sparse. Articles about the immunity acts and their consequences speculate, without evidence, about the incentive effects of liability exposure on volunteering.

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Finally, the results are policy relevant. They help determine whether immunity encourages volunteering, which politicians commonly support. In 1993, President George H. W. Bush even claimed that “every serious social problem is being solved through voluntary service.” The question of volunteer immunity has come up in several other political contexts. Good Samaritan laws, which predate volunteer immunity statutes, provide some immunity for accidents caused by uncompensated assistance in an emergency. The fear that lawsuits would discourage “able citizens from acceptance of public office” led the Supreme Court to grant qualified immunity to many officials for civil rights violations. More recently, had the 2005 Katrina VPA passed the Senate, it would have extended the VPA by immunizing Hurricane Katrina volunteers from the costs of accidents caused by their gross negligence.

We describe the immunity acts and their justifications in Section II, and summarize related research in Section III. Section IV details our data and methodology. Section V provides the results, sensitivity tests, and research limitations. We discuss the implications of the findings in Section VI.

II. IMMUNITY LAWS

During the 1980s and 1990s, impassioned advocacy persuaded state and federal legislatures to immunize volunteers from civil lawsuits. Senator Spencer Abraham declared that “[f]rivolous litigation is an attack on altruism itself,” Senator John Ashcroft invoked de Tocqueville on the matter, and President George H. W. Bush decried volunteer liability because “it’s time that we ought to care for each other more and sue each other less.” We examined legislative histories, news reports, and press releases to find these

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sentiments translated into three categories of justifications for the sweep of federal and state immunity legislation: (1) instrumental claims regarding the chilling effect of liability on volunteering; (2) both instrumental and normative claims about the liability insurance crisis, sometimes framed more generally as a “liability crisis”; and (3) particularly at the federal level, a normative claim that volunteers should not be sued.

A. State Law

1. Statutes

State legislators acted first. Between 1984 and 1997, 29 states and the District of Columbia adopted legislation providing some immunity from civil suits to all volunteers (see Table 1 and the Appendix). Others protect only specific volunteer categories, such as firefighters, coaches, mediators, or librarians.
(for damages resulting from information contained in library materials). 8

We analyzed each state statute to determine the scope of immunity. 9 In almost all cases, the statutory language granting immunity to a class of volunteers is clear, although some statutes require more interpretation. 10

The statutes typically specify the lowest standard of care for which volunteers may face liability. 11 If a statute permits liability for one standard, it allows

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9We collected state statutes on Westlaw with the query “volunteer /s liab!”, and compared the results with (1) Nonprofit Risk Management Center, State Liability Laws for Charitable Organizations and Volunteers (Sept. 2001), available at (http://www.nonprofitrisk.org/downloads/state-liability.pdf), and (2) a report by Daniel Kurtz, Holland & Knight LLP (on file with authors).

10For example, the Georgia statute covers “[a] person serving with or without compensation as a member, director, or trustee, or as an officer of the board without compensation, of any nonprofit hospital or association or of any nonprofit, charitable, or eleemosynary institution or organization.” Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-20. Georgia courts interpret “member” to include non-managerial volunteers and employees. Stephens v. Conyers Apostolic Church, 532 S.E.2d 728, 730 n.4 (Ga. App. 2000) (holding that a pastor employed by a church fell within scope of statute), cert. denied (Ga. 2000); Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Ass’n, 500 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. App. 1998) (assuming the statute covers a volunteer seminar instructor for a nonprofit), reconsideration denied (Ga. App. 1998). South Carolina grants immunity to “employee[s],” defined as “an agent, servant, employee, or officer of a charitable organization.” S.C. Code Ann. § 33-56-170(2). We interpret South Carolina as immunizing all volunteers because (1) an Attorney General opinion concludes that a physician giving high school athletic physicals on a volunteer basis, without compensation, would probably be immune from liability, 1989 Op Atty Gen, No. 89-83, p. 218, and (2) the statute only protects uncompensated individuals.

11In some cases, identifying the standard was difficult. Maine protects volunteers “[w]hen the cause of action sounds in negligence.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 158-A (2005). We code Maine as immunizing negligence but not gross negligence. Pennsylvania does not immunize volunteers when the “conduct of such person falls substantially below the standards generally practiced and accepted in like circumstances by similar persons.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8332.4 (2005). This likely means gross negligence. See Sewickley Twp. Volunteer Fire Co. No. 3 v. First Nat. Bank of Herminie, 8 Pa. D. & C. 4th 297, 300 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1990) (holding that plaintiff must allege at least gross negligence for claim to be outside scope of statute). Texas imposes liability when the volunteer’s act was “intentional, willfully negligent, or done with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 84.007(a). Because earlier Texas case law defines “willfully negligent” to apply to a person who is “conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally or probably result in injury,” Glassman v. Feldman, 106 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (quoting Sorrell v. White, 153 A. 359, 362 (Vt. 1931)), we classify the statute as immunizing up to recklessness. We treat Florida, Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky as having no immunity. Interpretation of the Florida, Missouri, and Ohio statutes is difficult because they appear to impose liability for negligent acts, thereby effectively draining the laws
liability for all standards involving greater culpability. Therefore, a statute that allows volunteers to be sued when they act with gross negligence will permit a suit when they act intentionally. The statutes commonly include exceptions, such as wrongful acts committed while operating a motor vehicle, exposing many volunteers to liability risk.12

2. Justifications: Why Did the States Pass These Laws?

State legislatures passed immunity laws to: (1) increase volunteering, (2) address an insurance crisis, and (3) maintain fairness. First, legislators worried that liability hindered volunteer recruitment, and reasoned that immunity would encourage volunteering. For example, the New Jersey Assembly Insurance Committee’s statement to the Senate explains that “[b]y giving immunity to trustees, officers, directors, and other uncompensated volunteers, the bill’s purpose is to permit nonprofit and charitable organizations to continue to attract able people to serve in these capacities.”13

Volunteers, however, seemed to face little risk of suit before immunity laws were passed. In a survey of state law, the Nonprofit Risk Management of any force. Florida immunizes volunteers “acting as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.” Fla. Stat. § 768.1355. As Florida courts note, this is the usual negligence standard. Campbell v. Kessler, 848 So. 2d 369, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Botte v. Pomeroy, 438 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fl. App. 1983). We unsuccessfully investigated bill hearings for any explanation of using the standard in the statute. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Court Systems, Probate, and Consumer Law, Feb. 10, 1993 (audiotapes and notes on file with authors). Missouri allows liability when damage is caused “by the negligence of such volunteer,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.118(2)(2), whereas Ohio permits liability for “[a]n action or omission of the volunteer [that] constitutes negligence.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.38(D)(2). Although the negligence standard immunizes volunteers from strict liability suits, this is an unsatisfying explanation because volunteers are unlikely to face a strict liability claim. Michael Mayer, Stepping In to Step Out of Liability: The Proper Standard of Liability for Referees in Foreseeable Judgment-Call Situations, 3 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 54, 81 n.160 (2005); Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities—The Alternative to “Nerf®” Tiddlywinks, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 683, 754 (1992). Although Kentucky passed an immunity statute in 1988, an Attorney General opinion found that it violates the three sections of the state constitution providing that the legislature “shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.” 1988–1991 Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 2-637, Ky. OAG 91-89, 1991 WL 533922 (Ky. A.G.).

12See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.10(a)(3).

13Assembly Insurance Committee Statement to Senate, No. 2705, State of New Jersey (Feb. 5, 1987). See also, e.g., Washington Senate Bill Report 1643, Senate Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2001).
Center identified only a handful of cases against ordinary volunteers. Rather, the reported cases typically involved nonprofit directors (primarily over labor disputes), auto accidents, quasi-governmental volunteers who are generally afforded sovereign immunity (e.g., for community members serving on government committees), or vicarious liability suits against nonprofit organizations for their volunteers’ negligence.

Our own efforts to find lawsuits against nondirector volunteers also produced few results. Although we do not know whether volunteers settled, we found few documented suits against them. In a search of all cases with written decisions over the past 40 years—covering the period before and after the Acts—we found only 60 cases against volunteers, almost none of whom would be immune under the Acts. Of these 60 cases, 23 were against volunteer firefighters (typically based on negligent driving and, therefore, exempted from immunity); three were for negligent driving by other volunteers; eight were sex related (usually against youth leaders for child molestation and, therefore, intentional torts exempted from immunity); and 19 involved nontort claims, such as antitrust, Fair Labor Standards Act, discrimination, interference with contract, and other claims brought in the employment context. From 1978 through 2006, only seven cases alleged a straightforward negligence claim; of these, five invoked state acts and two invoked the VPA, with one invoking both. Moreover, the supervising nonprofit or government agency was also almost always a named defendant, so the risk to the volunteer’s assets was minimal. In fact, although threats to


15See, e.g., cases granting sovereign immunity to government volunteers assuming employee-type roles, such as Yonker By & Through Helstrom v. Thompson, 939 P.2d 530 (Colo. App. 1997) (guardian ad litem granted sovereign immunity when child under his supervision was kidnapped); Trotter v. School Dist. 218, 733 N.E.2d 363 (Ill. App. 2000) (volunteer lifeguards are employees under tort immunity act); Kennedy v. State, 730 A.2d 1252 (Me. 1999) (volunteer guardian ad litem held to be state employee).

16We searched Westlaw using the terms “sy(volunteer lia! Sue lawsuit tort) & volunteer/10defendant.”
personal funds are used to achieve settlements in tort suits, parties generally settle claims only with insurance proceeds.\textsuperscript{17}

It is not surprising, therefore, that legislators commonly emphasized the \textit{perception} rather than the true risk of suit. The Alabama statute asserts that “[t]he willingness of volunteers to offer their services has been increasingly deterred by a perception that they put personal assets at risk in the event of tort actions seeking damages arising from their activities as volunteers.”\textsuperscript{18} Hawaii legislators surveyed state nonprofits to determine the true volunteer liability risk and concluded that “[a]lthough a perception lingers that use of volunteers increases the threat of lawsuits demanding astronomical damages, this does not appear to be the reality experienced by Hawaii’s nonprofits.”\textsuperscript{19} In fact, the Nonprofit Risk Management Center concludes:

Although we are somewhat doubtful about the claims that large numbers of persons have declined to volunteer due to fear about personal liability, we acknowledge that these fears have persisted during the past two decades. Over the past few years, . . . [we have] . . . received dozens of calls from volunteers expressing concern about the potential for personal liability. . . . [W]e have yet to hear from someone whose fear of liability has led to the decision to cease participating as a volunteer in any form.\textsuperscript{20}

A few highly publicized lawsuits against volunteers may have convinced legislators that there was a volunteer liability crisis. In a case that reportedly settled for $25,000, parents sued their son’s Little League coach when a ball injured his eye, claiming that the 10-year-old was unaccustomed to playing

\textsuperscript{17}Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 Law & Soc’y Rev. 275 (2001).

\textsuperscript{18}Ala. Code § 6-5-336(b)(1). See also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-6-102 (“While there are no known recent instances in Arkansas where a volunteer has been subjected to personal liability for negligence in performing volunteer duties . . . , the recent publicity generated in relation to the perceived insurance crisis has heightened concern among many who would provide volunteer services.”).

\textsuperscript{19}Charlotte A Carter-Yamauchi, Hawaii Legislative Research Bureau, Volunteerism, A Risky Business? (1996), available at (http://www.state.hi.us/lrb/rpts96/vol/voldoc.html). Only three nonprofits reported that “any suit involving a volunteer had been filed or threatened; and one of these involved an injury to a volunteer, as opposed to an injury caused as a result of a volunteer’s acts or omissions.” None of the “responding organizations reported knowing of another nonprofit organization that had been sued or threatened with suit.”

\textsuperscript{20}Nonprofit Risk Management Center, supra note 9, at 4.
second base and had not been trained to field balls correctly. Another lawsuit that sparked outrage involved a young mountain climber who became quadriplegic after a 90-foot fall; he sued the volunteers who participated in a nighttime helicopter evacuation for $11 million, alleging “reckless and negligent” rescue techniques, but later dropped the case. Others may have sought liability reform because they feared a future decline in volunteering, possibly caused by increasing female workforce participation.

Second, legislators may have reacted to a widely publicized liability and insurance crisis. This crisis was commonly believed to have “disrupted product and service markets” through drastically increased premiums across diverse activities, including medical care, recreational activities, and transportation. Reform advocates linked many social ills to the insurance crisis,


including, perhaps most dramatically, obstetricians walking off the job.\textsuperscript{26} Insurers blamed “greedy lawyers, mushy-headed juries and a litigious culture,” whereas lawyers retorted that premium increases were caused by interest rate declines and an insurance business cycle.\textsuperscript{27} Regardless of the reason for high premiums, tort reform was believed to be the answer. Several states implemented “no-fault” insurance during the mid-1980s when automotive insurance rates peaked.\textsuperscript{28} States also regulated medical malpractice insurance, and others called for limiting product liability.\textsuperscript{29}

This general trend affected nonprofits as well, with the average cost of liability insurance for them increasing by 155 percent in 1987,\textsuperscript{30} and with many nonprofits concerned about their ability to insure at all.\textsuperscript{31} After being inundated by constituent complaints, Washington State legislators concluded that “[t]he public interest is not being served by the commercial underwriters.”\textsuperscript{32} Legislators believed that liability protection was needed

\textsuperscript{26}Jill R. Horwitz & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injury: A Case Study, 14 Health Aff. 164, 166 (1995).

\textsuperscript{27}The Liability Crisis: Companies, Consumers and Courts; Are Insurers Caught in a Squeeze or Putting it On? N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986; Russo, supra note 24.


either to encourage insurers to cover volunteers or to protect those without coverage.\textsuperscript{33}

Third, state legislators believed that holding volunteers liable for negligence was unfair. Florida representatives identified the need “to strike a balance between the right of a person to seek redress for injury and the right of an individual to freely give of his time and energy without compensation as a volunteer in service to his community without fear of personal liability for acts undertaken in good faith absent willful or wanton conduct volunteer . . . .”\textsuperscript{34} Some went further, arguing that even nonfrivolous claims against volunteers are unfair because it is wrong to penalize well-intentioned people, whereas immunity opponents wondered why volunteers should be immune, since “[t]here doesn’t need to be immunity unless they did something wrong.”\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{B. Federal Law}

The 1997 VPA roughly tracked the state statutes. After 12 failed attempts, Illinois Congressman John Porter introduced a bill that overcame the federalism objections that had doomed earlier efforts.\textsuperscript{36} Under the VPA, a


\textsuperscript{34}Billy Buzzett, Staff Attorney, Florida House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Florida Volunteer Immunity Act Summary (on file with the authors).


\textsuperscript{36}Mary Jacoby, House OKs Liability Protection for Volunteers, Chi. Trib., May 22, 1997, at 13; Alfred R. Light, Conscripting State Law to Protect Volunteers: The Odd Formulation of Federalism in “Opt-Out” Preemption, 10 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 9, 14 (2000); George Constantine, How Landmark Legislation Evolved; Special Report: The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 49 Assoc. Mgmt. 36 (1997). Previous attempts, such as the Volunteer Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 911, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., tried to overcome these objections by making state compliance optional with a 1 percent increase in Social Service Block Grants. Section 5(a); 1988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 25–28 (discussion between Sen. Thurmond and Rep. Porter on federalism concerns). Although the VPA’s constitutionality is untested, one state passed its own Act out of
volunteer will not be liable for harm he or she causes while negligently performing services for a nonprofit or government entity, with several exceptions, including liability for gross negligence, willful or criminal misconduct, hate crimes, sexual offenses, volunteering under the influence, or injuries from motor vehicle use. The Act also limits punitive damages to situations where the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the volunteer’s actions constituted “willful or criminal misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety” of the plaintiff and eliminates joint and several liability for noneconomic damage awards. The VPA preempts inconsistent state laws but explicitly saves from preemption state laws that offer additional liability protection to volunteers. It also permits states to opt out of the statute for suits between their own citizens by passing a statute explicitly expressing intent to permit liability.

Advocates supported the federal Act for similar reasons to those advanced for state immunity. First, some worried that the fear of tort liability, unfounded or otherwise, discouraged volunteering. Representative Porter explained that the legislation:

addresses a very real problem, and that is the chilling effect that is felt by volunteers across this country that they might somehow be named a party defendant in a lawsuit and have to go to court and hire a lawyer and defend themselves. And what the legislation does is remove that and say the organization remains liable but the volunteer can come forward, serve as a direct service volunteer or on a volunteer board, without worry that they have to go to court and hire a lawyer.

concern that the VPA would be struck down as exceeding Congress’s power. Washington Senate Bill Report 1643, Senate Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2001).


3842 U.S.C. §§ 14503(e)(1), 14504(b).


When Porter introduced the 1987 version of the bill, he was more succinct: “The purpose behind this legislation is one thing, and one thing only—that is, to keep volunteers volunteering in our country.”42 Other politicians pointed to the role of tort liability in declining volunteerism as a particular problem in the context of a shrinking government.43

Second, supporters found it inappropriate for nonprofits to spend a considerable, and rising, portion of their budgets on insurance. It particularly upset legislators to learn that “the Little League’s biggest cost isn’t bats and balls, but legal and insurance costs associated with liability.”44 (It is unclear whether these legal fees were for defending volunteers, other liability issues, or even unrelated legal services such as negotiating licenses.)

Third, supporters believed that lawsuits are frivolous and accidents simply a part of life. According to John Ashcroft, then Senator from Missouri, the bill:

go to the heart of who we are. . . . [T]hat those who would hold themselves out to help their fellow citizens would have to offer as a potential the well-being of their own families because of the opportunity or potential for legal liability is an idea that is offensive. . . . [H]ow many . . . volunteers can afford to have that kind of exposure? I was a Boy Scout, I remember playing touch football. We played worse than that. It is the nature of boys. We played fox over the hill. You just had to run from one line to another line without getting knocked down, tackled or beat up.45

421988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 7 (testimony of the Honorable John. E. Porter). Some did not agree. H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 18 (dissenting views) (“The literature does not reveal a single independent study, much less a juried piece of research, suggesting that federally imposed tort immunity will increase the number, frequency, or quality of volunteers.”).


44H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 6. Upon the passage of the VPA, Newt Gingrich commented, “the Girl Scouts in Washington DC alone had sold—I think it was 87,000 boxes of cookies just in order to be able to pay their legal and litigation and liability insurance, and that Little League actually pays more nationally for legal fees and liability insurance than they pay for baseballs and bats. And average common-sense folks understand that makes no sense at all.” News Conference on the Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, June 11, 1997, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service.

451997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 16 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (discussing a judgment of $4 million, reduced from $7 million, against the Boy Scouts and volunteers for negligent supervision on a trip where a scout suffered a paralyzing injury during a game of touch football).
The New Jersey Little League suit was mentioned frequently in the press and in debates regarding the federal legislation.46 A common theme was that it is simply unfair to hold liable those who act generously.47

According to law professor Andrew Popper, the only dissenting voice in the 1997 VPA hearings before Congress, the Act was a class-based transfer from those who are injured to those who injure, one motivated only by politics and not by a genuine concern for volunteerism.48 Popper characterized tort victims as “a highly vulnerable group, legally unsophisticated, often powerless to select the person who will assist them, and sometimes unable to discern inappropriate behavior.”49 Although the costs of immunity to injured parties were hardly mentioned in the 1997 hearings, Representative Porter had earlier proposed that immunity be withheld from volunteers at organizations subject to charitable or sovereign immunity.50

III. Previous Scholarship

A. Legal Scholarship

Legal research on volunteer immunity statutes focuses on their fairness or incentive effects, particularly whether liability exposure discourages

46Aaron Epstein, Congressional Leaders Back Bill to Limit Liability of Volunteers, Knight Ridder, Apr. 29, 1997. Tort reform opponents charge VPA supporters with omitting important facts from their accounts, such as the fact that the boy hit by the fly ball underwent five operations and there was evidence of careless coaching. The judgment in the Oregon case cited by Senator Ashcroft—in which the plaintiff was disabled—“was paid by the Boy Scout’s insurance company, not the volunteers.” Id.

47John Porter, End the Liability of Volunteers, Chi. Trib., Aug. 24, 1986 (“Why should the assets of board members of the Junior League be jeopardized for a slip-and-fall injury in the local thrift shop? . . . We should not have to fear placing family assets at risk when we donate our time and talent without compensation to serve our communities.”); 1997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 54 (testimony of Lynn Swann, Immediate Past President of Big Brothers, Big Sisters of America) (“You would not take a mother and father and sue them . . . [b]ut a Big Brother Big Sister, you could.”); 1997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 98 (testimony of Charles Tremper, Founder, Nonprofit Risk Management Center) (“The fundamental question goes beyond one of empirical data: Is it fair to ask volunteers to risk their personal assets as a condition of helping others?”).


49Id. at 134.

501988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 12–13 (statement of John Porter).
volunteering. First, scholars concerned with fairness note that, in the volunteer context, immunity shifts the cost of accidents from volunteers onto nonprofit entities or, worse, accident victims. Some find this welfare enhancing because organizations may be better able to manage risk than individual volunteers, particularly because organizations can select, train, and supervise their volunteers. It may also, however, require organizations to limit their use of volunteers, which may be either welfare enhancing or welfare decreasing depending on the nature of the volunteers. Further, if organizations cannot satisfy judgments or are immune themselves, the injured party, commonly someone of low to moderate income, bears the loss. Whether this result is unfair depends on the significance of compensation as a justification for tort law and one’s views on the appropriateness of the redistributive implications of tort. In fact, in an argument echoing the justifications for charitable immunity laws advanced in the mid-19th century, some claim that it is unfair for a volunteer’s kindness to be repaid with liability. That is, good beneficiaries should not bite gift volunteers in the hand.

Second, legal scholars also concentrate on deterrence, predicting both that immunity increases carelessness and that liability decreases volunteering. Deterrent effects may be particularly strong for volunteers because, unlike market actors, it is relatively easy for volunteers to quit


55See, e.g., Developments, supra note 53, at 1690, 1692; Tremper, supra note 51, at 426–27.
when they perceive themselves to be exposed to liability.\textsuperscript{56} Others fear that holding volunteers to a negligence standard will overdeter volunteering because it fails to account for positive externalities provided by volunteers while forcing the volunteers to internalize the cost of accidents.\textsuperscript{57} In addition to disagreeing about whether liability discourages volunteering, legal scholars disagree about whether the volunteer immunity encourages it. Supporters of immunity argue that it is necessary to generate human capital as liability protection is necessary to generate financial capital in the corporate context.\textsuperscript{58}

More skeptical observers predicted that the laws might be ineffective because of: (1) the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions, (2) volunteer lack of awareness of the laws, their exceptions, and their scope, (3) ambiguity due to poor drafting and over which state’s law applies, and (4) plaintiffs’ ability to forum shop.\textsuperscript{59} Sparse case law interpreting the state and federal Acts adds to the uncertainty of volunteer protection.

Yet other scholars argue that when immunity is conditioned on a volunteer’s or nonprofit’s ability to meet certain conditions, volunteers will be hesitant to offer their services.\textsuperscript{60} The statutes only provide partial

\textsuperscript{56}Benard, supra note 51, at 120–22; King, supra note 11, at 702, 734.

\textsuperscript{57}Tremper, supra note 51 at 427–28.

\textsuperscript{58}Tremper, supra note 51, at 443–44.

\textsuperscript{59}Byrne by Byrne v. Fords-Clara Barton Boys Baseball League, Inc., 564 A.2d 1222, 1224 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding an “ambiguity” in New Jersey’s volunteer coaches statute); Abraham, supra note 7, at 105 (criticizing excessive judicial discretion); David W. Barrett, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 Ind. L. J. 967, 1000 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing between recklessness and gross negligence); Brown, supra note 21, at 571–72 (noting and denouncing unfair variation in the law); Developments, supra note 55, at 1687, 1690 (noting disorder and poor drafting among statutory protection schemes); Daniel Kurtz, Protecting Your Volunteer: The Efficacy of Volunteer Protection Statutes and Other Liability Limiting Devices, C726 ALI-ABA 263, 289 (1992) (arguing that the variation creates “grave uncertainty” for insurance underwriters); Light, supra note 36, at 21–22 (discussing how a state court might avoid applying the federal VPA); Rebecca Mowrey & Adam Epstein, The Little Act That Could: The Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 13 J. Legal Aspects Sport 289, 299–301 (2003).

immunity, commonly requiring volunteers to act in good faith or not be grossly negligent or reckless. Moreover, they do not protect volunteers from the expenses of defending against frivolous suits.

Strong claims about the incentive effects of immunity are unjustified given the lack of evidence to support them. Furthermore, volunteers face little risk of liability exposure in practice because they are rarely sued, and although insurance may be expensive it can be purchased, and states can choose to subsidize premiums to encourage additional coverage.  

B. Determinants of Volunteering: Empirical Findings

Little information about the relationship between immunity and volunteerism exists. Previous studies include a few national opinion polls from the 1980s and scholarly studies regarding the factors that affect volunteer supply, which, with one exception, overlook the relationship between immunity and volunteering.

1. Survey Data

Immunity proponents relied on raw data from three surveys, which, although reporting perceptions about liability in the 1980s, cannot explain the relationship between liability and volunteering. Peat Marwick commissioned a 1986 survey of 2,532 leaders at both nonprofits and for-profits in which 28 percent of nonprofit respondents identified a directors and officers liability insurance crisis and 78 percent said that liability negatively affected governance. Only 6 percent of the respondents reported having a director resign and 8 percent reported having had a board candidate decline membership because of liability exposure; however, more respondents reported adopting

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new governance procedures to address liability. In 1986, the National Association of Corporate Directors surveyed 370 corporate directors, finding that one in seven had refused to serve on a board (including a for-profit board) without liability protection, whereas 4 percent had resigned from such a board. Finally, in 1988, the Gallup Organization surveyed nonprofit executives and directors, identifying a widespread perception that liability was reducing volunteering: 20 percent of executives reported reductions in their volunteer leadership force and 14 percent reported eliminating programs because of liability risk. The executives also reported concern about drastically increasing liability insurance premiums. Sixteen percent of directors reported that they had withheld their volunteer services due to a fear of liability; only 2 percent had ever been sued, including employment disputes.

2. Who Volunteers and Why?

Although empirical scholars have provided compelling models for volunteer supply, they have yet to consider whether and how tort liability affects the decision to volunteer. Many studies suggest that volunteering is not exclusively altruistic, implying that liability exposure may affect the potential volunteer’s self-interested decision regarding whether to volunteer.

Economists largely focus on the relationship between volunteering and wages to determine the wage elasticity of volunteer labor supply. Some identify a significant negative wage effect (i.e., since the opportunity cost of volunteering increases wages, volunteering decreases as wages increase), whereas others find little evidence of any effect or even a positive wage effect.

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63 Id. at 115. Protective measures included new information reporting systems, fundamental review of governance procedures, and recruiting members with specific expertise to the board. Id. at 119.

64 Id. at 120–21.


66 Id. at 8.

67 Id. at 31–32.

Many studies conclude that volunteering is explained by self-interested utility gains rather than pure altruism, suggesting that decreasing the price of volunteering through immunity should increase the volunteer rate. Empiricists have identified a warm glow that comes both from increasing the supply of public goods and from giving itself.\(^{69}\) There are both consumption (getting pleasure, improving health) and investment (meeting people to increase business contacts) aspects to volunteering, which may explain the positive correlation between volunteering and wages.\(^{70}\)

Menchik and Weisbrod find evidence of both consumption and investment, and identify a negative relationship between an individual’s net wage rate and hours volunteered.\(^{71}\) They fail to find the expected crowding-out relationship from increased government expenditures for aggregate volunteerism, which would suggest altruistic volunteering, but did find such a relationship in the higher education and social welfare fields. Brown and Lankford also find a strong positive relationship between donations of money and time, concluding that individuals have various “tastes for donating” and that donation of money and time are gross complements.\(^{72}\)


\(^{70}\)Woods Bowman, Confidence in Charitable Institutions and Volunteering, 33 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 247, 248 (2004) (citing J. Wilson & M. Musick, The Effects of Volunteering on the Volunteer, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 141 (1999)); Hartmann, supra note 30, at 74 (noting that young volunteers obtain valuable experience whereas older volunteers gain a sense that they are “doing something useful” with their skills); Francois Vaillancourt, To Volunteer or Not: Canada, 1987, 27 Canadian J. Econ. 813, 823 (1994).


Finally, Freeman analyzes the socioeconomic characteristics of volunteers (e.g., women and parents volunteer more than others). Consistent with previous studies, he also finds a strong correlation between volunteering and giving, concluding that some people have a taste for charity. He argues that standard labor supply substitution behavior—for example, the higher the wage, the higher the opportunity cost of volunteering—explains only some of these results. Rather, volunteering can be best understood as a conscience good, which he defines as “public goods to which people give time or money because they recognize the moral case for doing so and for which they feel social pressure to undertake when asked, but whose provision they would just as soon let someone else do.”

Feldman recently decomposed separate effects of a reduction in the tax price of monetary donations on giving and volunteering: the direct effects on donations of money and of time, and the indirect effect of changing the relative prices on donations of time where the “price” can be thought of as the shadow value of time. She finds that time and money are substitutes—that is, lowering the price of donating money causes people to shift from labor toward money donations—and that researchers had overlooked this effect because other, nonprice factors influence the relationship between giving time and money. For example, financial donors are relatively likely to be asked to volunteer.

3. Immunity and Volunteering

In the only previous study to examine immunity and volunteering directly, Judd predicts that liability exposure reduces the utility of volunteering under both the consumption and investment models of volunteering. Under a consumption model, the motivation to volunteer should decrease as the expected cost in the form of liability risk increases. Under the investment


74Id. at S141.


model, liability decreases the volunteer’s lifetime earnings, which also decreases a volunteer’s willingness to invest time.

Judd estimates the effects of two measures of liability exposure on volunteering in 1992. He first considers state litigiousness, measured by the per-capita tort case load in state trial courts. He also attempts to quantify volunteers’ liability exposure under state immunity statutes by adding the number of exceptions to general immunity listed in each state statute. He finds no relationship between volunteering and immunity statutes, but does find that residents in states with high per-capita tort filings volunteer less than others.

Our study improves on Judd’s work in important ways, including using comprehensive controls and multiple years of data. We also consider the scope of immunity statutes, whereas Judd treats alike statutes that immunize all volunteers and only some volunteers. Further, he incorrectly treats the “exceptions” to the immunity statutes as noncumulative. For example, his exceptions include bad faith, willful/intentional acts, recklessness, and gross negligence. However, if a person acts willfully, for example, he or she also satisfies the requirements of acting recklessly.

IV. Methodology

A. Data

Volunteering data are from the Independent Sector (IS) Giving and Volunteering in the U.S. surveys (1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2001). The IS commissioned the Gallup Organization to conduct the first six surveys (in person) and Westat to conduct the 2001 survey (random-digit dialing). The 2001 survey included new questions and organization, but the questions in our analysis were consistent across all years. Although the 2001 survey oversampled certain groups (African-American, Hispanic, and wealthy households) to obtain sufficient samples, our models control for these categories. State civil filings are from the State Court Caseload Statistics

77Judd notes that he only considers statutes that provide protection to “‘line worker’ type of volunteers.” Judd, supra note 76, at 25. However, he apparently considers whether the state protects any non-director or officer, and not whether they protect all volunteers. For example, Judd gives California a score of 0, meaning that volunteers in California have the lowest level of liability exposure. Id. at App. 1. However, in California, only nonprofit directors and officers and a few other narrow categories of volunteers (architects, engineers, and emergency rescue personnel) have any immunity.
Annual Reports (1986–2003) published by the National Center for State Courts. State population data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. State wages are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. State unemployment rates are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.\textsuperscript{78} Income tax itemization rates are from the Internal Revenue Service.\textsuperscript{79}

\textbf{B. Empirical Strategy}

We first compare volunteer rates in various immunity regimes. We categorize the immunity into five regimes: (1) up to, but not including, gross negligence or recklessness from state law; (2) up to, but not including, willful and wanton or intentional behavior from state law; (3) up to, but not including, gross negligence or recklessness from state and federal law; (4) any immunity from any source; and (5) no immunity. Our taxonomy tracks the statutes and the \textit{Restatement of Torts} by categorizing the standards by increasing levels of culpability: negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, willful and wanton, and intentional conduct.

In the basic regression specification, we ask whether volunteering differs by state volunteer liability regime. Because we are interested in the overall effects of liability protection on volunteering, we designed this model to account for both state and federal law in our base model. As explained above, the VPA sets a floor below which states cannot fall unless they opt out of the Act. Individual and state control variables and descriptive statistics are listed in Table 2.

We model the effects of legal regime as follows:

\begin{equation}
E(Volunteer\_Year)_{it} = \Phi[\beta_0 + \beta_1 I_{it} + \beta_2 D_{it} + \beta_3 E_{it} + \beta_4 L_{it}],
\end{equation}

where Volunteer\_Year is a categorical variable measuring whether the respondent claimed to volunteer for a government or nonprofit organization during the previous year. As required by the VPA, volunteering encompasses all types (e.g., religious, sports, education) and levels (directorships and line volunteers) of volunteering if the service is provided through a formal entity. The


Table 2: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Any State Immunity Statute</th>
<th>No State Immunity Statute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if year = 1990</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.150</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
<td>(0.357)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if year = 1992</td>
<td>0.140</td>
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<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.146</td>
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<td>(0.347)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.337)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
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<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.349)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
<td>(0.347)</td>
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<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if year = 1999</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.141</td>
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<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if year = 2001</td>
<td>0.218</td>
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<td>0.195</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.413)</td>
<td>(0.458)</td>
<td>(0.435)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
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<td>Volunteered year</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if respondent volunteered in past 12 months</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.516</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.499)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0.498)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liab. imm.—Any level</td>
<td>State has immunity statute</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.490)</td>
<td>(0.480)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liab. imm.—GNR</td>
<td>State immunizes volunteers up to gross negligence or recklessness</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.444)</td>
<td>(0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liab. imm.—WINT</td>
<td>State immunizes volunteers up to willful/wanton or intentional</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.313)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.444)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State unemployment</td>
<td>Unemployed state residents/state labor force by year</td>
<td>5.556</td>
<td>5.442</td>
<td>5.201</td>
<td>5.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.504)</td>
<td>(1.481)</td>
<td>(1.312)</td>
<td>(1.578)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean state income</td>
<td>Total state income/total state labor force participation</td>
<td>27,048</td>
<td>27,005</td>
<td>26,036</td>
<td>27,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(5,364)</td>
<td>(5,182)</td>
<td>(5,115)</td>
<td>(5,411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State civil litigation</td>
<td>Annual state civil filings/annual state population</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.346)</td>
<td>(0.376)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State tax itemizer rate</td>
<td>Itemized state returns/state tax returns by year</td>
<td>30.645</td>
<td>30.935</td>
<td>29.931</td>
<td>31,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(6.707)</td>
<td>(6,758)</td>
<td>(7,591)</td>
<td>(5,965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Respondent’s age</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>46.872</td>
<td>46.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(17.2)</td>
<td>(15.9)</td>
<td>(17.343)</td>
<td>(17.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age2</td>
<td>Respondent’s age-squared</td>
<td>2,463</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1,745)</td>
<td>(1,587)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Volunteers</td>
<td>Any State Immunity Statute</td>
<td>No State Immunity Statute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household children</td>
<td># of children &lt;18</td>
<td>0.860 (1.224)</td>
<td>0.927 (1.243)</td>
<td>0.878 (1.244)</td>
<td>0.852 (1.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child2</td>
<td># of children &lt;18-squared</td>
<td>2.237 (5.145)</td>
<td>2.405 (5.192)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if respondent employed at interview</td>
<td>0.617 (0.486)</td>
<td>0.676 (0.468)</td>
<td>0.611 (0.487)</td>
<td>0.620 (0.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if interviewer identifies respondent as male, 0 if female</td>
<td>0.479 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.450 (0.498)</td>
<td>0.479 (0.500)</td>
<td>0.480 (0.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic descent</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if respondent identifies as Hispanic</td>
<td>0.126 (0.332)</td>
<td>0.088 (0.284)</td>
<td>0.127 (0.333)</td>
<td>0.126 (0.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income2</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $10,000–$14,999</td>
<td>0.070 (1.254)</td>
<td>0.047 (0.213)</td>
<td>0.078 (0.268)</td>
<td>0.064 (0.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income3</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $15,000–$19,999</td>
<td>0.072 (0.258)</td>
<td>0.051 (0.220)</td>
<td>0.081 (0.272)</td>
<td>0.066 (0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income4</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $20,000–$24,999</td>
<td>0.074 (0.262)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.249)</td>
<td>0.075 (0.264)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income5</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $25,000–$29,999</td>
<td>0.092 (0.289)</td>
<td>0.087 (0.282)</td>
<td>0.113 (0.317)</td>
<td>0.078 (0.268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income6</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $30,000–$34,999</td>
<td>0.095 (0.293)</td>
<td>0.096 (0.295)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.278)</td>
<td>0.102 (0.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income7</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $35,000–$39,999</td>
<td>0.081 (0.272)</td>
<td>0.087 (0.281)</td>
<td>0.065 (0.247)</td>
<td>0.092 (0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income8</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $40,000–$49,999</td>
<td>0.110 (0.313)</td>
<td>0.121 (0.326)</td>
<td>0.107 (0.309)</td>
<td>0.112 (0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income9</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $50,000–$74,999</td>
<td>0.171 (0.377)</td>
<td>0.208 (0.406)</td>
<td>0.165 (0.371)</td>
<td>0.176 (0.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income10</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income $75,000–$99,999</td>
<td>0.059 (0.235)</td>
<td>0.075 (0.263)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.234)</td>
<td>0.059 (0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income11</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if income ≥ $100,000</td>
<td>0.081 (0.273)</td>
<td>0.099 (0.298)</td>
<td>0.075 (0.264)</td>
<td>0.085 (0.279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if respondent identifies married</td>
<td>0.612 (0.487)</td>
<td>0.664 (0.472)</td>
<td>0.616 (0.486)</td>
<td>0.068 (0.488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group member</td>
<td>(0,1) variable, 1 if respondent identifies member of a church or synagogue</td>
<td>0.595 (0.491)</td>
<td>0.663 (0.473)</td>
<td>0.645 (0.478)</td>
<td>0.559 (0.497)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
surveys defined volunteering as “not just belonging to a service organization, but actually working in some way to help others.”

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I are the two main variables. We first construct I as a binary variable measuring whether the respondent lives in a state with either federal or state immunity up to, but not including, gross negligence or recklessness. Then we construct I to measure immunity up to, but not including, willful or intentional conduct. We treat states that immunize only directors or particular volunteer types, such as firefighters, as not immunizing volunteers in general.

D are demographic variables associated with the propensity to volunteer, including the respondent’s race, age, number of children, employment status, membership in a religious institution, income, and education. Both women and religious organization congregants are disproportionately likely to volunteer.81 Women may volunteer more than men because they work fewer hours, are more involved in children’s activities, or, if they are high earners, may seek to preserve their human capital while not doing paid work.82 Religious group members may be particularly generous or have greater opportunity to volunteer than others.

We include a variable for children because, among married women, both volunteering rates and the number of hours volunteered are positively correlated with the number of children in the household.83 We include a children-squared variable, in part, as a proxy for the time to volunteer. We expect the coefficient on the squared variable either to be smaller in magnitude than the children variable or negative because people with many children likely have less time to volunteer.84 Similarly, because we assume

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82Carlin, supra note 68, at 817.

83Among married women, a “10 percent decrease in the average number of children per family would reduce the incidence of volunteering by about 1 percentage point.” Carlin, supra note 68, at 811.

84Vaillancourt speculates that volunteering will increase with the number of children (between the ages of 3–15) because socialization needs increase. Vaillancourt, supra note 70, at 817. Carlin finds that having more children increases the probability of volunteering but reduces the time volunteered. Carlin, supra note 68, at 802.
that volunteering likely varies over a lifetime, we include age and age-squared variables. Research on peak volunteering ages vary, with some showing the peak between 30 and 44 years and others showing it around middle age or during a broader “middle years” (from 35 to 55) period. On the contrary, it is possible that the time available to volunteer comes later in life. Perhaps retired people may have more time to volunteer, although they may have less physical ability.

Because education is a strong predictor of volunteering, we include five levels of education based on the highest level reached: high school, high school graduate, post high school but less than a four-year college degree, four-year college degree or more, and none of the above. We also include two measures of race and ethnicity. Respondents self-identified as Hispanic and as either white, black, Asian, or other. Studies predict lower participation among “dominant minorities, such as African-Americans and Hispanics.” Finally, we include indicator variables for 11

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85Carlin, supra note 68, at 804; Smith, supra note 81, at 248.
86Smith, supra note 81, at 257, n.2; see also James E. Curtis, Edward G. Grabb & Douglas E. Baer, Voluntary Association Membership in Fifteen Countries: A Comparative Analysis, 57 Am. Soc. Rev. 139, 150 (1992) (analyzing volunteer data from 15 countries, finding that “those in the middle-aged or older cohorts are more likely to join voluntary organizations”); Neal E. Cutler, Toward an Appropriate Typology for the Study of the Participation of Older Persons in Voluntary Associations, 9 J. of Voluntary Action Res. 9, 10–12 (1980) (analyzing 1972 survey data of Americans to find that age is correlated with increased volunteering for farm, religious, fraternal, and veteran organizations); J. Allen Williams, Jr. & Suzanne T. Ortega, The Multidimensionality of Joining, 15 J. of Voluntary Action Res. 35, 37 (1986) (analyzing 1973 survey, finding age is correlated with membership in church-related, fraternal/service, and civic/political organizations).
87Smith, supra note 81, at 248. For each year except 1988 there were separate designations for college graduate and graduate school. Because the data did not include the graduate school designation in 1988, we created a new category representing college graduate or above.
88The survey included only black, white, and other in 1988; added Asian in 1990; added Native Americans and Pacific Islanders in 1996; and allowed respondents to identify two races in 2001. We coded Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and those who reported two races (133 respondents) as other.
89Smith, supra note 81, at 249. Smith suggests that racism, leading to relatively low socioeconomic status among nonwhites, explains these results. Id. However, controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, we find racial minorities tend to volunteer less than whites. More study is needed to identify the determinants of any disparity. See Mesch et al., supra note 81, for review.
categories of income because volunteering is positively associated with income.\textsuperscript{90}

\textbf{E} are state economic variables. We include state unemployment and income (total income divided by total labor force population in each state) as proxies for the opportunity cost of volunteering. Not only an individual’s income but also the average income and economic options of those around the volunteer determine the opportunity cost of volunteering.

\textbf{T} is the percentage of state tax filers who itemize their taxes (total itemized filings divided by total filings) and is included to account for the cross-price effects between time and money donations. The relationship between giving time and giving money depends on the price of each, and the price of giving money varies by state tax regime. If money donors are able to deduct giving from income tax, the price of making donations is lower than it would be otherwise.

We construct \textbf{L}, the state civil litigation rate, by dividing state civil filings by state population. We hypothesize that even if a potential volunteer does not know the liability risk of volunteering, he or she may perceive a greater risk in states with relatively high levels of civil lawsuits.

Finally, because the probability of volunteering within a state is likely not independent, we allow for an arbitrary covariance matrix within each state over time, clustering the standard errors at the state level. We also adjust the models for heteroskedasticity.

After performing the initial analysis, we estimate the effects of volunteer immunity laws by replacing \textbf{I} with \textbf{J}, a series of alternative variables. We use three alternative specifications: (1) where \textbf{J} is a single variable for any state or federal volunteer immunity; (2) where \textbf{J} are two variables for (a) any state immunity and (b) federally imposed immunity; and (3) where \textbf{J} are three variables measuring (a) state immunity up to, but not including, gross negligence or recklessness, (b) state immunity up to, but not including, willful and wanton or intentional behavior, and (c) federally imposed immunity.

\begin{equation}
\text{E(Volunteer Year)}_{it} = \Phi[\beta_0 + \beta_1 J_{it} + \beta_2 D_{it} + \beta_3 E_{it} + \beta_4 L_{it}]
\end{equation}

\textsuperscript{90}Freeman, supra note 73, at S150; Menchik & Weisbrod, supra note 71, at 174–75. Some researchers might square income as well. We do not because researchers have found that volunteering peaks at incomes over $100,000; our top category was $>100,000. Smith, supra note 81, at 248 (citing V.A. Hodgkinson et al., Giving and Volunteering in the United States: 1992 Ed. (Independent Sector 1992)). Income categories are listed in Table 2.
V. Results, Sensitivity Tests, and Study Limitations

A. Results

The aggregate, unadjusted data suggest a positive correlation between volunteering and immunity. Respondents in states with immunity were 9 percentage points more likely to volunteer than respondents in states without immunity ($p < 0.01$) (see Figure 1; Table 3). Further, respondents were more likely to volunteer in states with relatively high levels of immunity compared to those in states with lower levels.

The main regression results, which exclude a time trend, demonstrate a significant association between volunteering and immunity (Table 4, Columns 1 and 2). Estimating the probability of volunteering with control variables set at their mean values, volunteering in states with immunity up to

Figure 1: Percentage of respondents volunteering during previous year, by regime.

![Figure 1: Percentage of respondents volunteering during previous year, by regime.](image)

Notes: State Imm. up to Gross Negligence or Recklessness = conduct up to, but excluding, grossly negligent or reckless; State Imm. up to Willful/Intentional = conduct up to, but excluding, willful and wanton or intentional; State or Fed Imm. up to Gross Neg. or Reckless = conduct up to, but excluding, grossly negligent or reckless, through state statute or VPA; Any Immunity = any source of law; No Immunity = no general volunteer immunity.

Source: Authors’ analysis of Independent Sector’s Giving and Volunteering Survey.
gross negligence or recklessness was approximately 8.36 percentage points higher than in states without immunity ($p < 0.01$). We find a larger effect, 9.18 percentage points, among respondents in states with more immunity ($p < 0.05$).

Respondents also volunteer less in states with comparatively more civil litigation. An increase of one civil suit per 1,000 people is associated with 7.33 percentage points less volunteering ($p < 0.05$).

Table 3: Percentage of Respondents Volunteering in Previous Year, by Immunity Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State or Federal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immunity Level</td>
<td>Gross Neg/Reckless</td>
<td>Willful/Intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Respondents</td>
<td>5,670</td>
<td>2,096</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Regression Results, Volunteer Rates by Immunity Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Type</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Linear Probability</td>
<td>Probit</td>
<td>Linear Probability</td>
<td>Linear Probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Variables</td>
<td>Year Dummy</td>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State or federal, GNR protection</td>
<td>0.0751***</td>
<td>0.211***</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>0.0519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State, willful/intent imm.</td>
<td>0.0823**</td>
<td>0.234**</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State civil litigation rate</td>
<td>-0.0641**</td>
<td>-0.184**</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.194*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>-0.926***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
<td>-0.350***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.088)*</td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
<td>(0.077)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>19,132</td>
<td>19,132</td>
<td>19,132</td>
<td>19,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***$p < 0.01$; **$p < 0.05$; *$p < 0.1$. Results control for unemployment rate, mean state wage, state tax itemization, age, age$^2$, # children, # children$^2$, employment, sex, Hispanic descent, income category, marital status, racial category, religious group membership, and education level.
B. Sensitivity Tests: Rejecting Alternative Explanations

1. Year Trends and State Fixed Effects

Our results cannot rule out an effect of either a secular trend or unobserved state characteristics. Here we present additional tests, including alternative regression specifications, to help determine whether immunity, rather than a time or state effect, explains the results.

One would ordinarily include an indicator variable for year of survey in the main specification, particularly given the increase in volunteering in 2001 (Figure 2 and 3). However, because many states passed legislation in 1988 or earlier and federal preemption applied everywhere in 1997, we suspected that year variables would absorb much of the immunity effect because of multicollinearity. Including a year dummy, the coefficient on the high-level immunity variable remains positive (about 3 percentage points) and the coefficient on low-level immunity is effectively 0 but, as we predicted,

Figure 2: Volunteer rates by year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Surveys were completed before 9/11. Therefore, the bump in volunteering is not a 9/11 effect.
Source: Authors’ analysis of Independent Sector’s Giving and Volunteering Survey.
the coefficients on both are statistically insignificant (Table 4, Column 3). Unfortunately, we cannot solve this problem with adding data because there are no pre-1988 observations in the data set.

Still, there are reasons to believe that immunity, rather than timing alone, might explain at least some of the results. First, we find no secular time trend in the aggregate data, a result confirmed by others. Still, we find evidence that each of our measures of immunity were highly collinear with survey year. Still, the results may be caused by (1) endogeneity (states with more volunteering disproportionately adopted immunity statutes), or (2) an unobserved characteristic that both causes volunteering and exists disproportionately in states with immunity.

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92The condition indices for the relationship between various immunity variables and survey year ranged from 891–1,174 where an index of 30 suggests strong collinearity. Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics 213 (5th ed. 2003).
To investigate these alternatives, we first use a fixed-effects approach—examining changes in volunteering rates within states before and after the adoption of immunity laws—rather than examining differences between states with and without laws.93 This approach allows us to control for state-specific, time-invariant omitted variables, but it does not necessarily eliminate endogeneity. Although the magnitude is smaller than in the basic specification, the results are positive (Table 4, Column 4). The coefficient on state or federal lower-level protection is relatively large and positive (5.19 percentage points). The results for higher levels of state protection are not significantly different from zero. These insignificant results are unsurprising given that few states implemented immunity, particularly at the higher levels, during the study period. We therefore pursued an additional approach.

We recoded as Year-0 the year of state immunity adoption, from either state or federal sources. We coded each year after as 1, 2, 3, and so on, and each year before as -1, -2, -3, and so on, thereby separating the effects of immunity from a year trend. The results are most clearly seen in Figures 4a and 4b.94 Including a year trend variable and state dummy variables, we identified a difference in average state volunteering trends before and after states adopt immunity statutes, regardless of the adoption year. Figure 4a shows an increase in volunteering rates after states enact immunity laws, regardless of the enactment year. Figure 4b, which controls for being asked to volunteer, shows a sharper difference in volunteering trends: average state volunteering rates decline before and increase after the enactment year. This test excludes 1988 because the survey did not ask respondents whether they were asked to volunteer (Figure 4b). These results support the idea that volunteering is responsive to immunity. They cannot, however, tell us whether the laws came just at the point where respondents were motivated both to act politically and volunteer.

Finally, we used a difference-in-difference approach to determine whether the federal VPA had a differential effect in states where it preempted state law.95 We found no significant differences between states that


94These results are confirmed by significant coefficients. Results available from authors.

95The difference-in-differences method compares treatment and control groups before and after an intervention (here the VPA). States that were eligible for preemption (those with no
Figure 4: Volunteering rates before and after adoption of increased protections.

Notes: Year of Statute adoption recoded as Year, thereafter as 1, 2, 3, etc. and before as -1, -2, -3, etc. Results control for year and state. Figure 4b also controls for being asked to volunteer, but excludes 1988 because the survey excluded the question the year.

Immunity before 1997) were the treatment group, and the remainder were the control group. We compared the change in volunteering in the treatment group to the change in volunteering in the control group before and after the federal Act was passed.
already had volunteer immunity and others. We found that although the VPA had no independent effect on volunteering in states where it was implemented (i.e., states with no immunity before 1997), the coefficient on the post-1997 variable was positive even in states that already provided immunity.96

2. Other Sensitivity Tests

Given the geographic distribution of immunity statutes, it is difficult to think of plausible left-out variables that are both correlated with volunteering and disproportionately found in states with immunity.97 One possibility is that social capital—the strength of social connectedness or social engagement—is both correlated with voluntarism and with the political will to protect volunteers. To address this alternative explanation, we examine a model including Bratz and Putnam’s social capital index.98 The index is the average \( z \) score of (1) nonprofit organizations per capita in 1989, (2) 1991 newspaper circulation per capita, (3) voter turnout in the 1988 and 1992, (4) association memberships per capita from the General Social Survey, 1974–1994, and (5) the social trust measure from the General Social Survey, 1972–1996.99 This measure not only controls for differences in state residents’ propensity to volunteer but, because it includes a count of nonprofits, also controls for state differences in volunteering opportunities.

Social capital is strongly correlated with volunteering. Including the controls in Equation (1), a one-unit increase in the social capital \( z \) score is related to approximately 8 percentage points more volunteering.100 Yet the relationship between immunity and volunteering appears stronger than in

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96 Details available from authors. Controlling for all variables in the basic specification, probit coefficient = 0.182, \( p < 0.01 \).

97 In addition to the formal tests described below, in informal investigations we found no relationship between state immunity laws and voting patterns in previous presidential elections.


100 The social capital coefficients are 0.0724 (linear probability model) and 0.0832 (probit model estimated at means), both \( p < 0.01 \). Results available from authors. Excludes Alaska and Hawaii.
the basic specification; states with immunity show approximately 11 percentage points (up to gross negligence/recklessness) or 10 percentage points (up to willful/intentional) more volunteering. Interaction tests demonstrate that the effect of social capital does not vary by immunity type.

Because previous research suggests that volunteers are commonly motivated by social obligation, we also tested the relationship between immunity and being asked to volunteer. Because the 1988 survey excluded the question of whether respondents were asked to volunteer, these tests excluded 1988 data. Controlling for being asked—a large predictor of volunteering (coefficient 0.455, \( p < 0.001 \))—respondents were more likely to volunteer when immunized: 5.2 percentage points \((p < 0.001)\) in lower-level states and 1.5 percentage points in higher-level states (insignificant). We found no significant effects among respondents being asked to volunteer, which likely indicates selection on an endogenous variable. Perhaps volunteers are more likely than nonvolunteers to be recruited, or altruistic people make themselves available for recruitment.

We also considered whether there might be variation in the amount rather than on overall participation. That is, potential volunteers might adjust time donations rather than forego volunteering according to liability exposure. Among respondents who volunteered for at least one hour in the previous month, volunteering was higher in states with immunity than in states without immunity, although the results were not statistically significant (lower-level protection, 0.788 hours per month; higher-level protection, 1.33 hours per month).

C. Study Limitations

In addition to those discussed above, the data raise four limitations. First, they are self-reported and retrospective. Second, the number of observations and survey method changed in 2001. These changes raise a particular concern given the large increase in volunteer rates that year. However, because the surveys were performed in May, June, and July 2001, we know that the 2001 increase in volunteering does not reflect increased volunteering after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Further, the 2001 survey targeted

\[\text{Results, based on probit model estimated at mean values (} p < 0.01\text{), available from authors.}\]

\[\text{Leete, supra note 91, at 166–67 (citing Freeman, supra note 73). Test results available from authors.}\]
only adults 21 years and older, whereas the earlier surveys targeted adults 18 and older. There is no a priori reason to believe, however, that the self-reported data, survey changes, or increase in observations had a differential effect in states with or without immunity. Moreover, the additional observations appear not to be concentrated in states with a particular immunity regime—in Figure 3, the lines representing the increase in respondents from 1999 to 2001 are roughly parallel, particularly for respondents in states with volunteer immunity up to either gross negligence or recklessness and in states with no state immunity (i.e., where the federal immunity applied). Third, there were no respondents in 13 states for at least one survey year.103 However, there appears to be no correlation between liability regime and missing data. Where demographic information was missing from the IS surveys, we imputed values by using the median value for the variable in the state. Finally, the surveys did not differentiate between wage and other income, making for an imperfect proxy for the opportunity cost of volunteering.

The state litigation variable was also imperfect.104 It included all civil suits rather than only tort suits, which would, arguably, make for a better measure of the real liability risk to volunteers. The data on tort litigation by state, however, are inconsistent across states and only sporadically reported.105

VI. Insights, Implications, and Conclusions

Despite limitations, we believe that the cross-sectional results suggest a plausible positive relationship between volunteering and immunity and, therefore, consider the implications of the relationship.


104Because Mississippi provided no data on state civil filings until 1990, we extrapolated the value for 1988. We took the average percentage change in civil filings from 1990–2002 (2003 was an outlier), extrapolated back from 1990 to 1988, and then divided civil filings by the 1988 population. The resulting litigation rate value in 1988 is 0.384, the 1990 value 0.40. Other extrapolation methods yielded consistent results.

105Missing values ranged from approximately 0.5 percent to almost 10 percent of the observations.
A. The Supply Side: Why Do People Volunteer?

Economic theories on volunteering are based on the underlying idea that people weigh the costs and benefits of volunteering. Tort liability alters the potential volunteer’s utility calculation by raising the costs of volunteering without raising corresponding benefits.

How might this work? Our results are consistent with the idea that liability exposure raises the expected cost of volunteering in at least three ways. (1) The volunteer’s own-price evaluation—the tradeoff between volunteering versus working—changes because an hour worked must be compared not only to an hour not earning any wage but to a potential loss from tort liability. (2) The cross-price evaluation—the comparison to prices of unrelated activities such as leisure—changes because volunteering becomes more expensive relative to these other activities. (3) The direct expected risk of income loss increases with liability exposure. As we discuss in detail below, however, we question whether the direct financial effects of tort law offer the most plausible explanation for our findings.

Among people who were asked to volunteer (yet were similar in terms of socioeconomic and state characteristics), immunity laws seem to have no effect. It might be that pleasing recruiters or volunteering with friends and acquaintances increases the benefits of volunteering more than liability exposure increases the costs. Perhaps volunteering is not fully voluntary. People volunteer because of social pressure, and these results suggest that it takes social pressure to overcome the potential cost of liability. However, Freeman also suggests that people volunteer from moral imperative, yet our results suggest that such an imperative (to the extent it exists) is not strong enough to overcome the aversion to liability exposure for some people who are not asked to volunteer.

B. The Demand Side: Why Do Organizations Want Volunteer Protection?

We know comparatively little about why organizations use volunteer labor or how immunity affects the demand for volunteers. The widespread organizational support for volunteer immunity—including most of the nation’s largest nonprofits—raises some puzzles. One might expect limited demand for volunteers; they may crowd-out donations or government support, violate labor contracts, complicate relations with paid staff, or come with

106Freeman, supra note 73, at S140.
high direct costs of recruiting, screening, training, managing, and retaining volunteers.107

In short, free labor is not a free lunch, and volunteer immunity may make it more expensive for organizations in two ways: it shifts liability onto the organization, and it increases liability by removing individual incentive effects of tort exposure for individual volunteers. Although it is true that “the lower the wealth-at-risk of an enterprise, the greater the likelihood that a volunteer will be sued personally in the event of a harmful incident,” the inverse is also true.108 If an individual volunteer is immune, a plaintiff can make direct and indirect claims against the nonprofit. This increased risk was only briefly mentioned in the 1997 VPA hearings and dismissed as an issue “best handled by organizational liability insurance.”109

Despite the potential cost of increased liability—either because plaintiffs increasingly sue organizations or because of an increase in the underlying riskiness of volunteer behavior—the additional volunteer labor may be worth it to the nonprofit. In some cases, such as free health clinics, organizations simply cannot operate without volunteer labor.110 There are hints in the VPA history that demand for volunteers was not satisfied. Further, scholars predict that nonprofit growth and changing demographic conditions will lead to increased competition for volunteers.111

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1091997 Hearing, supra note 7, at 65 (prepared statement of Robert K. Goodwin, President & CEO, the Points of Light Foundation).

110Observers have suggested that malpractice exposure deters physicians from volunteering, particularly when the physician’s liability insurance will not cover volunteer activities or where a retired physician has no malpractice insurance. Paul A. Hattis, Overcoming Barriers to Physician Volunteerism: Summary of State Laws Providing Reduced Malpractice Liability Exposure for Clinician Volunteers, 2004 Univ. Ill. L.R. 1033, 1036, 1033–34. During the study period, several states immunized physicians, either through general volunteer immunity statutes or specific health-care statutes. However, we found no evidence that health-care organizations were influential players in lobbying efforts to secure volunteer immunity. More traditional voluntary organizations, such as the Little League, dominated discussion.

Finally, some organizations are themselves immune from suit. Some state immunity statutes extend to nonprofit organizations, and remnants of charitable immunity exist in several states, including damage caps, protections against vicarious liability, and immunity from suits by charitable beneficiaries. There is some evidence that after passage of state laws, nonprofits reorganized to create their own immunity, separating their risky activities from their assets, leaving victims without compensation and reducing incentives for nonprofits to “engage in prudent risk-management activities.”

These issues need further study. We plan to examine the potential interactions between organizational and individual immunity in future work. One such question is to what extent, if any, organizational liability influences individual conduct, and vice versa. These tradeoffs between

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113Harvey P. Dale, Speech Given on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Peter Swords as President of the Nonprofit Coordinating Committee 10 (Nov. 17, 1997) (citing several IRS letter rulings, e.g., LTR 9721037 Feb. 28, 1997, approving reorganizations that segregate assets to, in part, limit third-party liability).

114One might expect volunteer immunity laws to have little or no effect in states without charitable immunity for organizations and to have a larger effect in states with organizational immunity. This is because organizations might be more willing to recruit volunteers when they are not liable for the negligence of those volunteers. In very preliminary testing of this hypothesis, we have found no difference in volunteer rates in states with and without organizational immunity. This might be because of the weakness of charitable immunity laws even in those states that have them. We thank Jennifer Arlen for suggesting this extension.
organizational and individual risk are complicated in the nonprofit context. Davis, for example, argues that shielding a nonprofit’s wealth will not necessarily give volunteers “an incentive to lead the enterprise into risky activities.” He claims that, unlike shareholders of for-profits who both control corporations and benefit from cost-justified liability avoidance, nonaltruistic donors will donate even though their donations go to tort victims rather than to beneficiaries and judgment proofing will have little affect on them, while altruists who disregard tort victims may withhold contributions from charities.

On a practical level, our qualitative and quantitative results offer insights to nonprofits that wish to recruit more volunteers. Although volunteers fear liability, this fear does not mean that immunity statutes are needed or are even helpful. Accurate communication about underlying tort risk may be more effective and fair than these statutes. Indemnification policies and insurance may also assure the nervous volunteer in the absence of statutory immunity.

C. Insights for Tort Law and Theory

1. Deterrence

A dominant theory characterizes tort law’s purpose as promoting social welfare through accident deterrence; by forcing potential defendants to internalize the costs of their risky behavior, they impose only efficient risks. A central objection to this and related deterrence-based theories has been that they are unrealistic.

[T]ort doctrines, however abstractly calculated to promote efficient resource allocation, do not actually affect human behavior. Most people... do not even know the doctrines of tort law; behavior in the face of danger is dominated by concern with personal safety rather than with the financial consequences... and people lack sufficient information about the probability of an accident to make rational judgments concerning accident avoidance.116

Goldberg puts it simply: “a fundamental premise of the deterrence model is that legal sanctions are capable of deterring... [yet]... evidence suggests

115Davis, supra note 108, at 412.
that actors do not respond to the threat of liability with anything like regularity.  

Whether deterrence occurs is an empirical question. Although liability exposure may not be the primary reason why people avoid volunteering, our study provides some evidence to inform this debate. The law may inspire people to increase care or, as we suggest here, avoid an activity altogether.  

People who live in jurisdictions without immunity are less likely than others to volunteer, suggesting that individuals do indeed react to tort risk—or the perception of that risk—through activity avoidance.

A compelling piece of evidence for the deterrent effect of tort law from what we have observed here is that the activity-level deterrent effect increases with the level of legal risk. People who live in regimes that shield volunteers from liability for accidents caused by more careless behavior are more likely to volunteer than those who live in regimes that shield negligence. Further, our data are particularly useful because they suggest the deterrent effects of tort liability on individuals, rather than on organizations. Despite the range of tort defendants, both empirical analyses and legal doctrines tacitly assume the tortfeasor is either an individual or a firm, but the two are unlikely to respond to tort law in the same way.  

It is not that one of them is rational and the other irrational; firms are not monolithic actors and individuals commonly behave irrationally. But firms (with teams of lawyers) compared to individuals (with limited legal knowledge) will likely differ in their response of legal risk.

More concretely, we estimate that volunteer tort immunity generates about $4.4 billion a year (0.035 percent of 2005 GDP). We base this estimate on our finding of 7.5 percentage points more volunteering in states with some immunity than in states no immunity. Since volunteers spent a median of 50

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119Croley, supra note 2, at 1705.


121Using the same variables and data described above, the coefficient on a variable representing respondents in states with any level of volunteer immunity, from either state or federal law, was 0.0748 (p < 0.01). This result may be an underestimate. Using a probit model, estimating all
hours volunteering annually, we assumed that volunteers deterred by liability exposure would have volunteered at the same level as those who were not deterred by liability exposure. This assumption probably generates a higher than accurate estimate because those who decide to volunteer are likely more committed than those deterred by tort liability. We then assess the value of a volunteer hour at $17.80, and adopt the CPS estimate that 65.4 million people volunteered during the period. Using this number also introduces some error because it includes volunteer rates in states with and without immunity, but probably makes the estimate a lower bound of the immunity effect since even volunteers in states with liability immunity do not have complete immunity. Although it would likely be undesirable to have blanket immunity, it would also likely induce more volunteering.

We believe these results are generalizable. Although social pressures may be at play, no law forces anyone to volunteer or to purchase liability insurance. Someone fearful of liability can simply choose not to volunteer. This estimate does not, however, indicate whether the foregone activity is efficient or fair. This depends on both the value and distribution of avoided accidents. To the extent that tort law deterred particularly accident-prone people, it may have had a good effect. To the extent it overdeterred by causing people to forego volunteering altogether rather than simply moderating their care, it had a bad effect. Without more information, there is no a priori reason to believe that volunteering is a particularly risky activity and that we would want to deter participation.

variables at their mean values, the coefficient on the same variable = 0.0841 (p < 0.01). All results available from the authors.


We average $17.55/hour (2004) and $18.04/hour (2005), both based on average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory workers on nonfarm payrolls increased by 12 percent for fringe benefits. See (http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/volunteer_time.html). Although the CPS are lower than the IS estimates of volunteering, the difference between volunteering rates should be the same.


Those who endorse deterrence as the best justification for tort “emphasize that accident rates are typically correlated with levels of inherently risky activity,” so that strict liability may be
2. Risk Versus Perception

Although possible, we doubt that direct financial risk is the best explanation for our findings. The probability of suit, either before or after the introduction of the immunity laws, appears to be quite small, with only a few reported cases against nondirector volunteers.\(^{126}\) Moreover, immunity does not fully protect volunteers from legal costs since volunteer-defendants must hire a lawyer to raise immunity as an affirmative defense and have the burden of proof on the issue. Further, at least in the short term, the laws are vaguely drafted and without interpretive case law so that using them as an effective defense would likely involve protracted litigation.

Volunteers may perceive that the immunity laws are effective and misunderstand the remaining financial risk of volunteering in regimes with immunity. If true, why would volunteers be so knowledgeable about their liability regimes yet so confused about their true risks under immunity? Publicity about immunity appears not to be the answer; we found little mention of even the federal Act in major newspapers. Maybe volunteers in states without immunity perceive volunteering to be less valuable for reasons that are related to liability exposure but not necessarily to the expected value of the financial loss of exposure. For example, if volunteering is a consumption good, liability exposure decreases the feel-good value of volunteering. It is unpleasant to worry about getting sued for teaching Sunday School. To the extent that volunteering is an investment good (e.g., a way for volunteers to invest in their careers), the investment may appear to be worth less in regimes without immunity (e.g., volunteers risk their reputations in lawsuits).

Or maybe the laws did something entirely different from their intended goals. They may have directed public attention to volunteer opportunities. There is some evidence for this in the difference-in-differences results, where we found that the VPA had no independent effect on volunteering in states where it was implemented. Publicity for the VPA could have encouraged volunteering everywhere since it was not limited to the preempted states. However, the relatively large effect in states with high immunity levels is contrary to this interpretation.

\(^{126}\)H.R. Rep. 105-101(I) at 17 & n.1 (dissenting views) (noting that no witness identified a single case that would be decided differently under VPA).
3. Property Rule Versus Liability Rules

We also use our results to examine the idea that tort law is primarily an appropriate vehicle for distributing accident costs among strangers (i.e., those who cannot express their risk preferences through contracting) or where transaction costs are otherwise high. This model assumes that it is more efficient for private parties to negotiate contracts than for tort law to displace what would naturally arise from private initiative—so courts ought to rely on property rules when they can and, as a positive matter, contracts will flourish. Although some scholars have convincingly challenged these views, others have defended the benefits of property over liability rules because of their flexibility in allowing people to express their subjective valuations.

Our findings suggest that people do not contract when they can. Our qualitative research suggests that volunteers understood (in fact, overestimated) their liability exposure. Because volunteering is seldom a spur of the moment decision, volunteers had ample time to negotiate risk—not with potential victims, but with nonprofits. Potential volunteers could have externalized the cost of their negligence by asking nonprofits to indemnify them or, at least, partially externalized the cost of their negligence with personal insurance, perhaps quite easily through umbrella insurance or homeowner policies, which typically include coverage. If tort law had been simply displacing efficient, private initiative, we would not have found an effect


128 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 719–21 (1996) (arguing that when transaction costs are high, liability rules are not merely second-best rules but are preferable because potential injurers can make efficient decisions with their private knowledge regarding the cost of accident avoidance; when transaction costs are low, they demonstrate that with perfect information the two rules are equivalent, but with imperfect information neither rule is to be preferred a priori); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995) (arguing against the conventional wisdom that judges should use liability rules when transaction costs are high).


130 Volunteers have disproportionately high incomes and, therefore, are likely to own homes.
from the passage of liability protection laws because private agreements, reflecting the preferences of volunteers and others, would have been in place already.

Several possible interpretations of our results inform a long-standing puzzle over the property versus liability rules debate, at least regarding its practical application. Maybe people did insure against liability or force nonprofits to do so on their behalf; perhaps we identified an effect because the immunity laws imposed excess protection from liability compared to that which volunteers were willing to purchase. Although this level of protection was not worth it to the volunteers, it may still have been efficient from a societal perspective if social welfare was increased by motivating more people to volunteer. We find this explanation unlikely given many anecdotes from nonprofits that potential volunteers felt too exposed to liability to volunteer. More likely, people simply failed to negotiate the distribution of risk that they would wish in advance. They were too busy, lazy, or confused to do so (yet, paradoxically, some took the time and expense to advocate for legal change). Therefore, tort law may provide a useful administrative fix even where parties can negotiate.

There are, however, explanations other than failed initiative. It may be that volunteers wanted liability insurance, but could not obtain it. Immunity advocates advanced several anecdotes suggesting that this was the case.\(^\text{131}\) If liability insurance was unavailable because of a market failure, a socially productive activity was displaced for the wrong reason; immunity, therefore, works in a second-best world where insurance market failures cannot be addressed directly. In the face of such market failures, theorists have suggested that tort law acts as an appropriate administrative remedy.\(^\text{132}\)

But maybe insurance was unavailable because the nonprofits did not like the price. In this case, immunity would represent an inefficient redistribution of accident costs away from the tortfeasor. Under this explanation, the statutes were part of a negotiation over liability. The immunity was either an effective way for volunteers to fully place the cost of risky behavior on victims or nonprofits, or it was part of an overall program on the part of nonprofit organizations to encourage tort reform—an explanation with

\(^{131}\)1988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 14.

\(^{132}\)Priest, supra note 25, at 1588.
plenty of evidence in the record.\textsuperscript{133} The Helicopter Association International’s letter in support of immunity, which amounts to little more than a complaint that flying helicopters is risky and expensive to insure, urges Congress to adopt “general tort reform with emphasis upon products liability and aviation products liability relief.”\textsuperscript{134} This possibility is also suggested at the state level.

Despite data and methodological limitations that prevent us from conclusively establishing a causal connection between volunteering and immunity, we offer evidence that indicates a positive association. We suggest that one cost of tort liability is that it likely deters volunteers. This does not mean that using immunity to increase volunteering is worth it—we know neither the benefits of tort liability in terms of accident reduction nor the characteristics of those potential volunteers who are deterred by perceived tort exposure. It may, in fact, be less costly to indemnify volunteers or to educate potential volunteers on the risks of being sued. Given the potential of the relationship between immunity and volunteering for explaining the deterrent effects of tort law, we intend this study only as a first step and plan further work with more comprehensive data sources.

\textsuperscript{133}See, e.g., 1988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 40 (letter from Colen Eidel, Chairman & Barbara Holden, President, Junior League of Great Falls). Washington legislators were convinced that state volunteer immunity was “important because it protects credit union volunteers, and the federal law does not. Volunteers are the backbone of credit unions.” Washington Senate Bill Report 1643, Senate Committee on Judiciary (Mar. 29, 2001).

\textsuperscript{134}1988 Hearing, supra note 22, at 69 (letter from Frank L. Jensen, Jr., president of Helicopter Association International); see also id. at 78 (letter from Albert H. Quie, president, Prison Fellowship Ministries).
## APPENDIX

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Notes: Column 3 designates whether the statute immunizes only directors or is a general statute that immunizes all volunteers. Many statutes apply only to specific categories of volunteers, for example, immunity for emergency room volunteers, firefighters, coaches, or volunteers in the act of cleaning up hazardous waste. This chart excludes such statutes.