Fun with Administrative Law: A Game for Lawyers and Judges

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The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare and change business’ profitability or even viability. Nonetheless, it can seem like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doctrines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step” or “Chevron step zero.” To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in linguistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure the real issues. Grammatical arguments about things like the “rule of the last antecedent” abound, and they rarely serve to make clear language any clearer, or to clarify ambiguous language. At its worst, this type of analysis frustrates
one goal of the requirement of reasoned decision making: preventing agency officials “from cowering behind bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo.” In this context, it is not surprising to see courts treat legislative goals and public policy as all but irrelevant to their decisions. Perhaps because much of the popula-

clause ‘which exists in the national economy’) should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows (here, ‘any other kind of substantial gainful work’).” Id. Lengthy analyses that purport to shed light on whether a statutory phrase is or is not ambiguous are almost inherently suspect. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89, 550 U.S. at 93-98 (providing a more-than-ten-paragraph analysis to find ambiguity in the “literal language” of a short statutory phrase); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority required “more than 10 pages” to find that a statutory provision was “clear and unambiguous”); cf. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The sheer surfeit of factors that the Court was required to consider in this case should arouse the suspicion that something is seriously amiss with our jurisprudence in this area.”). Despite the masterful obfuscation of the Zuni majority’s “literal language” analysis, Justice Stevens suggested “a more direct route to the Court’s patently correct conclusion [that the agency’s regulation was consistent with congressional intent],” arguing that a “policy-driven interpretation” is appropriate as long as the “driving policy is faithful to the intent of Congress (or, as in this case, aims only to give effect to such intent)—which it must be if it is to override a strict interpretation of the text—[in which case] the decision is also a correct performance of the judicial function.” 550 U.S. at 105-06 (Stevens, J., concurring).


7. See Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1227 (11th Cir. 2009) (deferring to an interpretation which creates a regulatory gap that “may seem inconsistent with the lofty goals of the Clean Water Act” because it is “no more so [i.e., inconsistent with these lofty goals]” than to allow other gaps in coverage that “we know the Act does.”). The court essentially threw up its hands at the prospect of ever understanding statutory purposes, explaining that:

[T]he legislative process serves as a melting pot of competing interests and a face-off of battling factions. What emerges from the conflict to become the enactment is often less pure than the preamble promises. The provisions of legislation reflect compromises cobbled together by competing political forces and compromise is the enemy of single-mindedness.

Id.

The Friends of the Everglades court cited In re Hedrick, 524 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that courts “interpret and apply statutes, not congressional purposes,” and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998), for the recognition that “it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which [courts] are governed.”

In Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 886 F.2d 355, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court upheld a regulation that would sometimes require companies to treat hazardous waste to levels beyond drinking water standards before placing that waste in a hazardous-waste landfill. In other words, waste would sometimes have to be cleaner than water suitable for drinking before it could be placed in a landfill. Noting, inter alia, that EPA considers cost when setting drinking water standards but not when developing the disposal-in-a-landfill standards at issue, the court deferred to an interpretation that, on its face, appears to defy common sense.
tion has already written lawyers off as idiots and leeches, there is little public outrage at the spectacle of courts resolving important public issues in terms that only lawyers can understand. And even lawyers do not necessarily take these doctrines seriously.

The ideas that animate administrative law jargon are far from nonsensical, although they tend to elevate the question of “turf” to a more prominent role in judicial decisionmaking than might be desirable. But the “turf” issue is important: When the legislative meaning of regulatory legislation is in dispute, “Who [d]ecides?” The courts, whose “province and duty [is] to say what the law is” Or agencies, to which Congress has arguably “delegate[d] . . . the authority to interpret [legislative] ambiguities with the force of law”? Understandably, some judges do not trust agency bureaucrats to advance congressional policies without relatively strict supervision, warning

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9. See Tom Leahy, This Year’s Charge! For Section Officers, 81 Ill. B.J. 348, 348 (1993) (evoking “the faces of the public who mistrust and distrust our profession,” the author states that these “are faces of ordinary people (probably a lot of our own relatives!) who believe the legal profession was made by lawyers and for lawyers, and that only lawyers can understand and work within it.”); see also Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 6-7 (1993) (suggesting that judicial use of some “linguistic principles to justify their decisions, without any explanation of why one principle was chosen instead of another” can result in “a perceived lack of candor”).

10. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77, 97 (2011) (“I now share the view of many scholars that courts will never announce a doctrine that cannot accommodate the powerful tendency of judges and Justices to act in ways that are consistent with their strongly held political and ideological perspectives.”).


12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that, “[h]eless of the original design of the APA, [courts] have developed an elaborate law of deference” which tasks courts with deciding “whether the law means what the agency says it means.”).

13. City of Arlington, Texas v. Fed. Commc’n’s Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Justice Scalia has explained his view that some court discussion of delegation is really about “a fictional, presumed intent [to delegate, which] operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate.”
of “the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state.”14 Bureaucrats, left to their own devices, may become subject to “capture”15 and “hubris.”16 But other judges do not trust their comrades on the bench. In this view, judges—if afforded too much interpretive latitude—are likely to end up imposing their own policies as law, since even “[i]ntellectual honesty does not exclude a blinding intellectual bias.”17 Because neither bureaucrats nor judges are inherently trustworthy,18 these differences seem unlikely to be resolved soon. But to a large degree, the differences are papered over by confining interpretative analyses to the famous Chevron doctrine, which at key points employs vague language that can support conflicting views.19 Nonetheless, a Supreme Court majority purports to believe


16. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 311 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is not the EPA’s prerogative to disregard statutory limitations on its discretion because it concludes that other remedies it has created out of whole cloth are better.”); Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The rule of law in general, and separation of powers principles in particular, require that . . . administrative hubris be reined in, and that the task of improving the basic provisions of statutes be left to the same body that wrote them in the first place.”); Se. Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 761, 767 (5th Cir. 1980) (condemning “bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of power with reason”).

17. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 116-17 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “once one departs from ‘strict interpretation of the text’ . . . fidelity to the intent of Congress is a chancy thing” and that “what judges believe Congress ‘meant’ (apart from the text) has a disturbing but entirely unsurprising tendency to be whatever judges think Congress must have meant, i.e., should have meant.”).

18. See, e.g., Bob Warren, Slidell City Council Takes Exception to N.O. Inspector General’s Comments, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 17, 2013 (reporting on elected officials’ outrage over the New Orleans Inspector General’s suggestion that “the world is full of ‘thieves and liars’ and that some in that class are attracted to government work.”).

that the *Chevron* doctrine stands between relative predictability and “chaos.”

Does administrative law doctrine offer predictability? Well—it is undeniable that the doctrine embodies and reinforces a long-standing judicial reluctance to lightly dismiss the interpretations of the agencies that Congress has charged with implementing regulatory programs. This is no small thing; it means at minimum that the government has an advantage in complicated or confusing cases. The more administrative law cases resemble “scary math problem[s],” the more likely judges are to defer. But aside

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22. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 762-63 (1877) (“The construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.”); Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979) (stating that when a term is “so general . . . as to render an interpretive regulation appropriate,” the court customarily defers to the regulation, which, if found to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner, must be upheld) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 955 (1992) (noting that a cannon which “militates in favor of accepting an agency’s construction of a statute as long as the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to admit of that construction” dates “at least as far back as the New Deal”).
23. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the *Chevron* Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duq. L.J. 984, 1036 (1990) (finding “a dramatic decrease in substantive law remands following *Chevron*, and that the number of remands in other [e.g., procedural] categories remained constant”).
24. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 111 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This case is not a scary math problem; it is a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation.”).
25. See Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the *Chevron* Doctrine, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 73 (2013) (“Step two of *Chevron* remains a mystery, beyond the observation that agencies usually win when they get to it.”).

Acronyms can go a long way toward draining legal arguments of human interest and helping them sound like “scary math problems.” See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. at 111 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, for a government lawyer defending an (hypothetical) agency approval of a highway project that might disproportionately affect members of a minority group, why use the term “environmental justice” more than necessary? The phrase can be quickly defined as “EJ”—which has a bloodless, non-threatening tone to it. See, e.g., Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ. Dev. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 858 F. Supp. 2d 839, 860 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (“Putting aside whether LASED has the right to mount an EJ challenge under
from this bias toward deference to government decisions, it is questionable whether administrative law doctrine is often outcome-determinative.26 Even judges with carefully constructed philosophies about the doctrine have a tendency to ignore those philosophies when the result is important enough.27 Further, U.S. Supreme Court precedent supports the idea that courts may abandon deference when they deem the issues sufficiently important.28 Specifically, the Court expects Congress to “speak clearly [as opposed to ambiguously] if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast

NEPA, the argument that the FHWA ‘predetermined’ the location of the DRIC is not borne out by the AR.”). Similarly, there may be little need to refer repeatedly to a “highway” running through someone’s neighborhood, which might sound distressingly real. Why not call it a “LULU,” and move the case to a higher level of abstraction? See, e.g., Lydia B. Duff, *Beyond Environmental LULUs: Thoughts of an Urban Environmental Lawyer*, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 49, 49 (1994). From the government’s perspective, you may not wish the facts and equities to distract the court from principles of deference “to the ‘informed discretion’ of deciding agencies.” See, e.g., Latin Am’s. for Soc. & Econ. Dev., 858 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (citations omitted). The flip side of course, is that lawyers who challenge the government should seek to tell their clients’ stories clearly and in English (without ignoring the administrative law principles that the court will need to justify a result). For example, if you bring a lawsuit to protect asthmatic children from air pollution, would you rather talk about “health protection standards” or “NAAQS”? Cf., e.g., Mississippi v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 744 F.3d 1334, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing the stringency of “NAAQS”).

26. See, e.g., Beermann, *supra* note 19, at 783 (“Chevron is so pliable that courts applying it can still reach any desired result . . . .”); Scalia, *supra* note 13, at 521 (explaining that because [Justice Scalia] usually finds statutes clear from their text and their “relationship with other laws,” it is “relatively rare that *Chevron* will require [him] to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, [he] would not personally adopt.”).

27. Justice Scalia, for example, is the U.S. Supreme Court’s most eloquent champion of deference to “authoritative” agency interpretations, advocating for deference even to the interpretations that the U.S. Justice Department advances in briefs on behalf of client agencies. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 201, 259 n.6 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet Justice Scalia joined the majority in *Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000), denying deference to the Federal Drug Administration’s interpretation of the statutory term “drug” as broad enough to include tobacco when the statute defined that term to include “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body,” 529 U.S. at 125. The Court employed a wide-ranging analysis to interpret statutory words “in their context,” including the context of “other Acts” and “common sense,” and to construe the law “as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.” 529 U.S. at 132-33 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

28. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159 (“In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”) (citing Stephen Breyer, *Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy*, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986), for the proposition that courts “may also ask whether the legal question is an important one.”); id. at 160 (“Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”).
'economic and political significance.' And as the Seventh Circuit noted in a different context: ‘‘significance’ often lies in the eye of the beholder.’

If administrative law doctrines do not actually determine outcomes, they nonetheless create a risk of confusing advocates and causing them to give short-shift to the persuasive power of their clients’ stories and the equities that underlie their cases. Experienced lawyers know, however, not to put all of their eggs in the basket of dry, administrative law doctrine. This can be verified by looking behind the judicial rulings and reading the briefs in administrative law cases. While good lawyers are careful to show courts how administrative law principles can be used to express a ruling in their favor, they do not neglect to show—as a matter of policy, truth, and justice—why their favored result is best.

30. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005). For example, dissenting in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Justice Breyer noted that even if there were a rule that required “in close cases that a decision with ‘enormous social consequences’ should be made by democratically elected Members of Congress rather than by unelected agency administrators[,]” such a rule would not “control[ ] the outcome” in a case about whether the FDA had authority to regulate tobacco as a drug. 529 U.S. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
31. Cf. Beermann, supra note 19, at 837 (arguing that Chevron provides “courts with a mechanism for reducing their accountability by hiding their decisions approving agency action behind a veneer of deference”).
32. For related reasons, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn explained as part of his “Seven ABC’s of Appellate Argument” that “it is in the statement of the facts that the advocate has his first, best, and most precious access to the court’s attention.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 237-38 (1960). This is, in part, because there is usually “an equally perfect technical case to be made on [either] side.” Id. at 237. Thus, a persuasive case should make sense not only in terms of doctrine, but also “in simple terms of life and justice.” Id. at 238.
33. For example, in Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court overturned EPA’s decision not to grant a waiver to allow sale of a gasoline fuel additive, MMT. The court based its ruling on step one of the Chevron test. Specifically, the court held that EPA violated the Act’s “clear terms . . . in denying Ethyl a waiver for MMT on public health grounds.” Id. This is because the Act’s “plain language . . . makes clear that waiver decisions are to be based on one criterion: a fuel additive’s effect on emission standards.” Id. at 1058. Thus, “[i]n basing her waiver decision on the public health implications of MMT, the [EPA] Administrator acted contrary to the plain language of [the relevant statutory provision].” Id. Because the court’s ruling flowed from unambiguous congressional direction, the administrative law novice might expect that the legal briefs before the court would have been short, dry, and focused on statutory interpretation. Not so. The petitioner’s fifty-seven-page brief does, of course, stress the Act’s limited criterion. See Brief for Petitioner at 4-40, Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1505), (1994 WL 16182838). But the brief also takes more than fifteen pages to show that EPA’s approach to its “public health” analysis was unfair, unscientific, and
In sum, administrative law jurisprudence tends to boil down to a body of judicial opinions that serve poorly to enlighten or sharpen public discourse. Many administrative law opinions read as if they were in code, designed to obscure rather than illuminate the considerations driving the result. For lawyers, however, the doctrine boils down to a flexible tool for advocacy—a language capable of justifying whatever result the advocate favors. Although the doctrine’s gist appropriately favors deference to the government in close cases, it supplies a counter-argument to almost any opponent’s argument. In this respect, the doctrine is reminiscent of a children’s game, known as “fortunately/unfortunately,” which involves some variation of the following recitation:

Unfortunately, a man fell out of an airplane. Fortunately, there was a haystack in the field below. Unfortunately, there was a pitchfork in the haystack. Fortunately, the man missed the pitchfork. Unfortunately, he missed the haystack.

For lawyers, of course, what is unfortunate in one case may be fortunate in the next. Therefore, for our purposes, the doctrine is more appropriately phrased in value-neutral terms, i.e., “on one hand” and “on the other.” If we were to succumb to the lure of legal analysis that focuses on the “two step” and the “zero step” and begin to treat administrative law as a game, it might look something like this:

Instructions: Select the principles that support your case or the result you wish to reach. If you notice an administrative law principle that is contrary to your preferred result, don’t worry! There is likely to be a contrary principle in the next column.34

“smack[ed] of Orwellian ‘doublespeak,’” and that, in fact, there is no evidence that MMT presented a significant threat to public health. See id. at 41-55 (the “Orwellian doublespeak” quote is on page fifty-one of the brief). Why did the petitioners bother? The petitioners’ lawyers presumably wanted the court to feel comfortable that it was reaching the correct result in terms of justice and good public policy. In other words, they were presumably not confident that having the best side of a Chevron step-one argument would be enough. Further, those parts of the petitioner’s argument that focused on fairness, science, and public policy had a logical function in the brief as a fallback “arbitrary and capricious” argument under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Id. at 52 (“EPA’s denial of Ethyl’s application on the basis of this record is arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside.”).

34. Professor Karl N. Llewellyn used a similar chart to demonstrate that “there are two opposing canons [of statutory construction] on almost every point.” LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 521. He explained, “to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon . . . .” Id.
On one hand: On the other:

- Courts review agency interpretations of regulatory laws by applying the *Chevron* two-step test: “First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . . [Second, if] the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute . . . . Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

An agency’s view of ambiguous statutory language “governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed *most* reasonable by the courts.”

- “[I]f the language of the statute is open or ambiguous . . . then [the court] must uphold the [agency’s] interpretation as long as it is reasonable.”

- The *Chevron* two-step analysis only applies when [1] “Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and [2] that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” Otherwise, the appropriate degree of judicial deference depends on the “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”

Further, courts need “accept [as reasonable] only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ.”

- But courts apply “traditional tools of statutory construction” to ascertain whether there is ambiguity, i.e., whether “Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.” And there is no definitive list of these “traditional tools.” Further, “plain meaning, like

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41. *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.

42. See Lawson & Kam, *supra* note 25, at 74 (“Professor Lawson has been waiting for almost thirty years for a court to openly acknowledge there is some uncertainty about how to determine the ‘clear’ meaning of a statute—and he is still waiting patiently.”); Craig Allen Nard, *Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts*, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1509 n.246 (1995). Arguably, this is all for the good. If we wanted the legal system to resolve disputes according to rigid rules, we presumably could replace judges with computers. Because judges “are not automata,” Universal Camera Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951), we expect them to apply their wisdom to traditional and evolving tools of legal and factual analysis, tempered by a humble appreciation of the judiciary’s limited role in making policy.
beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the beholder.  

• Where statutory text is "not crystalline," deference to a reasonable construction is appropriate.  

• "In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. . . . It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. . . . A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole. Similarly, the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand."  

• "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive . . . ."  

• "[E]xcept in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’"  

See id. ("The ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its work."); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983) ("Marbury’s justification for judicial review, grounded as it is in the ‘ordinary and humble judicial duty’ of the common law courts, seems necessarily to entail a general obligation of independent law-exposition by article III courts. This is what courts ‘do’; it is their ‘job.’").  

43. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron As A Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 705 (2007) (arguing that "whether deference will be given in practice is a function of heterogeneous interpretive methods used by individual judges and divergent views about the degree of clarity in statutes").  

44. See New Mexico v. Watkins, 969 F.2d 1122, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1992).  


47. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
| • "The power of executing the laws . . .
  does not include a power to revise clear
  statutory terms that turn out not to work
  in practice." | • Courts routinely construe the "owner
  and operator" language of 42 U.S.C.
  § 9607(a)(1) as "owner or operator" where
  there is "no rational explanation, other
  than careless statutory drafting, for
  imposing liability upon 'owners or
  operators' under one section but only
  holding 'owners and operators' liable
  under another section." |
| --- | --- |
| • "The fact that the agency has from
time to time changed its interpretation" does
not mean "that no deference should be
accorded . . . ." Thus, an "initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone." Instead, the agency must consider
"the wisdom of its policy on a continuing
basis." | • "An agency interpretation of a relevant
 provision which conflicts with the
 agency's earlier interpretation is entitled
to considerably less deference than a
 consistently held agency view." |
| • Agencies must "examine the relevant
data." | • But if the law required agencies to re-
think decisions every time "some new
circumstance has arisen, some new trend
has been observed, or some new fact
discovered, there would be little hope that
the administrative process could ever be
consummated in an order that would not
be subject to reopening." Further, "[i]t
is well settled that an agency need not
reopen administrative proceedings merely
because some new piece of evidence has
come to light that was not before the
agency at the time it made its decision." |

that same case, however, the Court approvingly cited EPA's tendency to interpret the Clean
Air Act's phrase "any pollutant" to include only some pollutants, since "the Act is far from a
chef d'oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship." 134 S. Ct. at 2441.
49. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990); see
also SOKAN, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the "and/or rule," under which courts sometimes
treat these conjunctions as interchangeable to correct common drafting errors).
51. Immigration & Nationality Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30
(1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
(1944)).
54. Am. Mining Cong. v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 1982).
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<th>An agency “typically has wide latitude in determining the extent of data-gathering necessary to solve a problem.”</th>
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<td>&quot;[T]he agency must explain the evidence which is available, and must offer a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.&quot; Generally, one aspect of that explanation would be a justification for [acting in the face of uncertainty] before engaging in a search for further evidence.&quot;</td>
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<th>The doctrine of <em>stare decisis</em> has “‘special force’ . . . with regard to questions of statutory interpretation . . .&quot;</th>
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<td>But a “court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to <em>Chevron</em> deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” A contrary rule “would lead to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law.”</td>
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<th>A party challenging an administrative rule must “exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.”</th>
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<td>But an agency has a “preexisting duty to examine key assumptions as part of its affirmative burden of promulgating and explaining a non-arbitrary, non-capricious rule” and the agency “must justify that assumption even if no one objects to it during the comment period.”</td>
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59. Id. at 983 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Courts "have recognized two distinct species of exhaustion requirements: (1) non-jurisdictional exhaustion, which is a judicially created doctrine requiring parties who seek to challenge agency action to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing their case to court; and (2) jurisdictional exhaustion, which arises when Congress requires resort to the administrative process as a predicate to judicial review."63

"The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate APA standard of review . . . to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to the reviewing court."64

"Particularly when "the procedural validity" of agency action is "in serious question," it may "sometimes be appropriate to resort to extra-record information to enable judicial review to become effective."65 Also, at times "[t]o ignore [specific extra-record] facts is to ignore reality. For the law to have any credibility or respect, it must be grounded in reality."66

So what is the prize for winners? Ideally, the game will help all players internalize the fact that—aside from its role in reinforcing the traditional principle of deference to agencies charged with carrying out Congress' schemes—administrative law doctrine is a language, not a generator of results. Advocates must be steeped in the doctrine, of course, and use it to highlight a path to the results they seek. But the bottom line remains: What is your client's story? Why do truth, justice, and the American way demand that your client prevail? Your results may vary.

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