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AGAINST PRACTICE

Anthony V. Alfieri*


“[T]he challenge of professional preparation for the law [is] linking the interests of educators with the needs of practitioners and the members of the public the profession is pledged to serve—in other words, participating in civic professionalism” (p. 4).

INTRODUCTION

Legal education is against practice. More than a half century after Jerome Frank’s call for a clinical-lawyer school,¹ and nearly two decades after the MacCrate Commission’s plea for professional development,² many American law schools continue to privilege theory over practice in teaching, scholarship, and institutional mission. In teaching, law schools elevate formal knowledge and case-dialogue pedagogy over practical judgment and policy analysis. In scholarship, law schools favor doctrinal synthesis and critique over field-based research on “law in action.” And in mission, law schools promote a self-regarding vision of lawyer-guild professionalism, role differentiation, and dyadic adversarial conflict over civic professionalism, role integration, and community-based social justice.

The animus of theory-centered traditions toward practice obscures the interdisciplinary breadth, empirical richness, and moral import of lawyer roles and relationships. The same animus reduces professionalism to a largely aspirational function sounded in tropes to alumni, students, and the

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The results of this animus reinforce conventional roles and relationships among lawyers, clients, and communities; fortify the socioeconomic inequalities of entrenched civil and criminal justice systems; and preserve the disparate treatment suffered by women and minorities in the legal services marketplace. Acquiescence to role convention and sociolegal inequality diminishes the curricular importance of professional development opportunities and programmatic social justice initiatives. Absent a meaningful commitment to professional development and social justice in the law school curriculum, institutional mission succumbs to the reigning orthodoxies of the adversary system and the ethics of the legal marketplace.  

The theory/practice dichotomy in law school teaching, scholarship, and mission relegates clinical-lawyer instruction to the periphery of legal education and consigns clinical faculty to a subordinate caste status differentiated by inferior compensation, limited governance, and segregated space. Despite this academic caste hierarchy, an increasing number of law schools have made progress in integrating clinical-lawyer perspectives into their pedagogies, scholarship, and curricular missions. Indeed, numerous schools at all tiers now embrace policy-oriented, problem-solving methods of pedagogy; recognize interdisciplinary, practice-based scholarship; and incorporate “lawyering” skills courses into the traditional core curriculum. Paradoxically, by carving pedagogies of practice out of positivist norms of neutrality and scientific technique, and individualist norms of liberal legalism, law schools have fashioned a new formalism severed from difference-based identity, context, and community. Pedagogies of practice common to both clinics and skills courses point to the rise of this new formalism in claims of neutral lawyer judgment, technical “lawyering” process values, and client-centered representation indifferent to the other-regarding interests of community building.
This Review examines the theory/practice dichotomy in legal education through the prism of the Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law. Descriptively, it argues that the Foundation’s investigation of law school curricular deficiencies in the areas of clinical-lawyer skills, professionalism, and public service overlooks the relevance of critical pedagogies in teaching students how to deal with difference-based identity and how to build cross-cultural community in diverse, multicultural practice settings differentiated by mutable and immutable characteristics such as class, gender, and race. Prescriptively, it argues that the Foundation’s remedial call for the curricular integration of clinical-lawyer practices similarly overlooks the utility of critical pedagogies in teaching students not only how to understand difference, but also how to represent difference-based clients and communities here and abroad.

The Review is divided into two parts. Part I explores the Carnegie Foundation’s assessment of law schools in preparing students through contemporary case dialogue and in integrating alternative-practice pedagogies. Part II analyzes the ramifications of the Foundation’s report for the application of alternative curricular frameworks, particularly critical pedagogies grounded in difference-based identity and community. These frameworks are briefly sketched in a study of the West Coconut Grove Historic Black Church project at the University of Miami Law School’s Community Economic Development and Design (“CEDAD”) Clinic. The case study demonstrates both the difficulty and the necessity of developing theory/practice pedagogies effective in dealing with difference-based identity in the context of representing communities of color.

I. (Mis)Educating Lawyers: The Carnegie Foundation Critique

The Carnegie Foundation’s critique offers an abridged cultural and social history of legal education predicated on the vision of law as a “public profession” and of lawyers as agents charged with “important public responsibilities” (p. 1). The critique gleans this sociocultural history from a cross-section of sixteen law schools of varying tiers surveyed during the 1999–2000 academic year. The Foundation views the preparation of lawyers in law school as “the crucial portal to the practice of law” (p. 1), illuminating “the daily practices of teaching and learning through which future legal professionals are formed” (pp. 1–2).

To better understand legal education and its implications for the profession, the Foundation focuses on “how learning occurs” in law and in other professions such as medicine (pp. 2, 192–94). Focusing on how law school
forms minds and shapes identities," it links the common aim of all professional education to the cultivation of specialized knowledge and professional identity (p. 2). Next it highlights the "modes of teaching and learning" that law schools use to accomplish that common aim (p. 3). Two modes of teaching and learning stand central to this analysis—the classroom experience of Socratic case dialogue and the clinical experience of lawyer apprenticeship. Both modes of pedagogy contribute to the development of legal understanding and the formation of professional identity. Yet, both produce different and often inconsonant sets of legal skills and professional norms. That dissonance, echoed throughout the law school experience, challenges the Foundation to search the history of legal education for means of pedagogical reconciliation and curricular integration.

A. The Evolution of Case-Dialogue Pedagogy

The Carnegie Foundation traces the current dissonance in the professional enterprise of legal education to the evolution of the modern law school as a contested, hybrid institution (pp. 4–5, 78–82). This evolution displays a historic tension between the conventions of the practitioner community and the canons of the modern research university. From the practitioner community, law schools derive traditions of craft, judgment, and public responsibility. From the research university, law schools deduce ideals of knowledge, reason, and truth—academic ideals that emphasize objective, quantitative measurement and formal knowledge abstracted from the daily context of practice (p. 5). Akin to philosophical positivism, this widely adopted academic epistemology heralds the value of importing "scientifically generated" forms of knowledge as "technical instruments for managing events in more rational ways" (p. 5). Legal positivists grasp "law as an instrument of rational policymaking—a set of rules and techniques rather than a craft of interpretation and adaptation embedded in the common law" (p. 5). This institutional seizure of scientific methodology and technical rationality, the Foundation shows, "undermined the academic legitimacy of practical knowledge" in legal education (p. 5).

To the Carnegie Foundation, the waning legitimacy of practical knowledge under positivist legal theory stemmed from a failure to blend academic


10. The Carnegie Foundation observes: "Professional schools are not only where expert knowledge and judgment are communicated from advanced practitioner to beginner; they are also the place where the profession puts its defining values and exemplars on display, where future practitioners can begin both to assume and critically examine their future identities." P. 4.
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and practitioner traditions of legal training in "reciprocal enrichment."
That failure breached the legal profession's "contract with society" (p. 21). Repairing this breach and restoring public trust requires academic/practitioner goal integration, a reappraisal of signature pedagogies, and a recovery of professionalism (pp. 21–33). For the Foundation, the opportunity to transform legal education springs from the potential union of innovative practice pedagogies, professional norms, and case-dialogue traditions (pp. 33–43).

The predominance of case-dialogue pedagogy in law schools signals the triumph of formal knowledge and scientific rationality in legal analysis (pp. 5–7). Marked by the ascendence of university-housed academic specialists, the rise of an abstract jurisprudence of "general ideas and principles" in American law produced a new legal scholarship of doctrinal synthesis and a new method of training in legal knowledge "separate from learning to practice" (pp. 5–6). The new scholarship assimilated the model of formal, scientific discourse, engraving it on constitutional, statutory, and common law materials (pp. 5–7). Assimilation resulted in the shifting of academic research norms away from practice contexts toward an emulation of the arts-and-sciences disciplines (pp. 11–12). The new methodology likewise favored legal knowledge and reasoning over practice skills, deferring practice experience until postgraduate entry into the profession. Preference for formal knowledge and objectivity helped rationalize the legal process, the Foundation concedes, but worked to diminish the relationship of legal education to morality and public responsibility (p. 7). The consequent "loss of orientation and meaning" among faculty and students reveals the "shadow side" of modern legal education and fuels recurrent accusations of professional self-absorption and public irresponsibility (p. 7).

For the Carnegie Foundation, case dialogue symbolizes legal education's signature pedagogy. The reliance of the case-dialogue method on the in-class tactics and dynamics of the Socratic process furnishes students cognitive instruction in the realist task of fitting rules to contextually unmoored facts. According to the Foundation, the Socratic process affords flexibility


in adjusting case dialogue and exposes indeterminacy in the application of rules (pp. 47–50). To a more limited extent, it also expands the interpretative and policy repertoire of students. Nonetheless, the Foundation contends that the case-dialogue method generates diminishing returns, particularly when extended beyond the first-year classroom. This decline in pedagogical efficacy is not seen elsewhere in professional education, for example in medical school, where a continuum of theory/practice integration holds curricular sway. To correct the curricular overreliance on case-dialogue methods in law school, and to counter the ethical relativism and nihilism that may ensue, the Foundation considers alternative methods of practice-based instruction that enhance the formative, identity-making dimension of legal education.

B. The Turn to Practice: Clinical Programs and “Lawyering” Courses

The Foundation’s turn toward practice integration borrows from apprentice traditions and the cognitive sciences. Earlier invoked in the MacCrate report, apprentice traditions help to overcome the trade school stigma often associated with practice pedagogies. Bolstered by advances in the cognitive study of learning, the traditions now give greater meaning to the formation of professional expertise (pp. 95–100). The apprentice model of practice supplies cognitive techniques and operating procedures to enrich legal knowledge and professional effectiveness. Those techniques include case and composition theory, legal writing, skill simulation, and negotiation (pp. 102–13). Case theory in particular affords students an opportunity to move from novice experimentation to expert practice and, ultimately, to

17. Pp. 75–78; see also Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235 (2001).


19. Pp. 59–84; see also Andrew J. Rothman, Preparing Law School Graduates for Practice: A Blueprint for Professional Education Following the Medical Profession Example, 51 Rutgers L. Rev. 875 (1999); cf. Molly Cook et al., American Medical Education 100 Years after the Flexner Report, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1339 (2006).


formal knowledge. This process fosters the exercise of judgment in context and builds professional identity and purpose.\textsuperscript{23}

To surmount the positivist ethos of the research university, the Foundation recommends practice pedagogies that unite the disparate parts of legal education by reconnecting craft with formal knowledge. It locates this unity in an alternative conception of craft-informed knowledge animating the work of engaged practitioners in clinical, "lawyering" skills, and legal writing courses. For this practitioner community, "law is a tradition of social practice that includes particular habits of mind, as well as a distinctive ethical engagement with the world" (p. 8). Understanding law as a practice tradition tied to cognitive development, skill, and social interaction redefines legal education as a practical discipline. To the Foundation, "the practical disciplines embody forms of knowing that blur distinctions among cognition, action, and intention" (p. 8). Learning to apply these forms of knowing requires the teaching of practical judgment.

The Carnegie Foundation defines practical judgment in terms of "the ability to both act and think well in uncertain situations" (p. 9). On this definition, judgment is in part a function of professional expertise. The skillful application of professional judgment "means involvement in situations that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view of formal knowledge" (p. 8). The Foundation explicitly aims to enhance professional judgment through critical analysis. This craft-guided critical analysis treats professional practice as an instance of "judgment in action" (p. 9). In order "to make practice more effective, comprehensible to students, and open to critical assessment" (p. 9), the Foundation notes, analysis demands reflection.

Clinical education satisfies this demand by providing contexts in which students "observe, simulate, attempt, and then critically reflect on their work" (p. 9). The clinical case conference and practicum employed in the CEDAD Clinic's Historic Black Church project, for example, provide contexts in which students assess community-based practice situations, critically reflect on church-client and community needs, and reach collaborative judgments about remedial legal, political, and social solutions. Indeed, the clinical pedagogy of participatory analysis, critique, and reflection enables CEDAD students to broaden their perception of faith-based racial identity and deepen their appreciation for black church ministries and congregations, thus enlarging their professional repertoires of experience and judgment. Experiential learning of this sort revives the normative purposes of the profession (p. 10).

The Carnegie Foundation's endorsement of the application of theoretical work to the domain of practice generates alternative pedagogies and analytic frameworks culled from the interpretation of client and community contexts and case narratives. Unsurprisingly, the narratives reveal "much more being

\textsuperscript{23} See pp. 111–25. The Foundation argues that "case theory calls attention to the important role played by the problems of particular clients in specific situations in giving impetus to the legal process." P. 124.
taught and learned in any pedagogical situation than can be consciously ab­
stracted in the form of procedures or techniques" (p. 11). The lessons of
client and community narrative carry moral consequences for legal relation­
ships, political alliances, and social activities, faith-based and otherwise.24 A
decisive dimension of a lawyer's multiple roles and relationships “is respon­sibility for clients and for the values the public has entrusted to the
profession” (p. 12). Basic to legal knowledge, that responsibility drives the
increased curricular integration of “lawyering” skills courses.25

C. Professional Reformation

The Carnegie Foundation's integrated model of legal education com­
bines “conceptual knowledge, skill, and moral discernment” with the
capacity for situated judgment (p. 12). Bridging the gap between analytical
and practical knowledge and revitalizing professional integrity hinge on (1)
extending the field of legal knowledge and (2) honing the moral capacity for
good judgment acquired by students in clinical settings,26 such as the
CEDAD Clinic’s Historic Black Church project. The mutual enlargement of
theoretical and practical legal knowledge, the Foundation maintains, “will
progress best when it is directed by a focus on the professional formation of
law students” (p. 13).

1. Curricular Integration

The Carnegie Foundation’s vision of integrity-promoting purposive edu­
cation rests on the curricular integration of legal analysis, practical skill, and
professional identity (pp. 191–202). Legal analysis, the Foundation ob­serves, serves as “the prior condition for practice because it supplies the
essential background assumptions and rules for engaging with the world
through the medium of the law” (p. 13). Practical-skills training requires
introduction to the cognitive perspective of practice and, moreover, immer­
sion in the development of advocacy and counseling methods.27 Professional
identity28 uses professionalism, social responsibility, and ethics as the cata­
lysts for an integrated legal education. To merge legal analysis and practical

24. On the normative lessons of narrative, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty

25. Pp. 11–12. The Carnegie Foundation defines “lawyering” courses to include legal writing
instruction, simulated practicums, and in-house clinics. P. 17. See generally Arturo Lopez Torres,
MacCrate Goes to Law School: An Annotated Bibliography of Methods for Teaching Lawyering


27. The practical skill of intervention in advising and counseling clients grows through mod­
eling, habituation, experiment, and reflection. Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate
pedagogies blending formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interaction.

28. See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lost Opportunity: Legal Education and the Development of
skills in a significant way, the Foundation insists, "professionalism needs to become more explicit and better diffused throughout legal preparation."  

The Carnegie Foundation's framework for a more integrated approach to legal education recognizes that reliance on law school case-dialogue pedagogy for the purposes of professional socialization produces adverse, unintended consequences (pp. 185–88). Chief among those consequences is the neglect of practical judgment, lawyering skill, and professional identity. To mitigate such widespread neglect, the Foundation proposes comprehensive change to the first-year and upper-level curricula. Borrowing from business and medical school education, it urges continuity and innovation in case-teaching methodology in the classroom and in the field (pp. 197–200). Innovation requires not only leadership and vision, but also learning-based assessment procedures appropriate to case pedagogies. By design, assessment procedures measure both conceptual knowledge and competence. Measures of conceptual knowledge rest on traditional standards of evaluation inside the classroom. Measures of competence, by contrast, require alternative criterion-referenced appraisals of "lawyering" skills and ethical-social development outside the classroom (pp. 164–80). The appraisal of classroom and fieldwork performance, the Foundation points out, depends on an institutional climate of reform and intentionality (pp. 180–84).

2. Professional Identity and Purpose

To the Carnegie Foundation, "the formation of competent and committed professionals deserves and needs to be the common, unifying purpose" of legal education (p. 13). This mission gives "renewed prominence to the ideals and commitments that have historically defined the legal profession in America" (p. 13). Renewing the ideals and commitments of the profession depends on communication and reciprocal learning among faculty and students through curricular reorganization and innovative pedagogy. Reorganization moves legal ethics and professionalism to the center of the

29. P. 14; see also Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Teaching a Professional Responsibility Course: Lessons Learned from the Clinic, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 149, 152–54 (2002) (describing a situation where professionalism would have resolved a clinic dispute).


curriculum. Innovation incorporates ethics and professionalism instruction throughout the curriculum.

Research on education and moral development underscores the importance of the pervasive method of legal ethics instruction. That method treats legal professionalism as an ideal, a practice, and a means of social contribution. An ethically sensitive apprenticeship model correlates professional identity with the public value of "doing justice." When ethical-social values pervade the apprenticeship process, professional identity and purpose gain a greater sense of responsibility, seen for example in the expanding commitment of the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove where attendance at evening church meetings and Sunday services has become routine. Enhanced responsibility augments the presence of moral-legal dialogue in law school and the potential for pro bono work, demonstrated for example in the cooperative development of a lawyer referral network jointly administered by the CEDAD Clinic's students in West Coconut Grove and black lawyers volunteering under the auspices of Miami's Wilkie D. Ferguson Jr. Bar Association.

Pervasive professional responsibility dialogue links the "lawyering" roles of advocacy and service. It also unifies the cognitive, practical, and ethical-social dimensions of the apprenticeship process around the focal point of competence. That process installs a continuum of teaching, learning, and modeling positive professional ideals across first-year and upper-level experiences. Engaging professional ideals in core courses, "lawyering" practicums, and legal clinics demonstrates the possibility of purposive legal education (pp. 145–61).

II. (Re)Educating Lawyers: Alternative Theory/Practice Pedagogies

The Carnegie Foundation's model of educational reform falters in slighting the integration of critical pedagogies in formal legal analysis, practical-skills training, and professional-identity building. Descriptively the model overlooks alternative theoretical frameworks and practice pedagogies acknowledging difference-based identity, context, and community. Prescriptively the model omits remedial strategies aimed at integrating

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difference-based identity, context, and community into law school pedagogy inside and outside the classroom. Reforming law school and reeducating the legal profession require a fuller description of the role of identity and community in "lawyering" and a bolder prescription for their pedagogical and practical integration. Many of these pedagogies are embedded in clinical education and legal education more generally yet remain isolated and segregated from the broader curriculum. Exhibited in clinical and hybrid outreach programs to minority racial groups and subordinate cultures, the pedagogies demand alternative academic and experiential training regimens for students emphasizing civic leadership.

A. Critical Pedagogies in Legal Education

Critical pedagogies extend the modern traditions of liberal legalism, particularly their condemnation of ascribed caste or status hierarchies, and embrace the postmodern contingencies of racial and cultural identity. Affirmation links liberal legalism and postmodern contingency in a shared commitment to difference-based identity and antisubordination practice norms. These norms guide interdisciplinary, community-based collaborations employed in representing historically stigmatized groups encountered in Miami's West Coconut Grove and elsewhere. The Carnegie Foundation ignores such alternative norms and their critical frameworks.

The Foundation's disregard of alternative norms and frameworks in formulating its model of educational reform inhibits the comprehensive transformation of practice pedagogies tied to legal analysis, "lawyering" skills, and professional identity. Pedagogical transformation requires closer attention to identity, context, and community in everyday practice, especially in dealing with minority racial groups and subordinate cultures. Critical pedagogies prove useful to representing historically stigmatized groups not only in condemning ascribed caste or status hierarchies, but also in understanding the complexity of racial and cultural identity, especially faith-based identity in individual, group, and institutional settings. Both liberal legalism and postmodern contingency aid this revision by challenging neutral pedagogical perspectives and engendering practical cross-cultural collaborations.

A transformative commitment to difference-based identity and antisubordination practice norms commands the abandonment of neutrality claims in rendering lawyer judgments about the means and ends of representation. The Carnegie Foundation's stance of neutrality, entrenched in the MacCrate

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report, tolerates the use of stereotype and stigma in the "lawyering" process. Difference-based stereotype and stigma based on race, gender, or sexuality deforms the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral content of advocacy. The classically liberal purpose of client-centered "lawyering" fails to cure stereotypes of client or group difference. Without cross-cultural and difference-based identity analysis, client-centered methods perpetuate stigma-induced marginalization in law and society. Suffused in neutrality, these methods seldom call for the contextual reassessment of client and community identity. However, only that reassessment will alter lawyer perception and interpretation of client difference, and facilitate lawyer-client as well as lawyer-community interaction across differences. Reassessment entails lawyer introspection, cultural self-awareness, and cross-cultural skills.

Client-collaborative reassessment confronts stereotypes that impute marginalizing traits or behaviors to communities of color inside and outside their church congregations. Confronting stereotypes through cross-cultural collaboration involves the identification of segregating differences, the exploration of multiple explanations for client behavior, and the elimination or mitigation of lawyer bias. Although the depth of lawyer bias and the force of color-blind neutrality hinder such identification and explanation, collabor-
ratively enlarging the scope of client participation in the "lawyering" process through individual decision making and collective action transforms practical judgment. Further, it sometimes expands client and community problem solving beyond case-specific needs to encompass issue-focused, neighborhood-wide campaigns, thereby motivating broader affinity groups to participate in democracy-enforcing legal-political advocacy about commonly shared grievances such as crime, fair housing, and municipal equity.

B. Critical Pedagogies in the Classroom

The Carnegie Foundation's neglect of critical norms and frameworks in designing its model of educational reform hampers the comprehensive transformation of classroom pedagogies fastened to legal analysis, "lawyering" skills, and professional identity. To be inclusive and wide-ranging, pedagogical transformation requires the classroom infusion of multiple identity narratives, layered contextual descriptions, and silenced community histories. The contextual exploration of client narrative and community history in parsing stories of dominant/subordinate group competition and sociocultural conflict emerges out of a mixture of classical liberal and critical-outsider jurisprudence coupled with interdisciplinary investigation. Liberal jurisprudence gives voice to authentic self-elaboration, individual liberty, and collective equality. Critical jurisprudence reveals caste status, class subordination, and the stigmas of race, gender, and sexuality. Interdisciplinary investigation discloses ethnographic, psychological, and sociological insight.

Tailored to both clinical and nonclinical classrooms, mixed jurisprudential and interdisciplinary pedagogies of practice illuminate the cognitive, affective, and normative elements of legal roles and relationships in guiding


46. See Lucie White, "Democracy" in Development Practice: Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1073 (1997).

47. See Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140 (1995); Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402 (1998).

48. Compare DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991), with Jacobs, supra note 42, at 346 (observing that the client-lawyer models employed by clinical programs "fail to address . . . the effects of race, class and, to a lesser extent, gender").


lawyer, client, and community decision-making. Built on learning theory, those elements comprise intuition, empathy, and emotional intelligence. Each of these behavioral elements is relevant to practice and professionalism training in "lawyering" courses, simulations, and university-wide, cross-disciplinary clinical settings.

Joining jurisprudential and interdisciplinary classroom pedagogies also elucidates the values and techniques of ethical discretion and moral decision making in the "lawyering" process. Among the historic black ministries of West Coconut Grove, the calls for moral education, theology, spiritual-


60. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 119–22 (2006); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1317, 1320–33 (2006). Katyal maintains that there is a "need for law schools to start a moral conversation and to encourage students to practice law in an 'ethical' manner." Katyal, supra, at 121.

61. See Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality" 4 Clinical L. Rev. 1 (1997); Thomas Shaffer, Legal Essay, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 St. Mary’s L.J. 195 (1986).

ity, and religion in "law" converge in a moral conversation about "lawyer­
ing." The Carnegie Foundation implicitly invites this conversation by
promoting a vision of civic professionalism inspired by renewed public re­
sponsibility. That vision hinges on the capacity for reflective moral
judgment acquired from ethical, legal, and social skills, and applied in
classrooms, clinics, and communities. Realizing the Foundation's vision of
student ethical-social development and law school-community collaboration
warrants new forms of theory/practice integration and outreach.

Critical forms of theory/practice pedagogy regularly emerge from client
and community collaborations in clinical education, often in the field of
civil rights and poverty law. Erected here, four critical frameworks stand out
in affording pedagogical opportunities for curricular revision. Fundamental
to community-based clinical education, the frameworks view the law as a
social and cultural practice and look skeptically upon legal judgments as
descriptively incomplete. Moreover, the frameworks view legal reasoning as

63. See Calvin G.C. Pang, Eyeing the Circle: Finding a Place for Spirituality in a Law
School Clinic, 35 WILAMETTE L. REV. 241 (1999); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Integrating Spiritual
Perspectives with the Law School Experience: An Essay and an Invitation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
167 (2000).

64. See Margaret E. Montoya, Introduction, Religious Rituals and LatCrit Theorizing, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 417 (1998); Russell G. Pearce, Forward, The Religious Lawyering Move­
ment: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1705 (1998);
see also Amelia J. Uelmen, An Explicit Connection Between Faith and Justice in Catholic Legal

65. See Milner S. Ball, The Promise of American Law: A Theological, Human­

66. See Steven K. Berenson, Institutional Professionalism for Lawyers: Realizing the Virtues
desires a resurgence of civic professionalism to challenge the dominance of technical
professionalism). See generally Mary Ann Dantuono, A Citizen Lawyer's Moral, Religious, and
Professional Responsibility for the Administration of Justice for the Poor, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1383 (1998) (noting that religion can positively impact civic obligations).

67. See Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths From
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) (endorsing scholarly clinical projects that
"would envision the clinical training student-advocates need in order to work effectively with
[community] groups"); cf. Linda F. Smith, Why Clinical Programs Should Embrace Civic Engage­
ment, Service Learning and Community Based Research, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 723 (2004)
(contending that law school clinics could benefit from the community service based learning move­
ment).

68. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Story, Clinical Genesis in Miami, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1137
(2007). See generally Symposium, Race, Economic Justice, and Community Lawyering in the New
Century, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1821 (2007) (discussing community lawyering and the changing mean­
ing of community).

69. See Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV.
355 (2008); Robert Greenwald, The Role of Community-Based Clinical Legal Education in Support­
ing Public Interest Lawyering, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 569 (2007).

70. For prior groundwork in the practical uses of critical theory under the frameworks of
cultural studies, critical-outsider jurisprudence, pragmatism, and democratic theory, see Anthony V.
(2008).
multivariable and open-ended, and cast the process of lawyering as deriving legitimacy through client participation.

The critical view of law as a social and cultural practice arises out of cultural studies. Essential to the critical reflection of clinical practice, cultural studies scholarship denotes "lawyering" as an interpretive practice applicable to multiple oral, written, and social texts in action. That interpretive practice locates the social reality of difference-based client and community identity in the interwoven constructions of law, culture, and society seen and heard for example within the congregations of the Historic Black Churches of West Coconut Grove. Situating client or group identity in law, culture, and society refutes neutral claims of a natural or necessary mode of construction in advocacy and politics. From this standpoint, neither the socioeconomic condition of the West Grove churches nor the socio-legal identity of their congregations is attributable to a natural or necessary racial order. In fact, both are constructed in the interpretive and material movements of law, culture, and society often captured within the "lawyering" process.

The critical view of legal judgments as descriptively incomplete follows from the insights of cultural studies and additionally borrows from critical outsider jurisprudence in treating identity as multifaceted and unstable. The constituent parts of critical outsider jurisprudence—critical race theory, feminist theory, and queer theory—proffer identity as a shifting aggregation of multiple categories beyond stock accounts of race, gender, sexuality, or


73. See Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993).


religious faith. Acknowledging the multiple dimensions and changing qualities of difference-based client and community identity renders "lawyering" judgments of fact and law incomplete and partial. Applied to the congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this view counsels CEDAD's clinical students to proceed carefully in describing what they see and hear, and to advance slowly in reaching judgments of client motivation and purpose.

The critical view of legal reasoning as multivariable and open-ended draws from outsider jurisprudence coupled with the realist caution of pragmatism. Critical pragmatism contextualizes lawyer advocacy judgments exposing legal reasoning as situational. Entangled in the representation of difference-based client and community identity, those practical judgments produce highly contingent, provisional outcomes. The critical impulse of pragmatism encourages revisiting the roles, relationships, and goals of client and community representation in order to test the validity of "lawyering" judgments in action. For CEDAD clinical students working in partnership with the congregations of the West Grove's Historic Black Churches, this counterintuitive encouragement produces useful reflection and self-doubt about "lawyering" solutions, as well as ongoing experimentation in developing community-based, participatory remedies.

The critical view of lawyering as legitimated through client participation comes out of democratic theory. Engrafted on difference-based identity

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and ant subs ordination practice norms, democratic legal theory encourages client participation in the "lawyering" process through community-based collaborations inside and outside of neighborhood church congregations. Facilitating client participation in the "lawyering" process educates clients in rights discourse, creating opportunities for individual empowerment and collective mobilization.\textsuperscript{83} Empowerment and mobilization depend on educating clients in "lawyering" skills and training lay advocates to represent underserved groups and communities.\textsuperscript{84} Civic engagement in fostering grassroots, democratic initiatives among clients and client groups helps transform the standard conception of the "lawyering" process as lawyer driven and professional identity as lawyer dominant. Joining the congregations of the West Grove’s Historic Black Churches in strategic planning about legal-political rights education and social-service capacity-building breaks away from the standard conception of lawyer domination in community advocacy.

\textbf{C. Critical Pedagogies in Community Action: The Historic Black Church Project}

The Historic Black Church project is part of the University of Miami Law School’s ongoing nine-year effort to assist Miami’s economically distressed West Coconut Grove community. Housed at the School’s Center for Ethics and Public Service, the project is spearheaded by the CEDAD Clinic, a joint venture collaboration with the University’s School of Architecture and Florida Legal Services. The purpose of the project is to provide multidisciplinary resources in education, law, and social services to underserved low-income residents by establishing congregation-based church partnerships through the West Grove’s sixteen-church Ministerial Alliance. Exemplifying critical pedagogies, the project combines poverty law instruction\textsuperscript{85} and community-based skills training\textsuperscript{86} with student-centered ethical and social development strategies to advance racial justice.\textsuperscript{87}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{83} See \textsc{Lani Guinier} \& \textsc{Gerald Torres}, \textit{The Miner’s Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy} (2002); \textsc{Susan D. Bennett}, \textit{Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the Arts of Democracy}, 2002 Wis. L. Rev. 469; \textsc{Scott L. Cummings}, \textit{Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice}, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 399 (2001).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} \textsc{Daniel S. Shah}, \textit{Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change}, 6 Clinical L. Rev. 217, 250-54 (1999).
  \item \textsuperscript{86} \textit{See generally} \textsc{Susan D. Bennett}, \textit{Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community Economic Development Clinic}, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 45 (2002) (discussing the diversity of skills learned in a community economic development clinic); \textsc{Andrea M. Seielstad}, \textit{Community Building as a Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal Education}, 8 Clinical L. Rev. 445 (2002).
  \item \textsuperscript{87} \textit{See generally} \textsc{Jane H. Aiken}, \textit{Provocateurs for Justice}, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 287 (2001); \textsc{Anthony V. Alfieri}, \textit{Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice}, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 851 (2004); \textsc{Jon C. Dubin},
The project entails several interrelated experiential learning initiatives encompassing rights-education seminars, capacity-building workshops, and oral history church archive compilations. The project’s rights-education seminars address a wide range of topics affecting the West Grove’s church congregations, including children’s health, education, elder law, tenants’ rights, homeowner protection, crime prevention, and voting rights. The church-based seminars afford both students and church activists the opportunity to learn substantive law while integrating critical pedagogies into classroom and community settings. Legal analysis of this kind supplies students and activists with the constitutional, statutory, and doctrinal rules needed to engage with the world through the medium of the law.

The project’s capacity-building workshops, by comparison, focus on community-wide economic development and nonprofit legal compliance. These church-based workshops offer practical-skills training in financial management and nonprofit governance spanning a variety of substantive areas from corporate to tax law. Learning to assist client groups and organizations occurs through modeling, habituation, experiment, and reflection. Both simulated and clinical forms of modeling dictate pedagogies blending formal legal analysis, practical habits of mind, and skills of social interaction.

In contrast, the project’s ongoing assembly of oral history church archives, and the planned establishment of a national consortium on

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90. See Project Description, Community Economic Development and Design Clinic, Historic Black Church Project (Fall 2008) (on file with author).


92. The archives are compiled and stored at individual churches through a student-faculty partnership with local schools in Coconut Grove. The oral histories of each congregation and ministry are assembled and videotaped by high school, undergraduate, and law students. Both high school and undergraduate students also participate in faculty supervised multimedia projects (drawing, painting, and photography) documenting the churches in conjunction with their congregations and affiliated youth groups. See Project Description, supra note 90. Such multimedia projects offer partnership opportunities with university fine arts departments and law school legal writing programs. Cf. Rebecca A. Cochran, Legal Research and Writing Programs as Vehicles for Law Student Pro Bono Service, 8 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 429 (1999) (proposing to use legal research and writing programs as a means of engaging students in pro bono work). See generally Sarah O’Rourke Schrup, The Clinical Divide: Overcoming Barriers to Collaboration Between Clinics and Legal Writing Programs, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 301 (2007) (advocating increased communication between legal research and writing programs and clinical programs).
campus-church-community collaboration linking faith-inspired civic engagement and service learning in higher education, work to invigorate professionalism norms of social responsibility, historical witness, and ethical reflection. By plan, critical pedagogies stress the public purpose of the profession. Fundamental to that purpose is the formation of professional identity guided by other-regarding interests. Viewed against the backdrop of the Historic Black Church project, both the formation and reformation of professional identity is underway.

CONCLUSION

Joint law school-community initiatives like CEDAD’s Historic Black Church project enrich the mission of clinical education and legal education more generally by addressing difference-based identities, contexts, and communities through innovative theory/practice pedagogies. Both CEDAD and the Carnegie Foundation advance these pedagogies in the hope of encouraging “more informed scholarship and imaginative dialogue about teaching and learning for the law” and prodding legal educators to build “a stronger commitment to the public mission and purpose of the vocation and the institution they have chosen to serve” (p. 19). And yet, both the Foundation and CEDAD falter when they overlook the relevance of critical pedagogies in teaching students how best to engage with difference-based identity in the context of representing communities of color. The traditions of civic professionalism help shape that engagement. The critical pedagogies arising out of the campus-community collaboration between CEDAD’s clinical law students and the West Grove’s Historic Black Church congregations help ground it in mutual faith.

94. See Floyd, supra note 28.