From *Brown* to *Bakke*: The Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978

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"Brown may be the most important political, social, and legal event in America's twentieth-century history. Its greatness lay in the enormity of injustice it condemned, in the entrenched sentiment it challenged, in the immensity of law it both created and overthrew" (p. 6). From Brown to Bakke narrates the nation's uneven acceptance and the Supreme Court's unsure implementation of Brown v. Board of Education. The narrative's plot: the Supreme Court's attempt to integrate education, beginning with Brown and culminating, twenty-two years later, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Its characters: the nation's highest court, students black and white, local school boards, NAACP attorneys, well-meaning social scientists, much-harried federal district court judges, and, of course, the forces of evil, personified in figures like former Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus. Its theme: like many tales of Milton and Blake, this book studies the loss of innocence.

The Supreme Court's innocence was manifested in the unanimous Brown opinion, where integration and racial equality seemed so eminently attainable, a simple matter of judicial decree and reliance on the children ("I have seen them do it," Thurgood Marshall told the Court in Brown. "They play in the streets together, they play on their farms together, they go down the road together, they separate to go to school, they come out of school and play ball together" (p. 41)). That innocence was but a memory by the time of the "brokered judgment" (p. 298) in Bakke, where the Justices struggled in several opinions to maintain some semblance of support for affirmative action, seemingly the last, best hope of blacks seeking educational and social parity in the Land of Promise.

J. Harvie Wilkinson attributes this loss of innocence, this change in spirit from Brown to Bakke, to two forces. In grand fictional form, one force was internal, personal to the Court, and thus in some sense less excusable. The other was impersonal, finding its expression in two disheartening racial clashes generated by the inner logic of the Court's sweeping attempt to integrate education.

The Supreme Court's personal failing, Wilkinson believes, was in not standing behind the "all deliberate speed" language of Brown

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* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.—Ed.
II. He argues forcefully, if ultimately unpersuasively, that Brown II was itself correct. In his view, gradualism — "a course of steadily mounting federal pressure, which allowed the South its filibusters and fulminations, but all the while forced private reckonings that Southerners were, after all, a part of the nation" (p. 68) — was the proper course. But from 1955, the year of Brown II, until the landmark Green decision in 1968, the Supreme Court virtually abandoned the field of school desegregation it had so promisingly staked out. Implementation was left to the forty-eight federal district judges in the southern states and, to a lesser degree, to the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court's failure to supervise this implementation contributed largely to the uneven and uninspired progress of integration.

Wilkinson describes the Court's unsure implementation of Brown — rather than demanding substantial integration, "it pleaded, mediated, mollified, or even withdrew" (p. 310) — but he fails to explain it. He emphasizes that the Supreme Court is a pragmatic institution, both reflective of and responsive to the political environment in which it operates, and he notes that "[i]n almost all the landmark school cases, white racial sensibilities weighed heavily" (p. 310). But he never clearly explains why this pragmatic institution cared so much about white racial sensibilities.

Perhaps the Justices feared that a "desegregation now" order would provoke outbreaks of violence that would threaten life and property. Perhaps they feared that such an order would leave black children with a pyrrhic victory — desegregated education that was valueless in the face of white hostility. Or perhaps they were concerned that outright defiance would reveal the Court's powerlessness to enforce its own judgment.

Whatever the reason for the Court's failure, it did not stay above the fray forever. In 1968, in Green v. County School Board, it announced that its attempt to integrate education would be "deliberate" no longer. Yet Wilkinson contends that this victory over the internal force was not adequate to prevent the loss of innocence. The promises made in Brown could not be fulfilled by judicial fiat; the logic of the Brown decision itself generated clashes that forced the Court to confront the complexity of America's racial problem.

Brown stood for several propositions. On the one hand, its message was that minorities have a right to equal educational opportunity, and segregated classrooms and instruction do not provide

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4. Cf. Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 22 (1970) (arguing that Brown II undermined respect for fundamental law by asking blacks to postpone enjoyment of a right the Supreme Court had just declared was constitutionally theirs).
that equal educational opportunity. But America’s neighborhoods — particularly in the urban North and West — were as segregated as its schools. Practically speaking, if Brown required integration, it also required busing. But Brown also stood for the primacy and centrality of education in American life, and for many, particularly middle- and lower-class urban whites, education meant safe, secure neighborhood schools. These ideals inevitably clashed and rekindled the fears and hatred that Brown had hoped to still. In the 1974 Detroit busing case — the first school case lost by black plaintiffs in the Brown era — the Supreme Court resolved the clash in favor of the neighborhood. For Wilkinson, the decision was a “great gamble . . . that black progress would continue in the absence of an activist judiciary” (p. 242). It was also a sign that the loss of innocence would not be pretty.

Brown stood for still another idea — the color-blind Constitution. In its purest form, such an ideal is irreconcilable with affirmative action programs that seek to remedy the educational disadvantages of past prejudice by treating minorities preferentially. The clash between the ideal of color-blindness and the ideal of equal educational opportunity also found its way to the Supreme Court, first in DeFunis and finally in Bakke.

With Bakke, the Court’s loss of innocence was complete. The long moralistic voyage begun with “optimism and confidence” had reached a stage of “confusion and doubt” (p. 308). Wilkinson’s discussion of the Bakke decision is slightly less insightful than his analysis of the busing decisions, in part, perhaps, because it was written so soon after the event. But while he hedges in expressing his personal opinion on busing, Wilkinson’s judgment on Bakke shines through clearly:

Perhaps there has never been a case before the Supreme Court with opposing arguments of more equal legitimacy. The Court’s own task in Bakke was to avoid a conclusive outcome. . . .

The Court did just that. If Brown was a great moral blow, Bakke was a brokered judgment. The Supreme Court offered “a Solomonic compromise,” in which “the nine justices spoke in many voices, a chorus of competing viewpoints adding up to a well-modulated counterpoint”. [P. 298.]

From Brown to Bakke is elegant and engrossing. It loses none of its penetration for being written in clear and simple prose, and it loses none of its winsomeness for including a heavy dose of professorial legal analysis. One of the most engaging aspects of the narrative

8. The phrase was coined by the elder Justice Harlan in lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
is the liberal sprinkling of anecdotes. For example, Wilkinson de-
scribes Virginia Governor Linwood Holton's politically courageous
decision in 1973 to send his children to black-majority public schools
in Richmond in hopes of lessening resistance to desegregation orders
in that race-torn city. We also learn that Marco DeFunis, two short
years after escaping the notoriety that would forever belong to Allan
Bakke, filed an amicus brief on Bakke's behalf for the Young Amer-
icans for Freedom.

Perhaps, as Professor David Chambers suggested in an earlier
review, Mr. Wilkinson writes "generally with the detachment of a
person telling someone else's tale," and perhaps the book suffers as
a result; but I do not think so. For while its narrator may be de-
tached, his story is ours. As the black minority shared the humilia-
tion, so must the white majority share the shame. Together we must
face an uncertain future:

From Brown to Bakke has been a maturing journey also. Findings in
the education cases laid bare the depth of American prejudice and
made clear the true dimensions of our difficulties. We now seem to be
many sad and wise days away from those happy forecasts of play-
ground bliss. What we better understand is our own lack of under-
standing. School integration has taught us at home what Vietnam did
abroad: how much eludes the American capacity to reshape. [P. 308.]

9. DeFunis was, in 1971, in a position similar to that of Allan Bakke. However, he was
admitted to the University of Washington Law School while his appeal from an unfavorable
state supreme court ruling was pending. Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it
declared the question before it moot when it became apparent that DeFunis would graduate
regardless of the outcome of the case. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (per
curiam).