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Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State of Play

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The State of Play

Monica Hakimi*

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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 22, 2014, a U.S.-led coalition began airstrikes against the so-called Islamic State in Syria. At the same time, the United States started targeting the Khorasan group in Syria. These two operations raise (again) the question of when States may use defensive force against non-State actors in other States.¹ The text of the United Nations Charter does not resolve the question. Article 2(4) prohibits States from using force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”² Article 51 then recognizes “the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.”³ The proper interpretation of those provisions for cases involving non-State actors is uncertain and contested.

The response in the secondary literature has been to try to resolve the uncertainty—to identify the interpretation that is or should be correct.⁴ For example, two prominent expert reports on the topic, the Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence and the Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law, recognize

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¹ Some readers might ask whether these operations should instead be characterized as humanitarian interventions. The operations arguably have a humanitarian angle, but none of the participating States has chosen to advance that angle as a justification for the use of force. See infra Part II. Further, the focus of the operations has been to repel the Islamic State and Khorasan group, not to alleviate the broader humanitarian crisis in Syria. See Louise Arimatsu & Michael N. Schmitt, Attacking “Islamic State” and the Khorasan Group: Surveying the International Law Landscape, 53 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW BULLETIN 1, 24–27 (2014).
² UN Charter art. 2(4).
³ Id., art. 51.
that the law in this area is uncertain and controversial. Each report then aims to clarify the law’s substantive content. Similarly, Sir Daniel Bethlehem’s recent piece in the American Journal of International Law argues that much of the scholarly literature on the topic is far removed from the operational practice. Bethlehem offers a set of principles that he hopes will “attract a measure of agreement about the contours of the law.” His principles instead generated more debate. Others argued that the law is not as he articulated.

Efforts to clarify the law on the use of defensive force against non-State actors are premature. The evident ambiguities and inconsistencies in the practice reflect an ongoing struggle over the law’s proper content. This struggle cannot neatly be resolved because the international legal system is, at bottom, decentralized. No actor is charged with settling competing claims on the law or dismissing invalid claims. Unless and until States gravitate toward the same claim, multiple claims will continue to circulate simultaneously. Any one of these claims might be treated as law by only some actors and not others, or in only certain respects and not others. Trying to clarify the law in the face of this contestation thus elides more than it reveals. It suppresses the underlying tensions that shape how global actors engage with the law in concrete cases.

This article takes a different approach. Rather than try to distill the best or most accurate interpretation of the law, I map the positions that were plausibly available when the Syria operations began. I do so precisely because the law in this area has been unsettled. A broad range of legal positions might reasonably be invoked or applied in any given case. After mapping the legal terrain, I argue that the current operations in Syria accentuate

6. Chatham House Principles, supra note 5, at 963; LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, ¶ 29.
8. Id.
three preexisting trends. First, the claim that international law absolutely prohibits the use of defensive force against non-State actors is losing legal traction. That claim is increasingly difficult to sustain. Second, States have not coalesced around a legal standard on when such force is lawful. Most States seem conflicted or uncertain on that question, and have declined to advance a particular legal position. Third, this ambivalence has contributed to a sizeable gap between the norms that are widely articulated as law and the ones that reflect the operational practice. States regularly tolerate operations that they are not yet willing to legitimize with legal language.

II. MAPPING THE LEGAL TERRAIN

When the Syria operations began, several positions on the use of defensive force against non-State actors were in play. Each of these positions had some support in the practice and secondary literature. But none was widely accepted as the correct interpretation of the law. As a result, States and other global actors could plausibly invoke or apply any of these positions in the Syria case.

A. An Absolute Prohibition

The most restrictive position in the literature would permit defensive force only if the initial attack were attributable to a State—and thus would prohibit such force against non-State actors. Conceptually, those who advance this position posit that operating in another State without its consent is the same as operating against that other State; the State has a right to its own territorial integrity. So, the reasoning goes, permitting defensive force in that State would mean holding it accountable for acts that are not its own. Instead of using defensive force, the victim State may lawfully address the problem by: (1) asking the territorial State to prevent the violence, (2) obtaining the territorial State’s consent to use force, or (3) seeking relief from the UN Security Council.

An absolute prohibition of the use of defensive force against non-State actors finds solid support in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Two post-9/11 cases are directly on point. In the 2004 advisory opinion in *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, the ICJ plainly stated that Article 51 applies “in the case
of an armed attack by one State against another State.” The Court then determined that Article 51 did not excuse Israel’s security barrier on the Palestinian territories, in part because Israel did not claim that it had been victimized by another State. A similar logic appears in the 2005 Armed Activities case between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Court found that “there [was] no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC.” In other words, any attack was “non-attributable to the DRC.” The Court then determined that “the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise of the right of self-defense by Uganda against the DRC were not present.”

Some have suggested that the Armed Activities judgment does not support an absolute prohibition of defensive force against non-State actors. Indeed, the judgment avoids the issue of whether defensive force is ever lawful in response to “large-scale attacks by irregular forces.” This language arguably preserves the possibility that States may use defensive force against irregular groups whose conduct is not attributable to a State—in other words, that such force can be lawful, even if a group does not act on behalf of a State, as a State agent. However, the better interpretation is that the Court meant to leave open the question of whether States may use defensive force against irregular groups that are State agents. This latter interpretation would make Armed Activities both internally consistent and consistent with the Court’s earlier judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities

10. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) (emphasis added). See also Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (2005); but cf. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 136 (3d ed. 2008) (arguing that this language can be interpreted narrowly, to permit defensive force against non-State actors in other States).


13. Id.


15. Id., separate opinion of Simma, J., ¶ 7 (claiming that the judgment is ambiguous); Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 359, 384 (2009) (describing the judgment as “far more equivocal” than the Wall opinion).

in and against Nicaragua. The Nicaragua Court recognized that “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” might trigger Article 51. Given the Nicaragua and Wall precedents, and the logic of the Armed Activities judgment itself, the case strongly suggests that Uganda could not lawfully use defensive force in the DRC because the initial attacks were not attributable to the DRC.

As I explain below, many international lawyers disagree with the ICJ’s position or argue that this position has been superseded by events. But in the jus ad bellum, as in other areas of international law, ICJ decisions are treated as highly authoritative and given considerable deference. Thus, other international lawyers continue to cite the ICJ’s decisions to support an absolute prohibition.

For example, Dire Tladi argued in 2013 that, “[g]iven the very clear line of reasoning by the [ICJ],” any contrary position “must be properly probed.” Tladi concluded that “[t]he use of force by a state against nonstate actors for acts not attributable at all to another state

18. Id., ¶ 195 (emphasis added).
19. See Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 200, 213 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHARTER COMMENTARY] (“In its recent jurisprudence the ICJ made it clear that acts of violence by non-State actors can only become relevant as amounting to an armed attack, if they are attributable to a State . . . .”).
20. See, e.g., TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 52 (2010) (“It stands beyond doubt that the case law of the ICJ dealing with the law on the use of force . . . carries considerable authority.”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 343, 359 (2010) (“[T]he ICJ and other international tribunals have clarified the general principles and the rules of state responsibility applicable to lawful uses of force.”).
22. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 20, at 486–89; Constantine Antonopoulos, Force by Armed Groups as Armed Attack and the Broadening of Self-Defence, 55 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 159, 169–71 (2008); cf. Albrecht Randelzhofer & Georg Nolte, Article 51, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 1397, 1417 (“[T]he preferable view still seems to be that attacks by organized armed groups need to be attributed to a State in order to enable the effected State to exercise its right of self-defence, albeit under special [looser than normal] rules of attribution.”).
falls to be considered under the paradigm of law enforcement (in which consent of the territorial state would be required) and not the law of self-defense.”

Mary Ellen O’Connell argued the same: “[a]tacking [non-State actors] on the territory of another state is attacking that state.”

In addition, the absolute prohibition has had some traction in institutions other than the ICJ. Most notably, Latin American States collectively seemed to endorse this prohibition in response to Colombia’s 2008 incursion against non-State actors in Ecuador. A commission of the Organization of American States (OAS) labeled the incursion “a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law.” The OAS Permanent Council then reaffirmed the “principle that the territory of a State is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of . . . measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever.” The Rio Group of Latin American States issued a very similar statement on the incident.

B. Grounds for Defensive Action

Although the absolute prohibition is still in play, it is no longer the dominant position in the literature. Many international lawyers now cite the contrary practice as evidence that defensive force against non-State actors is at least sometimes lawful. Conceptually, these lawyers balance the compet-

24. Id. at 576.
28. OAS Commission, supra note 26, Annex 2 (reprinting Rio Group Declaration), at 1. Claus Kreβ argues that this episode “need not . . . be interpreted as the rejection of the possibility of a non-state armed attack. . . . It might simply suggest that the non-state violence . . . was not significant enough to pass the threshold of a non-state armed attack.” Claus Kreβ, Major Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the State Practice on the International Law on the Use of Force, 1 JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 45 (2014). That interpretation is plausible but minimizes the language in the relevant texts. The texts suggest an absolute prohibition and do not address the idea of an armed-attack threshold. I discuss the armed-attack threshold at infra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
ing sovereignty interests of the territorial State and the victim State. As for how to strike that balance—and when to permit defensive force—the literature is conflicted. Essentially three grounds for permitting such force are plausibly available: (1) the territorial State actively harbors or supports the non-State actors, or lacks governance authority in the area from which they operate, (2) the territorial State is unable or unwilling to address the threat that the non-State actors pose, and (3) the threat is located in the territorial State. To be clear, each of these grounds for permitting defensive force has some interpretive space and overlaps with the others. The three are best conceived as concentric circles; as one moves from the first ground to the third, the scope of permissible defensive actions expands. Treating the three as distinct is analytically useful, then, because it exposes the variations in the practice as the application of Article 51 broadens. As I explain in the next Section, any of these grounds for permitting defensive force might be further restricted by other conditions that attach to Article 51.

1. An Attack from an Ungoverned Space or from a Harboring or Supporting State

The narrowest ground for permitting defensive force would require that the territorial State actively harbor or support the non-State actors, or lack control over the area in which they operate. The justification for permitting defensive force in these circumstances, but not necessarily in others, is that the victim State cannot plausibly rely on the territorial State to contain the threat. The territorial State is objectively part of the problem. Indeed, States on the whole have endorsed the use of defensive force in several cases involving a harboring or supporting State, or an ungoverned space.

The global reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks is the most significant example of States applying a harbor or support standard. The UN Security Council and OAS Permanent Council both recognized the Article 51 right in the context of condemning those attacks. Moreover, NATO asserted that if the attacks were “directed from abroad,” it would treat them as

that States increasingly accept “that private armed attacks can occur in which no state is substantially involved”); Tams, supra note 15, at 360 (“[T]he international community during the last two decades has increasingly recognized a right of states to use unilateral force against terrorists.”).

“armed attacks”—the triggering language for Article 51. These decisions reflect the widespread view that the United States could lawfully use defensive force in Afghanistan, which had harbored al Qaeda. Separately, the African Union adopted a harbor or support standard in its 2005 defense pact. The pact defines “aggression,” which generally triggers Article 51, to include “the encouragement, support, harbouring, or provision of any assistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent transnational organized crimes against a Member State.”

The harbor or support standard was also arguably in play in the case of Israel’s 2006 operation against Hezbollah—although here, that standard bleeds into the ungoverned space standard. At the time of the Israeli operation, Hezbollah participated in Lebanon’s central government and controlled much of Lebanon’s territory. As Theresa Reinold explains, “Hezbollah [had] erected a state within a state and . . . had emancipated itself entirely from the central government’s writ.” Because Hezbollah was well represented in Lebanon’s central government, it could influence that government to bolster its own violent policies. The government might be described as supporting Hezbollah. Alternatively, the government could be said to lack control over the areas in which the militant wing of Hezbollah operated. The Security Council had repeatedly called on the government to extend its authority and control to Hezbollah’s strongholds. In either

32. Some commentators have interpreted the decisions more broadly—not to be limited to harbor or support scenarios. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 839, 840 (2001); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 7, 17 (2003). That interpretation is plausible, but it extends the decisions beyond their immediate texts and contexts.
34. Reinold, supra note 29, at 266.
event, many third States responded to Israel’s 2006 operation by expressly recognizing Israel’s right to use defensive force against Hezbollah.37

Other support for the ungoverned space standard is more scattered. In Armed Activities, Judges Kooijmans and Simma wrote separate opinions that endorsed this standard. Kooijmans and Simma bemoaned “the almost complete absence of governmental authority in the whole or part of the territory of certain States.”38 The two judges then asserted that, “if armed attacks are carried out by irregular forces from such territory against a neighboring State, these activities are still armed attacks even if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State.”39 The Institut de Droit Internacional took a similar position in 2007. The Institut recognized that States may “in principle” use defensive force against non-State actors; it then identified only one scenario in which such force would be lawful: if the attack “is launched from an area beyond the jurisdiction of any state.”40

Finally, several incidents involving the territorial State’s ambiguous or imperfect consent are probably better described as defensive operations in ungoverned spaces. Consider three examples. First, the United States has repeatedly struck non-State militants in Pakistan. The extent to which the Pakistani government has consented to these strikes is unclear. Pakistan has publicly condemned some U.S. strikes, but reports indicate that it has also, covertly, consented to these strikes.41 In any event, the U.S. strikes occur primarily in areas that are beyond the Pakistani government’s jurisd-
diction or control. Although the strikes have been criticized on human dignity grounds, most third States have remained quiet about the potential intrusions on Pakistani sovereignty. Second, most States were muted or mildly supportive when Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006. The stated purpose of the invasion was to defend against the threat posed by Islamist groups that controlled considerable portions of Somali territory. Ethiopia also hinted that the transitional Somali government had invited the incursion, but invitations to intervene that are issued by only one side to an internal conflict—especially by a side that lacks control over much of the territory—are commonly viewed as suspect. Third, France reportedly justified its 2013 operation against al Qaeda-affiliated militants in Mali “on the grounds of maintaining stability in the region and reducing the risk of ter-


43. See Reinold, supra note 29, at 280 (reviewing incidents and concluding that “the strikes in Pakistan did not trigger much of an international response”); see generally Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 283, 434 (2011) (noting “the silence of other countries” about U.S. drone strikes).

44. GRAY, supra note 10, at 244 (describing a “reluctance of other states to enter into legal debate” on the action and explaining that “[t]he public silence of China, Russia and the NAM was striking”); Zeray W. Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action Against the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications, 56 INTERNATIONAL LAW & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 666, 673 (2007) (“The prevalent view of the international community does seem impliedly to approve the Ethiopian action . . . .”).


rorist attacks elsewhere, including France.”

France also claimed to have the consent of the transitional Malian government, but here again, any consent by a domestic authority was imperfect: rebel groups already controlled much Malian territory. The global reaction to France’s operation was positive. Several States affirmatively supported France, and a few months later, the UN Security Council “welcom[ed] the swift action by the French forces.”

2. An Attack from an Unable or Unwilling State

A territorial State that actively harbors or supports the relevant non-State actors, or lacks control over the area from which they operate, is demonstrably unable or unwilling to contain the threat. Such situations would also be covered by an unable or unwilling standard. But the unable or unwilling standard is broader. It would permit defensive force against non-State ac-

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tors even when the territorial State exercises governance authority and actively tries to suppress the violence—but is, simply, ineffective. The standard is controversial because it risks tipping the balance too far in favor of the victim State, without sufficient regard for the interests of the territorial State or the broader prospects for peace and security. Nevertheless, a number of States—including the United States, Israel, Russia and Turkey—have expressly invoked the standard to justify defensive operations. The standard also finds support in some of the secondary literature.

States have, in effect, applied the unable or unwilling standard in concrete cases. For example, Turkey’s 2008 ground incursion into Iraq to incapacitate Kurdish rebels does not fit neatly within the harbor or support, or the ungoverned space standard. Iraq’s Kurdish region had considerable autonomy from the central government but was not in any meaningful sense ungoverned. Moreover, although some Iraqi officials were probably sympathetic to the rebels, the evidence that these officials actively harbored or supported the rebels is weak. Iraqi officials in the Kurdish region had dissociated themselves from the rebels, and the central Iraqi government was working with Turkey to address the violence. The government was, however, unable to prevent the violence. The incident sounds in the unable or unwilling standard. And the global reaction was notably muted.


52. See, e.g., Chatham House Principles, supra note 5, at 969; LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, ¶ 32.


54. Tom Ruys, Quo Vadit Jus ad Bellum?: A Legal Analysis of Turkey’s Military Operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq, 9 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 334, 338, 342, 353 (2008). See also Turkey Invades Northern Iraq, ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10766808 (“Iraq’s Kurds have little love for the PKK, and insist that they do not help it with logistics or weapons.”).

55. Reinold, supra note 29, at 272; Ruys, supra note 54, at 342.


57. Reinold, supra note 29, at 272; Ruys, supra note 54, 340–41, 345.
Most third States tolerated the operation without endorsing or rejecting Turkey’s Article 51 claim.58

Similarly, most States effectively applied the unable or unwilling standard to Russia’s 2002 and 2007 incursions against Chechen rebels in Georgia. Although Georgia was actively taking measures to suppress the rebels’ violence, these measures were not yet effective.59 When Russia responded with force, the vast majority of third States stayed quiet.60 The most notable exception was the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, which declared in 2002 that “Article 51 . . . do[es] not authorise the use of military force by the Russian Federation or any other state on Georgian territory.”61

The Turkey-Iraq and Russia-Georgia cases show that the unable or unwilling standard is sometimes implemented in practice. In each of these cases, the acting State specifically invoked the unable or unwilling standard as law. Third States, for the most part, did not endorse the legal claim, but they tacitly condoned the actual operations. They stood by as the unable or unwilling standard was applied. This reaction differs from the reaction to at least some operations involving a harboring or supporting State, or an ungoverned space. Recall that third States affirmatively endorsed the U.S.-Afghanistan, Israel-Lebanon and France-Mali operations. The difference suggests that many States might tolerate operations under an unable or unwilling standard without actively supporting these operations or legitimizing them with legal language.

60. Reinold, supra note 29, at 256 (“The international reaction to the Russian raids in the Pankisi Gorge was muted, with only a few states taking an explicit stand.”); Tams, supra note 15, at 380 (“Responses were mixed, but again there was no principled condemnation that would have denied Russia’s right to use force extraterritorially.”).
3. An Attack that is Sourced to Another State

Taken to its extreme, the unable or unwilling standard might permit defensive force once an attack has emanated from the territorial State. The mere fact of the attack might be said to show that the territorial State is unable or unwilling to suppress the violence. After all, the State actually failed to prevent an attack. Yet no State has expressly advanced such an expansive interpretation of the unable or unwilling standard. The standard is generally thought to turn on the territorial State’s actual conduct and capabilities. Still, States sometimes use defensive force without making a claim or showing about the territorial State. These operations suggest a standard that is even broader: that defensive force is permissible if the source of the attack is located in another State.

Consider Israel’s reported attacks on weapons caches in Sudan and Syria; the weapons allegedly were headed to Hamas or Hezbollah.62 The operations targeting these weapons reflect expansive applications of Article 51 for three reasons. First, the operations were intended not to prevent an immediately imminent attack but rather to nip in the bud a latent threat. The dominant view in the literature is that anticipatory self-defense is lawful only if the attack is actually imminent.63 Second, Sudan and Syria were, at best, indirect sources of an attack. The weapons almost certainly would have been used from Gaza or Lebanon. Third, as Israel has not publicly acknowledged its role in these operations, it has not even tried to show that the relevant territorial States were unable or unwilling to prevent the attacks. Such a claim is plausible but not a slam dunk, especially as it concerns Hamas. Because Israel itself controls Gaza’s borders, it might have had other reasonable opportunities to prevent Hamas from receiving or

63. See, e.g., Randelzhofer & Nolte, supra note 22, at 1423.
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using the weapons. Yet despite the expansive nature of these operations, the global reaction has been largely silent. A few States have verbally condemned some of the operations, but most States have looked the other way. These incidents show that the majority of States silently tolerate even operations that reflect very expansive interpretations of Article 51.

C. Enhanced Limitations

Any of the above grounds for permitting defensive force against non-State actors might be further limited by other requirements that attach to Article 51. Two possibilities appear in the secondary literature. One is to permit defensive force only if the initial attack is especially severe. The second is to permit such force only after the territorial State is given a meaningful opportunity to cooperate with the operation. Each of these limitations has some seeds in the practice, but the support for it is equivocal.

First, the ICJ has long taken the view that, although Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits even low levels of force, such force does not necessarily trigger Article 51. According to the Court, defensive force is permissible only if the initial incursion is sufficiently severe to qualify as an “armed attack.” In practice, any severity threshold for an armed attack appears to be marginal. States sometimes use defensive force, without repercussion, in response to very low levels of force. Some experts argue,


however, that no matter how the threshold applies in State-to-State conflicts, it should be taken seriously and even heightened in cases involving non-State actors.  For example, the Chatham House Principles and Leiden Policy Recommendations both endorse the unable or unwilling standard but posit that the initial attack must be especially severe to trigger that standard. In 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions cited those reports to assert that “[t]here is an emerging view that the level of violence necessary to justify a resort to self-defence ought to be set higher when it is in response to an attack by non-State actors than to an attack by another State.”

A heightened armed-attack threshold lacks precision but would probably prohibit defensive force unless the victim State is hit severely or repeatedly. (Under the so-called “pinprick” or “accumulation of events” theory of an armed attack, multiple small-scale attacks could together satisfy the threshold, even if none of the attacks on its own could satisfy the threshold. This theory has gained considerable legal traction over the past two decades.) The advantage of a heightened threshold is that it would give the territorial State some room to deal with its internal problem before being subjected to defensive force. However, States have not themselves advocated for lifting the threshold in cases involving non-State actors. Moreover, although defending States sometimes wait for a hard hit before responding with defensive force, they do not always.

1996) (“There is not the slightest indication that states have regarded themselves as subject to [the threshold].”)
67. See, e.g., Kreß, supra note 28, at 48 (“[I]t is widely believed that a non-state armed attack must pass a significant gravity threshold.”).
68. LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, ¶39; Chatham House Principles, supra note 5, at 969.
70. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 10, at 130, 155; Tams, supra note 15, at 388 (“[S]tates seem to have shown a new willingness to accept the ‘accumulation of events’ doctrine which previously had received little support.”); Steenberghe, supra note 58, at 184 (“[A]ny armed attack must reach some level of gravity—which may be evaluated by accumulating minor uses of force—in order to trigger the right of self-defense.”).
71. See, e.g., Europe Again Warns Against Turkish Intervention in Iraq, supra note 56 (“For the past several months, PKK guerilla fighters have been actively attacking Turkish military interests from within northern Iraq. A total of around 100 Turkish soldiers have died since the beginning of the year . . . .”)
The second possible limitation lies in the necessity requirement. This requirement attaches to Article 51 as a matter of customary international law and generally demands that defensive force be the option of last resort; the victim State must exhaust the feasible alternatives for addressing a problem before resorting to defensive force. Some experts have argued that defensive force is unnecessary if the territorial State would meaningfully cooperate to suppress the violence, whether by using its law enforcement tools or by consenting to a forcible operation. This interpretation would essentially impose on the victim State the burden of trying to work with the territorial State before using defensive force.

The support for that interpretation is equivocal. Victim States commonly do try to work with territorial States before resorting to defensive force. But even when a victim State makes this effort, the territorial State’s consent might be attenuated, and its participation in any operation to deal with the problem might be limited. The U.S.-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Somalia, and France-Mali operations are illustrative. Moreover, in practice, the burden to cooperate to address the violence seems to fall not on the victim State but on the territorial State. Claims to use defensive force against non-State actors typically focus on the territorial State’s own failings, not on the victim State’s efforts to address the problem through less intrusive means. And third States rarely push back on this point. To be

72. See, e.g., Israel Opens Fire after ‘Shooting from Inside Syria,’ BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21917351 (reporting that Israel used force in Syria, after Israeli soldiers were targeted but not hit from Syria).


74. See, e.g., LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5, ¶ 41; Chatham House Principles, supra note 5, at 971. See also Dapo Akande & Thomas Lieffänder, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 563, 566 (2013) (“The central consideration is again one of necessity: would seeking consent deprive the defending state of the possibility to act effectively?”).

75. See Deeks, supra note 51, at 519–21.


77. See Reinold, supra note 29, at 285 (reviewing practice and concluding that defending States tended to claim that territorial States either contributed to the violence or “failed to meet their due diligence obligations and had therefore forfeited their right to noninterference”); see also, e.g., Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Letter dated Sept. 11, 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General transmitting a Statement by Russian Federation President V.V. Putin dated Sept. 11, 2002, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1012, Annex at
clear, a victim State that does not try to work with the territorial State might weaken its claim under one of the other standards—especially, the unable or unwilling standard. A territorial State that had been unable to suppress the violence on its own might be more effective if it works with the victim. A territorial State that had been unwilling to suppress the violence might be more invested once it realizes that the alternative is defensive force. Still, the unable or unwilling standard puts on the territorial State the burden to cooperate or otherwise address the problem.

D. The State of Play before the Syria Operation

When the Syria operations began, then, States and other relevant actors had not yet coalesced around a legal standard to regulate the use of defensive force against non-State actors. Of the plausibly available legal standards, the most restrictive one—the absolute prohibition—was still occasionally invoked but increasingly out of touch with the operational practice. Over the past fifteen years, States have regularly conducted and tolerated defensive actions against non-State actors in other States. Some of these actions, like the Israeli ones in Sudan and Syria, reflect extremely expansive applica-

4 (2002) (asserting that Russia tried to work with Georgia but that Georgia has not satisfied its obligations to address the terrorism emanating from its territory); S.C. Res. 1655, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1655 (Jan. 31, 2006) (urging “the Lebanese Government to do more to assert its authority in the South, to exert control and monopoly over the use of force and to maintain law and order on its entire territory and to prevent attacks from Lebanon”); John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security, Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an (“[W]e reserve the right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary action themselves.”).


tions of Article 51. But using or tolerating defensive force is not quite the same as endorsing or advocating for its legality. The norms that are operational in practice are looser than the ones that are widely invoked and articulated as law. The majority of States has affirmatively supported defensive operations and validated Article 51 claims in only a handful of cases involving non-State actors.

The discrepancy between what States tolerate in practice and what they endorse as law might be explained by any number of factors. Because ICJ pronouncements are generally treated as authoritative, some States might hesitate to accept or advance alternative interpretations that are still controversial. Other States might favor a restrictive legal position in principle but find that position too constraining in concrete cases. Still other States might lack the incentive to defend or promote a particular legal position. Or they might be conflicted on how to balance the competing interests at stake. The point here is that, when the Syria operations began, the field was still fairly open. Multiple positions were in play, so actors seeking to push the law in a particular direction could plausibly invoke or apply any one of them. I turn, then, to the question of how States have engaged with the law in the Syria case.

III. The Syria Operations

Two defensive operations are occurring simultaneously in Syria: one against the Islamic State and the other against the Khorasan group. The Islamic State emerged in Syria in 2013, in the midst of the ongoing civil war. In January 2014, the Islamic State crossed into Iraq and seized the Iraqi cities of Falluja and Ramadi. By June, the Islamic State had swept across northern Iraq and captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. In August, the United States began airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq, at the Iraqi government’s request. Yet even as the United States acted in Iraq, the Islamic State was seizing more territory in Syria. By some accounts, the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
group controlled about 35 percent of Syria’s territory. In September, a U.S.-led coalition began striking the Islamic State in Syria. At the same time, the United States began hitting the Khorasan group in Syria. U.S. officials describe this group as a small but extremely dangerous unit of “seasoned al Qaeda veterans” who are plotting attacks against the United States and other Western targets.

The operations in Syria have accentuated three preexisting trends on the use of defensive force against non-State actors. First, the claim that international law absolutely prohibits such force is losing ground. The reaction to the operation against the Islamic State in Syria has been positive. Second, States are still floundering on when to permit such force. Many States seem unsure about the correct legal standard or uncommitted to advancing a particular legal standard. Third, there is still a significant gap between the norms that are actually implemented and the ones that are legitimized as law. Most States tolerate operations that they are not yet willing to validate with legal language.

A. Supporting Some Defensive Force against Non-State Actors

The global reaction to the defensive operation against the Islamic State has been positive. According to the United States, more than forty countries have helped fight the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria. The nature of this participation varies. Five Arab countries are themselves using force in Syria: Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Other States—Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands—are attacking the Islamic State in Iraq but...
not in Syria.\textsuperscript{88} Still other States are providing military or logistical support for the general campaign against the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{89} All of these countries presumably support the operation against the Islamic State in Syria; the Syria strikes are an integral part of the broader mission to suppress the Islamic State.

In fact, several States that are not themselves using force in Syria have expressly endorsed that part of the campaign. Shortly before the coalition began hitting targets in Syria, ten Arab countries issued a joint statement to support the military operation. The signatory States said that they had “discussed a strategy to destroy [the Islamic State] wherever it is, including in both Iraq and Syria,” and that they would “do their share in the comprehensive fight against [the Islamic State],” including, “as appropriate, joining in the many aspects of a coordinated military campaign.”\textsuperscript{90} Separately, Turkey announced that it might provide military or logistical support for the operation.\textsuperscript{91} And the United Kingdom made clear that it “support[ed] the latest airstrikes against [Islamic State] terrorists which have been carried out by the U.S. and five other countries.”\textsuperscript{92} Significantly, a few States have also suggested that attacking the Islamic State in Syria is internationally lawful.\textsuperscript{93}


Even UN officials appear to have condoned the operation. In August 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2170, which did not authorize force but called on States to take various measures to suppress the Islamic State. On October 10, the UN Special Envoy for Syria described the U.S.-led coalition as having “been created on the basis of resolution 2170,” and then asked countries to do “what [they] can in order to control and hopefully stop this atrocious terrorist movement.” To be sure, the Special Envoy also said that any action against the Islamic State in Syria should respect “the broad parameters of international law and integrity and sovereignty of Syria,” but that language is noncommittal, and the Special Envoy was almost apologetic about using it: “the UN cannot say otherwise.” He clearly was not trying to condemn the operation. Neither was the UN Secretary-General when he said, on September 23, that it was “undeniable—and the subject of broad international consensus—that these extremist groups pose an immediate threat to international peace and security.”

In addition, some States that might be expected to condemn the operation have not done so. For example, China has sided with Russia in resisting a number of U.S.-led military operations. But in this case, China’s posi-

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96. Id.
Defensive Force against Non-State Actors

The day after the Syria strikes began, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry explained that “China always supports the counter-terrorism efforts made by the international community.” The spokesperson then hinted at China’s lingering discomfort: “international law, the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of relevant countries should be respected.”

India, which has resisted other international interventions, has been noticeably quiet about the Syria strikes. Indeed, even the Assad regime in Syria has communicated a mixed message. Before the operation began, the regime said that “[a]ny action of any kind without the consent of the Syrian government would be an attack on Syria.” Yet once the operation was under way, the regime moderated its tone, noting that it supports “any international effort that contributes to the fight against terrorists.” In the end, the regime has not resisted the defensive operation; it has instead suggested that it and the U.S.-led coalition are fighting the same enemy.

Still, some States have objected to the operation. The most vocal objections have come from Russia and Iran—two States with longstanding ties to the current Syrian regime and a direct stake in the outcome of the Syrian civil war. Both States condemned the operation and hinted toward an abso-

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100. Id.


103. Baker, supra note 87. See also Syria’s Assad Backs Efforts to Fight Terrorism, ARMY TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140923/NEWS08/309230063 (reporting on Syria’s reaction).

lute prohibition of defensive force against non-State actors. However, that position appears to reflect the particular interests in this case, not a principled stance on the law. Russia and Iran have both claimed the right to use defensive force against non-State actors in other contexts. A handful of other States have been more mildly negative. For example, Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner seemed to criticize the operation when she asserted that, “if the UN General Assembly is actually allowed to serve its mandate, despite the lack of observance by some nations, . . . we could actually have international law and order built on dialogue and peace instead of military intervention.”

Those negative reactions are outliers. The States that support the defensive operation against the Islamic State far outnumber the ones that resist it. This broad and affirmative support suggests that most States have moved past any norm that absolutely prohibits the use of defensive force against non-State actors. Most States seem to accept—and even endorse—the idea that such force is sometimes permissible.

B. Floundering on the Applicable Legal Standard

However, States have not coalesced around a legal standard for when such force is permissible. Unsurprisingly, the United States invoked the unable or unwilling standard to justify the defensive operation against the Islamic State in Syria. The U.S. report to the Security Council explained that Iraq was “facing a serious threat of continuing attacks from the Islamic State . . . coming out of safe havens in Syria,” and that, as “[t]he Syrian regime has shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe havens effectively


106. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (Russia); Deeks, supra note 51, at App. I (Iran); Tams, supra note 15, at 380 (both).

itself,” the United States and its partners were acting collectively on Iraq’s behalf.  

Other States have declined to use unable or unwilling language in this case. Most States seem unsure of the correct legal standard or reluctant to advance any particular legal standard. For example, although a few States have suggested that the operation against the Islamic State is internationally lawful, these States have not presented a coherent theory of the case: they have not explained precisely why the operation is lawful or under what standard the operation should be assessed.  

The Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands specifically noted that, “[f]or military operations in Syria, there is currently no international agreement on an internationally legal mandate.” And the fact that several States have used force against the Islamic State in Iraq but have declined to do so in Syria suggests a certain discomfort with the Syria part of the campaign.

This lack of legal conviction is all the more remarkable because the defensive operation against the Islamic State could be justified on three relatively narrow grounds. First, the operation fits squarely in the ungoverned space standard. The airstrikes against the Islamic State are being conducted almost exclusively in areas that are beyond the authority or control of any recognized government.

A few States have hinted that this factor is legally relevant but have not articulated it as the governing legal standard.

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109. See sources cited supra note 93.


111. For evidence that the airstrikes against the Islamic State have been conducted almost exclusively in areas outside the Syrian government’s control or authority, see A Visual Guide to the Crisis in Iraq and Syria: Areas Under ISIS Control, supra note 84. For similar evidence relating to the strikes against the Khorasan group, see Ben Hubbard & Eric Schmitt, American Fighter Jets Carry Out Series of Airstrikes Against Qaeda Cell in Syria, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, at A4; Nabih Bulos & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Says It Has Targeted Khorasan Group Again in Syria with Airstrike, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-airstrikes-20141114-story.html.

112. See, e.g., Interview by Fran Kelly, supra note 93 (quoting Australian Prime Minister Abbott in addressing “the legalities of operating inside Syria which is ungoverned space with a regime we don’t actually recognize”) (emphasis added); Patrick Wintour, David Cameron Over-
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did the same, when he “note[d] that the strikes took place in areas no longer under the effective control of that Government.”

Second, the Assad regime seems to have acquiesced in the operation. Of course, acquiescence is not the same as consent. And the United States has gone out of its way to underscore that it did not obtain Assad’s consent or otherwise coordinate with his government. But States have previously supported defensive operations in ungoverned spaces, with minimal “buy in” from the territorial State. Recall the U.S.-Pakistan, Ethiopia-Somalia, and France-Mali precedents. As in the U.S.-Pakistan case, the extent to which a relevant domestic authority has consented to the operation in Syria is unclear. As in the Ethiopia-Somalia and France-Mali cases, splintered control over Syria’s territory calls into question the validity of such consent. Still, the United States apparently gave the regime advance notice of the impending operation, and the regime chose not to protest. The regime even suggested that this notice somehow mitigated the intrusion.

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113. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, supra note 97.

114. See supra notes 46, 48 and accompanying text.


116. See supra notes 46, 48 and accompanying text.

117. See Morello & Gearan, supra note 115.

118. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, supra note 97 (“I note that the Syrian Government was informed beforehand”); Tiezzi, supra note 98 (reporting on China’s reaction).
Third, the operation against the Islamic State responded to a massive armed attack. By the time the coalition began using force in Syria, the Islamic State had already seized several Iraqi cities. Moreover, the Security Council had determined that this conduct posed a serious threat not only to Iraq but to international peace and security more generally. Any heightened threshold for an armed attack would surely have been satisfied in this case.

These three grounds for limiting the right to use defensive force—the ungoverned space standard, the modest buy-in of a domestic authority, and a heightened armed-attack threshold—were available to States in the Syria case. Each ground had support in the relevant precedents or in high-profile documents in the secondary literature. And yet, States that undoubtedly supported the operation against the Islamic State declined to invoke these grounds to justify the operation under international law or to delimit the scope of Article 51 more generally. This behavioral pattern—States’ reluctance to articulate a legal justification even for an operation that they support—suggests that many States are not yet ready to push the law in a particular direction. They presumably are conflicted or uncertain about how this area of law is or should be developing.

C. Tolerating a Broad Range of Defensive Operations

The reluctance to advance even a narrow legal position on the operation against the Islamic State does not reflect a concerted effort to prevent much more expansive applications of Article 51. States have generally been lax about policing defensive operations against non-State actors. The reaction to the operation against the Khorasan group is indicative. Even the United States has been somewhat opaque about the legal justification for this operation. The U.S. report to the Security Council noted, almost as an aside, that in addition to attacking the Islamic State in Syria, the United States would target “al-Qaeda elements in Syria known as the Khorasan Group to address terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and our partners and allies.” However, the United States has declined to elaborate on this Article 51 claim.

Two justifications for using defensive force against the Khorasan group are plausible, but each is contingent on facts that are not publicly available and on legal positions that are contested. First, the U.S. strikes might be

justified on the ground that the Khorasan group is part of al Qaeda. The precise nature of the relationship between those two groups is not publicly known. If the groups are meaningfully distinct, al Qaeda’s attacks would not trigger the right to use defensive force against the Khorasan group. If the groups are intermingled, the extent to which the United States may still use defensive force against al Qaeda—especially against al Qaeda outposts in States from which al Qaeda has not itself attacked—is unclear. The dominant position among international lawyers would probably be that the United States may not use defensive force in this context.\(^\text{121}\)

Alternatively, the strikes against the Khorasan group might be justified in anticipatory self-defense. A Pentagon official hinted at this justification when he explained that the strikes “were undertaken to disrupt imminent attack plotting against the United States and western targets” and that “intelligence reports indicated that the Khorasan Group was in the final stages of plans to execute major attacks.”\(^\text{122}\) As discussed, the use of force in anticipatory self-defense is widely understood to be unlawful, unless an attack is truly imminent.\(^\text{123}\) The United States has not publicly addressed how close the Khorasan group was to committing an attack. Yet the above-quoted language suggests that the group was still planning its attacks and not quite ready to strike.\(^\text{124}\)

\(^\text{121}\). Compare, e.g., Heyns, supra note 69, ¶ 89 (asserting that an “emerging view” is that the heightened armed-attack threshold “must be met vis-à-vis each host state on whose territory action in self-defence is taken”), and Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 42, at 109, 129–30 (expressing doubts about the justification for using defensive force against al Qaeda in States from which al Qaeda has not attacked), with, e.g., Brennan, supra note 77 ("The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa’ida as being restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, . . . we have the authority to take action against al-Qa’ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time.").


\(^\text{123}\). See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

\(^\text{124}\). For evidence that the strikes are motivated by factors other than the imminence of any attack, see Mitchell Prothero, Sources: U.S. Air Strikes in Syria Targeted French Agent who Defected to Al Qaida, MCCLATCHY DC (Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/10/05/242218_sources-us-air-strikes-in-syria.html?rh=1.
In short, any legal theory to justify the operation against the Khorasan group is contingent on facts that are not publicly available and on legal claims that are controversial. Yet the global reaction to this operation has been remarkably muted. The vast majority of States has neither condemned nor supported the operation. Almost all of them have simply looked the other way. The gap between the norms that are articulated as law and the ones that are operational persists.

IV. CONCLUSION

The law on the use of defensive force against non-State actors is unsettled. The Syria operations have not resolved but rather accentuated the ambiguities and inconsistencies in this area. For many international lawyers, the instinctive response will be to sift through the practice and try to distill the best or most accurate interpretation of the law. This response is not especially useful so long as States are still struggling over the law’s proper content. Because States have not coalesced around a legal standard for regulating such force, each of the legal positions described above is still in play and could plausibly be invoked or applied in future cases.

The claim that international law absolutely prohibits defensive force against non-State actors is losing legal traction but not yet dead. After all, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is widely regarded as a *jus cogens* norm\(^{125}\) — meaning that a practice that chips away at the norm qualifies as law only if the practice is as robust and supported as Article 2(4) itself.\(^ {126}\) Many States that have strategic reasons for supporting the operation against the Islamic State have not themselves participated in or advanced a legal justification for that operation. For some lawyers, this pattern of behavior does not


evince a sufficiently robust practice and opinio juris to stray from the ICJ’s pronouncements.

At the other extreme, some lawyers will underscore that the majority of States repeatedly conducts or tolerates operations that reflect very expansive applications of Article 51. Although most States have declined to advance a particular legal standard for regulating defensive force against non-State actors, most have also refrained from policing such force. In many cases, the territorial State has not itself used defensive force or taken other measures against the acting State, and third States have remained silent. Some lawyers will argue, then, that even operations that push or exceed the bounds of the unable or unwilling standard are lawful—in other words, that such operations have effectively reshaped the law in their image.127

In fact, no one position by itself represents the current state of the law. With multiple positions in play, each is, simultaneously, legally relevant and legally deficient. A position will be legally relevant so long as it continues to resonate with enough States or other global actors—such that it might reasonably be invoked or applied in specific incidents. The position will be legally deficient so long as it competes with the others for preeminence—and thus is not widely accepted and treated as law. For now, the position that best captures the operational practice seems not to be generally accepted as law. And whatever position is most widely accepted as an authoritative statement of law seems not to reflect the operational practice. The Syrian case suggests that this struggle within the law will continue for some time; most States appear conflicted or uncertain about how this area of law is or should be developing.

Nevertheless, a few basic guidelines can be distilled from the practice: the majority of States has affirmatively endorsed defensive operations against non-State actors in States that actively harbor or support those actors, or lack control over the areas from which they operate. Further, most States passively tolerate defensive operations in a much broader range of circumstances. These latter operations are unlikely to be legitimized or validated as lawful, but they also are unlikely to be condemned or treated as unlawful.

127. See, e.g., Bethlehem, supra note 7; Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 939, 960 (2005) (arguing that restrictive norms on the use of force have fallen into desuetude and no longer qualify as law); cf., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (6th ed. 2008) (“Generally, where states are seen to acquiesce in the behaviour of other states without protesting against them, the assumption must be that such behaviour is accepted as legitimate.”).