

## Chapter XII

# False Hopes

### I

#### A Debate, an Inventory, a Showdown, a Schism

The next period in the nuclear test ban negotiations brought certain significant changes. Although it started inauspiciously, suddenly both sides—but particularly the Soviet Union—demonstrated greater flexibility, and some observers felt that an agreement might be in sight. Hopes soared, but by the end of the period this optimism had been dashed.

#### *The Seventeenth General Assembly*

While the Subcommittee of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee continued to meet in Geneva—an American suggestion which the USSR reluctantly accepted—the spotlight of attention turned to New York and the United Nations General Assembly, where all three groups within the ENDC hoped to gain support for their positions. The Soviet Union, though, may well have had certain special expectations. Soviet leaders may have expected that the series of nuclear tests which the USSR was then conducting could be completed in sufficient time to enable them to make some dramatic move, such as announcing another unilateral suspension. Making such a move during the Assembly session would put great pressure on the Western states to take similar action. The USSR's assertions that the date set for the reopening of the full Eighteen-Nation Committee, November 12, could easily be adjusted and set back so that there need be no deadline on the Assembly's deliberations and its insistence that the subcommittee's sessions in Geneva should not in any way inhibit the Assembly,<sup>1</sup> support the suspicion that Soviet leaders may have considered such a move.

The item, "The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests," had been placed on the Assembly's agenda at

<sup>1</sup>ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 26, p. 24.

the request of India. When the Assembly opened, the First Committee decided to make it the first order of business. The debate in the Committee lasted from October 10 through November 5, and the two resolutions recommended by the Committee were adopted on November 6. For the most part the debate consisted of an expanded version of that which had occurred previously in the ENDC. The addition of ninety-three more states to the debate brought little that was qualitatively new.

The introduction of so many states which had not had previous detailed contact with the negotiations, however, complicated the Western position. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee the United States and the United Kingdom had attempted to build an elaborate technical case to substantiate their position, and had devoted considerable effort to explaining their views to the eight new members of the Committee.

To undertake a comparable effort in the Assembly would have been impossible. Immediately after the debate opened in the First Committee, the United States submitted two memoranda: the first outlining the technical aspects of the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions and the second explaining the findings of the Vela Program as they related to a nuclear test ban.<sup>2</sup> Obviously, though, these memoranda were not as effective as the briefings with top Western scientists held in Geneva. Nevertheless the Soviet Union, for the first time in 1962, felt constrained to issue a technical reply, though it did not do so until November 11 after the Assembly debate on a nuclear test ban had been concluded, and did so then only in the form of an article by three Russian scientists in *Izvestia*.<sup>3</sup> Subsequently the Soviet article was circulated as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.<sup>4</sup>

During the course of the debate, speakers from several Latin American states (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru), states belonging to the Western alliance system (Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, Greece, Iran, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and

<sup>2</sup>UN Document A/C. 1/873.

<sup>3</sup>For the text of the article, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 1042-46. The article was signed by Mikhail A. Sadovsky, V. Keilis-Borok, and N. Kondorskaya. The first two individuals had participated in some of the meetings of scientists connected with the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

<sup>4</sup>ENDC/67.

the Philippines), as well as from the Federation of Malaya, Spain, Ireland, and Somalia, supported the idea of a partial test ban treaty as a first step toward a comprehensive ban. On the other hand, spokesmen from Communist states (Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR), certain African and Asian states (Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) and Austria emphasized the importance of having a test ban treaty apply to all environments.

Two draft resolutions were introduced, both on October 19. The first was proposed by thirty African, Asian, and Latin American states, including the eight new members of the Disarmament Committee.<sup>5</sup> Seven other states from the same geographic regions later became additional cosponsors. The other resolution was proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>6</sup>

The thirty-seven power resolution condemned all nuclear tests, asked that all such tests should cease immediately and in any event not later than January 1, 1963, endorsed the Eight-Nation Memorandum "as a basis for negotiations," called upon the parties concerned "to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently," and asked the ENDC to pursue the matter and to report to the General Assembly on or before December 10, 1962. With the exception of certain preambular paragraphs, the Soviet Union supported this proposal.

The Western resolution urged the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to work toward the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty "with effective and prompt international verification," but asserted that if this proved impossible, the ENDC should

. . . seek the conclusion of an interim treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in those environments where radioactive fall-out is a matter of international concern and where nuclear weapon tests can be detected and identified without international controls, namely, the atmosphere, the oceans, and space.

It also urged the negotiating powers to agree on a date on which a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests should enter into force, noted

<sup>5</sup>UN Document A/C. 1/L. 310.

<sup>6</sup>UN Document A/C. 1/L. 311.

the reports of the Committee, and requested the Secretary General to bring the records of the Assembly debate to the attention of the Committee. Essentially, it was an endorsement of the Western position.

Canada submitted a number of amendments to the thirty-seven power proposal.<sup>7</sup> The most important of these involved the addition of a paragraph recommending that if agreement were not reached on a comprehensive ban by January 1, 1963, the parties concerned should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. Subsequently, Canada modified this, incorporating a Ghanian subamendment, so that the paragraph recommended that a partial ban be accompanied by an interim arrangement, limited in time, suspending underground tests, on the basis of the Eight-Nation Memorandum.<sup>8</sup> The United States and the United Kingdom proposed to add to this:

Such limited interim agreement shall include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.<sup>9</sup>

At the suggestion of Ambassador Arthur Lall of India, who again as on many previous occasions manifested concern for the position of the USSR, the two Western powers agreed to delete the word "limited." As revised, the United Kingdom and United States subamendment was adopted by a vote of 65 to 11, with 28 abstentions. The Soviet bloc states and Cuba voted against the proposal. All of the eight new members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee except the United Arab Republic, which abstained, voted affirmatively. The alignment on the vote on the paragraph as a whole was similar, although there were minor differences. The vote was 62 to 11, with 31 abstentions.

The First Committee then turned to the thirty-seven power resolution itself.<sup>10</sup> The condemnation of all nuclear tests in the first operative paragraph was adopted by 81 votes to 0, with 25 abstentions. The major states of both East and West abstained. The second

<sup>7</sup>UN Document A/C. 1/L. 313.

<sup>8</sup>For the Ghanian subamendment, see UN Document A/C. 1/L. 314.

<sup>9</sup>UN Document A/C. 1/L. 316.

<sup>10</sup>For the record of the voting see UN, General Assembly, First Committee, *Official Records*, 17th Session, pp. 110-13.

operative paragraph establishing the cut-off date of January 1, 1963, was adopted, 88 to 10, with 8 abstentions. Only Australia, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States voted against the paragraph. China, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, and Thailand abstained. The states voting for the paragraph even included three members of NATO, Canada, Denmark, and Iceland. The disarray within the ranks of the Western alliance demonstrated, among other things, the strength of support for an immediate, unconditional cessation of nuclear testing.

The thirty-seven power resolution as a whole was adopted in the First Committee by a vote of 81 to 0, with 25 abstentions, and in the plenary session, 75 to 0, with 21 abstentions.<sup>11</sup> The major states of both East and West abstained, though as can be seen from the votes on the parts of the resolution, for different reasons: those from the East because of the condemnation of all nuclear tests and those from the West for the same reason and also because of the cut-off date.

Just before the vote on their resolution, the United States and the United Kingdom dropped the paragraph endorsing a partial ban. With this change, the resolution was adopted in the First Committee by a vote of 50 to 12, with 42 abstentions, and later in the plenary session, 51 to 10, with 40 abstentions.<sup>12</sup> In the Committee vote, Mali and Cuba joined the Soviet bloc in opposing the resolution. In the plenary session, Mali did not participate and Cuba was absent. The eight new members of the Disarmament Committee split evenly: Brazil, India, Mexico, and Sweden voted for the resolution; and Burma, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic abstained.

The results of the General Assembly's consideration of the nuclear test ban issue were therefore somewhat contradictory. Because of the adoption of their resolution, the Western powers could claim something of a victory, although in their efforts to muster a majority they had had to abandon the idea of obtaining an endorsement for their partial ban proposal. Even after this concession was made, less than half of the UN's membership had actually voted for their resolution. The Soviet Union was pleased with the establishment

<sup>11</sup>General Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII).

<sup>12</sup>General Assembly Resolution 1762 B (XVII).

of the cut-off date and the endorsement of the Eight-Nation Memorandum in the thirty-seven power resolution which had been adopted by substantial majority of all members. However, the USSR strongly opposed the Canadian amendment referring to verification arrangements. The meaning of this amendment as it was finally adopted was not very clear. The Western powers would have to exercise their interpretative skills to see it as supporting their position. Those who fared best in the Assembly were the eight new members of the Disarmament Committee, to the extent that their Memorandum was endorsed without qualification. Perhaps this could be explained by the very ambiguity of the Memorandum! In any case, the two Assembly resolutions constituted a charge of sorts for the ENDC, which now had to report back to the Assembly by December 10, 1962.

The other actions of the General Assembly at its seventeenth session with respect to disarmament and arms control were also rather ambiguous. It decided not to take any decision on the suggestion of certain Latin American states that Latin America should be established as a denuclearized zone. It also did not take a decision on the Soviet-sponsored item relating to propaganda favoring preventive nuclear war, accepting instead the Soviet recommendation that the matter be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The resolution which the Assembly adopted on General and Complete Disarmament was procedural and hortatory. It was adopted unanimously, except for the vote of France, which abstained. In another resolution, the Assembly postponed the question of convening a conference to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons by asking the Secretary General to carry on further consultations with the governments of Member States. At that point, 59 states had replied to the Secretary General's inquiries. Thirty-three, including the USSR had favored the convocation of such a conference, and 26, including the United States and the United Kingdom, had expressed negative views or doubts.

### *Continued Testing*

Although the General Assembly debate and the resolutions which were adopted may have had some influence on the nuclear test ban negotiations, events which occurred outside the meeting halls in Geneva and New York had a much more significant impact.

Both sides continued their test programs. The Kennedy Administration authorized an extension of the United States atmospheric and high altitude testing program, so that the series, originally scheduled to end in July, was continued into the fall. The extension was made partly to allow shots which had originally been scheduled, but for various reasons had not been conducted. It was also made to allow American scientists to follow up leads gained during the spring and summer. Finally, on November 4, President Kennedy announced that the atmospheric and high altitude series had been concluded. Underground shots, however, would continue in Nevada. By the end of the year, including both series, the United States would have conducted over ninety tests.

The Soviet series, which started in early August, was in full operation during the Assembly debate. Both within and outside of the United Nations, Soviet officials continued to assert the right of the USSR to test last. On November 7, Chairman Khrushchev predicted that the current Soviet test series would end on November 20. By the end of the year, the Soviet Union would have conducted some 40 explosions. In all there would have been more nuclear detonations in 1962 than in any other year.

What was perhaps more significant than the conclusion—or prospective conclusion—of the two test series was the fact that both sides appeared to be losing interest in testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, at high altitudes, and in outer space. Even when the decision to start the 1962 series of tests was taken that spring, there was some discussion in the United States that that series would be the last in these environments. In their 1962 test series, both sides appeared to be approaching the theoretical limits of development which had been postulated by nuclear scientists. This meant that there was less and less to learn through further testing, and also that each gain became more and more difficult. The two sides, though, appear to have emphasized and to have learned different things. The Soviet Union had detonated more high-yield weapons and appeared to know more in this area, while the United States had detonated a larger number of lower yield weapons and seemed to have the lead here.

### *Military Crises*

Another event, or series of events, external to the negotiations which would have an important impact on them was the Cuban crisis,

which came to a climax in late October 1962. In this crisis, the United States and the USSR faced the grim possibility of nuclear war more directly than ever before. Apparently this had a profound impact on the leadership of both states, and led them to seek a *détente*. Most analysts think that this crisis was an important—if not the most important—factor explaining the subsequent change in Soviet policy which ultimately led to the signature of the Moscow Treaty.<sup>13</sup> In withdrawing its nuclear tipped missiles from Cuba, the USSR accepted a resounding defeat and also abandoned the hopes that it seemed to have harbored of overcoming or at least counterbalancing American strategic superiority through this move.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, in the process the USSR accepted the idea of international verification, though not on Soviet soil. Finally, Soviet actions in this instance added fuel to the already smouldering Sino-Soviet dispute.

Almost simultaneously with the Cuban crisis, heavy fighting broke out on the Chinese-Indian border. As a result, India was forced to explore the possibility of obtaining defense assistance from the West, and its entire relationship with the major Western powers became more cordial. One repercussion of this development was the dismissal of Krishna Menon as the Indian Minister of Defense and this in turn led to the replacement in Geneva of Arthur Lall, who left the diplomatic service. The Sino-Indian dispute created a dilemma for the Soviet Union. Allied with China, but also interested in retaining good relations with India, the USSR was forced to choose between the two. By seeking to avoid this choice, it weakened its ties with both parties.

While these important events were taking place and the Assembly debate was in progress representatives of the three nuclear powers continued to meet in the tripartite Subcommittee in Geneva. Yet their instructions obviously were unchanged, for their efforts in eighteen sessions were repetitive and sterile. Outside events were hardly mentioned.

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman's testimony: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty*, 88th Congress, 1st Session (1963), pp. 792-813.

<sup>14</sup>For an excellent analysis in these terms see Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," *World Politics*, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 363-89.

## II

## Will the Deadlock Dissolve or Endure?

*Signs of Change*

The pace of the negotiations, however, would soon quicken. In one of the final exchanges of correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy relating to the Cuban crisis, both leaders expressed the hope that the nuclear test ban issue could be solved.<sup>15</sup> In early November there were hints in New York, Moscow, and Geneva that the USSR might change its position.<sup>16</sup> Specifically, it was indicated that the USSR might propose the adoption of a suggestion which had been raised by three American and three Soviet scientists at the Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which had been held in London in early September. In a signed published statement, the six scientists suggested that the use of sealed, automatic recording stations, later dubbed "black boxes," might provide a way out of the test ban impasse.<sup>17</sup> The scientists concluded their statement by saying that a system designed along the lines they suggested would produce enough objective data so that an International Control Commission would "need to request very few on-site inspections." They thereby implicitly acknowledged that some on-site inspections would be necessary. In private conversations during the Pugwash meetings some American scientists suggested that they thought that the West would be satisfied with very few on-site inspections.

At the same time that there were indications that the Soviet position might change, the West began to make new efforts. For the first time since the revelation of the new data it disclosed the number of on-site inspections and control stations in the USSR that it would be willing to accept. In a private meeting in New York on November 7, the day after the General Assembly adopted the two

<sup>15</sup>See Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 27 and President Kennedy's letter of October 28, *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 991-94, 1000-1001.

<sup>16</sup>See *New York Times*, November 2, 1962; November 11, 1962; and ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 43, pp. 17-31.

<sup>17</sup>For the text of their statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 863-65. The statement was signed by D. R. Inglis, R. S. Leghorn, and A. Rich of the United States and L. A. Artsimovitch, Y. V. Riznichenko, and I. Y. Tamm of the Soviet Union.

resolutions concerning a nuclear test ban, Ambassador Dean revealed to Ambassador Kuznetsov that the United States might be willing to accept as few as from 8 to 10 on-site inspections annually in the Soviet Union, and from 8 to 10 nationally manned control posts on Soviet territory. In an earlier meeting, on October 30, Ambassador Dean had said that he thought that a mutually satisfactory arrangement covering all tests could be arranged, and that the United States had in mind a small number of on-site inspections.

At about the same time, in late October 1962, Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, had occasion to meet privately with Soviet scientist Fedorov in Washington, D.C., a friend from his Pugwash days. Trying to get the USSR to modify its position so that negotiations would again be possible, Wiesner told Fedorov that if the Soviet Union would come back to its earlier position and accept a small number of inspections, he felt confident that the United States would be able to reduce the number which it would ask for. Till that point the minimum American demand had been for 12. Wiesner continued saying that once the principle of on-site inspection had been established he would hope that the two sides could arrive at some satisfactory number. Dr. Wiesner did not intend to mislead Fedorov, nor to create the impression that the United States could accept as few as 3 or 4 on-site inspections, but merely sought to take action that would get the negotiations started again.

Apparently, however, Chairman Khrushchev interpreted the reports of the Dean and Wiesner conversations as indicating that the United States would be willing to agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty if the USSR would merely accept 3 on-site inspections annually. According to his own account (as relayed by Norman Cousins), Khrushchev presented this information to the Council of Ministers and got the Council to agree to reinstate the Soviet offer of 3 on-site inspections annually.<sup>18</sup>

### *The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Reconvenes*

When the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened on November 26, 1962, it was faced with two imminent deadlines.

<sup>18</sup>Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit with Khrushchev," *Saturday Review*, Vol. XLVII, No. 45 (November 7, 1964), pp. 16-21, 58-60.

First, it had to report its progress on the test ban issue to the General Assembly by December 10. Secondly, there was the cut-off date of January 1, 1963, established by Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII). According to the schedule originally established the Committee would have had more time, but to accommodate Soviet desires the opening date of the Committee had been moved back two weeks from November 12, the date set at the time of the recess and written into the General Assembly resolution. As it was, the Soviet Union had just completed its series of aboveground tests when the Committee reconvened, although it, like the United States, was still conducting tests underground.

Since it was obvious that the nuclear powers would not be able to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty within the specified time, and since at the conference table the USSR continued to reject the alternative of a partial ban, the eight new members of the Committee concentrated their efforts on the solution suggested in paragraph 6 of General Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII), a partial ban accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending underground explosions. Canada, continuing to follow a course somewhat independent of its NATO allies, also participated in these efforts.

A number of concrete suggestions emerged. Sweden again raised its suggestion that the international scientific commission proposed in the Eight-Nation Memorandum should be constituted immediately.<sup>19</sup> In the Swedish view this body could act as an interim commission and it could (1) provide the conference with scientific information and undertake certain scientific investigations, (2) assist in elaborating the detection and data exchange system, and (3) perform the functions which the Eight-Nation Memorandum envisaged for the permanent commission. The Swedish delegate even suggested that it might be helpful if it were possible for this interim commission to undertake an on-site inspection. Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ethiopia, Mexico, and the United Arab Republic supported this suggestion. Canada maintained that an interim arrangement would have to be of limited duration, perhaps a year or six months.<sup>20</sup> Various delegations also echoed this sentiment. Others, however, such as Ethiopia, argued that an interim arrangement should not be bound by a time limit

<sup>19</sup>ENDC/PV. 84, pp. 11-23.

<sup>20</sup>ENDC/PV. 85, p. 17.

and that to impose a time limit would violate the sense of the Assembly resolution. This was also the USSR's position.

Ambassador Lall of India suggested that it might be possible for the states concerned to agree to an annual quota of invitations for on-site inspections.<sup>21</sup> In the course of his remarks about on-site inspection, he also said that the Eight-Nation Memorandum put "an obligation upon all countries to supply all that is required in order to establish the nature of an event."<sup>22</sup> He went on to say that "under the normal rules governing equity and responsibility a country which was in breach in this respect would in fact have broken the agreement, which would no longer subsist." Although these remarks seemed to favor the Western position, they had been submitted to Ambassador Zorin seventy-two hours before they were delivered, and he apparently raised no objection to them. Furthermore, in response to later questioning, Ambassador Lall admitted that his formula did not involve an obligation.

On the same day that Ambassador Lall spoke, Ambassador Padilla Nervo made a similar point. He maintained that "refusal by one of the parties to invite scientific groups would have the same consequences as the violation of a provision for compulsory inspection."<sup>23</sup> The consequence, he felt, in both cases would be to release the injured party from its political and legal obligations—to terminate the treaty.

### *The "Black Boxes"*

The first sign of loosening in the Soviet position came on December 3, 1962. The USSR proposed, although somewhat obliquely, that control over underground nuclear explosions could be established through the use of automatic seismic recording stations in the territory of the nuclear powers and in adjacent countries.<sup>24</sup> In subsequent discussions it emerged that the USSR felt that the use of "black boxes" would obviate the need for internationally supervised, nationally manned control stations and also for on-site inspections. The Western powers were willing to consider the use of "black boxes"—indeed, the United States had made such a suggestion to the Soviet

<sup>21</sup>ENDC/PV. 85, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>24</sup>ENDC/PV. 86, p. 33.

Union in private meetings in New York before the Eighteen-Nation Committee resumed—but felt that at most they would merely reduce the number of manned stations and on-site inspections required. Moreover, the Western powers wanted to explore the technical details of the “black boxes.” The United Kingdom proposed that a group of experts should be convened for this purpose.<sup>25</sup> Later the United States joined the British in urging a technical meeting. Western experts were confident that scientific evidence could not be marshalled to support the Soviet stance. This probably explains why the United States was again willing to support a proposal for technical talks. The USSR, in contrast to the Western powers, insisted that the concept had to be accepted in principle first, then the relevant technical details could be elaborated jointly. Thus the deadlock remained on December 7, 1962, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee filed its required report with the General Assembly.<sup>26</sup>

In the almost two weeks before the Committee recessed on December 20, there were three more meetings of the tripartite subcommittee on nuclear testing and six-plenary sessions. On December 10 the USSR expanded its “black box” proposal by listing three sites where such installations could be located: near Yakutsk for the Far Eastern zone, near Kokchetav for the Central Asian zone, and near Badaibo for the Altai zone.<sup>27</sup> The United States felt that a larger number of “black boxes” would be required and thought that only one of the three suggested sites would be acceptable. Nevertheless it welcomed this Soviet move as providing at least some details.<sup>28</sup> In the same statement, the USSR also announced that it would be willing to have foreign personnel from the international center participate in the delivery and replacement of the “black boxes,” it being understood that the USSR could establish appropriate precautionary measures and that Soviet personnel and aircraft would be involved. This was a significant step, for it was the first time since November 28, 1961, that the USSR had been willing to commit itself to allowing some foreigners to enter Soviet territory in connection with a nuclear test ban. For this reason, even though it was not directly related, it had some bearing on the controversial question of on-site inspections.

<sup>25</sup>ENDC/PV. 87, p. 13.

<sup>26</sup>ENDC/ 68.

<sup>27</sup>ENDC/PV. 90, p. 15.

<sup>28</sup>ENDC/SC. 1/PV. 49, pp. 7-9.

It certainly did not solve this conflict, however; and, when the ENDC recessed, the deadlock on nuclear testing persisted. Moreover, on December 13, 1962, the USSR resumed atmospheric testing, and there was some speculation in the West that it might have engaged in atmospheric testing before that date.

*The Khrushchev-Kennedy Correspondence: Back to On-Site Inspections*

The next moves of the negotiations occurred outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee. This was partly because of the recess. More importantly, however, at this point the two parties principally involved, the Soviet Union and the United States, appear to have desired privacy.

On December 19, 1962, as a part of the private correspondence between the two heads of government inaugurated during the Cuban crisis, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a letter which dealt exclusively with the nuclear test ban issue.<sup>29</sup> The most notable feature of the letter was the statement that the USSR would be prepared to agree that two to three on-site inspections should be carried out each year "when it was considered necessary," in seismic areas on the territory of the nuclear powers. The effect of this was almost to bring the Soviet position back to what it had been prior to November 28, 1961. At that time, however, the USSR had not limited the inspections to seismic areas. The offer was cleverly phrased so as not to denigrate the Soviet claim that on-site inspections were unnecessary. Khrushchev stated that he understood from the President and his representatives that the United States Senate would not ratify a nuclear test ban which did not provide for a minimum number of on-site inspections and that this was preventing an agreement. The offer was made, Khrushchev stated, to overcome this obstacle. The Chairman also stated that precautions, such as the use of Soviet aircraft flown by Soviet crews to transport inspection teams on Soviet territory, the screening of windows on the aircraft, and a prohibition on members of inspection teams carrying cameras, would have to be taken to preclude the misuse of inspections for intelligence purposes.

Khrushchev finally repeated the Soviet offer with respect to the three automatic recording stations, and stated that if the sites which

<sup>29</sup>*Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 1239-42.

had been proposed were not acceptable, the Soviet Union would be willing to discuss the matter and "to seek a mutually acceptable solution."

Western policy-makers were puzzled by two of what they considered to be outright misstatements of fact. First, Khrushchev's letter asserted that at the recent Pugwash meeting, English scientists had proposed the use of automatic seismic recording devices. It was the Western understanding that the idea had been introduced by Soviet scientists, and the public recommendation had been signed by three American and three Soviet scientists. Secondly, the letter declared that in his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on October 30, Ambassador Dean had stated "that in the opinion of the United States Government 2-4 on-site inspections a year in the territory of the Soviet Union would be sufficient." That meeting was conducted in English. During it, Kuznetsov read a draft of the letter which Chairman Khrushchev would send to President Kennedy. Ambassador Dean claims that he told Kuznetsov, both at that meeting and at the one on November 7, that 2 or 3 on-site inspections would not be sufficient. He mentioned a figure from 8 to 10 as being the one which the West would accept. At this point, no mention was made of the Wiesner-Fedorov conversation. For the moment Western policy-makers attributed these two—from their point of view—errors to hasty composition, of which there was other evidence in the letter.

Despite this puzzlement Western policy-makers thought that the letter advanced the negotiations considerably. President Kennedy himself was "exhilarated" on receiving it.<sup>29a</sup> Now at least both sides agreed on the principle of on-site inspections.

President Kennedy replied on December 28, 1962.<sup>30</sup> The President welcomed the change in the Soviet position. He repeated that the United States would be willing to allow "reasonable" security provisions relating to on-site inspection, so long as the inspectors could assure themselves that they were taken to the intended area and had the necessary freedom within the designated inspection area. He also said that an effective test ban treaty was of such importance to him that he "would not permit such international arrangements to become mixed up with our or any other national desire to seek other

<sup>29a</sup>Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, p. 896.

<sup>30</sup>*Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 1277-79.

types of information about the Soviet Union." Thus he gave his personal pledge not to use on-site inspections for intelligence purposes.

Elsewhere in his letter, the President corrected what he considered the factual errors in Chairman Khrushchev's message. He gave the American version of the Dean-Kuznetsov conversations and stated that the only figures that Ambassador Dean had mentioned were from 8 to 10. He also stated his understanding that the proposal for the use of automatic recording stations had been introduced by Soviet scientists, not British. In passing, he noted that none of the three American scientists who had signed the recommendation were seismologists and that they had been acting as private citizens, not as governmental officials. He also refuted the suggestion that Congress was the sole reason for the American insistence on on-site inspections, asserting that this issue went to the "heart of a reliable agreement."

The President argued that on-site inspections should be allowed in aseismic as well as in seismic areas. He maintained that the automatic recording stations should be established in the areas of greatest seismicity, and thus that there "would be a need for a number of stations in the vicinity of the Kamchatka area and a number in the Tashkent area."

At last the differences between the two sides appeared to be susceptible to negotiation. With this in mind, President Kennedy suggested that a Soviet representative meet with William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to attempt to resolve the differences.

### *The Washington and New York Talks*

Chairman Khrushchev agreed to this course in a letter dated January 7, 1963, and talks between Mr. Foster and Soviet representatives began in Washington one week later. After several days the talks were moved to New York, and British representatives were added. On January 26, President Kennedy ordered the Atomic Energy Commission to postpone the underground nuclear tests which were scheduled to occur in Nevada. (The United States had continued its underground testing program despite the exhortation contained in General Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII). However, no tests had as yet been conducted since January 1.) Many thought that a nuclear test ban treaty was finally in sight, but as so often in the past,

these hopes were dashed. Questions relating to on-site inspections continued to be at the center of the most important disagreements.<sup>31</sup>

In his letter of January 7 Chairman Khrushchev had agreed that inspections should occur in aseismic as well as seismic areas. The Western powers now wanted to probe the technical details relating to on-site inspections. The United States made proposals concerning the criteria to be used in locating suspicious seismic events; the method of choice for exercise of the quota; the size and shape of the area to be inspected; the personnel and techniques to be utilized in the inspections; and the safeguards to be established surrounding inspections. The Western powers indicated that they would be willing to allow procedures whereby sensitive defense installations could be excluded from on-site inspections, provided that there would also be a remedy for abuse of this privilege. While the Western powers stuck to their position that they would require a quota of from 8 to 10 on-site inspections annually on the territory of the Soviet Union, they indicated that they might be willing to reduce this figure somewhat if they were satisfied that the arrangements would ensure the effectiveness of on-site inspections. The Soviet Union argued that the Western powers were attempting to put off the conclusion of a treaty by the discussion of technical detail, and that these technical matters could be discussed after the quota figure of from 2 to 3 on-site inspections on the territory of the nuclear powers had been accepted. Thus there was once more a deadlock.

Again according to his own account, Chairman Khrushchev felt betrayed by the Western powers, since he had thought that they would accept his offer of 3 on-site inspections annually. Because of domestic opposition to his policy of détente with the West, and because of the opposition of Communist China, he has claimed that he felt that he could not ask that the USSR make still one more concession to the West, since he had asserted that the first would be sufficient.<sup>32</sup> Both the domestic and international forces opposing his policies would

<sup>31</sup>Although there are no public records of the talks, the major participants all gave detailed accounts before the ENDC. See the remarks by Foster (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 9-14; ENDC/PV. 104, pp. 15-21); Stelle (ENDC/PV. 116, pp. 10-16); Godber (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 30-33); and Kuznetsov (ENDC/PV. 96, pp. 20-23).

<sup>32</sup>See Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit With Khrushchev," *supra* note 18, pp. 21, 58.

argue, he has said that he felt, that if another concession were made, the West would merely raise its demands again.

In the private talks the Western powers agreed with the Soviet Union that the control system should consist of nationally owned and operated control stations which would submit data regularly and in a uniform manner to an international data-collection center. The Soviet Union and the United States exchanged preliminary lists of seismographic stations from which a control network might be formed (the United States submitted a list of 76 stations and the USSR, 73 stations), and the United States gave the Soviet Union a general description of the instrumentation at each of the United States' stations. The Western powers also agreed that the nationally owned and operated stations would be supplemented by automatic recording stations. The United States suggested ten sites in the United States where automatic recorders might be installed and furnished information on the average seismic noise levels at each site. The Soviet Union accepted one of these, declined the other nine, and requested two additional sites. The United States did not object to these two sites, and furnished seismic noise-level data on them. The United States specified ten general areas within the Soviet Union where it felt automatic recorders might be located, and requested that the Soviet Union designate specific sites within those areas. The Soviet Union countered that there need only be three automatic recording stations on its territory. Ultimately, agreement was reached on three sites in both the USSR and the United States, and on January 31 the Soviet Union provided background noise information on these sites, but there continued to be a debate about whether or not more sites were necessary. The United States eventually stated that its requirements might be met by as few as seven stations, but the Soviet Union refused to agree to more than three. The United States made a number of specific proposals relating to the installation, operation, and removal of the "black boxes," to which the Soviet Union made no response. Implicit in the discussion of "black boxes" and nationally owned and operated stations was the fact that the West no longer insisted on internationally supervised stations.

On the surface, and to much of the press, the disagreement seemed to be quantitative, about the numbers of stations and on-site inspections. In reality, it may well have been considerably broader since the Soviet Union refused to discuss the modalities of conducting

on-site inspections. This made many participants in the formulation of American policy pessimistic that negotiations on numbers would prove useful. On January 31, 1963, the Soviet Union requested that the private talks be ended, and that the negotiations be taken up again when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed. This was widely interpreted as an attempt to use that body as an instrument to bring pressure on the West to agree to Soviet terms.

### III

#### Plans, Fears, Explanations, and Frustrations

##### *Plans for a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force*

Meanwhile, other events had occurred which would have an impact on the test ban negotiations. Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy met at Nassau in the Bahamas from December 18 to 21, 1962. Their discussions centered on matters relating to national security. The principal topic with which they had to deal was the American decision to abandon the development of the Skybolt medium-range air to surface missile, on which the United Kingdom had counted to maintain and extend the useful life of its bomber force. In searching for an alternative, the United States offered to provide the United Kingdom with a certain number of Polaris missiles, without nuclear warheads, which could be installed on British submarines. A condition of this offer was that the British agree to employ the missiles not as an independent deterrent, but as part of a NATO nuclear force.<sup>33</sup> The United States agreed to make available equal forces for inclusion in such a multilateral force. The President and the Prime Minister took the occasion, therefore, to attempt to solve the strategic crisis in NATO, as well as to solve the immediate British problem. The creation of new instrumentality, a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF) was implicit in their resolution of the Skybolt controversy. By this move, which would mean giving a larger voice in nuclear strategy to their allies—although exactly how much larger was not clear—the two leaders hoped to head off the development of further independent nuclear forces and to increase confidence in and the viability of NATO. As an immediate start on the creation of a multilateral nuclear force, the Prime Minister suggested, and

<sup>33</sup>See the communique, *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, Vol. II, pp. 1274-76.

the President agreed, that some elements of the United States Strategic Forces and the United Kingdom Bomber Command could be assigned to NATO and targeted in accordance with NATO plans.

Whether or not the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would actually achieve the results for which the two leaders hoped was moot. The detailed plans for implementation, of course, would have to be worked out. However, it was clear that the United States had no intention of assigning more than a fraction of its Strategic Forces to NATO, thus it still would have the ability to inaugurate a nuclear war without the consent of its allies. On the other hand, it was fairly clear that the United States would insist that it would have to agree to any decision to employ the MLF. Therefore the defense of Europe through nuclear weapons would continue to be dependent upon an American decision. France indicated clearly that a multilateral nuclear force would not solve the problems relating to NATO which concerned it. France turned down a United States offer similar to that which was made to the British to supply Polaris missiles and refused to participate in the discussions of plans for a multilateral nuclear force. Some other Western European members of NATO, especially Western Germany, were more receptive to the plan, which would give them greater access to nuclear weapons and a larger voice in NATO nuclear strategy than they had had previously. For this very reason the MLF had implications for the "nth country" problem, one of the issues at stake in the test ban negotiations.

### *Rising Republican Opposition*

A second development during this period was the growth of serious opposition within the ranks of Republican Congressmen to American policy in the nuclear test ban negotiations. The two draft treaties which the United States tabled on August 27, 1962, had been cleared with the relevant congressional committees. At that time some members of Congress had not paid much attention to the shifts in United States policy because they were convinced that the Soviet Union would reject the new American proposals.<sup>34</sup> When the negotiations began to look more serious as a result of the Khrushchev-Kennedy correspondence, some of these Congressmen began to have second thoughts. One, Representative Craig Hosmer, a Republican

<sup>34</sup>See *New York Times*, August 3, 1962, p. 3.

from California, the ranking minority member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the individual who as an Army officer had led the first United States occupation forces into Hiroshima in 1945, concluded that the Kennedy Administration might well agree to arrangements which, in his view, would prejudice American security. He expressed his concerns in a speech in the House of Representatives on January 24, 1963.<sup>35</sup> What he appeared to fear most was that the United States would agree to the Soviet offer of three on-site inspections annually. He was also concerned that the United States would accept three "black boxes" in lieu of a much larger number of international control posts. He further worried that the Soviet Union had made significant gains through its atmospheric tests in December and that the United States was acting before these gains could be properly analyzed and their impact on the United States assessed. He recommended that President Kennedy restate the American 1958 terms and that these be made nonnegotiable. By this he seemed to mean an international control system involving 20 on-site inspections and 19 internationally manned control posts on Soviet territory.

After his speech the Republican leadership took the unusual step of establishing a Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing, with Representative Hosmer as its head. Initially this Committee planned to arrange for the personal appearance by experts before a meeting of the Republican Conference on January 29. However, when President Kennedy announced the suspension of nuclear testing on January 26, Hosmer thought that an agreement was near, and changed his plans. He then decided to issue a series of papers prepared by experts. The first of these, written by Edward Teller, was issued on January 31, 1963. In it, Teller argued that acceptance of the current Soviet proposals would constitute acceptance of an unpoliced moratorium. Other scientists who prepared subsequent papers reiterated this position, and also argued that further tests were needed to explore and develop nuclear weapons and to create a pure fusion weapon. The Kennedy Administration attempted to answer these criticisms with a paper prepared for the Republican Conference Committee by William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and also a lifelong Republican and former official in the Department of Defense. He argued that the United

<sup>35</sup>*Congressional Record*, Vol. CIX, Part 1, pp. 950-51.

States was ahead of the Soviet Union in many areas of nuclear weapons development and that a test ban would slow down or "freeze" Soviet efforts to catch up. He also maintained that as a first step toward other measures of arms control, a test ban would offer important advantages. Although he conceded that there would be risks in a test ban, he maintained that on balance the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages.

With these developments, the domestic battle was joined. The Republican Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing would continue its attack throughout the spring of 1963.

### *The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee Resumes*

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvened on February 12, 1963, almost a month later than had been planned. Both East and West sought to gain the support of the eight new members of the Committee for their position. The Western representatives gave a detailed explanation of their position, and attempted to indicate its reasonableness and flexibility, however, the British delegates put considerably greater stress on the latter point than the Americans. Soviet representatives, on the other hand, argued that the USSR had made major concessions to the West and that it was the West which was blocking agreement. They also strongly criticized the current American underground tests, the first of which was conducted on February 8, 1963—President Kennedy rescinded the suspension after the New York talks collapsed—underscoring that these tests violated General Assembly Resolution 1762 A (XVII). In contrast, the Soviet Union, so far as could be determined, had not conducted any nuclear tests since the conclusion of its Arctic series in December 1962.

As in the January private talks, the principal differences between East and West involved on-site inspections. Soviet delegates argued that they had made a major concession in accepting obligatory on-site inspections. They maintained that this was a political concession, since the USSR did not feel that such inspections were necessary. They also developed the argument, touched upon in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of December 19, that the USSR had been led to believe that if it accepted 2 or 3 on-site inspections, the West would agree to a treaty banning all nuclear tests. In seeking to substantiate this case, Soviet delegates reiterated their version of the Dean-Kuznet-

sov conversations, and maintained that in the private conversations in January Mr. Foster had been very cautious in denying this, saying merely that Mr. Dean was not authorized to offer any figure other than 8-10.<sup>36</sup> They also quoted a number of statements made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the seventeenth General Assembly by British and American representatives to the effect that all that was needed to achieve a comprehensive treaty was for the Soviet Union to accept the principle of obligatory on-site inspection, and to revert to the position which it had held prior to November 28, 1961. At that time the Soviet Union was willing to accept 2 to 3 on-site inspections. Soviet delegates also stated that in the second half of October, 1962, Jerome B. Wiesner, during two informal meetings in Washington and New York with Soviet academician Fedorov, had requested that the Soviet Union should agree to on-site inspections, and that a small quota of 2 to 3 inspections annually would open the way to an agreement.<sup>37</sup> The USSR held that by now insisting on more than three on-site inspections the West was acting in bad faith.

Western delegates denied most of the Soviet charges. As President Kennedy had in his letter of December 28, they refuted in unambiguous terms the Soviet version of the Dean-Kuznetsov talks. They argued that Soviet delegates were distorting the statements made in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and in the General Assembly. They also said that "no official representative of the United States" had ever said that 2 or 3 on-site inspections would be acceptable to the United States, and pointed out the number of occasions, including President Kennedy's letter of December 28, on which a higher figure had been named. However, they never denied the Soviet account of the Wiesner-Fedorov conversation. Moreover, some American officials have conceded that the USSR may have "honestly misunderstood" some of the private meetings that preceded the December correspondence between the two heads of government.<sup>38</sup>

The American failure and inability to deny the Soviet accounts of the Wiesner-Fedorov conversations damaged its case before the eight new members of the Committee. Dr. Wiesner, beyond being an important administration official, had after all borne the burden of

<sup>36</sup>ENDC/PV. 113, p. 35.

<sup>37</sup>See ENDC/PV. 101, p. 48; and ENDC/PV. 113, p. 16.

<sup>38</sup>*New York Times*, April 23, 1963, p. 8.

explaining to them the technical situation as the United States understood it.

In his initial presentations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, Mr. Foster continued to maintain that the minimal number of on-site inspections annually on the territory of the USSR which the United States could accept would be from 8 to 10. In one session, he argued that in order adequately to deter a would-be violator, a country would have to save at least one or two of its quota of inspections until the end of the year.<sup>39</sup> If the annual quota were only three, this would mean that a country would only be able to call for one on-site inspection during most of the year. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, who was a member of the American delegation during the first days of the resumed session, emphasized in private conversations with other delegations that the United States Senate would not ratify a test-ban treaty which provided for only three on-site inspections in the USSR annually.<sup>40</sup> According to the testimony of some of the representatives of the eight new members of the ENDC, he did state, however, that the Senate might accept a figure lower than 8-10. American negotiators continued to maintain that before the United States would agree to any quota figure, the Soviet Union would have to specify its view concerning several aspects of the overall verification system.

During the week of February 18, Mr. Foster met privately with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. In this meeting he explained a new American position on several features of the inspection system, and then stated that in the context of the verification system which he had described, the United States could accept an annual quota of seven on-site inspections for each side.<sup>41</sup> The Western press had widely forecast that the United States would reduce its demands, and some within the Kennedy Administration were arguing that the United States could go still further. Secretary McNamara was reportedly willing to settle for 6.<sup>41a</sup> Jerome B. Wiesner maintained that 5 inspections per year would provide adequate security against clandestine testing.<sup>42</sup> Five is the number which the representatives of the

<sup>39</sup>ENDC/PV. 99, p. 21.

<sup>40</sup>*Washington Post*, February 21, 1963, February 22, 1963.

<sup>41</sup>ENDC/PV. 102, pp. 23-24.

<sup>41a</sup>Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, p. 897.

<sup>42</sup>Jerome B. Wiesner, *Where Science and Politics Meet* (1965), p. 167. Interestingly and perhaps significantly Wiesner states that the United States formally reduced its demand to 6 or 7 (*ibid.*).

eight new nations in the ENDC expected the United States to ask for. The other changes in the Western position which Mr. Foster described related to the conduct of on-site inspections. Western delegates presented them in more detail to the ENDC at various times during the next month, and then summarized them in a memorandum submitted on April 1, 1963.<sup>43</sup> As of mid-March, the United States actually had a new draft treaty prepared. However, it did not table anything more than the memorandum.

These changes shifted the most important elements of the on-site inspection process in the case of the nuclear powers to representatives of the other side. Thus they moved away from the impartial concepts that had been written into the August 27, 1962, draft comprehensive treaty and in the direction of reciprocal or adversary inspection. The other nuclear side would not only have the right to select which events it chose to inspect (as in the 1962 draft treaty) but in addition it would supply the leader of the inspection team and over half of the team's technical personnel. Only the remainder of the personnel would be selected from the international staff. Beyond this, the Western position specified various time limits. The most important of these were that the other nuclear side would have up to sixty days after a seismic event to request an on-site inspection, and, unless drilling were required or mutual agreement for an extension obtained, an on-site inspection team would have only six weeks in which to complete an inspection. The inspection area would consist of an ellipse with a semi-major axis of no more than 15 kilometers, with a maximum area of 500 square kilometers. The country on whose territory the inspection was to take place would be responsible for transporting the team to the inspection area. It could use its own aircraft and pilots, and could select the flight routes. It could have its own personnel including observers accompany the team. The number of such personnel could equal the team. The Western powers also spelled out their concept of the use of the "black boxes."

Despite repeated requests in private and plenary sessions, Soviet delegates refused to comment on these matters. They argued that the Western powers were seeking to block an agreement by having the negotiations become involved in a morass of technical details. They

<sup>43</sup>See ENDC/PV. 108, pp. 5-10; ENDC/PV. 110, pp. 19-26; ENDC/PV. 113, pp. 5-9; and ENDC/78.

continually asserted that if the West would agree to the number of "black boxes" and on-site inspections proposed by the Soviet Union, there would be no difficulty reaching agreement on the details. Since the Western powers would not do this, the deadlock continued.

The eight new members of the Committee were perplexed and irritated by the situation. Because of the Washington and New York talks, they had returned to Geneva in an optimistic mood. When their expectations were not fulfilled, they became irked, yet they did not know what to do. Some of them made rather halting attempts at suggesting compromise solutions, and they were even encouraged to do this by the United Kingdom, but these attempts were virtually ignored by the United States and the USSR. The two states even discouraged the eight new members of the Committee from submitting compromise proposals which they had formulated but not tabled. While the eight agreed not to act—apparently because of pressure applied by both Soviet and American diplomats in their national capitals<sup>44</sup>—some of them warned that if agreement were not forthcoming soon, they might submit their proposals even if these proposals met the displeasure of both powers.<sup>45</sup> The United Kingdom suggested that the tripartite Subcommittee of the three nuclear powers should be revived, and the United States and other countries supported this proposal, but the Soviet Union refused, insisting that the discussion should be conducted in the plenary sessions.

#### IV

### For the Moment: Pianissimo

In mid-March the United States and the Soviet Union, as Co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, suggested that the Committee should also discuss the other items on its agenda, and thereafter normally only one of the three weekly meetings of the Committee was devoted to discussion of the nuclear test ban.

The Soviet Union appeared to be quite interested in the discussion of other matters. When the Eighteen-Nation Committee had resumed in February, it had tabled two new proposals. The first was

<sup>44</sup>Arthur S. Lall, *Negotiating Disarmament*, p. 25. Eventually, in a public address in Copenhagen, on May 9, 1963, Mrs. Alva Myrdal exposed most of the details of the proposals (*ibid.*, pp. 27-28).

<sup>45</sup>ENDC/PV. 123, pp. 48-49.

for a declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the second was for a nonaggression pact between the parties of the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaties.<sup>46</sup> In the debates Soviet delegates linked both of these proposals with the Western efforts now in progress to develop a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force. They asserted that such a force would be dangerous, among other reasons, because it would give Western Germany access to nuclear weapons. These delegates argued that the MLF, in widening access to nuclear weapons, would contradict one of the aims of a nuclear test ban. Western delegates, on the other hand, explained that the purpose of the MLF was to prevent the development of independent nuclear capabilities and that it was consonant with long-standing Western policies opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. The French nuclear test in the Sahara on March 18, 1963, furnished Soviet delegates ammunition for their attack on Western policy. Obviously, all of these issues were linked with the test ban negotiations in Soviet strategy.

What this new development in the test ban negotiations meant was the subject of speculation. Did it mean that these other issues would have to be solved before or simultaneously with the achievement of a test ban treaty? Various answers were given. Regardless of their answer to this question, many, both within and outside of the Committee, regarded the lower priority now accorded the test ban issue as a sign that the high hopes raised by the correspondence between the heads of government in December 1962 and the private talks the following month would not be fulfilled.

<sup>46</sup>ENDC/75, and ENDC/77.