Troubled Waters Between U.S. and European Antitrust

D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida Levin College of Law

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol115/iss6/10
INTRODUCTION

Antitrust is an important area of law and policy for most companies in the world. Having divergent rules across antitrust systems means that identical economic behavior may be treated differently depending on the jurisdiction. This leads to disparate outcomes, with one jurisdiction finding illegal behavior (that the other does not) when the underlying behavior may be pro-competitive. For example, one of the U.S. antitrust agencies, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (the other is the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, or “DOJ Antitrust”) unanimously voted to close its investigation into Google in 2013 after concluding that the company’s behavior was not anticompetitive.¹ Yet, in spite of this outcome, more recently the European Commission’s Competition Commissioner and its antitrust agency equivalent, the Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Competition”), issued a statement of objections against Google in a case that remains ongoing.² This is but one example of how an antitrust divide continues to exist across the Atlantic.


This disparate set of outcomes creates a world in which the most stringent antitrust system may produce the global standard. As a result, if the antitrust rules applied are too rigid, they threaten to hurt consumers not merely in the jurisdiction where they are applied but globally as well. The stakes are high, not merely in the tech sector, but more generally. Other jurisdictions look to both the United States and Europe for guidance for antitrust jurisprudence.

Though antitrust law and economics has transformed across both the United States and Europe in the past forty years, institutional differences may explain, in part, these divergent outcomes. Starting in the 1970s, the United States went through an antitrust revolution as it moved from multiple public interest goals to a singular goal based on economic analysis. The end result of that revolution is that antitrust in the United States has some variation of economic efficiency as its sole goal (based on a welfare standard of either total welfare or consumer welfare). The United States was the first jurisdiction to give economic analysis primacy in antitrust law, although other jurisdictions have since moved in this direction.

Given that economic thinking continues to develop, case law plays a particularly important role in antitrust. The Supreme Court recently explained in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC:


5. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 3, at 2503.

6. See Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J. Competition L. & Econ. 733, 773–74 (2011) (finding evidence of structural shifts in enforcement in the 1970s); D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1247, 1251–52 (2015) (“Much of US antitrust enforcement from the 1950s and 1960s is an embarrassment by today’s standards. . . . This approach in US case law began to change in the late 1970s . . . . In the United States, antitrust liability has narrowed due to a better understanding of economics, and antitrust analysis is now driven by economic analysis.”).


We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences. Moreover, because the question in those cases was whether the challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned on its understanding of economics.9

In Europe, by contrast, the shift to greater economic analysis in antitrust (or as they call it, competition law) started in earnest only in the early 2000s—though as this Review will illustrate, economic analysis has not permeated as far in European competition law cases as it has in the United States, even if the language used by the European Commission’s Competition Commissioner and DG Competition is that of consumer welfare.10

In their book The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An Examination of US and EU Competition Policy, Daniel Gifford and Robert Kudrle11 analyze a distinct set of cases across a number of different substantive areas in the two jurisdictions. In doing so, they also discuss the potential for both convergence and divergence (Chapter Ten). Their comparative analysis makes an important and well-informed contribution to the literature, even if parts of the book might have limitations.

Gifford and Kudrle begin their book by examining the different historical and institutional perspectives in U.S. and European antitrust (Chapter One), providing important context for the development of the analysis of the cases that follow in subsequent chapters. They then articulate the various economic standards for antitrust harm across both systems in the context of judicial review (Chapter Two). Next, they examine merger policy and how the two systems treat merger efficiencies (Chapter Three). The subsequent chapters discuss particular types of conduct—price discrimination (Chapter Four), predatory pricing (Chapter Five), exclusive supply contracts (Chapter Six), both single product (Chapter Seven) and bundled discounts (Chapter Eight), and the comparative Microsoft antitrust cases (Chapter Nine)—as a way of framing a broader discussion of antitrust in high technology and in the area of antitrust–IP interface issues.

This Review first explores the developments of the goals of antitrust (and how these goals shape enforcement) and the particular insights and shortcomings of Gifford and Kudrle’s investigation into comparative antitrust—in particular, the area of greatest cross-Atlantic discord: cases involving single firm conduct, especially in markets characterized by high technology and innovation. Second, this Review explores cartel law and policy, a topic that Gifford and Kudrle overlook entirely. This is a surprising

11. Daniel J. Gifford is the Robins Kaplan Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Robert T. Kudrle is the Orville and Jane Freeman Chair in International Trade and Investment Policy at the University of Minnesota Humphrey School of Public Affairs, as well as an adjunct faculty member with the University of Minnesota Law School.
omission given that cartel activity is the highest enforcement priority in the area of nonmerger conduct in both the United States and Europe (at the EC level) in terms of the number of cases.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, it is an area in which the law and policy is in flux on both sides of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{13}

I. DIVERGENT GOALS

In the comparative context, Gifford and Kudrle effectively point out that, while upon first glance, judicial review looks the same across the two jurisdictions (p. 37), in practice cases come out differently. This is because of different sets of considerations, goals, and institutional design issues in the two systems, including noneconomic goals, which are more significantly embedded in the European case law,\textsuperscript{14} and significant deference by European courts to DG Competition in the conduct context.\textsuperscript{15}

Path dependency based on multiple overarching goals remains a fundamental characteristic of European antitrust case law.\textsuperscript{16} Europe also has more of an interventionist flavor than the United States,\textsuperscript{17} which, as Gifford and Kudrle discuss, is a result of having those multiple goals embedded in the competition law on the books.\textsuperscript{18} These goals include fairness, European integration, and the protection of rivals (pp. 12–13). Even if DG Competition states that its sole goal is consumer welfare,\textsuperscript{19} Europe remains a far more favorable jurisdiction for a finding of a competition law infringement than the United States, where the shift to a singular goal of antitrust and the primacy of economic analysis has led to more rule of reason analysis and less


\textsuperscript{14} See pp. 8–14.

\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., pp. 34–38.


\textsuperscript{18} See pp. 8–17. For recent formulations in the courts on these goals, see, for example, Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-4529, and Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Léelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Prioionton, 2008 E.C.R. I-7139.

\textsuperscript{19} Blair & Sokol, supra note 3, at 2513.
In Europe, however, having multiple goals, even in modern case law, tends to push antitrust law into more aggressive enforcement of behavior than may be efficient. As such, case analysis by the European courts sometimes leads to outcomes that are not efficiency based (p. 34). In the language of European competition law: too much European case law is subject to too many practices that are categorized by "object" (where economic analysis is not required) rather than "effect" (which requires economic analysis). The move to economic analysis has been proceeding since the 1990s. But, perhaps surprisingly, the first time the term "consumer welfare" was mentioned meaningfully in a decided case by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was 2012 in Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet. When there are multiple goals used in the underlying analyses of cases, it makes planning of pro-competitive business behavior more difficult because a firm that legitimately competes on the merits may be punished for its success.

The strong-interventionist case law and enforcement in Europe also operates in the shadow of the law, serving as leverage to extract greater concessions in commitment decisions from firms that are under investigation. These firms end up settling because they do not think that a win before the highly deferential courts is likely.

One area where European courts have pushed back against overly restrictive competitive effects analysis is mergers (pp. 35–36). This pushback is


significant because in merger law the courts have reversed the European Commission, where there had been errors in accuracy of information assessment and in economic analysis (pp. 36–37). Significant judicial oversight of DG Competition means that the agency is less likely to bring merger cases where its analysis and the underlying economics are weaker. Contrast this with dominance cases, where the courts had the ability to create similar limiting principles for DG Competition in the Microsoft case but where the General Court remained deferential to the Commission. Perhaps for this reason, scholars, including Gifford and Kudrle, have been far more critical of DG Competition’s conduct cases rather than its merger cases.

II. Single Firm Conduct

Single-firm conduct addresses that part of antitrust where a monopolist exercises its power to raise prices and/or exclude its competitors. Enforcement agencies must determine how to best limit the unlawful exercise of monopoly power while avoiding overenforcement, using resources efficiently, and incentivizing innovation. It is perhaps the most complex part of antitrust analysis. Gifford and Kudrle spend a number of chapters addressing various forms of conduct in their book and areas of ambiguity or difficulty in case law. This Part addresses some of the ambiguities of how single firm conduct issues play out comparatively.

Since its inception, antitrust has fixated on the behavior of dominant firms. Such cases involve exclusion or predation. In both scenarios, the Sherman Act "directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself." Due to the procedural and substantive tightening on antitrust doctrine that has occurred since the U.S. antitrust revolution in the 1970s, there are fewer exclusion cases now than in the prior era. For the most part, U.S. case law has been scrubbed of its earlier excesses. In Europe, however, such
anachronistic cases remain on the books, and recent cases repeat noneconomic formulations of the goals of competition law, which lead to results that may chill pro-competitive business behavior (pp. 92–94, 98–100). Further, in conduct cases under Articles 101 and 102 TEFU (the rough equivalent of the United States’ Sherman Act sections 1 and 2), the European courts have not created limiting principles with regard to economic analysis as the same courts have in the merger context.34 Although Article 102 was “modernized” with a Guidance Paper to help push Europe to more of an effects-based approach centered on economic analysis,35 attempts to modernize case law and practice remain a work in progress. Sometimes economic analysis guides decisions, but in other cases the Commission takes a more formalistic approach.36 Worse, as this Review discusses herein in the chapters on conduct (pp. 63–196), unlike in the area of mergers, the European courts have not limited DG Competition’s rulings because of faulty, or even a lack of, economic analysis.37 The lack of limiting principles means a more aggressive Commission with regard to dominance cases (even when the behavior may not have anticompetitive effect), which leads to greater uncertainty for business decisions that require complex antitrust analysis and to findings of infringement of European competition law when the behavior in question is not anticompetitive. It also creates incentives to bring cases even if the cases settle because any such settlement is a “win” for purposes of bureaucratic politics.38

One such example of the difficulty of modernizing practice is Intel,39 a case to which Gifford and Kudrle devote a portion of Chapter Seven. In Intel, one of the earliest post-Guidance Paper cases, the Commission found that Intel had infringed Article 102 TEFU—even without providing anticompetitive effects.40 More specifically, the Commission argued that there

---

34. See p. 98. Angela Zhang suggests that the motivation to overturn a Commission decision in the area of conduct may not be benign. She notes, “As members and staff of the Court of Justice do not want their dockets flooded with appeals from the General Court, they are likely to be less inclined to annul the Commission’s decisions.” Angela Huyue Zhang, The Faceless Court, 38 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 71, 118–24 (2016).


37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Akman, supra note 22.


40. Id. at 17.
was no requirement to show actual foreclosure because a 102 TFEU violation could be found merely from "object" practices by a dominant firm.\footnote{Commission Decision No. 2009/C 227/07 (Intel), slip op. ¶¶ 919, 923 (May 13, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel_provisional_decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/X93S-9XYW].} On appeal, the General Court upheld the European Commission’s decision,\footnote{Case T-286/09, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R., ¶¶ 198–206 (delivered June 12, 2014), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62009TJ0286&from=EN [https://perma.cc/6CJK-BHVT].} stating that there was no need to show competitive effects that harm consumers once an anticompetitive object has been found.\footnote{See id. ¶ 145.} Though there was some economic analysis in the case, there was no discussion of a counterfactual to Intel’s behavior, precisely the opposite of the Guidance Paper’s test for such behavior.\footnote{Akman, supra note 23, at 186–87.} Intel has not been an isolated case of discussing conduct by its object when the discussion should be by the conduct’s effect. Similar analysis can be found in contemporary cases such as\footnote{See Case T-203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Comm’n (Michelin II), 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, ¶¶ 241–42.} Michelin II\footnote{See Case C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca AB v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R., ¶ 165 (delivered Dec. 6, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CJ0457&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= [https://perma.cc/8K8Y-2ACA]; Case T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. II-2805, ¶ 902.} and\footnote{See, e.g., pp. 134–35.} AstraZeneca\footnote{See Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Beyond the “More Economics-Based Approach”: A Legal Perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 710–11 (2016); Nicolas Petit, Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU, 11 EUR. COMPETITION J. 26, 67 (2015) (“[T]he case-law analysis provided by the Intel court in support of its reasoning is on the whole very weak and riddled with disconcerting inconsistencies.”).} (both in the decisions of the General Court and European Court of Justice). Overall, across chapters in the book, Gifford and Kudrle show the divide between the economics-based effects approach set forth in the Guidance Paper and case law.\footnote{See, e.g., supra note 23.} This lack of coherence chills pro-competitive behavior. Advocate General Wahl’s recent Intel opinion (post publication of the book), offers hope that the European case law is moving in the right direction towards greater economic analysis.\footnote{See Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n (Oct. 20, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62014CC0413 [https://perma.cc/B5UD-PZUZ].} Nevertheless, while the European academic opinion is clearly trending in favor of more economic analysis in doctrine,\footnote{See Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Beyond the “More Economics-Based Approach”: A Legal Perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 710–11 (2016); Nicolas Petit, Intel, Leveraging Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU, 11 EUR. COMPETITION J. 26, 67 (2015) (“[T]he case-law analysis provided by the Intel court in support of its reasoning is on the whole very weak and riddled with disconcerting inconsistencies.”).} some European case law, in dicta, even goes so far as to suggest hostility to the economics-based effects approach. In the Post Danmark II case, Advocate General Kokott wrote:

It is my view that, in its replies, the signal effect of which is likely to extend well beyond the present case, . . . the Court should not allow itself to be influenced so much by current thinking (‘Zeitgeist’) or ephemeral trends,
but should have regard rather to the legal foundations on which the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position rests in EU law.50

She later added further skepticism, noting, “the added value of expensive economic analyses is not always apparent.”51 Across the different chapters that otherwise do a good job in analyzing particular areas of antitrust law, Gifford and Kudrle do not capture as precisely as they should how critical this struggle within European competition policy is in terms of the goals of competition policy leading to doctrinal changes. While Gifford and Kudrle provide excellent analysis of the cases they cover, by not emphasizing how the battle for goals remains an issue in conduct cases, they underplay the impediments to more economically reasonable cases in Europe and, ultimately, to prosecutorial discretion for such cases. Without European courts more critical of non-effects-based analysis, there is the potential for pro-competitive behavior to be chilled.

In a case like Intel in the United States, by contrast, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate anticompetitive harm through an analysis of competitive effects.52 To my knowledge, the emphasis on economic analysis is embedded in the judiciary. In their opinions, judges in the United States do not tend to question the analytical basis of economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence. This is because of the uniformity of Supreme Court cases since the mid-1970s in shaping how lower courts use economic analysis in antitrust cases.53

One area of increasing divergence across the Atlantic is in markets characterized by high technology and dynamic innovation. Conduct issues ranging from online search,54 online resale price maintenance, and online most-
favored-nation clauses; pharmaceutical reverse payments; and FRAND licensing, among other issues, are hotly contested. Europe seems to be the more aggressive enforcer in areas where the stakes are high, the issues complex, the likelihood of mistaken enforcement may be high, and the industrial policy broadly defined may be influencing European competition policy.

One complaint of industrial policy in European antitrust came from no less than the then President of the United States. President Obama suggested that some European antitrust enforcement targeting U.S. tech companies might be essentially an element of European industrial policy. President Obama explained in an interview with Kara Swisher: “We have owned the Internet. Our companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it, in ways [that inefficient European competitors] can’t compete [with]. And oftentimes what is portrayed as high-minded positions on issues sometimes is designed to carve out their commercial interests.”

President Obama’s comment is relevant to a larger issue involving single firm conduct: case law involving high technology cuts across antitrust. Given how few decided cases there are before the courts involving high technology, much of the “action” occurs in the shadow of the law. Gifford and Kudrle emphasize the easiest comparison of high-tech issues—the Microsoft saga that remains important to the present. Gifford and Kudrle discuss how antitrust addresses technology and innovation in the U.S. and European Microsoft cases (Chapter Nine). These cases were seminal in understanding how antitrust addressed new economy issues in both jurisdictions. Since that time, technology has played an increased role in terms of both merger cases and conduct cases (pp. 191–94). Unfortunately, however, Gifford and Kudrle do not discuss these more recent cases in detail, nor do they discuss tech markets, antitrust, and the difference between merger and dominance cases.


58. Sokol, supra note 6, at 1254–58.

(at least in Europe where the differences in case law between the two are significant) outside of the Microsoft cases.

Though there is no need for new antitrust rules specifically for markets characterized by innovation,60 particular care must be given in such markets where some of the assumptions of how competition works may differ from those of more traditional markets.61 In such technology-driven markets there is rapid technological transformation and innovation across a number of different paths, including products, services, and platforms.

Because of the rapid transformation of tech-based markets, the traditional structural presumption of market power may be transient.62 Markets move quickly across different platforms from general search to more specialized search, and from social networks to apps. The concept of fast-changing markets in antitrust emerges from Joseph Schumpeter’s views on creative destruction.63 The method of competition in these markets is such that traditional markets can be subject to significant disruption.64 In a number of circumstances, firms compete for the market rather than in the market.65 As a result, prediction for mergers is more difficult, as is understanding the competitive effects in conduct cases, because the innovation in question may not be linked to a preexisting market. This is not to argue that antitrust has no role to play in fast-moving markets. Rather, as with other areas of antitrust, the problem with antitrust intervention is that without a clear theory


61. See chapter 9.


of harm linked to facts that match up with economic theory, aggressive antitrust enforcement creates the negative potential of chilling pro-competitive innovation.

Gifford and Kudrle’s chapter on Microsoft could have served as a springboard to discuss two-sided market analysis in tech markets. According to the economics literature, double-sided markets occur when firms or platforms have the ability to bring together distinct types of economic actors (e.g., online auctions such as eBay, dating services such as Tinder, search engines such as Google, or social network sites such as Facebook).66 In such markets, services on one side of the market often may be free for users, and firms may make money from advertising.

This market structure complicates traditional antitrust analysis. A first step in antitrust analysis is market definition. In one-sided markets, an increase in price or decrease in output provides guidance on how to undertake the subsequent analysis.67 In two-sided markets in which one side is free, however, a traditional market share calculation is inadequate because one side of the market may serve to subsidize the other.68

This limitation to market definition in high-tech cases involving two-sided markets is just part of what is increasingly a convergence across the Atlantic of the limits of the use of market definition, particularly in merger analysis. This discussion of how high technology works in the merger context, particularly in Europe where there is case law (in contrast to the conduct area), suggests that European antitrust is capable of understanding tech issues and gives hope that DG Competition and the courts can do better going forward in tech-related antitrust conduct cases.

In the area of U.S. mergers, there has been a move away from market share in the 2010 Merger Guidelines.69 Though the European merger guidelines have not been revised so recently, European merger cases suggest that a high market share is not fatal with regard to market power. This includes


cases such as Microsoft/Skype, Alcatel/Telettra, Canon/Iris and ARM/Giesecke & Devrient/Gemalto. Similarly, in the United States, the majority of merger closing statement cases at both DOJ Antitrust and the FTC do not turn on issues of market concentration but on competitive effects. In contrast, the structural presumption plays a larger role in litigated merger cases in the United States due to a lack of modern analysis by the Supreme Court, which last reviewed antitrust merger jurisprudence in the 1970s and for which the structural presumption weighs heavily in the case law of the 1960s.

Contrast the lack of focus on effects in some abuse of dominance cases to how the courts have discussed effects in merger cases involving technology in Europe. In a series of cases, both DG Competition and the European courts have recognized that the dynamics of online markets may, at times, be different than those of traditional markets. For example, in Microsoft’s merger with Skype, the General Court noted that network effects (the effects of a good or service to others who may use that good or service) do not necessarily create barriers to entry. Rather, the court recognized that “the existence of network effects does not necessarily procure a competitive advantage for the new entity.” The reason for this is that direct network effects may not necessarily apply in certain high-tech markets. To distinguish further between two types of network effects, there are direct (more people on the network allows for scale, such as with Skype) and indirect network effects (complementary goods are produced, such as with an ATM network). This distinction between direct versus indirect network effects is particularly
important given the discussion that Gifford and Kudrle have in their Microsoft chapter on the tying claim in that case, in which Microsoft’s tying of the internet explorer to its operating system played such an important role in the case of direct network effect to the theory of harm (pp. 170–71).

With regard to mergers, because of the speed of change in online markets, the European Commission similarly found in the Facebook/WhatsApp merger that because of fast-moving markets, “any leading market position even if assisted by network effects is unlikely to be incontestable.”

Not only are online markets fast moving and therefore potentially have low barriers to entry, arguments have emerged in such contexts to provide a duty to deal for less efficient competitors. Gifford and Kudrle correctly provide an analysis of the significant limitations on the duty to deal and also provide context for these limitations in high-tech antitrust (pp. 162–66). They note that the European case law more readily accepts refusals to supply and refusals to deal than U.S. case law (although the duty is not broad). Something Gifford and Kudrle fail to mention, however, is that, importantly, in addition to the limits on the European case law, the Guidance Paper also shows deep reluctance to create blanket obligations for rivals.

The context for refusals to deal is different in Europe where, unlike the United States, there is a history of state-owned enterprises. In what is perhaps still the leading economic policy book of European competition law, the most recent former chief economist of DG Competition, in his prior academic writing, also shows great reluctance to undertake an aggressive approach with regard to refusals to deal. But the impulse for broader use of such an approach by the more populist elements within other parts of the European Union structure suggest the potential for mischief in EU competition law on this topic.

Thus far, insights that have found their way into European merger law with regard to high technology and economic analysis have not yet found their way into European abuse-of-dominance case law. Such a revisiting is in order with European antitrust concern over the companies that have been

---


79. See p. 166.

80. Guidance Paper, supra note 24, para. 75.


82. Massimo Motta, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice 89 (2004) (“Competition laws and their enforcement should therefore ensure that firms will be able to enjoy the rewards for their investments. I have therefore argued that any expropriation of firms’ assets (whether material or immaterial) should be avoided. As a consequence, resorting to the essential facilities doctrine (granting assets of crucial assets to competitors), to price controls, or even more drastic structural remedies must be carried out only in truly exceptional circumstances.”).

83. See, e.g., Renda, supra note 60, at 39–40.
termed “GAFA” (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon). Perhaps part of the aggressiveness of DG Competition and EU Member State prosecution at the national level is due to the fact the European courts have not yet limited the abuse of dominance law the way that they have limited the Commission’s merger jurisprudence to economic effects in a series of cases, including Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand, and Tetra Laval/Sidel. As Gifford and Kudrle correctly note, the European Microsoft decision was the chance to extend this thinking to dominance cases, but the General Court did not (pp. 36–37). As a result, as Gifford and Kudrle explain, “the deference accorded by the General Court to the Commission’s Microsoft decision seems without parallel in the US case law on judicial review because of the magnitude of the policy issues involved” (p. 38). Perhaps a similar pushback by the General Court and the European Court of Justice is needed in dominance to keep DG Competition “honest” in its jurisprudence and to focus more on an effects-based economic analysis.

III. Cartel Policy

At a basic level, there is consensus that cartels (companies or individuals who collude through an illegal contract, typically to raise prices) are a problem of major concern in antitrust. In the United States, active cartel enforcement has long been a hallmark antitrust enforcement—even if the design of that enforcement has been suboptimal due to problems of both insufficient detection and punishment. Over time, through case law and policy, fines have ratcheted up. Government emphasis on cartel prosecutions has been a priority across presidential administrations. Further, the Supreme Court has observed that cartels are “the supreme evil of antitrust.”

Though both the United States and Europe are now active cartel enforcers, this was not always the case. Further, in terms of the structure of the

cartel policies and the enforcement tools, the two jurisdictions differ. Most importantly, the United States imposes criminal penalties for collusion while the European Union does not.91 And, in a recent shift, the United States, in contrast to the European Union, now recognizes that a robust compliance program may lead to a penalty reduction.92 Finally, European case law and enforcement on information sharing is more aggressive than the United States.93 These differences lead to potentially disparate policy outcomes, as the discussion below will explore.

To understand current U.S. cartel policy, it helps to understand the shifts that have occurred over time—namely, increasingly severe punishments for both corporations and individuals. In the past, criminal cartel enforcement significantly underdeterred both firms and individuals. For example, imprisonment was rarely used (there was a gap between 1921 and 1959 in which there were no cartel-related incarcerations) and when it was, jail time was minimal.94 Indeed, a Sherman Act section 1 crime did not become a felony until 1974.95

It was not until the Reagan presidency that the total number of cartel prosecutions increased dramatically—although these prosecutions were targeted primarily at small domestic cartels.96 Modern prosecutions against global cartels did not begin until the Clinton Administration; the prosecutions began then only because of the policy innovation of a revised leniency program. The revised program encouraged a firm to defect from the cartel with the promise of no criminal penalties and single damages if it cooperated fully with the prosecuting authorities.97 Although there have been fewer cartels prosecuted since the 1990s, both the number of days in jail for individuals and the number of foreign nationals in jail have increased considerably, as have the level of fines for companies and individuals.98 These changes in part reflect further changes in the statutory limits for fines and incarceration.

The figures below offer some descriptive statistics that illustrate these shifts in cartel prosecutions over time.

---

92. See id. at 411.
94. See Ghosal & Sokol, Policy Innovations, supra note 88, at 410–11.
95. Id. at 409.
96. See id. at 423–25
97. Id. at 410–11.
98. Id. at 417.
Figure 1. Fine per Corporation (Real 2009 Dollar ’000s)

Figure 1 offers a time-series view of the increasing amount of fines imposed on firms that have pled guilty to collusion under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The trend is toward increasingly higher fines, particularly since the emphasis on the detection and prosecution of large international cartels, the revision of the leniency program, and statutory increases to the financial penalties and the maximum period of incarceration.

Figure 2. Total Incarceration Days Ordered by Court


100. Based on the average days of incarceration ordered multiplied by number of individuals sentenced to incarceration. Both variables are based on statistics from Workload Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Antitrust Division, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations [https://perma.cc/J5KS-9K89].
As Figure 2 illustrates, individual sanctions for cartel participation in terms of total number of days in jail have also increased over time in the United States. The increased time of incarceration mirrors the ratcheting up of financial penalties.

Europe was slower to fight against cartels than the United States. Indeed, cartel promotion and facilitation were a part of European industrial policy for a considerable period of the European integration project. Europe was slower to fight against cartels than the United States. Indeed, cartel promotion and facilitation were a part of European industrial policy for a considerable period of the European integration project. It was not until the introduction of a leniency program in 1996 by DG Competition that cartel prosecution in Europe began in earnest. The 1990s and early 2000s saw further tweaks to the system, including changes to leniency and fines. More recently, DG Competition introduced a settlement notice with a 10 percent discount that accrued to participating firms. It also moved to decentralize cartel enforcement to the national competition authorities. Then, in 2014 and 2015 the European Parliament and the Council of the European Commission tweaked immunity to limit liability in private follow-on actions for damages and to ensure that leniency statements and settlement submissions by the parties would not be used in follow-on actions.

Figure 3. Total Cartel Fines (Real 2009 Dollar ‘000s)

107. Id. arts. 6(6), 7(1); Commission Regulation 773/2004, art. 16, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18, 22, amended by Commission Regulation 2015/1348, 2015 O.J. (L 208) 3.
Figure 3 shows that, like in the United States, average fines in Europe have increased over time due to the increases in penalties and cartel detection.

The introduction of leniency and the use of higher penalties in both jurisdictions suggest convergence on cartel enforcement between the United States and Europe.109 Yet, differences remain. And in some cases, differences across the two jurisdictions are increasing due to Europe’s poor understanding of how best to structure incentives to increase cartel detection.110


113. See Sokol, supra note 109, at 818.

liability approach has been followed by other antitrust agencies.115 DG Competition, however, has yet to follow this composite approach, even though some national competition authorities within Europe do. Rather, DG Competition believes in strict liability for firms and does not offer any credit for robust compliance programs.

DOJ Antitrust has provided penalty mitigation on the basis of a robust compliance program in two circumstances: Kayaba Industry Co., Ltd.116 and Barclays.117 In Kayaba, DOJ Antitrust provided a roadmap of the elements a robust compliance program should have: support for compliance among top management, the use of an anonymous antitrust “hotline,” antitrust compliance training, monitoring of employees who are high risk for antitrust, and the company’s willingness to discipline antitrust violators.118 These changes echo policy changes across antitrust agencies in other jurisdictions. Some agencies have even created antitrust compliance guidelines.119

In Barclays, DOJ Antitrust issued its first-ever award of credit against a fine so that the cartel member could implement a robust compliance program that met the criteria of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for penalty mitigation for compliance programs. Of significance was that Barclays implemented a compliance program after it had pleaded guilty to price fixing in the LIBOR cartel.120 When it was found to have participated in the FOREX cartel, Barclays received a penalty reduction based on its compliance program while the other banks that pleaded guilty that day did not.121 These two cases show that DOJ Antitrust has begun a process of aligning incentives of firms with more robust compliance by rewarding them when they comply and by punishing individuals when they veer from firm interests.

DG Competition remains the one major global holdout to using modern tools to increase firms’ incentives to invest in greater compliance. Worse,


120. See Plea Agreement, supra note 117, at 9.

121. Id. at 11–12, 15–16.
there is case law to suggest that DG Competition will use a company’s compliance program against it.\textsuperscript{122} Compounding the problem is the fact that in Europe there is parental liability for subsidiaries when the two share a compliance program.\textsuperscript{123}

A shift from strict liability to composite liability for entities is not the only innovation where DOJ Antitrust and DG Competition have diverged. In the area of individual sanctions, DOJ Antitrust continues to tweak its criminal antitrust program by creating better incentives with regard to individual accountability and wrongdoing. This emphasis on individual sanctions has become more pronounced recently due to the September 2015 DOJ “Yates Memo.”\textsuperscript{124} The Yates Memo is a DOJ-wide document that has put increased focus on DOJ prosecutions and policy guidance.\textsuperscript{125} It emphasizes the need for DOJ prosecutions to focus on individuals.\textsuperscript{126} Though the Yates Memo is relatively recent and its full effects are as yet unclear, the increase in individual penalties (and the corresponding incentives to defect from a cartel by providing information to DOJ) might indeed lead to better detection of cartels.

Speeches by the top DOJ Antitrust criminal enforcer have similarly emphasized the importance of individual prosecutions.\textsuperscript{127} The push toward greater individual accountability in a criminal antitrust setting predates the Yates Memo, with the DOJ Antitrust leadership focusing on increased corporate responsibility to take action against individuals in their organizations who have been active in cartel conduct.\textsuperscript{128} Further, increased criminal incarceration in the United States for antitrust violations must also be viewed hand in hand with more aggressive incarceration of foreign defendants.

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{122} See Commission Decision No. 1999/210/EC (British Sugar), 1999 O.J. (L 76) 1, 43–44.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the Assistant Att’ys Gens. and U.S. Att’ys. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/G2J8-YGXD].
\item \textsuperscript{125} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Id. at 1–2.
\item \textsuperscript{128} See, e.g., Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks for the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium: Prosecuting Antitrust Crimes 8 (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/att/file/517741/download [https://perma.cc/8A3F-4EJE] (“It is hard to imagine how companies can foster a corporate culture of compliance if they still employ individuals in positions with senior management and pricing responsibilities who have refused to accept responsibility for their crimes and who the companies know to be culpable.”).
\end{enumerate}
including the use of extradition of foreign nationals. 129 Each of these steps has brought U.S. cartel enforcement closer to the optimum.

Compliance is the preventive part of cartel enforcement. Cartel enforcement also extends to breaking up cartels and to ensuring that legal tacit collusion (based on parallel behavior) 130 does not cross into illegal tacit agreement. 131 “Information exchange” is the area of antitrust that deals with determining when a firm has crossed over from tacit collusion to tacit agreement. 132

Information exchange generally is a necessary part of a well-functioning market to achieve legal and legitimate business purposes: for example, joint research and development, or lower costs for production. In the United States, because of the potential pro-competitive effects, information exchanges fall within the rule of reason. The Joint DOJ/FTC Guidelines for Collaboration Among Competitors provide more guidance in this area. 133 EU enforcement in the area of information exchange is also more aggressive than its U.S. counterpart: the European Union treats information exchange as object infringement and therefore as a hard-core violation of antitrust. 134 The requirement for such a hard-core offense may be satisfied if information exchanged is “strategic,” defined broadly. 135 This critical difference between

129. See Snyder, supra note 127 (stating that “culpable foreign nationals, just like U.S. co-conspirators, serve significant prison sentences for violating the antitrust laws of the United States”).

130. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 Antitrust Bull., 143, 179 (1993) (“[A]ntitrust law clarified that the idea of an agreement describes a process that firms engage in, not merely the outcome that they reach. Not every parallel pricing outcome constitutes an agreement because not every such outcome was reached through the process to which the law objects: a negotiation that concludes when the firms convey mutual assurances that the understanding they reached will be carried out.”).


132. Id. (manuscript at 49–51).


135. Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, 19 [hereinafter Commission Applicability Guidelines]; see also Howard Rosenblatt & Tomas Nilsson, Analyst Calls and Price Signaling Under EU Law, Antitrust Source, June 2012, at 1, 4 (“At a time when advancements in economic analysis typically favor more nuanced competitive assessments over bright line tests, the Guidelines contend that one kind of information exchange is ‘by its very nature’ likely to restrict competition: ‘Information exchanges between competitors
U.S. and EU approaches suggests that there are more cases in Europe that are being captured with prosecution than may actually be cases of collusive conduct, as opposed to tacit collusion.\textsuperscript{136} One recent EU case involving Dole Food (in which banana importers exchanged information regarding banana price-setting factors, leading to banana importer liability) suggests aggressive enforcement in this area.\textsuperscript{137} This difference across U.S. and European information-exchange enforcement remains unresolved. But in practice, the European approach is stricter; companies who want a global approach to compliance will need to follow the European model.

\section*{Conclusion}

The United States and Europe seem divided in a number of areas as to antitrust as a matter of policy and case law. Gifford and Kudrle provide the basis for this explanation: With its steadfast economic focus, antitrust in the United States has a clear goal. In Europe, however, the goals remain muddled as the continent attempts to modernize the jurisprudence to a more effects-based economic approach. Two major factors contribute to this posture: First, there remain vestiges of noneconomic goals in the case law. And, second, the European Commission may use the case law to aggressively bring actions that it might otherwise not pursue, were the courts less deferential in conduct cases than in merger cases. This divergence between the United States and Europe is particularly pronounced with regard to single-firm conduct and technology markets in particular. Europe remains the more aggressive antitrust enforcer, possibly reflecting a larger anti-tech bias stemming from concern over privacy, the lack of European tech champions, and an overall dearth of support for the market relative to the United States.

In the area of cartels, despite agreement on the need for enforcement, the United States and Europe disagree on how best to tweak the leniency system to get closer to optimal deterrence. Further, the law on information exchanges in Europe remains more aggressive than in the United States.

Unfortunately, divergence has negative global repercussions with regard to business planning, which hurts consumers worldwide. While Gifford and Kudrle are hopeful that future convergence is possible, that outcome is only desirable if it is built around a framework for the two jurisdictions that supports an economics-based approach centered on actual competitive effects.

\footnotesize{of individualized data regarding intended future prices or quantities should therefore be considered a restriction of competition by object." (quoting \textit{Commission Applicability Guidelines, supra}, at 16)).

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{See} Federico Ghezzi \& Mariateresa Maggiolino, \textit{Bridging EU Concerted Practices with U.S. Concerted Actions}, 10 J. \textit{Competition L. \& Econ.} 647, 649 (2014) ("In the European Union, a concerted practice to fix prices may exist even regardless of firms’ market practices, simply because firms have exchanged information as to their future prices and strategies. At least, this is the principle that EU antitrust enforcers affirmed while dealing with the most recent cases of blatant cartel activity. Conversely, in the United States, a leap on the basis of these preconditions does not exist.").

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Dole Food}, 2013 E.C.R. (delivered March 14, 2013).}