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THE INFLUENCE OF MODERNIZATION IN 
COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY

Marshall B. Clinard*


All countries have crime. Crimes occur more frequently, however, in some countries than in others, and in all countries changes in the crime situation take place over time. Any study of crime in a single country, as, for example, the United States, can lead to misconceptions about the basic factors that produce the crime; and for this reason it is important that comparative studies be made in a wide variety of countries. Only in this way can some fundamental theoretical frameworks, propositions, or models be developed that might account for the processes that produce crime, even though there would be, naturally, some individual variations. An adequate comparative criminology, for example, should be able to ascertain if similar social processes account for crime in the industrial, developed countries and in the less developed countries.

Any efforts to discover a valid comparative criminological theory must be based on studies that have been made of diverse types of societies. They should be made of such similar types of societies as the capitalist developed countries of the United States, Canada, Australia, Western Europe, and Japan. The findings should then be compared with the criminal behavior situations of the developed socialist countries of Europe. Finally, the developed countries, whether capitalist or socialist, should be compared with the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and elsewhere.

Any attempt to write a book of such tremendously wide-ranging scope is one thing; to do it reasonably successfully is quite different. But this is what Louise Shelley has done in Crime and Modernization. In concise fashion, drawing definite conclusions, she has written a comparative criminology by examining the impact of modernization, or, more appropriately, development, on crime. She has utilized, first, a historical European context, and then has combined it with contemporary materials on a global basis. In this comparative criminological approach only China (which is, unfortunately,

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1. Durkheim recognized, nearly a century ago, that it is essential to test theoretical propositions in the widest possible variety of social milieus available for scientific investigation. E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 139 (S. Solvay & J. Mueller trans., G. Catlin, ed. 1938).
a major omission), Cuba, and a few African countries are omitted, either because the data are not published (for political reasons) or because the statistical material is seriously faulty.

No previous book has fully attempted to fit criminality within a worldwide model. Some books have done so within certain regions or nations, or by selected time periods. For example, Clinard and Abbott's *Crime in Developing Countries* deals only with developing countries, and for the most part with Africa. As Shelley points out, "[o]nly by examining cross-culturally and historically the evolution of development in diverse societies is it possible to reach conclusions that have international validity" (p. 136). Fortunately, she had available to her, which was not the case twenty-five years ago, a body of research findings by international scholars, as well as a considerable amount of fairly reliable national and international crime statistics.

The organization of Shelley's book is simple, yet comprehensive, covering European crime data over the past 200 years and dividing the analysis into capitalist and socialist countries, and, further, into developing and developed countries. In the analysis, historical crime material is incorporated with that of the contemporary world, a unique approach. She rightly points out that there exists, in contemporary research on criminality, an abject blindness to the historic past. (For example, property crime, particularly such crimes associated with violence, may well have been greater in American cities during the middle and late nineteenth century than it is today.) Conversely, the few who examine historical data on crime rarely do more than speculate about the actual relationship between what was observed historically and the contemporary scene. Shelley shows that a century or more ago Europe was experiencing serious crime problems, often linked to urbanization, a fact that has a significant bearing on the rising crime rates that are experienced today in the developing countries.

Shelley deals almost exclusively with the internationally recognized ordinary or conventional types of crime, such as criminal homicide, assault, rape, and crimes against property like theft and robbery. The variation in the legal definition of specific crimes in different countries is accepted, and no effort is made to establish any internationally valid definitions. Obviously, this would not be easy to do in a study that has many other facets. However, she compounds this difficulty when she states that she has circumvented the problem of these variations in legal definition by focusing on the "total crime of individual countries or on the aggregate rates recorded for crimes against the person and property" (p. xvii). Obviously, this puts all types of offenses together in a hodgepodge that has little real meaning: for example, robbery and burglary are quite different offenses, both in behavior and in the legal sense. She wisely recognizes, however, that criminal statistics vary widely in their reliability and that, today, we are in no position methodologically to attempt to use international socioeconomic data to factor out the variables affecting crime rates. "Such extensive

2. Two criminology books have included much material from various countries, but they had no general theoretical model. M. López Rey, *Crime: An Analytical Approach* (1970); H. Mannheim, *Comparative Criminology* (1965).

quantitative research seems premature until such time as the available data merit such methodologically complex analysis" (p. xvii).

Unfortunately, Shelley has not fully presented the comparative significance of white-collar crime in developing and developed countries, even though she briefly mentions this problem (pp. 72-73). This recognition may be mere lip service, inasmuch as the book concentrates on ordinary crime; on the other hand, this may be due to the scarcity of statistical and other comparative materials in this particular area of criminality. Corporate crime is not mentioned: Like white-collar crime in general, this entire area is a serious, but largely unrecognized and unstudied, form of criminality. In many ways, these offenses are more serious and damaging to a society than is ordinary crime. It would have been a major contribution to the field of criminology had she compared the similarities and the differences in the criminal behavior of corporate executives in a capitalist society with the managers of socialist industrial and commercial enterprises.

For the most part, the unit used for the comparative analysis of crime statistics is the nation-state or country. Such an approach is, on the whole, a fairly conventional way of analyzing crime today, but one should be constantly aware that such an extremely broad and often artificial category as a nation is often misleading and obscures much internal variation. As an example, the crime rate of the United States as a whole, and even trends in the crime rates, have little meaning. The variations by rural and urban areas, by region, state, and city are enormous, especially in respect to size and location. Even large cities vary a great deal in their crime rates, as is the case with Milwaukee and Chicago. Shelley does, however, point from her research to the internal variations among diverse parts of the Soviet Union. Such internal variation is even greater in the developing countries, as, for example, was found in the homicide rates among three Ugandan tribal groups.

The crime rates of most countries also reflect, in large part, the crime rate of their urban areas, mainly the largest cities. In all probability, the most appropriate way to compare criminality would be to analyze the rates for the large urban areas and to forget the national statistics. As one study has pointed out:

Delinquency and crime rates are always lower in rural than in urban areas in developed countries, and a similar situation exists in the developing [countries]. In fact, the increase in crime in less developed countries can be misleading in the sense that it involves a relatively small proportion of the country's total population which is concentrated in urban areas and only in certain parts of them.

Shelley believes that, internationally, the general increase in crime rates cannot be explained by individualistic theories of crime such as abnormalities of personality. Nor can past or present sociological theories account for this global situation — such theories as anomie, opportunity theory, differ-

4. The only major studies in this area have been done by Sutherland, Clinard and Yeager. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1961).
6. M. CLINARD & D. ABBOTT, supra note 3, at 81-82.
ential association, culture conflict, social disorganization, relative deprivation, and delinquent subcultures. Shelley briefly appraises the limitations of each explanation and claims that all are ethnocentric, based on uniquely American and Western European experiences. They are derived from capitalist societies, primarily the United States, and make no attempt to compare the applicability of the theory to socialist countries. She concludes that by “analyzing modernization in the context of both developing and developed capitalist and socialist societies, this book overcomes the weaknesses of criminological theories based solely on the capitalist form of economic development” (p. 15).

Conceptually, the modernization or developmental process is the most valid explanation, and this process can be broken down into two main features — industrialization and urbanization. Economic development brought about by industrialization leads to the rapid growth of urbanization, which follows from the attraction of the population, primarily the young, to the cities, for the purposes of obtaining industrial and commercial employment. The growth of industrialization affects the nature of urbanization; they both, in turn, affect the growth of modernization. The possession of material goods becomes more accessible and ever more desired. Concomitant with the impact of urbanization and industrialization are basic changes in social institutions, such as the family structure, and the secularization of man’s beliefs. The heterogeneity of city living brings people into contact with varied patterns of living. University of Chicago law professor Norval Morris, who was at one time director of the United Nations Institute for Asia, was frequently asked by relatively underdeveloped Asian countries with little crime and delinquency but with rising rates what they should do to stop this trend. His answer, although admittedly factious, contained much truth:

He urged them to ensure that their people remained ignorant, bigoted, and ill-educated; that on no account should they develop substantial industries; that communications systems should be primitive; and that their transportation systems should be such as to ensure that most of the citizens lived within their own small, isolated villages for their entire lives. He stressed the importance of making sure their educational systems did not promise a potential level of achievement for a child beyond that which his father had already achieved. If it was once suggested that a child should be able to grow to the limit of his capacity rather than to the ceiling of his father’s achievement, he pointed out, the seeds of the gravest disorder would be laid. He stressed the universal human experience that village societies are entirely capable of maintaining any discordance or human nonconformity within their own social frameworks and never need to call on centralized authority to solve their problems. He would take time to sketch, with a wealth of detail, the horrors of increased delinquency and crime that would flow from any serious attempt to industrialize, urbanize, or educate their communities. He would conclude with a peroration against the establishment of an international airline.

The rapid increase in crime observed in nineteenth-century Europe (England, France, Germany, and Sweden) and that being experienced in the developing countries today is the result of this dual process of industrialization and urbanization. Yet there is a significant difference. The increasingly high crime rates of developing countries are enhanced by the impact of an increasingly sophisticated technology unknown in the nineteenth century, including, for example, the auto and the availability of manufactured consumer goods, as well as the increasing need for these goods. This important difference makes the two situations difficult to compare.

Through the use of historical materials, Shelley goes further, pointing out that the tradition of rural violence was transferred in an even more violent form to the nineteenth-century cities as a response to the social tensions being experienced. Later, much violent crime was replaced by an emphasis on property crimes. “The transition from a society dominated by violence to one characterized by property offenses as in Europe of yesterday is the hallmark of modernization [sic]” (p. 36). She feels that, although the cities of developing countries today are characterized by exceptionally high rates of violent crimes, these high rates will, in time, probably diminish.

Although Shelley is correct in stating that development plays a part in the high urban homicide rates of the past and in the developing countries today, she has failed, in stressing the modernization process, to consider the differences in cultural norms that result in the violence or nonviolence used to settle disputes. Although it is true that most of the developing countries in Africa and Latin America, and a few in Asia, particularly Sri Lanka, are characterized by extremely high rates of criminal homicide, one authoritative source concluded that, in general, world homicide rates must be interpreted in terms of cultural conflict, which results from social change, and cultural differences in attitudes toward the use of violence. “It is impossible to determine, however, how much these high rates are attributable to underdevelopment and how much they are the result of various cultural factors associated with the use of violence to settle disputes.”

Crime can become an index to social change:

Thus, crime rates at all stages of the developmental process appear to be a barometer of the problems associated with this major societal transition. Property and violent crime are therefore important measures of social order and societal transition and assume a significance greater than that previously attributed to these forms of societal misconduct. Violent criminality is both a symptom of rural life as well as an indication of the problems associated with the adjustment to urban life. Property crime is a natural consequence of modern urban settlement with its emphasis on material goods unequally distributed to all inhabitants. The crime rate and the relationship between property and violent crime provide indices of a society’s transition towards modernization. [P. 37] (footnote omitted).

Although not discussed by Shelley, India might well be cited as a good example of what happens to crime rates when a country moves rapidly to modernization and industrialization. This country is now almost completely self-sufficient in practically every way: consumer goods like transis-
tor radios, stereo sets, and watches are readily available. As a result, such goods, acquired through theft or purchased with stolen money, are regarded as status symbols or even essentials, particularly by the urban youth. The country has had extremely large cities for centuries, but most of the cities were not industrialized until fairly recent times, and during this same period new industrialized cities have developed. The increased movement of youth to the cities has meant a decline in the effect of informal social controls exercised by the family and the village.

Crime rates in India remained low until fairly recent times. During the sixties one had little cause to fear robbery, burglary, larceny or auto theft in the large urban areas, and official statistics, which are in general regarded as superior, reflected this generally low crime rate. In a 1965 crime victimization survey, which included urban areas, nine out of ten males questioned stated that they had no anxiety about the safety of their own neighborhoods. Only one in ten had ever been a victim of a crime. As late as 1973 this reviewer wrote that “[c]rime has not increased as rapidly in India as in other developing countries. For years the rate remained about the same, even declining.”

In the 1980 national election that returned Indira Ghandi to power, however, the increase in crime and the inherent fears of crime among the general populace were two of the most important issues of the election. Today the media reports are full of crime stories, a situation that differs markedly from that of ten years ago. Concern and discussion about crime in both federal and state parliaments also have increased markedly. In March 1981, for example, a motion was introduced in the Federal Parliament to consider the “increasing robberies” in some of the states and in Delhi. Equally telling, the Prime Minister was laughed down when she claimed in Parliament to have made a dent in the crime situation in Delhi. More specifically, burglary has shown sharp increases, and many more devices used to protect against such crimes are evident in both homes and shops. Armed robbery, particularly with a gun, which previously had been rare, has increased dramatically in urban areas. The commercial robbery of banks and business establishments, formerly also rare, has now reached serious proportions. Armed robbery both in the villages and in the open rural areas (dacoity), often perpetrated by heavily armed gangs, has been occurring for a long time in India, but it is now greatly increased and guns are being used. Robberies on trains present serious problems, and they are widespread, whereas previously train robberies had occurred only on occasion and in special areas. Truck hijacking and the holdups of buses on highways have increased, and auto thefts, previously rare, are now common.

Shelley’s comparative analysis leads to other interesting specific conclusions that resemble “scientific laws,” most of which, like her other observations, must be tested by subsequent research:

(1) The maturation of the developmental process brings a stabilization in recorded crime rates, as was first noticed in the latter half of the nine-

11. Id. at 118.
teenth century in Europe and in the differential growth rates in the developing countries.

(2) The major characteristic of modernization is the transition from a society dominated by violent crime to one more and more characterized by property crime. In the increasingly modern mobile society one's status becomes determined more by possessions than by birth.

(3) The greatest effect of the development process is the resulting high crime rates in urban areas, a process most pronounced in the early stages of modernization.

(4) Regardless of their forms of economic development, crime rates in the developed and the developing countries are highest in the urban core and in slum areas that are often populated by migrants from the rural areas.

(5) As societies modernize, women commit an increasingly larger share of crimes and the range of their offenses becomes wider.

(6) As the development process continues, juveniles, primarily males, assume a noticeable share of total criminality, and the amount of crime ascribable to them increases as the society becomes more industrialized.13

In spite of modernization, or the lack of it, however, all countries do not, obviously, have the same level and distribution of criminality, and Shelley recognized the varying impact of social and political factors on crime patterns. Some of the factors that she claims account for this variation are (1) the degree of urbanization and the rapidity with which it takes place, (2) the degree of industrialization, (3) changes in the social structure, and (4) the nature of the criminal justice system. Others of importance are the degree to which the traditional way of life is maintained, the amount of internal migration, and the influence of peer groups, particularly youth gangs. In the long run, only the degree of political, religious, and economic controls exercised by a society appear sufficiently strong to avert the criminalizing effects of modernization. As she points out,

When societies enforce deliberate social policies that prevent or control the seemingly inevitable urbanization accompanying economic development, then the consequent growth and transformation of criminality that accompanies modernization may be partially voided. When political regimes such as Stalin's in the Soviet Union and Franco's in Spain maintain strict control over the criminal population through long prison terms or by annihilation, then even a modernizing society can contain some of its crime problems. The endurance of traditional religious values or of societal traditions associated with the religious heritage make societies at least partly immune to some of the destabilizing criminogenic consequences of modernization. Japan and the countries of the Middle East, which have preserved their traditional cultural values in the face of modern technology, increasing industrialization, and societal prosperity, have crime rates well below those of nations at comparable levels of social and economic development. A society may also avert the disorienting and criminogenic consequences of modernization by means of economic controls. For example, in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe where controls are placed over the

13. This has been confirmed by two other studies that have used worldwide data. See M. Clinard & D. Abbott, Crime in Developing Countries (1973); M. Clinard, Slums and Community Development (1966).
distribution of wealth, employment is guaranteed, and the fruits of material success are hidden from the general public, crime rates are much lower than in most developing nations. The crime problem is aggravated where the financial gap between rich and poor is enormous or, as in the United States, where advertising through the mass media fosters the feeling of deprivation among large numbers of less affluent members of the population. [P. 142.]

Shelley resided in the Soviet Union as a research scholar for some time. She is fluent in Russian, and she has published a number of research articles on the crime situation there. Thus, her book must be regarded as the most authoritative and comprehensive presentation now available on the historical and current status of crime in the Soviet Union. Basically, she concludes that the relation of modernization and development to crime is much the same as in capitalist countries.

Contrary to ideological expectations, the advent of socialism has not brought a diminution in criminality. Instead, development in socialist countries, like that in capitalist societies, has led to increased rates of property crime, a reduction in violent crimes relative to those committed against property, and an increase in criminality among juveniles and females. . . . In both types of society, crime is primarily an urban phenomenon and cities are characterized not only by proportionately more property crime but by the concentration of crime in particular [slum] neighborhoods. [Pp. 133-34.]

This does not mean that capitalist and socialist countries have the same type of crime. Socialization of the means of production has both created and eliminated certain types of crime. Frequently, for example, in crimes such as theft and embezzlement the victim is not a private individual but rather the state. As Shelley points out,

The easy access to state goods in societies frequently threatened by shortages makes all forms of theft from the state common. . . . In the Soviet Union, for example, over 17 percent of all convictions are for crimes against socialist property, slightly more than the contribution of crimes against personal property to the total crime pictures. [Pp. 113-14.]

Other specific crimes that differ from those in capitalist countries are those regulating private entrepreneurial activity and speculation, which are considered essential for the preservation of the socialist economy.

At the same time, the socialist state exercises a degree of formal (including police) control over individuals that also affects the distribution of crime. For example, the larger cities of the Soviet Union do not have crime problems as serious as those in the newer rapidly industrializing cities, a fact that Shelley attributes to strict controls over population migration (particularly to the larger cities) and to the greater developmental forces evident in the newer cities.

Although crime, under socialism as well as under capitalism, is "one of the major costs of modernization" (p. 134), Shelley concludes that crime is less prevalent in socialist than in capitalist countries. This difference is explained not by the form of economic system chosen by the socialist societies but rather by the nature of the controls exercised over the population. Other than the reasons just given, such as the strict police and population controls, "socialist societies have been able to foster close citizen involve-
ment in the criminal justice system: this action has served to suppress but not eliminate the crime problem” (p. 134). Citizen involvement in crime control is also common in both Switzerland\textsuperscript{14} and Japan, but it is not characteristic of most capitalist countries and, in particular, the United States.

It would seem logical that there would be less crime, as Shelley contends, in socialist countries, due to the different preventive and control forces that operate in these countries. One can, to some extent, accept this assumption on the basis of Shelley’s residence in the Soviet Union, which gave her the opportunity to draw conclusions through careful observation of what did and did not take place. Still, there is a degree of inconsistency evident when she cites statistical evidence from socialist countries to support her thesis, for in her discussions in other connections she is quite aware of their limitations, a fact true of all criminal statistics but apparently more true in the socialist countries. She points out that in socialist countries

[the absence of comprehensive data is deliberate and the reasons for this secrecy is primarily ideological. As socialist ideology proclaims that crime will wither away under socialism and disappear under communism, the persistence of crime under socialist conditions is both an embarrassment and evidence of weakness in the ideology. Authorities in socialist societies, who not only have failed to eliminate their crime problems, but also face growing rates of juvenile delinquency, choose to suppress their crime data rather than admit their failure. [P. 104.]

Shelley defends her use of these statistics by claiming that it is still possible to study the crime patterns of these nations. “By piecing together evidence from different available sources it is possible to construct a picture of the patterns of criminality and the nature of offender populations” (p. 105). One might add that this method constitutes a valid basis for her claim that, because of modernization, crime is still increasing in the socialist countries, in contradiction to the often repeated statement by socialist “social scientists” and other influential spokesmen from socialist countries that, in contrast to capitalist countries, crime is decreasing. As Shelley found, crime rates in socialist countries have actually been rising, and she feels that they will continue to rise. The socialist economic system constitutes no basic defense against the forces of modernization and development that are now sweeping these countries.

The greatest advances in any field of science, whether physical or social, are probably made through insightful observations and speculations provided by the “exceptional instance.” Often, it is not critical that a laboratory experiment works 999 times out of 1,000, but rather that, for some reason, in one case it failed to work. Thus, the point is not the fact that modernization (industrialization and urbanization) generally produces increasing and high crime rates, but that exceptions exist to such a generalization. Two major exceptions that have been the subject of research are

\textsuperscript{14}. See M. Clinard, Cities with Little Crime (1978).

\textsuperscript{15}. Salas has described the frustrations of trying to do research in Cuba on crime and social control. See Salas, The Study of Crime in Marxist Countries: Notes on Method for Outsiders, with Special Reference to Cuba, in Crime and Deviance: A Comparative Perspective 68-100 (G. Newman ed. 1980).
Japan\textsuperscript{16} and Switzerland.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, Japan's crime rate appears to be decreasing. Shelley has discussed this matter, pointing out that these countries "must be examined to provide insights into the forces that counteract what otherwise seems to be the irrevocable link between crime and industrial development" (p. 73).

In spite of the country's huge industrial cities, the unique situation seen in Japan's crime rates is attributed generally to the homogeneity of the country, the high degree of governmental centralization and the common social and cultural heritage. Informal social controls have been preserved to a remarkable degree within the family, the school and the local community. Japanese cities do not have slum areas and have avoided any real cultural tradition of violence. Moreover, Japan has made effective use of various legal controls, such as those that forbid firearms. Finally, the Japanese criminal justice system, in particular the police, has a long history of public support and participation, especially in preventing and deterring crime.

Many factors that characterize Japan apply as well to Switzerland, although some differences do exist. The Swiss have, for example, also preserved a close family structure. In addition, far less cross-generational alienation between adults and youth exists there than in most modern industrial societies. As in Japan, the Swiss attempt through the educational system to provide a real purpose to education. Urbanization there is extensive — but the rate of growth has been slow, due to the decentralization of industry — and slum areas have never developed. Furthermore, Swiss citizens assume much responsibility for social, as well as crime, control at the local level. In fact, the remark has often been made that "each Swiss is his own policeman." Historically, the governmental responsibilities assumed by the citizenry have been unique in the Western world, and this has provided a certain counterforce to criminality.\textsuperscript{18} The Swiss criminal justice system has also helped to reduce ordinary crime. In the predominantly German-speaking area, offenders are seldom arrested; citations are usually given instead. No plea bargaining is available for a reduction of the original criminal charge; most convicted first offenders are given a suspended sentence; prison sentences are of short duration; and the prisons themselves have never been large.

On the other hand, these two countries do differ. Switzerland, unlike Japan, is not nationally homogeneous. Rather, it is regionally homogeneous, with rather definitive German, French, and Italian areas. A large foreign worker population resides in the country, and there is a high degree of political decentralization in the cantons and the communes, where, as in the Japanese local communities, the ordinary citizen assumes personal responsibility for many aspects of life that are ordinarily controlled by governmental authorities. "The Swiss today have an ingrained faith in mutual help and solidarity and the direct democracy of their political system en-

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{17} See M. Clinard, \textit{supra} note 14.
\bibitem{18} See id., at 103.
\end{thebibliography}
ables each citizen to share in the responsibility for running the country." Indeed, Switzerland has no tradition of violence. Unlike Japan, however, firearms are readily accessible through the system of universal citizen military service. In this system, each person is expected to keep his weapons in the home, and weapons can be purchased legally. Nevertheless, both criminal homicide and robbery are rare in Switzerland.

Most of these features of Japanese and Swiss life, with the resulting low crime rates, are not characteristics of the United States, a highly industrialized and urbanized country that has a high crime rate. Shelley points out, in referring to the crime situation in the United States, the various differences, including what she calls the "recurrence of urbanization" that has occurred since World War II.

The reasons why American crime patterns are so distinctive arise from the social, cultural, and political history of the country as well as from recent demographic developments.

The characteristics that scholars claim are responsible for the low crime rates of Japan and Switzerland are absent from American society. The United States has both a tradition of violence[,] attributable to the presence of the frontier and to the slave-holding mentality, which holds that individuals are not equal and that violence against inferior individuals is all right, and ready access to firearms for most of the population. There has never been a tradition of cooperating with the criminal justice system and, in fact, the converse spirit of vigilantism has prevailed during much of American history and is resurfacing in many American communities. The mobility of American society and the emphasis on independence and peer culture have resulted in a long-term weakening of the family structure and the emergence of highly atomized individuals. The ethnic diversity of the American population as well as the influx of immigrants has resulted in an extremely heterogeneous population in sharp contrast to the regional homogeneity of the Swiss population or the national homogeneity of the Japanese population.

Neither the heterogeneity nor the origins of the American population appears to be an adequate explanation of its observed rate of criminality. Australia and Canada, both settled by heterogeneous immigrant groups, have very different crime rates from the United States, which suggest that factors other than origin of the population and the period of settlement are important in determining the character of a nation's criminality.

The United States, though urbanized at a much earlier period in history, has suffered from a new cycle of urbanization in the period since World War II.

The recurrence of urbanization can be explained in the following way. The city population, already accustomed to urban life, moved to the suburbs in large numbers in the postwar period. The urban exodus was in part a reaction against the movement into the city of large numbers of previously rural workers who were at first attracted by the employment of the wartime economy. Entire extended families followed the initial migrants resulting in an ever escalating exodus from rural areas. The core of American cities was thus filled by black rural workers from the South and white

rural workers from Appalachia. The already established cities were as unprepared for this major influx of humanity as these new settlers were unaccustomed to this new way of life. Slums developed and fostered conditions conducive to increased rates of criminality. [Pp. 77-78.]

In contrast to her excellent Crime and Modernization, Shelley's Readings in Comparative Criminology is a disappointing work. One might say, in fact, that if this is all that the historical and cross-cultural study of crime and criminal justice can present, the field is in a sad state (which it is not). The readings are extremely uneven in the quality of theory, research, and methodology. The editor should have examined each reading much more closely. The book is divided into two main parts. The first, "Offender and Offense Comparison," contains articles on crime committed by American women, as well as by youth in various societies, and a statistical comparison of homicide in several countries. The second part is entitled "Social Forces, Crime and Criminal Justice," and is divided into such categories as crime trends, crime and economic development, and comparative criminology and criminal justice.

Of the thirteen articles, only six merit serious attention. Robert Gurr's historical study of crime in London, Stockholm and Sydney, which presents a contemporary perspective, has actually already been published in two books. Gurr found similar crime trends over 150 years in all three cities studied. Specifically, the volume of threatening social behavior decreased consistently and dramatically in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, yet increased quite rapidly in the aftermath of World War II. Gurr suggests that these trends, in three distinct cities, reflect profoundly similar changes in aggregate social behavior.

Howard Zehr presents another historical comparative study of crime in Germany and France, from 1830 to 1913. He concludes that crime rates rose during this period but, surprisingly, that urbanization and urban growth do not necessarily result in crime. Crime, therefore, is not due to the breakdown in social structure but rather to the modernization of criminal behavior arising from the transition from rural to urban society.

Probably one of the best articles is Shelley's comparative study of urbanization and crime in the Soviet Union. Urbanization, she finds, is directly correlated with levels of crime, but restrictions on the free movement of the population result in its not being concentrated in the most urban areas, as in the United States. Maria Los and Palmer Anderson compared prison cultures in Polish and American prisons, and they found that similar methods of dealing with offenders produce different inmate structures and consequences in the two societies. Jackson Toby, in a wide-ranging comparative article, presents evidence that the affluence of a society, rather than its poverty, is a major contributor to youth crime. Paul Friday and Jerald Hage, using materials from various societies, attempt to show how patterns of youth role relationships, particularly as they affect social integration, are related to their criminality.

The other seven articles should not have been included for a variety of reasons. Rita Simon's deals with criminality among American women: although it has some reference to other societies, this article is not comparative in nature. Edmund Vaz and John Casparis try to compare delinquency in Canada and Switzerland, but they fail as the two samples are of such a
nature that comparison is not possible. Three studies (Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner, United Nations 1977 Crime Survey, and Margaret Bacon, Irvin Child and Herbert Barry III) use crime data from a large number of countries and compare them with various social data in an attempt to find correlations to crime. This type of research is not difficult; it applies limited theory and depends on the reliability of crime and other statistical data. Unfortunately, many of the countries included in these studies do not as yet have such data readily available, a fact that Shelley has, oddly enough, recognized in her own book but not in her selection of these readings. Wolf Middendorf analyzes a single legal case, that of August Sangret, occurring in England in 1942: it has virtually nothing whatsoever comparative about it. Finally, there is a rather brief survey of crime and delinquency research in certain European countries that is dated and of little intrinsic value. One might well conclude from this disappointing volume that Shelley's strong forte is conducting research and writing her own books, not in trying to put together a compendium of works by other authors on comparative criminology.

20. The Canadian sample is drawn from a large and a medium-sized city, while the Swiss sample comes from rural areas and a small city.