Negligence - Last Clear Chance - Evidence Insufficient as a Matter of Law

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NEGLIGENCE—LAST CLEAR CHANCE—EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW—Plaintiff, having fallen asleep at night at the side of a narrow dirt road, was run over by defendant's automobile. He alleged that defendant was negligent in operating a vehicle at an excessive speed without proper lights. Defendant pleaded that plaintiff was contributorily negligent by being asleep in the road, and plaintiff then replied that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. On appeal from a judgment of involuntary nonsuit, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. The plaintiff, by falling asleep at the side or in the middle of the road, was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and the evidence was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude that the defendant had an opportunity to avoid the accident after he discovered or should have discovered the plaintiff's perilous position. Barnes v. Horney, (N.C. 1958) 101 S.E. (2d) 315.

The doctrine of last clear chance, as an antidote to the harsh rule that any negligence of plaintiff which contributes to his injury will bar his recovery, was first announced in the famous "jackass case," Davies v. Mann. It is found to some extent in nearly all American jurisdictions, and will no doubt continue until a better method is found to allocate the financial burden arising from negligence. There are four categories of cases wherein the doctrine has been applied which are distinguished.


2 Several states reject the last clear chance doctrine but may reach similar results in a given situation by holding that contributory negligence is not a bar if defendant acts willfully and wantonly or is grossly negligent after discovering the helpless plaintiff. See Bushman v. Calumet & S. C. Ry. Co., 214 Ill. App. 435 (1919); Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. (2d) 523 (1943); Switzer v. Detroit Investment Co., 188 Wis. 330, 206 N.W. 407 (1925).

3 See James, "Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine," 47 Yale L. J. 704 (1938); MacIntyre, "The Rationale of Last Clear Chance," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1940). Great Britain and the Commonwealth nations have adopted comparative negligence legislation, and in this country Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wisconsin now have some form of general comparative negligence statute. In addition, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the Merchant Marine Act, and numerous state acts covering specific industries apportion damages on the basis of comparative negligence. See Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 465 (1953).
by whether the plaintiff is physically helpless or merely inattentive, and
by whether the defendant has actually discovered the peril or should have
discovered it had he been exercising due care. In the principal case the
plaintiff by his own negligence had placed himself in a position of peril
from which he was helpless to escape, and North Carolina is committed
to the doctrine that if the defendant either discovered or in the exercise
of due care should have discovered the plaintiff in such a position and
subsequently failed to exercise due care to avoid the accident, the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence does not bar his recovery. Generally, the
factual determination as to whether the defendant should have discovered
the plaintiff's helpless situation, whether the defendant then had the
means to avoid the accident, and whether the defendant then failed to
use due care to do so, is left to the jury. It is only when reasonable minds
could not differ that the court should make such a determination as a
matter of law. Although the North Carolina court has often affirmed
nonsuits or reversed judgments for plaintiffs based on last clear chance,
in this case it has gone very far in taking the case away from the jury
when there was substantial evidence, as indicated in the dissenting
opinion, which the jury could have considered. This seems to indicate
a judicial distrust of the jury in this type of case, perhaps based on the
feeling that juries often decide cases and award damages on some rough
formula of proportional fault, despite instructions to the contrary, or on
the fact that the greater number of jury verdicts in negligence actions

plaintiff is physically helpless to escape the consequences of his own negligence, all states
except the group mentioned in note 2, supra, will apply last clear chance if the peril is
actually discovered, and probably a majority will also apply the doctrine if the peril
should have been discovered by defendant in the exercise of due care. 2 HARPER AND
JAMES, TORTS §22.12 (1956); 2 TORTS RESTATEMENT §479 (1934). PROSSER, however, states
that the greater number of courts will deny recovery if the peril is not actually discovered.

5 Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E. (2d) 337 (1945); Wade

6 The doctrine of last clear chance has not been applied where there were no known
facts concerning the accident, other than that plaintiff was somehow injured by defendant.
Mercer v. Powell, 218 N.C. 642, 12 S.E. (2d) 227 (1940); Cummings v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 217 N.C. 127, 6 S.E. (2d) 387 (1940). It has not been applied where the
evidence showed that defendant could have had only a second or two to act. Van Dyke
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N.C. 283, 10 S.E. (2d) 727 (1940); Matheny v. Central
Motor Lines, 233 N.C. 673, 65 S.E. (2d) 361 (1951). In addition, where the evidence
showed that plaintiff was not physically entrapped but only inattentive, last clear chance
was not applied in Cox v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 210 S.C. 32, 41 S.E. (2d) 580 (1947);

7 This evidence included testimony of a supervisor of roads and a state highway
patrolman as to visibility along the road; photographs of the accident scene; a surveyor's
profile map; defendant's own admission that he was driving with his lights on dim
(low beam); and a state statute which requires that automobile headlights produce suf-
ficient light to render a person 200 feet ahead clearly discernible. Principal case at 319.
are for the plaintiff. It may be that the court wishes to retreat somewhat from the far-reaching possibilities of recovery inherent in the "discoverable peril" doctrine, but if so, this should be done explicitly. It seems clear that last clear chance, by placing all the financial burden on one of two partially negligent parties, is not the best solution to the problems arising from negligence actions. It is equally clear, however, that strict application of the contributory negligence rule is no better. The eventual solution will no doubt come in comparative negligence legislation, but until that occurs, last clear chance offers a makeshift solution, where, in certain types of cases, the jury can reach solutions which in the long run will be in accord with the wishes of the majority of the community. The courts should use restraint in taking these cases from the jury except in instances where there is no evidence of the actual circumstances of the accident; where it would have been physically impossible for the defendant to avoid the accident; or where some essential condition of the doctrine is not present. If there is substantial evidence on both sides, it would be better to let the defendant take his chances with the jury than to preclude the plaintiff from recovery as a matter of law.

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8 See 2 Harper and James, Torts 1257, 1261 (1956).
9 See note 6 supra.