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ARTICLE

UNITED STATES v. O'HAGAN: AGENCY LAW AND JUSTICE POWELL'S LEGACY FOR THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING

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Additionally, certain matters discussed in this Article may be issues in litigation in which the Commission appears as a party or otherwise, and no statement made in this Article should be considered indicative of the views or positions that might be taken by the Commission in any such litigation. I would like to thank Michael Dreeben, Paul Gonson, Joan Larsen, David Levine, Richard Levine, Ronald Mann, Chris Mixter, Randy Quinn, David Ruder, Jake Stillman, Steve Thel, and Elliot Weiss for helpful discussion and comments on earlier drafts. Richard Walker gets special thanks for comments above and beyond the call of duty.
INTRODUCTION

The law of insider trading is judicially created; no statutory provision explicitly prohibits trading on the basis of material, non-public information. The Supreme Court’s insider trading jurisprudence was forged, in large part, by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. His opinions for the Court in United States v. Chiarella and SEC v. Dirks were, until recently, the Supreme Court’s only pronouncements on the law of insider trading. Those decisions established the elements of the classical theory of insider trading under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). Under this the-

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1 The “short-swing” profits rule of §16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which allows an issuer to sue an insider for “any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months,” has a much narrower scope. 15 U.S.C. §78p(b) (1994).


3 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation . . . only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders . . . and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach”).

4 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (raising the question of the validity of the misappropriation theory of insider trading). The Court split 4-4 on the misappropriation theory counts and its opinion therefore did not discuss the theory. See id. The Court unanimously affirmed convictions for mail and wire fraud. See id.

5 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (proscribing the use “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe”). Section 10(b) is implemented through Commission Rule 10b-5, which provides, in relevant part, that:

It shall be unlawful for any person, . . . (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] . . . (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
ory, corporate insiders and their tippees who trade in their corporation's securities while in possession of confidential information violate duties owed to the corporation's shareholders with whom they trade.

The Supreme Court's recent decision in *United States v. O'Hagan*, which upheld the misappropriation theory of insider trading, provides an occasion for reassessing Justice Powell's contributions to the law of insider trading. The misappropriation theory differs from the classical theory in that it applies when an agent or other fiduciary misuses information entrusted to her by her principal to trade in securities, whether or not those securities were issued by her principal. The Court's decision in *O'Hagan* breaks new ground in establishing a foundation for insider trading based on common law agency principles, thereby departing from Powell's vision of the scope of insider trading prohibited by § 10(b).

This Article explores Justice Powell's legacy for the law of insider trading and traces the development of insider trading jurisprudence through *O'Hagan*. Part I analyzes Justice Powell's opinions in *Chiarella* and *Dirks*. These opinions form the contours of the classical theory, and can be read as Powell's response to what he evidently perceived to be overreaching by the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Powell sought to restrain the government's attack against insider trading by anchoring insider trading law to his interpretation of the common law of deceit. Part I concludes with a discussion of the doctrinal puzzles created by Powell's reliance on the common law of deceit as the basis for insider trading liability under the federal securities laws.

Part II traces the judicial development of the misappropriation theory. First articulated by Chief Justice Warren Burger in his dissenting opinion in *Chiarella*, the misappropriation theory was adopted and refined by the Second Circuit.* The Second Circuit's development of the theory ultimately

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17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1997).

6 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-14 (1997) (holding that a person who trades in securities, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).

7 See id. at 2202-03 (noting that the fiduciary commits the fraud when she uses her principal's confidential information in purchasing or selling securities without prior disclosure).


9 See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). Defendant James Mitchell Newman worked as a securities trader and manager of the trading department of a New York brokerage firm. See id. at 15. E. Jacques Courtois, Jr. and Adrian Antoniu misappropriated confidential information concerning mergers and acquisitions that was entrusted to their employers, the investment banking firms of Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb & Co., respectively. See id. This information was secretly conveyed to Newman, who subsequently purchased stock in companies that were merger and takeover targets of clients Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb & Co. See id. The Second Circuit held that Newman's involvement in the transaction operated as a fraud under Rule 10b-5. See id. at
lead to *United States v. Carpenter*,\(^\text{10}\) the first case involving the misappropriation theory to reach the Supreme Court.

*Carpenter* highlights the sharp distinction between the misappropriation theory and Justice Powell's view of the law of insider trading. Although the Court originally voted to deny certiorari in *Carpenter*,\(^\text{11}\) Justice Powell prepared and circulated a dissent from that denial, in which he rejected the misappropriation theory as both inconsistent with *Chiarella* and *Dirks*, and for failing to meet § 10(b)'s requirement that the fraud be "in connection with"\(^\text{12}\) the purchase or sale of a security.\(^\text{13}\) Evidently persuaded of the issue's importance by Powell's draft dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia and William F. Brennan, Jr. changed their minds and voted to grant certiorari.\(^\text{14}\) Before the following term when *Carpenter* was argued and decided, however, Powell retired from the Court. Consequently, the Court split 4-4 on the misappropriation theory, leaving its validity unresolved.\(^\text{15}\) Had Powell remained on the Court for another term, the misappropriation theory almost certainly would have been overturned in 1987.

Powell's objections to the misappropriation theory were rebuffed by the Supreme Court a decade later in *O'Hagan*, when the validity of the misappropriation theory was finally decided.\(^\text{16}\) Part II concludes with a discussion

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10. The court reasoned that, "by sullying the reputations of [the investment bankers] as safe repositories of client confidences, [Newman] and his cohorts defrauded those [investment bankers'] clients, whose takeover plans were keyed to target company stock prices fixed by market forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by purloiners of confidential information." *Id.* at 17; cf. *Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc.*, 719 F.2d 5, 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding in a private damages action, that although there was a duty to disclose or abstain, the duty was owed to the tipper's employer who was neither a purchaser nor seller of securities, and thus no duty was owed to open-market sellers of the securities in question).

11. Because the Court ultimately granted certiorari in *Carpenter*, Powell's dissent was never published. In the course of my research for the government's brief in *O'Hagan*, I uncovered Justice Powell's draft in the collection of Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers housed at the Library of Congress. Justice Powell's draft is attached as an appendix to this Article. *See* Draft of Dissent from Denial of Certiorari for *Carpenter* v. United States, Justice Powell (Dec. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Powell's Draft] (reprinted at Appendix) [Editor's Note: Pincites to Powell's Draft correspond to the page numbers on the original document.]. Justice Powell dissented from the initial denial of certiorari, but after a revote, certiorari was granted. *See* United States v. Carpenter, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986).


15. *See* *Carpenter*, 484 U.S. at 24 (noting that the Court was evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the securities laws).

of the post-\textit{Carpenter} cases that reject the misappropriation theory, and an analysis of the Court’s recent acceptance of that theory in \textit{O’Hagan}.

Part III evaluates the misappropriation theory’s support in the common law and its utility in serving the policy goals underlying prohibitions against insider trading. In addition, Part III analyzes the relationship between misappropriation theory and the classical theory. In her opinion for the Court in \textit{O’Hagan}, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the misappropriation theory as “complementary” to the classical theory.\footnote{See \textit{O’Hagan}, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.} While the two theories are complementary in the sense that they “each address[s] efforts to capitalize on non-public information through the purchase or sale of securities,”\footnote{Id.} the misappropriation theory encompasses almost all of the conduct proscribed by the classical theory,\footnote{In some areas the classical theory may reach more broadly. The classical theory proscribes insider trading while “in possession of” confidential information. \textit{See SEC v. MacDonald}, 699 F.2d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (noting that the scienter element of § 10(b) “is satisfied if at the time defendant purchased stock he had actual knowledge of undisclosed material information, knew it was undisclosed, and knew it was material”). Misappropriation requires that the misappropriator “\textit{use} the information to purchase or sell securities.” \textit{O’Hagan}, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (emphasis added). Very little, however, may turn on this distinction. \textit{See United States v. Teicher}, 987 F.2d 112, 119-21 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating, in dictum, that because a possessor of inside information cannot help but “\textit{use}” it, proof of possession of inside information is sufficient). The other significant distinction between the two theories is that the misappropriation theory is subject to contractual waiver by the owner of the information, while the classical theory is not. \textit{See infra} notes 216-20 and accompanying text (noting that misappropriation theory does not apply if insiders trade with the approval of their principal, the owner of the information).} and more.

Despite its breadth, the misappropriation theory is in many ways more consistent with the common law than Powell’s classical theory. The two theories draw on different sets of common law principles: the classical theory draws heavily on the common law of deceit, whereas the misappropriation theory draws primarily on the common law of agency. Agency law provides a more comprehensive and coherent basis for dealing with the problem of insider trading, which is, at bottom, the misuse by faithless agents of information that belongs to others. Moreover, the misappropriation theory’s broad scope allows it to fill a gap left by the classical theory which, if left unfilled, would severely undermine the policy interests served by prohibitions against insider trading. The misappropriation theory, as adopted in \textit{O’Hagan}, secures the law of insider trading to firmer foundations.
I. THE CLASSICAL THEORY: CHIARELLA AND DIRKS

A. United States v. Chiarella: Requirement of a Duty of Disclosure to Shareholders

Vincent Chiarella was a “markup man” for a New York financial printer.20 In the course of his work on announcements for corporate takeover bids, he deduced the identity of the target companies and used the information to trade in the securities of the target companies, realizing a gain of slightly more than $30,000.21 His trading violated his employer’s clearly established policy against the use of customer information for personal gain.22

Chiarella’s trading triggered an investigation by the SEC, leading to a criminal securities fraud conviction under § 10(b) that was affirmed by the Second Circuit.23 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, reversed.24 Justice Powell framed the question presented as whether Chiarella’s silence could be deemed deceptive.25 Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Powell reasoned that:

At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information “that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”26

Powell incorporated this common law approach into § 10(b).27 He found

20 Chiarella’s duties included the selection of type fonts and page layouts. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing Chiarella’s duties as a “markup man”), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

21 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224 (explaining that although the names of the companies were concealed, Chiarella deduced these names from other information in the documents and traded in the securities of the target company to gain $30,000 in 14 months).

22 See Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1369 (noting that the employer’s rules were posted on bulletin boards throughout the office and described the prohibited conduct and the potential criminal consequences).

23 See id. at 1373.

24 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237.

25 See id. at 226 (“[Section] 10(b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device.”).

26 Id. at 227-28 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). The general common law rule is well established that silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not fraudulent. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 193 (1817) (holding that failure to disclose end of the War of 1812—which caused price of tobacco to increase—was not fraud in purchase of tobacco).

27 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“[S]ilence in connection with the purchase or sale of
that the common law of deceit recognized "a relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that corporation." \(^{28}\) In Chiarella's case, the jury was not instructed to find any such specific duty; rather, the jury instruction implied that Chiarella owed a "duty to everyone; to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material, non-public information at a time when 'he knew other people trading in the securities market did not have access to the same information.'" \(^{29}\) Powell rejected the notion that Congress intended § 10(b) to function as a "parity-of-information rule" prohibiting any informational advantages in the securities markets. \(^{30}\) To this end, Powell looked to the common law of deceit to confine § 10(b); that body of law did not support a sweeping duty to all market participants:

"[T]he element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose—is absent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner’s relationship with the sellers of the target company’s securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions." \(^{31}\)

Because Chiarella had breached no duty of disclosure to the sellers of the securities, his silence could not be fraudulent, and therefore, his conviction could not stand.

Powell declined to decide—on the ground that it had not been submitted to the jury—the merits of the government's alternative theory. That alternative theory argued that Chiarella had breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he traded information that he obtained in his position as an employee of the printer employed by the corporation. \(^{32}\)
B. SEC v. Dirks: Duty Acquired as a Tippee

Ray Dirks was an investment analyst for a New York broker-dealer whose research focused on the securities of insurance companies. Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America, told Dirks that Equity Funding was carrying on a massive fraud by grossly overstating the value of its assets and urged Dirks to bring the fraud to light. Dirks's investigation confirmed Secrist's allegations. Dirks shared this information with the Wall Street Journal, the SEC, and his clients, who proceeded to unload their more than $16 million in Equity Funding securities. Dirks's clients avoided massive losses by selling in advance of the public disclosure of the Equity Funding fraud.

After the fraud was disclosed, the SEC began an investigation into Dirks's role in uncovering the Equity Funding fraud, leading to the filing of an administrative complaint against him. The SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted insider trading violations by passing on information about the Equity Funding fraud to his clients. Conceding that Dirks had played an important role in bringing the fraud to light, however, the SEC imposed only a censure on him. Dirks appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the SEC's censure. The Supreme Court granted Dirks's petition for certiorari, and reversed.

Writing for the majority, Justice Powell strongly suggested that he viewed the SEC's censure of Dirks as overreaching by the agency. Once again, Powell rejected what he perceived to be the SEC's view that "the antifraud

34 See id. at 649.
35 See id. at 649-50 (noting that William Blundell, the Wall Street Journal bureau chief who Dirks contacted, doubted "that such a massive fraud could go undetected and declined to write the story").
36 See id. at 650 n.3 (noting that the SEC was currently conducting its own investigation of Equity Funding).
37 See id. at 649.
38 See id. at 650 (noting that the price of Equity Funding stock fell from $26 per share to $15 per share).
39 See id.
40 See id. at 650-51 (finding that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
41 See id. at 651-52.
42 See SEC v. Dirks, 681 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
44 See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 652.
45 See id. at 664 n.24 ("Without legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the facts of this case make plain.").
provisions require equal information among all traders.”

He reiterated that “[a] duty [to disclose] arises from the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire information because of his position in the market.” Nevertheless, Powell recognized that there was a “need for a ban on some tippee trading . . . .”

Looking to the Court's prior decisions for the limits of such trading, Powell found that limit in common law principles involving a fiduciary’s breach of duty, noting that “the transactions of those who knowingly participate with the fiduciary in such a breach are 'as forbidden' as transactions 'on behalf of the trustee himself.'” The absence of such a rule would “open up opportunities for devious dealings in the name of the others that the trustee could not conduct in his own.” But Powell also recognized that imposing a broad-based duty to the market on tippees such as Dirks could have a chilling effect on the process by which information makes its way to the market:

Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze information,” and this is often done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market worth of a corporation’s securities.

Balancing these factors, Powell concluded that a tippee’s duty to disclose derives from an insider’s fiduciary duty of disclosure, which would be breached only when the insider has improperly provided that inside information to the tippee.

Not all disclosures of corporate information are considered improper. A corporate official, for example, might mistakenly believe that the information was already public or not material. The test of whether a disclosure is improper is “whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no deriva-

46 Id. at 657.
48 Id. at 659.
49 Id. (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 272 (1951) (holding trustee personally liable for authorizing employee to trade in securities of the debtors' subsidiaries)).
50 Id. (quoting Mosser, 341 U.S. at 271).
51 Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted).
52 See id. at 659-60.
53 See id. at 662.
tive breach."\(^54\) Secrist, the source of Dirks’s information, was motivated to expose the fraud and had obtained no personal advantage by disclosing it to Dirks.\(^55\) Because Secrist had violated no duty to Equity Funding’s shareholders, Dirks could not be derivatively liable.\(^56\) Thus, \textit{Dirks} confirmed \textit{Chiarella}’s holding that insider trading liability—consistent with the common law of deceit—must be based on a breach of duty to the purchasers or sellers of the corporation’s shares.\(^57\)

C. Puzzles of the Classical Theory

Justice Powell’s efforts to limit the law of insider trading by incorporating the common law of deceit into § 10(b) of the Exchange Act create a series of doctrinal problems and unresolved issues. This Part explores those problems and questions.

1. No Reliance in Open-Market Transactions

The first and most notable problem is that the common law of deceit provides scant support for the proposition that a corporate insider defrauds a shareholder when the insider does not engage in a face-to-face transaction, but instead trades in an impersonal market on the basis of confidential information.\(^58\) In the leading case of \textit{Goodwin v. Agassiz},\(^59\) the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected a claim that an insider commits fraud when trading over a stock exchange.\(^60\) The plaintiff-shareholder sold his shares in a mining company to two of the company’s insiders, its president and general

\(^{54}\) \textit{Id.}

\(^{55}\) \textit{See id.} at 666-67.

\(^{56}\) \textit{See id.} at 667 (holding that Dirks “could not have been ‘a participant after the fact in [an] insider breach of a fiduciary duty’” (citation omitted)). In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, disagreed that personal gain by the insider was required for a breach of duty. \textit{See id.} at 673-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (arguing that personal gain is not an element of the breach of the duty because the duty does not look to the insiders’ motives, but rather to the insiders’ actions and the consequences to shareholders).

\(^{57}\) \textit{See supra} notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing Powell’s opinion in \textit{Chiarella}, which required that a tippee breach a duty that the tippee has with the shareholders).

\(^{58}\) \textit{See Lawrence A. Hamermesh}, \textit{Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty}, 49 \textit{VAND. L. REV.} 1087, 1153 n.296 (1996) (“Research has not disclosed any case in which a stockholder selling in the market has successfully invoked fiduciary disclosure duty, as opposed to Rule 10b-5, to recover compensatory damages from a director who concurrently bought stock.”).

\(^{59}\) 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).

\(^{60}\) \textit{See id.} at 661 (explaining the impracticability of requiring directors and other insiders who buy or sell shares of their corporation to seek out the other transacting party and disclosing to him everything that a court or jury may later find to affect the value of such shares).
The insiders were aware of a geologist's theory that the land owned by the company might contain valuable copper deposits. They kept this information secret, however, in order to obtain options on surrounding land that might also contain copper. Knowing that the company's stock price would rise if the theory panned out, the insiders bought heavily in the company's shares. These purchases, done over the Boston Stock Exchange, were completely anonymous.

The court rejected the plaintiff's claim of fraud. While the court recognized that the directors of a corporation "stand in a relation of trust to the corporation and are bound to exercise the strictest good faith in respect to its property and business," it held that directors do not "occupy the position of trustee toward individual stockholders." Thus, there was "no fiduciary relation between them and the plaintiff in the matter of the sale of his stock." This result was supported by the "imposing weight of authority in other jurisdictions." The court acknowledged that the result might have been different in a face-to-face transaction, but concluded that any such duty to shareholders did not carry over to an anonymous exchange transaction.

Goodwin sets forth the "majority rule," which holds that there can be no liability for insider trading carried out over an exchange. Even before past-

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61 See id. at 659 (discussing the transactions in question in which the defendants, through brokers, bought 700 shares from plaintiff).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 659-60 (noting that the plaintiff did not have this information).
64 See id. at 660 (noting that the defendants agreed that the theory should be disclosed only if absolutely necessary).
65 See id. (noting that the defendants bought many shares of the stock through agents).
66 See id. (discussing the plaintiff's lack of knowledge regarding the defendants' identity and that "[t]here was no communication between them touching the subject").
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. (citations omitted).
71 Id. (citing cases from Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Utah).
72 See id. at 661 (discussing, in dictum, that had the transaction been face-to-face, relief may have been granted in appropriate circumstances).
73 See Barbara A. Ash, State Regulation of Insider Trading—A Timely Resurgence?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 399 (1988) ("Under what has been referred to as the 'majority rule,' an officer or director owed no duty to disclose any information even when the trading transaction was with an existing shareholder."); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (noting that at the time the "Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act were passed, classic insider trading—transactions between uninformed shareholders and corporate officials possessing inside information—was not regarded as fraudulent in most jurisdictions" and that "[t]he corporate official's fiduciary duties were considered to run to the corporation as an entity, not to
sage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, a minority of courts had adopted an exception to the majority rule, known as the "special facts" doctrine. Under that exception, a corporate officer or director has a duty to disclose in a face-to-face transaction with a shareholder if there are special facts that would make nondisclosure unconscionable.

The United States Supreme Court first adopted the "special facts" doctrine in *Strong v. Repide.* In *Strong,* the managing director of a land development company was negotiating the sale of the company's land, its only valuable asset, when he arranged to purchase Mrs. Strong's shares from her agent. The managing director, rather than simply going from his own office to the agent's office next door, took elaborate steps to conceal his identity. He employed his own agent, who in turn employed a broker "who had an office some distance away," to approach the plaintiff's agent concerning the purchase of her stock. The managing director continued the concealment by paying for the shares with the check of a third person. The Supreme Court concluded from these facts that:

[T]he concealment of identity was not a mere inadvertent omission, an omission without any fraudulent or deceitful intent, but was a studied and intentional omission to be characterized as part of the deceitful machinations to obtain the purchase without giving any information whatever as to the state and probable result of the negotiations, to the vendor of the stock, and to in that way obtain the same at a lower price.

Based on this finding of deceitful concealment, the Court granted rescission

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74 *See, e.g., Todd A. Bauman, Comment, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 838, 853 (1984) (noting that "the traditional common law rule allowed insider trading in anonymous markets, while regulating such activity in face-to-face transactions in shares of closely held corporations").

75 *See Ash, supra note 73, at 399-400.

76 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (holding that there was a legal obligation to make the disclosures because of the special facts).

77 *See id. at 425 (noting that the defendant knowingly purchased 800 shares from Mrs. Strong's agent). The Court stated that "[i]f the sale should not be consummated ... the defendant also knew that the value of the lands and of the shares in the company would be almost nothing." *Id.* at 424-25. Apparently, the government had failed to provide any protection to the lands, thus rendering it essentially worthless. *See id.* at 425.

78 *See id.* (describing the scheme the defendant followed in order to purchase the shares).

79 *Id.*

80 *See id.* at 433.

81 *Id.*
to Mrs. Strong.\textsuperscript{82}

The special facts doctrine of \textit{Strong} is readily distinguished from the transactions over impersonal exchanges at issue in \textit{Goodwin}, \textit{Chiarella}, and \textit{Dirks}. The “special facts” found by the Court in \textit{Strong} indicate that active concealment of the defendant’s identity deprived the plaintiff-shareholder of a basis for inquiring about the transaction and the company’s prospects.\textsuperscript{83} In an impersonal exchange market, by contrast, the insider need not conceal his identity from the outsider on the other side of the transaction because there is no individual matching of trades in the securities markets.\textsuperscript{84} An insider makes no investment in concealment, and an outsider has no expectation of receiving any disclosure from the insider because the outsider does not know that she is trading with an insider. The identity of the person on the other side of the transaction is a mere fortuity, irrelevant to the shareholder’s decision to sell.\textsuperscript{85} Because of this anonymity in exchange markets, there can be no reliance on the insider’s duty to disclose, and the insider cannot be said to have induced the trade.\textsuperscript{86}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{82} See id. at 435.
\textsuperscript{83} See id. at 433 (noting that by concealing his identity, the defendant could “more easily avoid any questions relative to the negotiations for the sale of the lands and their probable result, and could also avoid any actual misrepresentations on that subject, which he evidently thought were necessary in his case to constitute a fraud”). Professor Keeton describes \textit{Strong} as a case involving concealed identity. \textit{See W. Page Keeton, Fraud—Concealment and Non-Disclosure}, 15 \textit{Tex. L. Rev.} 1, 26 (1936) (“[I]t has been held to constitute fraud for a director to conceal his identity along with another fact which makes the stock of much greater worth, and which the stockholder would probably have discovered, either by investigation or inquiry, if he had known that the purchaser was a director.” (citing \textit{Strong}, 213 U.S. at 431)). Keeton notes that “these cases often distinguish between facts which could be discovered by an inspection of the books and facts which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the director.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{84} See Lawrence E. Mitchell, \textit{The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back}, 52 \textit{Alb. L. Rev.} 775, 799 (1988) (arguing that “the existence of national securities markets makes the use of agents unnecessary, since the anonymity of the markets is sufficient to conceal the fact that insiders are trading in a manner analogous to that accomplished through the use of agents”).

\textsuperscript{85} See Donald C. Langevoort, \textit{Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement}, 70 \textit{Cal. L. Rev.} 1, 7 (1982) (arguing that investors don’t know nor do they care “who their buyers or sellers are, there is no bargaining similar to that in face-to-face transactions” and that “given the essential independence of buyer and seller decisions, causation and injury are difficult to trace”).

\textsuperscript{86} See Alison Grey Anderson, \textit{Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading}, 10 \textit{Hofstra L. Rev.} 341, 366-67 (1982) (“Silence by a fiduciary is fraudulent primarily because the beneficiary is likely to interpret that silence in a face-to-face transaction as meaning that the fiduciary is aware of no additional material information.”). The government is not required, however, to prove reliance to establish a claim of securities fraud because the government was not a party to the transaction. \textit{See SEC v. Blavin}, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th
From a doctrinal perspective, Powell’s invocation in *Chiarella* of the common law of deceit is strained. The majority rule is that there can be no liability for insider trading carried out over a stock exchange. The logic of the “special facts” exception to that rule, while protecting face-to-face transactions, cannot be stretched to encompass transactions over exchanges. As Michael Dooley observes, “insider trading in no way resembles deceit. No representation is made, nor is there any reliance, change of position, or causal connection between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s losses.” For these reasons, the common law of deceit does not support the proposition that a corporate insider defrauds a shareholder when trading in an impersonal market on the basis of confidential information.

2. No Fiduciary Duty to Prospective Shareholders

Another doctrinal problem with the classical theory is that the fiduciary obligation of corporate officers and directors generally extends only to current shareholders. That obligation does not extend to prospective shareholders who may purchase their shares for the first time when an insider sells. The classical theory fails to account adequately for this inconsistency with the common law. The Court’s only response to this problem was set forth in *Chiarella*, in which the Court quoted Judge Learned Hand:

[T]he director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one.

Although this distinction may be “sorry,” it is the common law rule.

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88 Michael P. Dooley, *Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions*, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1, 59 (1980). Although *Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States*, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), holds that reliance can be presumed in the case of a fraudulent omission, that case involved non-disclosure by fiduciaries in a face-to-face transaction. As such, the case is indistinguishable from *Strong v. Repide*, but readily distinguished from *Chiarella and Dirks*.


90 *See* id.

91 United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)).

92 *See* Anderson, *supra* note 86, at 356 (noting that “under state law corporate officers and directors generally have a fiduciary obligation to existing shareholders but not to prospective shareholders”).
ell’s reliance on the common law of deceit is, at best, selective.

3. Transformation of a Breach of a Tipper’s Duty of Confidentiality Into a Breach by the Tippee of a Duty of Disclosure to Shareholders

Additional problems with the classical theory are raised by the tension between Dirks and Chiarella. In Chiarella, Powell treats insider trading as a breach of a duty of disclosure to the shareholders, but the tipper’s breach is more readily seen as a breach of his duty of confidentiality owed to the corporation. Although Powell’s justification of the need for prohibitions against trading by tippees makes sense, his transformation of the tipper’s breach of his duty of confidentiality owed to the corporation into a breach by the tippee of a duty of disclosure to shareholders is harder to accept.

4. Causation

The classical theory also poses puzzles of causation. The “victim” of insider trading would likely have sold her shares regardless of whether or not the insider entered the market to purchase them. Moreover, identifying the “victim” of insider trading is problematic due to the near impossibility of matching trades in an impersonal market. Congress has addressed this tracing problem by allowing all contemporaneous traders to sue insider traders. Their damages are limited, however, to the insider’s profit gained or

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93 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (“[A] corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him.”).

94 See Mitchell, supra note 84, at 796 (noting that at common law, corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, and that only a few jurisdictions recognize a fiduciary duty to shareholders with respect to purchases of company stock).

95 I am indebted to Steve Thel for the argument presented here.

96 See Cox & Fogarty, supra note 73, at 359 (arguing that a purchaser “is rarely the person whose intermediary meets the insider’s intermediary on the exchange floor” and that “[t]he latter person was already in the market and probably would have bought or sold even if the insider had abstained”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 324 (“[The shareholder] who sold to Chiarella, might well have sold no matter what Chiarella did. There is no reason to think that Chiarella’s ‘buy’ order, placed through a broker, caused additional investors to sell.”).

97 See Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 238 (1992) (stating that “it is virtually impossible for a private plaintiff trading in the stock exchange to establish either privity with a particular defendant or causality of the trade by any trader’s particular transaction”).

98 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (1994). The statute states that:

Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling information shall be liable in action in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who, contemparaneously with the purchase or
loss avoided, and the damages are offset by any disgorgement paid to the SEC.99 The limitations on this statutory remedy suggest that Congress intended to deprive the insider of his gains rather than to compensate the "victims" of insider trading for their losses.100

5. No Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders

Another problem with the classical theory is that the common law also does not recognize a fiduciary duty running from officers and directors to bondholders, at least while the corporation is solvent.101 Therefore, the classical theory does not prevent insider trading in bonds. The failure to prevent insider trading in bonds is a large loophole in the classical theory.102

6. The Corporation's Property Rights in Information

Powell's efforts to ground the classical theory of insider trading in the common law of deceit ignore the corporation's interest in protecting its property rights in information. In Dirks, Powell distinguished "[t]he duty that insiders owe to the corporation's shareholders not to trade on inside information . . . from the common-law duty that officers and directors also have to the corporation itself not to mismanage corporate assets, of which confidential information is one."103 As discussed above, that duty of disclosure to shareholders is not well grounded in the common law of deceit. Nor is it grounded in the law of property, because the corporation's confidences belong to the corporation, not the shareholders.104 Consequently, the insider's

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99 See id. § 78t-1(b)(1)-(2). The statute states that:

The total amount of damages . . . shall not exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transactions that are the subject of the violation . . . . The total amount of damages imposed against any person . . . shall be diminished by the amounts, if any, that such person may be required to disgorge, pursuant to a court order obtained at the instance of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.

100 Cf. Salbu, supra note 97, at 236 (arguing that the "proper justification for the granting of surrogate status to contemporaneous traders is to achieve 10b-5's goal of deterrence").


104 See Dooley, supra note 88, at 32 ("Neither insiders nor outside investors have any property right in non-public corporate information. The corporate principal owns the information and may withhold it so long as withholding serves a valid corporate purpose.").
duty to protect the confidentiality of the corporation's information is much better established, and the corporation has a better claim than the shareholder that its rights have been infringed by the insider trading. The breach of this duty of confidentiality has given rise to liability to the corporation under state corporate law. But given the restrictions on purchasers or sellers that the Court has put on the private right of action under § 10(b), the corporation will have a difficult time collecting under the securities laws for the misuse of its information.

In sum, the classical theory of insider trading grounded in the law of deceit gives incomplete protection to the integrity of the market because it only addresses breaches of duty to shareholders. This gap was the driving force behind the development of the misappropriation theory. The next Part examines the development of that theory.

105 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 395 (1958) (stating that an agent is under “a duty... not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to the injury of the principal”).

106 See Dooley, supra note 88, at 21 (arguing that requiring insiders to forfeit any profit resulting from a breach of a fiduciary duty should result in payment to the issuer because it has the superior property interest in the information); see also Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 323 (“Chiarella’s trading... reduced the returns available to the bidders. His trading may have alerted the market to the impending offers and so made them more difficult to consummate. Chiarella’s conduct subjected his principals to uncompensated risk.”).

107 See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 916 (N.Y. 1969) (requiring that officers and directors account to the corporation for profits made in trading on inside information); cf. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (requiring that corporate officers account for trading profits made in competition with the corporation’s planned repurchase of its shares). But see Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 187 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting duty to corporation under Indiana law).

Section 16(b) also puts recovery for short-swing profits by insiders in the hands of the corporation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994) (requiring that any profit derived from the purchase or sale of a security by an insider within six months is to be recoverable by the issuer).

108 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (holding that a private right of action is limited to persons who purchased or sold securities). The purchaser/seller limitation is inapplicable to SEC enforcement actions and to criminal cases. See id. at 751 n.14 (holding that the purchaser-seller rule “imposes no limitation on the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief”); see also Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 281 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he purchaser/seller standing requirement for private civil actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is of no import in criminal prosecutions for willful violations of those provisions.”).
II. THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY: CARPENTER AND O'HAGAN

A. Background of the Misappropriation Theory

The misappropriation theory has its judicial genesis in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella. The Chief Justice agreed with Justice Powell that, "[a]s a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation." Burger parted company with Powell, however, where a trader obtained a trading advantage based on information that had been "misappropriated." In Burger's view, "a person who has misappropriated non-public information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading." Burger argued that imposing such a duty would not have any negative effect on legitimate business practices because the misappropriator's "conduct quite clearly serves no useful function except his own enrichment at the expense of others." Burger's theory, while much broader than Powell's, shared one feature with the majority opinion in Chiarella: the duty endorsed by Burger was owed to the

109 See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that "a person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading"). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall also indicated support for the theory or the broader parity of information theory. See id. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "a person violates § 10(b) whenever he improperly obtains or converts to his benefit nonpublic information which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities"); id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.) (stating agreement "with much of what is said in . . . the dissenting opinion" of the Chief Justice).

110 Id. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 106 (2d ed. 1955)).

111 See id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the rule should give way when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means").

112 Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Keeton, supra note 83, at 25-26). Keeton offers scant authority for this proposition, asserting that "[a]ny time information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to disclose that information, irrespective of the nature of the remedy." Keeton, supra note 85, at 25-26; see also id. at 35 (stating that a duty of disclosure exists when information is acquired by an illegal act). But the only authorities offered by Keeton are cases seeking specific performance. See id. at 25 ("There are cases denying the remedy of specific performance in instances where material information undisclosed has been acquired by a tortious act."). These cases denying specific performance are, of course, grounded in the equity doctrine of "unclean hands," which would not apply in an action at law. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (discussing the equitable notion of "unclean hands," which prohibits relief to those "tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief").

113 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
shareholder on the other side of the trade.\textsuperscript{114}

Prosecutors quickly embraced a variant of the misappropriation theory espoused by Burger. In \textit{United States v. Newman},\textsuperscript{115} they charged that Newman, a securities trader, and two investment bankers, one from Morgan Stanley and one from Kuhn Loeb, "misappropriated confidential information concerning proposed mergers and acquisitions that was entrusted to their employers by corporate clients."\textsuperscript{116} Rather than alleging a breach of duty to the shareholders with whom the conspirators traded, however, the indictment alleged that the conspirators had breached their duties of trust and confidence to their employers, the investment banks, and to their employers' corporate clients.\textsuperscript{117}

The Second Circuit agreed that this breach of duty stated a violation of § 10(b).\textsuperscript{118} The court brushed aside objections that the investment banks were not purchasers or sellers as being inapplicable to a government action.\textsuperscript{119} It found the requisite deception in the conspirators' conduct that damaged the investment banks' reputations as keepers of client confidences and in wronging the investment banks' clients.\textsuperscript{120} The court also rejected the claim that the conspirators' fraud was not "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities, reasoning that the defendant's sole purpose in misappropriating the takeover information was to purchase shares of the target companies.\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Newman} illustrates that from its earliest acceptance by the courts, the misappropriation theory, unlike the classical theory, was premised upon a fraud committed on one party, and a securities transaction entered into with another.

B. United States v. Carpenter: \textit{Misappropriation Theory in Limbo}

The Second Circuit subsequently reaffirmed the misappropriation the-

\textsuperscript{114} See \textit{id.} at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that one who misappropriates non-
public information has an absolute duty to disclose that information to the shareholder on
the other side of the transaction or to refrain from trading). Purchasers who have inside
information from their own company generally have no duty to shareholders of other cor-
porations. See \textit{General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus.}, 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968)
("We know of no rule of law . . . that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and
had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances
that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort the sale.").

\textsuperscript{115} 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{id.} at 15.

\textsuperscript{117} See \textit{id.} at 15-16.

\textsuperscript{118} See \textit{id.} at 16.

\textsuperscript{119} See \textit{id.} at 16-17 (arguing that Rule 10b-5 applies to any person, and that the court
must be concerned with the scope of the Rule and not the plaintiff's standing to sue).

\textsuperscript{120} See \textit{id.} at 17 (noting that the clients had takeover plans that depended upon market-
based prices, not inflated prices caused by the release of this information).

\textsuperscript{121} See \textit{id.} at 18.
The Supreme Court’s first opportunity to consider the misappropriation theory was presented in another Second Circuit case, United States v. Carpenter. Carpenter narrowly avoided a decision on the validity of the theory—a decision which, but for a quirk of fate, in all likelihood would have changed the course of insider trading jurisprudence.

Carpenter arose from a unique set of facts. Defendant R. Foster Winans was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal and one of the writers of the “Heard on the Street” column, while defendant David Carpenter was a news clerk at the Journal. Winans would pass securities-related information scheduled to appear in the next day’s column through Carpenter to Felis, who would then, depending upon the tenor of the article, buy or sell the subject securities. Wall Street Journal policy deemed all news information to be company property and required nonpublic information to be treated as confidential. Ignoring this policy, the conspirators netted nearly $690,000 from the scheme. The stress of an SEC inquiry into the scheme caused the conspirators to turn on each other, and an indictment followed.

The Second Circuit affirmed the conspirators’ convictions for mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud. With respect to the securities fraud convictions, the Second Circuit followed its earlier precedents and upheld the convictions under the misappropriation theory.

The conspirators petitioned for certiorari, which the Court initially voted to deny. Justice Powell prepared a draft dissent from the denial of certiorari in which he made it clear that he would have rejected the misappropriation theory altogether. He began his opinion by noting that “the Second Circuit has resolved an important question of securities law in a way that ap-

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122 See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that misappropriation of nonpublic information constitutes a violation of § 10(b)).
124 See id. at 1026.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 1027.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 1036.
131 See id. at 1034-35.
132 See id. at 1032-34.
133 See Powell’s Draft, supra note 11, at 1 (dissenting from denial of certiorari).
134 See id. at 6 (arguing that the misappropriation theory has “little or no support . . . in the language or history of the Securities Act of 1934”).
pears to conflict with recent opinions of this Court."135 The first of these opinions was Powell’s own work in Chiarella.

In Chiarella, the analysis of Rule 10b-5 began with the proposition that:

[P]arties to a business transaction generally do not have an affirmative duty to disclose information about the transaction. The court noted, however, that a failure to disclose material information could be fraudulent in certain circumstances. “But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”136

Powell’s reading of Chiarella is closely tied to the common law of deceit, which requires that “[o]ne party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated . . . matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”137 Thus, the common law of deceit requires that the duty of disclosure be owed by one party of the transaction to the other. In Powell’s view, Chiarella had incorporated this common law requirement into § 10(b).138

Powell then turned to Dirks, which “established that when outsiders have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they cannot purchase securities from those shareholders without first informing them of material information that might influence the decision to purchase or sell the securities.”139 Again, the disclosure duty was only between the parties to the securities transaction. By contrast, in Carpenter there was no fiduciary relationship between the defendants and those from whom they purchased securities.140 The only fiduciary relationship at issue was Winans’ duty to the Journal.141 Powell noted, however, that previous cases under Rule 10b-5 did not support the proposition that the fiduciary duty an individual owes to his employee was sufficient to support an action under Rule 10b-5.142 Rather, the inquiry under Rule 10b-5 “must focus on the petitioner’s relationship with the sellers of . . . securities.”143 Because there was no such relationship in Carpenter, Powell concluded that the petitioners’ conduct did not violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.144

135 Id. at 1.
136 Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
138 See Powell’s Draft, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that Chiarella found that parties to a business transaction do not necessarily owe a duty to disclose information and that liability arises only in instances where there is such a duty).
139 Id.
140 See id. (noting that the court of appeals found no fiduciary relationship between any of the parties).
141 See id. at 4-5.
142 See id. at 6.
143 Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
144 See id. (concluding that because there was no fiduciary duty to disclose information,
Powell’s draft dissent was joined by Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.\textsuperscript{145} It was never published, however, because Justices Brennan and Scalia changed their votes to grant certiorari.\textsuperscript{146} Before Carpenter was argued, Justice Powell retired.\textsuperscript{147} His successor, Anthony Kennedy, was not confirmed until after the argument.\textsuperscript{148} The Court split 4-4 on the misappropriation theory under the securities laws and it issued no opinion on the validity of the theory.\textsuperscript{149} Given Powell’s explicit rejection of the misappropriation theory in his draft dissent, it is reasonable to conclude that if Justice Powell had not retired when he did, the Supreme Court would have rejected the misappropriation theory in 1987.\textsuperscript{150}

C. United States v. Bryan: The Fourth Circuit Rejects the Misappropriation Theory

In the aftermath of Carpenter, Congress considered, but declined to adopt, a proposal to codify the misappropriation theory.\textsuperscript{151} Nevertheless, the government continued to bring misappropriation cases, and the theory was ac-

\textsuperscript{145} See Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Powell, (Dec. 11, 1986) (on file with the author) (joining in dissent from denial of certiorari); Letter from Justice O’Connor to Justice Powell, (Dec. 11, 1986) (on file with the author) (joining in dissent from denial of certiorari).


\textsuperscript{148} See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 19 (1987) (noting that the case was argued on October 7, 1987); Linda Greenhouse, Reagan Nominates Anthony Kennedy to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1987, at A1 (reporting that Justice Kennedy was nominated November 11, 1987); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Kennedy Sworn In as 104th Justice on High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1988, at A10 (reporting that Anthony Kennedy was sworn in as Justice on February 18, 1988).

\textsuperscript{149} See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. The Court affirmed the mail and wire fraud convictions unanimously. See id.

\textsuperscript{150} Conversely, if Justice Kennedy had been nominated and confirmed by the time of argument, the misappropriation theory might well have been upheld, given that Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in O’Hagan. See United States v. O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1997) (noting that Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined in Ginsburg’s opinion).

\textsuperscript{151} See Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAW. 145, 150-51 (1989) (discussing the debate over the move to define insider trading and the decision against such definition).
cepted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The government's string of victories came to an abrupt halt in 1995, when the Fourth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory in United States v. Bryan.

Elton "Butch" Bryan, Lottery Director for the State of West Virginia, was convicted of wire and securities fraud for trading in the securities of companies that were about to be awarded contracts with the lottery. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit framed the question before it as:

[W]hether [Rule 10b-5]'s prohibition of "fraud" "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," which can be read no more broadly than the statutory prohibition of "deception" "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," may extend to breaches of fiduciary duty involving the misappropriation of confidential information from one who is neither a purchaser nor seller of securities, or otherwise connected with a securities transaction.

The Fourth Circuit found that the misappropriation theory failed to meet the statutory requirements on two grounds. First, the court held that the misappropriation theory imposes liability upon the mere breach of fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of trust and confidence without a showing of deception. In the court's view, this omission conflicted with the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe, that a mere breach of fiduciary duty, absent deception, did not give rise to liability under § 10(b). Second, the theory failed because it could not satisfy § 10(b)'s requirement that the persons deceived have some connection to the security transaction, because it "artificially divides into two discrete requirements—a fiduciary breach and a purchase or sale of securities—the single indivisible requirement of deception upon the purchaser or seller of securities, or upon some other person intimately linked with or affected by a securities transaction." In this regard, the Fourth Circuit's analysis follows the logic of Justice Powell's draft dissent in Carpenter, that the fraud must be in the securities transaction for it to

152 See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991) (accepting the misappropriation theory and holding that one "violates Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) . . . by misappropriating and trading upon material information").
153 See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the misappropriation theory applies to fraud under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
154 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the misappropriation theory because it lacked support from the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Supreme Court decisions interpreting these provisions, or from the purposes of securities fraud provisions).
155 See id. at 937.
156 See id. at 939.
157 Id. at 946 (citations omitted).
158 See id. at 949.
159 See Santa Fe Indus., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (holding that deception is necessary to trigger § 10(b) liability).
160 Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950.
D. United States v. O'Hagan

1. The Eighth Circuit

In O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of the misappropriation theory. James O'Hagan was a prominent lawyer with Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, the law firm Grand Met retained to represent it in connection with a possible takeover of Pillsbury. Despite Grand Met’s and Dorsey & Whitney’s efforts to maintain confidentiality, O'Hagan learned of the transaction and began purchasing Pillsbury call options and stock. When Grand Met announced its tender offer for Pillsbury, O'Hagan realized a profit in excess of $4 million. Following an SEC investigation, O'Hagan was convicted of 57 counts of mail fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering.

In reversing all of the convictions, the Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory because it does not require deception, “contrary to § 10(b)’s explicit requirements,” and that in any event, it renders “nugatory the requirement that the ‘deception’ be ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.’” The court adopted Bryan’s analysis in its entirety.

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161 See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell’s draft dissent from denial of certiorari in Carpenter).
162 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 662 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that criminal liability could not be imposed under § 10(b) under the misappropriation theory), rev’d, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
163 See id. at 614.
164 See id.
165 See id.
167 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 620. The Eighth Circuit went further than the Bryan court, however, by also invalidating the SEC’s Rule 14e-3, see id. at 627, which prohibits the use in securities trading of confidential information relating to tender offers, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1997). The validity of the Rule had previously been upheld by the Second, see United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); Seventh, see SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995); and Tenth Circuits, see SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit rejected the Rule because it does not include any requirement of misrepresentation or nondisclosure. See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 625-26 (invalidating Rule 14e-3). In the court’s view, this omission conflicted with Chiarella’s holding that nondisclosure could be fraudulent only when there was a duty to disclose, and the court found no material differences between § 10(b) and § 14(e). See id. at
2. The Supreme Court

In the face of the widening split in the circuits over the validity of the misappropriation theory, the Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari. In arguing for the validity of the misappropriation theory, the government faced two principal challenges: (1) establishing that the theory rests on “deception” within the meaning of § 10(b); and (2) establishing that the deception required under the theory occurs “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities. The government argued that deception occurs not merely when a misappropriator breaches a duty to a principal in using the principal’s confidential information, but rather, when the misappropriator fails to disclose his intention to use the information. Drawing from agency principles, the government argued that O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his trading to his law firm and Grand Met made his conduct “deceptive” under § 10(b).

"[U]nder well settled principles, before an agent may use his principal’s confidential business information for his personal benefit, he must make disclosure to the principal and obtain the principal’s consent; the breach of that duty thus inherently involves deceptive nondisclosure." This failure to disclose in circumstances where disclosure is required distinguishes the misappropriation theory from the fully disclosed breach of fiduciary obligation rejected as a basis for § 10(b) liability in Santa Fe.

The government’s second challenge—establishing that the misappropriation theory satisfies the “in connection with” requirement—raised a question of pure statutory construction. The government argued that the statutory phrase should be read “in its ordinary meaning, as ‘related to’ or ‘involving.’” Applying this standard to the facts of O’Hagan, the government urged that O’Hagan’s fraud was “in connection with” his purchases of Pillsbury securities because . . . his trades were a necessary element of his fraud. The non-public information about the Pillsbury takeover had no value to [O’Hagan] personally except as it might enable him to reap windfall profits in the securities market (or enable someone else to reap such profits, through illegal tipping). Thus, . . . his deceptive fiduciary breach and his purchase of securities were connected, because the

624-27. The court also overturned O’Hagan’s mail fraud convictions, holding that “the indictment was structured in such a manner as to premise the fraud for the mail fraud charges on the acts allegedly constituting the securities fraud.” Id. at 627.

172 See id.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 8.
175 Id. at 11.
breach was consummated by his purchase of securities.176

No alternative opportunity could have secured the windfall profits of $4.3 million that O'Hagan made trading Pillsbury options. But until O'Hagan actually traded on the inside information, he had not actually converted it to his own use, and thus, he had not yet breached his fiduciary duty of disclosure. Only when O'Hagan used Grand Met's information for trading in the securities markets did he finally breach that duty. Consequently, the government's theory of "deception"—trading without disclosure—converged with its theory of why that fraudulent nondisclosure was "in connection with" O'Hagan's trading.

The "deception" and "in connection with" requirements were the central focus of oral argument before the Court. The first question posed by Justice O'Connor to Deputy Solicitor General Michael Dreeben concerned the deception element of the misappropriation theory:

QUESTION: Suppose the defendant here had instead come clean, and he told his superiors in the law firm that he was going to use this information. Then he would not be posing as a loyal employee any more, and it would have been okay?

DREEBEN: He would not have deceived his employer. He still would have breached independent fiduciary duties that he owed to that employer.

QUESTION: And you say he would still have breached the securities laws?

DREEBEN: No, I do not think he would have breached the securities laws.

QUESTION: So that's the line? He didn't tell them that he was going to go out and use it?

DREEBEN: That's absolutely correct, and the reason why that is significant is that § 10(b) prohibits deceptive devices and contrivances. It requires deception.177

Thus, the government's brief and oral argument made clear that under the misappropriation theory the "deception" element of § 10(b) is satisfied by an agent's failure to disclose to his principal the agent's intention to use the principal's confidential information for the agent's benefit.

Chief Justice Rehnquist raised concerns about the "in connection with" requirement that were reminiscent of Justice Powell's draft dissent in Carpenter:

176 Id.

QUESTION: Well, Mr. Dreeben, . . . the thing that bothers me about the case here is, where is the connection between the deceptive device and the purchase or sale of a security?

DREEBEN: The connection, Chief Justice Rehnquist, lies in the fact that the misappropriation does not occur until the lawyer uses the information as the basis for his trades. It is that very information which drives his participation in the market and allows the profits to be . . . reaped by him.

QUESTION: But he didn’t deceive anyone who sold him securities.

DREEBEN: That is true. The misappropriation theory doesn’t rely on the notion that he owed a duty of disclosure to the shareholders on the other side of the transaction, but it does satisfy the requisite connection between the fraud and the securities trading, because it is only in the trading that the fraud is consummated. There could be no closer—

QUESTION: But you think of fraud being practiced on a person who is damaged by it.

DREEBEN: I think under the common law view of fraud, Chief Justice Rehnquist, that is an accurate statement, but the securities laws are not framed to pick up only those violations that are covered by common law fraud. Congress did not pass a statute that says, it is unlawful to commit fraud on the purchaser or seller of securities.

Congress did not pass a law even that said it is unlawful to commit fraud in a securities transaction. It passed a law with a broader phrase, in connection with a securities transaction, because the very aim of this section was to pick up unforeseen, cunning, deceptive devices that people might cleverly use in the securities markets.178

The Chief Justice’s questions suggest that he believed that § 10(b) was limited to the common law of deceit, and that the fraud had to be in the securities transaction. This is essentially the position taken by Justice Powell,179 in which the Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor concurred at the time of Car-

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178 Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added).

179 See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell’s view that the fraud had to occur in the securities transaction). The Chief Justice dissented in O’Hagan, while Justice O’Connor joined the majority opinion. See United States v. O’Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1997).
O'Hagan's counsel attempted to capitalize on the issue raised by the Chief Justice's line of questioning. Relying on the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Bryan, he argued that deception and the securities transaction had to be "a unitary concept":

COUNSEL: The unitary concept is deception or manipulation in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. To me, that means the buyer or seller of the security deceives the person on the other side of the transaction. It's not as if you deceive someone over here and then later on you benefit from it by dealing with somebody else.

Mr. Dreeben's remark, it seems to me, fits with my theory of this case. He says... it has to be in connection with the purchase or sale of a security because the only way Mr. O'Hagan could profit was in the purchase or sale of a security. Not so. That assumes Mr. O'Hagan has no imagination. Mr. O'Hagan could have said, I now have a useful piece of information. I have misappropriated it. I'm going to profit on it by selling it to the trade press. I can get a good fee for this information.

So the misappropriation would have occurred, but it had been disconnected from the purchase or sale of the security.

QUESTION: It's not entirely disconnected. The trade press would only be interested in it because the people who read the trade press would be able to buy securities on the basis of this confidential information.\(^{181}\)

Counsel for O'Hagan provided the Court with another hypothetical:

COUNSEL: I'll give you another hypothetical, Your Honor, because I'm firmly convinced that the statute doesn't read the way Mr. Dreeben says it does. You cannot disconnect the misappropriation from the purchase and sale of securities and say it's satisfied.

Mr. O'Hagan's office in Minneapolis is across the street from the Pillsbury Company. He could have said to himself, I have always wanted the business of the

\(^{180}\) See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Powell in dissent from denial of certiorari).

\(^{181}\) See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 177, at 35 (discussing the unitary concept).
Pillsbury Company. I will walk across the street, misappropriating this information of my law firm and its client, deliver it to the Pillsbury Company, and suggest to the Pillsbury Company that in the future they might find it very desirable to use me for legal work.

That wouldn't have had anything to do with the purchase and sale of the security, and yet it would have profited Mr. O'Hagan if it had worked.¹⁸²

Experienced appellate lawyers know that many cases are decided before oral argument, but in some cases, oral argument can be decisive. O'Hagan may have been such a case. The government was able to demonstrate the logical limits of its theory of deception, and show how that deception was "in connection with" a securities transaction. The misappropriation was "in connection with" O'Hagan's securities trading because he had not breached his duty of disclosure until he actually traded. O'Hagan's counsel was unable to parry that argument with a convincing response.¹⁸³

The Court's decision accepted the misappropriation theory in its entirety.¹⁸⁴ Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, had little difficulty in finding that the misappropriation theory satisfied § 10(b)'s deception requirement.¹⁸⁵ She distinguished Santa Fe on the grounds that:

Deception through nondisclosure is central to the [misappropriation] theory . . . . Full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the non-public information, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no § 10(b) violation—although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.¹⁸⁶

Thus, nondisclosure in breach of a duty of disclosure remained the touchstone for a finding of deception under § 10(b), just as it had been in Chiarella. That duty of disclosure, however, was found in the common law of agency rather than the common law of deceit.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸² Id. at 35-37.
¹⁸³ See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Confidence, AM. LAW., June 1997, at 75-76 (reviewing the O'Hagan oral arguments).
¹⁸⁵ See id. at 2208 (stating that the misappropriation theory "satisfies § 10(b)'s requirement that chargeable conduct involve 'deceptive device or contrivance'").
¹⁸⁶ Id. at 2208-09. Justice Ginsburg reinforced the point, stating "it [was O'Hagan's] failure to disclose his personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to do so, that ma[de] his conduct 'deceptive' within the meaning of 10(b)." Id. at 2211.
¹⁸⁷ See id. at 2208 (discussing how a fiduciary breaches his duty of loyalty when con-
Ginsburg departed further from Justice Powell's legacy in her finding that the misappropriation theory satisfied § 10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement:

This element is satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell securities. The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the non-public information. A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains is advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.  

Ginsburg gave short shrift to the alternative uses for Grand Met's confidential information hypothesized by O'Hagan's counsel; in her view, it sufficed that the information "ordinarily" would have value only in securities trading. Thus, the misappropriation theory was consistent with the text of § 10(b).

Justice Ginsburg's treatment of the Court's prior precedents further demonstrated O'Hagan's departure from Justice Powell's vision of insider trading law. She rebuffed the notion that Chiarella required that the fraud be between parties to the securities transaction. The statements in Chiarella that suggested such an interpretation of § 10(b) merely "rejected the notion that § 10(b) stretches so far as to impose 'a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, non-public information,' and we confine them to that context." She also noted that Dirks specifically had reserved the question of trading on misappropriated information. Thus, Justice Ginsburg's treatment of Chiarella and Dirks diverged completely from Justice Powell's understanding of those cases as expressed in his draft dissent from denial of certiorari in Carpenter.

Ginsburg concluded that it would "make[ ] scant sense to hold a lawyer..."
like O’Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder”\textsuperscript{194} in light of “the inhibiting impact on market participation of trading on misappropriated information, and the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b).”\textsuperscript{195} Policy concerns and congressional intent, not the common law of deceit followed by Powell in \textit{Chiarella} and \textit{Dirks}, guided the Court’s decision in \textit{O’Hagan}.\textsuperscript{196}

These interests did not lead to a limitless prohibition against trading based on informational advantages, however, because the theory reaches only the “person who gains non-public information gained through misappropriation in breach of fiduciary duty”\textsuperscript{197} and then “without alerting the source... trades on the information.”\textsuperscript{198} That duty to alert the source of the information arises from the law of agency.

\section*{E. Puzzles in the Misappropriation Theory}

The misappropriation theory, like the classical theory, creates a series of puzzles. Most prominently, the agency law principles incorporated by the

\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Id.} at 2210-11.
\textsuperscript{195} \textit{Id.} at 2211. The Court also reversed the Eighth Circuit’s ruling on Rule 14e-3, holding that the Commission had not exceeded its authority in promulgating the Rule. \textit{See id.} at 2217 (upholding Rule 14e-3 as applied to cases like \textit{O’Hagan}). The Court held that § 14(e) authorized the Commission to adopt rules reasonably designed to prevent fraud, even if the conduct proscribed was not itself fraudulent. \textit{See id.} (upholding the Commission’s prohibitions if “reasonably designed to prevent... acts and practices that are fraudulent” even if not fraudulent themselves under the common law). The Court accepted the government’s argument that Rule 14e-3 serves this preventive purpose by prohibiting trading activity in a class of cases where there is likely to be a breach of fiduciary duty, but the breach is difficult to prove. \textit{See id.} at 2219 (validating Rule 14e-3 “insofar as it serves to prevent the type of misappropriation charged against O’Hagan”). Having reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment on the securities fraud counts, the Court also reversed the lower court’s ruling on the mail fraud convictions. \textit{See id.} at 2220.

\textsuperscript{196} Justice Scalia dissented in part, stating that, “[w]hile the Court’s explanation of the scope of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 would be entirely reasonable in some other context, it does not seem to accord with the principle of lenity we apply to criminal statutes.” \textit{Id.} at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, also dissented in part. \textit{See id.} (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the misappropriation theory failed to provide an acceptable interpretation of § 10(b)’s requirement that a deceptive device be used in connection with a securities transaction). While Thomas agreed that the undisclosed misappropriation of confidential information involves “deception,” he argued that deception in a misappropriation case is not “in connection with” a securities transaction. \textit{See id.} at 2221. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the “in connection with” requirement needs a more “integral” connection than what the majority required).

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Id.} at 2213.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Id.}
misappropriation theory apply whether or not the victim of the fraud has a connection to the securities markets.\textsuperscript{199} The misappropriation theory might have more intuitive appeal if the victims were always market participants, or businesses with close connections to market participants, such as investment banks and law firms.\textsuperscript{200} For example, in \textit{O'Hagan}, that connection existed because Grand Met intended to become a purchaser of Pillsbury securities, and therefore O'Hagan's trading was both in competition with, and posed a real risk of harm to, Grand Met.\textsuperscript{201} By contrast, in \textit{Bryan}, the West Virginia Lottery Commission did not intend to enter the securities market, and there was minimal risk that it would be harmed by Bryan's trading.\textsuperscript{202} Although the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the misappropriation theory was not premised on a lack of connection to a market participant, that lack of connection may have influenced the court's decision.

Notwithstanding this concern, there is no principled way to limit the misappropriation theory to market participants. Neither the statutory language of § 10(b), nor the principles of agency law, so circumscribe the theory's reach.\textsuperscript{203} While the common law of agency only precludes agents from using their principal's confidential information "in competition with or to the injury of the principal" the disclosure requirements imposed by agency law—and incorporated by the misappropriation theory—are not so narrow: "an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information

\textsuperscript{199} See Langevoort, \textit{supra} note 85, at 47 ("The source of the information is not necessarily defrauded as part of any investment-related activity of its own.").

\textsuperscript{200} See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, \textit{Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation}, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 202 (1991) (noting that fraud in an insider trading case is questionable when the victim is not a market participant); Mitchell, \textit{supra} note 84, at 830 (questioning the appropriateness of using securities fraud laws against those not trading in the stock about which the misappropriated information concerns); Lawrence A. Rosenbloom, Note, \textit{Is It Inside or Out?—A Proposal To Clarify the Misappropriation Theory of Unlawful Trading}, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 867, 900 (1996) (proposing that misappropriation theory be limited to fiduciary breaches or similar relationships "closely tied to the securities marketplace and pos[ing] a direct and imminent danger to the market" (emphasis omitted)).

\textsuperscript{201} See \textit{O'Hagan}, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.

\textsuperscript{202} See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 950 (1995) (explaining that the West Virginia Lottery Commission has no connection to the securities transaction).

\textsuperscript{203} See Fisch, \textit{supra} note 200, at 190. Fisch states:

Applying agency law principles to insider trading is problematic . . . because agency law does not generate an obligation to the trading counterparty or to the market. Rather, agency law suggests that a corporate insider is unjustly enriched by making use of corporate information for his personal benefit and that any trading profits are rightfully the property of the owner of the information—the corporation. This unjust enrichment takes place, though, whether or not the insider discloses the information prior to trading.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{204} \textsc{Restatement (Second) of Agency} § 395 (1958).
which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have." This broader disclosure requirement allows the principal, whether or not he is a market participant, to decide if he would be harmed by the agent's trading. Moreover, the broad disclosure required by agency law is more consistent with the purposes of insider trading prohibitions, because trading on misappropriated information impairs the integrity of the market, whether or not it has been purloined from a market participant.

The misappropriation theory also creates the oddity that the victim of the misappropriation usually does not have a cause of action against the wrongdoer under federal securities laws. Under the rule of Blue Chip Stamps, only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue under § 10(b).

As with the classical theory, Congress has created a statutory remedy for contemporaneous traders, but that provision affords no relief to the immediate victim of misappropriation. State law, of course, may provide a remedy.

Finally, the misappropriation theory is subject to contractual waiver. If the entity from whom the information has been obtained consents to the trading, there is no violation of § 10(b). This aspect of the misappropriation theory is subject to contractual waiver. If the entity from whom the information has been obtained consents to the trading, there is no violation of § 10(b).

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205 Id. § 381.
206 See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text (discussing the effects on the market of trading on misappropriated information).
207 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (holding that under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, only actual purchasers and sellers of securities can bring a private damages action); see also Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 749 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that tender offerors who have purchased securities may have a cause of action under § 10(b) if they can establish loss causation).
208 See Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (1994). Prior to Congress's passage of § 20A, the Second Circuit had ruled that contemporaneous traders had no private cause of action against misappropriators because they were not the victims of the fraud. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1983). Section 20A was specifically intended to overrule Moss. See Kaswell, supra note 151, at 167 (noting that § 20A "specifically overrules the holding in Moss v. Morgan Stanley"). Section 20A, of course, creates a doctrinal puzzle of its own, as the plaintiffs entitled to sue under that provision are not the victims of the fraud.
209 But see infra note 222 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of state law on insider trading).
210 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 85, at 52 (noting examples that the misappropriation theory does not cover such as where "executives of a company about to award a profitable contract to another trade in the other company's stock, they are not misappropriating the information if they trade with the approval of their own company"). There would be liability, however, under Rule 14e-3 in the context of tender offers. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 14e-3). The corporation's ability to waive its property rights in information means that market analysts will not risk misappropriation liability for trading on information given to them by the company.
tion theory has troubled some commentators, but it is not a serious defect in the misappropriation theory. The fact that the rule is not mandatory provides some assurance of its efficiency. If the misappropriation theory does create obstacles to useful business arrangements, corporations and their employees will simply contract around it. In any event, few corporations in the shoes of Grand Met would consent to trading by their agents. Such trading would come at the expense of their own shareholders, who would be forced to pay more for acquisitions. Authorizing insider trading could expose the directors to lawsuit under state corporate law for waste if the corporation did not receive adequate compensation for the information. For this reason, companies are not likely to compensate their officers, directors, lawyers and investment bankers by allowing them to trade on confidential business information. Furthermore, government enforcement of these contractual arrangements is appropriate because of the adverse effect on the securities markets and the difficulty that corporations would face in enforcing prohibitions on their own.

211 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 200, at 224. Fisch states:

A more troubling aspect of treating inside information as property is that such treatment does not justify government intervention to allocate the property rights to information. If inside information is the property of the firm producing it, why is it different from any other firm property, which the firm may allocate, as it chooses, by contract? This view would enable a firm to authorize its officers or employees to trade on the basis of inside information. The firm would, in effect, be opting out of the government enforcement of its property rights.

Id. 212 See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1449, 1468 (1986) (arguing that corporations should be allowed to opt out of restrictions on insider trading).

213 A corporation could not authorize such trading in its own shares because it would run foul of the classical theory. See McCormick v. Fund Am. Co., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Numerous authorities have held or otherwise stated that the corporate issuer in possession of material non-public information, must, like other insiders in the same situation, disclose the information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them."). Because the duties of the classical theory are owed directly to the individual shareholders, a knowing and intelligent waiver of those duties by the shareholders would be nearly impossible. This aspect of the classical theory also conflicts with common law. See Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. Ch. 1960) (holding that corporation has no duty of disclosure to shareholders in repurchasing shares); see also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 916-21 (discussing problems with treating corporation as fiduciary of shareholders and disclosure obligations in the context of share repurchase).

214 See ERNEST L. FOLK III ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.11 (1992) ("The duty of directors also includes a settled prohibition against waste of corporate assets.").
III. AGENCY LAW AND THE PURPOSES OF INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITIONS

The Court's shift away from the common law of deceit in *O'Hagan* has important implications for the law of insider trading. Most importantly, the Court's endorsement of the misappropriation theory has validated an important weapon in the government's fight against insider trading. Although the misappropriation theory sweeps broadly, it is well grounded in the common law of agency. As Justice Ginsburg recognized, those agency law principles limit the misappropriation theory's reach "to those who breach a recognized duty."215 Thus, this weapon has built-in checks on its use. The misappropriation theory is not only consistent with the common law, it is also narrowly tailored to the purposes of insider trading prohibitions.

A. The Common Law of Agency

The Restatement (Second) of Agency restricts an agent's use of confidential information that belongs to his principal either "in competition with or to the injury of the principal" without the principal's consent.216 This requirement of consent gives rise to the agent's disclosure duties; only with full disclosure will the principal be able to determine whether the agent's use of information would be in competition with or injure the principal.217 Specifically, the agent is required to disclose "if the agent has... interests adverse to the principal as to matters within the scope of the agency, or if he is competing with the principal and using information acquired during his agency."218 An agent may act for his own benefit, but only after "he makes a full disclosure of the facts to an acquiescent principal and takes no unfair advantage of him."219 The disclosure requirement affords the principal an opportunity to seek an injunction against the agent's trading or, more realistically, an accounting of his profits.220

The misappropriation theory incorporates this disclosure requirement of agency law into the securities laws. The securities markets provide an especially tempting venue for a faithless agent to breach his fiduciary duty to his principal and misappropriate confidential information. They afford an opportunity to breach that duty in secret and to collect enormous profits. The

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217 See id. § 395 cmt. c ("In obtaining consent of the principal to use or disclose confidential information, the agent is under the duty of disclosure stated in § 390.").
218 Id. § 381 cmt. d. This specific duty of disclosure is a part of the agent's broader duty to keep his principal informed: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have." Id. § 381.
219 Id. § 390 cmt. a.
220 See id. § 399 (listing possible remedies for a principal against an agent who has violated her duty).
facts of O'Hagan demonstrate the potential harm to the principal that could result from such a breach. O'Hagan's trading posed a risk that Grand Met's plans to take over Pillsbury would be prematurely discovered by others in the market. Such a discovery could have raised the price that Grand Met was forced to pay by many millions of dollars, as the market would have revalued Pillsbury's shares in light of the impending takeover. O'Hagan was secretly competing with his principal by purchasing the shares that Grand Met intended to purchase, thereby threatening enormous harm to his principal's interests. State fiduciary law alone is unlikely to deter such breaches because they are so difficult to detect. The misappropriation theory brings the enforcement authority—and subpoena power—of the federal government to bear on the problem, thus greatly enhancing the probability of detection, punitive sanctions, and as a result, compliance. The O'Hagan case provides a concrete example of the advantages of government enforcement—Dorsey & Whitney first learned of O'Hagan's malfeasance when the firm was subpoenaed by the SEC.

B. Misappropriation Theory's Close Connection to the Goals of Insider Trading Prohibitions

The misappropriation theory protects more than just property rights in valuable information. It also protects the integrity of the stock markets and public confidence in those markets. Insider trading impairs investor confidence, thereby discouraging capital formation and reducing liquidity.

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222 See Dooley, supra note 88, at 28 (stating that “the typical offense is so furtive in nature that it can be detected only through the use of the broad investigative powers of the federal government”).

223 See Easterbrook, supra note 98, at 334 (discussing advantages of public enforcement of insider trading prohibitions); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 393 (3d ed. 1986) (hypothesizing that because of the low probability of detection, it may not be cost effective for companies to stop insider trading because they cannot impose penalties); Cox & Fogarty, supra note 73, at 356 n.12 (arguing that corporate efforts to discourage insider trading may be deterred by “the practical difficulty of undertaking policing efforts whose effectiveness would justify their cost, by the willingness of public authorities to assume some of this burden, and by the imperfect identity of interests between managers and the corporation”).

224 There is clearly a strong federal interest in the integrity of the national stock markets. See Hamermesh, supra note 58, at 1175 (describing “the regulation of disclosure in the interest of facilitating interstate markets for securities” as “historically and far more properly a federal matter”).

225 Liquidity means that there is an active market for shares—that is, at any given time
Because insider trading reduces the returns from investing in the stock market, investors will discount the amount that they are willing to pay for shares to reflect the risk of insider trading, thus impairing capital formation.\(^2\)

Investors are reluctant to play in what they perceive to be a rigged game.\(^2\)

At a minimum, they must be compensated for bearing the risk that the game is fixed.\(^2\)

Corporations pay the price for this discounting because they receive less when they sell shares to the public. Insider trading prohibitions reduce this discounting by investors.\(^2\)

Insider trading reduces liquidity because outsiders will be reluctant to trade with insider traders. Outsiders do not know whether the share price accurately reflects the company's future prospects, but they do know that they are going to be net losers in transactions with insiders.\(^2\)

Insider traders will only buy when they know that the stock price is too low, and they will only sell when they know the stock price is too high.\(^2\)

Therefore, anytime an outsider trades with an insider, the outsider knows that the insider trader is taking advantage of her.\(^2\)

But in an impersonal market, outsiders...
do not know when they are trading with an insider, so insider trading simply becomes a transaction cost of all trading. This discourages outsiders from trading, thus reducing liquidity.

The transaction cost of insider trading is directly incorporated in the price of trading. Market makers also know that they are at a disadvantage when trading with insiders, and like outsiders, they cannot know when they are trading with an insider. In order to compensate for the losses suffered by trading with an insider, market makers increase the bid-ask spread. For example, instead of buying at $10 and selling at $10.25, market makers buy at $10 and sell at $10.50. This increase in the bid-ask spread also increases transaction costs for investors, who are therefore less likely to buy and sell.

This risk of dealing with insider traders is magnified in the options market, a favorite haven for insider traders because of the leverage it provides to the value of their information. Insider trading makes options more expensive to buy and sell, thereby further impairing liquidity.

The impairment of capital formation and liquidity caused by insider trading is not limited to situations involving the classical theory in which insiders are trading with their own shareholders, but rather it implicates all cases involving disparities in information. The misappropriation theory's broader...
scope allows enforcement authorities to combat those disparities created as a result of wrongdoing in the many situations not reached by the classical theory. At the same time, however, the misappropriation theory has natural limits, implicit in the common law of agency, that make its application predictable and prevent it from becoming the "parity of information" theory that Powell feared.

By limiting the misappropriation theory to information obtained in breach of a duty, the common law of agency protects individuals who have gained their informational advantage through superior insight or hard work. These efforts are essential to the informational efficiency of the stock market. Accordingly, the misappropriation theory does not interfere with the legitimate processes that lead to efficient pricing of securities in the way that a broader parity of information theory might.

The misappropriation theory also puts tippee and tipper liability on a more solid footing. Disclosures that would be a breach of duty to the corporation—absent prior disclosure to the board—are proscribed; disclosures that
do not breach any legitimate confidentiality interest possessed by the corporation are legal. Duties to shareholders are irrelevant to this inquiry.

Insider traders, knowing that they have a monopoly over the relevant information, trade strategically, because extracting the full monopoly benefit from their information depends upon concealing their trading. Insider traders split their trades between the equity and options markets, break their trades into small blocks, trade through off-shore accounts, and use multiple brokers to execute the trades, all in an attempt to prevent other traders in the market from discovering that they are trading on inside information. Because insiders can and do conceal their trading, insider trading does little to enhance the efficiency of stock market pricing.

By prohibiting trading by individuals with a monopoly over inside information, insider trading law encourages market analysts, professional investors, and others to compete for the information that drives efficiency in pricing. These informed investors will not make the same profits as insiders because they have to compete with other market analysts; that competition dissipates monopoly profits. The forces of competition discourage attempts to conceal trading, because an investor who believes that a stock is mispriced knows that other investors are also likely to be trading. If the investor delays, others will beat him to the punch and the profitable opportunity will be gone. Trading under competition will send stocks to their efficient prices at a lower cost to investors than insider trading based on an

244 See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Eric S. Maskin, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market, 98 J. POL. ECON. 70 (1990) (modeling trading strategies by insider traders that do not lead to revealing the insiders’ information). See also Manove, supra note 226, at 828 (explaining that if insider traders do not exercise restraint but rather trade excessively in a short period of time, the insider traders’ knowledge becomes reflected in the share’s price and thus the public becomes informed).

245 See Bainbridge, supra note 87, at 44-45 (observing that insider trading does little to convey inside information to the market); Dyer, supra note 230, at 31 (same); Kahan, supra note 230, at 1004 (concluding that insider trading activities do not necessarily convey the presence of insider information to the market because investors may not be able to distinguish between trades motivated by inside information and other motivations because insiders may try to conceal their trading activities). Of course, incompetent or greedy insider traders may be unable to conceal their trading, and they consequently have a greater effect on prices. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1696 (1992) (finding, based on a sample of detected insider trading, that 40 to 50% of the run-up in price before public announcement of takeovers occurs on days with known insider trading).

246 See Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Inside Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 311-12 (1994) (arguing that insider trading reduces competition and has the effect of a monopoly).

247 See Georgakopoulos, supra note 233, at 21 (“A monopolist trader can expect to be able to trade repeatedly on the same piece of information. By contrast, ... [c]ompetition decreases the number of trades that can be made on the information.”).
informational monopoly.\textsuperscript{248} Thus, the misappropriation theory strikes an appropriate balance between the purposes of insider trading law and the mechanisms of market efficiency.\textsuperscript{249}

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in \textit{O'Hagan} shifts the foundations of insider trading jurisprudence. The decision's focus on the common law of agency as the basis for analyzing whether an individual's trading is a deceptive misappropriation frees insider trading law of the classical theory's limitations. At the same time, the misappropriation theory provides a rational and principled basis for prohibiting conduct that has no social utility and impairs the integrity of the securities markets.

Despite the misappropriation theory's firm foundation in the common law and its utility in promoting the goals of the federal securities laws, Justice Powell likely would have voted to reject the theory. Based on his draft dissent to the denial of certiorari in \textit{Carpenter}, we know that Powell believed the misappropriation theory was inconsistent with his prior decisions for the Court in \textit{Chiarella} and \textit{Dirks}. The flaw in the theory, according to Powell's draft dissent, was that it broadly extends to any victim of a deceptive misappropriation, regardless of whether the victim is a party to a securities transaction. Powell apparently believed that premising liability on breaches of a fiduciary duty to persons other than securities traders would impermissibly expand the scope of the federal securities laws beyond the common law of deceit, the foundation of the classical theory.

Justice Powell's concerns about the scope of the misappropriation theory have been laid to rest by the logic of Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in \textit{O'Hagan}. As Justice Ginsburg explained, a breach of duty by an agent to his principal crystallizes at the moment the agent engages in a securities transaction without disclosure to his principal: the agent does not commit fraud on his principal unless and until the agent engages in a securities transaction without disclosure. Possessing confidential information, but not using it, does not breach the agent's disclosure duty. The securities transaction completes the agent's deception of his principal and simultaneously injures the integrity of the securities markets, the harm that insider trading prohibitions are intended to prevent. The nexus between the agent's breach of duty to his principal and transactions in the securities markets supplies the connection to the purchase or sale of a security that Justice Powell believed was

\textsuperscript{248} \textit{See} Macey & Kanda, \textit{supra} note 242, at 1015 ("\textquote{R}ivalrous competition among well-informed market professionals causes rapid assimilation of information accessible to the community of investment analysts into share prices at low cost to investors.").

\textsuperscript{249} \textit{See} Manove, \textit{supra} note 226, at 826 (arguing that the economic value of the release of information through informed trading by market professionals may more than offset the losses attributable to adverse selection and inefficiency and the costs of acquiring the information).
missing in the misappropriation theory. That nexus satisfies § 10(b)'s "in connection with" requirement, even if it does not satisfy the elements of the common law of deceit.

Justice Powell's legacy for the law of insider trading is the recognition of the need to anchor § 10(b) in common law principles. The common law defines and limits the law of insider trading, both under the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. Powell drew upon the common law of deceit for such guidance and found there a requirement that silence, in order to be fraudulent, had to be in breach of a duty to disclose to the shareholder on the other side of the transaction. But the law of deceit left gaps in the analytical framework. The Court in O'Hagan filled those gaps by relying on the common law of agency, rather than the common law of deceit.

The disclosure duties imposed by the common law of agency provide a rational, comprehensible basis for determining whether an agent's breach of duty constitutes a deception within the meaning of § 10(b). While Justice Powell's draft in Carpenter indicates that he viewed the misappropriation theory as a departure from the principles underlying the classical theory, Justice Ginsburg and a majority of the current Court saw the misappropriation theory as essential to the protection of the integrity of the securities markets. Their rejection of the common law of deceit as the outer limit of insider trading law circumscribes Justice Powell's legacy to the narrow reach of the classical theory. The Court's acceptance of the misappropriation theory based on agency law principles establishes a lasting foundation for the law of insider trading.
12/10

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia

From: Justice Powell

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DAVID CARPENTER, KENNETH P. FELIS, AND R. FOSTER WINANS v. UNITED STATES

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 86-422. Decided December —, 1986

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting from denial of certiorari.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has resolved an important question of securities law in a way that appears to conflict with recent opinions of this Court. As this decision—particularly by this Court of Appeals—could have substantial precedential effect, I would grant the petition for certiorari with respect to question 1.

I

In this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners' convictions for wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud. Question 1 of the petition chal-
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competes the securities fraud convictions. The convictions rest on a conspiracy involving petitioner Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, and petitioners Felis and Brant, stockbrokers with the firm of Kidder Peabody. The final party to the conspiracy was petitioner Carpenter, an employee of the Wall Street Journal who carried messages from Winans to Felis and Brant. Winans informed Brant and Felis of the dates on which the Wall Street Journal would publish columns discussing particular securities. Advance knowledge of the dates on which certain columns would appear enabled Brant and Felis to profit by trading in anticipation of price changes that would follow publication of the columns. The columns themselves consisted of public information. The only nonpublic information provided by Winans was the publication schedule for the columns.

The petitioners were charged with wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud. After a bench trial, the District Court convicted petitioners. *United States v. Winans*, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. *United States v. Carpenter*, 791 F.2d 1024 (1986). In the Court of Appeals' view, petitioners were guilty of criminal securities fraud under the "misappropriation" theory of securities fraud under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5. Under this theory, a person is liable under Rule 10b-5 if he misappropriates material nonpublic information and then uses the information in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. *Id.*, at 1031-1032. The Court of Appeals noted that we left open the question of the legitimacy of the misappropriation theory in *Chiarella*. But the court noted that its Circuit has adopted that theory since our decision in *Chiarella*. See *SEC v. Materia*, 745 F. 2d 197 (CA2 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); *United States v. Newman*, 664 F. 2d 12 (CA2 1981), affirmed after remand, 722 F. 2d 729 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).

The Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' argument that the misappropriation theory could not be applied in this case because the information was misappropriated not from the corporations whose securities were traded, but from the Wall Street Journal. The court believed that our recent opinion in *Dirks v. SEC*, 463 U. S. 646 (1983), offered substantial support to petitioners' contention, but concluded that "[i]t is not accurate to say that *Dirks* wrote the book on insider or outsider trading; it wrote one chapter with respect to one type of fraudulent trading." 791 F. 2d, at 1029 (quoting the District Court's opinion, *United States v. Winans*, 612 F. Supp. 827, 842 (S. D.N. Y. 1985)). The Court of Appeals concluded that Winans' appropriation of the Wall Street Journal's publication schedules was a fraud condemned by the securities laws. "Congress apparently has sought to proscribe . . . trading on material, nonpublic information obtained not through skill but through a variety of "deceptive" practices, unlawful acts which we term 'misappropriation.'" *Id.*, at 1031. Judge Miner dissented from the panel's judgment. In his view:

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JUSTICE POWELL'S INSIDER TRADING LEGACY

“[Section 10(b)) never was intended to protect the reputation, or enforce the ethical standards, of a financial newspaper. . . . [T]he securities fraud provisions were [not] designed to prohibit the type of fraudulent conduct engaged in by these defendants. Such conduct is addressed adequately by the statutes establishing the mail and mire fraud offenses of which the defendants stand convicted.” Id., at 1037.

II

A comparison of the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case with our recent precedents demonstrates the need for examination by this Court of the misappropriation theory. In Chiarella, we began our analysis of Rule 10b-5 with the proposition that parties to a business transaction generally do not have an affirmative duty to disclose information about the transaction. The Court noted, however, that a failure to disclose material information could be fraudulent in certain circumstances. “But such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.” 445 U. S., at 230 (emphasis added). Such a duty applied when corporate insiders traded in the securities of their corporation. In such a case, “the duty arose from (1) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (2) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” Id., at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907, 912, and n. 15 (1961)).

In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U. S. 646 (1983), we examined the circumstances under which outsiders could be held liable under Rule 10b-5. We noted:

“[U]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.” Id., at 655, n. 14.

Thus, Dirks established that when outsiders have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they cannot purchase securities from those shareholders without first informing them of material information that might influence the decision to purchase or sell the securities.

The Court also noted that even if a particular outsider were not under a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders, he could not trade on information that corporate insiders had disclosed to him improperly. See id., at 659-660. As the Court explained, “[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary, finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information . . . .” Id., at 661
Applying these principles to this case, it is difficult to understand how any of the petitioners were guilty of criminal securities fraud. The Court of Appeals found no fiduciary relationship between any of the petitioners and the parties from whom they purchased securities. The only fiduciary duty discussed by the court is petitioner Winans' duty to the Wall Street Journal. But our previous decisions establish that the duty of an individual to his employer, alone, is insufficient to support an action under Rule 10b-5. The inquiry under that section must focus on "petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the ... securities." What we said in Chiarella is true here: "[Petitioner] was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions." 445 U. S., at 232-233. As the petitioners in this case had no fiduciary obligation to disclose the information before dealing in the securities, their convictions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are without support in any prior decision of this Court.

III

In Chiarella, the Court had no occasion to address the merits of the misappropriation theory. 445 U. S., at 236-237 and n. 21; id., at 237-238 (STEVENS, J., concurring); id., at 238-239 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). The question is important, because the theory broadens substantially the ambit of criminal liability under the securities laws. There appears to be little or no support for the decision below in the language or history of the Securities Act of 1934.

The Court of Appeals has had three occasions to address the misappropriation theory since we left this question open in Chiarella. On each occasion, it has embraced the theory. Because the Second Circuit includes New York, the court's decision in this case is of special importance. In my view, this case presents "an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court." S. Ct. R. 17.1(c). The time has come for this Court to resolve that question. I dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in this case.