The Case Against Living Probate

Mary Louise Fellows

*University of Illinois*

Follow this and additional works at: [https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr](https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr)

Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

**Recommended Citation**


Available at: [https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol78/iss7/3](https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol78/iss7/3)
Living probate proposals have received increasing support in the last few years. Living probate enables a testator, prior to his death, to adjudicate several legal and factual issues that might be raised in a post-mortem will contest. Michigan enacted the first living probate statute in 1883, but two years later the Michigan Supreme Court voided the statute on state constitutional grounds. The idea of living probate thereafter lay dormant until the 1930s, when several proponents, most notably Professor David Cavers, encouraged its reconsideration. These commentators were unable to provoke legislative action. In 1946 the drafters of the Model Probate Code rejected living probate, saying that “the practical advantages of such a device are not great in view of the fact that few testators would wish to encounter the publicity involved in such a proceeding.” Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws continued to study living probate, the idea attracted few supporters until the publication of an article by Professor Howard Fink in 1976. Since that article appeared, Arkansas, North Da-
kota, 9 and Ohio 10 have enacted living probate statutes, and the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code have commenced work on a Uniform Ante-Mortem Probate Act. 11 More recently, Professor John Langbein and Professors Gregory Alexander and Albert Pearson have separately endorsed the idea of living probate. 12 They criticize existing legislation, however, and present alternative theoretical and practical approaches to living probate procedure.

This Article presents the case against living probate in hopes of preventing a reform that was appropriately discarded a century ago. Part I describes the various living probate proposals, highlighting their similarities, differences, and procedural complexities, and the benefits they seek to realize. Part II lays out four failings of living probate that call the desirability of this reform into question. Finally, in Part III, I propose an alternative reform which concentrates on the underlying problem inspiring living probate proposals— the expense and uncertainty of a mental capacity requirement for executing a valid will.

I. LIVING PROBATE PROPOSALS

In recent years scholars have advanced three different living probate proposals: Professor Fink advocates a “Contest Model” 13 for living probate procedure, Professor Langbein advocates a “Conservatorship Model,” and Professors Alexander and Pearson advocate an “Administrative Model.” Although the procedural differences between these models are significant, all three proposals envision the same limited scope of inquiry at living probate, and all attempt to reap the same benefits: improving the evidence of testamentary capacity and protecting testamentary freedom.

The various proposals for living probate statutes reflect nearly identical views of the proper scope of inquiry during living probate

13. Professor Langbein, and not Professor Fink, selected this label. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 63.
proceedings. In each model, the proceeding is limited to the issues of compliance with will execution formalities (e.g., signature of testator, number of witnesses attesting and signing the will), testamentary capacity, and undue influence. In other words, living probate would determine the validity of the testamentary instrument, but would not interpret its contents.

Deciding questions of compliance with will execution formalities during ante-mortem inquiry appears justified, but that advantage alone hardly justifies living probate. Adjudication of these questions can correct errors in will execution, thereby assuring the testator that the will is secure against attack for failure to comply with the formalities. This advantage is slight because only testators who have retained an attorney will make use of living probate proceedings, and attorneys rarely have had problems with execution formalities in recent years. Moreover, substantial Uniform Probate Code reforms already enable a testator to make sure that he has complied with execution formalities. The testator and the witnesses need only sign affidavits and complete certain procedures before a notary public (or any other officer authorized to administer oaths) to raise an irrefutable presumption of compliance. I am suggesting not that questions of compliance with execution formalities should be excluded from living probate inquiry, but only that this inquiry alone cannot justify creating this proceeding.

Construction of the contents of a will falls outside the scope of ante-mortem inquiry for several reasons. First, although the testimony of the testator would frequently help to resolve ambiguities and questions about a particular disposition, just as the attorney drafting the instrument failed to identify troublesome dispository language, the judge and the other parties may also overlook trouble-

---


15. See Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-504, 3-406(b). As opposed to establishing a conclusive presumption of compliance with certain formalities, the drafters could have merely provided that a will accompanied by signed affidavits meets all necessary procedural formalities. Such a statute would eliminate any possible allegations of a violation of procedural due process based on the use of conclusive presumptions. In any case, the statute would withstand constitutional attack on substantive due process grounds and should lead to the elimination of unnecessary litigation at probate. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 497-98 (1978); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1092-97 (1978).

16. In fact, the self-proved will promulgated by the UPC could be adopted in conjunction with the living probate proceeding and made a prerequisite to presenting the will to living probate.
some dispository language. Second, the proceeding could be lengthened and complicated unnecessarily while the parties resolve ambiguities that may never be relevant or important. Perhaps the parties should be able to raise construction questions, but should not be barred from litigating the issue later because of a failure to raise the issue in ante-mortem proceedings. Because of my fundamental criticisms of living probate in general, however, I do not discuss the merits of this possible expansion of the scope of the inquiry in this Article.

Inexplicably, issues concerning fraudulent interference in will execution (other than the question of undue influence) are also excluded from the living probate proceedings. 17 In this Article, I will address the application of living probate proceedings to allegations of fraud.

Proponents of each of the three living probate models foresee two advantages in its use. First, living probate could improve the fact-finding process in will contests involving allegations of mental incapacity, fraud, or undue influence by providing the testator the opportunity to testify. In such cases, the testator's state of mind and intent are determinative issues. 18 The availability of the testator for questioning eliminates the need to rely exclusively upon the testator's observed and reported actions. 19 The fact-finding process is further improved because the litigation occurs near the time of execution of the will, which is the critical time of inquiry in determining the will's validity. 20 This evidentiary advantage provides a strong argument for enacting a living probate statute.

Second, living probate proposals promote testamentary freedom


19. For examples of cases relying on observable and reportable actions of the testator to determine testamentary capacity, see Estate of Kirk, 161 Cal. App. 2d 145, 326 P.2d 151 (1958); In re Estate of Strittmatter, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947); Hickman v. Hickman, 244 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), error ref. n.r.e. In addition, see Note, Eccentricities and Testimonial Capacity, 46 DICK. L. REV. 254 (1942).

by offering the testator greater assurance that his dispository scheme will be carried out. In post-mortem probate, courts often substitute their own view of a fair dispository scheme for that of the testator by finding that the testator's scheme is abnormal.\(^2\) Abnormality of the dispository scheme bears on determinations of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence. When a court investigates testamentary capacity, the dispository scheme provides information about the testator's state of mind at the time of execution.\(^2\) When a court investigates fraud or undue influence, the dispository scheme may prove critical in determining whether the wrongful conduct affected the contents of the will.\(^2\) Obviously, the more atypical the distribution, the more vulnerable the will to claims of mental incapacity, fraud, or undue influence.\(^2\) But many courts fail to recognize that a finding that a disposition is "abnormal" should mean that the dispos-


\(^{2}\) See *In re Estate of Arnold*, 16 Cal. 2d 573, 107 P.2d 25 (1940); *In re Estate of Jensen*, 185 Minn. 284, 240 N.W. 656 (1932); *Keen's Estate*, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737 (1930). The courts substantially agree on the legal standard of mental capacity necessary for execution of a will. The testator must have at the time of execution of the will the ability to know and understand: (1) The nature and extent of the testator's property; (2) the persons who are the natural objects of the testator's bounty; and (3) the disposition the testator is making of his property. In addition, the testator must also have the capacity to appreciate these concepts in relation to each other, and to form an orderly desire as to the disposition of his property. *E.g.*, *Estate of Fritzsch*, 60 Cal. 2d 367, 384 P.2d 656, 33 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1963); *In re Anderson Estate*, 353 Mich. 169, 91 N.W.2d 356 (1953); *Hall Will*, 402 Pa. 212, 166 A.2d 644 (1961).

\(^{2}\) The elements necessary to prove fraud are: (1) misrepresentation or suppression of a material fact; (2) known to be false by the person making the misrepresentation at the time it was made; (3) made for the purpose of inducing the decedent to act in reliance thereon; (4) action by the decedent in reliance on the misrepresentation or suppression of fact; (5) injury to the decedent or another resulting from the induced action. *See, e.g.*, *Kyle v. Pate*, 222 Ark. 4, 257 S.W.2d 34 (1953); *Franklin v. Belt*, 130 Ga. 37, 60 S.E. 146 (1908); *Roblin v. Shantz*, 210 Or. 371, 311 P.2d 459 (1957); *Stick's Estate*, 232 Pa. 98, 81 A. 187 (1911); *In re Dand's Estate*, 41 Wash. 2d 158, 247 P.2d 1016 (1952).

Undue influence is defined as conduct that destroys the free agency of the decedent and substitutes the decedent's testamentary wishes for those of another. Although the instrument is executed by the decedent and all apparent formalities are present, the will or a part of the will is a product of a captive mind, and, consequently, testamentary intent is so lacking that the will is invalid. *Parrisella v. Fotopulos*, 111 Ariz. 4, 522 P.2d 1081 (1974); *Estate of Franco*, 50 Cal. App. 3d 374, 123 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1975); *In re Estate of Carpenter*, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1971); *Yribar v. Fitzpatrick*, 91 Idaho 105, 416 P.2d 164 (1966); *Breault v. Feigenholtz*, 54 Ill. 2d 173, 296 N.E.2d 3 (1973). Specific factors considered in finding a causal connection between undue influence and the testamentary disposition include consideration of an apparently unnatural or unjust dispository scheme that can be explained by influential conduct by a legatee or by one who is interested in benefiting the legatee. *See Estate of Teal*, 255 Cal. 2d 520, 154 P.2d 384 (1945); *Estate of Peters*, 9 Cal. App. 3d 916, 88 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1970); *In re Will of Fenwick*, 348 A.2d 12 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1975).

\(^{2}\) See Cavers, *Ante Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law*, supra note 4, at 442-43. In addition, see Fink, supra note 7, at 265 n.1 for a description of unreported cases in which the critical factor was an unnatural distribution.
sition appears unnatural for the particular testator. Instead, probate judges find a dispository scheme abnormal when they feel a contestant has been unfairly excluded from a share of the testator's bounty.25 Living probate discourages judges from invalidating a will

---

25. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 184-88 (1970); Cavers, supra note 4, at 441-43; Fink, supra note 7, at 265-66; Langbein, supra note 12, at 66. See also Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L. REV. 91, 92 (1953) (noting that juries find for the contestant in the majority of cases in California). The courts' inclinations to substitute their own views of a dispository scheme for that of the testator and the dangers of such a jurisprudence were perhaps best stated in 1876 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72, 77-78 (1876):

The growing disposition of courts and juries to set aside last wills and testaments, and to substitute in lieu thereof their own notions as to what a testator should do with his property, is not to be encouraged. No right of the citizen is more valued than the power to dispose of his property by will . . . . It rarely happens that a man bequeaths his estate to the entire satisfaction of either his family or friends. In many instances testamentary dispositions of property seem harsh, if not unjust, the result, perhaps, of prejudice as to some of the testator's kindred, or undue partiality as to others. But these are matters about which we have no concern. The law wisely secures equality of distribution where a man dies intestate. But the very object of a will is to produce inequality . . . . It is doubtful true that narrow prejudice sometimes interferes with the wisdom of such arrangements . . . . It must be remembered that in this country a man's prejudices are a part of his liberty. He has a right to them; he may be unjust to his children or relatives; he is entitled to the control of his property while living, and by will to direct its use after his death, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by law.

For examples of the improper standard of abnormality, compare Estate of Goetz, 253 Cal. App. 2d 107, 61 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1967), with Rizzo v. D'Ambrosia, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 837, 310 N.E.2d 925 (1974). In Estate of Goetz, evidence showing that the decedent erroneously suspected her husband of trying to poison her and of mistreating her led neither the jury nor the California Court of Appeal to invalidate a will which excluded her husband. In contrast, a Massachusetts court in Rizzo affirmed a verdict holding a will invalid based on testimony that at the time the will was executed, the testator suffered from the delusion that his niece was poisoning him. In the Goetz case the delusion was disregarded but in Rizzo it was of critical importance. The best, and perhaps only, explanation for the difference in results can be found in the respective courts' views concerning what constituted a proper disposition under the circumstances of the case. Never identifying the beneficiaries under the proffered will, the Rizzo court stated:

Here, the decedent's delusion that he was being poisoned by his niece concerned the very person who, as she had been rendering him daily care and assistance for more than ten years, would seem to have had the greatest claim to his bounty.

2 Mass. App. at 838, 310 N.E.2d at 926 (emphasis added).

The Goetz court, when addressing the allegation of undue influence, indicated its view as to naturalness of the disposition

It was, indeed, entirely natural that testatrix should consider that in view of her husband's advanced years he would have an ample amount, . . . . Mrs. Goetz' husband and her son had not been on good terms and it is unlikely that the husband would have left anything to the respondent.

253 Cal. App. 2d at 107, 118, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 181, 188 (emphasis added). Both courts imposed their own determinations of a fair and reasonable disposition of the decedent's property in light of the relationship between the testator and the litigants, the financial dependency of each litigant upon the testator, and the contributions of each litigant to the welfare of the testator. Accord, In re Estate of Coles, 205 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Adams v. Calla, 433 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. 1968); See generally Epstein, supra note 21, at 238-49; Green, supra note 21, at 277-81, 298-311; Note, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1129, 1130-31, 1141-43 (1966).

Bequests to nonprofit organizations viewed as unworthy of financial support suffer frequent attack. In the case of In re Strittmater's Estate, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947), a 49-year-old decedent, who was survived by some cousins whom she saw only infrequently during the last few years of her life, left her entire estate to the National Women's Party. Her mem-
despite insubstantial evidence of incapacity, fraud, or undue influence. The testator's presence and ability to testify would inhibit reliance by the court on its view of "fairness" in the dispository scheme to resolve these issues. 26

bership in the organization spanned over nineteen years. The court relied on memoranda written by the testator six years before she executed the will to find that she harbored an insane hatred for men. Although the testator's business dealings with her male attorney and male banker were entirely reasonable and normal, the court attributed the inconsistency to her "split personality." The Court concluded that her psychosis caused her to leave her estate to the National Women's Party, and it therefore invalidated the will.

In contrast, in Jones v. South Dakota Children's Home Society, 238 N.W.2d 677 (S.D. 1947), an 85-year-old decedent, who had previously suffered a stroke, executed a will revoking a prior will that contained substantial bequests to collateral relatives and substituting bequests to charities including a crippled children's hospital, a boys' ranch, a boys' home, and a township. The court held that the decedent possessed sufficient mental capacity to execute the will. The court reasoned that the testator was justified in revoking the bequests to his relatives because they were in part responsible both for the imposition of a guardianship over his estate and for the subsequent sale of his property. The court also refused to rely on the evidence concerning the decedent's weakened mental state that did not relate to the specific time frame in which the decedent executed the will. The court rejected the argument that leaving the property to a government was evidence of the decedent's incompetence.

The court in Strittmater was dealing with an insane delusion. Therefore, focusing on the particular disposition was justified because the legal issue was whether the insane delusion affected any part of the dispository scheme. The finding of an insane delusion in Strittmater, however, seems irreconcilable with Jones. Perhaps the best explanation for the different results is found in the courts' views as to the worthiness of the respective beneficiaries named in the wills.

The imposition of the court's view of a natural disposition is not limited to cases alleging testamentary incapacity, but includes cases in which fraud or undue influence is at issue. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gelonese, 36 Cal. App. 3d 854, 111 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1974). In Gelonese, the decedent bequeathed substantially larger shares of her estate to three of her children than to the other two. The two disfavored children contested probate of the will on the grounds that the will was procured by fraud and undue influence. A jury held that a presumption of undue influence had been established by the disfavored children upon showing a confidential relationship between the decedent and the favored children, active participation in the execution of the will by these children, and undue benefit to them. The jury also held that the proponents of the will had failed to rebut that presumption. The appellate court affirmed the jury verdict that the will was procured through the undue influence of the favored children:

[T]here can be no question that this element was established by substantial evidence. The will was an unnatural one in that it did not treat all of decedent's children equally . . . . In the light of the evidence, although in conflict, that decedent wanted her children to share equally in her estate, [three of the children] would receive substantially more under the will than [two other children]. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added).

In contrast, in Burke v. Thomas, 282 Ala. 412, 21 So. 2d 903 (1968), the court did not find that a beneficiary's active involvement in the execution of the will and the decedent's dependency upon the beneficiary for care raised an inference of undue influence. A distant relative had moved into the decedent's home for the purpose of caring for her during her illness. Without sufficient income to pay for her care, the decedent instead promised to leave the relative all of her property. The relative and the decedent asked an attorney to draft such a will, and the relative was present during the will's execution. The beneficiary under a prior will alleged undue influence and testamentary incapacity. The jury found the will valid, and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed their decision. The Burke court found that the care provided by the relative explained the bequest.

Like the mental competency cases, the Gelonese and Burke decisions can be best rationalized by looking not to the differences in the quality or the nature of the evidence showing undue influence, but, rather, to the courts perception of the fairness of the disposition.

26. Of course, many courts realize the danger of considering the fairness of a dispository
Living probate therefore draws its usefulness entirely from the testator's presence and testimony. The presence of the testator at a living probate proceeding serves both society's interest in accurate factual determinations on issues relating to will validity and the testator's interest in preventing courts from judging the "fairness" of his testamentary disposition.

A. The Contest Model

Professor Howard Fink proposed this model for living probate in 1976, and it has subsequently been enacted in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio. The Contest Model envisions an adversarial proceeding that results in a declaratory judgment on issues of testamentary capacity, compliance with execution formalities, and undue influence. The parties to the proceeding include expectant heirs and beneficiaries of the proffered will. In sum, the Contest Model changes only the timing of the litigation; otherwise the proceeding is essentially identical to a post-mortem will contest.

Because the Contest Model changes only the timing of the adjudication, it imposes substantial hardships on the testator and on the expectant heirs and beneficiaries of any will revoked by the proffered will. The testator loses the benefits of a confidential testamentary disposition during his life. Family harmony is seriously threatened since family members learn of unfavorable dispositions before the testator's death. The expectant heirs and beneficiaries of prior wills affected by the proffered will (hereinafter both classes of persons are referred to as presumptive takers) must bear litigation costs early although their inheritance remains uncertain until the testator's death. To take, they must not only survive the testator, but they also risk that the testator will consume or otherwise dispose of the property before his death. Beneficiaries under the proffered will who receive less than their intestate succession share, or less than the bequests made to them under a prior will, may abstain from litigating for fear that if they lose, the testator will execute a new will disinheriting scheme and refuse to invalidate a will on that basis. See, e.g., Jackson's Exr. v. Semones, 266 Ky. 352, 98 S.W.2d 505 (1936); Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Berry, 93 Md. 560, 49 A. 401 (1901); In re Estate of Martin, 1 Or. App. 260, 457 P.2d 662 (1967); In re Sommerville's Estate, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A.2d 496 (1962).

27. Professor Fink's proposal mistakenly omitted beneficiaries of prior wills affected by the proffered will from the list of parties to the living probate proceeding. The three statutes presently enacted also omit these persons.

heriting them entirely. Moreover, fickle testators who frequently change their wills could repeatedly confront family members with the dilemma of whether to contest each proffered will in ante-mortem proceedings. All these disadvantages of the Contest Model have led proponents of living probate to propose modifications in order to alleviate the hardships imposed upon both the testator and the presumptive takers.

B. The Conservatorship Model

Professor John Langbein proposes to reduce the family tensions living probate might create, and to improve the litigating posture of the will contestants, through the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent all persons whose property interests might suffer from an ante-mortem finding that a will is valid. Langbein refers to his proposed scheme as the Conservatorship Model. The procedure duplicates the adversarial and adjudicative format of the Contest Model. The testator would petition the court with probate jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment that his will was obtained without undue influence and that he possessed testamentary capacity at the time of execution. A copy of the executed will would accompany the petition. To assure adequate preliminary counseling, proper drafting and execution of the will, and prevention of frivolous proceedings, the Conservatorship Model would require that the testator be represented by an attorney. The presumptive takers and beneficiaries of the proffered will would receive notice and an opportunity to appear at the living probate proceeding. In addition, the court would appoint a guardian ad litem to represent all persons whose property interests might suffer from a finding that the testator possessed testamentary capacity or was free from undue influence. The testator would bear the reasonable expenses incurred by the guardian ad litem. 29 Thus, persons with potential interests in invalidating the will could decline to contest the testator’s suit in their own names, while continuing to be represented by the guardian ad litem.

Professor Langbein suggests that the guardian ad litem reduces living probate’s disruption of family harmony. The presumptive takers “would be able to communicate any relevant information or suspicions to the guardian ad litem in confidence, without having to take actions hostile to the testator.” 30 According to Professor Langbein,

29. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 79.
30. Id. at 78.
[The Conservatorship Model] would permit full development and ventilation of evidence of incapacity without requiring family members to step forward and assert that the testator lacked capacity. Those positions adverse to the testator would be developed, but not in the exaggerated mold of adversary contest, which has such unpleasant implications for family harmony and for the human values at stake.31 Langbein also predicts that the guardian ad litem would better protect the interests of unborn or unascertained heirs, as well as those presumptive takers who calculate that benefits of invalidating the proffered will are too remote to justify litigating.32

While I will describe the flaws of living probate at some length below, I feel compelled to challenge one feature of the Conservatorship Model at the outset. I doubt that employing a guardian ad litem will preserve the family harmony threatened by a living probate proceeding. Placing the guardian ad litem as a buffer between the presumptive takers and the testator achieves little. To represent fully presumptive takers, the guardian ad litem will necessarily rely on information the presumptive takers provide. He will obtain documents from them, take their depositions, and investigate their suspicions. The testator and others who want the will upheld are very likely to recognize the sources of information used to challenge the will. Although Langbein envisions an informal proceeding in which the evidence would be presented in a nonadversarial context without the use of a jury, the proceeding remains adjudicative, and opposing testimony will still be presented.33 In essence, the proceeding is both adversarial and potentially acrimonious.

C. The Administrative Model

Professor Gregory Alexander's doubts about the adequacy of Langbein's proposals eventually led him to construct the Administrative Model for living probate. Alexander believes that a living probate scheme will not be viable unless testators can keep their testamentary dispositions confidential. At first, Alexander proposed to preserve confidentiality by providing the testator a living probate procedure in which the presumptive takers would receive no notice or opportunity to appear, and only a guardian ad litem would investigate the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.34

---

31. Id. at 79.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 75-76, 80-81.
34. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 91. As the representative of presumptive takers including unborn or unascertained heirs, the guardian ad litem would provide information about the mental capacity of the testator and about whether the will was obtained free from undue influence.
electing to preserve confidentiality, the testator would sacrifice the
certainty provided by the Conservatorship Model. Any declaratory
judgment issued would create only a presumption of validity that
could be challenged in a subsequent post-mortem contest. Alexander
envisioned that both the Conservatorship Model and this “non-
binding option” would be available to the testator.

A year after proposing this “nonbinding option,” Alexander de-
cided that the ante-mortem declaratory judgment should be binding
even absent notice and a hearing for presumptive takers. Writing
with Professor Albert Pearson, Alexander developed a plan for an ex
parte living probate proceeding in which only a guardian ad litem
would appear. Because the proposal envisions an administrative-
type proceeding rather than an adversarial one, Alexander and Pear-
son label it the “Administrative Model.”

Unlike the Conservatorship Model or the “nonbinding option,”
the Administrative Model’s guardian ad litem would not represent
the presumptive takers or the beneficiaries of the proffered will, but
would function more as a civil prosecutor or special master account-
able to the court. Initially, the testator would petition the appro-
priate court for a declaration that the will was duly executed and
that the testator possessed testamentary capacity and was free from
undue influence. Although the will would accompany the petition,
only the judge could inspect it. If the court believed that the will
contained unusual provisions, it could alert the guardian ad litem
to inquire into specific matters without disclosing the terms. The
guardian ad litem would have the responsibility of interviewing the

35. If the court determined, after considering the evidence provided by the guardian ad
litum, questioning the testator, and reviewing the proffered will, that the testator possessed
testamentary capacity and was free from undue influence, it would issue a declaratory judg-
ment establishing a presumption of will validity for purposes of any post-mortem contest. To
make this option more attractive, Alexander proposes that the presumption of validity could
only be overcome by evidence establishing probable cause for invalidation that the guardian
ad litem did not present in the ante-mortem proceeding. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 92.
This presumption is stronger than the rebuttable presumption of validity with respect to issues
of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence created under the Uniform Probate Code
for self-proved wills. See Uniform Probate Code § 3-406. But doubt remains whether the
strength of the presumption would decrease strike suits enough to justify the administrative
burden on the courts and the increased burden on testators; Langbein asserts that it would not.
See Langbein, supra note 12, at 77-78 n.50.

36. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 111-12. This proposal is very similar to the one
proposed by Cavers in 1934. See Cavers, supra note 4, at 445-47.

37. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 113-14. Because the guardian ad litem only
functions as an investigator for the court, the “guardian” label chosen by Alexander and Pear-
son is probably inappropriate; it will be used in this Article solely to avoid confusion.

38. Id. at 113.

39. Id. at 114.
testator (outside the presence of the attorney who drafted the will), members of the testator’s family, and others who know the testator well. Based on these interviews the guardian ad litem would report his determination of the issues to the court.40 The trier of fact would then make binding determinations on the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

Like the Conservatorship Model, the Administrative Model still would disrupt family harmony. After interviews by the guardian ad litem, family members will likely grow curious as to the contents of the will. Although Alexander and Pearson do not suggest this, presumably the testator may waive the no-notice and restrictive procedures. If so, the secret procedure becomes elective and the testator’s failure to waive confidentiality may fuel unpleasant suspicions among family members.

D. Unresolved Issues

Before leaving this discussion of the living probate proposals, three unresolved procedural issues require discussion so that the reader has a more complete understanding of the complexity of living probate. Below I describe the thorny issues of appealability of a living probate decree, collateral effect of a living probate decree, and revocability of a will validated by living probate.

Parties to a living probate proceeding could appeal a finding of validity or invalidity of a will.41 Difficulties will arise, however, in defining the duty of a guardian ad litem to pursue an appeal under the Conservatorship or Administrative Model. If the testator dies before the parties have exhausted their opportunities for appeal, the distribution of the estate will await a final order. Once a final order upholding the will has been issued, all the living probate proposals contemplate that it will bind those persons who had notice of the proceeding. The Administrative Model, of course, would bind even those persons who were not notified of the proceeding.

The literature contains little discussion of the collateral effect of a final ante-mortem order holding the proffered will invalid.42 The proponents of living probate have concerned themselves more with the binding effect on presumptive takers of an order upholding the

40. Id. at 114.
42. Professor Fink recommended that a limitation be placed on the use in subsequent proceedings of the facts found in the ante-mortem proceeding so as to eliminate a testator’s fear “that by instituting a proceeding to determine his testamentary capacity he runs the risk that an unfavorable verdict or unfavorable findings could be detrimental (or even determinative) in a future proceeding testing his mental capacity.” Fink, supra note 7, at 277.
will. Under the Contest and Conservatorship Models, an order from an ante-mortem probate proceeding holding a will invalid binds the legatees because they were made parties to the proceeding. If the testator re-executes the will after the final order of invalidity, or if the testator executes another will containing different dispositions, the final order and other findings of fact from the proceeding are admissible evidence at a later living probate proceeding or at a post-mortem probate will contest. Res judicata does not apply to this latter case because the issue presented there is whether the testator possessed testamentary capacity or was free from fraud or undue influence when the second execution occurred. Nevertheless, a prior finding of testamentary incapacity will bear on whether the testator possessed testamentary capacity at a later time. A prior finding of fraud or undue influence with respect to a prior will is likely to be given less weight even if the dispositions are nearly identical because the same instances of wrongful conduct are less likely to affect the second execution by the testator. The contestants to the will must offer evidence of further wrongful conduct or continuing wrongful conduct at the time of the subsequent execution in order to have the second will declared invalid.

Similar questions arise under the Administrative Model. Arguably, presumptive takers should benefit from a finding of invalidity if the same will is presented at a post-mortem will contest because the testator already enjoyed an opportunity to prove the validity of the will. The difficult issue, however, is whether the testator satisfactorily represents the legatees named in the proffered will. The legatees' interests, in a sense, derive from that of the testator, and when

43. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-04 (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.085 (Page Supp. 1979); Fink, supra note 7, at 275. Both Fink's living probate proposal and the North Dakota statute contain redundant language:
The facts found in a proceeding brought under this [section/chapter] shall not be admissible in evidence in any proceeding other than one brought in [this state/North Dakota] to determine the validity of a will; nor shall the determination in a proceeding under this chapter be binding, upon the parties to such proceeding, in any action not brought to determine the validity of a will.
Fink, supra note 7, at 275; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-04 (Supp. 1979). The second phrase does not seem to provide any additional limitation on the use of the facts found in the proceeding, although in his explanation of the provision, Fink implies that two issues are involved:
[T]he proposed statute provides that facts found in a proceeding under the statute are not admissible in evidence in actions other than for the determination of the validity of a will, and that the determination in such a statutory proceeding shall not be binding for collateral estoppel purposes upon the parties in other actions not involving the determination of the validity of a will.
Fink, supra note 7, at 277.
The drafters of the Ohio statute eliminated the last phrase; perhaps they, too, found the language redundant. In any case, the use of the indefinite article in all of these statutes suggests that the drafters contemplated that the findings of fact would be admissible into evidence in litigation concerning the validity of a subsequent will.
so viewed, they should be bound by any order that binds the testator. If legatees could use a finding of validity against the presumptive takers, even though the legatees have not suffered litigation costs, presumptive takers should benefit from a finding of invalidity. On the other hand, because the Administrative Model does not require presumptive takers personally to litigate the issues, they have not incurred litigation costs and thus, arguably, they are not unfairly hurt if they cannot bind the legatees of the proffered will to a finding of invalidity. In any case, just as in the Contest Model or Conservatorship Model, if a testator re-executes the same will or drafts another will with different provisions, a living probate finding that a prior will was invalid should be admissible into evidence.

Allowing a living probate finding of invalidity to bind the testator and the legatees (and admitting that finding in contests over subsequently executed wills) may deter the use of the living probate proceeding. Nevertheless, this apparent disadvantage of living probate should not be removed; it will properly deter the use of the procedure in cases where questions of testamentary incapacity, fraud, or undue influence should legitimately be raised. Moreover, judges might be more reluctant to make a binding determination of will validity and preclude any further litigation by persons adversely affected by the will if they know that a finding of invalidity will have no binding effect on either the beneficiaries under the will or the presumptive takers.

In contrast to their silence on collateral effects, proponents of living probate have carefully addressed issues concerning the appropriate manner for totally or partially revoking a court-approved will. They have suggested three alternative approaches to revocation. Langbein argues that the formalities for revocation should be the same for court-approved wills as they are for other types of wills. Arkansas has adopted this proposition. Fink argues that the testator should be required to petition the court to revoke or modify a will it approved in a previous living probate proceeding. North Dakota has adopted this proposition. Alexander and Pearson propose a compromise; the testator could revoke by submitting notice of the revocation to the court.

44. Langbein, supra note 12, at 81.
46. Fink, supra note 7, at 276-77.
Alexander and Pearson's approach to revocability seems to be the most appropriate. Requiring court approval of a subsequent revocation or modification of the will eliminates post-mortem allegations of revocation or of incapacity, fraud, and undue influence with respect to a revocation. Requiring a court proceeding, however, seems to restrain unjustifiably a testator's freedom to modify or revoke an existing testamentary scheme. Since virtually all testators who use the living probate proceeding would obtain the advice of an attorney, they would usually know the risks of an informal revocation and could prudently decide whether to institute further proceedings. Requiring mere notice to the court eliminates the possibility of unfounded or erroneous allegations that the court-approved will has been revoked without imposing another costly and time-consuming procedure on the testator. Although requiring notice increases the risk that an otherwise valid revocation must go unrecognized, the protection against unfounded allegations of revocation probably makes that risk worthwhile.

II. THE FAILINGS OF LIVING PROBATE

The case against living probate can be rested on any of several flaws in the Contest, Conservatorship, and Administrative Models. First, the proposals will fail to achieve their own stated objectives of improving the evidence available during probate and assuring testators that their dispository schemes will be carried out. Second, all three proposals make the testator pay a high price for these ephemeral advantages. Finally, and perhaps most important, all three proposals are unfair to presumptive takers, and under the Administrative Model that unfairness may rise to the level of a constitutional due process violation.

A. Quality of Evidence at Living Probate

One of the alleged advantages of living probate is the improved fact-finding possible when adjudicating the issues of capacity, fraud, and undue influence before the testator's death. On the contrary, living probate sacrifices considerable evidence in order to obtain the testator's testimony. Under the Contest Model, presumptive takers are deterred from coming forward with meritorious evidence of fraud or undue influence. As long as the testator remains free to execute a new will, a successful challenge to a will on grounds of fraud and undue influence will achieve little; the testator can always

49. See text at notes 18-20 supra.
re-execute the will and force the presumptive takers to find further wrongful conduct to invalidate the will again. Even if the original will failed to reflect the testator's true intent, once free from fraudulent beliefs or undue influence the testator may execute a new will which, consistent with his true intent, disinherits the challengers. Professor Langbein responds that perhaps living probate should not resolve issues of undue influence at all. But he ultimately concludes that "failure to extend the res judicata effect of the living probate decree to the undue influence theory would undermine most of the reform, since it is so easy (and so common) to tack an undue influence count on to an unsound mind claim."^50

I seriously doubt that interjecting a guardian ad litem into proceedings under the Conservatorship Model will improve the quality of the evidence presented during probate. To the extent that use of a guardian ad litem provides anonymity for persons who offer evidence of testamentary incapacity, fraud, and undue influence, it also removes an important disincentive to the raising of unfounded allegations. Imposing the reasonable cost of the guardian ad litem on the testator^51 enhances this problem. Thus, it is unclear that the Conservatorship Model of living probate would lead to a correct decision more often than the Contest Model.

Finally, to the extent that the Administrative Model ensures confidentiality, it also increases the risk of an erroneous finding that a will was executed free from fraud and undue influence, or that the testator possessed testamentary capacity. The Administrative Model subverts the goal of improving fact-finding during living probate because it precludes interested parties who possess relevant information from participating in the adjudicatory process. A legislature that enacts the Administrative Model should understand that one of the consequences will be to uphold some wills that otherwise would be found invalid.

B. Testamentary Freedom: Assuring That the Testator's Disposition Will Be Followed

A second alleged advantage of living probate is that it will promote testamentary freedom by assuring the testator that a court will carry out his will after his death. Unfortunately, testators will have two lingering doubts even after a will is found valid in a living probate proceeding — doubts that will deter many testators from using

---

^50. Langbein, supra note 12, at 84-85 (footnote omitted).
^51. See id. at 75.
living probate. Testators will remain uncertain as to the validity of their wills because of the possibilities of a post-mortem contest based upon fraud on the court and fraud or undue influence occurring after the living probate decree is issued, and also because other states may refuse to recognize the living probate decree of the forum state.

Even after a testator obtains a living probate decree that his will is valid, presumptive takers can challenge the court-approved will by alleging either fraud on the court during the living probate proceeding or fraud or undue influence after the proceeding that prevented the testator from revoking his will. Under the living probate proposals, presumptive heirs can set aside a living probate order upon a showing of fraud on the court. 52 Fraud on the court would likely include the execution of a will that includes bequests to likely contesters solely to deter them from litigating if the testator sought to obtain a judgment on testamentary capacity that might bear on the validity of a new will executed shortly thereafter. If the contestants can establish the testator's intent and can show that they abstained from litigating because of the bequests to them, the court might nullify the living probate decree. 53 Fraud on the court might also include fraudulent concealment of evidence from the guardian ad litem (assuming a Conservatorship or Administrative Model), and may even include the negligent failure of the guardian ad litem to investigate suspicious conduct. 54

Presumptive takers can also challenge the court-approved will in a post-mortem proceeding by showing that fraud or undue influence after living probate prevented the testator from revoking the will and executing a new one. In many cases, wrongful conduct occurring before the execution of the will may continue after execution, and a binding living probate decree therefore will not prevent challenges based on fraud or undue influence. With attacks on the will based on fraud and undue influence remaining viable after the testator's death, living probate only prohibits post-mortem attacks alleging testamentary incapacity. However, most reported cases that contain allegations of testamentary incapacity also include allegations of fraud and undue influence — primarily because deception and duress intrude more easily upon the physically or mentally weakened testator. 55 Thus, for all practical purposes, wills may be

52. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 117.
53. Under the Administrative Model, the occurrence of this type of fraud would diminish because the incentive of the guardian ad litem to investigate would not hinge so greatly on the dispository scheme.
54. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 118.
55. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 84-85.
no more immune from attack after living probate than before.

The testator faces a further troubling uncertainty after obtaining a living probate decree: the extraterritorial effect of the decree is uncertain; it may bind only those persons over whom the forum state had personal jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test of *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* and its progeny. The extraterritorial effect of a living probate decree concerns, most importantly, full faith and credit principles. If the court possessed proper jurisdiction, its decree would obtain full faith and credit in every American jurisdiction. Below I examine at some length recent Supreme Court decisions bearing on the limits of a court's jurisdiction, and explore their implications for the extraterritorial effect of a living probate decree. In order to aid an understanding of these decisions, I begin with a brief theoretical discussion of the competing theories of jurisdiction necessary to obtain a probate decree.

A probate decree may be viewed as merely an exercise of the state's power to control assets located within its boundaries. This view, generally called the physical power theory, implies that each state possesses exclusive control over property located within its borders and that a foreign decree cannot affect that property. It further implies that the basis for the local probate proceeding, or the jurisdiction of the court, is the property in the estate that is located within the state. Following this narrow view of jurisdiction for probate would lead to inconvenient, inefficient, and expensive probate administration. With respect to living probate, this traditional in rem jurisdiction theory provides no basis for a living probate pro-

---

56. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
60. Frederick v. Wilbourne, 198 Ala. 197, 73 So. 442 (1916); Fritchard v. Henderson, 18 Del. (2 Penne.) 553, 47 A. 376 (1900); McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N.E. 210 (1886); In re Newbery's Estate, 168 Misc. 173, 5 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
ceeding since there is no specific property to distribute. 62

An alternative view of probate decrees applies the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam* and treats property wherever located as if situated at the decedent's domicile at the time of his death. 63 For reasons that will become obvious later in this discussion, I will refer to this view as the *status* theory. Although by its terms and as applied in most cases, 64 the maxim is limited to personal property, this restriction continues more as a remnant of the physical power theory than as a necessary restriction to assure certainty of land titles and protection of creditors. 65 The theory implies that states abandon territorial control over property. Jurisdiction for a probate proceeding would hinge not upon the state's power over property but upon the state's power to determine the status — intestacy or testacy — of a domiciled decedent. 66 Under the status approach, an ex parte proceeding in the testator's domiciliary state determining testacy or intestacy would be entitled to full faith and credit in sister states; contestants could attack the decree collaterally only to determine whether the decedent was actually domiciled in the state issuing the probate decree. 67


64. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Prichard v. Henderson, 18 Del. (2 Penne.) 553, 47 A. 376 (1900); Lowe v. Plainfield Trust Co., 216 A.D. 72, 215 N.Y.S. 50 (1926); Hopkins, supra note 57, at 249-52.


66. See Hopkins, supra note 57, at 228-29, 250-51.


Applying the status theory to probate cases has been justified by analogy to divorce cases, see Hopkins, supra note 57, at 228-29, 250-51, in which domicile of the plaintiff provides an adequate jurisdictional basis for a divorce decree, thereby requiring extraterritorial recognition of the decree even in the absence of personal service upon the defendant. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); R. Leflar, *American Conflicts Law* 451-52 (3d ed. 1977).
Before *Shaffer v. Heitner,* a landmark jurisdiction decision, the Supreme Court did not accept either view of probate jurisdiction exclusively. The Court endorsed the physical power theory when determining whether a probate judgment should obtain full faith and credit. It held that a decree from a state concerning property within its boundaries was entitled to full faith and credit everywhere. Similarly, the Court held that as to property not within territorial boundaries of a state, the full faith and credit clause had no application to that state's probate decree as it operated *in rem.*

Contrary to the physical power theory, however, the Court also required sister states to recognize a probate decree to the extent that the decree determined personal rights of persons subject to the forum state's *in personam* jurisdiction. These latter holdings do not

---


necessarily conflict with the physical power theory; they may only have expanded it to include a state’s power over persons as well as over property located within the state’s boundaries. 73

The Court’s decision in *Hanson v. Denckla* 74 most clearly demonstrated its abandonment of the status theory. In *Hanson*, the Court denied Florida jurisdiction to decide, as against a Delaware trustee, whether a Florida decedent had validly exercised an inter vivos power of appointment over a trust corpus located in Delaware. In upholding Florida jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Florida had relied on an earlier Florida Supreme Court decision in *Henderson v. Usher* 75 that had essentially adopted the status theory. 76

Since the interpretation of the will is the primary question with which we are confronted, we are impelled to hold that the res is at least constructively in this state and that the Florida courts are empowered to advise the trustees how to proceed under it and what rights those affected have in it. For the immediate purpose of this suit the will is the res and when that is voluntarily brought into the courts in Florida to be construed the trust created by it is to all intents and purposes with it. 77

Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in *Hanson*, rejected this argument:

> The settlor-decedent’s Florida domicile is . . . unavailing as a basis for jurisdiction over the trust assets. For the purpose of jurisdiction in rem

109 U.S. 608 (1883) (dictum). Cf. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108, 121 (1869) (dictum) (in a dispute involving the validity of a divorce decree rendered in Indiana, the Court stated that so far as the decree related to real property located in Washington, D.C., it could have no extraterritorial effect; but, if valid, it bound those who were parties in the case, and could have been enforced in the situs by the proper proceeding conducted there); Watts v. Waddle, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 389, 396 (1832) (court held that decree concerning title to land bound persons over whom the court possessed jurisdiction in personam although the land in question was located in another state); Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 148, 157-60 (1810) (in dispute over jurisdiction of a Kentucky court, arising out of suit brought to obtain conveyance of land located in Ohio, Court stated that jurisdiction of chancery court is sustainable in cases of fraud, trust, or contract wherever the defendant is found, although land outside of court’s jurisdiction may be affected by the decree); Massie v. Massie, 12 U.S. (7 Cranch) 141 (1814) (court held that decree concerning title to land in Ohio was void as to parties not made parties to the suit). See, e.g., *Fall v. Eastin*, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); *Clarke v. Clarke*, 178 U.S. 186 (1900). See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 59, at 242-45. But see Smit, supra note 59, at 601-06 (argues that courts have replaced the physical power test with the reasonableness test). After *Shaffer* and its progeny, the viability of the physical power theory is left in doubt. Requiring that the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum despite the situs of property within the forum, undercuts the physical power theory. See notes 79-103 infra and accompanying text.

75. 118 Fla. 688, 160 So. 9 (1935).
76. See 100 S.2d 378, 385 (Fla. 1956).
77. 118 Fla. at 692, 160 So. at 10.
the maxim that personalty has its situs at the domicile of its owner is a function of limited utility. The maxim is no less suspect when the domicile is that of a decedent. In analogous cases, this Court has rejected the suggestion that the probate decree of the State where decedent was domiciled has an *in rem* effect on personalty outside the forum State that could render it conclusive on the interests of nonresidents over whom there was no personal jurisdiction.\footnote{357 U.S. 235, 249 (1958) (footnotes and citations omitted).}

In *Shaffer v. Heitner*,\footnote{433 U.S. 186 (1977).} decided in 1977, the Court apparently rejected application of the physical power theory to property. *Shaffer* involved a challenge to Delaware’s assertion of jurisdiction to decide a shareholder derivative suit based on a nonresident defendant’s ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation. The Court recognized, contrary to *Pennoyer v. Neff*,\footnote{95 U.S. 714 (1877).} “that an adverse judgment *in rem* directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his rights in the property before the court.”\footnote{433 U.S. at 206. Although *Shaffer* could be read narrowly as serving only to reverse quasi-*in rem* jurisdiction of the *Harris v. Balk* type, later Supreme Court cases make it clear that it was not intended to be read restrictively. See Hay, *The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law in U.S. Conflicts Law*, 28 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 161, 166-70 (1979).} This recognition led the Court to hold “that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction *in rem*, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising ‘jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing’. The standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum contacts standard elucidated in *International Shoe*.”\footnote{433 U.S. at 207 (footnote omitted).} The Court did not go so far as to say that the presence of property in the state was irrelevant:

This argument, of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendants’ claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest.\footnote{433 U.S. at 207-08 (footnotes omitted).}

The Court thereby held that the presence of property within the forum could be evidence of the nonresident defendant’s expectation of benefit from the state’s protection and could thereby constitute the critical nexus between the forum and the nonresident needed to sat...
isfy the minimum contacts test. The court stated that the nexus would exist, for example, where a mortgagee sues a nonresident-mortgagor-landowner to foreclose a mortgage on land located in the forum, or where a plaintiff sues a nonresident landowner alleging that the condition of the property located in the forum caused personal injury to the plaintiff.84

Although a less clear case, Shaffer may not invalidate attempts to require nonresident claimants, such as intestate succession takers, to litigate the validity of a will in a jurisdiction where property found in the estate is located. The Shaffer Court indicated that a strong state interest combined with the location in the state of property that is the source of the underlying controversy could support jurisdiction:

The State's strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State.85

This dictum may prove crucial in determining the limits of a state's jurisdiction in probate cases, because often no nexus will exist between the state and the nonresident-estate claimant. To say that a will contestant enjoyed "the benefits from the State's protection of his interest" ignores the "voluntariness" aspect of the minimum contacts test. As stated in Hanson, "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State . . . ."86 That the decedent happened to leave property in the forum state in which the defendant claims an interest says nothing about the defendant's voluntary contact with the forum.87

If, regardless of the presence of property in the forum, the Shaffer decision requires a forum-defendant nexus88 under the standards

84. See 433 U.S. at 208.
85. 433 U.S. at 208 (footnotes omitted).
86. 351 U.S. at 235.
87. Criticisms of Hanson's distinction of McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), that there were not equivalent minimum contacts between the Delaware trustee and the decedent, are inapplicable here. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 621-22 (1958). Beneficiaries or intestate takers who are claiming in probate are distinguishable from the nonresident defendant in McGee. In McGee the nonresident defendant solicited a reinsurance agreement with a resident of California, the offer was accepted by the California resident in California, and the insurance premiums were mailed from California until the insured's death. The Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction over the nonresident insurance company because the suit was based on a contract that had substantial connection with California. But see Fink, supra note 1, at 282, 282 n.40.
88. The importance of the "purposeful act" was reiterated in Shaffer, see 433 U.S. at 216, and in Supreme Court cases decided after Shaffer. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
set forth in *International Shoe Co. v. Washington* for assertion of jurisdiction in a probate case, probate administration will fall into substantial disarray. The emphasis on the forum-defendant nexus is not new but previously had been the basis for the decision in *Hanson*, in which the Court held that Florida's interest in winding up the estate of a decedent domiciled in Florida was insufficient to override the burden on a nonresident defendant to litigate there. The holding in *Hanson* was not particularly disruptive of probate administration because property located in the state continued to be a valid basis for assertion of jurisdiction. Now, if under *Shaffer*, the presence of property in the state is also not alone sufficient for jurisdiction, an executor or administrator might have to probate a will in each state in which potential claimants reside.

When the Supreme Court realizes that present rules of jurisdiction may preclude any one forum from adjudicating everyone's interest in probate, it may not insist on the forum-litigation-defendant nexus for living probate decrees. Instead, the Court may refer to its holding in *Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.*, in which it held that New York had jurisdiction to settle a New York trustee's accounts as against nonresident beneficiaries, based not in rem or in personam, but rather by necessity.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). However, none of these cases involved a dispute centering upon the ownership of property in the state attempting to assert jurisdiction. 89 All assertions of jurisdiction must be evaluated according to this minimum contacts standard. This reexamination was not attempted in *Shaffer*. "It would not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the rationales of Pennoyer and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled." 413 U.S. at 212 n.39.

90. See *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.

91. The Court has been criticized for not having given adequate consideration in *Hanson* to the problem of multiplicity of litigation. See Smith, supra note 59, at 609 n.41.


93. The trustee's account did not affect title to the property and the trustee's obligation to beneficiaries was not a sufficient res. See *New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy*, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). In *Dunlevy* the Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania lacked jurisdiction to terminate a nonresident's claim to the proceeds to a life insurance policy owed by the interpleading plaintiff insurance company. But see Smith, supra note 59, at 624-25. Smith argues that the asserted claim against the insurance company should itself be a sufficient res for jurisdictional purposes. See also *Hazard*, supra note 59, at 278-81. Of course, after *Shaffer*, even if a sufficient res were found in the *Dunlevy* case, minimum contacts with the forum by the nonresident defendant would be required.

94. This was true because the court lacked the requisite jurisdiction over both creditor and debtor needed to determine conclusively whether one was liable to the other. See *New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy*, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). But see *Currie*, supra note 57, at 435 n.34.
It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its chosen procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.96

Like Mullane, the state's interest in avoiding multiple litigation and in permitting effective recourse to the benefits of its laws are also present for probate administration.

Assuming that after Shaffer the Court will carve out an exception for probate and other similar multiple litigation situations, many questions remain as to the appropriate forum for conducting probate. The Court is likely to adopt one of the following two approaches for determining jurisdiction. Under the first approach, jurisdiction for probate matters would be based on the domicile of the decedent. If the Court were to adopt this approach, it would have to overrule Hanson. By abandoning the traditional legal fiction that naming a res as a party defendant is sufficient to obtain jurisdiction and by recognizing that persons' rights in property are at stake, the Court after Shaffer is free to identify the appropriate forum in which to conduct probate administration irrespective of the situs of the property found in the decedent's estate. In most cases, probate administration, which includes discovery and collection of assets, determination and payment of taxes, debts, funeral and administrative expenses, determination and distribution to persons entitled to receive the property under the will or by the intestate succession statute, can most easily be conducted at the domicile of the decedent.97 This forum is no less convenient for all the estate claimants than any other forum, and it is as likely as any other forum to be the place where most of the claimants reside, the place where most of the property is located, and the place where witnesses and records are easily available. Also, the claimants to the estate have usually not

95. See Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity — An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 305 (1951). See also Hazard, supra note 59, at 283-84. Other scholars have written in support of such an approach. See Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 519, 523 (1979).


97. See Hopkins, supra note 57, at 249-54, 263-70; Currie, supra note 57, at 429-38.
entered into any transactions with respect to property found in the estate, but, instead, their interest arises out of their personal relationship with the decedent.98

The essential implication of binding all claimants, regardless of minimum contacts with the forum, to an adjudication of probate in the decedent's domicile is that the status theory would replace the physical power theory in probate.99 The decree would have to be given full faith and credit in any other state. To infer this result from the Shaffer decision is troubling because that case emphasized the territorial limitations on state power and checked the trend toward nationwide service of process begun by International Shoe. Yet, by requiring a nexus between the forum, the litigation, and the defendant, the Court diminished the state's power to control property found within its borders. Looking at the Shaffer decision from this viewpoint, complete probate in the decedent's domicile is not a surprising result.

If the Court adopts the domicile-of-the-testator-approach, living probate decrees issued from any of the living probate models would be afforded full faith and credit as long as the forum was the domicile of the decedent at death.100 The living probate decree might also be accorded full faith and credit if the forum is the domicile of the decedent at the time of the proceeding. In either case, if the court were to adopt the domicile-of-the-testator approach, the attractiveness and usefulness of all the living probate models would increase.

A second approach available to the Court for determining a proper forum for probate is to base jurisdiction upon the situs of the property. This approach can be supported by the dictum in Shaffer suggesting that a strong state interest combined with property lo—

98. One exception to this latter generalization encompasses secured creditors of the decedent. But when tangible or intangible personal property is at issue, even secured creditors cannot claim substantial unfairness if the probate forum is not the situs of the property. They had no reasonable expectation that the property would remain in the same forum where security was perfected. As for real property, however, requiring secured creditors to litigate their claims in a forum other than the situs of the property may raise problems of fairness. To resolve this difficult issue, a court must balance the interest of the estate in avoiding multiple litigation, the interest of the state in providing one forum to wind up the estate, and the interest of the creditor in not having to perfect his claim in a foreign state. See Smit, supra note 59, at 608-13.

99. See notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.

100. Under the Administrative Model, a question still remains as to whether notice and an opportunity to appear are constitutionally required. Assuming that these protective safeguards are not necessary, the living probate decree issued under the Administrative Model must be given extraterritorial effect under the domicile-of-the-testator approach. But see note 62 supra (describing the jurisdictional rules of existing living probate statutes).
cated in the state might be sufficient to support jurisdiction. The extraterritorial effect of the decree would be limited to property located in the forum. If the Court were to adopt this approach and bar probate proceedings at the testator’s domicile, then the extraterritorial effect of the living probate models would be severely restricted. Jurisdiction based on situs of the property would be unavailable because no particular property is at issue in living probate. The property found in the testator’s estate at the time of his death could totally differ from the property owned at the time of the living probate proceeding. A state would thus have no strong interest in asserting jurisdiction merely because the testator owned property in the state at the time of the proceeding. Without such an interest presumably a state could only assert jurisdiction over a nonresident claimant under the minimum contacts standard, and the extraterritorial effect of the living probate decree would be so limited.

101. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
103. Questions of in personam jurisdiction as it relates to the extraterritorial effect of the ex parte proceeding become very complicated under the Administrative Model. If the constitutionality of the Administrative Model were based on the adequacy of its procedures, see notes 158-63 infra and accompanying text, the ability to obtain personal jurisdiction arguably still might be important even though the parties would not have the right to notice or the opportunity to appear. The requirement would continue to impose important territorial limits on the power of a state. Such a rule would also be consistent with existing case law. If the Administrative Model were found to be constitutional on the theory that the state has created no protectible property interest, see notes 111-57 infra and accompanying text, then personal jurisdiction seems unnecessary. Whether this decree will be given effect in another state depends not upon full faith and credit of judgment principles but instead upon choice-of-law rules and upon whether the law of another state must be given full faith and credit in the forum. The same result would follow if the Administrative Model were found to be constitutional on the theory that it involves not a judgment, but rather a law prescribing will execution formalities in the state that waives the substantive formalities of mental capacity and absence of fraud or undue influence upon compliance with these designated procedural formalities. See text at notes 157-58 infra. In such a case, the extraterritorial effect of the ex parte proceeding again will depend upon choice-of-law rules and upon whether the law of the state must be given full faith and credit in the forum.

The general common-law choice-of-law rule is that the law of the situs of the testator’s land (including that jurisdiction’s relevant choice-of-law rules) determines the validity of bequests of real property. R. Leflar, supra note 67, at 401; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239 (1971), and that the law of the testator’s domicile at death determines the validity of bequests of personal property. R. Leflar, supra note 67, at 401; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 263 (1971). To ensure that a will would be valid regardless of where the testator owns land or is domiciled at the time of his death, many states have enacted statutes specifying additional choice-of-law rules to determine the validity of wills of real and of personal property. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ½, § 7-1 (1977); N.Y. Est., POWERS & TRUST LAW § 3-5.1(c) (McKinney 1987); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506. These statutes generally declare that a will is valid if executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the forum state, by the state where it was executed, or by the state where the testator was domiciled at the time of its execution. These statutes are not uniform. Some may provide that a written will is valid if executed in compliance with the law of the place where the testator is domiciled at the time of death. See, e.g., N.Y. Est., POWERS & TRUST LAW § 3-5.1(c) (McKinney 1987); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506. Still other statutes may provide that the will is valid if admitted to probate in another state. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 ½, § 7-1
In summary, the extraterritorial effect of the living probate decree is inextricably intertwined with the recent landmark case of Shaffer v. Heitner, which leaves the basis for jurisdiction of a probate proceeding in doubt. Relying on Mullane, I suggest that the Court is likely to permit a probate court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident claimant despite the claimant's lack of minimum contacts with the forum. Not to recognize jurisdiction over the nonresident claimant in this situation would preclude one forum from adjudicating everyone's interest in probate. As in Mullane, the Court will be reluctant not to make an exception to the general jurisdictional rules. The proper forum for this "jurisdiction by necessity" may be either the decedent's domicile or the situs of property found in the decedent's estate. If domicile is accepted as a proper forum and if jurisdiction by necessity is carved out as an exception to the forum-litigation-defendant nexus insisted upon in Shaffer, the living probate decree will have the binding effect its proponents expected. If, however, the Court refuses to recognize an exception to the forum-litigation-defendant nexus, or if the Court limits jurisdiction by necessity to the situs of the property, then the living probate decrees

(1977). However, these statutes have been interpreted to apply only to formal requirements for a valid execution; invalidity due to substantive requirements like mental incapacity, fraud, or undue influence remains subject to the common-law rules described above. See Crossett Lumber Co. v. Files, 104 Ark. 600, 149 S.W. 908 (1912); Guidry v. Hardy, 254 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 1971); Schalk v. Dickinson, 232 N.W.2d 140 (S.D. 1975).

Although narrow application of these statutes is usually insignificant because of the substantial similarity of will validity standards among the various states, it may substantially reduce the extraterritorial effect of nonbinding decrees produced under the Administrative Model unless the forum state has adopted a similar law. Absent adoption of the Administrative Model or of laws reflecting a similar policy not to recognize expectancies as protectible property interests (or not to require testamentary capacity or absence of fraud and undue influence for the execution of a valid will), another state is not likely to recognize the decree from the ex parte proceeding. Unless the contacts with the state are so slight and casual that to apply the forum's state law would be inconsistent with due process, the forum is free to apply its own law in furtherance of its own view of public policy. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1969); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., ___ Minn. ___, 289 N.W.2d 43 (1979) cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1012 (1980). For a proposal that a state only be allowed to apply its law to a case where it has the minimum contacts required by International Shoe for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant, see Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872 (1980).

When presented, for example, with a factual situation in which the decedent domiciled in Illinois at his death obtained an ex parte determination in Illinois that a will bequeathing all his property to a religious cult is valid, a court in another state, which is the situs of some of decedent's personal property and domicile of decedent's children, will be very reluctant to refuse the children an opportunity to litigate the issues of testamentary capacity, fraud, or undue influence. In the absence of a specific choice-of-law statute to the contrary, a court in the second state is likely to find either that eliminating mental capacity, absence of fraud, and undue influence as requirements for the execution of a valid will is contrary to the state's public policy, or that an expectancy interest as defined in the state is property deserving of due process protection. In either case, the second state has the power not to apply Illinois law.
will only bind those persons who purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. For the Administrative Model, the extraterritorial effect is even more uncertain unless the Court is willing to recognize jurisdiction of courts in the state of domicile of the decedent.

Because the extraterritorial effect of a living probate decree remains uncertain, a testator cannot be sure that his will is safe from attack as long as he has presumptive heirs, property, or domicile outside the forum state. This uncertainty, combined with the threat of post-mortem challenges based on claims of fraud on the court and fraud or undue influence subsequent to the living probate decree, significantly reduces the assurance of validity that a living probate decree can offer a testator.

C. Excessive Costs to Testators

A third failing of living probate is the high price it exacts from testators in return for an ephemeral assurance that their wills are secure from challenge. That price includes physical and mental examination, participation in the court proceeding, the cost of an attorney and of a guardian ad litem (depending upon the proposal adopted), and the risk of family disharmony. These costs will inevitably deter many testators from using the proceeding regardless of the benefits obtained.

After balancing the benefits of living probate against these costs, a testator will very likely turn to alternative methods of achieving certainty of testamentary disposition — most notably to the revocable trust. 104 Although expectant heirs may challenge a revocable trust for mental incompetency, 105 fraud, or undue influence, 106 potential challengers are much less likely to know that that trust exists than that a will exists. The settlor of the trust need not publicly disclose its existence. Moreover, when a trust exists for a significant period, the trustee’s testimony concerning the settlor’s capacity to

104. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 95; Langbein, supra note 12, at 67.
105. Most states have statutes that incapacitate a property owner under the protection of a guardian or conservator from making inter vivos gifts, but permit him to execute a will. The legal standard for donative capacity may therefore be more stringent than the legal standard for testamentary capacity. If the property owner is not under the care of a guardian or conservator, however, the courts apply the same legal standard for donative capacity as they do for testamentary capacity. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hart, 93 Ark. 548, 125 S.W. 1030 (1910); Thorne v. Consand, 160 Ind. 566, 67 N.E. 257 (1903); Stouffer v. Wolfkill, 114 Md. 603, 80 A. 300 (1911); Flynn v. Union Natl. Bank of Springfield, 378 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1964); Patterson v. Halterman, 161 Mont. 278, 505 P.2d 905 (1973); Riggs v. American Tract Sooy, 95 N.Y. 503 (1884); Grignon v. Shope, 100 Or. 611, 197 P. 317 (1921).
conduct business with the trustee reduces the chance of successful challenge. Through the revocable trust, the settlor can help to protect against disruption of his dispository scheme\textsuperscript{107} without relinquishing significant control of the property before death. Given this attractive alternative, few people are likely to use living probate.

D. Unfairness to Presumptive Takers

Quite apart from the usefulness or attractiveness of living probate to the testator, the three living probate proposals raise troubling policy questions. To prevent unwarranted strike suits and to preserve the right to testamentary freedom, the living probate schemes sacrifice fair adjudicatory procedures for the presumptive takers. The Contest Model requires presumptive takers to choose between unattractive alternatives: they can either remain silent, allowing the will to be validated and to extinguish their expectancies, or they can challenge the will, disrupting family harmony and incurring litigation costs earlier than otherwise necessary to retain the possibility of inheriting an indeterminate amount of property. Even if their challenge succeeds, they risk later disinheritance by the testator either through his donative transfers or through his execution of a subsequent will that requires the presumptive takers to decide again whether to litigate.\textsuperscript{108}

These alternatives are improved under the Conservatorship Model. The use of a guardian ad litem, however, will do little to shield presumptive takers since the sources of the guardian’s information will often be obvious to the testator. Of course, the presumptive taker’s ability to litigate fraud and undue influence in post-mortem proceedings by showing that wrongful conduct prevented revocation of the court-approved will reduces the unfairness of the Contest and Conservatorship Models. That breach of living probate’s promise of certainty against future attack, however, hardly deserves recognition as an attribute of the proposals.

Of all the proposals, the Administrative Model places the presumptive takers in the worst possible position; they receive no notice of the proceeding and depend completely upon the investigation of a disinterested guardian ad litem. Without an economically interested

\textsuperscript{107} But see Knowles v. Binford, 268 Md. 2, 298 A.2d 862 (1973).

\textsuperscript{108} A challenge based on testamentary incapacity during living probate is less of an imposition on the presumptive takers because, at the least, the finding of incapacity can be introduced in a subsequent will contest (ante-mortem or post-mortem). This problem is obviously worse if the presumptive takers must pay for their own litigation costs as under the presently enacted statutes in Arkansas, North Dakota, and Ohio.
party litigating the issues, the likelihood of erroneous determinations substantially increases. For two important reasons, providing confidentiality and avoiding risk of family disharmony, costs of notice, and risk of unfounded allegations does not justify a procedure that fails to provide presumptive takers notice or an opportunity to appear during the living probate process. First, as a matter of policy, notice and a hearing for presumptive takers seem desirable. Second, denying notice and a hearing may violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Alexander and Pearson want to eliminate notice and a hearing for presumptive takers because they fear that the risks of family disharmony and breached confidentiality that accompany these safeguards will deter testators from using living probate. But the risk of family disharmony or breached confidentiality deters use of the living probate procedure in exactly those cases where the state should be most concerned about providing notice to, and a full hearing for, disappointed heirs.

A testator who disinherits a distant cousin in favor of a religious cult is not as likely to be concerned about family harmony and confidentiality as is a testator who disinherits his nuclear family in favor of the same organization. In the latter case, the testator might be quite attracted by the secrecy of the Administrative Model. But that attraction cannot justify a less accurate procedure for determining will validity, particularly when the primary purpose of requiring mental capacity is to protect the testator's family and society from uninformed dispositions that leave family members as wards of the state.109 The features of the Administrative Model that may be attractive to testators conflict with this public policy.110

Notice and a hearing for presumptive takers may be more than a wise policy — they may be a constitutional right. Alexander and Pearson argue that the lack of notice and hearing under the Administrative Model is constitutional because presumptive takers do not own constitutionally protected property interests.111 While conceding that the differences between ante-mortem and post-mortem probate “provide an insignificant basis for constitutional distinction,”112

110. Alexander and Pearson suggest that their proposal could be modified either to provide notice and an opportunity to appear to nuclear family members, or to exempt them from the binding decree, but they ultimately reject these modifications as inconsistent with the nonadversarial ex parte proceeding. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 115-16.
112. Id. at 111.
Alexander and Pearson argue first that the landmark *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.* decision does not offer grounds to extend due process protection to presumptive takers either before or after the testator's death. In *Mullane*, the court struck down a New York statute that gave pooled trust beneficiaries notice of a judicial settlement of accounts by publication alone. The Court held that publication alone was a constitutionally inadequate method of notice “to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence,” but that it was an adequate form of notice to beneficiaries “whose interests are either conjectural or future” and to those “whose interests or addresses are unknown to the trustee.”

Alexander and Pearson correctly observe that *Mullane* does not necessarily require that contingent future interests (which they acknowledge to be traditional property rights) receive due process protections. Publication notice had been provided to these interests under the New York statute, and the constitutional question was therefore never presented to the Court. Nevertheless, the Court did reach the question of the adequacy of the publication notice for persons owning remote contingent interests, and it held such notice sufficient. The Court balanced the difficulty in discovering the addresses of remote trust beneficiaries against their interests and concluded that requiring notice by mail to these persons would impose an excessive burden on the trustee. Since the trustee already knew the place of residence of all known present beneficiaries, publication notice was inadequate for those persons. This balancing implies that the remote beneficiaries were entitled to at least some protection, and that they would have had a constitutional right to appear in the proceedings had they seen the publication notice.

Just as *Mullane* implies that holders of contingent remainders are entitled to some due process protection, the similarities between the

---

114. 339 U.S. at 318.
117. The court stated that the “practical difficulties and costs that would be attendant on frequent investigations into the status of great numbers of beneficiaries . . . would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages.” 339 U.S. at 317-18.
118. 339 U.S. at 318.
119. That this reading of *Mullane* is more fair is further demonstrated by the Court's comparison of the problem of discovering the beneficiaries who owned remote interests with those cases in which persons had been missing for many years and the state provided for the administration of their property. *See* 339 U.S. at 317 (*citing* Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1904)).
expectancies of presumptive takers and contingent remainders suggest that expectancies should be protected as well. The failure of the Administrative Model to provide any notice of a probate procedure that can extinguish these expectancies may therefore violate the Constitution.

Alexander and Pearson argue against extension of *Mullane* to expectancies by reference to traditional property law classifications and to a state's power to define the rights of inheritance. First, they observe that the trust beneficiaries in *Mullane* owned estates recognized at common law as property, whereas presumptive takers have neither a traditionally enforceable interest in the testator's property nor a fiduciary relationship with the property's custodian. To illustrate the distinction, consider inter vivos transfers of property by the testator. Such transfers generally are valid despite their adverse effect on expectant heirs and legatees. Those individuals whose hopes are extinguished by such transfers have no rights to compensation.

*Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank,* in which the Supreme Court held that a state ex parte divorce proceeding could not only bind the nonresident spouse on the issue of marital status, but could also terminate the spouse's dower rights, supports this distinction. Unfortunately, the *Simons* Court did not discuss thoroughly the reasons why the financial loss of dower was not a deprivation of property. The dower interest in a decedent's estate is, if anything, more substantial than the rights of other presumptive takers being litigated in a living probate proceeding. And the ex parte divorce proceeding and its effect on dower is functionally similar to the living probate proceeding of the Administrative Model and its effect on other expectancy interests. Dower depends upon a finding of marriage or nonmarriage just as the expectancy interests depend upon a finding of testacy or intestacy. Also, just as the plaintiff in a divorce proceeding must prove grounds for divorce, the finding of testacy or intestacy depends upon factual inquiry into testamentary incapacity, fraud, or undue influence. Nevertheless, *Simons* does not foreclose further inquiry. *Simons* has been severely criticized in the literature. More importantly, the ex parte divorce proceeding in *Simons* is distinguishable from the living probate pro-

121. *Id.* at 101-02 (footnotes omitted).
122. 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
123. In a brief paragraph the court merely noted the inchoateness of Ms. Simons's claim to dower, which might suggest that at the time of the ex parte divorce proceeding, the right to dower was not property within the meaning of the due process clause. See 381 U.S. at 85 & n.6.
ceeding under the Administrative Model in that the plaintiff in *Simons* was at least provided notice and an opportunity to appear. Presented with a case where these protections, rather than personal jurisdiction, were absent, the Court might not hold that the dower interest can be terminated.

Although the Alexander and Pearson distinction between an expectancy interest and a traditionally recognized estate in property may appeal to a property lawyer, constitutionally protected property interests are identified not by a state’s formalistic labelling but instead by their functional alikeness to property interests recognized as protected under the due process clause by the Supreme Court. The expectancies at issue in living probate may be functionally identical to the contingent interests considered in *Mullane*.

A comparison between the conditions and events that can prevent an expectancy and an equitable contingent remainder from vesting uncovers striking similarities. Consider the following example:

*O* declares a trust in Blackacre, naming himself as trustee and retaining a power to revoke the trust at any time. Under the trust, *O* retains an income interest in Blackacre until his death, whereupon Blackacre is to be transferred in tenancy in common to those of *O*’s children who are alive at his death. At the time the trust is created, *C* is *O*’s only child, and *O* is unmarried.

*O* owns a reversionary interest in Blackacre that will become possessory upon his death without children surviving. The reversionary interest will pass at his death either by intestate succession or by will unless *O*, through an inter vivos conveyance, transfers the reversionary interest. *C* owns an equitable contingent remainder in Blackacre and, as *O*’s sole expectant heir, an expectancy interest in *O*’s reversionary interest in Blackacre. *C*’s equitable contingent remainder is a traditionally recognized property interest but the expectancy interest is not.

The equitable contingent remainder can be totally defeated if:

1. *C* predeceases *O*;
2. *O* revokes the trust and transfers the remainder interest in Blackacre to another person during his life; or
3. 125 See Vernon, supra note 67, at 1016-17. Vernon questions how the nonresident spouse can obtain jurisdiction in actions to obtain alimony and support under *Sctffer*.

126 See Van Alstyne, *Cracks in “The New Property”: Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State*, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 454 (1977); Currie, supra note 67, at 34-37. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (lower court decision holding unconstitutional a statute that exempted certain conscientious objectors from combatant training and service in the military reversed based on determination that the statute exempted individuals whose conscientious scruples against such services were parallel to those of other persons exempted by the Act except that they were not rooted in the supposed dictates of a “Supreme Being,” as the Act seemed to require).
revokes the trust, retains Blackacre in fee simple absolute until his death, and devises it to another person by will or allows it to pass by intestate succession to his heirs. C's equitable contingent remainder can be partially defeated if O has another child who also survives O or if O modifies the trust reducing the share of the remainder going to his children. In any case, C would not have standing to object to any actions O took with respect to Blackacre. The expectancy interest that C owns in the reversion can also be totally defeated if: (1) C predeceases O; (2) O transfers the reversionary interest in Blackacre to another person during his life; or (3) O devises the reversionary interest to another person by will. Similarly, the expectancy interest may be partially defeated by the birth of siblings or if O transfers only a portion of the reversionary interest to another person by inter vivos conveyance or by will.

A difference between this equitable contingent remainder and this expectancy interest in this reversion concerns the possibility of O dying leaving a surviving spouse. Theoretically, C's equitable contingent remainder may be less vulnerable to defeat by the surviving spouse than C's expectancy interest. The surviving spouse may, by statute in some states,\(^\text{127}\) or by court-made law in other states,\(^\text{128}\) claim a forced share against the trust corpus. In nearly all states, however, the surviving spouse would receive at least a portion of the property found in the probate estate.\(^\text{129}\) In this example, even if the state provides only for a spouse's statutory share of the probate estate, it will have no effect on C's interest; in order for the reversionary interest to pass through the probate estate and become possessory and available to the surviving spouse, C would have had to predecease O — and that would in itself defeat his expectancy interest.

The enjoyment a person derives from owning either of these two interests before possession is also nearly identical. Although in most states the equitable contingent remainder can be gratuitously transferred by quitclaim deed and the expectancy interest cannot, the expectancy interest can effectively be gratuitously transferred by warranty deed.\(^\text{130}\) Moreover, in a few states, neither a contingent remainder nor an expectancy interest can be gratuitously transferred without full and adequate consideration.


\(^{128}\) See, e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937); 1 A. Scott, supra note 106 at § 57.5.

\(^{129}\) See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Code § 2-1(a)-(c) (1977); UPC § 2-102.

\(^{130}\) If the transfer is supported by full and adequate consideration, the expectancy interest can be transferred by quitclaim.
inter vivos by quitclaim deed. The differences in enjoyment would therefore be almost nonexistent.

Moreover, not all interests injured by a living probate finding of will validity are mere expectancies. Consider the following example:  

\( O \) dies leaving a valid will containing the provision: “I devise Blackacre to \( A \) for life and then to such of \( A \)’s children as \( A \) shall appoint by will, and in default of appointment to \( B \).” \( A \) thereafter executes a will that appoints Blackacre to his child \( C \).

\( A \) owns a special power of appointment that can only be exercised by a valid will. \( B \) owns a vested remainder subject to defeasance by the valid exercise of the power by \( A \). At the time \( A \) offers a will for living probate, \( B \)’s interest falls within the class of traditional property interests. Yet under the Administrative Model, \( B \) would not be given notice or the opportunity to appear at an ante-mortem probate proceeding determining the validity of \( A \)’s will. Thus, even under the criteria established by its proponents, the Administrative Model should be amended to provide notice to default takers.

Finally, \textit{Mullane} should apply to a living probate procedure because, even assuming the interests adjudicated at the time of the proceeding are mere expectancies, the adjudication will, after the testator’s death, bind persons who would have owned traditional property interests but for the prior ex parte proceeding. Alexander and Pearson reject this analysis by asserting that the property right arises only after probate is completed. They argue first that since the state can define the right to inherit, the state also possesses the right to decide when the property right comes into existence:

\begin{quote}
Inheritance through testate or intestate succession . . . is simply a state-supervised gift. Until the gift is completed, the expectant recipient has no greater property rights than the expectant recipient of an inter vivos gift. Under our probate system, the succession rights of expectant heirs and legatees do not receive formal legal recognition until (1) a will has been admitted to probate, or (2) the existence of a valid
\end{quote}


\[132. \textit{See id., at 1858-59.} \]

\[133. \textit{See Alexander \\ & Pearson, supra note 12, at 102. The Court in Simons v. Miami Beach National Bank, 381 U.S. 81, 85 (1965), accepted this theory for dower rights. The issue will be discussed further at note 139 infra and accompanying text.} \]

Fixing the time that the property rights arise after formal probate is completed is important to Alexander and Pearson for two reasons. First, it eliminates any claim that by accelerating the adjudication of the validity of the will, the presumptive takers are denied due process protection that they would otherwise enjoy. Second, if their constitutional analysis is accepted as correct, reforms to reduce procedural requirements and inefficiencies in probate administration after the decedent’s death could doubtless be implemented. For example, the UPC has promulgated in §§ 3-301 to -306 an informal probate proceeding that is ex parte and is very similar to the probate in common form that existed in England and that is already in effect in several states today. \textit{See T. Atkinson, supra note 18, at §§ 93-95.}
will has not been established and the establishment of any later discovered will is barred by the law. 134

The flaw in this analysis is that the law in the various states does not clearly define inheritance as arising after a state approves or rejects a will. Heirship status under an intestacy statute is determined immediately after a decedent's death. If an heir should die before completion of probate, his share of the decedent's estate passes to the beneficiaries under his will or to his intestate heirs. 135 Alexander and Pearson acknowledge that states have many laws in which rights of succession takers are recognized upon the decedent's death; they attribute these laws to "administrative convenience and necessity" 136 only.

Secondly, Alexander and Pearson argue that, until probate is complete, the property right is so contingent that it should not be raised to the level of a protectible property interest. 137 That probate is required to determine whether the decedent died intestate or testate and to determine and pay taxes and other debts does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that no property interest arises until after probate is completed. All the facts necessary to resolve the questions arising at probate, especially whether the decedent died testate or intestate, are known or knowable as of the time of the decedent's death. The law provides all the necessary criteria for determining who should share in the decedent's estate. That such a determination has not yet been made should not lead to the conclusion that no property interests exist.

Contrary to the argument made by Alexander and Pearson, this aspect of a testamentary transfer distinguishes it from an inter vivos gift. Unlike the uncompleted gift where the donor has not yet entered into a legal transaction, at the decedent's death, the decedent no longer owns the property — a transfer has occurred. All that remains to be done is to apply the various rules of law to determine who is the recipient of the transfer. To deny the expectant heir opportunities to present relevant evidence and to ensure correct application of the rules of law arbitrarily imposes a financial loss on him. 138

134. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 98.

135. Even if no law in a particular state provides that property rights arise at the time of the decedent's death, a claim that they arise at that time may derive from rules and procedures that raise the claimants' expectations. This idea of expectations arising through "de facto" procedures is seen in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In addition, see Van Alstyne, supra note 126, at 455.


137. See Alexander & Pearson, supra note 12, at 111.

138. The very act of dealing with what purports to be an "individual case" without first
Hanson v. Denckla \(^{139}\) supports this analysis. In Hanson, the Court found that Florida lacked jurisdiction in a post-mortem probate proceeding over a Delaware trustee, and therefore, that Delaware could ignore a Florida judgment. The Court relied upon the due process clause to determine the fairness of Florida's assertion of jurisdiction. The Court's analysis applied inferentially to all nonresident will beneficiaries or intestate takers. \(^{140}\) The Court necessarily found that these parties owned a property interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. \(^{141}\)

If a protectible property interest arises, at the latest, when the decedent dies, litigating the validity of the decedent's will before death in a binding declaratory judgment proceeding would seem also to require due process protection for the presumptive takers. Although the interest is subject to more contingencies than after the decedent's death, it would seem that the differences in the quality of the interest are not so important as to warrant a constitutional distinction. To hold otherwise would mean that a testator could unilaterally destroy an individual's right to inherit upon petitioning the court to recognize his will as valid. \(^{142}\)

Alexander and Pearson are correct in identifying the law of succession as a statutory creation. "Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction." \(^{143}\) The states have the power and in fact frequently repeal existing intestate succession statutes and enact new ones that provide for different distributive schemes. \(^{144}\) Similarly, the state has the

---

139. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). This argument appears inconsistent with the Simons case in which the Court, relying on Florida law providing that no dower right survived an ex parte decree of divorce, held that the spouse could not claim dower at the probate of her ex-husband's estate. Reading Simons and Hanson together, however, suggests that a testator, by merely petitioning a court to determine the validity of a will during his life, may destroy a protectible property interest. Formulating the issue in this way, the Court is unlikely to rely on Simons and to uphold the constitutionality of the Administrative Model.

140. 357 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissenting).

141. The same inference can be drawn from other earlier Supreme Court decisions concerning probate decrees. See, e.g., Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).

142. See Currie, supra note 67, at 36, in which the author predicts that the Supreme Court would not permit "a state to dispense with notice if a man sued simply to extinguish his wife's expectancy of a statutory share in his estate."


144. For example, in recent years, states have enlarged the share of the estate going to the
power to increase the requirements for executing a valid will and the power to create rights in certain persons, such as a spouse or children of the decedent, to take a share of the estate contrary to the testamentary scheme found in the will. To say that the state has the power to destroy a particular individual's expectancy interest in another person's property is not to say, however, that if the state continues to recognize the individual's expectancy interest, it is not a protectible property interest. The entitlement cases beginning with *Goldberg v. Kelly* make this proposition clear.

As they did with *Mullane*, Alexander and Pearson argue that the protectible property interests recognized in the entitlement cases are distinguishable and involve more substantial interests than the expectancy interests at stake in probate. Relying on *Roth v. Board of Regents*, *Perry v. Sindermann*, *Arnett v. Kennedy*, and *Bishop v. Wood*, they identify two necessary requirements for finding that a governmentally conferred interest is the equivalent of property and, therefore, must be provided due process protection: (1) a present enjoyment of that benefit and (2) state-induced reliance on its continuation in the absence of specific grounds for termination or disqualification. To these two requirements, I would add that the specific statute or regulation creating the benefit is the exclusive source that determines who the state intended to benefit and upon what conditions the benefit can be terminated.

Alexander and Pearson argue that the expectancy interests owned by the presumptive takers fail to meet the requirements of present interest and reliance: 

[D]espite such statutory provisions, neither category of potential takers can claim present use or enjoyment of the decedent's property. Their interests are wholly prospective and lack recognition as existing property rights. Indeed, to use the more vivid language of the Supreme Court in *Roth*, their interests represent nothing more than an abstract desire for the decedent's property or a unilateral expectation of a right to it. For constitutional purposes, a property right arises, if at all, when the inquiry into the existence of a valid will has been completed and rules of succession have been applied. Only then are the prerequisites of the entitlement cases, particularly that of justifiable reliance, satis-

---

146. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
147. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Alexander and Pearson apply these criteria too literally and, most importantly, ignore the specific statutes creating the inheritance rights. The mere fact that an individual does not presently possess property does not mean that he does not presently enjoy ownership of that property. That his right to future possession (in the case of an expectancy interest) is subject to many conditions and contingencies makes it less valuable than an indefeasibly vested remainder. But no one would argue that the latter, which is also a creature of state law, is not a protectible property interest. Alexander's and Pearson's arguments as to the lack of state created reliance is similarly flawed. The state, through the intestate succession statute and the will execution statute, has induced reliance. The intestate succession statute identifies certain classes of persons who are eligible to share in the decedent's estate if he dies without leaving a valid will. The will statute provides the requirements for a valid will. An individual qualifying as an heir under the intestate statute is induced by the state to rely upon the inheritance absent the execution by the testator of a valid will. The valid will is the specific ground for termination identified in the statute. In accordance with state law, whether or not a valid will exists depends on whether the decedent possessed mental competency and was free from fraud and undue influence at the time the will was executed. Thus, the expectancy interest can only be terminated if these individualized factual issues are resolved. Because the expectancy interest meets the requirements of an entitlement, those factual issues must be resolved in a proceeding that satisfies the due process clause.

Emphasizing the statutory provisions creating the benefit, rather than the quality and nature of the right at stake, seems correct in light of the entitlement cases. A review of two of these cases illustrates this conclusion. In *O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center*, elderly residents of a nursing home claimed to have a constitutional right to a hearing before a state or federal agency could revoke the

151. Id. at 107-08.

152. Alexander and Pearson may be limiting entitlements to rights that are presently possessed rather than merely presently owned. This restriction would be erroneous. Entitlements are a recognition that governmental largess is equivalent to traditionally recognized property rights. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, *The New Property*, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Since traditional property rights need not be possessory, entitlements should also not need to be possessory.

153. A similar analysis applies with respect to beneficiaries named in an existing valid will. Under the will statutes, they are induced by the state to rely upon the inheritance absent the execution by the testator of a valid will.

154. 100 S. Ct. 2467 (1980).
certification of the nursing home facility. The nursing home had been certified by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [HEW] as a "skilled nursing facility." It thereby became eligible to receive payments from HEW and from the state Department of Public Welfare [DPW] for providing nursing care services to aged, disabled, and poor persons who were in need of medical care. The nursing home entered into formal provider agreements with the two governmental agencies in which HEW and DPW agreed to reimburse the nursing home for care provided to persons eligible for Medicare or Medicaid benefits on the condition that the nursing home continue to qualify as a skilled nursing facility. The Court held that the Medicaid provisions "do not confer a right to continued residence in the home of one's choice . . . . [W]hile a patient has a right to continued benefits to pay for care in the qualified institution of his choice, he has no enforceable expectation of continued benefits to pay for care in an institution that has been determined to be unqualified."\(^{155}\) By virtue of the statutory and regulatory scheme, the elderly patients were presently enjoying residence in the nursing home and had relied on its continuing qualification absent a showing that it was no longer a "skilled nursing facility." Nevertheless, the statute did not expressly provide that the elderly patients had a "right to continued residence" and, therefore, it was not a statutorily created benefit enjoying due process protection.

*Bishop v. Wood*\(^{156}\) also illustrates the Court's reliance on the statute creating the benefit to identify an entitlement. The petitioner had been employed as a policeman by the City of Marion, North Carolina. The tenure of his employment was based on a city ordinance. The ordinance was ambiguous — it could have been read both as guaranteeing employment absent cause for dismissal and as granting no right to continued employment. Although the ordinance had not been interpreted by a North Carolina court, a United States district judge held that the latter interpretation was the correct one. The Supreme Court accepted this interpretation of the ordinance. The Court held that the policeman's employment was not a protectible interest and, therefore, that it did not enjoy due process protection. The fact that the statute was ambiguous and may have induced reliance by the employee was not relevant. The government retained control over both whom it intended to benefit and the con-

\(^{155}\) 100 S.Ct. at 2475.

\(^{156}\) 426 U.S. 341 (1976). In addition, see Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
ditions upon which it could terminate those benefits.\footnote{157

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Model may be constitutional if it is viewed as changing the substantive law of wills. Although some inquiry into testamentary capacity and lack of fraud and undue influence is conducted in the ex parte proceeding, these issues are not necessarily relevant to a finding of a valid will. Instead, a state may define a valid will to be an instrument approved by a court after submission by the testator. Under the Administrative Model, however, the court does not have absolute discretion in judging will validity. Alexander and Pearson seem unprepared to change the substantive law of wills by eliminating the requirements of testamentary capacity and freedom from fraud and undue influence. To the contrary, the Administrative Model establishes a procedure by which these factual issues are adjudicated. Thus, so long as the state law continues to require a valid will (defined as a document executed by a decedent with mental competency who was free from fraud and undue influence) to defeat the statutorily created expectancy interests, a protectible property interest exists. And because it exists, a proceeding with adequate safeguards is required to resolve the issue of whether or not a valid will exists.

Even if the expectancy interests of presumptive takers are entitled to due process protections, the constitutional analysis remains incomplete. The procedures available to the expectant takers under the Administrative Model might satisfy the mandates of due process.\footnote{158 The Court employs a balancing test to determine whether state procedures satisfy due process. See Barry v. Barchi, 433 U.S. 55 (1979) (suspension violated due process by lack of assurance of a prompt post-suspension hearing); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979) (Massachusetts' statute requiring suspension of driver's license for refusal to take a breath-analysis test after arrest did not violate due process); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (due process requires both opportunity to complain of excessive utility charges and notice to customers of the procedure for contesting bills); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (evidentiary hearing prior to initial termination of social security disability benefits not required by due process). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 498-503; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).} In Mathews v. Eldridge,\footnote{159 424 U.S. 319 (1976).} the Supreme Court articulated the balancing approach that it will follow in determining the procedural safeguards required:

Our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation and such interests through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and the administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.¹⁶⁰

Identifying the procedures required by this balancing test is difficult; the standard inevitably leads to uncertainty in adjudication.¹⁶¹ Whether the Administrative Model provides sufficient procedural safeguards is therefore difficult to predict.

That an individual's financial security does not typically hinge upon the right to inherit (unlike welfare payments, public sector licenses, and many entitlements) implies that, under the Eldridge formula, the probate procedure need not include a full-trial-type hearing.¹⁶² Along with recognizing that a deprivation of the expectancies of presumptive takers is unlikely to cause severe financial insecurity for presumptive takers, the Court, in accordance with Eldridge,¹⁶³ will also weigh heavily the good-faith judgment of the legislature that the procedure assures fair consideration of the claims of presumptive takers. But despite the relative unimportance of these property interests and the presumption in favor of the adopted procedure, the Court might invalidate the elimination of all notice and opportunity for a hearing unless there is some alternative procedure to assure representation of the interests of the presumptive takers.

Looking to the Mullane case for an analogous situation, the Court held that the state could not eliminate notice by mail for present income beneficiaries even though the statute provided for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent absent persons who might have any interest in the income of the trust fund at issue. For holders of more remote interests, the Court varied the form of notice, allowing notice by publication rather than by mail, after balancing the nature of the property interest at stake against the cost and delay in the administration of the common trust fund. From this case, due process seems to require notice and an opportunity to appear. Unlike the proceeding in Mullane, presumptive takers cannot appear at the living probate proceeding under the Administrative Model. Also unlike Mullane, the guardian ad litem in the Administrative Model acts only as an objective investigator rather than an advocate repre-

¹⁶⁰. 424 U.S. at 334-35.
¹⁶³. 424 U.S. at 349.
senting the presumptive takers' interests. The lack of notice and hearing under the Administrative Model may therefore violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO LIVING PROBATE

Over the last fifty years, commentators have suggested numerous statutory reforms designed to eliminate or to reduce unfounded contests based on claims that testators lack mental capacity to execute their wills. The proposals for living probate are only the most recent of the suggested statutory reforms. I believe that these and other proposals fail because they assume that mental capacity must remain an essential prerequisite to execution of a valid will. Below I challenge that assumption — I refute John Langbein's claim that "[n]o one seems to believe that the substantive law of testamentary capacity is misguided . . . ." 164 In short, I suggest that the benefits derived from requiring mental capacity are insufficient to justify the costs of adjudicating mental capacity in probate courts.

Statutes in every American jurisdiction require that testators possess a minimum mental capacity at the time they execute their wills.165 Yet few courts or scholars have ever explained why a testator's mental competency is an appropriate prerequisite to a validly executed will.166 Obviously, most people instinctively feel that mentally incompetent individuals should not be allowed to dispose of their wealth by will. They are troubled by the possibility that, for example, a mental incompetent would able to give property at death to a frivolous organization rather than to family members. They are uneasy not necessarily because the distribution is unfair in the abstract, but because the testator may be mentally incapable of evaluating the fairness of the distribution. Thus, the requirement of mental capacity protects testators from their own irrational testamentary dispositions.167 The requirement also protects the testator's family and society generally by invalidating irrational dispositions that would force families to become wards of the state.168

Some commentators suggest that the primary function of the

164. Langbein, supra note 12, at 66.
165. The first Statute of Wills enacted in England did not refer to the mental capacity of the testator. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540). This omission was corrected two years later by amendments providing that an instrument executed by an "idiot or, by any person de non sane memory" was not a valid will. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5, § 14 (1542).
166. For a rare exception, see Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1189 (1940).
167. See Epstein, supra note 21, at 233.
168. See id. at 232-33; Green, supra note 166, at 1204-07, 1211-12, 1216-18.
mental capacity requirement is to protect the family; they discount its importance in protecting the testator. Further, they assert that the requirement harms testators more than it protects them because testators fear the personal malignment and disturbance of their reasoned testamentary plan that the requirement permits. That latter fear is warranted; the mental capacity requirement protects families from disinheritance at the cost of allowing courts to police the fairness of distributions.

I propose to remedy these problems by abolishing the mental capacity requirement and providing a statutory election to those we most fear may suffer in the event of disinheritance. First, states should amend their will execution statutes to eliminate the requirement of testamentary capacity at the time of execution. Second, common-law property states should extend the surviving spouse's right to elect a statutory share to minor children of the decedent whenever there is no surviving spouse or the surviving spouse is not the children's parent. In community property states, whenever there is no surviving spouse or the surviving spouse is not the children's parent, minor children should receive a share of both the community property and the separate property found in the decedent's estate. If a spouse and minor children who are also the children of the spouse survive the decedent, common-law property states should increase the elective share going to the spouse to take into account the increased expenses of rearing the children. Community property states should similarly increase the amount going to the surviv-


170. See text at notes 20-39 supra.

171. For an alternative to my proposal, see Epstein, supra note 21. Epstein, a Philadelphia attorney, proposes that legislatures should sever the issue of testamentary capacity from the issue of fairness and reasonableness of the distribution. Epstein proposes "Family Maintenance Legislation" that allows a court to exercise its discretion in providing satisfactory maintenance for persons designated by the statute. The court would inquire into the fairness of the disposition only after finding that the testator possessed testamentary capacity, without reference to the "naturalness" of the dispository scheme. Unless narrowly designed, this proposal could limit the testamentary freedom of the testator as much as or more than sustaining the claim of testamentary incapacity through inappropriate determinations of "unnaturalness." The proposal actually only codifies the courts' power to apply a fairness standard that they already apply. Moreover, this proposal fails to protect the testator against maligning allegations of mental incompetency. Claimants not protected by the family maintenance legislation would continue to challenge the will for lack of other recourse. Even claimants protected by the family maintenance legislation might attack the will on testamentary incapacity grounds. In addition, see England's Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch. 63.

172. The amount of the children's share should depend upon the value of the estate. If one child survives, the first $50,000 and one third of the remaining estate would seem adequate. If more than one minor child survives, perhaps they should receive the entire estate.

173. Distributing the property to the surviving spouse instead of to the children eliminates
ing spouse if the decedent's children are also the children of the spouse. My proposal excludes adult children because, although they are natural objects of the testator's bounty, their livelihood rarely depends on the decedent. Restricting testamentary freedom to provide for those without financial dependency seems unjustified.\(^{174}\) Moreover, providing adult children a statutory share might reduce their incentive to take care of their sick or elderly parents.\(^{175}\)

This approach to the problem of unwarranted allegations of testamentary incapacity is far preferable to living probate. It eliminates any need to inquire into the testator's mental competency. The elective share to the surviving spouse and/or minor children only slightly increases the restrictions on testamentary freedom already existing in the law. Often persons who die testate no longer have minor children, and most states already provide some form of elective share for the spouse. Further, the benefits to the testator of knowing that presumptive takers cannot challenge the will on grounds of mental incompetency outweigh the cost of forfeiting control over the disposition of part of the estate.

This proposal rests on the conclusion that, after protecting the nuclear family, society has little or no interest in imposing the requirement of mental competency.\(^{176}\) Although it does not provide a

\(^{174}\) I do not propose a statute that permits persons who show financial dependency upon the testator to claim a share of the estate; that would encourage litigation and further encumber probate administration. Rather, I propose a conclusive presumption of dependency based on certain familial relationships.

\(^{175}\) If they know they can never be totally disinherited they may not be so willing to give their parents care and affection when they are sick and elderly. To the extent my proposal may create some disincentive to care for an irrational parent because that parent could disinherit the adult child, I think that the possibility of being included in the will may still encourage the child not to abandon his parents.

Although not a necessary aspect of my proposal, I think that the elective share of the spouse and the minor children should operate not only against the probate estate but also against inter vivos transfers that are essentially will substitutes like the revocable inter vivos trust. Without going into detail, I agree with the theory of the augmented estate adopted in the Uniform Probate Code in which the elective share operates against probate and nonprobate property. I also agree with the theory of the augmented estate adopted in the Uniform Probate Code in which a transfer of property to the spouse prior to the decedent's death reduces the amount of the elective share. \(\text{See Uniform Probate Code } \S 2-202.\) I also believe the statute should reflect that the elective share to a surviving spouse in noncommunity property states rests not only on the presumption of financial dependency but also on the assumption that the spouse actively participated in the acquisition of the marital property. The statute should limit the amount or availability of the elective share if the surviving spouse just recently married the decedent or married the decedent late in life after the decedent had accumulated much of the property.

\(^{176}\) The laws of succession protect against obviously wasteful dispositions independently of the testamentary capacity requirement. For example, courts will not permit an executor of an estate to carry out a testator's direction to dump cash into the ocean or to prevent real estate from remaining productive. \(\text{See, e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555}\)
perfect solution, it does balance protection of testamentary freedom against protection of presumptive takers. The testator forgoes some testamentary freedom by the provisions that give the surviving spouse and/or minor children the right to elect against the will, while presumptive takers other than nuclear family members forgo their right to claim a share in the estate based on the testator's mental incompetency. This proposal is less complex, more fair, and better directed toward the problem of capacity-based contests than is living probate.

State choice-of-law statutes that adopt the will execution statutes of another state do not also incorporate the testamentary capacity requirements of the other state. The constitution does not mandate extraterritorial recognition of my proposed statutory amendment in most situations, and the proposal will therefore provide certainty against unwarranted attack only in those states that enact similar succession law rules. Thus, the general effectiveness of my proposal hinges upon its adoption in a large number of states.

177. States that implement my proposal should eliminate the requirement of testamentary capacity for all testators who die after enactment of the amendment. Unlike new formal will requirements, this amendment can apply retrospectively. This application appears constitutional under the Supreme Court case of Usury v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). Although probably not constitutionally required, the statutory amendment should not apply to a will through which a testator exercises a power to appoint that the donor created prior to the statutory enactment. The donor of the power created it assuming it would only be exercised in a will by a person who possessed testamentary capacity. Fairness therefore requires that testamentary capacity remains a prerequisite for wills that exercise powers granted before the enactment of the proposed amendment. Moreover, default takers own property interests that can be defeated only upon a valid exercise of the power. At the time those interests were created, the prerequisites to a valid will included the requirement of testamentary capacity. Fairness suggests that the legal rule continue to be preserved for default takers who obtained their interests prior to the enactment of the proposed statutory amendment.

178. See note 103 supra.

179. An alternative to this proposal is to preserve the right of spouses and minor children to allege testamentary incapacity and to deny them an elective share. This proposal is less attractive in that it involves expensive litigation without significant benefits to either the testator or nuclear family members. Testamentary freedom would be somewhat greater, but the risks that a testator's mental competency would be challenged also increase. The spouse and/or children may obtain a greater share of the estate by a finding of invalidity, but that difference would be reduced by litigation costs.
I believe the requirement of absence of fraud and undue influence should be retained. Unlike the testamentary capacity requirement, the requirement of absence of fraud and undue influence exists to deter wrongdoers and to assure that they do not benefit from their wrongdoing. If contestants could not challenge a will on the basis of fraud or undue influence, testators would have little protection from deception and duress. Retaining the requirement of absence of fraud and undue influence raises two major issues. First, will those persons who would otherwise allege testamentary incapacity now allege fraud and undue influence and therefore reduce the usefulness of my proposal to abolish the mental capacity requirement? As noted earlier, most reported cases that contain allegations of testamentary incapacity also contain allegations of fraud and undue influence because deception and duress more easily influence a physically or mentally weakened testator.\(^{180}\) Thus, the answer may very well be yes. On the other hand, courts that would otherwise use the requirements of fraud and undue influence to strike down seemingly unfair dispositions will have less reason to do so if the nuclear family is entitled to a forced share of the testator’s estate.

A second issue concerns how states might best resolve issues of fraud or undue influence. I believe that the Uniform Probate Code’s self-proving will procedure offers the best method.\(^{181}\) Under this procedure, a testator can obtain a rebuttable presumption against fraud and undue influence upon presentation of the self-proved will to probate. This provides some protection to the testator as well as to intended legatees while still deterring wrongdoers.

**CONCLUSION**

The idea of determining the validity of wills during the lifetime of the testator carries superficial appeal. Not only might it provide the testator with greater assurance of testamentary disposition, it might also improve the quality and nature of the evidence available during probate. A critical review of the various living probate schemes reveals, however, that they fail to achieve these benefits, they impose significant costs on testators, and they inadequately protect the rights of presumptive takers.

Discouraging challenges based on allegations of testamentary incapacity troubles me little except to the extent that the proposals fail to protect the nuclear family from total disinheritance. But a pro-

---

180. See text at note 55 supra.
181. See Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-504, 3-406.
bate proceeding that discourages challenges based on allegations of fraud and undue influence alarms me, because it encourages wrong-doers to try to convince the testator to use the procedure. To the extent that living probate discourages challenges based on fraud and undue influence, it is both unwise and unfair to presumptive takers. Living probate cannot prevent all post-mortem challenges to a will; by slightly varying the basis of a fraud or undue influence allegation, presumptive takers can often challenge the court-approved will after the decedent's death. To the extent these issues remain litigable in a post-mortem proceeding, living probate fails in its promise of assuring testators that their dispository scheme will avoid attack after their death.

The primary purpose of this Article was to discourage the adoption of living probate schemes. My own proposal for reform is of only secondary importance. In my opinion, living probate fails to advance the law of succession. And that failure impedes reform by creating the illusion that a problem has been corrected.