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Special Assessments upon Cemeteries

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Special Assessments Upon Cemeteries.—Though the power to tax cemeteries would seem to be entirely clear, very commonly land devoted to such purpose is declared by constitution or statute to be exempt. See Cooley, Taxation, (3rd ed.) 354. So also in the case of special assessments such land, in the absence of a clear exemption, is liable thereto. Bloomington Cemetery Assoc. v. People, 139 Ill. 16, 28 N. E. 1076; Mullins v. Cemetery Assoc., 239 Mo. 681, 144 S. W. 109; Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 503; Lima v. Lima Cemetery Assoc., 42 Oh. St. 128, 51 Am. Rep. 809.

It may be suggested, in view of the theory upon which special assessments go, that the owner of the land gets back the amount assessed in benefits from an enhanced value of the property, land dedicated to cemetery purposes perpetually would not be subject to such assessments. This contention was urged in Garden Cemetery Corporation v. Baker, 218 Mass. 339, 105 N. E. 1070 (1914), and under the facts there presented was rejected, the court distinguishing Mount Auburn Cemetery v. Cambridge, 150 Mass. 12. Where all the lots are sold and used for burial and under the law the company cannot divert the land to other uses, perhaps the argument might be difficult to meet. Exemption from special assessment, then, in general, it would seem, must be found, if at all, in some provision or provisions of the
Exemption from "assessments," it is held, will exempt from special assessments. State v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 529, 32 N. W. 781; In re New York, 192 N. Y. 459, 85 N. E. 755; Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. I. 199. But an exemption from "taxation" does not have the same result. Bloomington Cemetery Assoc. v. People, supra; Lima v. Lima Cemetery Assoc., supra; Mullins v. Mount St. Mary's Cemetery Assoc., supra. And in Baltimore v. Green Mount Cemetery, 7 Md. 517, it was held that a statute providing that land forever appropriated and set apart as a cemetery so long as used as such "shall not be liable to any tax or public imposition whatsoever," did not exempt from special assessments. As to the effect of an exemption from "execution" the courts are not agreed. That such exemption includes special assessments was held in In re Sixth Ave. West, Seattle, 59 Wash. 41, 109 Pac. 1052, where the statute provided that any part of a burial ground appropriated as burying place for any particular person or family "shall not be liable to be taken or disposed of by any warrant or execution, for any tax or debt whatever," the court, however, holding the unsold portions of the cemetery liable to the assessment; and in Union Dale Cemetery Company's Case, 227 Pa. St. 1, 75 Atl. 835, where the charter of the company exempted the land of the company and the burial lots therein "from execution, attachment, taxation, or any other lien or process." In the latter case the court said that a confirmation of the assessment would mean the fastening of a lien on the land, which if not paid would lead to a sale, for "the right of lien includes the power to sell, else the lien would be a nullity." On the other hand it has been held that such exemption from execution does not include special assessments. Bloomington Cemetery Assoc. v. People, supra, holding such exemption only relieves from sale on fi. sa.; Mullins v. Mount St. Mary's Cemetery Assoc., supra; Lima v. Cemetery Assoc. supra, holding that there could be no sale to pay the assessment, but that the city could collect "by appointment of a receiver, by sequestration, or such other appropriate remedy as equity may afford, without in any way disturbing the resting place of those reposing in 'the city of the dead'." There was a statute in Ohio which gave remedy for recovery of the assessment by action. See infra.

The main question came before the Supreme Court of Michigan in Woodmere Cemetery Ass'n v. Detroit, (Sept. 26, 1916), 159 N. W. 383. The cemetery Association having failed to pay a special assessment for paving a street upon which the cemetery abutted, the city sold the land and bid it in, there being no other bidders. The association by bill in equity asked to have the sale set aside and to remove the cloud created by the apparent liens held by the city. The lower court granted the relief prayed for, holding that the city had not proceeded according to law in levying the assessment and that the cemetery property was exempt from any such sale. By an evenly divided court the Supreme Court affirmed the decree. The four judges for affirmance went on the ground that land used for cemetery pur-
poses was "exempt from the particular tax by virtue of a settled state policy
evidenced by the provisions in the charter of complainant and in other state
statutes." The other judges while agreeing that the land could not be sold
for the purpose of collecting the assessment, were of opinion that the land
was subject to the assessment which should be collected by way of a decree
that such special assessment was a debt due from the association to the city.

Howell's Mich. Statutes, § 13025, provide that "all cemeteries, tombs,
and rights of burial, while in use as repositories of the dead" shall be "exempt
from levy and sale under any execution, or upon any final process of a
court." It was upon this statute, upon the case of Avery v. Forest Lawn
Cemetery Co.; 127 Mich. 125, 96 N. W. 538, applying the statute in an action
seeking a sale of cemetery land to pay a debt, and upon the limitations on
the association's power to sell and use the land for nothing but cemetery
purposes, that the prevailing judges relied in holding the land exempt from
the assessment.

That the cemetery should be exempt from sale would seem, for obvious
reasons, a very proper conclusion: No doubt a court would be astute to
find ground on which to base such a determination. But does it necessarily
follow that because the land is held exempt from sale that therefore there
is no liability for such assessments? In Dillon, Municipal Corporations,
(§ 822) on the basis of McInerny v. Reed, 23 Iowa 410, it is said that "where
the charter of a city conferred upon it the power 'to levy and collect' a
special tax for local improvements and declared such tax to be 'a lien' upon
the real estate upon which it should be assessed, and no mode of collection
was prescribed; and no power to collect by sale existed, the court was of
opinion that the lien might be enforced in equity, and the power 'to collect'
be exercised by the corporation by a suit in its name." This was approved
and adopted by the Ohio court in Lima v. Cemetery Assoc., supra. But in
Cave Hill Cemetery Co. v. Gosnell, 156 Ky. 599, 161 S. W. 980 (1913), in an
action on a warrant against the Cemetery Company for its part of the cost
of paving a street, the lower court held the cemetery subject to the lien,
though not subject to a sale therefor, on the authority of Louisville v. Nevin,
10 Bush. 549, and ordered the company, it appearing that it had funds, to pay
the amount of the assessment into court within twenty days. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision, saying that "To require the cemetery company
to pay the apportionment warrant when its land is not subject to a lien would
be in effect to make the owner of the property personally liable for the
amount sued for. But we have often held that the owner is not personally
liable for the cost of a street improvement. * * * To require the cemetery
company to pay the money into court is only in another form to subject its
property to a lien. All the funds in the hands of the cemetery company are
held in trust to maintain the cemetery and to require these funds to be paid
out for other purposes is to require the trustee to divert the funds from the
trust to which they were dedicated."

However it may be in cases of the character just referred to, there would
seem to be no reasonable basis for denying the power of the legislature, in
the absence of constitutional restrictions, to provide for the recovery of the amount of such assessments by appropriate actions designed to that end. The exemption, to whatever extent it is granted, is wholly a matter of favor, which can be extended upon such terms as the legislature may see fit. The Ohio statute (§ 3898, P. & A. ANN. CODE) which provides that any unpaid special assessment may be recovered by suit against the landowner was upheld as constitutional in *Hill v. Higdon*, 5 Oh. St. 243; *Gest v. Cincinnati*, 26 Oh. St. 275. Of course if all of the funds of the cemetery company were held in trust for special purposes, the remedy may be of no avail.

The Detroit city charter (§ 221) provides that "the said receiver shall have power in the name of the city of Detroit to prosecute any person refusing or neglecting to pay such taxes or any special assessment by a suit in the circuit court for the County of Wayne, and he shall have, use, and take all lawful ways and means provided by law for the collection of debts, to enforce the payment of any such tax or any special assessment." Assuming the validity of such charter provision, may it not well be that by a proceeding thereunder and the assistance of the powers of a court of equity along the line of the doctrine of *McInerny v. Reed*, *supra*, and *Lima v. Cemetery Assoc.*, *supra*, it would be possible to reach non-trust funds of the Association?  

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