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Inter vivos transfers of ownership in family firms

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Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of inter vivos (lifetime) transfers of ownership in German family firms between 2000 and 2013. Survey evidence indicates that owners of firms with strong current business conditions transfer ownership at higher rates than others. When a firm's self-described business condition improves from "normal" to "good," the relative likelihood of an inter vivos transfer increases by 46 percent. Inter vivos transfer rates also rose following a 2009 reform that reduced transfer taxes. These patterns suggest that transfer taxes significantly influence rates and timing of inter vivos ownership transfers.

Keywords Inter vivos transfers · Transfer taxes · Family firms

JEL Classification H24 · D31 · D22

1 Introduction

Successful family firms are commonly transferred from one generation to the next.¹ Succession occurs naturally at an owner's death, but may also be planned in advance with inter vivos (during life) transfers. Business conditions, family considerations,

¹ The majority of firms around the world are family firms (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio and Lang 2002). See Burkart et al. (2003) on basic theoretical considerations regarding succession in family firms.

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and estate, gift, and inheritance taxes all have the potential to influence the timing and extent of inter vivos transfers. And these transfers, in changing ownership, may affect the operations and productivities of family firms.

This paper considers the determinants of inter vivos transfers of assets in German family firms. The analysis is based on unique survey data covering the years 2000–2013. The evidence indicates that inter vivos ownership transfers are most common in firms with strong business conditions. Furthermore, inter vivos transfers rose following a German tax reform in 2009 that reduced transfer taxes.²

The difficulty of obtaining data has limited the number of empirical studies of inter vivos transfers of family firms. Scholars find that macroeconomic conditions—especially financial factors such as the inability to find financial resources to liquidate the possible exit of heirs, the market environment, or increased competition—appear to influence succession plans of family firms (De Massis et al. 2008; Vozikis et al. 2012). While firms are typically the focus of the theory and empirical interest, the units of observation in most data sets are households rather than firms. Empirical studies indicate that transfer taxes influence behavior³ and that the amount of inter vivos transfers depends on the incomes of parents and children (Bernheim et al. 2004; Joulfaian 2004, 2005; Hrung 2004; Villanueva 2005; McGarry 1999; Arrondel and Laferrère 2001; Stark and Zhang 2002). Taxpayers forego substantial savings by not making inter vivos transfers that fully exploit annual gift tax exemptions (Poterba 2001; McGarry 2001, 2013; Joulfaian and McGarry 2004). Another strand of related literature considers bequest motives (Kotlikoff 1988; Modigliani 1988; Gale and Scholz 1994; Laitner and Ohlsson 2001; Arrondel and Masson 2006; Kopczuk 2007; Ameriks et al. 2011). Wealth transfers from one generation to the next may be accidental or intentional, with inter vivos transferring relatively clear cases of intentional choices.

Firm owners have better information on the business conditions of their firms than do outsiders such as external investors, banks or tax authorities. These information asymmetries can influence a firm's financing and investment decision (Leland and Pyle 1977; Myers and Majluf 1984; Miller and Rock 1985). In a similar vein, decisions on ownership structure may depend on the firm's business condition as perceived by the firm owner. A firm's self-assessed current business condition is likely to offer information on firm value that is not contained in balance sheet variables. Balance sheets are backward looking, whereas the assessment of a firm's business condition by its owner reflects soft information and expectations about future developments. As a result, it is valuable to consider the relationship between a firm's self-assessed business condition and any transfers of firm ownership to the next generation.

The paper's analysis of inter vivos transfers of assets in family firms is based on data that include evidence from a survey conducted among German family firms on inheritances, inter vivos transfers and taxation. The data include Germany's most important business cycle and firm survey information that serve as the foundation of the Ifo

² See Schinke (2016) on how the tax reform influenced inter vivos transfers to different types of recipients including the core family, other close relatives, and unrelated recipients.

³ On inheritance and inter vivos transfer taxation and legislation see, e.g., Gale et al. (2001), Ellul et al. (2010), Hines (2010, 2013), Kopczuk (2009, 2013a, b) and Wrede (2014). Transfer taxes may give rise to declines in investment, slow sales growth, and a depletion of cash reserves around family successions (Tsoutsoura 2015).

Business Climate Index, Germany's leading business cycle indicator. The new survey data include information on the years when firms made inter vivos ownership transfers. These data are matched with Ifo business survey data, which include information on how firm owners assess the current economic situation, business expectations, whether firm activity is constrained, and many other firm-specific characteristics. The data incorporate balance sheet information from external sources (Amadeus Bureau van Dijk and Hoppenstedt Firmeninformationen GmbH) and cover the years 2000 to 2013. Business survey and balance sheet data are preprocessed and provided by the Economics and Business Data Center, Munich.

German tax authorities generally base their assessments of the values of transferred firms on average revenues over three business years prior to transfer.⁴ Consequently, new information for the current business year, which is available only to firm owners, reveals likely future changes in taxable values and thereby affects incentives to make current inter vivos transfers.

The results indicate that when a firm's self-described business condition improves, for example, from "normal" to "good," then the relative likelihood of an inter vivos transfer rises by 46 percent. The reason for this timing may be that owners of firms with strong business conditions anticipate higher tax valuations in the future and therefore accelerate ownership transfers as part of prudent tax planning.

2 Inter vivos transfers and family firms

Despite the importance of estate planning and the availability of simple methods of tax avoidance, the evidence suggests that wealthy people make surprisingly few inter vivos transfers, thereby foregoing substantial potential tax savings (McGarry 2001, 2013). Empirical studies describe many factors that influence inter vivos transfers. Inheritance and gift taxes affect the timing of transfers, typically encouraging inter vivos transfers compared to bequests (Bernheim et al. 2004; Joulfaian 2004). Capital gain taxes can be offsetting considerations, since the favorable tax treatment of appreciated assets held until death can create some situations in which taxpayers benefit from avoiding inter vivos transfers (Poterba 2001; Joulfaian 2005). The composition of household wealth also influences the chance of making inter vivos transfers. When wealth is held in illiquid forms, such as private business, households are less likely to make inter vivos transfers than when wealth was held in more liquid forms (Poterba 2001). The amount of inter vivos transfers also increases with the lifetime income of parents (Poterba 2001; Hrung 2004): An additional dollar of parental lifetime income appears to increase inter vivos transfers by 0.7 cents in Germany and by 1.2 cents in the United States (Villanueva 2005). Another issue is the allocation of inter vivos gifts among heirs.⁵ Empirical studies indicate that parents make greater inter vivos transfers to children with lower incomes than to other children (McGarry 1999, 2016). Private transfers are targeted toward recipients that are liquidity constrained (Guiso and Jappelli 1991).

⁴ See § 201 subsection two of the valuation law (*Bewertungsgesetz*).

⁵ On theoretical models of intergenerational private exchanges within the family under alternative assumptions as to the nature of relations between parents and children, see Cremer et al. (1992).

The appeal of this type of redistribution is very intuitive, though as a theoretical matter there are models with the opposite prediction that parents would make greater inter vivos transfers to children with higher incomes than to children with lower incomes (Stark and Zhang 2002).

Family firms may be special cases due to tacit knowledge on the part of the founder or successor (Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001; Kannianen and Poutvaara 2007). Family firms display a great deal of stakeholder focus and feel more accountable to employees and banks than to shareholders (Mullins and Schoar 2016). Studies often find that family firms outperform other firms (McConaughy et al. 1998; Anderson and Reeb 2003).⁶ Following ownership succession, firms whose incoming CEOs are related to the departed CEO or firm founder tend to underperform relative to firms with new CEOs who are not related to firm insiders (Pérez-González 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Grossmann and Strulik 2010; Molly et al. 2010; Wennberg et al. 2011). Family firms have also been found to be less tax aggressive than non-family firms (Chen et al. 2010).

Owners of family firms may make provisions for succession during their lifetimes. In some situations, there are incentives to purchase life insurance that will provide liquidity when estate taxes are due (Holtz-Eakin et al. 2001).⁷ Several studies examine the succession planning of family businesses (e.g., Sharma et al. 1997, 2003).⁸ Sharma et al. (2003) find that even in cases where owners of family firms wanted to preserve their firms, the need to find successors did not induce succession planning. Succession planning appears to start only when trusted successors are available. Caillaud and Cohen (2000) interpret intergenerational transfers in a theoretical model as a cooperative agreement across generations sharing common principles, and Stark and Nicinska (2015) offer evidence that those who receive bequests are more likely than others to want to make their own bequests. Vozikis et al. (2012) predict that financial factors such as limited internal financial resources (high opportunity costs of obtaining external financing, inability to sustain transfer tax burdens, low capital stocks, and high earnings variability) impede succession planning. De Massis et al. (2008) describe potential obstacles to a smooth succession. These obstacles include private family conflicts (e.g., low ability or motivation of potential successors, family rivalries, and absence of mutual trust), financial issues (e.g., tax burdens or financial resources that are inadequate to liquidate possible exit of heirs) or changes in the economic environment of the firm (decline in business performance, loss of key customers, decreasing business scale). The willingness of offspring to join family firms correlates positively with business size (Stavrou 1999).

There are substantial transaction costs associated with transferring ownership of a family firm (Bjuggren and Sund 2005). Rates of ownership transfers are likely to be sensitive to changes in estate, gift and inheritance taxes, such as the 2004 abolition

⁶ On how family ownership, control, organization, and management influence firm value and firm performance see Jacquemin and de Ghellinck (1980), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Bertrand et al. (2008) and Minetti et al. (2015).

⁷ In the absence of sufficient life insurance coverage, liquidity problems driven by estate tax liabilities may force heirs of family firms to sell business assets (Astrachan and Tutterow 1996; Brunetti 2006; Houben and Maiterth 2011).

⁸ On exit strategies in family firms see also DeTienne and Chirico (2013) and Wennberg and DeTienne (2014).

of transfer taxes in Sweden. Bjuggren and Sund (2001) describe the role of the legal system in facilitating smooth transition of family firms from one generation to the next.

3 German inheritance and gift taxes

Germany does not tax estates, but it does tax receipt of inheritances and inter vivos gifts. Tax rates rise with the amount of gift or inheritance received, and rates are conditioned on the closeness of any family connection between those who give and those who receive. The lowest tax rates and highest exempt amounts apply to gifts to spouses, followed successively by children, grandchildren, other close relatives, and finally by all others. The German government grants special tax relief for transfers of family business assets, this favorable tax treatment intended to preserve jobs in family businesses. For this purpose, business assets include agricultural and forestry assets and privately held shares in corporations when the owner holds more than 25% of the shares. Inter vivos transfers are subject to the same tax rules as inheritances.

Until 2008, business assets were assessed at tax values that were typically considerably lower than market values, the outcome of tax practices rather than explicit exemptions for family firms (Houben and Maiterth 2011). In addition, there was a statutory tax exemption of €225,000 for transfers of business assets in family firms, and the remaining taxable amount was reduced by 35%.

Since 2009, business assets have been assessed at estimated market values. Firms with fewer than 20 employees can be transferred tax free. Owners of larger firms can choose between two types of tax relief, of which the first reduces the taxable amount of business assets by 85%. To be eligible for this relief, no more than 50 percent of business assets may consist of non-operating assets such as leased real estate, securities or cultural property; firm owners must commit to keeping the firm in business for at least 5 years; and the sum of wages and salaries over the following 5 years must be at least 400 percent of an historical average. An additional tax allowance of €150,000 may apply to the remaining 15 percent of business assets if this value is small. The second option is even more generous, exempting 100 percent of business assets, but can be chosen only if non-operating assets constitute no more than 10 percent of total business assets; the firm stays in business for at least 7 years; and the sum of wages and salaries over the following 7 years is at least 700 percent of an historical average. These employment-related tax exemptions apply immediately, with taxpayers required to remit transfer taxes if and when future employment levels subsequently fail to meet these targets. Eligibility for these tax exemptions is the same whether transfers are made within or outside the family.

Transfers of any business assets that remain after tax relief and exemptions, together with other assets such as real estate and financial assets, are subject to gift and inheritance taxation. Personal tax exemptions apply, e.g., €400,000 for a transfer from parent to child (€205,000 until 2008). Tax exemptions can be used every 10 years, making inter vivos transfers an effective instrument for reducing taxes. Tax rates are progressive and vary between 7 and 50%, depending on the degree of kinship between transferor and beneficiary, and the type of property transferred. Transfers to close relatives such as children are subject to lower rates of tax than transfers to more distant

relatives such as cousins, which in turn are subject to lower rates of tax than transfers to unrelated individuals; furthermore, transfers of business assets are taxed at the low rates applicable to transfers to children, regardless of the beneficiary.

For example, consider a firm worth €15 million with over 20 employees that the owner transfers inter vivos to a child in 2010. Using the 85% tax relief option, business assets of only €2.25 million are subject to taxation at the time of the transfer. Deducting the personal tax exemption of €400,000, the taxable transfer is €1.85 million. At a tax rate of 19%, the gift tax due is €351,500.

4 Analytical framework

It is useful to consider the effects of transfer taxes on incentives to transfer ownership of family firms. This section analyzes aspects of these incentives created by changing economic and legal environments.

4.1 Timing of ownership transfers

Let q_t denote a family firm's true value at time t , and s_t denote the signal of firm value observed by the tax authority and other outsiders. The original owner's (flow) after-tax return at time t of maintaining ownership is given by $v(q_t)$, whereas the after-tax return is $w(q_t)$ if successors own the firm. These returns can differ if ownership affects firm performance or if the same return is taxed at different rates if received by different potential owners. In the absence of transfer tax considerations, families would choose to transfer ownership in period t only if $w(q_t) > v(q_t)$. Transfer taxes complicate this decision.

A family chooses inter vivos transfers to maximize the present value Ψ , given by:

$$\psi = \int_0^{t^*} e^{-rt} v(q_t) dt + \int_{t^*}^{\infty} e^{-rt} w(q_t) dt - e^{-rt^*} \tau(s_{t^*}, t^*), \quad (1)$$

in which r is the decision maker's discount rate, t^* is the date of ownership transfer, and $\tau(s_{t^*}, t^*)$ is the transfer tax imposed in period t^* on a transfer of a family firm with observable value s_{t^*} . Time is an argument of the transfer tax function because tax laws vary over time, so the tax obligation associated with a transfer of a firm with a given observable value is time dependent.

Differentiating Ψ with respect to t^* produces:

$$e^{rt^*} \frac{d\psi}{dt^*} = v(q_{t^*}) - w(q_{t^*}) + r\tau(s_{t^*}, t^*) - \frac{\partial \tau(s_{t^*}, t^*)}{\partial s_{t^*}} \frac{ds_{t^*}}{dt^*} - \frac{\partial \tau(s_{t^*}, t^*)}{\partial t^*}. \quad (2)$$

The right side of Eq. (2) is the (undiscounted) value of slightly delaying ownership transfer at time t^* , so an optimizing decision maker solving for an interior solution with continuous variables transfers the firm at time t^* only if this expression equals zero. The first two terms on the right side of Eq. (2) are familiar from the transfer decision in the absence of taxation, and have the intuitive property that delaying trans-

fer is more attractive the greater is the difference between $v(q_{t^*})$ and $w(q_{t^*})$. Indeed, if $v(q_{t^*})$ exceeds $w(q_{t^*})$ to a sufficient degree at all times t , then the decision maker never transfers ownership of the firm until it becomes absolutely necessary (such as at the death of the original owner). Such situations arise if the original owner is a much more productive owner/manager of the firm than is the potential successor, at least as evaluated by the relevant decision maker (who is commonly the original owner). Current business conditions will influence the timing of asset transfers to the extent that they affect the difference between $v(q_{t^*})$ and $w(q_{t^*})$. Stronger current business conditions correspond to greater values of $v(q_{t^*})$, which reduce the likelihood of asset transfers except insofar as they are associated with even greater values of $w(q_{t^*})$, which are possible if new owners would benefit even more strongly from good current (and presumably future) conditions. Firm size may also be associated with the difference between $v(q_{t^*})$ and $w(q_{t^*})$, as larger firms will commonly have organizational structures that can better withstand the consequences of ownership changes.

The third through fifth terms on the right side of Eq. (2) capture the tax effects of delaying ownership transfer. The third term is the product of the discount rate and the tax cost of transfer, and reflects simply that delaying the incursion of a given tax liability reduces its present value. The fourth term on the right side of Eq. (2) is the product of the marginal tax rate and the change in the taxable value of a family firm. A rising taxable value reduces the attractiveness of delaying a transfer, since with a positive marginal tax rate it is clearly better to transfer ownership of a firm when it is valued at €50 million than when it is valued at €100 million. Conversely, if a firm is declining in value, then there is a tax benefit associated with delaying transfer. Notably, if the taxable value of a firm rises at the discount rate, and tax obligations are scalar functions of taxable transfers, then the third and fourth terms on the right side of Eq. (2) sum to zero. Consequently, other considerations equal, taxable firm values that rise faster than the discount rate are associated with accelerated transfers, whereas taxable values that rise more slowly than the discount rate are associated with delayed transfers.

The fifth term on the right side of Eq. (2) is the change over time in the tax due on the transfer of a firm of given taxable value. If tax rates are rising, then this term reflects that it is costly to delay ownership transfers; and conversely, if tax rates are falling, then it is beneficial to delay transfers.

Optimal ownership transfers incorporate all of these considerations. A local maximum at time t^* is characterized by a positive value of $\frac{dv}{dt^*}$ just prior to t^* , a zero value at t^* , and a negative value immediately following t^* . These properties reflect changing relative productivities of original owners and successors together with changing degrees to which tax liabilities evolve over time. One of the tax considerations may be that the decision maker anticipates that the taxable value of the firm will rise more or less slowly than the discount rate.

4.2 Taxable and market values of family business property

Taxable values need not coincide exactly with actual values as understood by firm owners. The tax authority obtains signals of firm value that are largely accurate but may not incorporate recent information that has not yet been revealed in profitability or

other objective measures. In order to capture the tax authority’s information acquisition process, it is useful to consider a model in which the true value of a family firm at time \hat{t} is given by:

$$q_{\hat{t}} = z_{\hat{t}}\theta_{\hat{t}} + \int_0^{\hat{t}} u_t dt, \tag{3}$$

in which $z_{\hat{t}}$ is a vector of observable variables at time \hat{t} , $\theta_{\hat{t}}$ is a date-specific coefficient vector, and u_t is a time t innovation, the value of which is known to firm owners but not necessarily to the tax authorities. $z_{\hat{t}}$ and $\theta_{\hat{t}}$ are assumed to be common knowledge. In the formulation of Eq. (3), the true firm value is a function of observable considerations captured in z and also a function of factors that are unknown to outsiders.

The signal of firm value available to the tax authority at time \hat{t} is $s_{\hat{t}}$, given by:

$$s_{\hat{t}} = z_{\hat{t}}\theta_{\hat{t}} + \int_0^{\hat{t}-\gamma} u_t dt + \int_{\hat{t}-\gamma}^{\hat{t}} u_t \left(\frac{\hat{t}-t}{\gamma} \right) dt. \tag{4}$$

In this formulation $s_{\hat{t}}$ differs from the true value $q_{\hat{t}}$ in that the calculation of $s_{\hat{t}}$ attaches linearly declining weight to more recent draws of u_t , starting a period of time γ prior to the present. This corresponds to the tax authority not having the same information as taxpayers about recent developments that affect the firm value, with the least weight attaching to the most recent developments.

In the model expressed by Eq. (4), and for unchanging values of z and θ , the tax authority’s signal of firm value evolves according to:

$$\frac{ds_{\hat{t}}}{d\hat{t}} = \frac{1}{\gamma} \int_{\hat{t}-\gamma}^{\hat{t}} u_t dt. \tag{5}$$

Equation (5) implies that if recent draws of u_t are positive, then s_t increases over time, reflecting that the tax authority only gradually incorporates the most recent information in its valuation of the firm. This most recent information, the cumulative draws of u_t between time $\hat{t} - \gamma$ and time \hat{t} , might also be described as the current business conditions of the firm. When current business conditions are favorable then the tax authority will gradually revise upward its valuation of the firm, whereas when current business conditions are unfavorable the tax authority will gradually revise downward its valuation of the firm.

It is useful to consider the application of the model of firm valuation in Eqs. (3)–(5) to optimal ownership transfer characterized in Eq. (2). If tax laws are unchanging then $\frac{\partial \tau(s_{t^*}, t)}{\partial t^*} = 0$ and the fifth term on the right side of (2) disappears. It follows from (5) that if current business conditions are favorable, $\frac{ds_{\hat{t}}}{d\hat{t}} > 0$ which, given that $\frac{\partial \tau(s_{t^*}, t^*)}{\partial s_{t^*}} > 0$, should encourage earlier transfers of ownership. It is worth bearing in mind that $\frac{d\psi}{dr^*} = 0$ characterizes local optima, of which there may be more than one, and that discrete changes in tax laws or business conditions may produce situations in which there are discrete jumps in the value of ownership transfers.

5 Data and descriptive statistics

5.1 Data

We conducted a survey on inheritances, inter vivos transfers, and transfer taxation (the Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey–IGTS) among owners of family firms in February and March 2014. We first asked participants in the monthly Ifo business survey whether they considered themselves to be family firms.⁹ The Ifo business survey is conducted every month among 7000 German firms, and provides the basis for the Ifo Business Climate Index, Germany's leading business cycle indicator. 4660 firms identified themselves as family firms. We then sent out the IGTS to the family firms. The response rate was an encouraging 35.5%.¹⁰ Among other things, respondents provided information on years in which they made inter vivos transfers (exact amounts of transfers are unknown, as are the identities of those who receive the inter vivos transfers) and years in which they paid gift taxes.¹¹ Understanding the determinants of this measure of inter vivos transfer is the focus of this study.

The IGTS data on transfers of business ownership were matched to Ifo business survey data. The Ifo business survey includes information on the current state of business,¹² the expected development of employment, and credit conditions. Survey measures based on the self-assessment of managers may contain more information than that embedded in financial statement data. While potentially somewhat subjective, survey responses related to the current state of business may reflect not only current turnover and profit figures (Abberger et al. 2009) but also new information, especially when requested in the second half of the year when balance sheet information is old (Hönig 2012). Similarly, self-reported firm credit conditions capture financial restrictions more comprehensively than do standard measures such as leverage, credit ratings, and liquidity. Since our sample includes firms that are not quoted on the stock exchange, financial restrictions can be quite important (Hönig 2012). The business survey data also include firm characteristics such as numbers of employees, broad industry (construction, retail, manufacturing or services), the founding year, and the legal form of each firm. In addition to the survey-based data, we use balance sheet data such as total assets and total equity, based on the Amadeus Bureau van Dijk and Hoppenstedt Firmeninformationen GmbH data bases.¹³ Business survey and balance sheet data are preprocessed and provided by the Economics & Business Data Center at the University of Munich and the Ifo Institute, Munich.¹⁴

The study uses annual data. In cases where monthly data are available, for instance from the business survey, these data are converted to yearly frequency by computing

⁹ A firm is defined as a family firm if most voting capital is held by one or several interconnected families.

¹⁰ See Seiler (2010) on nonresponse in business surveys.

¹¹ The survey questions are “Have there been inter vivos transfers of assets in your firm since the year 2000? Yes, in the year.../no,” and “Have you paid the gift tax since the year 2000? Yes, in the year .../no”.

¹² The survey statement is “We evaluate our present state of business as good/satisfactory/bad.” The simplicity of this survey question makes it easily understood by potential respondents, and contributes to the high response rate. Complete questionnaires are available at <https://doi.org/10.7805/ebdc-bep-2012>.

¹³ See Hoenig (2009, 2010) on how survey and balance sheet data are linked.

¹⁴ See Seiler (2012) for more information.

yearly averages. Balance sheet data are not available for all firms, and not for the year 2013. The regressions reported in Tables 3, 4, and 5 omit observations for which relevant data are missing, as a result of which the sample sizes can decrease significantly when including balance sheet control variables in some regressions.

5.2 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the subsamples of firms that did not, and those that did, make inter vivos transfers. The total sample includes 13,706 observations of 1654 firms. Three hundred and sixteen firms reported one or more inter vivos transfers (358 inter vivos transfers in total) since 2000. The share of firms making inter vivos transfers is thus quite small.¹⁵ Since business assets are an illiquid form of wealth, the small share of observed inter vivos transfers in our sample is reasonable (Poterba 2001). One variable in Table 1 is reported in categorical form: firm employment, which is measured as an integer from 0 to 5, with 0 corresponding to 0–19 employees, 1 corresponding to 20–49 employees, 2 corresponding to 50–249 employees, 3 corresponding to 250–999 employees, 4 corresponding to 1000–4999 employees, and 5 corresponding to 5000 or more employees. Table 2 shows pairwise correlations of the variables.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 describe the distribution of inter vivos transfers among firms in or with different industries, legal forms, and numbers of employees. The sample includes firms in the construction (45 inter vivos transfers), retail (88 transfers), manufacturing (184 transfers) and services industries (41 transfers). The rhombi in Fig. 1 show that relative to the whole sample, inter vivos transfers are more likely to occur in the manufacturing, construction, and retail industries than in services. Figure 2 shows that inter vivos transfers mostly occurred in firms operating as partnerships (46 transfers) or corporations (44 transfers), but rarely in proprietorships (one transfer).¹⁶ Figure 3 shows that most inter vivos transfers in the sample (126 transfers) are made by firms with between 50 and 249 employees. The rhombi indicate that the likelihood of making inter vivos transfers increases with numbers of employees. While inter vivos transfers occur in only 1.46% of firm-year observations of firms with fewer than 19 employees, they do so in 8% of the cases of firms with more than 5000 employees.

Figure 4 shows the average current state of business of firm-year observations with and without inter vivos transfers. The dashed line describes the average current state of business of firms making contemporaneous inter vivos transfers (left scale). The solid line describes the average current state of business of firms not making contemporaneous inter vivos transfers (left scale). The bars in the background display numbers of inter vivos transfers made each year (right scale). Annual numbers of inter vivos transfers rise over the sample period. Figure 4 indicates that firms making inter vivos transfers in most years had better current business conditions than firms not making inter vivos transfers. The years 2000–2001, 2003, and 2005–2006 are

¹⁵ Given asymmetries in reporting, it is likely that even fewer transfers would have been recorded if the survey instead asked beneficiaries about receipts of transferred business assets (Gale and Scholz 1994).

¹⁶ Data on legal forms and numbers of employees are not available for the entire sample; consequently, Figs. 1, 2, and 3 are each based on different samples.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Source
<i>No inter vivos transfers</i>						
Inter vivos transfers	13,348	0.00	0.00	0	0	See below
Current state of business	13,348	2.01	0.57	1	3	
Construction	13,348	0.13	0.33	0	1	
Retail	13,348	0.26	0.44	0	1	
Manufacturing	13,348	0.37	0.48	0	1	
Services industries	13,348	0.24	0.43	0	1	
Expected development of employment	13,341	1.95	0.34	1	3	
Number of employees (cat.)	10,337	1.33	1.07	0	5	
Credit conditions	8259	0.31	0.46	0	1	
Proprietorship	4301	0.08	0.27	0	1	
Partnership	4301	0.36	0.48	0	1	
Corporation	4301	0.56	0.50	0	1	
Firm age (years)	3792	40.01	45.59	0	882	
Total assets (log)	3025	14.86	1.87	7	21	
Total equity (log)	2797	13.57	2.10	6	21	
<i>Inter vivos transfers</i>						
Inter vivos transfers	358	1.00	0.00	1	1	
Current state of business	358	2.13	0.56	1	3	
Construction	358	0.13	0.33	0	1	
Retail	358	0.25	0.43	0	1	
Manufacturing	358	0.51	0.50	0	1	
Services industries	358	0.11	0.32	0	1	
Expected development of employment	358	2.00	0.34	1	3	
Number of employees (cat.)	324	1.77	1.07	0	5	
Credit conditions	278	0.17	0.38	0	1	
Proprietorship	91	0.01	0.10	0	1	
Partnership	91	0.51	0.50	0	1	

Table 1 continued

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Source
Corporation	91	0.48	0.50	0	1	
Firm age (years)	87	56.74	98.87	0	880	
Total assets (log)	68	15.75	2.12	8	21	
Total equity (log)	67	14.36	2.56	8	21	
Inter vivos transfer with transfer tax payment	358	0.13	0.34	0	1	
<i>Total sample</i>						
Inter vivos transfers	13,706	0.03	0.16	0	1	Own collection (Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey)
Current state of business	13,706	2.01	0.57	1	3	Ifo business survey
Construction	13,706	0.13	0.33	0	1	Ifo business survey
Retail	13,706	0.26	0.44	0	1	Ifo business survey
Manufacturing	13,706	0.38	0.48	0	1	Ifo business survey
Services industries	13,706	0.24	0.42	0	1	Ifo business survey
Expected development of employment	13,699	1.95	0.34	1	3	Ifo business survey
Number of employees (cat.)	10,661	1.35	1.07	0	5	Ifo business survey
Credit conditions	8537	0.30	0.46	0	1	Ifo business survey
Proprietorship	4392	0.08	0.27	0	1	Amadeus/ Hoppenstedt
Partnership	4392	0.36	0.48	0	1	Amadeus/ Hoppenstedt
Corporation	4392	0.56	0.50	0	1	Amadeus/ Hoppenstedt
Firm age (years)	3879	40.38	47.48	0	882	Amadeus/ Hoppenstedt
Total assets (log)	3093	14.88	1.88	7	21	Amadeus/ Hoppenstedt

Table 1 continued

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Source
Total equity (log)	2864	13.58	2.12	6	21	Amadeus/ Hoppenstedt
Inter vivos transfer with transfer tax payment	13,706	0.01	0.06	0	1	Own collection (Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey)

The top panel of the table presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations in which there are no inter vivos transfers; the middle panel presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations in which there are positive inter vivos transfers; and the bottom panel presents descriptive statistics for all firm-year observations. The variable “Inter vivos transfers” takes the value one if there is an inter vivos transfer, and zero otherwise. “Current state of business” takes the value 1 for firms that describe their business conditions as “bad,” takes the value 2 for firms that describe their business conditions as “satisfactory,” and takes the value 3 for firms that describe their business conditions as “good” (monthly survey responses are converted to yearly averages). “Construction,” “Retail,” “Manufacturing,” and “Services Industries” are dummy variables that take the value one if a firm is active in the respective industry and zero otherwise. “Expected development of employment” takes the value 1 for firms that expect the number of employees to “decrease,” takes the value 2 for firms that expect the number of employees to “not change,” and takes the value 3 for firms that expect the number of employees to “increase” (monthly survey responses are converted to yearly averages). “Number of employees” takes the value 0 for firms with 0–19 employees, 1 for firms with 20–49 employees, 2 for firms with 50–249 employees, 3 for firms with 250–999 employees, 4 for firms with 1000–4999 employees, and 5 for firms with 5000 or more employees. “Credit conditions” takes the value 1 for firms that describe their credit status as “financially constrained,” and zero otherwise. “Proprietorship,” “Partnership,” and “Corporation” are dummy variables that take the value one if a firm has the respective legal form, and zero otherwise. “Firm age” is measured in years. “Total assets (log)” is the natural logarithm of total firm assets. “Total equity (log)” is the natural logarithm of outstanding firm equity value. “Inter vivos transfers with transfer tax payment” takes the value one if there is an inter vivos transfer with accompanying gift tax payment, and zero otherwise.

exceptions, though the mean current state of business of firms with inter vivos transfers is based on only 4 to 13 observations in each of those years, reflecting that information on the current state of business is available for less than half of the reported inter vivos transfers in years prior to 2006, and making any inference potentially subject to the influence of outliers. The figure also suggests that the current state of business and number of inter vivos transfers are positively correlated. For example, when the financial and economic crisis hit in 2009 and business conditions deteriorated, firms made fewer inter vivos transfers than in preceding or subsequent years.

Most reported transfers took place since 2010. It is impossible to rule out recall bias, in which survey respondents are less apt to remember inter vivos transfers made years earlier—though these ownership transfers are so important to owners of family firms that it is difficult to imagine that they could possibly forget even the details of transfers during the preceding 15 years. In a similar vein, some family firms in the sample might not have been in existence at the start of the observation period. Another source of potential bias is sample selection, because, by construction, the sample includes only firms that still operated in 2014. Unsuccessful family firms disappeared from the market and cannot be included.

Table 2 Correlation matrix of regression variables

	Inter vivos	Current state of business	Expected development of employment	Number of employees (cat.)	Credit conditions	Firm age	Total assets (log)
Current state of business	0.033***						
Expected development of employment	0.024**	0.548***					
Number of employees (cat.)	0.071***	0.116***	0.022*				
Credit conditions	-0.054***	-0.286***	-0.215***	-0.087***			
Firm age (years)	0.052**	-0.117***	-0.077***	0.201***	-0.018		
Total assets (log)	0.069***	0.072***	0.024	0.793***	-0.150***	0.403***	
Total equity (log)	0.057**	0.073***	0.049**	0.705***	-0.172***	0.350***	0.880***

* $P < 0.05$, ** $P < 0.01$, *** $P < 0.001$




Fig. 1 Industry and inter vivos transfers. *Note* The shaded bars depict numbers of firm-year inter vivos transfers (left scale) by industry, whereas the rhombi denote ratios (right scale) of these transfers to total firm-year observations in each industry




Fig. 2 Legal form and inter vivos transfers. *Note* The shaded bars depict numbers of firm-year inter vivos transfers (left scale) by legal form of business, whereas the rhombi denote ratios (right scale) of these transfers to total firm-year observations of firms with each legal form

6 Empirical analysis

6.1 Empirical strategy

The theory sketched in Sect. 4 implies the following baseline empirical model of the ownership transfer decision:

$$T_{it} = \beta_1 c_{it} + \beta_2 x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{6}$$




Fig. 3 Firm size and inter vivos transfers. *Note* The shaded bars depict numbers of firm-year inter vivos transfers (left scale) by firm size as measured by numbers of employees, whereas the rhombi denote ratios (right scale) of these transfers to total firm-year observations among firms of each size category




Fig. 4 Business conditions and inter vivos transfers. *Note* The shaded bars depict numbers of inter vivos transfers (right scale) each year. The solid line is the average current state of business of firms without contemporaneous inter vivos transfers, and the dashed line is the average current state of business of firms with contemporaneous inter vivos transfers

in which T_{it} takes the value one if firm i reports an inter vivos transfer in year t , and is zero otherwise. The variable c_{it} in Eq. (6) is the yearly average of firm i 's perception

of the current business condition, measured on a scale between one (bad) and three (good). The variable x_{it} is a vector of firm i and year t characteristics, and β_1 a scalar and β_2 a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Control variables include firm sizes as measured by numbers of employees, and a dummy variable for years before the 2009 reform of inheritance and gift taxation. It is reasonable to expect inter vivos transfers to occur more frequently among larger firms with better current business conditions, and in years when the tax regime favors inter vivos transfers relative to inheritances. Additional control variables are intended to capture organizational features that might influence the cost and return to transferring firm ownership; these include firm assets, firm equity, firm age, dummy variables for a firm's legal form of organization, a firm's self-reported credit status, and its expected future development of employment. Anticipation of future tax changes can also affect the timing of ownership transfers and may be partly reflected in firms' assessments of current and future business conditions that are included as explanatory variables. Equation (6) is estimated as a random-effects logit model with classical standard errors.

6.2 Results

Table 3 presents results of estimating Eq. (6), displaying not the estimated coefficients but instead the corresponding odds ratios, for which an odds ratio of 1.0 implies that the associated variable has no effect on the dependent variable, and the P values reported in Table 3 correspond to tests of the hypotheses that the odds ratios equal unity. The regression reported in the first column includes the current business condition as an explanatory variable; the associated 1.439 odds ratio implies that improving business conditions from "bad" to "normal" or "normal" to "good" increases the odds (relative likelihood) of an inter vivos transfer by 43.9 percent. The odds ratio is statistically significant at the 1% level. The regressions reported in columns (2) to (4) include industry fixed effects, and sequentially add a dummy variable for the period before 2009, and numbers of employees (measured in six categories). The 1.456 odds ratio in column (4) implies that when the current business condition increases by one point (from bad to normal or normal to good), the relative likelihood of making an inter vivos transfer increases by 45.6 percent. The 0.499 odds ratio of the dummy variable for the period before 2009 in column (4) is smaller than one and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that, conditional on other variables, firms were less likely to make inter vivos transfers before the inheritance and gift tax reform in 2009 than after the reform. The odds ratio of the current business condition remains statistically significant at the 1% level. The odds ratio of the number of employees is larger than one and statistically significant at the 1% level in column (4).

Table 4 presents regressions with additional independent variables. The regressions reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 add control variables for the firm's expected development of employment and credit conditions. The odds ratio of the credit conditions variable is statistically significant at the 1% level, its magnitude implying that when credit conditions are difficult, the chance of making an inter vivos transfer decreases. The regressions in columns (3) to (5) control for other firm characteristics: firm age (in years), a firm's legal form of organization, total assets (in logs, column

Table 3 Determinants of inter vivos transfers: baseline regressions

	(1) Inter vivos transfers	(2) Inter vivos transfers	(3) Inter vivos transfers	(4) Inter vivos transfers
Current state of business	1.439*** (0.000)	1.516*** (0.000)	1.420*** (0.000)	1.456*** (0.000)
Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009			0.543*** (0.000)	0.499*** (0.000)
Number of employees (cat.)				1.453*** (0.000)
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,706	13,706	13,706	10,661
Groups	1654	1654	1654	1639
Pseudo- R^2	0.00437	0.0187	0.0276	0.0351
Chi-squared	14.48	62.09	91.41	101.9
Prob > Chi-squared	0.000141	1.05e-12	3.40e-18	9.89e-20
Log likelihood	- 1650.3	- 1626.5	- 1611.9	- 1399.7

The table presents results of estimating random-effects odds ratio logit models of the likelihood of inter vivos business asset transfers. The table does not present estimated coefficients, but instead the corresponding odds ratios. "Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009" is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for years prior to 2009 and zero otherwise. "Industry fixed effects" are dummy variables for retail, manufacturing, services industries, construction being the reference category. The table reports test results based on classical standard errors, the P values in parentheses are for tests of no effect of independent variables on odds ratios of inter vivos transfers (corresponding to coefficients of 1.00). The Chi-squared test statistic reflects a test that all independent variable coefficients equal 1.00

* $P < 0.10$, ** $P < 0.05$, *** $P < 0.01$

4), and total equity (in logs, column 5). The odds ratio of firm age (a variable having a maximum value of 882 years) is statistically significant at the 5% level only in the regression reported in column (3). The odds ratio of total assets is statistically significant at the 1% level, and similarly, the odds ratio of total equity is statistically significant at the 5% level; together they indicate that inter vivos transfers are more common among larger and more valuable firms.¹⁷ Including these firm size and value variables somewhat diminishes the statistical significance of the effect of the current business condition, reflecting the collinearity of these variables as well as smaller sample sizes. As noted in Sect. 4.2, good current business conditions affect expected future firm value but may not be yet captured in current taxable value. Because firm characteristics are not available for the full sample, the number of observations in columns (3) to (5) of Table 4 (including firm age and size) is much smaller than the number of observations in the regressions in Table 3. The regression reported in column (6) includes a linear and quadratic time trend to control for whether firms made inter vivos transfers more frequently in recent years. The estimated odds ratio of the squared trend is statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that transfers have been more frequent recently; inclusion of time trend variables does not change the estimated positive effects of firm size and the current state of business.

The regression results indicate that better current business conditions are associated with greater likelihoods of inter vivos transfers. The association persists when controlling for the 2009 tax reform, industry, firm size, and firm value. This pattern is consistent with firm owners having inside knowledge about a firm's current business condition that is not yet fully captured in taxable value for transfer tax purposes. As a result, when the current business condition is good, a firm's valuation for transfer tax purposes is likely to increase in the future, creating an incentive to accelerate asset transfers. In addition, when a firm's business condition is good, the firm owner perceives the firm to be more successful in the future than when the business condition is bad, and possibly less needy of the value provided by maintaining original ownership. Anticipating the need at some point to pass on a successful firm to the next generation is likely to influence tax planning and encourage immediate transfers of business assets.

One of the challenges of interpreting the evidence is that there are non-tax reasons why stronger current business conditions might be associated with ownership transfers. It is possible to examine more closely the tax interpretation by distinguishing very small (0–19 employee) from larger (20+ employee) firms before and after the 2009 tax change. Transfers of ownership of firms with fewer than 20 employees were exempt from tax after 2009, thereby eliminating any effect of current business conditions on the tax consequences of ownership transfers. By contrast, the 2009 tax change introduced a tax exemption for firms with 20 or more employees that sufficiently maintain employment levels in the years after ownership transfers.

Figure 5 depicts differences between the likelihoods of ownership transfers of firms with “good” business conditions and those with “bad” or “normal” business conditions. The leftmost bars reflect that the difference between the likelihood of ownership

¹⁷ These specifications, and indeed the available data, do not distinguish between wealth effects (Poterba 2001; Hrung 2004; Villanueva 2005) and ownership effects (more valuable firms have more owners and therefore more potential donors).

Table 4 Additional determinants of inter vivos transfers

	(1) Inter vivos transfers	(2) Inter vivos transfers	(3) Inter vivos transfers	(4) Inter vivos transfers	(5) Inter vivos transfers	(6) Inter vivos transfers
Current state of business	1.374** (0.012)	1.444*** (0.002)	2.212*** (0.001)	1.495* (0.097)	1.538* (0.079)	1.359*** (0.004)
Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009	0.502*** (0.000)	0.568*** (0.000)	0.630* (0.064)	0.962 (0.885)	0.940 (0.816)	1.385 (0.200)
Number of employees (cat.)	1.451*** (0.000)	1.498*** (0.000)	1.148 (0.269)			1.472*** (0.000)
Expected development of employment	1.187 (0.400)					
Credit conditions		0.634*** (0.007)				
Firm age			1.003** (0.018)	1.000 (0.909)	1.001 (0.730)	
Proprietorship			0.165* (0.080)	0.000 (1.000)	0.000 (1.000)	
Corporation			0.694 (0.149)	0.797 (0.406)	0.715 (0.216)	
Total assets (log)				1.284*** (0.003)		
Total equity (log)					1.183** (0.020)	
Linear time trend						0.971 (0.735)
Squared time trend						1.011** (0.027)

Table 4 continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Inter vivos transfers					
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects						
Observations	10,659	8407	2798	2590	2378	10,661
Groups	1639	1222	625	748	706	1639
Pseudo R ²	0.0354	0.0419	0.0492	0.0458	0.0386	0.0434
Chi-squared	102.6	101.9	31.85	27.47	22.43	125.9
Prob > Chi-squared	3.11e-19	1.02e-19	0.0000990	0.00117	0.00762	1.97e-23
Log likelihood	-1399.3	-1163.4	-307.7	-285.9	-279.3	-1387.7

The table presents results of estimating random-effects odds ratio logit models of the likelihood of inter vivos business asset transfers. The table does not present estimated coefficients, but instead the corresponding odds ratios. "Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009" is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for years prior to 2009 and zero otherwise. The reference category of the dummy variables "Proprietorship" and "Corporation" is "Partnership." "Industry fixed effects" are dummy variables for retail, manufacturing, and services industries, construction being the reference category. The table reports test results based on classical standard errors; the *P* values in parentheses are for tests of no effect of independent variables on odds ratios of inter vivos transfers (corresponding to coefficients of 1.00). The Chi-squared test statistic reflects a test that all independent variable coefficients equal 1.00

P* < 0.10, *P* < 0.05, ****P* < 0.01




Fig. 5 Differential effect of “good” business conditions on inter vivos transfers before and after the 2009 tax reform. *Note* Fig. 5 shows differences between the likelihoods of ownership transfers of firms with “good” business conditions (mean plus one standard deviation and larger) and those with “bad” or “normal” business conditions for small (0–19 employee) and large (20+ employees) firms before and after the 2009 tax reform

transfers by a small (0–19 employee) firm with “good” business conditions, and one with “bad” or “normal” conditions, was 2.47 percent prior to the 2009 tax change and 1.27 percent afterward. The two rightmost bars indicate that the difference between the likelihood of ownership transfers by a large (20+employee) firm with “good” business conditions, and one with “bad” or “normal” conditions, was 0.31 percent prior to the 2009 tax change and 0.70 percent afterward. Consequently, it appears that the effect of business conditions on the likelihood of ownership transfers declined for small firms after 2009 while it rose for large firms, which is consistent with their tax incentives. Due to the relatively small numbers of ownership transfers among small firms the pattern depicted in Fig. 5 is not statistically significant, so it is not possible to rule out effects of non-tax considerations or even that small and large firms reacted similarly to the 2009 tax change.

6.3 Robustness tests

Tables 5 and 6 present results of additional regression specifications intended to explore the robustness of the results appearing in Table 3.

Unobserved firm-specific characteristics (such as the presence of a qualified successor or the age of the owner) may be correlated with the regressors. It is possible to control for unobserved firm-specific characteristics by estimating fixed effects models that exploit only the within variation of the explanatory variables, though doing so has the downside of effectively disregarding the information contained in cross-sectional variation. Fixed effects estimation of nonlinear panel data is possible for the logit model, but not for the probit model. Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of a

Table 5 Alternative inter vivos transfer specifications I

	(1) FE Logit	(2) RE Probit	(3) RE OLS	(4) RE Logit: before tax reform	(5) RE Logit: after tax reform
Current state of business	1.461** (0.010)	0.161*** (0.000)	0.010*** (0.000)	1.394* (0.090)	1.522*** (0.001)
Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009	0.497*** (0.000)	-0.286*** (0.000)	-0.019*** (0.000)		
Number of employees (cat.)		0.161*** (0.000)	0.011*** (0.000)	1.138 (0.233)	1.611*** (0.000)
Industry Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3255	10,661	10,661	4501	6160
Groups	316	1639	1639	769	1639
Pseudo R ²		0.0344	0.00334	0.00613	0.0405
Within R ²	0.0264				
Chi-squared	40.66	99.76	82.14	5.555	79.68
Prob>Chi-squared	1.48e-09	2.81e-19	1.29e-15	0.235	9.80e-16
Log likelihood	-748.9	-1400.8		-450.0	-944.2

The table presents results of estimating models of the likelihood of inter vivos business asset transfers. Column (1) presents the result of a fixed effects logit odds ratio specification; columns (1), (4) and (5) report test results based on classical standard errors, with *P* values in parentheses for tests of no effect of independent variables on odds ratios of inter vivos transfers (corresponding to coefficients of 1.00). Column (2) presents the result of a random effect probit specification in which the dependent variable takes the value 1 for firm-years in which there is an inter vivos transfer, and zero otherwise; the column reports estimated classical standard errors. Column (3) presents the result of a random-effects OLS specification in which the dependent variable takes the value 1 for firm-years in which there is an inter vivos transfer, and zero otherwise; the column reports estimated Huber/White/sandwich standard errors. Columns (4) and (5) present results of random-effects odds ratio logit models of the likelihood of inter vivos business asset transfers, with the sample restricted to years prior to 2009 in the column (4) regression, and restricted to years after 2008 in the column (5) regression. "Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009" is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for years prior to 2009 and zero otherwise. "Industry fixed effects" are dummy variables for retail, manufacturing, and services industries, construction being the reference category. The Chi-squared test statistic reflects a test that the independent variables jointly have no effect

P* < 0.10, *P* < 0.05, ****P* < 0.01

Table 6 Alternative inter vivos transfer specifications II

	(1) RE Logit: Inter vivos ≤ 1	(2) RE Logit: Firm age < 250	(3) RE Logit: Lag state of business	(4) RE Logit: Lead state of business	(5) RE Logit: Inter vivos transfers with transfer tax payment
Current state of business	1.429*** (0.003)	2.209*** (0.001)			1.432* (0.096)
Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009	0.519*** (0.000)	0.625* (0.062)	0.492*** (0.000)	0.582*** (0.000)	1.005 (0.982)
Number of employees (cat.)	1.373*** (0.000)	1.151 (0.278)	1.475*** (0.000)	1.357*** (0.000)	1.621*** (0.000)
Firm age		1.003 (0.332)			
Proprietorship		0.166* (0.081)			
Corporation		0.699 (0.164)			
Lagged current state of business			1.444*** (0.001)		
Lead current state of business				1.166 (0.220)	
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,309	2791	9600	9038	10,661
Groups	1607	624	1614	1612	1639
Pseudo R ²	0.0264	0.0454	0.0381	0.0221	0.0401

Table 6 continued

	(1) RE Logit: Inter vivos ≤ 1	(2) RE Logit: Firm age < 250	(3) RE Logit: Lag state of business	(4) RE Logit: Lead state of business	(5) RE Logit: Inter vivos transfers with transfer tax payment
Chi-squared	62.99	29.03	101.1	49.29	37.20
Prob > Chi-squared	1.11e-11	0.000313	1.47e-19	6.52e-09	0.000002
Log likelihood	-1160.0	-305.2	-1277.3	-1089.7	-445.6

The table presents results of estimating random-effects odds ratio logit models of the likelihood of inter vivos business asset transfers. The sample used in the column (1) regression is restricted to firms making at most one inter vivos ownership transfer over the sample period. The sample used in the column (2) regression is restricted to firms that have been in operation for fewer than 250 years. The dependent variable in the regression reported in column (5) is constructed based only on inter vivos transfers that are accompanied by positive gift tax liability. "Lagged current state of business" is the one year lag of "current state of business." "Lead current state of business" is the one year lead of "current state of business." "Pre estate and gift tax reform 2009" is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for years prior to 2009 and zero otherwise. The reference category of the dummy variables "Proprietorship" and "Corporation" is "Partnership." "Industry fixed effects" are dummy variables for retail, manufacturing, and services industries, construction being the reference category. The table reports test results based on classical standard errors; the *P* values in parentheses are for tests of no effect of independent variables on odds ratios of inter vivos transfers (corresponding to coefficients of 1.00). The Chi-squared test statistic reflects a test that all independent variable coefficients equal 1.00

P* < 0.10, *P* < 0.05, ****P* < 0.01

fixed effects logit model, which are consistent with inferences based on the results reported in Table 3. Among firms making at least one inter vivos transfer during the observation period, the odds (relative likelihood) of making inter vivos transfers are 46.1 percent larger when the current state of business is good than when the current state of business is normal.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 present the results of estimating random-effects probit and OLS models, instead of the baseline random-effects logit model. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. Columns (4) and (5) display the results of logit estimation of the determinants of inter vivos transfers before and after the 2009 reform; in both time periods the likelihood of asset transfer is positively associated with the current state of business. The regression reported in column (1) of Table 6 restricts the sample to firms making at most one inter vivos transfer over the observation period, with results that closely resemble those for the whole sample reported in column (4) of Table 3. The regression reported in column (2) of Table 6 uses data only for firms not older than 250 years, thereby dropping seven of the observations used in the regression reported in column (3) of Table 4. The results are almost identical, with the current state of business continuing to be associated with asset transfers, though the odds ratio of firm age is not statistically significant.

Ownership changes have the potential to affect business conditions, which introduces the possibility of joint determination of these two variables. The regression reported in column (3) of Table 6 addresses the potential reverse causality of the current state of business variable by using its first lag rather than the contemporaneous value. The estimated odds ratio diminishes in magnitude but remains statistically significant. The regression reported in column (4) drops this lagged variable and instead uses the first lead, as a result of which the estimated odds ratio becomes statistically insignificant. Another possibility is that the change in business conditions, rather than the level, might influence ownership transfers, if the change is a better predictor of rising future asset values. The evidence, however, indicates otherwise: one-year changes in business conditions have insignificant effects on asset transfers when used in place of current business conditions in the specifications of Tables 3 and 4.

The positive association between the current state of business and the likelihood of inter vivos transfers may depend on whether firm owners transfer assets in excess of exempt amounts. The regression reported in column (5) of Table 6 replaces the dependent variable by a variable that assumes the value one when firms report an inter vivos transfer in a given year and a transfer tax payment in the same year or during the following three years, and zero otherwise.¹⁸ This specification produces an estimated odds ratio of the current state of business quite similar to the baseline model, one that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Thus the data suggest that the effect of the current state of business on the likelihood of taxed inter vivos transfers lies only at the margin of statistical significance. Several other specification checks produce

¹⁸ 13 percent of inter vivos transfers were accompanied by a tax payment in the same year or during the following three years (see Table 1).

results consistent with inferences drawn from the evidence presented in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, and Appendix considers issues with selective responses to the survey.¹⁹

6.4 Implications

The evidence in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 indicates that current business conditions are strongly associated with ownership transfers, a baseline specification indicating that the odds of making transfers increase by 46 percent when current business conditions are “good” rather than “normal.” While many business and family considerations may contribute to this pattern, there is reason to expect it at least partly to reflect reactions to tax incentives, and the empirical patterns are broadly consistent with this interpretation. To the extent that the 46 percent effect consists of reactions to tax incentives, it follows that firm owners are highly purposeful and quickly reactive in their asset transfer decisions, and that tax authorities by contrast are rather slow to adjust their valuations of family business assets.

7 Conclusion

Policymakers are understandably concerned about the potential effect of transfer taxes on the liquidity of family firms and the resulting viability of ongoing business operations. One way to address liquidity issues is to encourage inter vivos giving, so that firms choose when to transfer ownership rather than relying on mortality. The results in this paper indicate that ownership succession is more likely when market conditions are good, which is consistent with tax avoidance and with a desire to transfer ownership of better-performing assets.

These patterns suggest that, for a given firm value, intergenerational transfer taxation imposes greater burdens on underperforming firms than on firms that perform well. Well-performing firms are more likely to make inter vivos transfers of business assets, which are generally tax favored and can be timed to maximize tax advantage. If an underperforming firm does not manage to prepare for succession in advance, the inheritance tax burden at the moment of the owner’s death will be larger than the tax burden of an otherwise-similar well-performing firm, the assets of which were transferred during lifetime. The desirability of distinguishing tax burdens in this way may depend on the impact of transfer taxes on the activities of well-performing and poorly performing firms, about which currently very little is known.

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¹⁹ Replacing the current state of business variable with 0–1 dummies for either good or bad business conditions (two separate specifications) and replacing the number of employees variable by dummy variables for each category of number of employees produces results very similar to those reported in Table 3, as does estimation of standard errors in the Table 3 baseline regressions using bootstrap and jackknife procedures or using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the individual level [Huber/White/sandwich standard errors—see Huber (1967) and White (1980)]. Limiting the sample to firms with fewer than 1,000 employees likewise has little effect on the results reported in Table 3.

Economic Association (Augsburg 2016), the CESifo Public Sector Economics conference (Munich 2016), European Association of Law and Economics (Vienna 2015), Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Dublin 2015) and Public Choice Society Meetings (San Antonio 2015), and seminars at the ifo Institute, Paris School of Economics, University of Michigan, Swiss Economic Institute at the ETH Zurich, Centre for Business Taxation at Oxford University, University of Bayreuth, and University of Munich for their helpful comments. We are grateful to the Foundation of Family Businesses, on whose behalf we conducted a survey on inheritances, inter vivos transfers, and transfer taxation (the Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey–IGTS) among owners of family firms in February and March 2014.

Appendix

Because the study relies on survey data, response behavior may raise sample selection issues. Firms making inter vivos transfers could be overrepresented in the sample since the topic of the questionnaire is inheritance, inter vivos gifts, and their taxation. Firms unfamiliar with the inheritance and gift tax law because they did not experience a succession or did not make inter vivos transfers may have been less likely to participate because they did not think they had anything to contribute to the survey. Appendix Table 7 compares family firms responding to the IGTS to firms not responding. *T* tests

Table 7 Survey response behavior

	Non-response	Response	Test statistic (difference)
Current state of business	2.10	2.07	0.03* (0.042)
N	3003	1657	
Expected development of employment	2.00	1.98	0.02** (0.009)
N	3003	1657	
Credit conditions	0.26	0.27	− 0.01 (0.347)
N	2180	1224	
Firm age	40.16	38.09	2.07 (0.187)
N	1983	1113	
Total assets (log)	14.87	14.58	0.29*** (0.000)
N	1812	1020	
Total equity (log)	13.41	13.12	0.29*** (0.001)
N	1733	975	

The table presents numbers and mean values of responses to questions about firm characteristics, distinguishing respondents by whether or not they participated in the Inheritance and Gift Tax Survey (IGTS). Observations in the “Non-response” column represent firms not participating in the IGTS; observations in the “Response” column represent firms that did participate in the IGTS. Rows denoted “N” indicate numbers of firm-year observations of firms providing the specified information. Test statistics and *P* values correspond to standard *t* tests of differences between respondents and non-respondents in mean values of firm characteristics




Fig. 6 Response rates and firm characteristics. *Note* The figure presents distributions of IGTS survey respondents and non-respondents by size (numbers of employees), federal state within Germany, industry, and legal form of operation. The figures display results of a Pearson Chi-squared test that response behavior is independent of numbers of employees/federal state/industry/legal form

reported in Appendix Table 7 indicate that the means of credit conditions and firm age are not statistically different in the two subsamples. Firms responding to the survey had a somewhat worse current state of business and expected development of employment than firms not responding (2.07 and 2.10; 1.98 and 2.00). Firms responding to the survey tend to be somewhat smaller than non-response firms as measured by log total assets and log total equity (14.58 and 14.87; 13.12 and 13.41). A Chi-squared test does not reject the null hypothesis that response behavior is independent of the federal state within Germany (P value of 0.51, see Fig. 5), but Chi-squared tests indicate that response behavior varies with numbers of employees, industry, and legal form. Firms responding to the survey tend to have fewer employees than firms choosing not to respond.²⁰ The results of the Chi-squared tests and t tests notwithstanding, there is little evidence that sample selection is an important issue in interpreting the results, since differences between the subsamples are small and the categorical variables assume multiple values in both of the subsamples. Furthermore, there is little reason to expect self-classification as a family firm in the Ifo Business Climate Survey to be prone to sample selection, since firms answered this question prior to learning the topic of the IGTS.

See Fig. 6.

²⁰ Firm size is correlated with industry and legal form: firms in the retail and the services industries have, on average, fewer employees than firms in the construction and manufacturing industries, and firms operating as proprietorships have, on average, fewer employees than firms operating as corporations or partnerships.

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