From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts

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From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early Massachusetts

by Adam J. Hirsch*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Today, most Americans take incarceration for granted. It is the routine sanction for serious crime in our modern system of justice,

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seemingly as elemental and inevitable a part of that process as police arrest, state prosecution, and judgment by one's peers. Punishments by their nature are meted out in units of years and months (if not dollars and cents). To be a "convict" nowadays is to be a person "serving time" in a prison cell for the commission of a crime.

Yet the frozen landscape of the criminal justice system, when glimpsed in the light of legal history, melts quickly; conceptual continents drift, oceans of doctrine ebb and flow. The wholesale incarceration of criminals is in truth a comparatively recent episode in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. Before the nineteenth century, offenders faced a variety of sanctions, including the pillory, the lash, the gallows, and exile. Though not unknown, "the sentence of confinement" was a rarity. Thieves in early Massachusetts served their victims, not time. The term "convict" applied literally to all persons found guilty, not to persons under prison sentences.

This is not to say, of course, that incarceration per se originated in modern times; prisons have always played a role in Anglo-American jurisprudence. But before the American Revolution, prisons served principally a congeries of nonsanctional functions — some of which remain familiar, others of which have fled the scene.

While the transition from the old forms of criminal sanction to incarceration was perhaps not, as Jeremy Bentham claimed, "one of the most signal improvements that have ever yet been made in our criminal legislation," one does not overstate to call it a signal development in the history of Anglo-American criminal justice — a development, one may add, that still wants adequate examination, much less explanation. This Article attempts to do both for one sample region: Massachusetts. Though the jurisprudential movement from pillory to penitentiary took place throughout the new American re-

1. G. Bradford, State Prisons and the Penitentiary System Vindicated 11 (Charlestown 1821) (published anonymously); see notes 34-41, 227-49 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 243-48 infra and accompanying text.
4. The Latin root of the word "jail" (or "gaol") is "gaviola," which means cage or hole. This probably indicates the earliest form of this familiar institution. 5 Oxford English Dictionary 546 (1961).
5. See notes 13-33 infra and accompanying text. Nor was the prerevolutionary function of imprisonment static. For an example of a prison function that had expired before the colonial emigration, see S. Milson, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 359-60 (1969) (Imprisonment for refusal to plead).
7. See notes 69-79 infra and accompanying text.
public, as well as much of western Europe, our limited focus presents a case study, and a jumping-off point for further research.8

The story of the rise of the penitentiary in Massachusetts has many facets, and this Article addresses each in turn. Part II sets the stage by contrasting the penitentiary with an institutional predecessor in the criminal justice system: the colonial gaol. While the gaol and the penitentiary both held inmates against their will, they shared few functional or administrative attributes. As Part II shows, the system of incarceration represented by the gaol differed dramatically from the system of incarceration represented by the penitentiary.

In order to explain the transition to the penitentiary, one must first explore its ideological origins, and this exploration is undertaken in Part III. Although the penitentiary arose in the midst of a revolution in the theory of punishment, Part III asserts that the ideological blueprint upon which the builders relied had actually been developed at a much earlier date. Intellectual innovation did not prompt the transition, for Massachusetts had merely dusted off a venerable ideological construct that might have been implemented at any time.

Why Massachusetts chose the late eighteenth century to do so is the problem explored in Part IV. Here, the analysis shifts from criminological theory to social reality, to an examination of the criminal sanctions originally adopted in colonial Massachusetts and of the social setting that made those sanctions effective. Part IV concludes that widespread demographic changes occurring over the course of the eighteenth century weakened the initial system of crime control, and created a fear that crime had reached crisis proportions. In desperation, lawmakers turned to incarceration as the most promising means of restoring the status quo. Part V shows that the process of assimilating the new punishment into the Massachusetts legal system was gradual, and marked by a continuing debate over the efficacy and aims of the penitentiary.

In the course of detailing these results, this Article also responds to some prior students of incarceration in America. Special attention is given throughout to David Rothman, whose pioneering scholarship on this problem invites admiration — but also skepticism.

II. INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION

The penitentiary was not the first facility for physical restraint to play a part in the process of criminal justice. It was preceded by the

8. This Article is the first installment of a larger study contemplated by the author.
gaol, an institution shrouded in antiquity. Still, a comparison of these two institutions reveals sharp contrasts, and provides an overview of the transition that this Article explores.

A. The Gaol in Early Massachusetts

1. Function

The Puritan colonists who repaired to Massachusetts in the early seventeenth century set out to build a model society for the edification of mankind. Without forsaking their English heritage, the Puritans hoped to erase those features of English life which affronted their vision of a godly community. The gaol, an institution of long standing in England, apparently did not represent such an eyesore. Although a number of Puritans had languished in prison at the instigation of Bishop Laud, the colonial leaders quickly decided to build one of their own. Opened in 1635, the Boston gaol served as Massachusetts' sole prison for eighteen years. But as settlers fanned out into the wilderness, organizing new townships as they went, local facilities for incarceration sprang up elsewhere. By 1776 Massachusetts was divided into fourteen counties, and each was required by law to maintain its own county gaol.

Imprisonment played a variety of roles in the legal system of early Massachusetts, filling both criminal and civil functions. Among its civil roles, imprisonment for debt was the most notable. The judgment creditor of a debtor who would not pay had the legal right to order that debtor's incarceration in the gaol. Similarly, any


10. See, e.g., R. Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, 1471-1741, at 255-56 (1964). Personal experience with imprisonment has often been associated with movements for penal reform, see, e.g., Schneider, Book Review, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 727 (1979) (reviewing D. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum (1970)), but it does not appear to have had a noticeable impact in Massachusetts.


12. 1 Acts and Resolves of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay 426 [1700] (1699-1722) [hereinafter cited as PROV. LAWS]. On the early history of prison construction in Massachusetts Bay, see E. Powers, supra note 9, at 212-17. Hereinafter, references to "colonial" Massachusetts will indicate the period preceding the second charter, 1630-1691. In the latter year the "province" of Massachusetts was born, and it lived until the Revolution, when Massachusetts became a "Commonwealth."

13. Execution upon the debtor's body could only follow unsuccessful execution upon the debtor's estate, personal and real. See The Body of Liberties of 1641, in The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts § 1, at 41 (W. Whitmore ed. 1890) (reprinted from the edition of 1672) [hereinafter cited as COL. LAWS]. Imprisonment for debt could also occur on mesne process,
colonist adjudged delinquent in his obligations to the realm — for
taxes, fines, or costs of court — could incur the same treatment as "a Debtor to the Publick." Imprisonment for debt may be sharply distinguished from latter-day notions of criminal punish­ment. It was, at bottom, an instrument of coercion rather than sanction, intended to pry open the purse rather than to deter or rehabilitate welchers. This fact is plain from the form of the sentence: Delinquent debtors were imprisoned indefinitely until their debts were fully paid. Insolvent debtors could avoid imprisonment altogether by attesting under oath that they had concealed no part of their estates.

In the colonial tradition of institutional austerity, Massachusetts gaols also served some functions entirely beyond the scope of the legal system. It was standard procedure, for example, to house prisoners of war in the county gaols, which thereby doubled as military internment camps. In the seventeenth century, the principal victims of this policy were Indians, but, as the eighteenth century drew on,
French and eventually British soldiers came to join them. In addition, Massachusetts gaols occasionally held political prisoners, much like the Tower of London in Old England. Indian sachems, Quakers, Jesuits, and Loyalists all shared this plight at one time or another. Once again, however, it is critical to distinguish these gaol services from criminal sanctions. Here, the aim of incarceration was, at bottom, segregative: it prevented persons from causing physical or moral harm to the community, rather than punishing them for doing so.

By far the most pervasive use of the gaol in early Massachusetts, however, was for pretrial and presentence internment. When indicted on a criminal charge, the defendant who could not raise bail was routinely imprisoned until the moment of his trial and, if convicted, the execution of sentence. The court or a single magistrate submitted a *mittimus* to the sheriff, ordering him to hand the defendant over to the keeper, who in turn was responsible for holding him securely until further directed by due process of law. Likewise, upon conviction for an offense, the court routinely directed that the defendant, now a convict, “stand committed till sentence be performed.” Even after the punishment had been meted out, courts frequently demanded monetary “sureties” for future “good behavior” as a condition for release. Until the convict scraped the funds

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22. See, e.g., an act “against Jesuits and Popish priests,” which automatically accounted any such person “an incendiary and disturber of the publick peace and safety,” subject to banishment or “perpetual imprisonment” if he refused to depart. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 423 [1700]. Likewise, the danger posed by prisoners of war called for “a total & instant Separation” through confinement. 1770-1777 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 278-79 [1777]; 1742-1757 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 104-05 [1746]. Cf. note 249 infra and accompanying text.


24. E.g., WORCESTER COUNTY COURT, supra note 15, at 42 [1732], 80 [1733], 143 [1735], 149 [1736], 159 [1736], 184 [1737].
together, he stayed put. 25

Although it was in theory a status *pro tempore*, 26 pretrial incarceration might in practice go on and on. Not untypical was the procedural history of *Commonwealth v. Frye,* 27 heard before the Superior Court shortly after independence. Cato Frye allegedly committed a theft in April of 1784, for which he was indicted at the June session of the Court. Frye pleaded not guilty, "and from thence said Indictment was Continued from Term to Term to this Term and now the said Cato . . . is Set to the Bar" — on November 1, 1785, some seventeen months later. Frye was convicted that same day. In 1765, a woman accused of murdering her bastard child lay in gaol for a full year before she was acquitted and freed. 28 Yet despite its potential harshness, pretrial incarceration bore no abstract resemblance to a criminal sanction. Cato Frye might have had difficulty distinguishing such niceties, 29 but his lawyer would not. 30 Pretrial incarceration served a custodial 31 function: It merely ensured that the prisoner appeared for his trial and, if convicted, received his deserts. Under the circumstances, the state was perfectly willing to hold the accused financially, instead of physically, hostage. Requests for bail were rarely denied, and only the chronic inability of criminals to raise funds necessitated resort to a more extreme safeguard.

The routine application of incarceration to suspects rather than convicts colored contemporary perceptions of the gaol and spawned a kind of jurisprudential about-face not unfamiliar to historians. In

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25. See, e.g., *1 Plymouth County Court*, *supra* note 14, at 267 [1703]; *4 id.* at 131 [1795], 149 [1797], 202 [1802].

26. See *Col. Laws*, *supra* note 13, § 2, at 38 [1641].


28. See *Boston Gazette*, Mar. 25, 1765, at 3, col. 2. See also, e.g., *2 Plymouth County Court*, *supra* note 14, at 31 [1722].

29. The Sheriff of Suffolk County complained of "Cursing and Swearing" by the inmates confined in his gaol "who regard not the Laws already made in that Case, for they being Prisoners conclude they cannot be further punished, and so presume to commit that Sin very Frequently." *17 House Journal, supra* note 15, at 241 [1739].

30. See, e.g., *J. Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment* 101 (London 1830) (1st ed. Paris 1811, from a manuscript written in 1775). In 1799, a legislative committee urged that sentencing a convicted criminal to imprisonment in the county gaol would be "unequal, as a person charged with an offence would suffer before conviction as rigorously as he would after his guilt had been established by a trial." *Report Respecting Convicts*, appended to 1802 Resolves ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).

31. One document used the verb "detain'd" in reference to such prisoners. *A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, Containing the Records of the Boston Selectmen, 1764 to 1768*, at 2 [1764] (1884-1909) [hereinafter cited as *Boston Selectmen Records*].
1902, Edward Jenks stunned constitutional lawyers with his “most embarrassing discovery” that the writ of Habeas Corpus was originally used “not to get people out of prison, but to put them in it.”

Similarly, modern law enforcement officers would surely grimace to discover their eighteenth-century counterparts petitioning courts to expedite the trials of criminals — not so that they could lock the criminals up, but, on the contrary, so that they could free the criminals from gaol. Then as now, imprisonment was expensive, and in the eighteenth century prisoners stood to be released after trial whether convicted or no. Under those circumstances, it made perfect sense for sheriffs to do everything in their power to accelerate a criminal’s liberation — holding criminals was not what the gaol was for.

Not often, at least. On occasion, however, gaols did perform a penal function in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts, and the sanction of incarceration arose with increasing frequency in the criminal statutes of the provincial period. Still, a large proportion of these prison sentences were handed down to reprimand various shades of contempt, and once again appear more coercive than sanctional. Such sentences were always for indefinite terms, “during the Pleasure of the Court.” Release hinged upon a display of proper deference to the offended authority.


34. See note 283 infra and accompanying text. Incarceration as a sanction was sufficiently familiar to be included in the list of punishments expressly permitted by the Massachusetts Bay charter, 1 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 17. See id., at 171.


36. See, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 210 [1691].

37. See, e.g., 1 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 266 [1703]; 3 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 308 [1771]; 2 COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 62-63 [1636], 132 [1643]; E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 235. Occasionally, judges ordered imprisonment “till the next court,” when the prisoner’s attitude would presumably be reexamined, see, e.g., SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 867 [1677].
Criminal incarceration imposed in a strictly penal sense, for a definite span of time, was plainly a second choice: It served either as a substitute for some conventional means of punishment that proved infeasible\(^{38}\) or as a supplemental penalty, added to buttress the primary sanction.\(^{39}\) In either event, gaol terms rarely exceeded three months, and often proved as fleeting as twenty-four hours.\(^{40}\) Before 1750, those few criminal statutes that imposed long-term incarceration fairly shouted their eccentricity. Forgers convicted after 1692, for example, awaited the loss of an ear and “imprisonment by the space of one whole year without bail or main prise.”\(^{41}\) Bail was allowed, of course, in instances of pretrial incarceration, not by coincidence the most familiar function of the gaol. Colonial judges apparently granted bail so reflexively that a bail-less form of incarceration required careful elaboration.

In the final decades of the provincial government, social pressures began to nudge criminal justice in Massachusetts toward a critical transition. As a practical matter, however, the function of the prison had changed little over the first 150 years of the colony’s history. In 1646, the county gaol was a “fit place to which . . . malefactors may be committed until the next court.”\(^{42}\) In 1765, the gaol was “not intended as a Punishment, it is only to keep Offenders for Trial, or after Trial till Sentence is fulfilled.”\(^{43}\)

2. Institutional Design

Not only did the colonial gaol perform a set of functions different from the modern penitentiary, but it was itself a very different institution, both structurally and administratively. Most of the early gaols were singularly unimpressive buildings, holding up to thirty

\(^{38}\) See, e.g., 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 12 [1693].

\(^{39}\) See, e.g., 1 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 285 [1685], where the Court readily dispensed with the imprisonment which accompanied a fine. Hardly any prosecutions resulted in incarceration alone, without additional public or monetary sanction. For a rare example, see 3 Plymouth County Court, supra note 14, at 187 [1764] (five days for house breaking without theft).

\(^{40}\) See, e.g., 1 Plymouth County Court, supra note 14, at 267 [1703]. Worcester County Court, supra note 15, at 153, 154 [1736]. The longest term of incarceration mandated by statute for a criminal act prior to 1749 was one year. 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 51, 54 [1692].

\(^{41}\) 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 51, 54 [1692] (emphasis added). The caveat against bail or mainprise (a variation of bail, now obsolete) appears in various other statutes and court records as late as 1753. See, e.g., King v. Cook, Super. Ct., Jan. 1753, f. 218 (unpublished court records, Suffolk County Court House).

\(^{42}\) Col. Laws, supra note 13, § 2 at 13 [1646].

\(^{43}\) J. Quincy, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, Between 1761 and 1772, at 110, 112 (1865) (Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C.J., Super. Ct., March Term 1765).
prisoners or so. Upkeep was haphazard at best, and the thin wooden planks that stood between the inmate and freedom often rotted through, permitting easy escape.44

Indeed, the gaol in early Massachusetts was no place to be. If negligence characterized the gaol’s upkeep, then its administration must be elevated to the plane of recklessness.45 Not even casual measures were taken to guard the inmates’ physical health, and a mittimus of incarceration became an invitation to an early grave.46 Yet, the government was surely aware of the problem. Though few officials ever toured a colonial gaol (and invariably denounced the conditions as “shocking [and] loathsome” whenever they did)47 each change of season brought the legislature a fresh stack of petitions from inmates all over the colony alternately begging for a supply of firewood or access to fresh air.48 Even more copious, however, were requests for release, as opposed to relief, and it does seem plausible that the early gaol’s notoriously high rate of escape owed as much to inmate desperation as to the laxness of security.49

44. See E. Powers, supra note 9, at 212-16. On the small size of prisons, see 2 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 119 [1718]. On the high rate of escape, see, e.g., 7 House Journal, supra note 15, at 108 [1726]. Special precautions were occasionally taken to prevent dangerous prisoners from escaping — and even these did not always suffice. See 9 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 33 [1708]; 14 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 318, 324, 317-18 [1748].

45. The description that follows appears to conform with the other gaols of this period. For a similar picture of imprisonment in New York, see D. Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement in the Colony of New York, 1691-1776, at 124-27, 168 (1976). For the early English experience, see M. Ignatief, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850, at 29-42 (1978); J. Howard, supra note 3, at 1-10, 16.

46. Gaol keepers’ petitions for reimbursement of expenses not uncommonly included burial fees, see, e.g., 11 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 33 [1726], 84 [1726]. Thomas Hutchinson made the observation directly, see J. Quincy, supra note 43, at 11 (Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C. J., Super. Ct., Mar. Term 1765); Letter from Thomas Hutchinson to Robert Treat Paine (Nov. 29, 1766), in 1766 Paine Papers (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Hist. Soey.) (Hutchinson’s pardon of one inmate “that he might not be [imprisoned] another winter.”). Disease was one obvious danger (in England, “gaol fever” was an occupational hazard of the legal profession, for the inmates brought their afflictions with them to court; at the so-called “Black Assize” of 1577 almost 400 persons perished; John Howard believed that gaol fever claimed more lives than the gallows). See J. Cockburn, A History of English Assizes, 1558-1714, at 53 (1972); J. Howard, supra note 3, at 6, 258-59. Massachusetts gaols were also firetraps, see, e.g., 1754-1763 Boston Selectmen Records, supra note 31, at 150 [1761]; 1769-1775 id. at 4 [1769].

47. J. Quincy, supra note 43, at 111 (Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C.J., Super. Ct., March Term 1765); see 3 Plymouth County Court, supra note 14, at 308 [1771].


49. John Howard, who examined English gaols, drew this conclusion. See J. Howard, supra note 3, at 40 n.1.
In large measure, the mistreatment of inmates may be traced to the constitution of prison government. David Rothman has described prison government in the eighteenth century as "familial." In Massachusetts, at least, a better term would be "despotic." As in English practice, Massachusetts gaols were managed by a "gaol keeper," but in all the years preceding independence, no statute or regulation ever ventured beyond the most cursory guidelines to delineate the responsibilities of this office. One of the first acts, appearing in 1663 (in response to the keeper's own inquiry), directed keepers to record a "true List" of their inmates and to discharge them from custody only upon judicial warrant. These provisions were subsequently reaffirmed by the provincial government. Another line of statutes, originating in 1705, provided for the separation of debtors from the rest of the inmate population. Though the fees recoverable for inmate "maintenance" were a matter of frequent provision, no authority ever bothered to explain the degree of care to which inmates were entitled. Inmates could, of course, lodge protests against ill use with the legislature, and they did so often. But in practice, few strings were attached to the keeper's office: The realm that he ruled was a small one, but within its walls his word was law.

Given such a license, abuse was inevitable. Keepers alternately neglected and exploited their charges. Illustrative of the problem — and of the legislature's indifference toward it — was the notorious career of Zechariah Trescott, keeper of the Suffolk County gaol in Boston from 1727 to 1737. Prisoners began issuing complaints against Trescott shortly after he was installed in his post. When the

51. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 128 [1663]; id. § 2, at 6 [1662].
52. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 424 [1700].
53. 1 id. at 565 [1705]; 2 id. at 119 [1718] (reaffirmed in subsequent statutes). For other random provisions, see 1 id. at 95 [1692], 330 [1698], 381 [1699].
54. See, e.g., COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 128 [1663]; 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 88 [1692], 331 [1698], 699 [1712]; 5 id. at 1173 [1780]. As in England, inmates in early Massachusetts gaols were required to pay the charges of their own support (a system that has stirred renewed interest of late, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1979, § 1, at 26, col. 1).
55. Keepers probably earned more from the sale of liquor to inmates than from their regular fees. See 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 145 [1734]; Petition to Governor Bernard in 44 Mass. Archives 512-13 [c. 1765] (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); 22 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 240, 245 [1746]; SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 912 [1678]. At least one keeper made a habit of using his prisoners as personal servants, see ESSEX COUNTY COURT, supra note 35, at 84 [1672]. At the same time, the right to exercise was routinely withheld, see, e.g., 8 id. 335 [1682], and as late as 1833, a House committee visiting the Springfield gaol on a tour of inspection "found the keeper absent, and the Prison left in charge of his two sons, one aged 13 and the other 11." REPORT ON GAOLS AND HOUSES OF CORRECTION IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS MADE BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 10 (Boston 1834).
House ordered an investigation in 1731 it too received a taste of the Keeper's audacity. Although the legislators amassed enough evidence to vote for Trescott's dismissal, the keeper responded with a humble prayer to "overlook . . . his Faults and Misdemeanors" and restore him to office. "[A]fter a considerable Debate" Trescott's prayer was denied. Yet the keeper managed somehow to worm his way back into office — as we know by the fresh batch of complaints of "many grievous hardships and abuses" at his hands which turn up in the House minutes of the following year.56

Upon receipt of these new charges, the House ordered Trescott to explain himself in person. But when the appointed day arrived, the keeper was nowhere to be found. Aroused, the legislators ordered Trescott locked behind his own bars, "there to remain till further order." Once again, he begged the House's forgiveness, and once again — incomprehensibly — was restored to favor.57

Although petitions continued to pour out of Suffolk gaol,58 the ax did not fall until 1736. In that year, as the inmates were about to be transferred out of the old "Wooden Prison" into a new stone structure, they rebelled and took over the building. The House was forced to call up the militia to surround the gaol, "with their Musquets charged," until the prisoners submitted.59 Here was an event too serious to ignore or treat with another tap on the wrist. In January of 1737, after a full investigation, a formal hearing was held in the House to inquire into the management of the Suffolk gaol. This time Trescott did appear to answer his accusers (his wife at his side, in the best tradition of investigative hearings) but to no avail. The House determined that the keeper had "extorted excessive Fees," "unreasonably prevented the Prisoners receiving Victuals and Drink when sent to them by their Friends," and "kept some of the Prisoners in close Confinement without Water, to their great Suffering."60

When the hearing concluded, Trescott was stripped of his office for good.61 Still, the legislators' response to the keeper's excesses was shortsighted at best. By merely replacing the bureaucrat instead of taking steps to define and monitor his duties, the House was clipping a branch, rather than grubbing up the root of the problem. The predictable sequel: a renewed stream of petitions assailing Trescott's

56. 10 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 327, 346, 350, 356 [1731]; 11 id. at 142 [1732].
57. 11 id. at 142, 144, 147, 149, 153, 161 [1732].
58. 13 id. at 59 [1735].
59. 14 id. at 176-77 [1736].
60. 14 id. at 177 [1736], 238, 240-41, 243-44 [1737] (emphasis omitted).
61. 14 id. at 244 [1737].
B. The Rise of the Penitentiary

When we skip forward a few years to 1785, a new picture begins to emerge. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has just appointed Castle Island, a fortress guarding Boston harbor, to be a repository for convicted criminals — and only convicted criminals — from all over the state. Simultaneously, the criminal code has been revised to permit judges to impose long-term incarceration as an alternative to the old sanctions such as whipping and the pillory. Fourteen years later, Castle Island has been sold to the federal government and lies abandoned as a prison. But by 1805, the Commonwealth has opened a new prison in Charlestown that presents a sharp contrast with the local gaol. Simultaneously, the criminal code has been revised anew, not simply to make room for incarceration, but to supplant the old sanctions entirely.

Structurally, the State Prison leaves a strong impression. Designed by one of the foremost architects in the state, its massive stone frame and looming walls have consumed six years of labor and $170,000 in costs. It holds not thirty but three hundred inmates, all criminal offenders sentenced to solitary confinement and hard labor. They begin their terms in a dark and solitary cell and then find themselves transferred to congregate quarters and workshops where from dawn to dusk they labor at manufacturing shoes and nails or hammering stone.

Equally striking are the changes in institutional administration, now elaborated as the science of “prison discipline.” No longer do the inmates’ basic needs go unattended. A hospital has been constructed on the premises, staffed by a full-time physician. A major

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62. 17 id. at 235, 247 [1739]; 18 id. at 51, 98, 129, 146, [1740]; 19 id. at 40, 41, 80, 82, 83, 91, 201 [1741].
64. See notes 344-46 infra and accompanying text.
effort has been undertaken to ensure prison hygiene and a proper
diet. And as for our friendly gaol keeper, his responsibilities have
been parceled out to a network of officials, all of whom work under a
detailed code of regulations. What is more, the government inspects
the State Prison periodically. In combination, these efforts have dra­
matically reduced prison mortality.68

In short, the modern penitentiary has come of age. But where
did it come from? The roots of criminal incarceration surely cannot
be found in the old penalties like whipping and the pillory — at least
there appears to be no natural progression from the one to the other.
But neither can its roots be found in the gaol, for beyond the most
superficial coincidences the two institutions were as different as night
and day. To discover the penitentiary's true beginnings, we must
explore, first, the ideology that underlay criminal sanctions in early
Massachusetts and, second, the social realities that governed their
effectiveness.

III. THE IDEOLOGY OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

A. The Rothman Thesis

Any investigation of the rise of criminal incarceration in America
must begin with a tip of the hat to David Rothman. Rothman's
justly acclaimed work, The Discovery of the Asylum,69 framed the
questions, if it did not supply all the answers, and his interpretation
of events has since spread throughout the textual and jurisprudential
literature on penology. It seems appropriate, therefore, to review
Rothman's conclusions briefly here, as a backdrop to my own
analysis.

Rothman traces the inauguration of criminal incarceration pre­
eminently to a series of intellectual waves that swept across America
in the wake of the war for independence. During the colonial era,
Rothman asserts, the Calvinist doctrine of orginal sin forestalled ef­
forts to reduce crime by reforming or even deterring the criminal.
Before the Revolution, punishment remained in principle retributive
and expiatory — purposes that simply did not call for incarceration
on a large scale.70

68. See notes 382 & 384 infra. For a brief administrative history of the State Prison, see M.
HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION 162-81 (1980).
69. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50. This work won the Beveridge Award in 1971. For
thoughtful criticisms of the work, see Schneider, supra note 10; Zuckerman, Book Review, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 398 (1972); Muraskin, The Social-Control Theory in American History: A Cri­
tique, 9 J. SOC. HIST. 559 (1976).
Rothman asserts that independence brought a fresh ideology and new programs. The social optimism of European Enlightenment thought found a receptive audience in the new American republic, steeped as it was in revolutionary excitement and activism. Concepts of human perfectability overpowered the "grim determinism" of Calvinist thought and inspired in Americans a fresh resolve to eliminate crime. Criminal incarceration was born not of an effort to maintain crime control, but of an intellectually stimulated effort to enhance it.

The initial program to accomplish this feat was derived from the tract of a recently celebrated Italian theorist named Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria postulated that the proliferation of crime could be traced directly to the viciousness and thoughtlessness of criminal codes. If the statutes were carefully redesigned to deter criminals rather than to take revenge against them, Beccaria taught, then the galling offenses would not occur in the first place. Rothman asserts that incarceration was first seized upon as a punishment because it constituted an eminently variable mechanism of deterrence.

By the 1820's, Americans had become disillusioned with the deterrent approach. Beccaria's vaccine had failed to immunize American society against crime. At the same time, population growth, urbanization, and nascent industrialization had provoked a general fear for the stability of American society. Still, reformers had lost none of their determination to put an end to crime. The Jacksonians looked into the problem anew, fueled by both ambition and anxiety.

The solution that they lighted upon, Rothman contends, was both novel and of American origin. Taking a hint from the pro-

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71. Rothman is adamant in his appraisal of the Revolution as a watershed: "Even at the close of the colonial period, there was no reason to think that the prison would soon become central to criminal punishment." Id. at 56, 59-61. See note 75 infra.
73. Beccarian ideology is discussed in greater detail at notes 83-92 infra and accompanying text.
74. D. Rothman, supra note 50, at 59-62, 89. "To reformers, the advantages of the institutions were external, and they hardly imagined that life inside the prison might rehabilitate the criminal." Id. at 62.
75. Id. at 62, 68. For Rothman, the intellectual eras are quite distinct: "Almost no eighteenth-century assumption about the origins or nature of... deviancy survived intact into the Jacksonian era..." Id. at 3. Furthermore, Jacksonian reformers "now looked to the life of the criminal, not to the statutes, in attempting to grasp the origins of deviancy. They presented biographical sketches, not analyses of existing codes..." Such questions were for the 1790's, not the 1820's and '30's." Id. at 68.
76. Id. at 57-59, 62, 69-71, 78.
77. See id. at 89, 94, 108, 330 n.20.
pounders of human perfectability, the Jacksonians determined to re-
habilitate the criminal, to treat him and then to return him to the
community a new man. Distressed by social deterioration, they now
identified the root cause of crime to be the social environment, rather
than misconceived criminal codes. To cure the offender, he had to
be pulled out of society and placed in an artificial, corruption-free
environment. Under the Jacksonians, the prison embarked on a new
career as an institutional forum for the rehabilitation of criminals,
and more broadly as a prototype for the rehabilitation of society. 78

Fascinating as it is, Rothman's account of the rise of criminal
incarceration requires significant revision. The analysis is flawed,
perhaps, by a tendency toward idiosyncrasy, but more seriously com­
promised by a curious compass of research that sweeps in all of the
United States, yet never strays beyond its bounds. By contrast, a
close study of the evidence from Massachusetts, coupled with a sur­
vey of European sources, presents a very different picture. Specifi­
cally, (1) the core ideology on which Massachusetts relied when it
introduced criminal incarceration derived neither from eighteenth­
century Italy nor from nineteenth-century America, but from six­
teenth-century England; (2) the ideology of incarceration did not go
through two distinct stages, the first emphasizing deterrence and the
second rehabilitation; and (3) social forces influenced the initial post­
revolutionary development of criminal incarceration, which oc­
curred well before the Jacksonian era. The process of demonstrating
these points, undertaken below, will also reveal that Rothman's
treatment telescopes the complexity of the social and intellectual
landscape on which his thesis rests. 79

B. Images of Deterrence

"One of the most embarrassing circumstances attending the gov­
ernment of the [Massachusetts State] Prison," its Directors observed
in 1823,
is the vacillating and contradictory opinions, which prevail with re­
spect to it. The subject of punishment for crime is one, on which most
people have thought something and very few profoundly. Each man

78. Id. at xviii-xix, 62-78, 84, 107-08. A recent study also traces rehabilitative ideology
expressly in Massachusetts to the Jacksonian era, specifically, to the period following the
prison reforms of 1829 (discussed at notes 409-418 infra and accompanying text). See M.
HINDUS, supra, note 68, at 163.

79. One potential element in the rise of criminal incarceration, namely class conflict and
exploitation, requires separate treatment, and will not be addressed in this Article. For Marx­
ist interpretations of the rise of criminal incarceration in Europe, see M. FOUCAULT, DISCI­
PLINE AND PUNISH (1975); M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45; G. RUSCHE & O. KIRCHHEIMER,
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939).
has his own theory, and each successive Committee of the Legislature its own favorite plan. . . . Opposite and conflicting expectations are entertained by different individuals, and often by the same individual.80

The observation was as cogent as it was timeless. Like most social problems that stir emotion and defy solution, the "Gordian Knot"81 of crime control was incessantly debated, but never untangled. It would take an essay longer than this to rehearse all of the strands of contemporary ideology connected to the problem.82 For our purposes, however, broad strokes will suffice.

1. Beccarianism

Rothman traces the first movement toward incarceration in America to the criminological theories of Cesare Beccaria. Beccaria's essay, "On Crimes and Punishments," created a sensation on its publication in 1764, spreading quickly across Europe and onward to the American colonies.83 But this work was not penned in a vacuum. It belongs to a larger school of thought known as "rationalism" or "utilitarianism" — an ideology planted at the core of the European Enlightenment and expounded by such well-known philosophers as Montesquieu and Bentham.

The rational ideology rejected scripture in favor of human logic and reason as a guide to the construction of social institutions. The aim of secular government, the rationalists taught, was not to do God's bidding, but to maximize secular utility (in Beccaria's oft-repeated phrase, to provide "the greatest happiness shared by the greatest number").84 Intellectually, at least, the shift was as drastic as any that can be imagined, and it obliged the rationalists to recon-


81. This is Bentham's analogy. See BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 39.


83. C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (H. Paolucci ed. 1963) (1st ed. Leghorn 1764). On the work's notoriety, see id. at ix-xi; 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 277 n.38, 283 n.60; note 94 infra and accompanying text. For a biography of Beccaria, see M. MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM (1973).

84. The phrase is often attributed incorrectly to Bentham. See C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 8 & n.10.
sider a vast constellation of the most venerable dogmas. They plunged into the task gleefully.

In the realm of criminal law, rational philosophers argued that what made an action a "crime" was the harm it did to other members of society. "Sins" that were not also socially harmful had to be answered for at a different tribunal. Furthermore, once a crime was committed, the only rational purpose of punishment was the prevention of future harm; retribution had no place in a theory of secular utility, for "what is done can never be undone." Viewed in the cold light of reason, punishment thus became "an evil to which the magistrate resorts only from its being necessary to prevention of a greater." Any gratuitous severity, (or "prodigality") of punishment constituted "abuse and not justice."

Rational philosophers who grappled with the problem of how crime could be prevented devoted much attention to deterrence: that is, setting penalties such that a potential offender would be held in check by the fear of a painful sequel to his action. Just what scheme of penalties would best accomplish this intimidation was, to put it mildly, a matter on which the criminologists differed. The ideology of rationalism was sufficiently flexible to bear both reformist and apologetical glosses.

For his part, Beccaria postulated that the certainty of punishment contributed more to deterrence than its severity. Were apprehension, conviction, and sentencing all rapid and infallible, the punishments established for crimes could be quite moderate, for it was pre-eminently that reed of optimism, "the hope of impunity," that sustained

85. E.g., Montesquieu: "In things that prejudice the tranquillity or security of the state, secret actions are subject to human jurisdiction. But in those which offend the Deity, where there is no public action, there can be no criminal matter; the whole passes betwixt man and God, who knows the measure and time of his vengeance. . . . [W]e must honor the Deity, and leave him to avenge his own cause." C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 263-64 (2d ed. London 1752) (1st ed. Geneva 1748); see C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 20-21.

86. See, e.g., W. EDEN, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW 6-7 (2d ed. London 1771) (1st ed. London 1771). (“The prevention of crime should be the great object of the Lawgiver . . . . It is from an abuse of language, that we apply the word 'Punishment' to human institutions: Vengeance belongeth not to man.”)


88. C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 13, 14, 45, 63.


90. For example, Paley and Madan, both defenders of the "bloody code" (Great Britain's accumulation of over 200 capital statutes during the eighteenth century), adhered to the basic premises of rationalism enunciated above, though their thoughts on the matter of capital punishment were the antithesis of Beccaria's. See generally 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 239-59, 277-86. On the bloody code, see id. at 3-227.
an offender in his moment of temptation. Beccaria in particular denounced capital punishment for its superfluous rigor and capricious enforcement.\footnote{See C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 13-17, 42-52, 55-59, 62-64. In England, only a fraction of the capital offenders were actually executed. See generally I L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 83-164.} And on a structural plane, he insisted that judges should exercise no discretion over sanctions. The legislature should specifically prescribe the penalty for each crime, both as a matter of constitutional theory, and to inhibit expectations of lenient treatment.\footnote{“Flexibility” of sentence and “certainty” of punishment were cognate concepts, in that flexibility approaches uncertainty as the range of discretion approaches a minimum of zero (no penalty, hence impunity).} In mapping out its code, Beccaria added, the legislature should carefully proportion punishments to the magnitude of crimes. The more heinous the offense, the more severe the penalty needed to deter it; but uniformly severe penalties would necessarily entail “prodigality” and destroy moral distinctions among various offenses.

Here, then, was one program for the control of crime. But how significant was it to the coincident rise of criminal incarceration in Massachusetts?

2. Massachusetts Legislation

The extent to which Beccarian ideology influenced developments in Massachusetts is problematic. To be sure, this current of thought did flow vigorously through the province in the late eighteenth century. By 1765, public documents paraphrased rationalist tracts by styling prevention the “great end” of punishment,\footnote{44 Mass. Archives 538-39 [1765] (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); see, e.g., G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 6-7, 10-11; Answer of the House of Representatives [n.d.] in May, 1818 Mass. Resolves 594. Cf. C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 93 (“ultimate end”); W. EDEN, supra note 86, at 6 (“great object”); M. MADAN, THOUGHTS ON EXECUTIVE JUSTICE WITH RESPECT TO OUR CRIMINAL LAWS 11 (London 1785) (“great end”).} and Beccaria’s specific suggestions for law reform received widespread notoriety and praise. Nathan Dane, codrafter of Massachusetts’ criminal code of 1805, offered passages from the Italian theorist’s writings in his celebrated Abridgments.\footnote{See N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 625, 630-32 (Boston 1824). Another student of Beccaria was John Adams, who quoted the theorist’s writings at the Boston Massacre trial and on other occasions. See 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 352, 353 n.2 (L. Butterfield ed. 1961); 2 id. at 440, 442.} Still, the broad principles that made up Beccarian ideology were older than Beccaria’s essay, and its specific suggestions were largely disregarded when the time came to translate exhortations into enactments. Moreover, Beccaria’s program, though compatible with criminal incarceration, issued no call for it.
Even if the rhetoric had been faithfully observed, the rise of the penitentiary would not thereby be explained.

On the surface, at least, the early Puritan settlers of Massachusetts held sacred everything that Beccaria disavowed. For the Puritans, crimes and sins were one and the same: They were affronts to God, and their punishment by secular authority constituted an expiatory obligation to His government.\(^95\) But whatever the ministers might have thundered from their pulpits, no historian today will question the pragmatic nature of early Massachusetts law. For all their avowed Biblical literalism, the Puritans regularly interpreted scripture to accommodate secular utilities, and they made only selective use of the Pentateuch in drafting their criminal laws.\(^96\) Such general rationalist objectives as deterrence and carefully tailored criminal statutes would not have struck Puritan law-makers as blinding flashes of insight.\(^97\)

Beccaria's stand against capital punishment won many adherents in post-Revolutionary Massachusetts.\(^98\) Yet once again, the ideology merely tapped an ancient cultural vein. From the beginning, the Puritans theory of punishment derived from the theology of the national covenant: if the nation endeavored to minimize sin and punished all incidents of it as dictated by scripture, then God would bless the nation with prosperity; if, however, the nation allowed sin to flourish and go unpunished (thereby violating the covenant), God would make His displeasure felt by visiting the nation with disaster. Thus, an offender is admonished in 1681 "that he do no more So offend, and become an occasion of bringing down Gods Judgmente upon the Land." \(^95\) PYNCHON COURT RECORD, supra note 23, at 122-23; see generally P. MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 463-91 (1939).

\(^96\) See G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 141-62. For one Puritan's efforts to justify theologically the dilution of biblical literalism, see Perkins, \(\textit{EPIKEIA}, \) or a Treatise of Christian Equity and Moderation, excerpted in \textit{PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS, 1558-1794}, at 60, 63, 69-70 (E. Morgan ed. 1965).

\(^97\) For early recognition of the importance of a thoughtful and detailed corpus of criminal law, see, e.g., 2 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 39 [1643], 96 [1644], 168-69 [1646]; G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 119-35. Haskins has termed the "Laws and Liberties" of 1648 "one of the crowning achievements of the Bay colony." \(^96\) Id. at 136. Though Rothman asserts that interest in the structure of criminal codes flagged in the Jacksonian era, see note 75 supra, this never occurred in Massachusetts. In 1834, for example, the criminal code was subjected to a major overhaul into which "great . . . time, labor and money" were invested, culminating in a debate in a special session of the legislature, see Resolve of Feb. 24, 1832, ch. 30, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 103; Governor's Address, Jan. 8, 1833, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 272; Governor's Message, March 6, 1834, ch. 32, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 623-24; Resolve of Apr. 1, 1834, ch. 85, 1832-1834 Mass. Resolves 663-64; Lieutenant Governor's Address, Sept. 1835, 1835-1838 Mass. Resolves 207-08; Resolve of Nov. 3, 1835, ch. 117, 1835-1838 Mass. Resolves 232; Lieutenant Governor's Message, Nov. 4, 1835, ch. 118, \(\textit{id.}\) at 240-41. Rationalism or no rationalism, concern over the statutory framework of criminal punishment is discernible in Massachusetts from the very beginning, and has continued unabated to the present day.

ritan settlers demonstrated an extreme reluctance to execute offenders, and they restricted the capital list in the colony to the most serious crimes. In 1805, when the State Prison was opened and a new code of laws inaugurated, the drafters decided “after an anxious revision” to reject Beccaria’s extreme position and “retain the punishment of death” to a limited extent. But even if Massachusetts had gone ahead and dismantled the gallows, only a handful of sentences would have been affected. Criminal incarceration on a large scale could not have resulted from such a move.

Another pillar of Beccarian ideology, inflexible punishments, called for a more drastic change in Massachusetts tradition. This issue had in fact simmered in the colony from its earliest days, when the permitted ambit of sentencing discretion was at bottom less a matter of ideology than of parochial politics. The magistrates sat as judges in colonial Massachusetts, and they resisted repeated efforts by the deputies to curtail their powers in that capacity. The dispute over sentencing discretion constituted one front in this broader
In response to the deputies’ charge that the magistrates were “seeking to have the government arbitrary,” John Winthrop and others in 1641 fashioned a defense of sentencing discretion heavily laden with Biblical exegesis. But Winthrop also identified the principal oversight, and upshot, of Beccaria’s plan, over a century before the Italian theorist began to ponder the problem of crime: namely, the more inflexibly a punishment is mandated, the smaller the likelihood that its enforcement will be just. “Offenses [vary] so much in their merit by occasion of circumstances,” Winthrop commented, that “it would be unjust to inflict the same punishment upon the least as upon the greatest . . . . It is against reason that some men [legislators] should better judge of the merit of a cause in the bare theory thereof, than others (as wise and godly) should be able to discern it pro re nata.”

Under the criminal statutes of Massachusetts, judges continued to enjoy wide sentencing discretion throughout the colonial and provincial periods. Indeed, even where discretion was not provided for by statute, the judges presumed to arrogate it.

Against this background, the adoption of Beccaria’s method of inflexible sentencing would have been a radical departure indeed. But in its initial burst of post-Revolutionary legislation, in 1785, the House fairly thumbed its nose at Beccaria, installing by far the most discretionary code in the state’s history. Most of the noncapital statutes previously in force had mandated a maximum term to a single public punishment (often with an alternative fine); now the statutes were revised to permit a variety of alternative punishments (including incarceration), and they often failed to set any quantitative limitations whatsoever.

In a speech before a joint session of the
legislature in 1793, Governor Hancock called on the representatives to abandon this system and impose Beccaria's method, but the House failed to comply. The redrafted code of 1805 did limit the number of alternative punishments, but most of the new noncapital statutes continued to set maximum penalties only. A legislative committee that reviewed the code in 1814 declined to alter this policy. Twelve years later, another committee reconsidered the question of judicial discretion and laid the matter to rest with words that might as easily have flowed from John Winthrop's pen:

"crimes of the same denomination admit of such a variety of palliating and aggravating circumstances, that discretionary power in punishing them should . . . exist somewhere; and when confided to the court, it is fair to presume, it will be discreetly exercised."

The timeless wisdom of John Winthrop foiled Beccarianism.

A related matter was the role of the pardon in criminal law. In keeping with its policy of sentencing discretion, Massachusetts had long granted a power to pardon convicted offenders in the General Court. The Beccarian principle of certainty, however, called the practice into question. Yet once again, a prescription that grated on ancient tradition was simply ignored. The Massachusetts Consti-

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106. "I recommend these ideas to your wise deliberations, that such punishments may be provided as, if administered with certainty and inflexibility, may be sufficient to check the progress of crime." Governor's Message, Jan. 31, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694; see Governor's Message, June 6, 1792, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 682.

107. By failing to set minimum penalties in many instances, the code of 1805 violated both the principle of inflexibility and certainty. See note 355 infra.

108. "The result of their attention to the subject has been a decided opinion on their part, that the Statutes enacted . . . [have] left very little occasion for additions or improvements to be attempted at this time." Committee Report, Jan. 22, 1814, 1813-1816 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 10, at 1 (1814) (State Library Annex). (This conclusion may have been influenced by the fact that two of the three committee members were the original 1805 drafters.).


110. The issue, indeed, remains as timeless as the wisdom. For a recent contribution to the debate on judicial discretion, see Note, During the Courts: Trial and Bargaining Consequences of Minimum Penalties, 90 YALE L.J. 597 (1981).

111. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2 at 34-35 [1641]; see, e.g., 2 J. WINTHROP, supra note 21, at 61.

112. "[I]f the power of pardon is frequently exercised, the utility of the Penitentiary ceases," one legislative committee warned, "for . . . those who have the benefit of pardon escape with impunity . . . . There appears to be great force in the sentiments of Beccaria, connected with this subject." Committee Report, n.d., 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 4-5 (1817) (State Library Annex); Committee Report, Jan. 20, 1818, id. no. 2, at 3 (1818).
tion of 1780 invested the Governor with the pardoning power, and courts soon claimed their own analogue in the guise of the suspended sentence.113

The story of Massachusetts' bout with Beccarian inflexibility and certainty is an interesting sidelight, but has little connection with the rise of criminal incarceration. Incarceration was, after all, no more intrinsically inflexible and certain than any other mild punishment; "uncertain" death penalties could have been repealed without resort to anything new.114

The final principle of statutory structure offered by Beccaria, "proportionality" between crimes and punishments, again struck an ancient chord and appears to be reflected in the systematic splintering of legal categories in 1805.115 Still, incarceration does not facilitate such splintering in a way that older, noncapital penalties could not. One could spend "so many years" in prison, or suffer "so many lashes" at the whipping post.116 No commentator in Massachusetts cited variability as a merit unique to incarceration. Indeed, the Boston Discipline Society drew the opposite conclusion: Because men reacted so differently to the experience of solitary confinement, a whipping (as punishment for breaches of prison regulations) "can be more easily proportioned to the offense."117

Overall, Beccarian ideology may have had a significant impact on perceptions of punishment and deterrence in Massachusetts.118

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114. Thus, in advocating a retreat from the gallows, rationalist William Eden urged that "corporal pains might certainly with good effect be substituted, in some cases, in the room of capital judgments." W. EDEN, supra note 86, at 63. On the "uncertainty" of capital punishment, see notes 91 & 99-100 supra and notes 294-98 infra and accompanying text.


116. See, e.g., id.; J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 83, 113.

117. First Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the Prison Discipline Society 26 (Boston 1826) [hereinafter cited as PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY]; see J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 111-13, 81-84.

118. One Jacksonian rationalist (mistakenly) remarked that the early Massachusetts criminal law "was deduced almost literally from the Books of Moses." This, he added, had "given rise to no little ridicule, and however creditable to their piety it may have seemed to some in former times, it has certainly not tended to give the world in general, at the present day, a very exalted idea of their legislative wisdom." F. GRAY, REMARKS ON THE EARLY LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 3 (Boston 1843).
As a practical matter its contributions were less marked, but Beccarianism probably did help to bring about the differentiation of grades of crimes, as well as to hasten the retreat of "moral" offenses. But Beccarian concepts of deterrence did not drive Massachusetts to criminal incarceration. The Italian theorist was captivated by statutory structure more than substance, and his structural suggestions demanded no novel sanctions. His allusions to the staple punishments of whipping and the pillory accepted them as a given, and his chapter on "imprisonment" addressed the subject in its classical, custodial context.

We must look beyond ideological reformulations of deterrence to find the origins of criminal incarceration. And, as already noted, Cesare Beccaria did not write in a vacuum. His was but one strand in the tangle of eighteenth-century thought on crime.

C. Images of Rehabilitation

Beccaria and others sought to prevent crime via the threat of punishment. Rothman asserts, however, that the Jacksonians placed their hopes in a different and novel mechanism: rehabilitation. Jacksonian punishment sought not to awe criminals but to change them, to cure their tendency toward criminal behavior.

The first thing to notice about the concept of rehabilitation is its plasticity. Rehabilitation has meant different things to different men. To understand a given theory of rehabilitation, one must ask of its author (1) What causes persons to commit crime, and (2) What particular treatment will counteract that cause. These questions have been pondered at least since Plato. In English criminology, answers involving incarceration (which we shall call "carceral rehabilitation") stretch back to Elizabethan times.

120. See C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 19-20, 54-55, 68, 71, 74. In several places, Beccaria also refers to penal servitude. See id. at 47-50, 74-76.
122. While the ideal of rehabilitation does not per se require incarceration (we shall encounter several forms of noncarceral rehabilitation in Massachusetts, see notes 228-36, 243-48 infra and accompanying text), the one did suggest the other. The signal feature of incarceration is that it offers an unparalleled measure of control over the deviant, and rehabilitation has often been deemed a process which demands such physical control in order to succeed. Thus Jeremy Bentham, speaking from the standpoint of Lockian psychology (see notes 160-62 infra and accompanying text), described criminals as "a particular class of human beings, that, to keep them out of harm's way, require for a continued length of time that sort of sharp looking after, that sort of peculiarly close inspection, which all human beings, without exception, stand in need of, up to a certain age." Other sorts of punishment, less comprehensive than incarceration, were "radically incapable of administering that corrective aid which, in the case in question, is so perfectly indispensable." J. BENTHAM, PANOPTICON versus NEW SOUTH WALES, in 4
In the sixteenth century, when criminology in England remained an avocation of magistrates and pamphleteers, the common wisdom attributed the realm’s abundance of property crime to idleness. “[T]heir sinews . . . benumbed and stiff through idleness,” some Englishmen had abandoned all thought of earning a living, and so “of necessity live[d] by spoil” while drifting aimlessly about the countryside. 123 Since the Statutes of Laborers in 1349 and 1351, English law had sought to discourage able-bodied idleness by making it a status crime. Persons convicted of leading a “Rogishe or Vagabonds Trade of Lyef” were subject to an array of criminal sanctions that by 1530 included whipping, mutilation, and even capital punishment for a subsequent “offense.” 124

With vagrancy on the rise in the sixteenth century, the municipal government of London decided to hazard a new approach to the problem. In 1557, after four years of planning, the city opened an old royal palace at Bridewell as a repository for all vagrants convicted in the municipality. Incarcerated vagrants were to be “chastened and compelled to labour, to the overthrow of the vicious life of idleness” to which they had all ostensibly succumbed. 125 In the following decades, “houses of correction” or “workhouses,” as the institutions came to be known, 126 sprouted up in other major towns, and


124. On the development of early English vagrancy law, see 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-64 (rev. ed. 1923); 4 id. at 387-402; 3 J. Stephen, supra note 123, at 266-75.

125. Van der Slice, Elizabethan Houses of Correction, 27 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 50 (1936). On the history of Bridewell, see A. Copeland, Bridewell Royal Hospital (1888); E. O’Donaghue, Bridewell Hospital, Palace, Prison, Schools (vol. 1, 1923; vol. 2, 1929). Documents on the founding of Bridewell, emphasizing its rehabilitative aims, can be found in 19 PARL. PAPERS 393-645 (pl. 1) (1840). See E. Coke, THE SECOND PART of THE INSTITUTES of THE LAWS of ENGLAND 734 (London 1817).

126. The terms “workhouse,” “bridewell,” and “house of correction” had no generally accepted definitions; while some contemporaries used these phrases to refer to different institutions, many used them synonymously. (From the last we have perhaps derived the modern term “correctional facility.”) Hereinafter, I shall generally use the term “workhouse,” even
in 1576\(^{127}\) every county in the realm was enjoined to build one. The workhouse remained a fixture in England throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Puritan settlers carried the idea with them to Massachusetts.\(^{128}\)

The inventors of the workhouse operated under the assumption that idleness was a vice or “habit” that could be broken only through a regimen of enforced abstinence. The challenge of rehabilitation lay in destroying a “habit of idleness” and replacing it with a “habit of industry” more conducive to an honest livelihood. The therapy, at once depriving the deviant of old habits and instilling the new, was hard labor. Every house of correction was to obtain stocks of raw materials and the tools of trade necessary to set its inmates to work on such practical crafts as weaving, nail-making and wheat grinding.\(^{129}\)

The workhouse embodied one paradigm of carceral rehabilitation, a paradigm that we shall call “rehabitation.” Rehabilitation was an inherently superficial form of rehabilitation: it addressed the inmate’s outward routines and abilities rather than his inner moral standards. Once released, the rehabilitated inmate would no longer need to “live by spoil,” but curing that compulsion marked the limit of the treatment. Rehabilitation was also inherently coercive, acting quite against the deviant’s will. As Lord Coke noted, some of his contemporaries were “of opinion, that in particular townes a discrete and expert workman may set the young and idle people as voluntaries on work.” But he concluded that the derelicts were so wedded to their vices “as they will be never brought to worke, unless they be thereunto compelled.”\(^{130}\) Incarceration served to facilitate this coercion.

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\(^{127}\) 18 Eliz. I, c. 3.

\(^{128}\) Van der Slice, supra note 125, at 52-57. In the seventeenth century, institutions similar to the workhouse also developed on the European continent, in the Netherlands, France, and Germany; the extent to which they were influenced by English practice remains a matter of some controversy. See T. Sellin, Pioneering in Penology 9-22, 27, 102-10 (1944); Langbein, supra note 101, at 48-51. While historians have traditionally assumed that the English workhouse fell into decline in the eighteenth century, see, e.g., S. Webb & B. Webb, English Prisons Under Local Government 14-17 (1922), research in progress by Joanne Innes at Cambridge University indicates that they continued to flourish. In any event, there is no question that the theory remained vital throughout this period, see M. Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 11-14. On the workhouse in Massachusetts, see notes 190-91, 240-42 infra and accompanying text.

\(^{129}\) M. Grunhut, Penal Reform: A Comparative Study 15-16 (1948); S. Webb & B. Webb, supra note 128, at 12-14; Van der Slice, supra note 125, at 50-52, 60-65.

\(^{130}\) E. Coke, supra note 125, at 734, 728 (emphasis added); see, e.g., J. Howard, supra note 3, at 42; J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 155.
As they developed a theory of carceral rehabilitation, the builders of the workhouse also wrestled with the host of problems that have forever surrounded its implementation. One perennial concern of prison advocates was to reconcile rehabilitation with deterrence. A rehabilitative regime with too small a deterrent component might fail to prevent crime in the first instance or, worse, encourage persons to commit offenses for the very purpose of gaining admission.\footnote{131} By the same token, a rehabilitative regime with too large a deterrent component might occasion such “rankling enmity” against the authority inflicting it that any concurrent hope of rehabilitation would be dashed.\footnote{132}

Advocates of the workhouse believed that they had avoided this Scylla and Charybdis by making hard labor the institution’s hallmark. According to the prevailing doctrine, hard labor could rehabilitate idlers, but it could also deter them because idlers were supposedly scared to death of work, and “will rather hazard their lives” than submit to it.\footnote{133} Indeed, the beauty of hard labor was its capacity to serve simultaneously as threat and therapy. If it did not succeed as one, it might still as the other.\footnote{134}

A second, more practical, stumbling block lay in designing a system of institutional administration suitable to the new facility. Local gaols in England (as in Massachusetts) had been left to rot, precisely because their function extended no further than to mere custody over inmates. But the moment those inmates were to receive special treatment within walls, conscientious management of the facility became essential. In order to ensure the integrity of the workhouse’s rehabilitative routine, authorities provided codes of regulation for its

\footnote{131} Some persons imagined that the poor might find carceral facilities “more comfortable places of residence than their own houses.” J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 44; J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 30. This fear was later elaborated into the infamous doctrine of “less eligibility,” which held that a prisoner’s lot must be made worse than that of the lowest paid honest laborer. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 122-23. Cf. note 391 infra and accompanying text.

\footnote{132} I PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 26 (1826).

\footnote{133} Hext to Lord Treasure, supra note 123, at 291. This assumption continued in England into the eighteenth century. See, e.g., J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 44. But it was left to later reformers to address the second half of the problem, that is, the possibility that hard labor would prove so hard that the element of deterrence swamped the element of reformation. In this vein, Bentham urged moderation of the convict labor routine: “a man [should] be taught to love labour, instead of being taught to loath it . . . .” J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 144.

\footnote{134} The point was later presented crisply: “The privation of personal liberty and social intercourse, and the subjection to strict discipline and to hard labor, form indeed a severe punishment. But they would be equally necessary, if the Prison were not designed in the slightest degree for punishment [i.e., deterrence], but solely for the reformation and permanent good of the Convicts.” REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 9-10 (May 1830) (legislative document, Harvard Law Library) (Also printed in 1830-1831 Mass. Legislative Documents 67 (1830) (State Library Annex)).
orderly government, supervised by the local justice of the peace. And in order to ensure that the rehabilitative routine was not threatened by disease, authorities mandated the first rudimentary hygienic precautions against the afflictions endemic to prior carceral facilities.135

Last, but far from least, there remained the problem of funding the new establishment. Institutional treatment has never come cheap, and the builders of the workhouse hoped that proceeds from the inmates' own labor would suffice to foot the bill.136 Hard labor thus took on still another role: as threat, as therapy, and as a fountain of support for both.

2. Solitary Confinement

A second stream of thought on carceral rehabilitation can be traced to the eighteenth century and another group of English reformers. These were the "humanitarians,"137 a mélange of clergymen and lay pietists of various denominations who sought to alleviate the harsher features of English criminal law — not so much for reasons of secular expediency as for the sake of Christian charity.138 And of all the features of eighteenth-century criminal justice that cried out for amelioration, gaol conditions cried the loudest.139

Humanitarian reformers initially focused on curing the destruc-


137. Also referred to in the literature as the "philanthropists," or the "evangelicals."

138. As described by Gamaliel Bradford, "the heart of the benevolent man and philanthropist is full of compassion and sympathy for the suffering of his fellow being . . . [even] where interest is opposed to the feeling." G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 32. Among the most notable English humanitarian prison reformers were Thomas Bray, John Bellers, Jonas Hanway, and "the great Philanthropist" John Howard. Humanitarian concerns also spanned many fields outside the legal hemisphere, such as education and poor relief. For discussions of the movement as it related to prison reform, see M. Grunhut, supra note 129, at 23-42; W. Lewis, From Newgate to Dannemora 19-28 (1975); Schneider, supra note 10, at 716-26. The standard treatment of the movement as a whole is D. Owen, English Philanthropy, 1660-1960, at 11-88 (1964). Cf. M. Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 44-65, 76, 143-53, 164-67, 211, who discerns a complex of motivations behind the English humanitarian movement, most significantly a desire to utilize philanthropy to legitimate and perpetuate control.

139. See note 45 supra. Humanitarian concern for prison conditions, characteristically, was not restricted to gaols for criminals; debtors' prisons were included. See D. Owen, supra note 138, at 61-65. But the concern was not strictly benevolent: prison hygiene was a boon to everyone who participated in the criminal justice system. John Howard insisted that efforts to ameliorate prison morality must accompany hygienic reform for "it is obvious that if [moral] neglect be neglected, besides the evil consequences that must result from such a source of wickedness, a suspicion will arise, that what has been already done has proceeded, chiefly, from the selfish motive of avoiding the danger to our own health, in attending courts of judicature." J. Howard, supra note 3, at 268; see note 46 supra.
tive aspects of pretrial incarceration, rather than on attempting to use the prison for rehabilitation. John Howard, the most famous and influential representative of humanitarianism, devoted his life to the study of prison conditions and wrote movingly about the inmates' torments. Most of the suggestions offered by humanitarians in the areas of hygiene and administration either borrowed from or built on prior workhouse practice. But humanitarians cared about more than just the inmates' physical ordeal; they also stressed the moral degradation inherent in pretrial imprisonment. In this regard, humanitarians sought increased attention to inmates' spiritual needs and an end to the random commingling of prisoners that resulted in "Old criminals corrupting new comers." 141

Once they had set out to maintain an inmate's condition during confinement, humanitarians slid easily toward proposals to improve that condition. By the mid-eighteenth century, some spoke of reforming gaol inmates awaiting trial. With the appearance of Jonas Hanway's Solitude in Imprisonment in 1776, humanitarian literature began to focus on post-conviction rehabilitation of criminals. 143

The humanitarians thus came upon carceral rehabilitation by way of institutional benevolence rather than sanctional effectiveness — both roads had led to the same destination. Or had they? The humanitarians urged carceral rehabilitation, to be sure, but theirs was a novel brand, quite distinct from the workhouse model.

Humanitarians viewed crime as an outgrowth of the offender's estrangement from God. Once such a break had occurred, no punishment inflicted by men could deter the offender from sinning. 144 The challenge of rehabilitation lay in restoring the criminal's faith

140. See, e.g., Bray, An Essay Towards The Reformation of Newgate and Other Prisons in and About London [1702], reprinted in H. DIXON, JOHN HOWARD AND THE PRISON-WORLD OF EUROPE 33-41 (1850) (in the first edition only); Bellers, Essay, reprinted in A. FRY, JOHN BEL- LEERS, 1654-1722, 22, 77 (1937); J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 29-36, 111-24. Howard derived many of his suggestions for reform from the practices of continental workhouses, see, e.g., J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 30-31, with which Hanway was also familiar, see J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 117.

141. See, e.g., J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 13, 24, 104; J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 6, 8, 10, 37-38; Bray, supra note 140, at 34, 38.


143. Though Hanway focused on post-conviction rehabilitation, he did not in the process forget preconviction rehabilitation, which he noted might in particular cases negate the need for a formal sanction entirely. See J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 110.

144. "When only the fear of temporal punishments makes an impression, the world can never be governed; the power cannot be wrested out of the hands of the great ruler and supreme Legislator of the world." Id. at 5, 26, 72-73, 105, 117.
in, and fear of, his Maker, and thereby "qualify [him] for happiness in both worlds." One humanitarian went so far as to equate the function of a rehabilitative prison with that of a church.

Though they did not speak with one voice, many humanitarians endorsed a radical antidote to the criminal's affliction: "Solitude," Jonas Hanway proclaimed, "[is] the most humane and effectual means of bringing malefactors . . . to a right sense of their condition." Since 1740, humanitarians had touted solitary confinement, not only to isolate prison inmates from moral contagion, but also to precipitate their spiritual recovery. As John Brewster remarked, "It has been recommended, both by the practice and precept of holy men, in all ages, sometimes to retire from scenes of public concourse, for the purpose of communing with our own hearts, and meditating on heaven." Cloistered from the buzz of social interaction, forced to converse only with his own guilty conscience, the solitary inmate would rediscover God, tearfully repent his sins, and pledge himself to an honest and godly life. A Bible and a minister's proselytizing could smooth the process, but the operative agent was not to be found in this world. As Hanway concluded, "Let us pursue a consistent plan, and leave the event to Heaven!"

The humanitarian paradigm of carceral rehabilitation, which we shall call "reclamation," envisioned a deeper change in the offender's psyche than that intended by rehabituation. Equipping the criminal for work was not enough; secular habits and abilities would make no difference unless the offender wanted to live rightly, unless his own spirit (under threat of divine sanction) demanded moral rectitude. Given this premise, reclamation, unlike rehabituation, was inherently noncoercive, for "to compel people to be virtu-

145. Id. at 4, 18, 72-73, 98-99, 109, and passim. See J. Howard, supra note 3, at 261; Bellers, supra note 140, at 77.
146. He added that under his program "the repentance and amendment, the sorrow for the past, and the resolution with regard to the future part of life, will be more sincere in the prison, than it usually is in the church," J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 98-99 (emphasis in original).
147. Id. at 4; see W. Dodd, Thoughts in Prison (1777).
148. See note 142 supra.
150. J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 31.
151. Contemporaries who compared the two programs were perfectly aware of this difference. Hanway: "solitude will thus accomplish the work, not in a vague, formal, and unmeaning manner, but by creating a real change in the heart, to raise them that are fallen." Id. at 44 (emphasis in original). Bentham: "This kind of discipline [hard labor] does not indeed, like the other [solitary confinement], pluck up corruption by the roots: it tends however to check the growth of it, and render the propensity to it less powerful." J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 164; see note 418 infra.
ous, is a contradiction in terms.” Incarceration served only to induce the criminal to listen to his conscience. In the end, reclaimed prisoners were expected to work “gladly,” and the humanitarians also hoped, under the dubious assumption that too much of a bad thing would do some good, that the relentless idleness of solitary confinement would itself produce a craving for employment.

Humanitarians also addressed the timeless obstacles to carceral rehabilitation that the builders of the workhouse had already faced. In reconciling reclamation with deterrence, humanitarian reformers emphasized that the fate of solitary subjection to one's guilty conscience was a painful sanction indeed, and that the ascetic existence of a solitary cell would never tempt persons to seek entrée. At the same time, humanitarians promised that solitary confinement would not be so unbearable as to harden the inmates' attitudes. In this regard, many advocates stressed the importance of convincing prisoners that the punishment meted out to them was just and for their own benefit, both as part of the process of instilling remorse and as a means of preventing any “seeds of malice or ill-will” from infecting the rehabilitative process.

The problem of financing solitary confinement left the humanitarians in a bind. Unlike advocates of hard labor, the humanitarian reformers could not blithely assign prison costs to the inmates themselves. They sought instead to finesse the problem by belittling it, reciting the Kingdom's ample resources for such a project, as well as underscoring its nobility and practical value. The propaganda succeeded: Local facilities for the solitary confinement of criminals appeared in Gloucestershire, Sussex, and Berkshire by the 1790s.

3. Rationalism

At this point rational ideology, already considered in the context

152. J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 37. Like “volunteering” in the army, however, submission to the Lord was assumed to be virtually unavoidable. Hanway noted by analogy: “The arts practiced to seduce women are often successful: in this case gentle treatment and Tenderness alone will prevail... it does not change its name, when employed in the cause of virtue.” Id. at 37-38; see J. Bentham, supra note 122, at 176.

153. See J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 34; W. Paley, supra note 87, at 292.

154. See J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 118-20; J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 30-31, 103; W. Paley, supra note 87, at 291.

155. J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 119; J. Brewster, Sermons for Prisoners 15 (Stockton 1790); J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 104-05.

156. J. Hanway, supra note 80, at 25, 35-36, 71-72. It was this issue that prompted Bentham to reconsider, and ultimately abandon, his ideological commitment to the principle of solitary confinement, when he drew his blueprints for the Panopticon in 1791. See J. Bentham, supra note 80, at 71-76, 137-41 (esp. 138n).

157. See M. Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 96-109.
of deterrence,\textsuperscript{158} reenters the stage. While Beccaria himself focused exclusively on deterrence, other rationalists did not share his fixation. Having declared war on crime, rationalists hoped to mount the assault from a variety of directions, and rehabilitation was often central to their strategies.\textsuperscript{159}

The rational theory of criminal motivation rested largely on the "sensational psychology" first propounded by John Locke late in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{160} Locke maintained that human conduct was a product of social environment, not innate propensities or moral principles stamped upon the soul. The human mind began life as a \textit{tabula rasa} and formed a code of behavior by reference to continual hedonistic calculation. Beccaria had argued that because all "sensible beings" steered their conduct toward maximum pleasure and minimum pain, a properly graded scheme of punishments could prevent criminal acts by draining them of utility. What Beccaria \textit{qua} rationalist neglected to consider was that some persons would not react "sensibly" to the threat of sanction. While sensational psychology assumed that a properly socialized individual would always act in his own best interest, it also recognized that some environments could impair an individual's ability to make such calculations, and thereby lead him into "senseless" behavior, such as choosing the short-term gratification of crime without heed to the long-term misery of punishment.\textsuperscript{161}

For the offender thus deranged, sensational psychology held out hope. If environmental influences had crippled him, then a different environment could cure him. For rationalists, the challenge of rehabilitation lay in restoring the offender's ability to appreciate the inex-

\textsuperscript{158} See notes 89-92 supra and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{159} Bentham spelled it out lest there be misunderstanding: "It is an excellent quality in a punishment that it is calculated to conduc to the reformation of the delinquent. I do not mean merely through fear of undergoing punishment a second time, but by reason of a change in his character and habits." 2 J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION [c. 1788] at 146-47 (1914) (emphasis in original). On the eclecticism of the Rationalists' approach to crime, see id. at 174-273; H. FIELDING, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE LATE INCREASE OF ROBBERS, ETC. WITH SOME PROPOSALS FOR REMEDYING THIS GROWING EVIL (London 1751); M. MADAN, supra note 93, at 78.

\textsuperscript{160} See J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690).

\textsuperscript{161} Actually, the rationalists' "environmental" outlook on crime (though now developed into a complex theory) was not far removed from the thought of earlier criminologists, who also often attributed idleness and vice, in turn, to improper upbringing and evil companionship. Humanitarian theorists also rang the changes on this theme. See, e.g., J. BREWSTER, supra note 155, at 66-90; Remarks, supra note 80, at 10n; note 141 supra and accompanying text. The theme, indeed, has biblical roots: "Be not deceived: evil Communications corrupts good Manners," 1 Cor. 15:33. For early Massachusetts, see notes 223-24 infra and accompanying text. Cf. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 82-83 (tracing environmentalism to the Jacksonians).
pedience of crime.¹⁶² As in workhouse ideology, the depth of the change envisioned by rationalism was shallow: While the first sought to remove the inmate's need to steal, the second sought to grant him the good sense not to. Incarceration was the key to rationalist rehabilitation because it provided a controlled environment directed to criminals' psychological renewal.

But what sort of controlled environment would accomplish the job? Given the novelty of the rationalist perspective on criminal behavior, it is rather surprising to find that the enlightened philosophers had few new programmatic suggestions to offer. Imagination had carried the rationalists far, but here it seems to have failed them. Instead of inventing their own therapeutic design, the rationalists simply pirated those produced by their predecessors. A few rational reformers, notably Jeremy Bentham, initially joined the call for solitary confinement, notwithstanding the spiritual imagery in which the humanitarians had steeped it.¹⁶³ Bentham simply translated the humanitarian program of solitary reclamation into a secular version, based on sensational psychology.¹⁶⁴ Most rationalists remained skeptical of the therapeutic value of solitary confinement, however, and instead took up the banner of congregate hard labor, in the mold of the workhouse.¹⁶⁵ The hope was that rehabilitation would itself restore the offender's sensibility by correcting his hedonistic response to work, and thus his response to crime.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶². M. Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 66-68.

¹⁶³. This led to the curious spectacle of a rational reformer endorsing the humanitarians' platform, even as he heaped scorn upon its ideological foundation. J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 114-20 (Bentham, an agnostic, does speak of religion in this section, but in distinctly pragmatic terms); W. Paley, supra note 87, at 291-92. Bentham later altered his views on this subject. See note 156 supra. Though his thoughts at this time were unoriginal, Bentham ultimately deserves credit for one of the few programmatic innovations in rational penal theory: the "inspection principle" that inspired Bentham's Panopticon plan. See J. Bentham, supra note 80, at 40, 44-46; J. Bentham, supra note 122, at 175.

¹⁶⁴. For Bentham's animus against "your sentimental orators," see J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 73-75. Predictably, the humanitarians returned the favor, though they remained willing to participate in a wary marriage of convenience. Thus, in the pages of his journal The Philanthropist, Quaker William Allen praised Bentham's early writings after determining that they contained "nothing at variance with my religious feelings. . . ." Quoted in Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 146-47.


¹⁶⁶. See M. Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 67.
4. Massachusetts Legislation Revisited

Though the legislative record is scant, evidence drawn from it and other sources indicates that the government of Massachusetts did have rehabilitation in mind when criminal incarceration was introduced in 1785. The rehabilitative ideology advanced in that year, moreover, was not a new one at all — it was the venerable English rehabituative construct, known to the settlers of Massachusetts even before their arrival in the New World.167

The ancient equation of idleness and crime certainly remained alive and well in eighteenth-century Massachusetts. Old Light minister Charles Chauncy could easily have traded scripts with an Elizabethan magistrate when in 1752 he queried: "Who are so much noted for the moral Disorder of Lying and Stealing, as those who have settled into the Habits of Laziness? Their Laziness," Chauncy predicted, "reduces them to Straits and Difficulties; and these, as the readiest and easiest Way to supply their wants put them upon . . . robbing [persons] of their Money, and their Goods."168 The 1785 Act establishing the prison at Castle Island followed hard on the heels of a string of newspaper columns petitioning the legislature to impose hard labor on property criminals. One author, who signed himself "A Friend of Industry," favored collaboration with New Hampshire on building a "nailing house" for convicted thieves. "As theft generally proceeds from idleness, labor will be the severest and most effectual punishment," the Friend promised. "A house established on this plan would I believe turn out many an industrious member with an occupation, who was taken in, an idle thief without one." The change envisioned remained a superficial one: "To eradicate bad habits, and teach the vicious that 'HONESTY IS THE BEST POLICY'" — an aphorism that itself emphasized the sort of compliance to law that sprang from calculation rather than conscience.169 Other commentators shared in these sentiments, and one even specified Castle Island as a suitable site.170

While the Castle Island Act does not explicitly refer to the goal of rehabilitation, that goal is implicit throughout the document. Most telling is the statutory requirement that imprisoned convicts perform

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167. See notes 240-42 infra and accompanying text.
“hard labour,” the sine qua non of the rehabitative program. That such treatment was distinguished from the pretrial carceral regime is further indicated by the statutory restriction of Castle Island to convicted offenders. Other statutes and a gust of speeches spelled out the rhetoric more concretely, indeed, monotonously. An act in 1785: “Whereas idleness is often the parent of fraud and cheating, . . . confinement to hard labour may be a means of reclaiming such offenders . . . .” Governor Hancock in 1793: “[C]rimes have generally idleness for their source, and where offences are not prevented by education, a sentence to hard labour will perhaps have a more salutary effect . . . .” Governor Strong in 1801: “A great proportion of crimes are the effects of idleness, and it seems peculiarly proper therefore to punish them by confinement to hard labour; that offenders . . . may be compelled to acquire new habits and contribute something to the good of society . . . .” Et cetera.

To bolster his contention that pre-Jacksonian prisons did not focus on rehabilitation, Rothman points to the continued crudity and disarray of their internal administrations. In this crucial respect, he argues, post-Revolutionary facilities resembled the colonial gaol more than the Jacksonian penitentiary. Whether or not Rothman’s finding is sustainable elsewhere, the evidence does not sup-

177. “In the 1790's reformers anticipating the benefits of statutory revisions had devoted little energy to internal prison arrangements. Since laws, and not blueprints, captured their attention, the prisons erected at the end of the eighteenth century usually made only minor or confused departures from colonial arrangements . . . .” D. Rothman, supra note 50, at 62, 89-93.
port it in Massachusetts. Convicts confined to Castle Island served under the military discipline of the garrison “as if under voluntary enlistment,” rather than under a keeper’s whim.\(^{179}\) The convicts’ dietary and sanitary well-being were provided for, and a full-time physician and chaplain were appointed to the Castle Island staff — all unprecedented measures for a gaol.\(^{180}\) Equally extraordinary were the measures taken to ensure the physical security of the facility.\(^{181}\) Finally, the legislature carefully monitored the affairs of Castle Island by dispatching committees to inspect it periodically.\(^{182}\)

To be sure, Castle Island failed to function in practice as a well-regulated facility. During its thirteen-year history, some forty-five inmates, or sixteen percent of the total prison population, managed to swim to freedom;\(^{183}\) and in 1792, smallpox broke out on the Island.\(^{184}\) Evidence of such failure appears to have led Rothman to his conclusions.\(^{185}\) But what a person (or institution) is doing is quite a different matter from what he is trying to do. Elsewhere in his book, Rothman addresses the trying, not the doing; there is little evidence that the Jacksonians whom he champions ever succeeded in rehabilitating anyone. At Castle Island, there was no shortage of concern. What the reformers lacked was practical experience in large-scale prison administration, and that was something that they could only

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\(^{181}\) One innovation was the introduction of convict uniforms “made half of cloth of one color, and the other half a cloth of a distinct different color” — a precursor of prison stripes — to aid detection of escapees. In the same vein, “lamps” were ordered installed around Castle Island — a precursor of the modern search light. See note 171 supra; Resolve of June 30, 1792, ch. 76, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 183; see also Governor’s Message, Nov. 5, 1785, ch. 39, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 755-56; Resolve of Mar. 22, 1786, ch. 166, id. 927-29; Resolve of July 8, 1786, ch. 123, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 338; Resolve of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 126, id. 405-06; Resolve of Nov. 22, 1788, ch. 73, 1788-1789 Mass. Acts 270 (halting the practice of staffing the garrison-guard with invalids). See also note 422 infra.


\(^{183}\) E. Powers, supra note 9, at 241-42.

\(^{184}\) Governor’s Message, Nov. 9, 1792, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 688-89.

\(^{185}\) See D. Rothman, supra note 50, at 89-90.
acquire the hard way.\textsuperscript{186}

In short, the program applied to Castle Island parroted the program of the ancient workhouse. The one coincided with the other in therapeutic design, administrative precautions, and even institutional nomenclature.\textsuperscript{187} One early legislative report actually referred to the proposed facility as “a Provincial [i.e., province-wide] Workhouse or House of Correction.”\textsuperscript{188} Under the circumstances, contemporaries harbored few illusions about the intrinsic novelty of the program they had implemented.\textsuperscript{189} Workhouses had dotted Massachusetts since the seventeenth century, having “been found very Beneficial in other countrys.”\textsuperscript{190} In the eighteenth century, one massive workhouse constructed in Boston almost rivaled later penitentiaries in scale.\textsuperscript{191}

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\item 186. See note 401 infra.
\item 187. See note 135 supra and note 242 infra and accompanying text. Provincial workhouses operated under detailed ameliorative regulations and regular inspection. See 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 378-80 [1699], 674 [1711]; 3 id. at 106-11 [1743]; 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 104, 230-31, 234-40, 251-52; 1742-1757 id. at 150-51. On the coincidence of terminology, notice the term “overseer” in 3 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 108 [1743] and Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 165 (a term still current in the 1820s and 1830s, Rules and Orders of 1823, in Remarks, supra note 80, at 53-54; LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE PRISON 38-40 (Boston 1839)). Though often structurally connected, the workhouse and the gaol were under separate government. 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 230-31; 1700-1728 id. at 93; 5 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 237 [1679].
\item 188. 44 Mass. Archives 526, 526a, 538-39 [1765] (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); 41 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 186, 230 [1765]. The 1765 report called for criminal incarceration, but was independent of the subsequent move to open Castle Island. By statute in 1785, all crimes triable by the Supreme Judicial Court, and previously punishable by hard labor in a workhouse, see note 212, infra, were thenceforth punishable by “hard labour generally” in a workhouse or on Castle Island, at the justices’ discretion. See note 173 supra (slightly ambiguous provision). On the workhouse analogy, see 2 A. BRADFORD, HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS 251-52 (Boston 1822-1829). The analogy was also made in England, where similar legislation was floated in the eighteenth century. See J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 7; J. HANWAY, supra note 80, at 117; J. HOWARD, supra note 3, at 262, 263, 265n; Berkeley, Querist, quoted in L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 82, at 263 n.11.
\item 190. 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 180 [1737].
\item 191. The Boston workhouse completed in 1739 took fully two years to build; some 55 inmates were housed there by 1741; in a 1-month period between 1739 and 1741 the facility produced some £1,620 worth of merchandise for sale. Id. at 273, 251. By comparison, Castle Island held an average of about 50 and a maximum of 91 prisoners during its 14-year history, 1785-1798. Opinion or Notes . . . . Relative to the Situation and Plan of the State Prison, appended to 1802 Resolves, ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives) (this portion of the document is crossed out). The State Prison opened in 1805 was larger, containing on average some 300 inmates. G. BRADFORD, supra note 67, at 6. Apart from administrative similarities to later penitentiaries, see note 187 supra, the Boston workhouse was also subject to the careful construction planning, cost overruns, and financial legerdemain that later became a penitentiary trademark. See 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 104-05, 114, 116, 152, 156, 159-62, 165-67, 172, 172-76, 186, 230, 248; 1742-1757 id. at 198. Cf. note 67 supra and note 393 infra and accompanying text. Without question, the workhouse regime was in toto far superior to that of the common gaol. In 1764 we find one Mary Robinson, in gaol
\end{itemize}
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Castle Island did differ from earlier workhouses in one respect: It applied the rehabilitative formula to convicted criminals instead of idle vagrants. Yet even this step was neither intellectually momentous nor institutionally unprecedented. In the ancient equation, idleness and criminality had always been closely linked. To extend rehabilitative therapy from idlers to active criminals was roughly analogous to prescribing curative surgery along with preventive medication.

The idea of widening the scope of hard labor had been in the air in England, almost from the day the workhouse was founded. As an administrative matter, such an extension presented no hurdle. Since the Statutes of Laborers, idleness had constituted a crime, so from the beginning a sentence to the workhouse was strictly speaking a criminal punishment. Nor did the need for effective deterrence militate against the extension. When Edward Hext, an influential Somersetshire justice of the peace, submitted in 1596 that idle vagrants "will rather hazard their lives than work," he illustrated the point with a startling anecdote: "And this I know to be true: for at such time as our houses of correction were put up . . . I sent divers wandering suspicious persons to the house of correction; and all in general would beseech me with bitter tears to send them rather to the gaol. And denying it [to] them, some confessed felony unto me, by which they hazarded their lives, to the end that they should not be sent to the house of correction where they should be forced to work." The moral of the story fairly leapt from the page: The workhouse, for "mere" idlers, was more terrifying unto felons than the traditional criminal law. Subsequent English criminologists were likewise quick to point out the potential deterrent value of hard labor for serious offenses.

Edward Hext was perhaps the first criminologist to formally recommend an expanded role for the workhouse. His critique in 1596 on suspicion of theft and near the term of her pregnancy, ordered removed to the workhouse until she had given birth, and when "in a fit condition to be removed back again to the said Gaol," See note 124 supra.

192. Bentham considered the difference between "the inferior degrees of dishonesty" and "idleness as yet untainted with dishonesty" to be "microscopic." J. BENTHAM, supra note 80, at 59 (emphasis in original).

193. See note 124 supra.

194. Hext to Lord Treasurer, supra note 123, at 291.

urged that convicted petty offenders be sentenced to hard labor in addition to traditional punishments.\(^{196}\) In the seventeenth century, English workhouses increasingly served as repositories for petty criminals. While many of these institutions had been founded on former hospital sites, emphasizing their role in the system of poor relief, they subsequently gravitated toward the local gaols, often forming an annex to those facilities.\(^{197}\)

From the far end of the criminal spectrum, other criminologists offered hard labor as an alternative to transportation and the death penalty. Following the English Civil War, a procession of Commonwealth law reformers sought such measures.\(^{198}\) George Berkeley repeated the call in his *Querist* articles early in the eighteenth century.\(^{199}\) In fact, from 1576 onward, judges had held statutory authority to commit clergied felons to the workhouse for up to one year, though they declined to exercise it.\(^{200}\) The eighteenth century witnessed further legislative initiatives in this area: Under a 1707 statute inspired by Sir Robert Clayton,\(^{201}\) incarceration of clergied felons became a common practice; this program continued until 1717, when the new Whig government decided to reemphasize transportation.\(^{202}\) In 1750, the Fielding Committee introduced legislation to impose hard labor in the royal dockyards as punishment for felony. It passed in the Commons but was rejected by the House of Lords. In 1776, an act of Parliament temporarily re-routed prospective transportees to the Thames river, where they were to be reformed as they dredged the riverbed in aid of navigation.\(^{203}\) Finally, the Hard Labor Act of 1779, drafted by Howard, Eden and Blackstone, provided once again for therapeutic incarceration in lieu of

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200. 18 Eliz. c.7 (1576). Benefit of Clergy, when granted, permitted a convicted felon to escape the gallows. It was rarely allowed in provincial Massachusetts, however, and was formally abolished in 1785. E. Powers, *supra* note 9, at 607 n.151. See generally 1 J. Stephen, *supra* note 123, at 457-73.
201. 5 Anne c.6 (1707). As a matter of law, the statute merely increased the permissible length of imprisonment in the workhouse to two years; it served in practice, however, as a stimulus to the program.
202. 4 Geo. I c.11 (1717). This episode is treated in a doctoral dissertation in progress by Joanne Innes at Cambridge University.
203. L. Radzinowicz, *supra* note 82, at 415-23. The infamous "prison hulks" which resulted from the Act of 1776 were intended as a temporary alternative to transportation to the American colonies, which had become impossible upon the onset of the American Revolution. 16 Geo. 3 c. 43 (1776); W. Branch-Johnson, *The English Prison Hulks* (1957).
transportation. The act passed through both Houses, but due to a series of ill coincidences the prisons it mandated were never constructed.204

Hard labor as a criminal sanction took firmer root in other places. From the mid-seventeenth century, persons convicted of serious crimes in many of the German states had been subject to hard labor in work-gangs and a specialized institution called the Zuchthaus.205 These facilities operated into the eighteenth century and were known in both England and Massachusetts.206 The Massachusetts colonists were probably also aware of Pennsylvania's brief experiment with criminal incarceration. Promulgated in 1682, the Great Law of Pennsylvania prescribed hard labor in the workhouse as a penalty for most crimes. The penalty was effectively abolished in 1718, but was reimposed soon after independence.207

Finally, Massachusetts had itself imposed hard labor in a workhouse on the occasional criminal from the earliest days of the colony. The categories of activities punishable by commitment208 to the workhouse, first established by statute in 1656, already betrayed some blending of "status" crimes with the lower grades of active offenses. The list included idleness, drunkenness, pilfering, night walking, eloping from indentured service, and "uncleanness in speeches or action."209 The provincial legislature subsequently added begging, vagabondage, juggling, brawling, harassment of wo-

204. 19 Geo. 3 c.74 (1779) (also known as the Penitentiary Act); M. Ignatieff, supra note 45, at 93-96.

205. Convict labor in this context expressly served both exploitative and rehabilitative ends. See M. Grunhut, supra note 129, at 25-27; Langbein, supra note 101, at 51-53.

206. J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 158-59; Berkeley, Querist, quoted in L. Radzinowicz, supra note 82, at 265 n.11; Mass. Centinel, Jan. 5, 1785, at 3; id., Oct. 16, 1784, at 1.


208. Commitment was by a single justice, two justices quorum unus, or by the criminal court of general sessions. Col. Laws supra note 15, § 2, at 127 [1672]; 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 378-81 [1699]; see, e.g., 2 Plymouth County Court, supra note 14, at 13, 173; Suffolk County Court, supra note 13, at 89, 125, 185, 231, 356, 411; 17 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 584 [1765].

209. 4 pt.1 Col. Records, supra note 11, at 257; Col. Laws, supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1672]; see 4 pt.2 Col. Records, supra note 11, at 394-95; Col. Laws, supra note 13, § 2, at 236 [1672]. Another statute refers to the list as encompassing "misdemeanors and evil practices." 4 pt. 1 Col. Records, supra note 11, at 222; see Col. Laws, supra note 13, § 2, at 208 [1672]; E. Powers, supra note 9, at 225-27. The criminal orientation of the workhouse in Massachusetts, as in England, was often emphasized by its physical proximity or attachment to the gaol. See id. at 224-25; Worcester County Court, supra note 15, at 58; 1 Plymouth County Court, supra note 14, at 199; note 173 supra.
men, and fortune telling. In the seventeenth century, a number of persons convicted of serious crimes were also sentenced to the workhouse on an ad hoc basis. In 1749 and 1750, statutory prescriptions to the workhouse were passed for extortion and counterfeiting. And as will be shown, noncarceral forms of rehabilitation were common punishments for major offenders throughout the colonial and provincial periods.

In sum, not only was the concept of rehabituation well known to the builders of Castle Island in 1785, but the prospect of applying it to active criminals was equally familiar to them. No great conceptual leaps attended the facility's inauguration. An establishment like Castle Island might easily have been conceived at a much earlier date.

IV. SANCTIONAL TRANSITION

If we accept that the intellectual foundation of criminal incarceration in Massachusetts was ancient, then an important question immediately suggests itself: Why did the government of Massachusetts choose this particular moment to implement in depth a venerable ideological motif? While the ideology was a prerequisite to the transition, it is not alone sufficient to explain it. For some reason, criminal incarceration became in 1785 an idea whose time had come.

To understand more fully the rise of the penitentiary in Massachusetts, we must move beyond ideology to the reality of criminal sanction in that region. My conclusion is that social change in the eighteenth century caused the gradual breakdown of the criminal

210. 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 67 [1692], 378-81 [1699].

211. 1 Col. Records, supra note 11, at 177, 193; 2 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 118, 126.


213. See notes 244-48 infra and accompanying text.
justice system that had functioned adequately in the seventeenth century, thus driving the colonists to seek new ways of dealing with crime. Criminal incarceration was born of a struggle to restore crime control, not a resolution to enhance it.

A. Punishment in Early Massachusetts

1. Puritanism

Judicial authorities in early Massachusetts used a wide array of sanctions to punish crime. While the express purpose of such punishments was expiation in fulfillment of the terms of the national covenant, its literal, biblical terms often bowed before (or, more precisely, were construed to coincide with) secular political and social needs. Before turning to those punishments and needs, we must dispose of one last assumption about the Puritan viewpoint. Rothman and others have inferred that the vision of John Calvin, as reflected in Puritanism, precluded both the deterrent and the rehabilitative approaches to criminality in colonial Massachusetts. This conclusion is unequivocally false, and rests upon a reductio ad absurdum of the Puritan creed.

Calvin taught that every human person since Adam's fall suffered from a "natural depravity" of the soul and deserved damnation. This innate depravity inevitably led persons to sin, and "prepared [them] for the commission of atrocious and innumerable crimes." The Puritans adhered to Calvin's vision; indeed, it was their determination to do so that led the Puritans to Massachusetts. Still, on close inspection, one finds that while Puritan theologians professed faith in Calvinist principles, they nonetheless filtered out of those principles some of their more pessimistic and deterministic implications.

As ever brilliantly, Perry Miller identifies one screen to determinism in the Puritan theory of the social covenant. Although the national covenant with God offered Puritans one perspective on sin, the social covenant provided an alternative framework, based on the

214. See note 96 supra.
215. See D. Rothman, supra note 50, at 53 (conclusion generalized to all the colonies); K. Erikson, Wayward Puritans 196-98 (1966).
217. See note 9 supra.
218. The social covenant, in contrast to the national covenant discussed at note 95 supra, bound the people not to God, but to each other: once the people had agreed to obey the will of God, a further joint compact granted government the authority to enforce that will.
secular institution of government. From the latter vantage point, sin assumed the form of a secular compact broken, an affirmative act of will, rather than "a disease contained in the protoplasm" of mankind. The social covenant tended to "externalize" sin, Miller concludes, for "[b]y reducing original sin to legal imputations and by turning redemption into a rational transaction, the doctrine was bound to enhance the value of natural capacities . . . [and vitiate] literal application of the dogma of innate depravity." 219 What is more, even when Puritan theologians spoke of sin in its unadulterated Calvinist sense, they remained equally adamant in admonishing their listeners to try to overcome it — an encouragement whose hopeful phrases carried Puritanism time and again to the brink of Arminianism. 220

In addition to softening the concept of innate and inevitable depravity, Puritan theologians concurrently developed a theory of rehabilitation designed to overcome it. Theologians posited that the soul of every human person, though corrupted by original sin, possessed a "natural conscience" that could in the ideal distinguish right from wrong. Original sin clouded the conscience, but theologians maintained that secular instruction, in combination with saving grace, could restore it to near perfect clarity. Once afforded a "True Sight of Sin," the offender would sin again only by overt act of will, "against his conscience." 221 Notions of rehabilitation, which were too shallow to reach the conscience, must have been even easier to reconcile with Calvinism. 222

The end result was a practical approach to crime, stressing the reformability of offenders, but only up to a point. Criminal tendencies were frequently equated with an infectious and progressive disease. If discovered before the criminals had slid too far and become "harden[ed] . . . in their evil courses," there was hope for them. But if the infection could not be arrested, as demonstrated by repeated offenses, a criminal would be deemed "incorrigible" and

219. P. MILLER, supra note 95, at 400, 411. See generally id. at ch. 14.

220. G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 210; E. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 136-37. The Arminian heresy held that salvation could be achieved by dint of human effort, contrary to the Calvinist dogma of divine omnipotence and human helplessness.

221. G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 204-06.

222. In accordance with his presentation of Calvinist doctrine, Rothman describes "Enlightenment ideas" as a "challenge" to them, as if the two were mutually exclusive. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 37. As a general matter, it is well known that Calvinist and Enlightenment principles merged readily in the minds of the American revolutionary thinkers. See, e.g., note 372 infra. In particular, Lockian psychology and natural depravity were both accepted and reconciled in the writings of American intellectuals such as Jonathan Edwards. See generally P. MILLER, JONATHAN EDWARDS (1949).
dealt with accordingly. Youths were singled out as both particularly vulnerable to, and particularly savable from, the disorder.

In sum, Puritan theology did not compel the people of Massachusetts to view punishment as an exercise in futility. They could, and did, try to use punishment to control crime. But theology was, in any event, merely one variable in the calculus of sanction; there were others of equal, if not greater, weight.

2. Communitarianism

From the time of its foundation until the grant of the Second Charter, Massachusetts remained a conglomerate of small, tightly knit communities. The first generation of Puritans had settled into a string of embryonic townships. After the initial migration, the exodus from England tapered off rapidly, and even within the colony, intermigration between settlements became uncommon. Massachusetts communities grew slowly but steadily over the course of the seventeenth century, but almost entirely as a result of natural increase. The demographic history of Dedham was typical. Following its initial settlement in 1636, Dedham grew to contain some 400 inhabitants in 1648; by 1700, the total had climbed to 750. Over these years, migration into and out of town stood at less than one percent per annum, and the total number of family names actually declined. Kenneth Lockridge has described Dedham as “a self-contained social unit, almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world.” As late as 1690, no town in Massachusetts, save Boston and Salem, held more than 2,000 persons.

Criminal justice in Massachusetts reflected the social intimacy of its communities. Since the communities experienced little turnover in population, most criminal offenders were life-long residents, well known to everyone, rather than transient “outsiders.” The first impulse of all concerned was to heal the wounds as best they could. The preferred sanctions sought to draw the resident offender back

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223. See, e.g., 2 Col. Records, supra note 11, at 241 (quote); Col. Laws, supra note 13, § 2, at 13 [1642], 59-60 [1651]; 1 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 189 [1680]; 2 id. 60 [1635].


into the community, through rehabilitation, deterrence, and an expression of community forgiveness. Sanctions of the last resort, designed to expel the offender, were reserved for nonresidents or residents who had tried the community's patience once too often.226

Monetary sanctions, common throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, relied entirely on deterrence to keep potential offenders in line. One such sanction was the fine for petty offenses. Closely akin to the fine, though less familiar today, was the bond for good behavior. Under the latter scheme, offenders were required to post a sum of money with the authorities, which would be forfeited upon any future infraction. Absent such infraction, the sum would be returned after a space of time set by the court. Thus, in colonial days, an offender might pay his debt to society in the form of an outright forfeiture or a financial contingency, as the court saw fit.227

More serious crimes required more serious punishment. One form of rehabilitative sanction common in the seventeenth century was the admonition. Faced with a community member who had committed a serious offense, the magistrates or clergymen would lecture him privately to elicit his repentance and a resolution to reform. The offender would then be brought into open court for a formal admonition by the magistrate, a public confession of wrongdoing, and a pronouncement of sentence, wholly or partially suspended to symbolize the community's forgiveness.228

John Winthrop provides a rare glimpse of the process in action in his Journal narrative of a 1639 case.229 Nathaniel Eaton, the first president of Harvard College, was presented before the General Court for an assault on one of his students. Eaton was found guilty in open court, Winthrop reported, "yet [he] continued to justify himself." Thereupon proceedings were suspended till the morning, while in the interim, "for divers hours," the elder ministers "[took] pains with him, to convince him of his faults . . . [and] in the end,

226. See note 223 supra.

227. In another variation, many early 17th-century fines were remitted, subject to good behavior — a procedure functionally equivalent to the later bond, except that in the first instance the offender held the stake. See Zanger, Crime and Punishment in Early Massachusetts, 3 ser. 22 WM. & MARY Q. 472-73 (1965).


229. References in the court records are generally cryptic. See, e.g., 1 Essex County Court, supra note 35, at 174; Pynchon Court Record, supra note 23, at 207; 1 Plymouth County Court, supra note 14, at 189, 258; 2 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 65, 68, 91, 92, 94, 104, 109, 116, 117, 118, 131, 139. For legislative references, see Col. Laws, supra note 13, § 2, at 13 [1652], 26 [1642], 59 [1646].
he was convinced, and had freely and fully acknowledged his sin, and that with tears; so as they did hope he had truly repented, and therefore desired of the court that he might be pardoned.” The justices then heard Eaton’s confession, were satisfied of its sincerity, and sentenced the defendant to pay a fine, which the court remitted in part.230

Though built upon different premises, the Puritans’ noncarceral process of admonition displayed striking similarities to the subsequent humanitarians’ carceral process of reclamation: Both sought to make a deep impression on the offender’s sense of right and wrong; both were voluntary processes, seeking to elicit tears, shame, confession, and a promise of reform. The Puritans’ version depended on their own peculiar belief that a conscience clouded by original sin could be clarified through secular persuasion.231 But it also depended on the communitarian nature of society for its success. The Puritans considered it critical to judge the sincerity of a repentance, and this was feasible only if the offender was well known to his examiners.232

Kindred to the admonition was a whole family of humiliatory punishments, performed “openly” or on lecture days before the assembled community.233 Sentences to the pillory, to the stocks, to lashes at the whipping-post, and to hours on the gallows with a rope around the neck were all variations on this theme. Like the admonition, humiliatory punishments sought to elicit feelings of shame, though through manifest, collective disapproval rather than private instruction.234 Humiliatory punishments also sought to deter both offenders and onlookers by administering physical — and psychic — pain. The sting of the lash and the contortions of the stocks were

231. Cf. note 150 supra and accompanying text.
232. Zagarri, supra note 228, at 12-13; see D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 158-59 (1967). Cotton Mather also emphasized the role of neighbors in reinforcing the reformatory process (in the analogous context of Church discipline): “When a Person has thus received an Admonition for a Scandal, the private Christians who dwell near him, reckon it their Duty, by Visiting of him, and by discoursing with him, to prosecute the good Effects thereof upon him.” C. MATHER, RATIO DISCIPLINAE FRATRUM NOV-ANGLORUM. A FAITHFUL ACCOUNT OF THE DISCIPLINE PROFESSED AND PRACTICED IN THE CHURCHES OF NEW ENGLAND 148 (1726).
233. See, e.g., COL. LAWS, supra note 13, at 54 [1646], 59 [1651], 91 [1645] (all second section).
234. Unfortunately, the early Puritans did not discourse at length upon (what must have been for them) the obvious effects and utility of public humiliation. See generally G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 210; E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 518; D. ROTTMAN, supra note 50, at 49-50; Friedman, The Devil Is Not Dead: Exploring the History of Criminal Justice, 11 GA. L. REV. 260-62 (1977). For a later English appraisal, see W. EDEN, supra note 86, at 56-59. But cf. J. BENTHAM, supra note 30, at 84-85.
surely no balm, but even worse were the piercing stares of lifelong neighbors who witnessed the offender's disgrace, and with whom he would continue to live and work. Esteem has always meant much in intimate communities, and in the world-view of the visible saints it had spiritual as well as secular implications. Under the circumstances, the authorities often dispensed with the punishment's physical component entirely: Many humiliated offenders were required simply to stand in public with signs cataloguing their offenses, a punishment that relied solely on mental anguish for its rehabilitative and deterrent effect.

Still another battery of punishments evoked the English rehabilitative equation, which was already close to a century old when the colonists left the mother country. The Puritans, of course, had their own reasons for frowning upon idleness. As a matter of theology, idleness clashed directly with the Calvinist work ethic, which enjoined every person to labor assiduously at his calling. As a matter of economics, the scarcity of labor in early Massachusetts made it all but essential that every settler do his share. And as a matter of social tradition, the easy availability of employment in early Massachusetts deprived able-bodied idlers of their customary defense, to wit, the inability to find a job. Those who neglected work in spite of its abundance could not expect an outpouring of sympathy. To be sure, idleness (except among troublesome monarchs) had never been a virtue in Old England either, but in New England its offensiveness stood significantly enhanced.

In 1629, the Massachusetts Bay Company ordered the vanguard of the settlement, recently arrived at Salem, to erect a workhouse “for the better governing and ordering of our people, especially such as shalbe negligent and remiss in performance of their dutyes, or

235. Being disgraced might literally indicate a lack of saving grace.
236. See, e.g., 2 COURTS OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 62, 89, 90; E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 198-201. On the other hand, a public audience was essential to the effectiveness of humiliatory punishment; whence this delightful entry: "To sit in the stocks one hour next lecture day, if the weather be moderate." 1 ESSEX COUNTY COURT, supra note 35, at 138 [1647].
238. English statutes often distinguished idlers from unemployed persons who sought work; no such distinction was necessary in Massachusetts. See, e.g., 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 124, at 392; Answer of the House, n. d., May 1818 Mass. Resolves 593.
239. For a discussion of Old English attitudes toward labor and labor practices, see E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM 61-70 (1975).
otherwise exorbitant." 240 In 1655, the General Court instructed each county in the colony to construct its own local workhouse and to gather a stock of raw materials to occupy its inmates at their "dayly stint." 241 Once again, the ostensible purpose of the regime was to bring delinquents "to some meet order." 242

Though the workhouse was generally reserved for status criminals and other petty offenders, 243 a sentence to hard labor for serious crimes could also result, though in a more roundabout fashion. By statute, persons convicted of theft in Massachusetts were liable to pay treble damages to the aggrieved as restitution. 244 Offenders unable to pay this sum could be pressed into service for a term of years (either to the aggrieved himself or to a third party) to work off the judgment. Persons unable to pay fines or prison fees might be treated in the same way. 245 While the expedient of service was doubtless contrived in part to guarantee effective compensation, 246 it also served as a means of rehabilitation, conducted under

240. 1 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 401. A workhouse was ordered built in Boston once the main body of the settlers arrived. 1 id. at 100.
241. 3 id. at 399-400; 4 pt.1 id. at 222, 256-57, 305; COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1646].
242. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1646]. Another statute refers to the institution as a "House for Correction and Reformation," id. § 2, at 66 [1668], and the Boston workhouse built in 1739 operated under the slogan: "Labor improbus omnia vincit" [hard labor conquers all], 1729-1742 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 234. See note 187 supra. Persons could be committed to Massachusetts workhouses under indeterminate sentences, again emphasizing their rehabilitative function over their deterrent function: freedom would follow upon "reasonable caution or assurance to the satisfaction of the justice or court, that the inmate will reform." See COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 127 [1646]; 1 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 401; 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 13, at 67 [1692], 538-39 [1703], 655 [1710]; 2 id. at 183 [1720], 580 [1730]; 2 PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT, supra note 14, at 6; Act of Mar. 26, 1788, ch. 54, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 625-26. Other records indicate attention to the revenue and separation elements of workhouse incarceration. See 4 pt.1 COL. RECORDS, supra note 11, at 257; 1 id. at 193.
243. See notes 208-11 supra and accompanying text.
244. The first statute of this kind, passed in 1646, applied only to thefts from a garden or orchard, though this restriction was often ignored in practice. After 1692, all thefts were liable to treble damages. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, § 2, at 13; 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 13, at 52. See, e.g., 1 COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 145, 189, 200, 284; 2 id. at 32, 66, 70, 79, 90, 94, 97, 99, 118, 131, 134; SUFFOLK COUNTY COURT, supra note 13, at 321.
246. The treble damages award for theft had biblical, as well as English statutory, origins and was probably rationalized as liquidated damages. If the aggrieved recovered any portion of the goods stolen, the award was mitigated accordingly. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lisk, Sup. Jud. Ct., Feb. 1785, ff. 72-73 (two indictments) (Suffolk County Court House); Towner, supra note 245, at 397-409. On the roots of the restitution sentence, see G. HASKINS, supra note 9, at 153-54, 178.
the auspices of private masters rather than a carceral facility.\textsuperscript{247} That the two were considered functionally equivalent is indicated by the authorities' willingness to substitute a term of indenture for commitment to the workhouse, even where there was no judgment to pay.\textsuperscript{248}

There remained one last set of punishments designed, not to reintegrate the offender into the community, but to cast him out of it once and for all. Banishment served as the ordinary mechanism whereby Massachusetts communities rid themselves of undesirables. Less common, but equally effective, were branding and mutilation, punishments that fixed upon the offender an indelible "mark of infamy," to warn community members to keep their distance. Recourse to the gallows also took the offender out of the community, though this most final of all punishments was applied only in extraordinary cases.\textsuperscript{249} While all of these exclusionary sanctions were aimed in part at general deterrence, their specific motive was to disable the offender from ever harming the community again.

B. \textit{The Breakdown of Crime Control}

1. \textit{Change}

The initial repertoire of punishments in Massachusetts proved adequate to contain crime in the seventeenth century — at least there is no surviving record of dissatisfaction with it. But during the eighteenth-century, Massachusetts was buffeted by demographic and social changes that distorted old patterns of criminal activity. Having previously sustained moderate but steady population growth, eighteenth-century Massachusetts entered upon a period of rapid growth. By 1765, some thirty towns contained more than 2,000 residents apiece, and almost half of all towns within the province had swelled beyond the 1,000 person mark.\textsuperscript{250} What is more, the mobility of

\textsuperscript{247} Cf. W. Nelson, supra note 119, at 40; Towner, supra note 245, at 118-19.

\textsuperscript{248} 2 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 126; Suffolk County Court, supra note 13, at 89, 125, 185. This policy persisted into the provincial period. See 3 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 926-28 [1756]. Cf. Act of Mar. 16, 1784, ch. 53, 1782-1783 Mass. Acts 633. In England, Bentham noted the reformative potential of enforced servitude to a "private master," but considered institutional hard labor superior, because then the reformative objective would be "express." J. Bentham, supra note 6, at 7.

\textsuperscript{249} On the separatory conception of the death penalty in English legal theory, see W. Eden, supra note 86, at 25; in Massachusetts, see, e.g., Resolve of Nov. 17, 1786, ch. 134, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 413 ("necessary for the safety of the Community"). Banishment was often ordered "on pain of death" if the outcast were ever to return; the two punishments were closely linked. E.g., 2 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 35; 3 id. 68-69.

\textsuperscript{250} See E. Greene & V. Harrington, supra note 225, at 21-30. For figures from a typical community, see P. Greven supra note 225, at 103-24, 175-79. Modern estimates of the overall population of early Massachusetts have relied on literary evidence, not the statistical
Massachusetts' population increased significantly over the same period. More than half the sons born in eighteenth century Andover, for example, moved out of town at some point in their lives. After 1765, more than ten percent of the residents of Boston had lived in town for five years or less. 251

To some extent the flood of migration emanated from outside the province. A small but growing proportion of Boston's immigrants arrived from foreign ports. The remainder, Massachusetts-born, streamed out of agricultural communities whose limited supplies of arable land could no longer support the burgeoning population. 252

The result was not merely motion but perpetual motion, the emergence by mid-century of "a small, but significant, floating population of men and women at the bottom of society who moved from seaport to seaport and town to town in search of work." These luckless vagrants had not only broken the bonds with their native communities, but had failed to tie themselves to new ones. 253

As these demographic changes gathered momentum, so did distortions in the configuration of crime. Both impressionistic evidence and statistical studies indicate that the rate of property crime — theft, robbery, and related offenses — climbed fairly steadily after 1700, and most dramatically after the 1750s. 254 And along with this increase went a growing perception that responsibility for property


253. Jones, supra note 252, at 28-54; Kulikoff, supra note 251, at 403 (quote); Lockridge, supra note 252, at 73. See generally Henretta, Economic Development and Social Structure in Colonial Boston, 3 ser. 22 WM. & MARY Q. 75-92 (1965); 1700-1728 BOSTON TOWN RECORDS, supra note 14, at 93, 97; 1716-1736 BOSTON SELECTMENT RECORDS, supra note 31, at 66, 108, 275; 4 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 911 [1767].

254. For impressionistic statements of the growth of crime, see 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 673-74 [1711]; 2 id. at 5 [1715], 838 [1756]; 4 id. at 488-89 [1761]; 5 id. at 43 [1770]; 47 Mass. Archives 555 [1773] (unpublished document, Mass. Archives); 46 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 108 [1770]; Grand Jury Charge by Hutchinson, C.J., Super. Ct., Mar., 1786, in J. QUINCY, supra note 43, at 260-61; notes 278, 340 infra. See generally E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 186-87. On crime in Boston, see C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS 68-
crime rested in large measure on persons unattached to the communities they afflicted. Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson believed that “bad People frequently come into this Province from other Governments . . . merely for the sake of committing [larceny] here.” Justice Nathaniel Sargeant referred to the recipients of punishment as “vicious persons . . . roving about the country disturbing peoples rest and preying upon their property.” Evolving patterns of crime were matched by an evolving composite of the average criminal. 255

While the imputation of criminal acts to outsiders must have stemmed from the rising geographic mobility of Massachusetts society, the causes of the overall increase in property crime are more complex and difficult to trace. Growth in the absolute numbers of inhabitants surely contributed to the trend, and it seems likely that commercial wealth, urbanization, and employment patterns all

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Kealy, The Punishment of Criminal Offenders in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts 329 (unpublished chapter of a dissertation in progress, University of Toronto, on file with the author). See Flaherty, Crime and Social Control in Provincial Massachusetts, 24 HIST. J. 357-60 (1981); Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 458-59 (1967). These data indicate dramatic proportional growth, but a low absolute number of prosecutions and convictions. In the face of literary protestations of daily offenses, the low absolute numbers suggest an additional circumstance, likely contributing to popular anxiety: ineffective law enforcement. See notes 279 & 310 infra and accompanying text.

raised the incentives to crime — at least, contemporaries thought that they did. But the evidence also points to a decline in the effectiveness of traditional sanctions. As emerging social forces strengthened propensities to crime, they also weakened the impediments to crime. As a result, crime soared.

One traditional sanction that seems to have broken down was the sale into servitude. Throughout the provincial period, thieves unable to raise treble damages had routinely been bound out to a term of rehabituative service; the proceeds passed to the aggrieved to compensate him for his loss. This practice depended on the availability of a willing buyer, however, and finding one may never have been a simple matter. As early as 1702, Massachusetts legislators were compelled to make provisions for unsalable convicts. “Inasmuch as it often happens, that persons convicted of theft, and sentenced to make restitution to the party injured... are held long in prison” for want of buyers, the legislators ordered the convicts’ release if not disposed of within thirty days. By the late eighteenth century, the market appears to have folded up altogether. “If [thieves] are not able to pay damages, they must be sold for a term of time sufficient to discharge costs,” wrote a commentator in 1784. “But where are the purchasers? It is as difficult to find such persons, as for a thief to become an honest man.”

Just what caused the ultimate collapse of the convict-servant market remains unclear; the employers do not tell us. Economic trends do not appear to have been pivotal, for demand did not revive in the 1790s, when the Commonwealth enjoyed booming prosperity. One possible explanation is that the Massachusetts antislavery movement spilled over to this not very different form of enforced servitude.


257. For a very different interpretation of the effectiveness of crime control in provincial Massachusetts, see Flaherty, supra note 254, at 339-60.

258. See notes 244-45 supra.


260. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1. See 46 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 108 [1770] (Gov. Hutchinson’s message to the House enumerating the larcenist’s “Risque” as a fine or whipping, without mention of treble damages or service.)

servitude. 262 But it is also likely that demand slackened over the years because the status of the convicts had changed. It was one thing for a community member to admit into his household a wayward individual whom he had known, or known of, since birth; it was quite another to take charge of a transient pauper whose sole connection to the town was born of misconduct. 263 Lawrence Towner suggests that changes in the composition of the servant population rendered the family increasingly unfit to perform its traditional function “as a socializing agency” in eighteenth-century Massachusetts. One manifestation was a growing storm of disputation between master and servant, 264 and another may have been reluctance to purchase bonded servants in the first place. With the decline of community intimacy, rehabilitation at the private level probably became impractical.

Another punishment that proved particularly vulnerable to social change was the admonition. The process of admonition had never been used when the offender was a newcomer or a stranger, for in such cases the sincerity of the offender’s repentance could not be gauged. As crime became increasingly the province of strangers, the utility of the admonition diminished accordingly. In addition, there appears to have been a growing reluctance, even among longstanding community members, to bare the soul before admonishers and before the public in the subsequent confession. Increasingly anonymous town life spawned a commensurate appreciation of, and insistence on, personal privacy. 265

Other humiliatory punishments were similarly impeded by social change. A sentence to whipping or the pillory had worked primarily through the media of psychic pain and shame. Growing social anonymity diluted both elements of the punishment. Surely, the penalty of a session on the pillory must have appeared far less daunting when performed before persons with whom the offender was unacquainted, and with whom he need have no further contact whatsoever. “Could your Honours but be spectators of the ease, the negligence, and unconcernedness, with which these people are led to

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262. On the antislavery movement in Massachusetts, see, e.g., A. ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION (1967).

263. It is suggestive that the first expression of doubt about the salability of convicts in the records of the Court of Assistants involved a pair of “Incorrigible Theeves” who had allegedly threatened “if loose to burne the Towne.” 1 COURT OF ASSISTANTS, supra note 23, at 189 [1680].


the whipping post,” a commentator lectured the legislators in 1784, “your blood would chill in your veins, at the depravity of human nature.”

As for the rehabilitative element of humiliatory punishments, this appears not merely to have dwindled but to have positively backfired. Expressions of rebuke, whether individual or collective, will strike home only when delivered by a person whom the wrongdoer respects. The same rebuke, when delivered by a rival or a stranger, will more likely arouse resentment or hatred. By the late eighteenth century, humiliation before anonymous onlookers appears to have engendered in offenders not heightened regard for the community but heightened indignation against it. “[T]he punishment [whipping] they have received has destroyed the fear of shame, and produces a desire of revenge, which serves to stimulate their vicious inclination,” another commentator noted in 1784. “They improve the next opportunity to repeat the crime, and by practice make themselves masters of the trade.” The process was indeed a vicious circle, the first author agreed: “A man shall be tried, sentenced, whipped and set at liberty; his character, if tolerable before, is now ruined; nothing is to be done but for him to go to the old trade of stealing, when he is again taken and goes through the same process, which instead of answering the least good purpose, serves only to harden him the more; and so he goes on stealing and being whipped, until death rids the community of him.” Such a description of public humiliation surely would have bewildered Puritan colonists of the first generation.

In his early essay “Some Thoughts Concerning Education,” a prescient John Locke warned that “the shame of the whipping, and not the Pain, should be the greatest part of the Punishment . . . . The Smart of the Rod, if Shame accompanies it not, soon ceases, and is forgotten, and will quickly, by use, lose its Terour.” Locke’s insight, furnished from the context of family government in England, proved all too cogent from the perspective of community government in provincial Massachusetts. As the aura of shame and psychic trauma surrounding the penalty evaporated, there was left

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267. For another example of Massachusetts social change causing a reversal in the impact of law (in an historian’s view), see W. NELSON, supra note 119, at 6.
270. THE EDUCATIONAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 152-54, 177 (J. Axtell ed. 1968).
behind only a small core of physical pain quite insufficient to pre­
vent offenses. By the late eighteenth century, the lash had evolved
into a "slight corporal Punishment." 271

Still other traditional penalties grew increasingly unworkable as
the eighteenth century progressed. At a glance, the fine would seem
to be the most timeless of all sanctions — a blow to the pocketbook
will be painful, no matter how many onlookers witness the event.
Yet, there remains one instance in which a fine imposes no pain —
namely, when the offender's pocketbook is already empty. One of
the few freedoms that indigents have always enjoyed is the freedom
from fear of large fines or judgments. The culprits responsible for
the upsurge of property crime in provincial Massachusetts were pri-
marily vagrants and transients and belonged to this judgment-proof
class: threatening to fine them would have been tantamount to sug-
gestng that they eat cake. 272

Even punishments that sought to exclude criminals from the
community were weakened by social change. In the seventeenth
century, banishment had effectively incapacitated offenders because
they were well known and could not return; 273 likewise, indigent
strangers were instantly recognizable and could be "warned out," in
the contemporary phrase, before they had a chance to commit

272. See 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 122 (1693), 287 (1695); 3 id. 711-12 (1754).
273. See, e.g., 2 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 59.
274. See generally J. Benton, Warning out in New England (1911). Given the demo-
graphic trends of the eighteenth century, the incidence of warning out initially rose sharply. C.
Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness, supra note 254, at 231; Cook, supra note 252, at
569; Kulikoff, supra note 251, at 399-400; Lockridge, supra note 252, at 72-73.
275. 1700-1728 Boston Town Records, supra note 14, at 93, 97; C. Bridenbaugh, Cit-
ties in the Wilderness, supra note 254, at 231; R. Kelso, The History of Public Poor
Relief in Massachusetts, 1620-1920, at 54-55 (1922).
276. See notes 292-300 infra and accompanying text.
277. By "the people" I mean those people who favored crime control and who registered
their opinions in the literature of the day. Whether such "people" included, or spoke for, the
honest poor is a splendid question which I shall not attempt to answer here. On the relation-
ship between crime control and class control, cf. Muraskin, supra note 49; Ignatieff, State, Civil
problem on their hands, and they quickly drew the connection between escalating crime rates and the failure of traditional sanctions. “It must give every man of feeling the most sensible pain, when he observes how insufficient our penal laws are to answer the end they were designed to,” wrote one critic. “Scarce a morning arrives, but we hear of some house or store having been broke open the past night.” Crime waves have always triggered anxiety over the manner of criminal justice, and the prospect must have been especially frightening in societies, like provincial Massachusetts, that lacked a professional police force; for little stood between the criminal and his victim but effective social discipline. Under popular pressure, the landscape of criminal justice in Massachusetts began to change.

Some time-worn punishments simply disappeared. One of the first to go was public confession, which quietly bowed out of the records after 1700. Banishment and “warning out” hung on a while longer, expiring shortly after independence.

Other punishments remained in effect, but took on different functions. The lash and other humiliatory punishments had initially served to instill shame and to reintegrate offenders into the community. But when offenders failed to reform, or were outsiders to begin with, the sanctions’ purpose shifted from reintegration to expulsion: Public punishment ceremonies alerted townspeople to the offenders’ infamy. It thus became common as the century progressed to hold the public punishment of a single offender on multiple occasions, so that all the more citizens could take careful notice of him.

Still other punishments which remained viable were extended to cover a broader range of crimes. A growing number of provincial statutes prescribed short-term imprisonment in the common gaol as a deterrent, though this sanction’s utility was limited by the infeasibility of longer sentences. More promising were the first few
statutes mandating long-term hard labor in the workhouse, which appeared on the statute books by mid-century.\footnote{284. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.}

The most notable legislative response, however, was a wider recourse to capital punishment for the major types of property offenses. In 1692, when the new provincial government passed its first set of criminal laws, the only property crimes punishable by death were third offenses of burglary and robbery.\footnote{285. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 52. This provision traces back to 1642. COL. LAWS, supra note 13, §2, at 12-13.} But in 1711, citing the growing insecurity of the highways, the House prescribed the death penalty for second-time robbery offenders.\footnote{286. 1 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 673-74.} Four years later, again pointing to the rising frequency of crime, the House added first-time burglaries to the capital list.\footnote{287. 2 id. at 5.} In 1736, the gallows was mandated for theft, if it was a second offense — the first time that category of crime had ever been punishable by death in Massachusetts.\footnote{288. 2 id. at 838.} In 1761, the robbery statute was revised yet again to send first offenders to the gallows.\footnote{289. 4 id. at 488-89.} Finally, in 1770, once again finding the old provisions "ineffectual," the House expanded the definition of burglary (which was subject to capital punishment) to include entry into a dwelling in the day or night, with or without a breaking, as long as the offender broke out at night.\footnote{290. 5 id. at 43. Several sorts of counterfeiting were also made capital. See E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 307-08.}

In retrospect, the legislators' reaction seems to have been perfectly natural. As criminal penalties prove increasingly ineffective, the reflexive response is surely to move along the prevailing spectrum of sanctions to more severe alternatives.\footnote{291. A recent example of this reflex may be the New York drug law of 1973. For the analogous background of that legislation, see Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth Amendment: New York's 1973 Drug Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 638-40 (1975).} But the flaw in this solution quickly became apparent. The people of Massachusetts had never had much stomach for the gallows, even when the victims were outsiders, and the thought of expanding the penalty into the range of common property crimes was more than most jurymen could swallow. So they set about thwarting the new capital statutes, just as earlier generations of Puritans had thwarted previous ones.\footnote{292. See note 99 supra.}

And in a contest between jurymen and the rule of law in Massachus-
Juries frustrated the new capital statutes in several ways. At the indictment stage, grand juries often refused to charge persons with capital crimes. The indictments were simply downgraded to noncapital charges of the jurymen's invention: thus, burglary was often transmuted into "theft in the night time." Even when an indictment for burglary was sealed, its harsh consequences could still be avoided by the petit jury. Of course, the jurymen could always acquit the defendant outright, but on many occasions they chose instead to convict him of a lesser crime. (This version of jury nullification, known in England as "pious perjury," had also been used in the mother country to avoid the rigors of the bloody code.) Finally, even if the box did nothing to mitigate the penalty, the bench often did so, in blatant disregard of statutory sentencing prescriptions. This last datum indicates that laymen had no monopoly on moral aversion to the gallows in provincial Massachusetts.

In the face of such determined resistance, the gallows could not replace other failing sanctions. The legislators recognized that the capital law against burglary "is so severe that many offenders escape..."
Punishment," and they balked at lengthening the capital list further. Here, then, were the horns of a dilemma: While "[a]t present, our laws are no more a check to simple robbery [than] they are to getting money honestly," the alternative of "tak[jing] a man's life for every trifling theft, as is done in England, is a disgrace to a civilized nation; humanity recoils from the idea." Only after the slide toward harsher traditional sanctions, the path of least resistance, proved to be a cul de sac did Massachusetts lawmakers turn "sideways" to explore new solutions to the problem of crime.

The penitentiary was not the only remedy suggested by reformers. Another proposal, which retained a following as late as the 1820s, was transportation of criminals, on the English model. Since banishment by way of escort to the town limits could no longer guarantee an offender's permanent removal, transportation advocates hoped that a more distant exile would effectively prevent his return. The idea was always rejected because of both its cost and the suspicion that no expanse of ocean would keep unreformed offenders away.

Hard labor, on the other hand, offered several enticing attractions to Massachusetts lawmakers. The problem that they faced

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300. Mass. Centinel, Oct. 16, 1784, at 1. Practical difficulties of enforcement were buttressed by theoretical opposition (per rationalist ideology) to an expanded capital list. See, e.g., The Independent Chronicle, Feb. 7, 1793, at 1, continued Feb. 14, 1793, at 1-2; Mass. Centinel, Oct. 20, 1784, at 1 (statutes violate the principle of proportionality discussed at note 92 supra and accompanying text). And the famous anecdote about pickpockets who did their briskest business at the hangings of their comrades — which made such a mockery of the practical deterrent value of the capital sanction — was already current. The Independent Chronicle, Feb. 14, 1793, at 2. The story is still repeated. See L.CARNEY, CORRECTION AND THE COMMUNITY 26 (1977).

301. Boston Gazette, Nov. 29, 1784, at 3 (possibly facetious); G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 61-63; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 21-22 & n (1817) (State Library Annex); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 15 (May 1830); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 5, 14-15 (1822) (Harvard Law Library). This idea blended easily with the "back to Africa" solution for freed slaves. See id. For an English criticism of transportation making many of the same points, see J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 173.

302. Apart from the attractiveness of carceral punishment, one may speculate about its feasibility at alternative dates. James Stephen has argued that "in the days of Coke it would have been impossible practically to set up convict establishments" in England, even if they had been deemed advisable, for want of economic resources and managerial expertise. 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 123, at 92. Criminal incarceration thus might have appeared in the late eighteenth century, not because it was at last prudent, but because it was at last possible. But this argument will not stand up to analysis. Though the financial resources of Massachusetts grew substantially in the eighteenth century, the fact remains that funds sufficient to build and run carceral institutions had always been found; gaols and workhouses were constructed from the earliest days of the colony. See notes 11-12, 240-41 supra and accompanying text. And
was not crime in general, but property crime, committed in the main by an identifiable class of vagrants. Because "the idle and poor [have] much increased among [us]," Boston had already built a new workhouse in 1739, and the legislature had encouraged other towns to follow suit.303 Active criminals from the same class would also benefit singularly from this treatment,304 and since it was believed to be "a sentence more dreadful to the Lazy [and] the dissolute than almost any which could be inflicted," it would constitute an effective deterrent as well.305 Advocates also observed that if all else failed, incarceration did at least incapacitate the criminal offender. Public punishments, which had relied on rehabilitation, deterrence, and notoriety, set the offender immediately at liberty, and the frequent repetition of offenses impressed upon advocates the importance of physical restraint as an additional bulwark against crime.306 By the late eighteenth century, incarceration constituted a more reliable means of incapacitation than either banishment or (when filtered through the jury process) capital punishment.307 Finally, some advocates promised that the prisoners' labor would pay the expenses of the otherwise costly punishment.308 These arguments were persua-
sive, and in 1785 the Castle Island prison was inaugurated.

With the rise of criminal incarceration in Massachusetts, old concepts of crime control befitting small, intimate communities finally gave way to new ones, more appropriate to the large, anonymous communities that were spreading across the state. In the seventeenth century, the criminal was generally looked upon as a person who had wandered astray, but whose basic loyalties still ran to the community he had injured. By the end of the eighteenth century, the criminal was more commonly viewed as a member of an antagonistic subculture, whose allegiances disposed him to villainy from the outset. One by-product of this changing outlook was the institution of a professional police force in post-revolutionary Boston. Once criminals were perceived as out-and-out adversaries, physical enforcement became a crucial vehicle for the prevention of crime.

The prison fit snugly into the new social framework. Whereas early rehabilitative punishments had sought to draw the offender back into the community to which he already belonged, criminal incarceration sought a dual objective: to wrench the offender out of the community he had afflicted, and only later to return him to it, shorn of his prior hostility.

Equally appropriate was the transfer of the situs of punishment from town centers to a pocket of the legal system hidden from public view. Some students of incarceration in Europe have interpreted this movement as a ploy by the ruling elite to wrest political control of punishment away from the popular mobs that had clustered around the old public ceremonies. But in Massachusetts, at least, the demise of public punishment seems explicable on strictly practical grounds. Once criminal offenders ceased to be persons who respected or cared about the community, punishment in the community's presence could no longer have a salutary effect on them.

The old punishments were also intended to weigh upon the public, as opposed to the offender, by providing general, as opposed to

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309. See notes 169-70 supra and accompanying text. There is no evidence that the 1785 initiative in Massachusetts was directly stimulated by reformist undertakings outside the state; still, that possibility cannot be denied. Several American mandates for criminal incarceration shortly preceded the Castle Island statute, see notes 207 supra & 338 infra. On the other hand, Castle Island was the first operational facility for criminal incarceration in America during this period, see note 351 infra. Cf. text at notes 360-62 infra. Given post-revolutionary antagonism for England, the influence of the British Hard Labor Act of 1779 on Massachusetts is ambiguous, see note 327 infra and accompanying text.

310. See generally R. LANE, POLICING THE CITY 3-13 (esp. 6-7) (1967).

311. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 79, at 57-65, 126-31; M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 21-24, 88-90, 105.
specific, deterrence.\footnote{312 See the terminology in J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 19-20.} In the ancient, community-oriented model, general deterrence was believed to arise from the spectacle of punishment. As Cotton Mather once put it, “notorious Sinners were put to open penance in this World, that their Souls might be saved . . . and that others admonished by their Example, might be more afraid to offend.”\footnote{313 See the terminology in J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 19-20; E. Powers, supra note 9, at 199.} Later rationalist literature continued to reiterate this theme; Bentham referred to it as the “exemplarity” of punishment.\footnote{314 J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 45-46.}

From the standpoint of exemplarity, incarceration could well appear to be defective. As English rationalist William Eden warned, a prison sentence “can[not] communicate the benefit of example, being in its nature secluded from the eye of the people.”\footnote{315 J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 45-46.} Yet, in sprawling and bustling cities, spectacles intended to edify the community were increasingly futile and out of place. “[S]uch exhibitions,” Massachusetts reformer Gamaliel Bradford commented in 1821, “are very limited in their extent. If a person is to be hanged, not one in a thousand in the community sees the tragedy performed.”\footnote{316 W. Eden, supra note 86, at 50. See J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 113.}

Rather than make this point directly, early advocates of incarceration in Massachusetts found a way to steal the exemplarists’ thunder. In perhaps their most artful stroke, the advocates identified exemplarity as yet another virtue of incarceration. “When a thing is out of sight, it is soon out of mind,” one commentator noted; the spectacles of the old public punishments had always been palliated by the brevity of their duration. Long-term incarceration, on the other hand, would expose offenders “to constant public view.” “[S]uch living examples of justice,” another writer agreed, “would have a better tendency than the sight of an execution, which is transitory.”\footnote{317 G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 7. Cf. J. Quincy, supra note 256, at 29.} Prison advocates thus disarmed their critics by stressing the longevity, rather than the drama, of the spectacle of incarceration. Subsequent theorists in Massachusetts did take the final step and deny the value of spectacle entirely.\footnote{318 G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 8-9, 46; J. Quincy, Remarks on Some of the Provisions of the Laws of Massachusetts Affecting Poverty, Vice, and Crime 26-28 (Cambridge 1822); Senate 1831 Mass. Legislative Documents 527-29 (State Library Annex).} But it is likely that the striking architecture of the Massachusetts State Prison was inspired
precisely by this conception; it was not a herald of the new, as some have supposed, 319 but a last intellectual vestige of the old. 320

In sum, the penitentiary closed the books on community involvement in punishment because such involvement no longer seemed constructive: Neither humiliation nor terror could be instilled through the old media of public participation. Still, public punishment did not completely disappear with the turn to incarceration. Most ironically, it lived on for a short time within the walls of the State Prison itself. By statute, violations of prison discipline were punishable by up to thirty lashes, and a platform was constructed in the prison yard on which offending prisoners were forced to stand, holding signs or wearing dunce caps. 321 Even as public sanctions were discarded by society at large, they were retained by the very institution that was to serve as a substitute. Of course! The penitentiary was one “community” in Massachusetts still intimate enough for the old formulas to remain effective.

3. Independence

Rothman argues that the American Revolution was central to the emergence of the penitentiary. Independence, he asserts, brought Americans a repugnance for old English institutions, a political freedom to replace them, and most of all an activist spirit that renounced Calvinist complacency in favor of a belief in man’s boundless potential for improvement. 322 Rothman’s Revolution-as-watershed hypothesis once again assumes that incarceration was un-English and a product of intellectual innovation. Neither of these assumptions is valid.

Given the English origins of the rehabilitative program, 323 it is hardly plain that the Home Government would have rejected colonial legislation creating a penitentiary. One cannot assume that the


320. The spectacular value of prison design was stressed in England by Bentham, who urged construction in or near populous cities, and who favored open admission of the public to prison grounds, all to further “the exemplarity of imprisonment.” Bentham added: “However, if the prisoners are not seen, the prison is visible. The appearance of this habitation may strike the imagination and awaken salutary terror. Buildings employed for this purpose ought therefore to have a character of seclusion and restraint, which should take away all hope of escape, and should say, ‘This is the dwelling place of crime.’” J. Bentham, supra note 30, at 113, 353-54; J. Bentham, supra note 122, at 174; J. Bentham, supra note 6, at 32.


322. D. Rothman, supra note 50, at 57-61.

323. See text at notes 123-36 supra.
Revolution permitted Massachusetts a freedom that had previously been denied. The crown did retain veto power over provincial legislation and, ironically, had exercised it over several capital statutes passed in 1692.324 But the acts of 1749 and 1750, which mandated the sanction of hard labor, drew no apparent resistance.325 If anything, the Home Government encouraged such developments by issuing several instructions for the construction of workhouses.326 To the extent that post-revolutionary animus against English institutions affected Massachusetts at all, it could have discouraged resort to hard labor as much as it promoted it. In any event, Massachusetts' diatribes against English criminal justice were largely confined to the bloody code, a body of enactments that had no counterpart in the province.327

Evidence of a perceived need for new sanctions to halt the deterioration of crime control has already been presented. There is little evidence of a post-revolutionary expectation that the move to incarceration would serve the more ambitious end of eliminating crime. Just as Rothman overstates the pessimism inherent in the colonial concept of original sin, so he also exaggerates the optimism inherent in the post-revolutionary belief in human perfectibility. Once again, Massachusetts criminologists drew the practical conclusion that some offenders could be reformed while others could not.328 Youths were still believed to stand the best chance.329 Incarceration could

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324. See E. Powers, supra note 9, at 303-05.
325. Even the "Great Law" of Pennsylvania, instituting hard labor comprehensively in 1682, passed with only limited objection. Its repeal in 1718 constituted a presumed tactical gambit by the Pennsylvania legislature, not a direct response to royal indignation. See H. Barnes, The Evolution of Penology in Pennsylvania 37-39 (1927); Fitzroy, The Punishment of Crime in Provincial Pennsylvania, 60 PA. MAGAZINE 248 n.24, 247-52 (1936). In 1700, a Home Government review of Pennsylvania statutes resulted in the disallowance of several criminal laws on the basis of vagueness, overbreadth, technicalities, and (as in Massachusetts) unreasonable harshness. See note 324 supra, and accompanying text. Significantly, no per se objection to hard labor as a penalty was raised, see 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 178, at 479-97.
326. Such instructions were issued annually from 1686-1689, and again from 1702-1715. 1 Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, at 342-43 (L. Labaree ed. 1935).
327. Cf. Mass. Centinel, Jan. 5, 1785, at 3; id., Oct. 16, 1784, at 1; Independent Chronicle, Feb. 14, 1793, at 2. On the bloody code, see note 90 supra. Notice that the British Hard Labor Act of 1779, see text at note 204 supra, preceded the Massachusetts initiative. It was ignored by the early American commentators.
prevent some, but not all, crime. While the published criminologists did, on occasion, refer to the hope that all criminals could be re-formed and all crime prevented, they invariably rejected it as unrealistic. 330

To be sure, some elements of revolutionary ideology did facilitate the transition to the penitentiary. Many post-revolutionary reformers spoke of the project as an "experiment" at a time when all America was ablaze with self-conscious experimentalism. 331 And the very fact of a radical change in government led Americans to review the efficacy of the institutions that they had inherited from colonial times. 332 Many reformers thus coupled their arguments against the old sanctions with a plea for new ones more "suited to the genius of a Republic." 333 Still, the social and demographic forces that had undermined the old sanctions preceded independence by many decades; the Revolution was not pivotal to the transition.

Perhaps the most unequivocal evidence of the pre-revolutionary prospect for criminal incarceration is that Massachusetts had seriously considered implementing such a system as early as 1765. In that year, the legislature appointed a committee "to prepare a Bill to make the Punishments of Criminals more subservient to the public Interest, by altering the punishment of certain Felonies, and by providing a Method for a publick Work-House, to which criminals of

330. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 4, 10-11, 16-17; Answer of the House, May 1820 Mass. Resolves 237; Governor's Message, Jan. 30, 1793, 1792-1793 Mass. Acts 694 (object is to "check the progress of crime"); Remarks, supra note 80, at 23; 1 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 33-35 (1826); 8 id., 29-30 (1833); Tudor, supra note 80, at 418, 435-36; Austin, Book Review, 10 N. AM. REv. 235, 246-49 (1820) (reviewing W. Roscoe, supra note 189).


332. Dissolution of the provincial government in no wise required reconsideration of the criminal code, however. By the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pre-revolutionary statutes remained in effect; the structural inertia of the legislative process was not affected. MASS. CONST. of 1780, Pt. II, ch. VI, art. VI.

every Part of the Province may be committed.” 334 The list of public servants recruited for this work reads like a Who’s Who of the Massachusetts political aristocracy. Among them were Peter Oliver, Justice of the Superior Court (who would become Chief Justice in 1772), Edward Trowbridge, Attorney General of the province (who would also rise to the bench in 1767), Thomas Hutchinson, Chief Justice and Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts, and James Otis, former Advocate General and, since 1761, an influential representative from Boston. 335

As a preliminary step, the committee prepared a report formally recommending the replacement of capital and corporal punishments with “long confinement to hard labor in a House of correction,” built “in one of the maritime towns of the province where work of various kinds may be procured.” 336 The plan apparently suited the genius of a province, if not yet a republic, for the legislature instructed the committee to go ahead and draft the bill. 337 But at this point the project appears to have been dropped. No further entries, not even a formal discontinuance of the project, found their way into the house minutes. The plan, and the committee itself, simply disappeared.

The bits and threads of this curious episode are too scant to provide much more than food for speculation. 338 In its brief justification of the proposal, the committee did stress the failure of old sanctions. Were their plan adopted, the members commented, “the great end of punishment viz the deterring [of] the criminals and

334. 41 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 186.
335. Also drafted to serve on the committee were Oxenbridge Thacher, a respected lawyer and Otis ally; Samuel Dexter, a merchant who would serve on the Supreme Executive Council of State during the Revolution; and Joseph Lee, who sat on the Inferior Court of Common Pleas. W. DAVIS, HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY OF MASSACHUSETTS 141, 155 (1900); E. WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS 221-24, 300-11 (1840).
337. 41 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 15, at 230.
338. It is even possible that the 1765 move to institute criminal incarceration in Massachusetts was not the only such initiative before the Revolution. A legislative report prepared in 1822, briefly tracing the heritage of the State Prison, asserted that “At different times the House voted to prepare places of confinement for criminals, where they might be kept at hard labor, and after the revolution they were confined for this purpose at Castle William.” REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 2 (1822) (emphasis added) (Harvard Law Library). Nor was Massachusetts alone in proposing such projects. In 1773, during the period of relative calm that preceded the Boston Tea Party, Connecticut passed an act to create a “Public Gaol or Work-House” and to mandate long-term hard labor as the sole penalty for six property crimes. Act of Oct. 1773, 1773-1783 Conn. Acts & Laws 385-89. The revolution followed, however, and during this period the Connecticut prison lodged mainly political prisoners. At the end of the revolutionary war, in 1782, the prison was abandoned following a destructive fire, and was not rebuilt as a state prison for criminals until 1790. R. PHELPS, NEWGATE OF CONNECTICUT 5-9 (2d. ed. Hartford 1844); N. PHELPS, A HISTORY OF THE COPPER MINES AND NEWGATE PRISON 11-18 (Hartford 1845).
others from committing the like crimes would be better answered
than it is at present.” 339 That the proposal emerged in the midst of a
severe crime wave, stretching over 1764 and 1765, further suggests its
connection to social desperation. 340

Given such a connection, and the prestige of the politicians ap­
pointed to deal with the matter, the sudden collapse of this first call
for criminal incarceration seems especially puzzling. Nowhere does
the record indicate Home Government action to head off the propo­
sal — on the contrary, Lieutenant-Governor Hutchinson’s service on
the committee hints at the blessing of higher imperial officials. 341
The timing, however, is once again suggestive, for the committee’s
labors in the spring of 1765 were quickly overshadowed by the
Stamp Act crisis. Soon, James Otis became immersed in leading the
fight against Parliamentary taxation of the American colonies; for
Thomas Hutchinson, a suspected supporter of the tax, the problem
of protecting the people from crime became subordinate to the prob­
lem of protecting his person from the crimes of the people. 342 Under
the circumstances, it may not be so surprising that the proposal for
incarceration fell by the wayside. If this hypothesis is correct, then
the temporal proximity between independence and the penitentiary
must be deemed deceptive: Far from precipitating its rise, the Amer­
ican Revolution may instead have delayed it for a generation. 343

V. EPILOGUE: TO 1830

A. The Legislative Transition

The legislation establishing the Castle Island prison in 1785 did
not spell the end of the old public sanctions in Massachusetts. The
drafters ventured only a tentative step in that direction. Although
the old punishments seemed to be failing, the alternative of large
scale incarceration — whatever its promise — remained untested.
The experimental zeal of the new Commonwealth government did
not extend to an immediate and total break with the colonial past.

339. See note 336 supra.

340. Boston Gazette, Sept. 27, 1764, at 3; id., Nov. 12, 1764, at 3; Grand Jury Charge by

341. On the other hand, the combination of Thomas Hutchinson and James Otis did not
bode well for the smooth operation of the committee. On the gulf of animosity that separated
these two politicians, see E. MORGAN & H. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS 266 (rev. ed.
1962).

342. See generally id.

343. Perversely, the Revolution may have done more to stimulate the rise of criminal in­
carceration in England than it did in America. See note 429 infra and accompanying text. See
also note 338 supra.
Twenty-four categories of crimes were made subject to hard labor on Castle Island, yet, with two minor exceptions, the sanction constituted an alternative to, not a replacement for, the old public punishments. The new statutes simply added hard labor to the judge's list of options. Even where hard labor replaced capital punishment, the public sanctions were resurrected as alternatives. Indeed, many of the new provisions significantly widened the latitude of judges to choose among traditional punishments. Whereas arson against a building other than a dwelling had previously been punishable by whipping only, the revised statute of 1785, with typical inclusiveness, authorized sentences to hard labor "for life or years," the pillory, whipping, imprisonment in the gaol (again, any term), binding to good behavior, fining, "or to any or all of these punishments, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence." 346

What can one make of such a statute? Is it a sign of legislative uncertainty, born of social upheaval? Or does it represent a recognition that, in a time of change, the judicial system would benefit from a maximum of leeway? Whatever the answer, judges retained their wide discretion to choose among sanctions for some twenty years — and they hardly availed themselves of every opportunity to impose hard labor. 347 The Massachusetts legal system eased its way from pillory to penitentiary. 348

344. These were: attempted robbery, fraud, buying or receiving a convict's clothing, assisting or harboring an escapee, accessory after the fact to rape, sodomy, robbery, arson, or burglary, accessory before or after the fact to larceny, three grades of forgery, three crimes against the Massachusetts Bank, three grades of arson, and five grades of larceny. Act of Mar. 11, 1785, ch. 58, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 157-58; Act of Mar. 9, 1785, ch. 52, id. at 135; Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, id. at 167; Act of Mar. 15, 1785, ch. 65, id. at 169-70; Act of Mar. 15, 1785, ch. 66, id. at 171-74; Act of Nov. 1, 1785, ch. 21, id. at 473-74.

345. Prescriptions of hard labor for buying or receiving a convict's clothing, and for assisting or harboring an escapee, were alternative to a fine only. Id. at 167.

346. Id. at 157.


348. The legislative treatment of theft is an interesting side-light to this transitional phase. Under the provincial statute in force since 1736, common thieves had been subject to a session on the gallows with a rope around the neck, a whipping, and treble damages payable to the aggrieved. 2 PROV. LAWS, supra note 12, at 838. (The gallows provision was rarely enforced, see, e.g., King v. Allen, Super. Ct., June 1752, f. 64-65 (Suffolk County Court House).) The treble damages award, ostensibly a form of civil compensation, had also served as a tacit mechanism of rehabilitation when translated into a term of service. See notes 244-48 supra and accompanying text. The larceny statute of 1785 reflected the decline of the convict labor market not by abolishing restitution outright — that decision was not taken until 1805 — but by making it interchangeable with hard labor on Castle Island. There remained, apparently, a hope that some offenders could be disposed of (or were solvent): the law still provided that all offenders were to make treble restitution in either specie or service. Only if the aggrieved
It arrived there in due course. Over its fourteen-year history, the
proved unable to sell the offender within thirty days was the offender to perform up to three years hard labor “without sentencing him to make satisfaction.”

(The quoted explanatory phrase appears in the manuscript draft of the bill, but was omitted (by mistake?) from the printed version, though no deletion was authorized in the bill of amendments. Compare Act of Mar. 15, 1785, ch. 66, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 173. So the issue was raised squarely: did “like punishment” cover only the whipping, or did it include treble damages as well? The attorney general, taking the latter position, argued

Under the larceny statute of 1785, receivers were liable to the “like punishment” as the thief Andrews, 2 Mass. 13 (1806). In

quite ambiguous. The issue reached the Supreme Judicial Court in

See Konig, Community Custom and the Common Law: Social Change and Development of Land Law in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 137 (1974).)

Whatever we choose to call it, the statute of 1785 left the status of the treble damage award quite ambiguous. The issue reached the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Andrews, a case whose ingenious argumentation must be abbreviated here. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 13 (1806). In Andrews, the accused was charged with receiving stolen goods. Under the larceny statute of 1785, receivers were liable to the “like punishment” as the thief himself. Act of Mar. 15, 1785, ch. 66, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 173. So the issue was raised squarely: did “like punishment” cover only the whipping, or did it include treble damages as well? The attorney general, taking the latter position, argued inter alia that the treble damage
Castle Island prison entertained an average of fifty prisoners at a time, "criminals of almost every species, and from every part of the Commonwealth."349 By 1797, the sanction of hard labor had become sufficiently familiar to enter the vocabulary of banal humor.350 But it had also won the confidence of persons in high places. "I believe it will not be doubted," Governor Sumner lectured the legislature, "that the Commonwealth, since the Institution of that mode of punishment, has been abundantly more free from high-handed offences, than at any former period."351 The question of the sanction's future came to the fore in 1798, when the federal government prevailed upon the state to convert Castle Island into a federal military fortification. By allocating funds to build a far larger prison at Charlestown from the ground up,352 Massachusetts signalled a quantum leap in its commitment to the sanction of incarceration.353

The criminal statutes of the Commonwealth were revised for the second time in twenty years to reflect this new commitment. The legislature appointed Nathan Dane and Justice Samuel Sewall to draft a code "applicable . . . to the spirit and nature of the proposed es-

award should be equated with its alternative: confinement to hard labor. "Will it be said that this is no part of the punishment?" he demanded. The defense counsel, arguing for the contrary construction, denoted the hard labor contingency inter alia "an inducement to the defendant [thief] to make the satisfaction." The Court, however, held for the state: restitution had been transformed into a criminal sanction. 2 Mass. 13, 27, 28 (emphasis added). See Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 513 (1809). (Both opinions imply that the restitution requirement would have been categorized differently before the contingency provision of the 1785 act was added.) For an early case in this line, in accord with the later holdings, see Commonwealth v. Cleaves, Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 1785, ff. 324-26 (2 indictments).

This issue was, in any event, mooted in 1805, when the provision for treble damages was eliminated from the code. Act of Mar. 16, 1805, ch. 143, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts. 240.


350. "The punishment of the man of ninety-three for a rape, it seems, is imprisonment for two years, and to be kept at hard labor! This proceeds upon a very nice calculation, a rape at ninety-three equal to two years hard labor!" Massachusetts Mercury, Mar. 28, 1797, reprinted in Trivia, 3 ser. 36 WM. & MARY Q. 460 (1979) (emphasis in original).


352. Castle Island had likely been selected as the first site for criminal incarceration because its pre-existing facilities minimized the size of the requisite capital investment. Castle Island had received special prisoners on occasion since colonial times. E. POWERS, supra note 9, at 220-21. The initial flow of inmates was accommodated in the existing barracks, although an additional "gaol" was soon constructed on the Island. Governor's Message, Nov. 5, 1785, ch. 39, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 756; Governor's Message, Nov. 7, 1786, ch. 78, 1786-1787 Mass. Acts 950.

353. See notes 65-67 supra, and accompanying text.
tablishment.” Adopted to coincide with the opening of the State Prison in 1805, the new code finally abandoned the public sanctions that had been used in Massachusetts for almost two centuries. From that point on, all crimes were punishable by fine, incarceration, or the death penalty, in the vein of all modern American statutory schemes.

There remains one curiosity in this legislative transition: the lag in efforts to formalize it. A catch-all statute making hard labor the alternative sanction for every crime meriting corporal punishment was passed by the House in 1785 but rejected by the Senate. This statute did not become law until 1813, years after the corporal punishments had been effectively interred. Meanwhile, a law to formally abolish the old punishments was drafted by Dane and Sewall as part of their code of 1805, but it too died in the Senate, even as the rest of their statutes were passed. Corporal punishments were not abolished de jure until 1826. Just what caused the legislators to delay these enactments is difficult to say. It was apparently less jarring to turn the pages of the old laws than to close the book on them entirely.

B. Patterns of Ideology

The prison on Castle Island conformed to the workhouse tradition. Congregate hard labor by day and congregate confinement by night set the tone of the facility. But in the years following that prison’s inception, the ideological innovations then dawning in England began to infiltrate Massachusetts. Harmonious in 1785, the theory of carceral rehabilitation soon developed divergent strands, and the proponents of each alternative fought for control of the state’s prison program.

The new ideological element that caused all the commotion was solitary confinement and the theory of reclamation. Not a whisper of this approach was audible in 1785; but humanitarian prison litera-

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ture rapidly became available in Massachusetts and elsewhere. In fact, another state's effort may have served to focus attention on the new ideology. In 1790, the Pennsylvania legislature ordered the construction of an inner block of solitary cells within the Philadelphia prison at Walnut Street. Whereas most prisoners suffered hard labor, "the more hardened and atrocious offenders" were thereafter to undergo a solitary regime. Caleb Lownes, a Pennsylvania reformer, soon published a pamphlet extolling the Walnut Street facility and its system of solitary confinement. When in 1799 the Massachusetts legislature began to plan a replacement for Castle Island, it ordered three hundred copies of Lownes' pamphlet.

Still, the legislature proceeded cautiously. The committee appointed to study the Walnut Street plan was impressed, but the representatives decided only that the Massachusetts Prison should "be constructed with interior cells and apartments [...] that the Legislature may adopt if they see fit, the mode of confinement in solitary apartments without any alteration in said buildings." An inroad had nonetheless been made, and when Dane and Sewall drafted the new code in 1805, they provided for a combination of the two schemes. Upon conviction under any criminal statute mandating incarceration in the State Prison, the judge was to set two successive terms: an initial term of solitary confinement, and a subsequent term of hard labor, each to be served within the Charlestown facility. This dual sentencing structure may well have been fashioned to satisfy both of the emerging ideological camps.

360. See, e.g., the Howard extracts in 1 Mass. Magazine 639-40 (1789), continued in 2 id. at 476-78, 685-88 (1790); Tudor, supra note 80, at 440.

361. H. Barnes, supra note 325, at 118-20.

362. Lownes, supra note 178; Senate Document no. 2445 (1799) (unpassed). This narrative corrects E. Powers, supra note 80, at 440. Lownes was a member of the Board of Inspectors of the Walnut Street prison. His pamphlet is largely descriptive and does not contain an elaboration of the underlying ideology.


365. See note 355 supra.

366. No surviving legislative history speaks to this matter, nor does the Dane-Sewall report to the legislature offer any sort of explanation for the extraordinary sentencing structure contained in the drafters' bills. Oddly, the Dane-Sewall report never once mentions solitary confinement, only "imprisonment and confinement to hard labor" (imprisonment in this context almost certainly referred to imprisonment in local gaols mandated for some minor offenses, not to solitary confinement. See, e.g., 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 202), Dane & Sewall, supra note 100. But years later, Dane complained that "When Judge Sewall & myself drew the bills enacted for governing the State prison[,] we fully expected that adequate means would be provided for giving full effect to solitary confinement." Letter from Nathan Dane to Josiah Quincy (May 6, 1822) in Quincy Papers, reel 40 (unpublished document, Mass. Historical Society).
If this was a compromise, it did not endure. By the beginning of the 1820s, different reformist circles vied for influence on the Prison's internal management. At one extreme stood the Board of Directors of the Massachusetts State Prison. Thoroughgoing advocates of solitary confinement, the Board members insisted that the only way to reform a convict was “to turn the mind in upon itself [and] awaken remorse” — in short, to bring about a “change of heart.”\textsuperscript{367} From the Directors' perspective, hard labor had no therapeutic value. On the contrary, labor obstructed the process of arousing remorse, by offering “relief . . . [from] the painful monotony of self-contemplation.”\textsuperscript{368} Hard labor did, however, generate revenue to help support the facility. On this basis, the Directors concluded that “economy and reformation are adverse objects in the establishment of the Massachusetts State Prison. They are antagonistic principles . . . [S]training the one relaxes the other.” The problem was to bring the two into some reasonable balance, so that neither was altogether sacrificed.\textsuperscript{369}

At the other extreme stood Gamaliel Bradford, warden of the State Prison from 1812 to 1824. His was the voice of the rehabilitative tradition, under which hard labor remained the be-all and end-all of the rehabilitative process: “Industry is the nurse of virtue, and the enemy of vice . . . [T]o overcome habits of idleness, and beget a custom and taste for labour, would be the most acceptable offering which could be laid on the altars of religion and morality.”\textsuperscript{370} From this perspective, both economy and reformation flowed from the same source and were not antagonistic principles at all.\textsuperscript{371}

Though well-acquainted with the theory of solitary confinement, Bradford remained decidedly skeptical of its rehabilitative powers. This skepticism emanated, perhaps, from the lingering influence of Puritan axioms.\textsuperscript{372} One of the most essential of these axioms was

\textsuperscript{367} Remarks, supra note 80, at 4, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{368} Id. at 4-5.
\textsuperscript{369} Id. at 4, 9-10, 27. For other expositions of this philosophy, see J. Quincy, supra note 318, at 20-26; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 2, at 3 (1818) (State Library Annex); Austin, supra note 330, at 249-50, 259.
\textsuperscript{370} G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 13, 20, 24, 45. See the report of a committee investigating alternative American prison systems, 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 8-13 (1817).
\textsuperscript{372} Edmund S. Morgan has argued that the revolutionary generation perpetuated, and often pursued policies directly shaped by, Puritan values. See Morgan, The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, 3 ser. 24 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (1967) (reprinted in E. Morgan, supra note 331, at 88).
that men must live within their sinful world, and not seek to escape it. Bradford echoed that:

Man was made for society, and although some men, for pious purposes, have withdrawn themselves from the world — and to avoid the corruptions which abound in it, have shut themselves up in monasteries or caves, yet it is not allowed that the cause of religion and virtue is promoted by such retirement . . . . [A] long confinement in total solitude, might destroy [the convict's] social feelings, and produce a sort of stupid apathy which would render him very unfit for an useful or happy member of any society.374

In addition, Calvinist perceptions of human frailty suggested that attempts to influence fundamental moral values held little promise of success. Finally, a term of idle solitary confinement ran counter to the work ethic. Bradford concluded that, because of its relative severity, solitary confinement could play a useful role within the prison — but only as a deterrent against internal offenses, crimes committed by persons already serving terms of hard labor.377

In short, both camps were prepared to accept a combination of solitary confinement and hard labor — but for different reasons and with different intentions. For advocates of rehabilitation, hard labor meant therapy as well as economy, and solitary confinement served

373. This theme is treated extensively in E. Morgan, supra note 9.
375. "[W]hat faith may be placed in resolutions (let them, when made, be perfectly sincere,) formed in the bosom of solitude, against the temptations of the world when that solitude is at an end? It requires but a slight knowledge of the human heart to answer this question. St. Paul has answered it — when I would do good evil is present with me." G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 19. See G. De Beaumont & A. De Tocqueville, supra note 331, at 90. The early Puritans had sought to enlighten the consciences of offenders, but only those of community members whose histories and characters were well known, and whose subsequent progress could be carefully scrutinized. See notes 228-32 supra and accompanying text.
376. A term of reclamatory solitary confinement would "leave the men enfeebled, and unable to work, when they left the Prison; and as ignorant of any useful business, as when they were committed." In contrast to the gloomy silence of a solitary prison, institutions of labor reverberated with "the busy hum of industry." 2 Prison Discipline Society, supra note 117, at 58, 66 (1827); G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 19; Report [On the State Prison] 12-13 (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library). See note 399 infra and accompanying text. Cf. G. De Beaumont & A. De Tocqueville, supra note 331, at 57, 84 (mirroring English humanitarian theory, note 153 supra and accompanying text).
377. G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 47-48. See 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 20 (1817); id. no. 2, at 3 (1818) (State Library Annex); G. Bradford, supra note 67, at 36; Act of Mar. 14, 1806, ch. 113, 1804-1805 Mass. Acts 549-50. The idea of using solitary confinement as a deterrent may have originated with John Howard, see J. Howard, supra note 3, at 40, and it has continued to be used in that capacity to the present day. Some advocates of rehabilitation did allow that the "reflection" and "remorse" induced by solitude could have a positive impact, but they did not stress it, see G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 19; 1 Prison Discipline Society, supra note 117, at 8 (1826); Governor's Message, Jan. 2, 1828, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 635; Governor's Message, June 2, 1828, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 24.
as a deterrent; the object of the exercise was to break bad habits. For advocates of reclamation, hard labor meant economy only, and solitary confinement served as the therapy; the object of the exercise was to reach the offender's heart. This conceptual disagreement ultimately caused trouble within the prison administration. The Directors made "repeated representations" to the legislature for funds to extend the use of solitary confinement; the Warden favored other priorities. An overlap in the administrative responsibilities of the contending factions further aggravated matters. By 1824, the two sides were not on speaking terms, and the Directors sought to have the Warden's office abolished.

Even as rival advocates locked horns over policy, they also locked arms in a rear-guard action against die-hard opponents of the penitentiary system. Like Castle Island, the State Prison at Charlestown had been devoted from the beginning "to the purposes of safe confinement and penitentiary reformation," and like Castle Island, the State Prison had therefore been subject from the beginning to extensive regulations and oversight. Had these been the only

378. Introduction of extended solitary confinement would have required structural changes, for the solitary cells proved unfit for long terms of confinement. As a consequence, judges generally restricted the solitary confinement stage of prison sentences to ten days or less. J. Quincy, supra note 318, at 20-22, 25; Remarks, supra note 80, at 20-21; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 2, at 5 (1818); id. no. 1, at 20 (1817) (State Library Annex). Bradford opposed construction of additional cells for full time solitary confinement, though he favored construction of the smaller cells necessary for separate confinement at night. Significantly, Bradford's first priority was greater space for the prison workshops. G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 49-51; Letter from G. Bradford to W. Roscoe (Sept. 10, 1823) in W. Roscoe, A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CAUSES WHICH HAVE LED TO THE ABANDONMENT OF THE CELEBRATED SYSTEM OF PENITENTIARY DISCIPLINE IN SOME OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 52-53 (Liverpool, n.d.) [c.1827]; Communication from Gamaliel Bradford to the Legislature, Jan. 27, 1824, Senate Document no. 7029 (1824) (unpassed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives).

379. Both parties complained of this problem. G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 33-34, 49; Remarks, supra note 80, at 18-19; see 1 Prison Discipline Society, supra note 117, at 29-31 (1826); 3 id. 37-39 (1828).

380. See G. Haynes, supra note 321, at 45-46; Remarks, supra note 80, at 18-19 (claiming to be on good terms with Bradford, personally). Haynes speculates that Bradford's state of "indisposition" may have caused the conflict; he had sickened, and died in 1824.


382. Even before the State Prison was constructed, the subject of its proposed internal administration (or "prison discipline") had been recognized as "intimately connected with the peace & welfare of the Public." Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30. For subsequent reaffirmations, see Answer of the Senate, Jan. 1807, Jan. 1807 Mass. Resolves 6; Answer of the Senate, June 15, 1811, May 1811 Mass. Resolves 193; Governor's Message, May 31, 1817, May 1817 Mass. Resolves 397-98; Answer of the House, n.d., id. at 404. The object was expressly to avoid the shortcomings of the local gaols, Answer of the House, Jan. 18, 1804, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts 875; Governor's Message, Jan. 13, 1804, id. at 980-81. Thus, plans for the structure of the State Prison were carefully reviewed for their efficacy, and recommendations put forward for frequent inspection and a code of internal bylaws. Id. at 875, 980-81; note 67 supra. These recommendations were followed: A physician and chaplain were appointed to the State Prison staff, and a Board of Directors was established to furnish the facility, appoint its officers, write
similarities between the two institutions, all might have been smooth sailing for the early advocates. But unfortunately, the State Prison also shared a third characteristic of Castle Island: for all the government's interest, it was an administrative fiasco.

A generation after the State Prison opened, Governor Levi Lincoln looked back and demanded, "Whence it arises, that disappointment in results so often follows the best promises of success, in the affairs of that establishment." The disappointment had not been long in coming. From at least 1809, the prison had been plagued by inmate violence, escapes, and expenses far in excess of earnings. In 1813, the inmates contrived to burn their workshops, and three years later they staged a full-scale insurrection that resulted in one death. The frequency of recommitments, moreover, cast doubt on the facility's rehabilitative capability.

By 1818, a popular reaction had set in. Rothman contends that the early administrative failure of American penitentiaries helped to draw attention away from statutory schemes of deterrence and toward an emerging ideal of rehabilitation. In Massachusetts, at least, precisely the opposite occurred: The legislators considered abandoning "the beautiful and brilliant theory of reclaiming the unprincipled," as "vain and illusory," and substituting a policy intended "to deter and restrain the atrocity of offenders." Many of the critics favored an increase in both the length of sentences and in the harshness of the prison regime. A few refugees from the seven-

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384. G. Haynes, supra note 321, at 20-38; Governor's Message, Jan. 25, 1811, Jan. 1811 Mass. Resolves 66; Governor's Message, June 7, 1811, May 1811 Mass. Resolves 189; Answer of the Senate, June 15, 1811, id. at 193; Governor's Message, Jan. 8, 1812, Jan. 1812 Mass. Resolves 282; 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 4 (1817) (State Library Annex); G. Bradford, supra note 67, at 9-12; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 1 (1827) (Harvard Law Library). In 1825, it was discovered that counterfeiters had been carrying on their trade within the State Prison's walls. 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 11-12, 21-23 (1827). In the area of prison hygiene, however, the State Prison did achieve a record of sustained success — prison mortality was consistently low. See, e.g., May 1811 Mass. Resolves 189; 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 35 (1827).


teenth century even advocated a return to the ancient public punishments, scrapping criminal incarceration entirely.387

This popular reaction against the prison brought the rival advocates together. All advocates in unison defended the penitentiary’s potential for rehabilitation by emphasizing the number of inmates who never returned, as opposed to the recommitment rate.388 All advocates in unison underscored the penitentiary’s value as a means of incapacitation.389 And all advocates, though not quite in unison, disputed the adequacy of a system of criminal law that relied entirely on deterrence, as some legislators had proposed.390

Prison advocates in Massachusetts also wrestled with the old problem of reconciling rehabilitation and deterrence. A charge repeatedly leveled by armchair critics of the State Prison (“men who sit quietly over a fire or round a luxurious table on a cold winter day”) was that the facility lacked sufficient hardship to terrify prospective offenders. The advocates responded by detailing the dreadful severity of prison life and recounting the long record of escape attempts. What few amenities the prison offered were essential to the rehabilitative process, the advocates explained; any further harshness would tip the precarious balance.391

All of the advocates also defended the fiscal responsibility of the State Prison, in spite of its persistent deficits. Like the English humanitarians, American advocates portrayed the penitentiary as a philanthropic enterprise. The costs represented “a beneficent gratu-

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387. *Id.* no. 1, at 8, 15 (1817) (State Library Annex); *id.* no. 2, at 1-3 (1818); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 2-3 (1822) (Harvard Law Library); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 1 (1827); Tudor, *supra* note 80, at 423-25; Austin, *supra* note 330, at 245.


391. Remarks, *supra* note 80, at 22-25 (quote at 24); G. BRADFORD, *supra* note 1, at 14-15, 31-33; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 8-9 (1822); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 11-12 (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library); Tudor, *supra* note 80, at 434-35. Like English reformers, Bradford believed it therapeutically necessary for each prisoner to be “made to understand, that this punishment has been inflicted from necessity, and with a view to his own improvement; that he has brought it upon himself; that the government can have no pleasure in chastisement, and that it holds out encouragement, and rewards for good behaviour, for the very purpose of avoiding the painful necessity of punishing.” G. BRADFORD, *supra* note 1, at 47. Cf. note 155 *supra* and accompanying text. In its quest to discourage “revengeful” attitudes, however, the State Prison was not always successful. See G. BRADFORD, *supra* note 67, at 10; Report [on the State Prison] 7 (May 1830). The criticism that incarceration lacked sufficient severity was so outlandish as to cause some of the usually patient advocates to lose their tempers: “Another error which it might be presumed a moment’s reflection would destroy, has been propagated with thoughtless alacrity. . . .” REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 8 (1822).
ity . . . which humanity and heaven required,” and were alleged to be fewer per capita than those of other social projects borne by the state.\textsuperscript{392} To satisfy persons unmoved by such appeals, the advocates also insisted that what appeared to be red ink on the State Prison’s balance sheet was in reality black. As Warden Bradford explained, a system of incarceration and hard labor ensured that each offender at least “produces something.” Without it he produced nothing, “and probably would have been twice as much damage to society as the amount of all the expenses of the Prison establishment.” Consequently, \textit{any} amount that he earned “ought to be considered as clear gain to the State.”\textsuperscript{393} But even as advocates argued the sufficiency of prison labor, they were whipsawed by the converse accusation that convicts “work too much,” undercutting the market for goods produced by free labor. So, from the other corner of their mouths, the advocates depicted the economic impact of prison production as minimal.\textsuperscript{394}

The problem of maintaining the rehabilitative integrity of the penitentiary system could not be as easily dismissed. Critics charged that the State Prison had become “a sink of corruption,” a collection point where novices in crime learned the state of the art from older, more accomplished, offenders. Contact between prisoners, so the argument ran, harmed inmates morally more than the rehabilitative therapy helped them.\textsuperscript{395} In fact, as early as 1799, a legislative com-

\textsuperscript{392} Remarks, \textit{supra} note 80, at 9-11; J. Quincy, \textit{supra} note 318, at 12, 23-26; G. Bradford, \textit{supra} note 67, at 15; Austin, \textit{supra} note 330, at 250-51, 257, 259.

\textsuperscript{393} G. Bradford, \textit{supra} note 1, at 12-13, 16-17; Remarks, \textit{supra} note 80, at 3; Austin, \textit{supra} note 330, at 252, 259. \textit{C.f.} 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1 at 7, 15 (1817) (State Library Annex). William Tudor spiced the argument with a dash of ridicule:

To that class of economists, and unfortunately they are not few in number, who are apt to look at this branch of legislation exclusively in reference to expense, and to calculate every thing only in dollars and cents, it may be suggested, that the hanging of one culprit costs the community in the loss of labor of the thousands who flock to behold it, a thousand times as much as it would to keep him in prison a century.

Tudor, \textit{supra} note 80, at 431-434.


mittee had identified prisoner congregation as a critical flaw in the Castle Island facility. The planners of the State Prison at Charlestown had been urged to take steps to remedy it. But this warning had fallen upon deaf ears: As finally constructed, the State Prison provided supervised, congregate workshops for hard labor in the daytime and unsupervised, congregate cells for the night hours — cells that eventually lodged anywhere from four to sixteen prisoners each. The block of cells provided for solitary confinement in the first phase of a sentence was far too small to be put to any more extensive use.396

Rather than deny that inmate congregation created a problem, the advocates answered the indictments with a call for prison renovation. Advocates of reclamation seized on the problem as yet another argument in favor of using solitary imprisonment throughout the inmate's confinement.397 Advocates of rehabilitation, on the other hand, were caught in a bind. While they felt compelled to agree (if somewhat less enthusiastically) that congregation could corrupt,398 they still considered it necessary to the process of learning a practical skill. Solitary hard labor, as suggested by some advocates of solitary confinement, would not do, for it reduced productivity and tended to "render labor irksome and disgusting" instead of making it "habitual and easy."399 Warden Bradford thus urged continued supervised congregate hard labor by day, but single-celling by night, when supervision was impractical. This was the system prescribed in the English Hard Labor Act and advocated by many Eng-


397. Solitary confinement of course represented the ne plus ultra of separation. J. Quincy, supra note 318, at 20-21; Remarks, supra note 80, at 4-5, 8; Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30.

398. "We have it from the highest authority, that 'evil communications corrupt good manners' [1 Cor. 15:33] — but the communication even between convicts is not always evil — they have been known to pray in their rooms with each other, and to form associations for religious purposes — and it is not altogether unreasonable to suppose, that examples and practices of this kind should have their influence, as well as wicked ones." G. Bradford, supra note 1, at 18-19; see Tudor, supra note 80, at 438.

399. "[A] man works much more cheerfully when in company than when alone; when he sees all around him at work, it encourages him to be active from example, and a sort of feeling of sympathy: he becomes industrious." Id. at 18-20. A standard solitary prison industry was treadmill pumping (to grind grain, or, often, mere air), hardly a useful trade. See Report [On the State Prison] 12-13 (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library); G. de Beaumont & A. de Tocqueville, supra note 331, at 202; G. Haynes, supra note 321, at 45; Remarks, supra note 80, at 4-5.
lish rationalists.  

The advocates ultimately succeeded in rebuffing the critics' assaults; the State Prison, and the goal of rehabilitation, were not abandoned. Instead, in 1818, the legislature made its first attempts to reform penal reform in Massachusetts. An act passed in that year for "the better regulation of the State Prison" set sterner guidelines for enforcing discipline in the facility and provided for progressively harsher sentences for second and third offenders. And while the legislature was reluctant to mandate expensive structural changes to separate convicts, it did take a less costly step in that direction: henceforth, the prison population was to be split into three classes according to deportment, each class lodged and employed separately from the others. Another law gave judges discretion to divert offenders sentenced to three years or less to local gaols, to avoid contamination by contact with more hardened State Prison inmates.

Initially, the Massachusetts government felt confident of these reforms. Governor Brooks and the legislators congratulated each other for setting matters right at the State Prison and reacclaimed the principle of carceral rehabilitation as ardently as each had con-

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403. As a subsequent committee report noted dryly, "The legislature . . . adopted every [proposal] which involved no expenditure, and rejected or postponed every [proposal], that required an appropriation." *Report on the State Prison* 3 (1822).


demned it the year before. But these jubilations proved premature. Escapes and disruptions continued as before, and the closefisted measures to ensure separation of convicts quickly disintegrated. In 1826, Governor Levi Lincoln reported that the State Prison was at last turning a profit, but added “a melancholy reverse to the picture” — namely, “the system is utterly ineffectual, to purposes of reform or amendment.” Structural alterations to accommodate separate confinement were still “imperiously required,” and the legislators finally resigned themselves to this expense.

By this time the two competing rehabilitative ideologies had matured into full-fledged institutional systems in other states. In Pennsylvania, the Walnut Street Jail with its experimental block of solitary cells was replaced in 1826 by the Western State Penitentiary, where all prisoners underwent solitary confinement without labor. In New York, at around the same time, the Auburn Prison thoroughly overhauled its system of discipline. The new Auburn system featured separate confinement at night and congregate hard labor by day (as had been urged in Massachusetts), supplemented by a cluster of disciplinary innovations: a strict rule of silence, orderly marching to and from the cells (which became famous as the “lockstep”) and constant oversight by prison authorities while the inmates were at labor. For the advocates of rehabilitation, these administrative


407. G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 40-46, 131-37; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 6 (1822) (Harvard Law Library); Governor’s Message, Jan. 9, 1822, Jan. 1822 Mass. Resolves 392-95; Governor’s Message, Jan. 1, 1823, Jan. 1823 Mass. Resolves 564; Governor’s Message, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 24; Governor’s Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 223-24. The Directors argued that the criteria of the classification scheme had, in any event, been misconceived. See Remarks, supra note 80, at 20-21. As for the diversion program for low level offenders, its creators had neglected to ensure the serviceability of local gaols. The result was another fiasco. See G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 22-23; J. QUINCY, supra note 318, passim; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 3-5 (1822); Austin, supra note 330, at 255-59.

408. Governor Lincoln sweetened the pill by shrewdly suggesting that the prison profits accrued up to that time be allocated to the new construction project, that convict labor be used to reduce the project’s cost, and that future prison profits be pledged to make up the difference. All of these proposals were followed. Governor’s Message, Jan. 31, 1825 ch. 62 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 105; Governor’s Message, Jan. 4, 1826, id. 251-254; Governor’s Message, Jan. 3 1827, id. 447-48; Governor’s Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 224-25. A similar request by Governor Brooks, made in 1822 under less promising fiscal circumstances, had gotten nowhere. Governor’s Message, Jan. 9, 1822 Mass. Resolves 391-97.

409. In 1829 solitary labor was introduced, and a second, more successful, institution based on the latter program (which came to be known as the Pennsylvania Plan) was opened. H. BARNES, supra note 325, at 168.

410. See generally W. LEWIS, supra note 138, at 81-110. The Auburn measures were homegrown, not borrowed from abroad. See M. IGNATIEFF, supra note 45, at 178. The ideals, however, of silence, strict discipline, and constant oversight can all be found in Massachusetts prison regulations long before the Auburn reforms, even if not scrupulously enforced. See Report of 1815 in G. HAYNES, supra note 321, at 232-35; Rules and Orders of 1816 in G.
devices fully reconciled the dual imperatives of congregate therapy and inmate separation. Though he labored in a team, each prisoner under the Auburn system of order and silence would nevertheless find himself "surrounded by an invisible wall." 411

In 1826, the Massachusetts legislators made the critical decision to renovate the State Prison according to the Auburn model, rather than the solitary model. 412 This decision accorded with Governor Lincoln's own preference, 413 as well as the counsel of Reverend Louis Dwight, whose influential Prison Discipline Society had been formed in the preceding year. 414 In 1829, the so-called "New Prison" opened, administered under a new code of regulations which ordained the Auburn discipline. 415

The underlying philosophy of the Massachusetts State Prison thus remained decidedly rehabilitative. Relying "on the presumption that habit will have some influence," the prison authorities assigned each convict to "that [prison] occupation . . . for which he seems best qualified, and by which therefore he may be most likely to earn a subsistence after his release." Once his sentence expired, the convict was launched back into the world, prepared to "obtain an honest livelihood with less exertion and risk than a dishonest one [whereby he] may perhaps pay some regard to [his] own interest." 416

BRADFORD, supra note 67 at 35-36; Rules and Orders of 1823 in Remarks, supra note 80, at 53-54, 56-59.

411. W. LEWIS, supra note 138, at 90.


414. The annual reports of the Prison Discipline Society propagated relentlessly for the Auburn plan. See, e.g., 1 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117, at 57-60 (1826). These reports were widely circulated; the first report (1826) went through four editions in a year and five hundred copies were purchased by the Massachusetts Legislature. In addition, the Society conducted a lobbying campaign, which, so it claimed, was instrumental in securing the renovation legislation. See 2 id. at 50-51. Among other influences that may have swayed the legislators were the Puritan values already mentioned, see notes 372-76 supra and accompanying text, and the relative frugality of the income-generating Auburn scheme, see W. LEWIS, supra note 138, at 109. In addition, while solitary confinement continued to constitute a subject of which "there is great interest excited at the present time," it had recently been tested in New York with disastrous results — a bit of empirical data which the Prison Discipline Society happily trumpeted. See 2 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117 (1826); 2 id. 61-69 (1827); G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 331, at 41-42, 56; W. LEWIS, supra note 138, at 68-70.

415. The "New Prison," later known as the "North Wing," was built within the original Charlestown prison compound. For a description, see REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 1-8 (1829). The rule of silence, the lockstep, vigilant inspection at labor, and solitary sleeping and dining were all introduced, per the Auburn plan. Id. at 8-9; Act of Mar. 11, 1828, 1825-1828 Mass. Acts 825; Governor's Message, Jan. 6, 1830, 1828-1831 Mass. Resolves 222-24.

Retained as an internal sanction, solitary confinement all but disappeared as a preliminary stage of a convict’s sentence. As if to crown the rehabilitation advocates’ victory, the Board of Directors of the State Prison, having previously sought to eliminate the Warden’s office, was instead itself dissolved.

By all accounts, the Massachusetts State Prison turned a corner in 1829. Internal disruptions ceased under the new discipline, convict labor remained productive, and the voice of opposition to the penitentiary system finally fell silent. In short, the 1828 reforms settled both the debate over the penitentiary’s choice of ideologies and the debate over its fundamental practicability. While that settlement relied on some home-grown administrative innovations, it also signaled a final triumph for a deeply rooted intellectual tradition.

417. Id. at 10. Under the Revised Statutes (code) of 1836, the old format of specifying two successive sentences, the first to solitary confinement and the second to hard labor, standard since 1805, was terminated. Thereafter, the statutes specified single terms of hard labor, the judge retaining discretion to set a preliminary term of solitary confinement of up to 20 days in all cases (far shorter than under previous statutes). Mass. Rev. Stat. pt. IV, tit. II, ch. 139, § 8 (1836).

418. Act of Mar. 11, 1828, ch. 118, 1825-1828 Mass. Acts 819; G. Haynes, supra note 321, at 47. (Sadly, Warden Bradford did not live to see this outcome). The conflict of ideologies remained active in other climes, where penitentiaries remained to be constructed. Often European visitors of American penitentiaries carried their ideological allegiances along with them, coloring their appraisals of what they saw: English inspectors of Auburn Prison thus described its discipline alternatively as “moral machinery” and as a “mere manufact{}ry.” M. Iona-Tiepp, supra note 45, at 194-95. Within the United States, advocates of the new Auburn plan struggled with the advocates of the new Pennsylvania plan, see supra note 409, to guide construction in the 1830s and 1840s. While both of these later programs combined elements of solitude and labor, they appear to have remained sufficiently distinct ideologically to prompt de Tocqueville’s salient contrast:

Now, to what point is this reformation actually effected by the different systems which we have examined? Before we answer this question, it will be necessary to settle the meaning attached to the word “reformation.” ... The [Pennsylvania] system being also that which produces the deepest impressions on the soul of the convict, must effect more reformation than that of Auburn. The latter, however, is perhaps more conformable to the habits of men in society, and on this account effects a greater number of reformations, which might be called “legal,” inasmuch as they produce the external fulfillment of social obligation. If it be so, the [Pennsylvania] system produces more honest men, and that of New York more obedient citizens.

G. De Beaumont & A. De Tocqueville, supra note 331, at 80-91 (quotes at 87, 91). Cf. D. Rothman, supra note 50, at 79-88, who draws his ideological distinction between an ancient deterministic theory and a modern optimistic theory, rather than between alternative contemporary theories (one old and one new). The Auburn advocates “fully shar[ed] the axioms and optimism of its rival,” differing only over the administrative details that would best fulfill the penitentiary’s promise. Id. at 87. Given “the basic similarity of the two programs,” Rothman traces the “startling” intensity of the debate, id. at 81, to the magnitude of the opportunity: “With the stakes so high . . . every element in penitentiary organization assumed overwhelming importance.” Id. at 85. Facial similarities in the two systems may, however, obscure the disparity between their intellectual foundations.

VI. CONCLUSION

The 1830s marked the heyday of the penitentiary in America. Facilities proliferated, the literature thrived, and visitors traveled vast distances to view American prisons in action. As Rothman says, the penitentiary in the 1830s "became the pride of the nation" — and the Jacksonians never tired of reminding others and themselves of their institutional achievement.420

Ballyhoo has always had a way of obscuring context. But even if contemporaries get caught up in their own excitement, the historian must not allow himself to be beguiled. The Jacksonians deserve due credit for their contribution, but the true origins of the penitentiary in Massachusetts will be found in a coalition of ancient European criminological theory and immediate, palpable social need.

In part, the assumption that the penitentiary was intellectually novel has probably sprung from an optical illusion. What we see before us, when we view the Massachusetts State Prison, is a structure without precedent: a facility with looming walls, holding hundreds of prisoners. Its very scale bespeaks innovation. But there is less here than meets the eye. Once state planners resolved to initiate a general policy of criminal incarceration, they had little choice but to design a new facility to accommodate it. The old ones were simply inadequate for the task.

It is unlikely that historians would have been so impressed with the novelty of criminal incarceration in America had it been instituted in the local workhouses that had long dotted the colonies. This possibility was pondered briefly in Massachusetts,421 but was rejected as impractical. Without refurbishing, the old facilities simply could not accommodate large numbers of long-term inmates. When the sale of Castle Island to the federal government forced the state to disperse its prisoners among local workhouses, the results were so unsatisfactory that judges temporarily ceased ordering sentences to hard labor. 422 Though the state might have upgraded these old facil-

420. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 50, at 79.
422. Act of Mar. 14, 1785, ch. 63, 1784-1785 Mass. Acts 163 (preamble); Act of Nov. 1, 1785, ch. 21, id. at 472 (preamble); Resolve of June 26, 1798, ch. 47, 1798-1799 Mass. Acts 196-97; Governor's Message, Jan. 13, 1804, 1802-1803 Mass. Acts 980; Petition of a number of Prisoners confined in Concord Jail, appended to 1802 Resolves ch. 54 (passed) (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Archives); Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30. Supreme Judicial Court manuscript minute books reveal an abrupt cessation of sentences to incarceration in the Feb. 1799 term; such sentences did not resume until the State Prison opened in 1805. Part of the problem was mere security: once the transfer to local workhouses had been effected, nearly half the previous Castle Island inmates escaped, a fact unsatisfactory in a theoretical, as well as
ities rather than build one new one on a grand scale, centralization offered a number of advantages: economies of scale, convenient oversight, and ready access to the Boston marketplace.\footnote{Report Respecting Convicts, \textit{supra} note 30; Governor's Message, Jan. 15, 1802, 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 583.} Thus, compelling administrative considerations determined the construction of the Massachusetts State Prison. The bare demands of penal ideology could have been met in far less dramatic a fashion.

Equally deceptive is the wealth of attention that visitors lavished on the Jacksonian penitentiaries.\footnote{Cf. D. Rothman, \textit{supra} note 50, at 94.} The deluge of European delegations in the 1830s masked a subtle shift in the intellectual center of penal reform. Before 1800, European theorists dominated the field of criminology, supplying the basic concepts and programs on which American facilities were built. Even the name “penitentiary” was coined by English reformers.\footnote{M. Ignatieff, \textit{supra} note 45, at 94.} But as the American efforts got off the ground, the new builders gained increasing renown. The Jacksonians offered, not fresh theories of what the penitentiary should accomplish, but fresh ideas about the practical implementation of old paradigms: primarily innovations in the realm of administration and design. European delegations flocked to American penitentiaries to learn these valuable, but secondary, lessons.

The English experience illustrates this intellectual migration. Having operated workhouses since the sixteenth century, English lawmakers had toyed with the idea of more extensive carceral programs over the years. The Hard Labor Act of 1779 was drafted by the towering figures of Howard, Eden, and Blackstone, and reviewed by Bentham; it certainly owed nothing to the rudimentary American efforts of that time. Though the Act itself was stillborn, English penitentiaries did open in the late eighteenth century, based upon local plans without American input.\footnote{See generally \textit{id.} at 93-109.}

By 1834, things had changed. Before embarking on a major new prison project, the English government sent William Crawford to tour American prisons. When Pentonville opened in 1842, its structure and internal routine strongly reflected the Philadelphia Penitentiary, with which Crawford had been most favorably impressed. Yet
the later English criminologists never lost track of the facility’s lineage. As Crawford insisted, the penitentiary was “British in its origin, British in its actual application, British in its legislative sanction.” And he was right. The Jacksonians reared the penitentiary; they did not conceive it.

In fact, ideological conception is but one chapter in the story of the penitentiary. Had ideology been all, the penitentiary might have appeared only in the pages of some dusty tomes. For only under conditions of intense social crisis could one expect a legislature to undertake a policy as wrenching and expensive as that represented by the move from pillory to penitentiary. The theorists themselves were first to bemoan their inability to make headway against the forces of legal inertia. “The voice of a philosopher is too weak to contend against the tumults and the cries of so many who are guided by blind custom,” Cesare Beccaria lamented. “How fortunate humanity would be if laws were for the first time being decreed for it . . . If these monarchs, I say, suffer the old laws to subsist, it is because of the infinite difficulties involved in stripping from errors the venerated rust of many centuries.”

How much more unyielding is that rust when reinforced with the virtues of economy? Jeremy Bentham learned the answer not once but twice. As a young critic of the Hard Labor Act, Bentham noticed that the logistical impediments to transportation of convicts brought on by the American Revolution “gave great weight to the inducements, if they were not the sole inducements, that led to the institution of this plan.” The novice prison reformer was amused that it had required “the misfortunes from which those difficulties took their rise . . . [to] force us into the adoption of a plan that promises to operate one of the most signal improvements that have ever yet been made in our criminal legislation.” But the elaborate Hard Labor Act was never implemented, and the lesson of the episode, so perceptively recognized, did not sink in. Bentham’s imagination had been warmed, and he spent the next twenty years beseeching Parliament to transform his own carceral scheme, the Pa-

427. Id. at 193-200 (quote at 195); see 8 PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, supra note 117; at 4 (1833); F. GRAY, PRISON DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA 59-61 (1847).
428. C. BECCARIA, supra note 83, at 52.
429. J. BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 5. Added Bentham: “It may not even be altogether extravagant to suppose, that at the end we may be found to have profitted not much less than we have suffered by these misfortunes, when the benefits of this improvement [the penitentiary system] come to be taken into the account.”
nopticon, into reality. These efforts came to naught, and Bentham eventually abandoned the project embittered rather than amused: "A jail," he wrote to Lord Pelham, "is not quite so easily built as talked of, not even in England, as I have had occasion to know but too well." 431

Indeed, Massachusetts was particularly prone to the forces of resistance, for it lacked a Jeremy Bentham to press the penitentiary's cause. In Pennsylvania, activist Benjamin Rush and the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons lobbied tirelessly for reform legislation, while in New York, Thomas Eddy pushed the idea with equal determination. 432 The great names of prison advocacy in Massachusetts do not appear until well after criminal incarceration had been instituted in that state. Gamaliel Bradford assumed his post as Warden (and unofficial cheerleader) of the Massachusetts State Prison in 1812, while the Reverend Louis Dwight founded the Boston Prison Discipline Society in 1825. Both arrived on the scene early enough to help fend off attacks on the fledgling penitentiary program, but far too late to influence its emergence. 433

The early stages of the penal reform movement in Massachusetts were shaped less by intellectuals than by popular clamor for action. The dominant theme was not enlightened principle but glaring necessity. "It appears to be the general and ardent desire of the people, that our penal laws may be immediately revised and corrected," one spokesman contended. 434 Another warned the legislature that the growing crime rate was "truly alarming — to your august body we

430. The story of Bentham's crusade has been often told. See, e.g., C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS 127-31 (1923).
431. J. BENTHAM, supra note 122, at 194-95.
432. See N. TEETERS, THEY WERE IN PRISON 1-50 (1937); W. LEWIS, supra note 138, at 1-5.
433. For a biographical sketch of Dwight, see O. LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776-1845 at 289-92 (1922). On Dwight's influence, see supra note 414. Bradford wrote a pamphlet to "vindicate" the institution in the face of its detractors, see G. BRADFORD, supra note 1 (first published in the Palladium), see also Communication from Gamaliel Bradford to the Legislature, Jan. 27, 1824 Senate Document no. 7029 (1824) (unpassed) (unpublished) (Mass. Archives), and encouraged outside manufacturers to contract for prison labor. In one letter, Bradford assures a businessman: "I think there is no doubt but you could have the mechanical part of your work done cheaper here than at any other place, but I should decline your friendly offer of becoming personally interested in any work established here, from motives of propriety." Letter from G. Bradford to F. Rotch, July 2, 1815, in Rotch Family Papers (unpublished manuscript, Mass. Historical Socy.). See letter from G. Bradford to F. Rotch, Aug. 18, 1815, in id. On the importance of individual efforts to spur reform, see generally Cooper, Ideas and Their Execution: English Prison Reform, 10 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUD. 87, 93 (1976).
look for redress — from you we have a right to expect it — and from you we will no doubt receive it." These were the sorts of arguments that could get things moving in the Massachusetts statehouse. Intellectual imagination had little influence on the process. As another columnist put it, "That the mode of punishment with respect to criminal cases, now in force, is derogatory to the principles of humanity, as well as impolitick, needs no great stretch of philosophy to discover." Only after the publicly perceived need for change had overcome the forces of inertia and economy did Massachusetts move in the direction of criminal incarceration.

Indeed, the years of reform were numbered by this stubborn fact. Once the immediate perception of crisis had passed, criminologists who sought additional institutional improvements encountered the familiar roadblocks. We have already noticed the legislature's reluctance to authorize funds for renovation, above the initial outlay to construct the State Prison. On another front, the legislature in 1819 responded to the pleas of activists by passing a sweeping reform of local houses of correction for juveniles and low level offenders. But the crucial section of the act mandating construction of individual cells and workshops was repealed within four months, and the rest of the act soon stood "little more than a dead letter upon the statute book." "Why" Josiah Quincy grieved, "should not the ancient houses of correction be revived? . . . There is but one reason; — that mistaken reason; — that abused word; — economy! The expense! — As if any expense was of weight, when put into the scales against humanity; against the duty, incumbent on every society, to multiply the means of moral advancement."

Quincy's cry from the heart has a timeless quality: In the real world, it takes a crisis to open the window to reform.

And therein lies the real tragedy in the rise of the penitentiary. For it is hardly clear, however much the theorists touted this reform, that the penitentiary ever really constituted an effective solution to crime. Under the early schemes of public punishment, the commu-

437. See notes 403 & 408 supra and accompanying text.  
439. Act of June 18, 1819, ch. 158, id. at 246.  
440. Quincy continued: "It is not pretended, that there is any thing new, in these suggestions. Would to heaven that there did not rest upon our state any deeper stain than that of ignorance!" J. QUINCY, supra note 318, at 12-19. Mayor Quincy's personal efforts did bear fruit within his own domain of influence: Boston. See J. QUINCY, supra note 256, at 102-09; 1826-1827 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 100, at 7 (1827).
nity had played an integral role in the rehabilitative process, reac-
tcepting the offender, or even shepherding him back into the fold of
society. Demographic change rendered these mechanisms of recon-
ciliation increasingly unworkable and, rather than endeavor to cure
them, the turn to incarceration sealed their abandonment. In this
sense, the transition represented a retreat in the face of adversity, not
an effort to forge ahead. With the rise of the penitentiary, the reha-
bilitative focus shrank from the offender and his place in the com-
munity to the offender alone. His orientation was the only factor
that the process sought to correct. And once the penitentiary was
frozen into place, the old, wider approach to rehabilitation was irre-
trievably lost:

The reformers themselves eventually came to appreciate the im-
portance of their omission. "[T]he system is incomplete," the Direc-
tors of the State Prison admitted in 1823,

and therefore the evil complained of necessarily occurs. Convicts are
discharged who have no friends, acquaintances or money; or who, by
being known as convicts, are avoided as infections and driven by ne-
cessity to commit new crimes. They are willing to labour, but can get
no employment; and cannot consent to starve, even at the hazard of
renewed imprisonment.441

Nor, in their haste to isolate offenders, had reformers kept sight of
another shortcoming of criminal incarceration: its impact on the of-
fender’s innocent dependents. The early Puritans had not been so
careless. In 1695, a statute mandating a fine or twenty days impris-
onment for unlicensed sale of liquor was abruptly amended to make
whipping the alternative to the fine. As the new preamble explained
the change, “divers ill disposed and indigent persons . . . if detected
and convicted of any such offense, are unable to satisfy the fine
imposed by law for the same, and cannot be punished by imprisonment
without wrong to their families.”442 Yet the later criminologists’ ef-
forts to correct these systemic defects were pitifully meager and
simpleistic.443

441. Remarks, supra note 80, at 26. See S. Burroughs, supra note 182, at 173, 176, 178;
Report Respecting Convicts, supra note 30; Report [On the State Prison] 8 (1822); 1817-
1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 20-21 (1817) (State Library Annex). The problem
was also recognized in England. See, e.g., W. Paley, supra note 87, at 293 & n.1, who went so
far as to oppose incarceration of petty criminals “until this inconvenience be remedied.” The
practice of tattooing State Prison inmates, instituted in 1818, hardly improved the situation.

442. 1 Prov. Laws, supra note 12, at 287 (1695). An interesting twist on this theme ap-
ppears in 2 Court of Assistants, supra note 23, at 65, 125 (imprisonment of a servant unjust
to the master).

443. The practice of tattooing inmates was abolished in 1830, Act of Mar. 12, 1830, ch. 114,
The ultimate irony of the rise of the penitentiary is that even as reformers waxed eloquent about the promise of rehabilitation, the scheme that they devised to accomplish it merely reinforced the conception of a criminal underclass. It built a wall, instead of a bridge, between offenders and society. If rehabilitation is inherently a reciprocal process, if it requires not only contrition but forgiveness as well, then the concept of criminal incarceration was flawed from the start.

Still, the penitentiary persists. Hallowed by time, it has ceased to constitute an "experiment" and instead has become second nature — just as the pillory had been before it. In an age of spiraling costs, explosive internal conditions, and escalating crime rates despite all, a sufficient crisis may well be approaching to sweep away the penitentiary and move on to something else. In any event, the historian can do his part by broadening the modern criminologist's horizons. If legal history does not tell us how things ought to be, it can at least tell us that they need not be the way they are. If "the venerated rust of many centuries" can be loosened a bit, then perhaps others will step forward to strip the errors bare.

1828-1831 Mass. Acts 459. The warden and the chaplain gave recommendations to those convicts whom they deemed worthy, and by statute in 1828, every convict left the State Prison with "a decent suit of clothes" and up to five dollars in cash (at the warden's discretion). Act of Feb. 23, 1818, ch. 176, 1815-1818 Mass. Acts 602-05; Act of Mar. 11, 1828, ch. 118, 1825-1828 Mass. Acts 825, 830; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 15-16 (1827); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 11 (May 1830); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 21 (1831). Warden Bradford simply asserted that society was "obligated" to welcome ex-convicts back into the fold and suggested that community groups participate in the process. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 51-52. At least one prison official acted on his own initiative to help ex-convicts find employment. AUSTIN, supra note 330 at 254. Government-sponsored programs to provide employment to ex-convicts, or to open a half-way house, were contemplated at various times, but never implemented. See 1817-1822 Mass. Legislative Documents no. 1, at 20-21 (1817) (State Library Annex); Resolve of Mar. 3, 1826, ch. 93, 1824-1828 Mass. Resolves 307; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 15, (1827): Resolve of Mar. 4, 1830, ch. 2, id. at 392; and the delightfully reasoned REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] (May 1830) (Harvard Law Library). An "agent" whose sole duties were to "counsel and advise" discharged convicts was finally appointed in 1845, sixty years after criminal incarceration had been instituted, Act of Mar. 22, 1845, ch. 176, 1845-1846 Mass. Acts 504; Act of Mar. 24, 1848, ch. 82, 1847-1849 Mass. Acts 647. The problems posed by the loss of support for convicts' dependents received even less attention. Bradford could be so callous as to identify loss of support as part of the deterrence inherent in the punishment. G. BRADFORD, supra note 1, at 14-15. The custom of "overstint," by which convicts could earn a salary for work performed over and above the daily stint assigned to them, was instituted in part to facilitate family support. But the practice was associated with internal abuses, and was abolished c. 1829. See Remarks, supra note 80, at 21; REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 9-11 (1827); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 11-15 (1828) (also printed in 1827-1828 Mass. Legislative Documents 734 (1828) (State Library Annex); REPORT [ON THE STATE PRISON] 8-9 (1829).