

THE UNITED NATIONS AFTER A DECADE

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Surveying the field of the United Nations can, like any other field of surveying, be helped a little bit by triangulation, and I suggest there are three principal angles which should be explored or measured in evaluating the role and function of the United Nations. I will speak very generally and briefly by way of introduction, with apologies for being perhaps too superficial. The first angle of measurement is the United States, or perhaps if you want to over-generalize, the free world angle. The second is that of the Soviet or Communist world. The third is that of the United Nations, not "one world," so much as "whole world." Diplomacy is the means for seeking peace and well-being for one's own country; that is axiomatic. The question is more specifically, what kind of peace and what conditions of well-being? I should like to take each of these angles for a very brief measurement.

So far as the United States objectives are concerned, briefly and most generally, we wish to promote the general welfare through co-operative effort, to create conditions in which individual freedoms flourish, and to remain loyal to a tradition of morality and ethics. Lapses are frequent, but they are viewed as departures from a norm. Our diplomacy works toward the kind of peace and stability which advances these objectives, or, to put it in international terms, a peace based on "collective security," which is simply a synonym for co-operative action.

Soviet objectives, our second angle of measurement, are of course designed to further their national interest, just as ours are intended to serve the United States. However, in many basic respects, one might say in most basic respects, Soviet methods are the opposite of ours. They seek to promote the general welfare through dictated effort. They subject the will of the individual to that of the state, the "will" of the latter being arbitrarily defined. And they view morality and ethics as a flexible means of achieving a predetermined goal.

The third angle of measurement is the United Nations' objectives. It has often been pointed out that the United Nations Charter broadly defines the objectives of a free society. It is therefore largely a projection of our own concepts into the international community. However, since its membership fortunately, if not happily, includes conflicting viewpoints which are facts of international life, the methods of the United Nations must seek to narrow the gaps without at the same time betraying its objectives. This is the dilemma of United Nations diplomacy. There is no escape from its challenge or its complexity.

May I now consider the impact of the dilemma which I have just described? Most Americans believe that the principal obstacles in the way of a just peace and conditions of stability are created by Communist foreign policy. This is not implying that our conduct of foreign affairs leaves nothing to be desired. We tend, for example, to assume truculent postures and work from inside lines of self-righteousness. Nevertheless, the fact is that many of our faults of omission and commission are the effect, rather than the cause, of tensions. I include in this category the many unrealistic aspects of our relations with Communist China.

A primary cause of tension, and hence a seed of war, is to be found in the closed-world concept of the Communist system. Our will toward freely-achieved unity is shown by the very name we give our country, the United States. The closed-world system is symbolized, on the other hand, by the divided states—Germany, Korea, Indochina, all of them victims of the Iron Curtain. It is the closed-world concept which accounts as well for the deadlock on other major issues of war and peace. Now, without taking our eyes off the pressing requirements of the hungry millions, a high priority must be given to bring about through peaceful pressures a shift of Soviet policy away from its present closed-world focus. International organizations can serve valuable roles in helping to bring about a modification in Soviet foreign policy in this respect. The problem I pose for myself this evening is how we can effectively use these forums to that end, in tandem with our bilateral diplomatic efforts.

May I first turn to an analysis of some of the characteristics of the United Nations forum. In a study by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation called United States Foreign Policy, George Kennan makes several comments which may serve as a point of departure for this section of my analysis. He disparages what he describes as "the importance attached in United Nations

circles, American and foreign, to the United Nations as an institution rather than just a forum of diplomacy." With obvious concern, lest these United Nations circles seek to run away from home, Kennan warns, "The United Nations under any realistic appraisal is in fact still the instrument of national policy. It is not an institution in itself at this stage in its development." And then to drive the lesson home Kennan concludes, "The single most important check to multilateral diplomacy is the recourse to bilateral diplomacy."

With all respect to a good friend and a universally admired scholar, these quoted bits seem to me to reflect an ignorance of the workings both of the United States Mission and of the United Nations itself. Whether it is called an institution or, as Kennan prefers to say, "just a forum" is a matter of indifference. The two terms are not mutually exclusive. What Kennan clearly intends to stress is the UN as a meeting place, rather than an agency for integrated effort. What is damaging, however, is his misconception that the United Nations was ever thought by any responsible American delegate to be something other than an instrument of enlightened national policy. It is this false premise which leads to the error of thinking of bilateral diplomacy as a "check" on multilateral diplomacy. The fact is that both these types of diplomacy must be used in skillful reciprocity. Neither can claim a higher virtue and both are indispensable. I would venture to say that the United Nations is a modern way of carrying on old-fashioned diplomacy. It is, of course, not the only way.

This leads me to consider some special characteristics of this forum. First, a feeling of sharing a common responsibility marks the attitude of colleagues in a multilateral forum to an extent rarely present in bilateral processes. This feeling contributes to that sense of the United Nations as an institution, which seems to trouble Kennan and some other distant observers. Incidentally, this is true of regional organizations as well. I have known in my service with the United States Mission numerous Foreign Service officers, skilled and experienced in the methods of bilateral diplomacy, who almost invariably within a few weeks or months of beginning service with the Mission developed this sense which I have just described. Membership on a council, on an assembly, or on a committee facilitates frankness of personal discussion. The sharing of functions common to one organization provides a certain degree of insulation from usual diplomatic sensitivities. I myself learned this almost within hours after joining the United States Mission in 1949 when

I was precipitated headfirst into private and delicate negotiations then going on in the highly inflamed Kashmir dispute. I felt at the time that I was able to discuss so frankly and personally, within a few hours of arriving on the scene, with high officials of the contending parties, matters of such high sensitivity only because I was doing so in a forum in which my Canadian, French, and British colleagues were present to share the load. I think any of us, Phil Jessup, or Jim Hyde, who was one of the most valued members of the Mission, and others in this audience, could verify what I have just said. And note please that in such cases, bilateral discussions were also taking place, co-ordinated and paced withours. Far from acting as a "check" on multilateral diplomacy, the bilateral negotiations often welcomed the larger forum as a decidedly more convenient and beneficial procedure in many difficult cases.

The second special characteristic of the multilateral forum, at least as I witnessed it, is based upon the importance of observation and reporting as a diplomatic responsibility. The larger forum furnishes an admirable opportunity, if properly used, to study the several national viewpoints, not only in themselves but also when they are viewed in conjunction or in conflict with each other. I have frequently recalled the numerous caucuses of the Latin American group held at the United Nations when it was discussing matters of common interest. The observations one was able to form concerning the interplay of viewpoint, as well as of personality, among the Latin American delegates seated around the table behind closed doors provided, I am sure, a degree of analysis, of information, and reporting, which would be difficult indeed to have duplicated from twenty separate Latin American capitols. I recall with equal vividness the beginnings of the Asian-African group during the Korean days in 1950 when, I believe, the characteristics and potential growth and development of that group was misread, perhaps it is fair to say, largely because of the biases of those familiar solely and exclusively with bilateral phenomena of diplomacy.

The third characteristic is that the multilateral forum provides a setting in which skillful handling can influence relationships between others, as well as with others. In this respect many of the characteristics resemble those of domestic politics. The bandwagon tendency is always latent, and the swaying of tides can be studied and sometimes managed. May I cite one or two cases from my own experience. In 1948 in the Paris Assembly, we were anxious to get through the Assembly a ceiling upon the United States contribution to the United Nations

budget. It is hard to exaggerate the degree of emotional opposition manifest at the beginning of the session to what many members thought was an attempt on our part to avoid our fair share of the contribution. I venture to say that if it had not been for a calculated tactic of developing a bandwagon psychology in our direction, we might not have gotten a simple majority. As a matter of fact we did get a unanimous vote, all except for the abstentions of the Soviet bloc. The same thing (as it happened during that same Assembly) was true of the Genocide Convention. We made a special effort to obtain a unanimous vote and were successful in doing so. The session did not start out that way, by any means.

Now, I should like to discuss briefly types of United Nations procedures which I believe illustrate the characteristics of the forum I have been describing.

Perhaps the most common fallacy about the United Nations is that the bulk of its operations takes place in public. One hears even well-informed persons characterize United Nations activity in terms of "diplomacy by conference" or "diplomacy in a goldfish bowl." United Nations diplomacy involves both private and public activities, and the private activities comprise perhaps 90% to 95% of the total effort expended in the forum. This is true of both the principal types of behind-the-scenes activity: secret or private negotiation and private mediation, conciliation, or the like. In each of these, the role of the Secretary-General is of increasing importance. I believe that within a short time this will become widely recognized and even perhaps publicly endorsed and stimulated by our own Government. The normal functions of public or open activity may be summarized as follows:

- (1) Fact-finding and reporting.
- (2) Open efforts at mediation. These almost invariably are designed to lead the parties to the conference table behind closed doors.
- (3) Open negotiation. It is perhaps better to describe this as "debate" rather than "negotiation," since it is primarily designed to generate public understanding and public pressures. A good example is the public activity of the Disarmament Commission.
- (4) Supervisory functions. These may be to supervise a truce, as in Palestine or Korea, or to carry out UN recommendations, as in the case of

Libya and Eritrea where UN administrators helped prepare the way for self-government.

(5) Activities in the economic and social fields, where publicly-organized and executed programs are the rule rather than the exception.

The issue of disarmament involves most if not all of these public and private functions which I have just described. In view of this fact, and because of its crucial importance, I should like to analyze the problem of disarmament and the key role which the United Nations must play in its handling.

The question is often asked whether the Soviets want war. This is the wrong question. Like anyone else, the Soviet leaders would prefer to gain their objectives without war. The real question is, what are their objectives? Are these objectives likely to lead to war? Disarmament is a good testing point, because the atomic arms race itself is a reactor which breeds war. I doubt that the Soviet motive is to create conditions most favorable for a sneak atomic attack, although naturally we guard against this to the extent practicable. It is more probable that they wish to effect a maximum reduction of the arms burden, with a minimum degree of trespass beyond the Iron Curtain. As between their fear of our violating an unpoliced pledge not to use atomic weapons and their fear of yielding any of their sealed-in sovereignty, it is the latter fear which has tended to shape their policy. For us, the risk of aggression had, up to now at least, out-weighed the resistance which any sovereignty, including our own, offers to encroachment. The difference is, at least in part, due to the fact that within a police state sovereignty is congealed by the requirements of power control, whereas in an open society the concept of sovereignty is more fluid and therefore more easily pooled.

All the while, however, the new discoveries have increased the hazards of atomic warfare. The new technology makes even more impractical what has come to be called in the folklore of disarmament "foolproof inspection." The result of the increasing hazards of atomic warfare and the impracticability of foolproof inspection is a growing pressure upon us to search for less rigid concepts of control and inspection. The same pressures work on the Soviet side to induce a relaxation of the closed-world abhorrence to all penetration. The resultant equation can be formulated something like this: the more closed the Soviet system, the more rigid must be the controls, and vice versa. It is not at all unlikely, and indeed I would

venture to say it is probable, that neither we nor the Soviets ment policy.' In any event, no one will deny the decisive importance of making a wise choice of international procedures in which these issues can be most effectively negotiated.

Before turning specifically to a consideration of the role of the United Nations in this respect, may I mention what I would call the three aspects of disarmament: weapons disarmament, strategic disarmament, and economic disarmament. These three are interrelated although seldom described in this way. "Weapons disarmament," or more accurately, reduction of arms and armed forces and elimination of certain weapons, is commonly regarded as the most important aspect. There is no doubt that it is crucial, but it is related to the other aspects. "Strategic disarmament" involves the means of delivery of weapons and of movement of material, of men, and of information. An example of strategic disarmament is of course the Soviet demand that we evacuate overseas bases. To a large extent the dismantling of key bases would involve dismantling the free-world coalition. The prime value of the regional arrangements, particularly NATO, is to be found in the infrastructure, even more than in the supra-structure. The third aspect, "economic disarmament," is not as fashionable a phrase now as it was during the abortive postwar attempt to limit German productive capacity. There is little doubt, however, that the Soviet desire to neutralize Germany is due in some measure, at least, to her desire to sterilize the Ruhr. Industrial capacity along with resources of men and material underlies the whole question of the use of national power. The Soviet Government combined these three aspects in their May 10, 1955 London proposals. I do not mean to express agreement with these proposals. In the first place, they are extremely difficult to understand in their over-generalized form. But they are realistic if only in the sense that they combine these three ingredients or components of the problem of disarmament. Incidentally, the Soviets have also shown their realization that the United Nations is the most practicable forum for dealing with this problem. This is the principal significance of their belated and rather startling concession that the United Nations is, after all, a forum in which German questions can be discussed!

All the foregoing factors lead me to attempt to define the disarmament objective in the following terms: an enforceable agreement on the balanced reduction of national power, as well

as on the limits within which that power will be used. These are both indispensable elements of the definition. It reflects the experience of the League of Nations, as distilled by Madariaga in 1929 in *Disarmament*, which still makes interesting reading. As so defined, disarmament is seen as a dynamic and a changing process rather than as a program which can ever be achieved or "completed." It is of the essence that the effort to deal with this process be a continuing and a general one. To that end it must be tackled, it seems to me, in a continuing and general forum that is the United Nations.

I should like to discuss briefly the relationship between the United Nations and other forums, such as regional organizations. In the quest for collective security, the regional arrangement plays a role which I believe is directly proportionate to the extent to which it is endowed with machinery. NATO has motors and is self-propelled. In my judgment SEATO is the glider type, pretty much held up by currents of warm air. There is a constant interplay between the Churchillian concept of a federation of regional organizations and the Rooseveltian (or perhaps more accurately the Cordell Hull) approach of an integrated world body. The former concept quite naturally gravitates toward Locarnos, meetings at the Summit, and similar eclectic procedures. This takes me back to the beginning of this survey, that is, a triangulation of objectives.

In the light of our objectives, those of the Soviet Union, and those of the United Nations, I have attempted to define them, what is to be expected from meetings of the Chiefs of State at the Summit, alternating, if I may say so, with Foreign Ministers' meetings in the attic? I believe their usefulness is to be gauged largely by the extent, if any, to which they tend to bring about a change in Soviet policy—specifically, to the extent to which they lead to at least a partial or gradual opening of the closed world. A confrontation of leaders, which in any event is demanded by public opinion, may work a limited personal magic, although there is room to doubt this. The Communists may wish to have dramatic sounding boards to announce so-called concessions, usually pre-determined. But neither of these tactical ends provides a worthy motive in itself for high-level meetings. When the substance of diplomacy becomes sticky—I cite again disarmament as a testing point—the highest premium must be placed upon the procedures of diplomacy. A major effort should be in the direction of buttressing what we already have and, if you please, cashing in on pledges already obtained.

An effective method of doing this would be to insist in all our forums of diplomacy upon the overriding sanctity of the United Nations security guarantees. In a normal society it is commonly regarded as a duty rather than as a virtue to carry out one's pledge. Tension is undoubtedly relaxed when a pick-pocket takes his hand out of your pocket. This may provide a suitable occasion for rejoicing, but not necessarily for passing out good-conduct medals. Among its other dangers, an obdurate course of international conduct tempts the victims to keep buying back the same horse in the hope that sooner or later their title will be recognized. One of the standard ways of holding out bait is to offer new pledges without ever making quite clear what happened to the old ones. For some years the Soviet delegations in the United Nations have stressed the importance they attach first to a so called "Five Power Peace Pact," and more recently to obtaining confirmation of their postwar gains through a European Non-Aggression Pact. Whether or not this is an intentional plan to debase the value of the United Nations security guarantee is quite beside the point. The fact is that it would have exactly this effect.

Locarno was worse than useless. The reason it lasted only eleven years was precisely the reason why it was concluded in the first place: the lack of will on the part of the members of the League of Nations to give weight to the security pledges of the Covenant. For the same reason it is of the utmost importance that high-level meetings should dramatize our insistence that existing forums, and in particular the United Nations, the major one to which both we and the Soviet belong, must be faithfully employed.

Moreover, it should be made clear that the faithful employment of this forum requires that at least Germany, Japan, and Italy be added to it. High on the agenda of meetings of the Chiefs of State should be placed the question of the Soviet abuse of the veto on United Nations membership questions. It seems to me that this is a much more fitting forum in which to press for Soviet action and to inform public opinion with regard to this important problem than would be a general conference to review the Charter. We missed an excellent chance in the Austrian Peace Treaty to break the log jam on membership. The Soviets were, after all, let off the hook without even being asked to pledge their support to the Austrian application for membership. There was, it is true, placed in the Preamble of the Austrian Peace Treaty the boilerplate language of the earlier violated satellite treaties. But there was no Soviet commitment to vote for Austrian admission.

As one looks ahead, we may safely say that we will not have peace without the United Nations, and it is very difficult to see how the United Nations can effectively work for peace if its security guarantee is debased, if its membership is artificially and arbitrarily restricted, and if issues such as disarmament and the other major issues of war and peace, deadlocked, as I have said, largely because of the Soviet closed-world concept, are not constantly and patiently explored, dramatized in that forum. Public opinion must be constantly mobilized in support of practical and honest positions. Public opinion grows like a stalactite. I think, in a word, that the United Nations has a future something along these lines. If the United Nations does not have a future it is doubtful whether we do, either!

QUESTION: Recently there has been much talk in the press about "peaceful coexistence." In that respect Arnold Toynbee, the historian philosopher, writing in the New York Times Magazine Section recently has said that the alternative to peaceful coexistence is not the happy elimination of Soviet Russia with us the surviving jubilant victor, but an atomic war which will see us all destroyed. I would like to hear Mr. Gross's comments on this.

The other question I would like to ask is this. Recently President Eisenhower has appointed Harold Stassen as Secretary of Disarmament. I would like to know whether the work of Mr. Stassen is independent of or in conjunction with the work of the United Nations.

MR. GROSS: With regard to the first question, I was reading a Yugoslav publication—in English, I hasten to add—a few days ago in which one of the writers from the Yugoslav Information Service discussed this question of peaceful coexistence (this was after the conference in Belgrade of the Soviet leaders with Tito, and after Tito had agreed with Bulganin and with Chou En Lai that coexistence was quite the thing). This writer defined coexistence as "loyal compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." I accept that definition and I think that is as good a test as any. If I seem to be paraphrasing a similar definition of coexistence by our Secretary of State in his speech at San Francisco, it is by coincidence. It is the words of this Yugoslav writer that came into my mind first. The problem is to give content and meaning to the phrase. That is precisely what the problem must remain. It is easy enough to say "either coexistence or no existence," but I think we have

learned to distrust slogans. The problem is to give the phrase meaning, content, and reality; the United Nations Charter provides the framework.

With regard to the question about Stassen's responsibility, I believe that Stassen's appointment was suggested by the Secretary of State, and that his task of co-ordinating the presently diversified positions of the key departments of our Government will undoubtedly be reflected to the world when he speaks for the United States delegation to the Disarmament Commission.

QUESTION: I want to ask Mr. Gross if he can spell out a little more specifically what steps he believes now might be taken to give new credit and virtue and standing to the collective security guarantees in the United Nations Charter.

MR. GROSS: Our leaders talk insistently about the importance of the moral basis of our leadership in the world and the forging of a moral unity. It is fair to say that the first step to be taken is to dramatize and to insist in all available forums upon not merely the validity of the UN security guarantee, but also its sanctity. Aggression must be regarded as transgression, as Madariaga once said. This is a good way of describing what is usually referred to as the moral basis of the collective security system. The aggressor is a transgressor. And the fact that the UN security pledge, the no-aggression pledge, is coupled with other elements of a moral concept and a sense of world community adds to the sanctity of that pledge. The antithesis of that, the pathetic reaching for new pacts, new guarantees, new pledges, is on a different road altogether. With regard to practical matters, I would not disagree for a moment with my old friend, Mr. Gilbert Montague's, comments in his introductory remarks, that the skill of debating is an important attribute indeed and I can only apologize for having been a lawyer while I was also trying to debate! But the point I would want to make here is that the quick answer is appealing and one can gain certain virtue by virtuosity. The debater's answer is good for domestic consumption and for world attention. But the 90 or 95% of private, non-goldfish-bowl activity in the UN forum, the constant attempt to create a climate of responsibility, of good will, and of confidence is, in the last analysis—I say it as an old, broken-down bureaucrat, Mr. Chairman—the highest service the UN forum can really perform in terms of strengthening our relationship with other nations.

QUESTION: I wondered if I understood Mr. Gross correctly to say that we major powers no longer have particular policies with respect to disarmament and atomic energy control. That is, if we could consider a situation where there was complete agreement upon the United Nations majority proposals for atomic control as they were specified about 1950, would the United States now back away from that?

MR. GROSS: The impression one has is that the "fool-proof" formula is obsolete, that the new techniques have made 100% Baruch-type inspection a thing of the past. Perhaps that creates Stassen's primary responsibility. Also, I think the Secretary of State is the "Secretary of Peace," and that Secretary Stassen is secretary in charge of helping Mr. Dulles to find a new formula for disarmament. Moreover, the pressures of the new weapons have heightened a sense of urgency which leads one to the conclusion that the great problem of statesmanship in the United States and the Soviets is whether the two curves on the chart can be brought to some crossing-point. I refer to the line represented by pressures on the Soviet to relax the Iron Curtain system because of fears of hydrogen war, and the line depicting pressures upon us to relax our control formula because of the same fears.

QUESTION: Do I correctly gather from your remarks and implication that in working in the Summit meeting with Russia on their veto exercise, that the United States now would be willing, or should be willing, to do away with the veto, to accept the two-thirds vote as enough or something like that in the operations of the Security Council?

MR. GROSS: My comments were about the membership question. With regard to the veto, we had announced earlier that we would not use the veto in connection with the membership question. We have lost a little bit of, shall we say, abstract virtue in that regard because of the more recent announcement that we would if necessary veto the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. That, incidentally, is a viewpoint I have found it difficult to understand because, if it were a vetoable question, the Nationalist China representative could veto his own replacement and our own vote would there not be decisive.

With regard to the problem of veto in other aspects, so far as I know, the only recommendation that has been made by the

MR. GROSS: The specialized agencies have been startlingly successful. I should like to point out, however, that although I have always pictured them and will picture them as integral parts of the United Nations system, one of the most unfortunate aspects of the structure is that—as Cabot Lodge described it in testifying before the Senate Sub-Committee—they are for all practical purposes independent of the United Nations. To the public at large they are certainly regarded as UN agencies and I always make it a point to describe them in that way. But there is room for improvement in terms of co-ordination of effort. There is a great deal of efficiency and economy of operation which common budgets, common overhead, and pooling of resources could effectuate. There is entirely too much vested interest in each, or perhaps I should say, in many of the organizations. It is a problem which should be met head-on by a Congress which is properly jealous of the way in which the taxpayers' money is spent. In that respect the agencies leave room for improvement. With regard to their specific accomplishments, they are of course really jewels in the crown of the UN system, but I do wish that UNESCO would shine a little more brightly at times. UNESCO could profit a great deal by a closer co-ordination and integration, administratively and functionally, in the general pool of efforts of the United Nations. I

QUESTION: I wonder if you would undertake to comment briefly with respect to the function and success of some of the auxiliary agencies of the United Nations. I have in mind, of course, UNESCO, the International Labor Office and the like.

Administration is the elimination of the veto on pacific settlement. It has been repeatedly proclaimed that we would not favor elimination or modification of the veto with regard to enforcement measures. With respect to the pacific settlement questions, the problem is not one which has any acute urgency. It is not an issue of war and peace as between the Soviet system and the free world. Many people believe it would be a nice and a useful amendment. But it would not be a decisively important one because the principal causes of tension can not be traced to the Soviet abuse of the veto in pacific settlement issues. I do not recall any case in the first ten years of the United Nations in which the Soviet has cast a veto in the pacific settlement field, perhaps once or twice in ten years. It certainly has not been very basic to the success or failure of the security system.

do not believe that a Charter Review Conference should be called for the purpose of looking into that question. The United States, as the principal contributor to all of them could exercise a very salutary influence, and above all, the recruiting of good personnel could be immeasurably enhanced by a pooling of recruitment effort and a tenure based upon working for one organization instead of working in a side pocket.