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ANTITRUST’S “CURSE OF BIGNESS” PROBLEM

D. Daniel Sokol*


INTRODUCTION

Tim Wu¹ is the most important academic popularizer of law and technology debates² and is the intellectual leader of the neo-Brandeisian antitrust movement. He has brought antitrust from a technical subject of interest only to antitrust practitioners and academics to the forefront of policy discussions around the world. His ability to help shape policy is impressive. He is smart and a beautiful writer—an effective combination. Merely for making antitrust relevant to the general population, Wu deserves credit.

Wu’s most recent book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the Gilded Age, is an attempt to reframe contemporary antitrust debates by returning antitrust to its more populist roots. Given the global implications of his ideas and policy proposals (including breakup of tech platforms) for many of the large corporations that he takes on, The Curse of Bigness offers profound insights for how society and business should be organized.

Antitrust and scrutiny of large tech platforms like Amazon and Facebook are hot issues in policy circles. For critics like Wu, the growing concentration of American power and the rise of tech platforms are nothing less than a threat to American democracy (pp. 16, 55). Wu sees the current growth of large tech companies as the result of a generation of antitrust legal misapplication and harks back to an earlier era of significant antitrust enforcement (pp. 17–21).

Wu’s work is powerful and provocative. He makes several important points about how to think about the body of antitrust law. Wu would abandon the current legal framework of antitrust. However, although antitrust has made some tactical mistakes over forty years, the antitrust enterprise is not broken in need of total retrofit. Moreover, Wu’s policy prescriptions are not sensitive to administrability concerns. Antitrust law is akin to common

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law. Congress has purposely chosen not to make significant changes in antitrust’s fundamental structure but has left it to the courts to fill in the gaps. Given this reality, more constructive criticisms would go to how to shift doctrine in ways that might promote some of the changes that Wu seeks.

The first part of this Review summarizes Wu’s major claims. It then highlights some of his critiques as to “bigness,” the multiple goals of antitrust, and the missed opportunities as to cases that should have been or need to be brought, such as against tech companies. Some of Wu’s critiques are spot on in identifying missed opportunities, like a number of horizontal mergers that should have been challenged. Where Wu’s book suffers is where he undervalues the institutional structure of antitrust law, underplays what antitrust does well as a substantive matter, and misanalyzes antitrust and tech platforms.

I. POLITICAL ANTITRUST?

The Curse of Bigness is a fundamental challenge to the “Chicago School” and its approach to the analysis of antitrust law that has dominated the United States since the 1970s. Robert Pitofsky wrote an important article in 1979 that guides Wu’s analysis. Published in the famous symposium issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, the article signaled the end not merely of populism but of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. Pitofsky chastised antitrust scholars for “persuading the courts to adopt an exclusively economic approach to antitrust questions.” He argued that “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws.” Pitofsky explained political values in a populist manner by noting,

if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.

Wu’s book is part of this legacy. Wu is a powerful writer and explores similar themes with great passion and resolve. For example, he writes, “[antitrust] does strike at the root cause of private political power—the economic concentration that facilitates political action” (p. 23). Elsewhere, in describing

6. Id.
7. Id. supra note 5, at 1051.
8. Id.
the neo-Brandeisian agenda he explains, “these suggestions would help us return to an economic vision that prizes dynamism and possibility, and ultimately attunes economic structure to a democratic society” (p. 138).

Wu’s major insight is to suggest that there needs to be a broader set of goals for antitrust beyond consumer welfare to address this populist impulse. What this looks like in practice is not something that Wu spends much time developing.

Injecting political trade-offs into antitrust can have negative repercussions. In a world of multiple goals, government may pick winners and losers and may do so with something other than the public interest in mind. Wu would replace antitrust as we know it with a regulatory system akin to what one finds in other administrative agencies (a public interest standard with some “fairness” element, industry comments on mergers, banning mergers of a certain size, among others features) (pp. 127–39). This solution is subject to the same capture concerns one finds in other agencies and would not adequately address Wu’s concerns. Wu does not provide a mechanism to prevent special interests from lobbying to promote their interests over consumers’ with a veneer of “fairness.” Indeed, Wu’s previous writing in the telecom context suggests that capture is a significant risk.

Academics often change their approach following a stint in practice. Wu had short stints in government during the Obama Administration but not in a senior leadership role with managerial oversight in helping to run an agency. Such a position might have made Wu focus more on administrability concerns. When Pitofsky chaired the FTC in the 1990s, he did not adopt a populist agenda or embrace multiple goals as in his earlier writing. Rather, he continued with the economic framework that was established by prior Republican and Democratic administrations, and his tenure is seen as a “golden age” of antitrust. Nor is Pitofsky alone in reworking his criticisms.

11. Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 2, at 307–08 (“Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace.”).
12. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1. However, Pitofsky had some missteps such as allowing consolidation in some industries where there may have been anticompetitive effects.
within an economics framework and abandoning a more populist approach to antitrust. Indeed, Wu’s other antitrust works embrace economic analysis to guide antitrust and do not suggest the need for noneconomic values. This suggests the difference between making academic pronouncements and having to create real change given institutional constraints when handed power.

Wu shows nuance with two sets of critiques. One is a populist critique that Wu calls “neo-Brandeisian,” which questions the singular efficiency-based goal expressed explicitly and repeatedly in the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence and practiced by the two antitrust agencies (pp. 78–92). The second critique is within a law and economics tradition but suggests modifications to doctrine based on flaws in Chicago School assumptions (pp. 106–07).

Wu makes an important contribution, namely that some basic assumptions made by the Chicago School were crude or simply wrong and that improved economic analysis based on more precise models and more informed empirical work offers some alternative approaches for moving antitrust forward. He properly articulates that some Chicago assumptions, based on overly simplistic economics, may lead to bad results (pp. 102–09).

But Wu underestimates the current institutional setup of antitrust, in which a bad doctrine could be reshaped into something less harmful. As a result of the current institutional setup, antitrust addresses pure antitrust issues relatively well but other issues like privacy or traditional regulation less well. After suggesting that antitrust should be about such trade-offs, Wu does not offer insights into how to address the trade-off of efficiency and fairness inherent in a public interest standard. What would an administrable set of cases to guide future business behavior look like? What would the workable legal rule be? What would be the burdens of proofs and the presumptions? On these issues, Wu does not offer detailed insights. But if the claim is that antitrust must change because of new realities in concentration and tech, it is incumbent on those proposing changes to offer a workable system. The strength of the current approach is how it marries economic analysis with legal administrability.

Wu’s conception of competition would be a broader “protection of competition” approach that focuses on the competitive process and looks beyond price effects (p. 136). But a broader competitive process has a popu-

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list element to it because it supports inefficient competitors, and populism does not work within antitrust’s institutional structure. Understanding economic analysis and antitrust’s institutional structure of judge-made law explains why antitrust has evolved and why a populist embrace, short of new legislation, is unlikely to succeed. Antitrust is primarily federal law. But antitrust “common law” functions somewhat differently than other fields. Antitrust’s enabling legislation allows for common law–like development. In practice, statutes such as the Sherman Act enjoy a certain rank akin to constitutional common law.

The Supreme Court offered an early articulation of this constitution-like principle to the Sherman Act in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States. There, the Court stated, “As a charter of [economic] freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.” This framework changes how the Supreme Court views antitrust jurisprudence. Traditional stare decisis typically means that the Supreme Court is reluctant to overrule its precedent. As such, stare decisis does not have the same meaning in antitrust as it does in other fields, as precedent matters less than changes in economic thinking.


19. See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 228–29 (1954) (“[I]n adopting the standard of the common law Congress expected the courts not only to apply a set of somewhat vague doctrines but also in doing so to make use of that ‘certain technique of judicial reasoning’ characteristic of common law courts.”).


23. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is not . . . [an] inexorable command . . . Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . . even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions.” (third emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).

The Supreme Court has explained that antitrust precedent is less important than precedent in other fields. For example, in \textit{State Oil Co. v. Khan}, a case that removed the per se designation for maximum resale price maintenance, the Court explained:

\(\text{[T]}\)he general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress “expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.” . . . [The] Court . . . reconsider[s] its decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.\(^{25}\)

This view of antitrust as a variation of common law has taken hold even in recent cases. As the Court stated in 2015 in \textit{Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC}, “[w]e have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”\(^{26}\) This explicit incorporation of economic analysis—and the resulting limitation of traditional stare decisis in antitrust common law—makes antitrust unique among substantive areas of law.\(^{27}\)

Since 1950, the basic statutory scheme of antitrust has remained constant, though it has been tweaked with the introduction of premerger notification\(^{28}\) and increased penalties for antitrust violations.\(^{29}\) To understand what antitrust can and cannot do, it is important to understand how the broader political economy of antitrust has shaped antitrust jurisprudence. Fundamentally, antitrust changes gradually rather than through seismic shifts. Thus, only by looking at the long term can one understand trends that shape cases that can be successfully brought in court. Even if Wu were correct that antitrust enforcement has not been aggressive enough, short of legislative change, antitrust is not capable of the type of enforcement profile that he ascribes to it. Antitrust’s institutional attempt at a legislative solution to address “fairness” is the Robinson-Patman Act.\(^{30}\) Its case law evolution shows that even a protectionist statute can be reinterpreted to have a goal.

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based on economic effects, even when such a reformulation is in sharp contrast to the intent and actual language of the statute.31

II. MACROECONOMIC CHANGES TO THE U.S. ECONOMY HELP EXPLAIN ANTITRUST’S POLITICAL ECONOMY

Antitrust law and policy in part has responded to broader political economy concerns. These concerns support Wu’s unease with the direction of the U.S. economy.32 He notes the growing concentration in U.S. markets and suggests that concentration has led to a number of ills (p. 22). Wu’s concerns about economic concentration should be taken very seriously as there have been growing disparities in wealth, health outcomes, and education, and a growing cultural divide. Changes in antitrust law and policy may have played some role in this. But neither Wu’s work nor that of other neo-Brandeisians has clearly established antitrust as the cause of these broader policy shifts.33 Wu’s story should consider other factors—like employment and income—that implicate competition law and policy but have a benign or even positive impact on U.S. economic performance, innovation, and other measures of daily life for U.S. consumers.34

To provide a broader context of larger political economy shifts, this Review examines four instances of the vital intersections among macroeconomic factors, the industrial organization of the modern U.S. economy, and judicial and policy responses. There is a counterstory that antitrust populists ignore about U.S. growth—the effects of antitrust populism until the rise of Chicago School antitrust coincided with American economic decline. As antitrust rules changed to be more market oriented and where the outcome was improved economic efficiency, U.S. economic growth improved. Since the start of the Great Recession, however, a number of measures indicate that the U.S. economy is approaching the sickly economics of the stagnation period of the 1970s.35 Now, the efficiency-based assumptions of modern antitrust are being questioned, and policy may respond as a result. But the circumstances between the 1970s and 2010s are distinct in terms of the shift within the Supreme Court and the antitrust agencies. Whereas the executive

32. Pp. 19–23. I want to thank Dale Collins for bringing the issue of broader political economy shifts to my attention and providing my initial data and sources (since revised) for the first three periods.
and legislative branches sat out of antitrust’s shift to an efficiency-based goal for the most part (other than by appointing agency leadership that believed in economic effects), change today focuses on these two branches in terms of possible legislative reform to antitrust law and candidates who would appoint antitrust leadership that would fundamentally transform antitrust.

We can divide shifts in antitrust based on four different time periods: Period 1: good times (1950–1972); Period 2: stagnation (1973–1982); Period 3: the modern era (1982–2006); and Period 4: the “Great Recession” and beyond (2007–2017). Table I summarizes these results.

**Table I**

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<tr>
<td>Real GDP (average annual growth)</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>3.46%</td>
<td>1.52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonfarm business productivity</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
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<td>Inflation (average annual change)</td>
<td>2.79% MAX: 8.20% MAX: 3.10% MAX: 1.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>December to December</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
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<td>Bank prime loan rate (annual)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(beginning in 1956)</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
<td>21.50%</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>8.25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment (average monthly rate)</td>
<td>4.80% MAX: 7.00% MAX: 5.90% MAX: 6.80%</td>
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<tr>
<td>(beginning in 1956)</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>9.70%</td>
<td>9.60%</td>
<td>9.60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median real family income (average annual change)</td>
<td>3.28% -0.16% 0.92% 0.62%</td>
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37. See *Table 1.1.1 Percent Change from Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product*, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (Apr. 26, 2019), https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&select_all_years=0&nipa_table_list=1&series=a&first_year=1950&scale=-99&last_year=2017&thetable=x [https://perma.cc/YK2X-H6UX].
40. See *Bank Prime Loan Rate*, FRED ECON. DATA (May 13, 2019), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=nV8 [https://perma.cc/72RQ-FUQ5].
Table I shows that the good times of Period 1 have not been replicated in any subsequent period and that the economic stagnation of Period 2 looks similar to Period 4 of the Great Recession and beyond. Real GDP averaged 4.20% in Period 1, 2.40% in Period 2, 3.46% in Period 3, and 1.52% in Period 4. U.S. nonfarm business productivity shows swings of 2.79% in Period 1, 1.14% in Period 2, 2.30% in Period 3, and 1.33% in Period 4. With the exception of Period 2 (average of 8.20% with a maximum of 13.30%), inflation has been relatively low in the other periods, with averages of 2.70%, 3.10% and 1.60% in Periods 1, 3, and 4, respectively. Unemployment averaged 7.0% in Period 2, 5.9% in Period 3, and 6.8% in Period 4. Finally, median real family income (which tells us about total income growth and not distribution) averaged 3.28% in Period 1, -0.16% in Period 2, 0.92% in Period 3, and 0.62% in Period 4.

The overall trend is a function of many factors. Babies were not the only thing booming in Period 1. Rather, the entire economy boomed, and U.S. competitiveness did not really matter when the rest of the world was still in recovery mode post WWII. This boom period weakened as a costly international war (Vietnam) and increased domestic spending (Great Society) meant that the economy struggled due to significant government spending and lower productivity. In Period 2, academics, the antitrust agencies, and ultimately the Supreme Court questioned the basis for the existing multiple-goal antitrust regime as U.S. competitiveness declined. Period 3 led to a loosening of antitrust rules and a larger liberalization of the economy. This led to more efficient business practices, such as improved vertical integration and economies of scale due to increased horizontal consolidation from mergers. In Period 4, another set of international military commitments (Iraq and Afghanistan) and increased domestic spending with resulting economic hardship (Great Recession) led people to question the antitrust regime. If

market competition no longer delivered in Period 4 in terms of macroeconomic gains, it is perhaps not surprising that we have witnessed the rise of antitrust populism to match the rise of overall populism.

From the antitrust perspective, these four periods identify several important procedural and substantive shifts. These political changes are linked to the types of cases that parties (government or private plaintiffs) were willing to bring before the courts. Ultimately it is the courts that shape antitrust policy, as business practices occur in the shadow of antitrust rulings. Understanding the larger political economy also explains why populism has reemerged—the current group of populists do not like the court outcomes on either substantive or procedural antitrust and believe that the current economic disruption will not be solved by the courts.49 This meta-analysis also explains the impact of antitrust’s institutional structure. Courts constrain agencies in the types of cases that can be brought and won.

Period 1 identifies a time in case law with rigid antitrust rules making much behavior was per se illegal or de facto per se illegal. This period included cases in which the Supreme Court pushed case law that restricted horizontal mergers,50 vertical mergers,51 and conglomerate mergers;52 doubted efficiencies;53 showed concern about dominant firms;54 and especially restricted vertical restraints55 and joint ventures.56 On procedural issues, the
Court provided a permissive view of government timing of enforcement. This period, from an antitrust jurisprudential perspective, reflected concern regarding political and economic power. For example, in Alcoa, dicta included the assertion that “great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results.” Similarly, in Procter & Gamble, the Court identified that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.” To a certain extent, size and concentration were to be feared. For example, a combined grocery store market share of 7.5% in Von’s Grocery resulted in the Supreme Court blocking the merger because the market was “characterized by a long and continuous trend toward fewer and fewer owner-competitors which is exactly the sort of trend which Congress . . . declared must be arrested.” Such jurisprudence was possible during a time when the macroeconomic factors were such that efficiency was less important because the economy was doing so well overall.

By the time we reach Period 2, the U.S. economy was in relative decline. Antitrust jurisprudence began to shift during this period, in part because of new economic learning but in part because there was less slack in an economy in which the United States was less competitive globally. The loosening occurs in several areas: mergers, vertical restraints, standing, specific-intent requirements in criminal antitrust cases, and the abandonment of several cases where economic learning suggested that the cases were mistaken.

Period 3 and a Reagan Administration–led “Chicago” revolution gave an intellectual basis for courts to loosen antitrust rules significantly. Instead, they promoted antitrust intellectual “goals” and ideological stability based on

58. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
a consumer welfare standard resolved from the Bush I to Bush II period. In terms of antitrust law developments, during this period, enforcement by courts and antitrust agencies increased the difficulty of finding concerted action, heightened procedural hurdles, focused horizontal mergers on finding anticompetitive effect, and validated merger efficiencies. This period also saw a shift to relaxed restrictions on dominant firm conduct. Vertical restraints were also relaxed. Finally, antitrust and IP were no longer at odds.

In Period 4, the pendulum began to swing back in some areas, but the loosening of antitrust restrictions continued overall. Procedural shifts made it harder for plaintiffs to bring class actions. In terms of substance, the burden shift became harder for plaintiffs in some rule of reason cases and where the Court imposed new limits to state action. But in other areas there was pushback against big tech companies, more aggressiveness in terms of cases in reverse payments, and a number of lower court wins to

limit anticompetitive vertical restraints in the new economy\(^\text{81}\) and in healthcare mergers.\(^\text{82}\)

### III. THE POPULIST ATTACK ON CONSUMER WELFARE IS MISGUIDED

Wu is hostile to the consumer welfare standard used in antitrust, concluding that the multiple-goals approach to "antitrust law, which dared dictate what the economy should look like, needed to be put into hibernation—perhaps forever" (p. 92). Yet, the consumer welfare standard that Wu attacks is not the actual consumer welfare standard articulated by Bork and the Chicago School. Bork’s consumer welfare was actually total welfare; Bork cleverly called it consumer welfare likely in part because it was a better slogan.\(^\text{83}\) The difference between the two, put simply, is that total welfare is the aggregate welfare of both producers and consumers, whereas consumer welfare focuses only on the welfare consequences of consumers.\(^\text{84}\) Though at first the Supreme Court understood consumer welfare the way that Bork did,\(^\text{85}\) today when the Court refers to consumer welfare it really means consumer welfare.\(^\text{86}\) Most of the time, consumer welfare and total welfare yield the same result.

Consumer welfare does not really mean consumer welfare for Wu either. Wu’s real concern is that antitrust has been guided by industrial organization economics and how economic evidence must match up with theories of harm. He would broaden antitrust to go beyond economic analysis and include a wider range of criteria that would be more democratic (p. 135). For example, Wu proposes public filing of industry comments on major mergers and of consent agreement remedies put up for public comment (p. 130). Wu claims that “big mergers are political, and the idea that the public or its representatives be kept in the dark is hard to support” (p. 130), thereby politicizing the merger review process. Such an approach is contrary to the Supreme Court’s implicit warning in *Trinko* that antitrust courts are ill-suited "to act..."
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing.”

Such an outcome would be “results” oriented because broader concepts like “fairness” would by definition be fair in the eye of the beholder, and certain outcomes would be reverse engineered via case law because they were “fair.” It is for this reason that Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp are wary about the use of fairness in antitrust, noting that fairness is “a vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to favor.” Similarly, Donald Turner cautions that populism “would broaden antitrust’s proscriptions to cover business conduct that has no significant anticompetitive effects, would increase vagueness in the law, and would discourage conduct that promotes efficiencies not easily recognized or proved.”

The notion of what consumer welfare means has shifted as economic learning has shifted. These shifts become embraced in case law. An example in this shift involves healthcare mergers and market definition. After losing healthcare mergers, the FTC undertook a merger retrospective to understand hospital markets better. Taking in more recent economic advances, the FTC uncovered that the Elzinga–Hogarty market definition test was flawed and overinclusive. By using case law to rework theory, better empirical tools, and more data, the FTC won in Evanston to undo a consummated hospital merger. Since that case, the FTC has had a much stronger track record of winning hospital merger cases because of the courts’ embrace of more sophisticated economic models.

Overall, economic analysis allows for a truly fair system—one that is decided by facts and real economic effects—not merely one side complaining more loudly than the other as to what is fair. Professor Froeb and his co-authors summarize the shift and why technocracy is better as follows:

Forty years ago . . . inference was primitive, drawn mainly from the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, and supported mainly by cross-industry regressions of price or profit on industry concentration. In antitrust trials, it was not uncommon for opposing experts to opine about the effects of a merger based on little in the way of economic theory or empirical evidence, and without offering any mapping from either to their opinions. Economic analysis now occupies a central role in antitrust enforcement and credible expert opinions are derived from theoretical and empirical models.

This insight explains that it is consumer welfare that offers democratic legitimacy. Cases come down to facts—and analysis to explain these facts—rather than to a popularity contest. The transition to greater economic analysis in cases was a result of an organizational shift that gave equal weight to economists in U.S. antitrust agencies as to the lawyers. When the economists have a say in working through cases, they can rethink economic models based on facts to better represent reality, whether using static or dynamic models.

One reason for Wu’s hostility to economic analysis is his concern that consumer welfare standard fails to take non-price issues into consideration (p. 135). Yet consumer welfare can address non-price issues. In fact, it does so regularly. Wu cannot really believe that non-price antitrust analysis is a problem with antitrust. Many of the important conduct cases of the Chicago School era that Wu studies address non-price competition (p. 131).

Both at the Supreme Court level and at the lower court level, antitrust courts have dealt with non-price issues (often with price elements as well) on a regular basis. Non-price factors are not new to antitrust. Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly acknowledges that it can deal with dynamic is-

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96. As the father of three wonderful children, I have learned that fairness means “fair is if I benefit but not if I don’t,” followed by name-calling across children, shouting, and hurt feelings. When more money is at stake like in antitrust, the name-calling and screaming are worse.
sues in antitrust. 102 Indeed, history has shown that antitrust is focused not merely on short-term effects but also on long-run effects. For example, Learned Hand wrote in 1916, “the consumer’s interest in the long run is quite different from an immediate fall in prices.” 103 Thus, economic learning helps shapes how agencies and courts view antitrust. 104

Given the significant case law on non-price-related antitrust, Wu is unwilling to express what the attack on the consumer welfare standard is really about for him: the creation of an antitrust regulatory regime rather than an antitrust enforcement regime. That is, Wu implicitly wants to turn the antitrust agencies into a regulatory body with multiple goals and prospective oversight—akin to the FCC, an agency he has studied extensively. Yet, administrative agencies are rife with capture concerns. 105 Further, the FCC’s record on mergers that Wu decries on the antitrust side is not strong. The FCC, using the public interest standard to review the same mergers as the antitrust agencies, also allowed for significant consolidation. 106 This is true for the FAA in airline industries, too. And various financial regulators (such as the OCC, Federal Reserve Board, and FDIC) that allowed financial services consolidation also have multiple goals. A public-interest-standard approach also assumes that government has the public interest in mind such that it responds to preferences by consumers and does not try to shape them. 107

IV. WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT PLATFORM TECH AND INNOVATION

Large tech companies should be feared, Wu suggests (pp. 21–22). Wu connects big tech’s “ubiquity” to a nondescript “sense of concern” about their power, which he describes as a “kingly prerogative” (p. 21). Focusing on a handful of companies, Wu explains that “[t]here stopped being a next new thing, or at least, a new thing that was a serious challenge to the old thing” (p. 121). Broad-brushed critiques do not fully appreciate different business models and competition concerns that may arise with different

104. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 67, at 43.
types of technology platforms. For example, e-commerce platforms have a
different model than cloud computing, social networks, fintech platforms,
P2P platforms, and various types of search-related platforms, even though all
compete on some level for advertising and users. Further, Wu ignores the
rise of Chinese tech platforms as such Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, DiDi, Xiao-
mi, and Ctrip, which create global competition for Western firms both di-
rectly and in the market for vertical acquisitions.108

While such broad-brushed critiques may score political points with
populists on both the left and the right, antitrust analysis requires an inquiry
that marries economic theory to evidence. In practice, working through an
analysis of tech platforms, which includes elements such as market definition
and the substantive analysis of economic effects, is complex.109

Since Wu does not make a specific claim as to the evidence of the mo-
nopolization case that would require antitrust intervention and the extreme
remedy of structural breakup, he focuses instead on the issue of nascent
technology-related acquisitions by tech companies. Wu is concerned that
acquisitions involving nascent technology and potential nascent competitors
might have negative competitive effects if established tech platforms acquire
smaller firms (p. 123).

Predicting future champions among tech companies is not easy. If it
were, law and entrepreneurship would not be defined as a distinct field be-
cause of the inherent uncertainty of such investments. Entrepreneurship is
complicated and exit strategies vary.110 But a structural fix like Wu recom-
ends would hurt innovation.

What makes entrepreneurship unique is that it involves high risk.111
Venture capitalists (VCs) have a portfolio of investments to reduce risk be-
cause any one investment is not likely to yield big returns.112 This is im-
portant given the limited time frame (typically ten years) in which the capital
needs to be returned at the end of the fund.113 As such, VCs do not make

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108. See, e.g., Hasan Chowdhury, China’s Tech Giants Have Conquered the East, Now for
the West, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018
/09/23/chinas-tech-giants-have-conquered-east-now-west/ [https://perma.cc/9FQF-HBW8].

ans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses, in 1 THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, supra note 99, at 404;
Thomas Eisenmann et al., Platform Envelopment, 32 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1270 (2011); Feng

110. Dawn R. DeTienne et al., Making Sense of Entrepreneurial Exit Strategies: A Typolo-

111. William R. Kerr et al., Entrepreneurship as Experimentation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer

112. See id. at 26.

113. GEOFFREY GREGSON, FINANCING NEW VENTURES: AN ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO
BUSINESS ANGEI INVESTMENT 31 (2014).
money on over half of their investments. To protect themselves from entrepreneurial holdup, VCs create a series of legal mechanisms (negative covenants) to ensure some control even when they lack voting control.

It would be a mistake to assume that antitrust enforcers could easily figure out which nascent firms might be competitors, let alone which firms might develop new markets. Wu understates how difficult it is to figure out the next sets of winners and losers. With significantly more information than an outsider (such as an antitrust agency reviewing a deal), even the best VCs and CVCs have trouble picking winners and losers. Just because a larger firm acquires a start-up does not mean that the best technologies, people, and ideas can be implemented to capture value from the acquisition. Though it is possible that a particular transaction might create competition problems, the solution is to address specific deals with a sufficient factual record. To wholesale attack an entire business model that has been the primary form of exit for entrepreneurs not merely in platform-based tech but in biotech would create economy-wide problems. When certain avenues for firm exit, such as vertical acquisition by larger firms, are closed off via limits to acquisition because of an overly stringent antitrust regime, it hurts the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Entrepreneurs would be chilled from creating start-ups if they could not easily create a liquidity event to extract financial rewards from their investment.

V. ROBINSON-PATMAN ENFORCEMENT IS THE ULTIMATE EXPRESSION OF NEO-BRANDEISIAN ANTITRUST

There is a natural experiment that tests the Wu hypothesis of what antitrust would look like with a different set of goals, which until relatively recently diverged fundamentally from the Chicago School approach found in Sherman and Clayton Act jurisprudence—the Robinson-Patman Act. Rob-

117. See Russell W. Coff, How Buyers Cope with Uncertainty when Acquiring Firms in Knowledge-Intensive Industries: Caveat Emptor, 10 ORG. SCI. 144, 144 (1999).
inson-Patman enforcement can teach us about what a more populist anti-trust would entail.

If Wu wants a return to Brandeisian-style populism in antitrust, this requires a change in antitrust law given the current development of judge-made antitrust case law. But Wu’s neo-Brandeisian critique and his push for new law should be informed by the negative experience of the interpretation and enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act.120

Unlike the other antitrust statutes, the Robinson-Patman Act was expressly protectionist in its drafting.121 Further, its negative economic effect on efficiency is unambiguous.122 A review of Robinson-Patman doctrinal shifts and scholarship suggests what Chicago did well in shifting an inefficient rule that hurt consumers, particularly poor ones. A review of Robinson-Patman and its decline also reflects the limitations of Chicago School economic analysis: what worked with regard to the analytical shift to Robinson-Patman was a function of economic consensus, as opposed to a number of areas of antitrust analysis where the economic literature suggests that Chicago-based antitrust analysis is coarse or potentially outdated.123

Academics have attacked the Robinson-Patman Act for decades because of the unambiguous harm to consumers that its enforcement has created.124 Thus, on consumer welfare grounds the Act is an abomination. In this sense, both antitrust enforcers on the left and the right had a shared vision of the Act—the economics were disastrous.125 Nevertheless, the Robinson-Patman Act has been shrouded in “democratic” values.

The origin of the Robinson-Patman Act126 was based on protection of small retailers from larger, more efficient competitors (large buyers).127 Originally titled the “Wholesale Grocer’s Protection Act,” there were no multiple purposes to the Act akin to the Sherman Act, such that one could reasonably claim any sort of efficiency rationale for Robinson-Patman.128 Rather, the Act was protectionism of a special interest under the guise of “fairness.”

120. See Sokol, supra note 31.
121. Id. at 2069.
125. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 122, at i, iii.
127. Sokol, supra note 31, at 2069.
Thus, whereas the Supreme Court explained that “[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise,” 129 the Robinson-Patman Act has been called the “Magna Carta of Small Business.” 130 The Supreme Court articulated how the Robinson-Patman Act embraces fairness over other goals:

The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer of such advantages . . . . 131

In fact, size (and potential scale-related efficiencies) is what drives down prices for consumers. Thus, to protect inefficient competitors, Robinson-Patman required a trade-off that hurt end consumers. 132 Because Robinson-Patman originally served to stymie the growth of the largest supermarket, the result is that the trade-off was regressive—those vulnerable consumers who needed lower prices were the ones most hurt by choosing a “fair” approach to antitrust to protect small stores.

This anti-bigness bias was pronounced in decades of Robinson-Patman jurisprudence in which large companies were punished merely for using buyer size to offer price reductions. 133 Thus, Robinson-Patman enforcement was a response to fears of size. 134 As Chief Judge Diane Wood recently noted, “Its fit with antitrust policy is awkward, as it was principally designed to protect small businesses . . . .” 135 For this reason, the Supreme Court explained that the Robinson-Patman Act "was intended to justify a finding of injury to competition by a showing of injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination." 136

Much of FTC enforcement in the 1950s and 1960s focused on Robinson-Patman violations. 137 Overall, because of a favorably worded statute that re-

132. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 122, at 317 ("[T]he Robinson-Patman Act is not targeted at harmful price discrimination. Rather, it condemns low prices."); id. at 318 ("The economic reality is that price differences and price discrimination typically benefit, not harm, consumers. To the extent that price discrimination (as defined by economists) may harm consumer welfare, other antitrust laws already address such conduct.").
133. Sokol, supra note 31, at 2070–76.
135. Woodman’s Food Mkt. v. Clorox Co., 833 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2016).
136. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 49 (footnote omitted).
137. Sokol, supra note 31, at 2071–73.
quired no showing of market power, plaintiffs often won these cases. But the Supreme Court slowly chipped away at the pro-plaintiff case law by requiring antitrust injury and a showing of consumer welfare loss even though nothing in the statute required either. Change to Robinson-Patman happened gradually. It included a unilateral declaration by DOJ that it would not enforce the Robinson-Patman Act because the Act had a “deleterious impact on competition.” Similarly, the FTC noted that the Act was protectionist. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, the Supreme Court began to reign in Robinson-Patman enforcement so that it did not have “open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation.” Further, the Court applied the Sherman Act antitrust injury concept to the Act to limit the number of Robinson-Patman cases. In Brooke Group, the Court made sure not to repeal the Act but read in a consumer welfare goal to Robinson-Patman where none existed. Thus, the Court pushed the interpretation far, but not so far as to provoke a legislative response.

Robinson-Patman created some of the worst decisions in antitrust history in the sense that they hurt consumers. Those consumers who benefit the most from low prices—the poor—bore the brunt of higher food prices. To the extent that there was a trade-off that supported smaller and inefficient competitors, such competitors benefited over the most vulnerable members of society.

Utah Pie epitomized the failure of Robinson-Patman. In the case, national competitors entered the Salt Lake City market where Utah Pie had two-thirds market share. As a result of competition, the price of pie decreased. However, Utah Pie’s market share decreased to just under 50 per-
cent even while its sales and profits increased. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Utah Pie (protection of a competitor) and against competition. Worse, during this period Robinson-Patman was enforced criminally. Thus, a low-cost pie that benefited consumers could potentially land a baker in jail. Such is the perverse effect of “political” antitrust.

CONCLUSION

Antitrust works well because it is technocratic in that a singular (but flexible within its economics) goal is administrable institutionally. To introduce the world of political imperfections into a technical process that examines markets would create further distortions affecting consumers. Antitrust does well dealing with antitrust problems. To the extent that there are other related problems, the right answer is not to create an antitrust that lacks democratic accountability (because antitrust becomes regulation via the backdoor) and exceeds its mandate of the past forty years. Rather, the better solution is to identify the underlying problem and solve it with more effective tools. If the problem is one of redistribution, tax is a better choice than antitrust. If the problem is one of privacy, strengthen privacy laws. If the problem is one of financial institutions or sector regulators not doing what they need to do, correct structural problems with sector regulators. Antitrust has increasingly moved out of sector regulation and toward advocacy. The advocacy budget of the antitrust agencies is tiny, and to the extent that the problem is the rules of the game for particular industry sectors, Wu falls short by not suggesting greater competition advocacy.

Wu’s concern with big tech companies because they are big (p. 126) is as misplaced now as it was earlier in antitrust history. Antitrust has gone through various moments in which it had reevaluated whether it has the proper tools to combat anticompetitive behavior in technology-related markets. It does have such tools and can bring important cases in these mar-

149. See id.
150. See generally id.
156. James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005).
It was just a decade ago that we were told that Walmart was taking over shopping, that eBay was the largest online marketplace, or that Facebook was the primary way in which users shared information. Today, Uber competes with Lyft, Amazon has eclipsed eBay, Facebook is a legacy service, and younger people use any other set of applications to share information—such as Pinterest, Twitter, or Snapchat. In a world of continuous change, antitrust is what remains constant. It has the tools to police against unlawful exercise of monopoly power and adapts to changes in economic theory and empirics. To ask antitrust to go beyond its institutional capacity sets up antitrust to fail, because Wu’s deeper concern is with how society is structured. That structure can be changed through elections to the presidency and Congress and through changes as to the makeup of the Supreme Court. Antitrust history shows that it is the Supreme Court that changes antitrust law and policy the most because of antitrust’s common law–like nature.\[159\]

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159. Deborah A. Garza, Deputy Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks on Modernization of Antitrust Law – Private and Public Enforcement and Abuses – Europe and the U.S. (May 29, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519641/download [https://perma.cc/NU5G-NTVN] (“Even the most passionate critics of current enforcement policy recognize the constraining influence of existing case law and, importantly, the substantial degree of consensus that exists today around most aspects of antitrust policy—a consensus forged on a solid foundation of economic learning. . . . We won’t return to what antitrust enforcement looked like 40 years ago.”).