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IN THE JUNGLE OF CITIES

Anthony Chase*


At various points in Capital I allude to the fate that befell the plebeians of ancient Rome. They were originally free peasants, each tilling his own plot on his own behalf. In the course of Roman history they were expropriated. . . . Thus one fine morning there were, on the one side, free men stripped of everything but their labour-power, and on the other, ready to exploit their labour, owners of all the acquired wealth. What happened? The Roman proletarians became, not wage-labourers, but an idle mob more abject than those who used to be called “poor whites” in the southern United States . . . .

—Karl Marx†

This review provides concentrated discussion of two recent, important books on criminal violence in American society. The first of these, American Violence and Public Policy, is a collection of nine essays edited, introduced, and brought to a programmatic conclusion by Lynn A. Curtis.2 Funded by the Ford Foundation (p. xi), the Curtis volume is designed as an “updating” of several well-known, nationally

† Title borrowed from B. Brecht, IN THE JUNGLE OF CITIES: THE FIGHT BETWEEN TWO MEN IN THE GIANT CITY OF CHICAGO (1924). Brecht was both fascinated and repelled by the criminal violence and sinister lifestyle of the American city and, in his early work, frequently deployed the violence of American urban culture as a metaphor for capitalist social relations in general. See B. Brecht, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CITY OF MAHAGONNY (1929); B. Brecht, SAINT JOAN OF THE STOCKYARDS (1931); K. Schoeps, BERTOLT BRECHT 143 (1977): While marching, the demonstrators repeat key verses of the opera that stress that the law of the jungle prevails in Mahagonny. This now is the real Mahagonny, whose law courts are no worse than other law courts, as Brecht said. It is a Brechtian vision of a capitalist society. The hurricane — besides serving as an excellent dramatic device — reveals the true nature of Mahagonny. It is a city dominated by greed and exploitation. The demonstrators represent the advocates of capitalism.

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2. Chairman Emeritus of the Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, D.C.
commissioned studies of criminal violence issued during the 1960s. The second book discussed, *The Miami Riot of 1980* by Bruce Porter and Marvin Dunn, represents an effort to confront some of the questions raised in the Curtis report — as well as in earlier, often ambitious, overviews of American criminal violence — but within the specific context of the most widely publicized riot in an American city since the 1960s — a decade virtually identified in the popular imagination with foreign war, civil insurrection, and assassination.

I. RIOTS AND CRIME

In America, during the seventy years separating the release of D.W. Griffith’s powerful film, *The Birth Of A Nation,* and the use of deadly force against presumed muggers by New York “subway vigi-

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3. See especially NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, FINAL REPORT (1969); see also PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) (sometimes referred to as “the Katzenbach report”); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (T. Wicker intro. 1968) (sometimes referred to as “the Kerner report”).

4. Director of the Journalism Program at Brooklyn College; Adjunct Professor, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism.

5. Associate Professor of Community Psychology, Florida International University.


8. Rogin, “The Sword Became A Flashing Vision”: D. W. Griffith’s The Birth Of A Nation, REPRESENTATIONS, Winter 1985, at 150: American movies were born, then, in a racist epic. “The film that started it all” [Herman G. Weinberg] builds to its sustained climax from two attempted rapes of white women by black men. It depicts, after the triumph of death in the Civil War and in Lincoln’s assassination, a nation reborn from the ride of the white-robed Knights of Christ against black political and sexual revolution.
lante’ Bernhard Goetz, national debate over a broad range of public policy issues has often been an indirect way of talking about race. Both violent street crime and ghetto riots share a direct and palpable relation to the just-repressed fears of much of the dominant white population of the United States. This social psychodynamic of theorizing

The case of Bernhard Goetz has become a kind of diagnostic test for sensitivity to issues of public justice, police authority and race relations. While many New Yorkers have reacted with riotous and racist fantasies of revenge, the press and political leaders have sought to set forth more palatable solutions to the problem of crime. There’s an idea floating around for a National Police Corps that would bring middle-class students into the business of social control at the curbside level. It seems a fitting monument to the official vigilantism of the Reagan era.

10. Riots and other forms of violent civil disturbance have a long and interesting social history. For a sense of the extraordinary range of approaches to writing about these events, see, e.g., R. Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History 74-104 (1984); M. Hane, Peasants, Rebels, and Outcasts: The Underside of Modern Japan 160-63 (1982) (discussing the rice riots of 1918, which were caused by war-time inflation and where there are interesting parallels between the treatment of burakumin in modern Japan and blacks in the modern United States); E. Ladurie, The Territory of the Historian 111-31 (B. Reynolds & S. Reynolds trans. 1979); V.S. Naipaul, Power To The Caribbean People, in The Aftermath of Sovereignty: West Indian Perspectives 363 (D. Lowenthal & L. Comitas eds. 1973) (discussing the relation between the Trinidad Carnival and the “Black Power Revolt of 1970”); J. Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn Against Liberalism 183-93 (1985) (discussing a secondary school racial incident in Brooklyn during 1976 characterized by “old rhythms of communal rivalry”); G. Rupe, Ideology and Popular Protest (1980) (compact introduction to the subject by the premier English-language historian of crowds). During the last few decades, analysis of “the underside of history” has become an increasingly recognized genre of professional social science. See Letgers, Who Speaks For The Workers?, 4 PRAXIS INTL. 438, 438 (1985):

If there is a single, overriding, innovative accent in contemporary western historiography, it resides, most observers would probably agree, in the concern to illuminate those areas sometimes identified as the “underside” of history.... There is of course no reason not to extend the list to include such topics as banditry, secret societies, popular protest and rebellion. See also E. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (1959); E. Hobsbawm, Bandits (rev. ed. 1981); E. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays 220-33 (1973).

11. White male fear of black economic competition was an early (and enduring) source of racial violence in the United States; see P.S. Foner, Blacks and the Labor Movement in Pennsylvania: The Beginnings, in Essays In Afro-American History 77, 79 (1978):

Between 1820 and 1850, Blacks not only lost their traditional means of employment but also became the victims of violence. Eight major riots were directed against Black people in Philadelphia, and there were several in Pittsburgh. In each case, white mobs burned and looted Negro churches, meeting halls, and homes, and clubbed, stoned, and sometimes murdered Blacks.... [In the sweatshops] vigorous routine emerged, wages declined, and opportunity for advancement was limited. All this made workmen reluctant to admit another source of cheap labor and more competition for wages. Early trade unions were designed as much to protect these exposed trades for white men as to win better working conditions and higher wages for their members. Blacks, naturally, were the scapegoats of the unions.

During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, socioeconomic and sexual-psychological fear of blacks became an undercurrent of the public politics of “law and order” as well as the private paranoia which led to de facto racial segregation organized by the leaders of the “white community.” See E.L. Ayers, Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the 19th-Century American South (1984); Berry, Repression Of Blacks In The South 1890-1945: Enforcing The System Of Segregation, in The Age of Segregation: Race Relations in the South, 1890-1945, at 29 (R. Haws ed. 1978); J.W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South (1982); The Fear of Conspiracy 162-48 (D.B. Davis ed. 1971); V. Harding, There is a
about crime and civil disturbance only complicates the task of writers such as those whose work this review analyzes.

The inherently multiracial or multi-ethnic context of the crime problem in most international urban centers is shaped in the United States by features of race and class that seemed to crystallize in the events that took place in Miami, Florida, during 1979-1980. On the heels of a series of police actions that had infuriated many Miami blacks (Porter & Dunn, pp. 27-32), a thirty-three year old black insurance agent named Arthur McDuffie was beaten to death by white police officers after he had run a red light on a borrowed motorcycle and led police on a high-speed chase that lasted eight minutes (p. 33). Within three minutes of his apprehension, McDuffie had been set upon by between six and twelve Dade County officers who used eighteen-inch Kelite police flashlights to crush his skull (pp. 34-35). As Porter and Dunn point out:

From the medical examiner's testimony, it became clear that when McDuffie's skull was fractured, he was lying face down with his head against the pavement. There was no possibility of his head recoiling from the blows — thus the extreme severity of the fractures. He was also handcuffed at the time. [p. 38]

The Dade County officers on the scene had a marked patrol car run over McDuffie's motorcycle to make it look like it had been damaged in an accident, and they reported that McDuffie had, in fact, been injured in a fall from his vehicle (p. 34). As the result of Dade County medical examiner Ron Wright's skepticism of this story and, eventually, police who had been on the scene deciding to speak to the state's attorney, the "coverup" began to unravel (pp. 35-36). The day before McDuffie was buried in his full-dress U.S. Marine Corps uniform, the State of Florida charged four white police officers with manslaughter and tampering with evidence in the death of McDuffie, the father of two small children (pp. 33, 36). By the time the officers were placed on trial, the charge against one of them, Alex Marrero, had been increased to second-degree murder. An immunized police officer who had been on the scene testified at trial that Marrero had struck McDuffie as if he was chopping wood with an axe and that Marrero had said to other officers who were beating McDuffie: "Easy. One at a time" (pp. 36-39).

After four weeks of trial, on May 17, 1980, an all-white jury in Tampa deliberated for less than three hours before finding all police officers not guilty on all charges. Within another three hours, blacks


13. The reasons the State of Florida managed to lose its case are complex and uncertain.
living along 62nd Street at the edge of Liberty City in Miami were throwing rocks and bottles at passing automobiles carrying whites. A half hour later, what would become the Miami Riot of 1980 claimed its first victim: a white derelict was beaten up by a gang of black youths. Shortly thereafter, a car carrying three white youths in their teens or early twenties was bombarded with rocks and bottles, including a chunk of concrete which went through the windshield. The driver lost control, struck an elderly black man and then pinned a black ten-year old girl against a housing project facade, severing the girl's leg and leaving a swath of blood across the front of the building. The mob dragged two of the car's occupants, Michael and Jeffrey Kulp, into the street and savagely beat them (pp. 47-52). Porter and Dunn observe:

At one point someone picked up a yellow *Miami Herald* newspaper dispenser and brought it down on Jeffrey Kulp's head. [The Kulps] were shot several times with a revolver and run over by a green Cadillac, whose driver then came over and stabbed them with a screwdriver. . . .

[A]n aged derelict, whom people in the community know only as "Ernest," approached Jeffrey Kulp, reached down and inserted a red rose in his bleeding mouth. [p. 52]

Eighteen people died in the riot, including whites who were beaten to death by blacks, whites who were burned to death in their cars, a Guyanan immigrant whose body was found mutilated and who had, apparently, been taken for white (pp. 52-53, 173), blacks who were shot by police officers, a black teenager who was killed by a Jet Food Market security guard, blacks who were shot by roving white motorists driving through black residential areas, and a police officer who died of a heart attack (pp. 71-73). Hundreds more were severely injured and Dr. David Bernstein, chief surgeon at the fifth largest emergency medical facility in the United States, remarked: "What impressed me, though, was the severity of the beatings that took place Saturday night. That was impressive. Just the severe skull fractures we were seeing, and the cases of mutilation" (p. 54).

Was the Miami Riot of 1980 a seemingly atavistic event (like a 1985 labor strike in the U.S. basic steel industry), incomprehensible after the gains of the civil rights movement; or an exclusive moment in the particular history of one urban social structure, understandable only in terms of a site-specific sociology; or an initial face-off from the

Porter and Dunn have not written an exhaustive treatment of the state (and subsequent federal) trial, which would have required another entire book. Suffice it to say here, as Porter and Dunn do in their book, that for most black residents of Miami, the gray areas of the case — the contradictory testimony, the credibility of the police witnesses, the way the prosecution had been conducted — had little meaning compared to the unendurable fact that a number of white policemen had beaten to death a black insurance man for what amounted to a traffic violation and that not one of them had gotten so much as a slap on the wrist from the courts.

P. 48.
futuristic interzone warfare which could render American race relations more like those of Soweto and Johannesburg\(^{14}\) and American criminal justice more like the Gotham nightmare portrayed in the recent social-science-fiction film, *Escape From New York*\(^{15}\). What should be the course of public policy on criminal violence in the United States, according to the contributors to the studies under review?

### II. INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE

Editor Lynn Curtis has divided *American Violence and Public Policy* into three sections: one dealing with individual violence, one with terrorism, and one with collective violence. The section on individual violence represents the lion’s share of the book’s research. Taking the contributors to this section as a whole, and emphasizing Curtis’ programmatic synthesis of what are occasionally disparate viewpoints, *American Violence and Public Policy* comes to these conclusions:

(1) After a long period of decline, violent crime rates in the United States demonstrated a sharp increase in the decade prior to, as well as in the decades following, publication of the major national crime reports in the late 1960s.\(^{16}\) As Curtis points out, violent crime soared in spite of the fact that American incarceration rates are higher than those of any other industri-

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There is, however, one variable — changing age-structure — which could reduce the level of crime. For some years, American criminologists have predicted that with ageing of the baby-boom cohort, crime rates would decline. For the past three years, this has already been happening and is likely to continue for at least the next decade, the usual “other things being equal.” Nevertheless, after levelling off in the early 1980s, according to the FBI, violent crime increased during 1984; see *Serious Crime Dropped in ’84*, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1985, at 10, col. 1 (“Serious crime nationwide dropped 2 percent in 1984, marking the third consecutive annual decline, but violent crime rose by 1 percent, with rape increasing 7 percent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported today.”).
alized country except, notably, South Africa and the Soviet Union. This is especially true in the case of black males, who . . . account for about 50 percent of the prison population. One result is that prison is one of the few U.S. institutions dominated by blacks — or, in some regions, Hispanics. [p. 8]

(2) It is essential to come to grips with the structural causes of crime if Americans genuinely wish to deal with the crime problem: “One response to those who said they had never seen a cause of crime is James Baldwin’s observation that to be black in the United States ‘and be relatively conscious is to be in a rage almost all the time’ ” (p. 5).

(3) The actual causes of criminal violence in America are multiple but include — particularly — injustice, poverty, racism, and inadequate labor markets (pp. 5-6, 59, 66, 122, 205-06). Curtis states in conclusion:

I am persuaded . . . that to address the causes of individual violence, which disproportionately involves poor minorities as both offenders and victims, is also to address the causes of group disorder. The common base of grievance also implies that a federal policy of reducing crime and fear through targeted, carefully evaluated economic and social programs needs to be part of a more inclusive policy of reducing the black and Hispanic underclass. [p. 206]

(4) The necessary crime-reducing program can be summarized under the heading: “Neighborhood, Family, and Employment” (p. 205). It is true that this slogan could encompass the popular strategy of virtually any political party from the extreme Right to the extreme Left. But what Curtis specifically has in mind is a more community-centered set of initiatives that would place greater responsibility for and participation in crime control on the shoulders of indigenous neighborhoods, with the extended family seen as a model for projects which reintegrate criminal youth into society and provide minority employment opportunity (pp. 205-19).

What can be wrong with such a proposal? First, a major effort has been made within contemporary legal and criminal-justice scholarship to demonstrate the futility of such “back to basics” communitarian nostalgia as that evidenced by Curtis. Stanley Cohen in criminal justice17 and Richard Abel in the field of informalism and delegaliza-
tion\textsuperscript{18} provide just two examples of writers who have made such a strong case that one would expect Curtis to begin by rebutting the kind of arguments they make.

Second, Curtis virtually ignores the critique set out by one of his own contributors, University of California (Berkeley) researcher Elliott Currie,\textsuperscript{19} which goes a long way toward demystifying the programmatic conclusion to \textit{American Violence and Public Policy}. "The danger in the notion of community crime prevention," asserts Currie, "is that it sometimes grants an almost mystical, idealized efficacy to an abstractly defined community altogether detached from the larger, en­vironing forces that, in fact, make or break living communities in the real world" (p. 58). That the "larger, environing forces" mentioned by Currie might include, for example, the nature of late-imperial, capitalist development is a theme to which we shall return in a moment.

Finally, Curtis presents a dubious example of neighborhood reform designed to reduce the minority underclass: the House of Umoja Boy's Town in Philadelphia (pp. 206-10). Describing one aspect of Umoja's program, the Security Institute, Curtis cites the case of a for-

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\textsuperscript{19}Elliott Currie's overview of contemporary American social thinking about criminal vi­olence is one of the most provocative essays in \textit{American Violence and Public Policy}. It stands in an odd relationship to the volume's conclusion provided by the editor. Currie asserts, for example, in a subsection entitled "Criminal Justice: Not the Solution," that "time has not been kind to the idea that much can be gained by way of crime reductions through the sheer expansion of criminal justice resources." P. 53. He goes on to criticize the notion that overhauls in police, courts, or neighborhood involvement could radically reduce violent crime. Pp. 54-60. Yet Lynn Curtis, in the book's conclusion, states: "Most volumes on policy against crime end with a phrase like, 'Of course, the criminal justice system cannot do the job alone.' The tone of this book has been more the opposite — that we should not downgrade the Violence Commission's concern for law and order . . . ." Pp. 219-20. It is not easy to reconcile the tone or emphasis of Curtis' views with those of Currie. For the reader more interested in Currie's approach than in that of Curtis, there is an immediate remedy. Late in 1985, Currie published his own full-scale treatment of criminal justice. \textit{See E. Currie, Confronting Crime: An American Chal­lenge} (1985).

James Comer's discussion of black violence and public policy, pp. 63-86, and the Ball-Rokeach and Short essay on collective violence, \textit{see} notes 39-53 \textit{infra} and accompanying text, are both excellent and should find a large readership. Franklin Zimring's analysis of violence and firearms policy, pp. 133-52, is compelling, yet in the midst of congressional consideration of actually \textit{reducing} existing federal handgun controls there seems to be little hope for any dramatic recognition of the need for tougher gun regulations, as Zimring acknowledges. P. 150. C. Sil­berman, \textit{supra} note 6, at 61, makes an important point, especially with reference to criminal violence in Miami and other cities involved in the illegal drug traffic:

Although public discussion has focused on the so-called "Saturday night special" (a cheap, short-barreled .22 revolver), most of the guns confiscated by the police when they make arrests are expensive, high-quality weapons — handguns, such as the Colt and Smith & Wesson .38, and sawed-off shotguns and automatic rifles.
mer Umojan who learned private security work through the Institute and became a detective:

The neighborhood shopping center is being patrolled by young men with Security Institute training. They wear Umoja uniforms, do not carry weapons, and serve as additional eyes and ears to protect the community. The street savvy of these young men is being tapped, not ignored or blocked (as was the case in many federal employment programs of the 1960s and 1970s). They know what suspicious behaviors to watch for, and they use that knowledge to prevent crime. Umoja has contracts with a nearby shopping mall, a 7-Eleven, and a Burger King to help keep crime and fear down. That also encourages businesses to stay in the neighborhood. [pp. 207-08]

Presumably these fast food special forces will have the street savvy to identify hungry little McBeggars going through the trash bins in the parking lot as potential garbage thieves and perhaps even pick out the random psychotic with one too many machine guns under his arm trying to get through the turnstile. But why does Curtis believe that young men trapped in the ghetto are likely to trade in a potentially lucrative, always daring, life of crime for a second class posting as unarmed security guard at Burger King? It is a wonder that so many people are able to spend eight hours a day in a fast food "restaurant" as it is. What Curtis produces is the material of a William S. Burroughs novel about America at the end of its tether, not the substance of a serious critique of either the poverty programs of the 1960s or the crime control programs of the 1990s. Curtis concedes that the "residential setting for the Job Corps is rural" but suggests that these programs can be brought into the cities (p. 212) and made to work. Indeed, one Florida program took "hard-core delinquents" out into the Everglades, "surrounded by woods and creeks and swamps filled with alligators and snakes, wild hogs and mosquitoes," and then returned them to Miami. But what do the "neighborhood and family" reformers plan to have these young men do for a living once they get back to the city? What attractive social opportunities are likely to come their way unless they replicate the lifestyles of the cool customers portrayed on the popular, prime-time television series, Miami Vice? What real prospects do the graduates of Curtis' model pro-


21. See C. Silberman, supra note 6, at 89:

[The cultural emphasis on success is greater now than it used to be: Every day of the week, in the films they see, the television programs they watch, and the public schools they attend, poor people are bombarded with messages about success — vivid images of the life style of the middle class. Television, in particular, drives home the idea that one is not a full-fledged American unless one can afford the goods and services portrayed in the commercials and in the programs themselves. To poor people, the TV screen provides a daily reminder, if any is needed, of the contrast between their own poverty and the affluence enjoyed by the rest of society.}
grams have of becoming doctors or lawyers, pharmacists or teachers, engineers or architects, nurses or city planners? What chance do they have of getting perhaps less professionally glamorous but, nonetheless, high-paying jobs in the new, upscale electronics or information industries? In other words, what picture of his future does the potential inner-city criminal have which competes with the attraction of crime? This is the sort of question a serious book about crime should have begun with.22

III. TERRORISM

"We asked Robert Kupperman," suggests Curtis, "to write the preceding chapter because terrorism has emerged so dramatically since the Violence Commission" (p. 205). Considering how relatively few Americans have been kidnapped or physically harmed by terrorists (pp. 184-87), it is not at all clear why "terrorism" alone has emerged sufficiently "dramatically" since the 1960s to require an additional chapter in a crime survey. I asked several criminal law teachers what one category of crime they would identify as having dramatically emerged since the Violence Commission and they all said the same thing: sexual abuse and violence directed against women and children by men.23 This subject is not even remotely addressed by American Violence and Public Policy, and I do not think that feminists alone will be surprised and disturbed by the omission.

When Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Marvin Wolfgang revised their earlier, three-part study of "The Criminal In The Arms Of The Law,"


22. C. SILBERMAN, supra note 6, at 110:
One need not postulate an autonomous "culture of poverty" to understand why the incidence of violence is higher among the lower than among the middle class. Poor people accept the norms and values of American society. If they do not always act in accordance with those norms, if they follow a life style that includes a good deal of criminal violence, it is mainly because the circumstances of their lives make it difficult or impossible for them to do otherwise. As the sociologist Hylan Lewis puts it, the poor are "frustrated victims of middle class values."
This is not an uncontroversial theory, yet Silberman argues it with considerable persuasiveness. See also M. MARABLE, The Cultural Dialectics Of Violence, in FROM THE GRASSROOTS: ESSAYS TOWARDS AFRO-AMERICAN LIBERATION 93-110 (1980).

23. See, e.g., S. AGETON, SEXUAL Assault AMONG ADOLESCENTS (1983); S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); J. COSTA, ABUSE OF WOMEN: LEGISLATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION (1983); J. COSTA & G. NELSON, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: LEGISLATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION (1978); J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER (1979). Whatever the actual statistics (which may be even worse than they appear as a result of "underreporting"), the public concern over these questions has emerged dramatically in the last decade, certainly since the 1960s.
they added a fourth part on torture. It is interesting that they would see this subject as deserving addition to their previous work whereas Curtis felt that terrorism was the one subject which needed to be added to the Violence Commission's list. It can be argued that relatively few Americans have been tortured during the past decade or so, yet the importance of an analysis of torture may derive from the relationship of the American state to regimes which do practice torture as a systematic governmental policy. At the same time, of course, analysis of terrorism could be justified on similar grounds of American involvement with state terrorism and support for regimes which deploy terror.

But Robert Kupperman begins by saying, "This chapter deals with subnational terrorism, not governmental terrorism" (p. 183). This is unfortunate since "subnational" terror — acts of terrorism by individuals or groups smaller than and independent from governments — has cost thousands of lives fewer than has governmental or state terror and is thus infinitely less significant as a form of crime. We quickly learn, however, that Kupperman is more interested in state terrorism

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25. Here I am referring, of course, to persons tortured by the police or the military as opposed to victims of private crimes involving mayhem or sexual torture who appear, if the focus of a sensationalistic media is any indicator, to have become grotesquely commonplace casualties of modern living.


27. See Piccone & Zaslavsky, Introduction: Special Issue On Terror and State Terrorism, 54  

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People who find themselves in a more comfortable relation to the state have different views. Jean Kirkpatrick, [former] U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has recently drawn a much more sanguine conclusion about state terrorism: "Coercion exercised by governments was judged more harshly than the violence of terrorists despite the historic view that, by virtue of their responsibility for maintaining order, government possesses a monopoly of legitimate force. Treating governments and terrorists as equals deprives the former of all claims to legitimacy." Be that as it may, if one compares the number of victims and the amount of suffering generated by individuals or groups on the one hand, to that generated by governments on the other, one cannot avoid paying immensely more attention to state terrorism, while putting aside apologies of apparatchiki or equivalent Western functionaries. See also one of the most extensive legal treatises on terrorism, 3 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL vii (1981) (emphasis added):

Individual and group terror — violence of a domestic nature, particularly in Spain, Italy, Central America, France, and Northern Ireland, has been escalating at a dangerous pace. . . . Government initiated or regime sponsored terror-violence has become commonplace in the contemporary world, as symbolized by the manipulated young Iranian militants who held U.S. diplomatic personnel hostage for 444 days and by the Latin American Death Squads operating in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Victims of state-encouraged right-wing terror have numbered in the tens of thousands. . . . Imagine if tens of thousands of people were killed by "subnational" terrorist groups like the Irish Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Jewish Defense League, Puerto Rican liberation activists, the Red Brigades, Armenian or Croatian liberation fighters, or the Weathermen (or Weatherpeople) in countries such as the United States, Italy, Spain, France, Great Britain, or Germany. Even Kupperman's paranoia cannot project a realistic image of such an occurrence.

Yet this has been happening for years in the countries of Latin America listed by Friedlander where the United States' right-wing client regimes have a free hand in such matters. There
than he has let on; he soon launches into an analysis of governments engaged in actively promoting and supporting terrorists with money, arms, or training. The list of nations that are now or have recently been involved in supporting terrorism includes Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden), Tanzania, Congo, Zaire, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. [pp. 193-94]

The absence of right-wing dictatorships, 28 and the United States, 29 simply is no comparison between the criminality of "subnational" and state terrorists. Kupperman does not even acknowledge that his choice might seem odd.

Even beyond this, the section of American Violence and Public Policy in which Kupperman writes is titled "Political Violence," p. 181, yet neither Kupperman nor Curtis provide any explanation whatsoever as to why they regard the subject of American political violence since the 1960s exhausted by a discussion of a subject as marginal to most Americans as terrorism. America's secret and illegal bombing of Cambodia begun in 1969 apparently was, for Kupperman and Curtis, merely a "sideshow" to the real danger: unspecified "Libyan Groups" and "Concerned Sierra Leone Nationals." P. 186. More people were killed by the American bombing of Cambodia than by all subnational terrorists operating in the United States since the violence commissions made their reports in the 1960s. See S. Hersh, THE PRICE OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE (1983); W. Shawcross, SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA (1979). For a view of "political violence" superior to that of Kupperman and Curtis, see J. ROEBUCK & S. WEEBER, POLITICAL CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYZING CRIME BY AND AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1978).

28. See, e.g., LeMoyn, New Army Slayings In Guatemala Reported by Villagers and Church, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1985, at 1, col. 2:

At least 60 Indian peasants living in and around this small town have been killed or have "disappeared" in the last seven months, almost all of them victims of the Guatemalan Army, according to local residents and the Archbishop of Guatemala. . . . According to the Church report, the Government-directed violence, apparently intended to eliminate anyone suspected of even sympathizing with leftist rebels, has left at least 146 orphans and 45 widows in this village alone. "The army kills many people, up to children," the Archbishop of Guatemala, Prospero Penados del Barrio, said in an interview. "There are many dead." Guatemala is typical of the kind of American client state excluded from Kupperman's list of governments which support terrorism. He nowhere discusses his method of including states whose political or economic systems the United States opposes while excluding states whose very terrorism often advances American foreign policy goals. See P. Lernoux, CRY OF THE PEOPLE (1982); Nairn, Behind The Death Squads, PROGRESSIVE, May 1984, at 1; Petras & Morley, Anti-Communism In Guatemala: Washington's Alliance With Generals and Death Squads, in THE SOCIALIST REGISTER, 1984, at 261-77 (1984).


For a recent reported incident of terrorist acts carried out by American-backed cadres, see White, U.S. Linked To Counter-Terrorist Blast, Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 19, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.):

[In] a move consistent with the Administration's public rhetoric in favour of "pre-emptive self-defence" against world wide terrorism, [the Reagan administration approved] a CIA training programme for Lebanese groups capable of making their own "counter terrorist" strikes [of which] [the outcome was a car bomb attack, apparently intended to kill a prominent Shi'ite suspect, Mr. Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, which missed him but killed 80 and wounded 200 in Beirut in March [1985].

See also Brummer, Why The CIA Primed The Blast Of Terror, Manchester Guardian Weekly,
from the list of countries that practice terrorism rapidly communicates to the reader everything that he or she needs to know about Kupperman's likely contribution to our knowledge of American violence and public policy. Substituting partisan ideology for partisan scholarship, Kupperman reveals himself to be a member of the Claire Sterling school of world conspiracy theory which, to paraphrase Lynn Curtis, "has never seen a cause of terrorism" except, perhaps, in the perfidy of Bulgarian or Russian intelligence operatives. As far as Curtis is concerned, James Baldwin's sense of rage at oppression is only worth recognition in the case of American minorities or oppressed groups.

To take just one example, the Irish Republican Army (mentioned by Kupperman at p. 184) may well represent as vicious a "subnational" terrorist group as exists in the world. But even the IRA's most severe critics, like Conor Cruise O'Brien and Edward Moxon-Browne, realize that terrorists like those of the IRA cannot be stopped until the underlying causes of their conduct have been recognized and dealt with. Much of this will be obvious to most readers

May 26, 1985, at 8, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.); R. Wright, Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Modern Islam 90-97 (1985); Cohen, Terrorism: The Mirror Image, Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 21, 1985, at 15, col. 3 (Wash. Post reprint ed.): "Hold the policy papers and suspend all meetings on terrorism. What this administration needs is not a new policy, not better intelligence and certainly not more street-corner rhetoric, but a good full-length mirror. It just might see a hypocrite there." Would that Mr. Cohen's advice, offered in the wake of a Lebanese terrorist hijacking of an American airliner and directed at the Reagan administration, had been offered to Mr. Kupperman by his editor before he submitted the draft of his essay on terrorism.

30. See C. Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War Of International Terrorism (1981) (see note 34 infra). Kupperman's bibliography, which includes Ms. Sterling's adventuresome narrative, and is jammed with titles from the Rand Corporation, the American Enterprise Institute, a publication called Enterprise: The Journal of Executive Action, the Hoover Institution, the American Council for World Freedom, Arlington House, and, of course, the CIA, perfectly reflects the mentality which shapes his research and argument: the technocratic stridency of world counter-insurgency, the less haute bourgeoisie (Kupperman is at Georgetown University) formulation of which appears regularly in the pages of Soldier Of Fortune, which is sold in 7-Elevens and late-night beer drive-ins across the country. Pp. 201-02. For an excellent critique of Kupperman, Sterling & Co., see Cockburn, The Gospel According To Ali Agca, 241 Nation 1 (1985). For complex and enlightening analyses of the technocratic mentality within America's intellectual power elite, see F. Kaplan, The Wizards Of Armageddon (1983); W. McDougall, . . . The Heavens And The Earth: A Political History Of The Space Age 8 (1985): "Foreign political and domestic social challenges, it was believed, were equally susceptible to the technological and managerial fix: revolutionary change without revolution, qualitative problems solved with quantitative methods. Under the impact of total Cold War, technocracy came to America." Unfortunately, Kupperman's essay is not the only part of Curtis' book to which this critique applies.

31. See text following note 16 supra.


34. See, e.g., O'Brien, Terrorism, supra note 32, at 102:

All my emphasis has been laid on the indigenous reasons for the durability of the war. I have not discussed the hypothesis suggested by Claire Sterling and others, including a few in
and, as previously indicated, *American Violence And Public Policy* is apparently premised on an assumption that Kupperman’s analysis effectively contradicts: that the first step in confronting crime is trying to understand its causes. So how did Kupperman end up being chosen to make the one contribution in a new category of crime explored in this update? Serious scholars define terrorism rigorously, stick to their definition, and do not play ideological favorites. But any list of terrorists which includes only members of one race or religion, or any list of states involved in terrorism that includes only those of one world ideological constellation, seems to me likely to be the work of the fanatic pamphleteer or the politician working the crowd, not the kind of scholarship for which Yale University Press usually strives.\[^{35}\]

What is most disturbing is that Curtis specifically endorses Kupperman’s views: “A democracy must debate the issues underlying a terrorist attack but cannot be blackmailed by the planned violence of trained professionals. That is why Kupperman’s tough policies are in order” (p. 220). Yet that is exactly the neo-conservative position on violent street crime to which Curtis is supposed to be providing an alternative: you can talk all you want about poverty, child abuse, and other so-called “causes” of crime, but when you finally become the victim of these drugged-up street thugs who have no respect for anything, then you too will recognize that violence and prison are the only things that will stop them.\[^{36}\]

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Northern Ireland, that the IRA functions as part of an international conspiracy. I believe that hypothesis to be fanciful and misleading... [B]asically [the IRA] is an outgrowth of the deep-rooted ultranationalist physical-force tradition within the Irish Catholic (and nationalist) community. It is a thoroughly and bitterly native phenomenon, and no one who has studied it closely believes in the reality, or even the possibility, of its falling under foreign control.

*See also* Moxon-Browne, *supra* note 33, at 161:

The [IRA] guerrilla fish do have the water they need to survive. The “water” consists of a proportion of the Catholic population that feels that it does not receive a “fair deal” in the Northern Ireland of today. Such a “fair deal” would consist of both tangibles and intangibles ranging from a notion of “justice” at one extreme to jobs, houses and leisure amenities, at the other. The role of the [Provisional IRA] has been to capitalise on these perceptions of injustice and link them to a broader struggle.

In the wake of American threats with respect to a “get tough” policy on villages in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley that provide aid and comfort to Shi’a terrorists, it is interesting to observe just how broad the waters of support for the IRA actually are:

In a fit of bad temper Mrs. Thatcher could wake up one day and decide that she is tired if [sic] waiting for Washington to offend the Irish vote by putting the IRA’s financial accomplices out of business — she could have the RAF make a surgical strike against Noraid offices in Brooklyn.

*In America, Counter-Insurgency Has Been Privatised*, Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 14, 1985, at 8, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.).

35. For the reader who doubts the possibility of the sort of balanced and consistent analysis I outline when the field of research is as emotionally and ideologically charged as that of terrorism and its causes, I recommend Robin Wright’s excellent book on Islamic Jihad, *supra* note 29.

36. The best general critiques of neo-conservativism in criminal justice theory are found in S. COHEN, *supra* note 6, and E. CURRIE, *Confronting Crime: An American Challenge* 22-50 (1985). For a critique of neo-conservative attitudes that stresses their avoidance of socioeconomic and historical causation, see Habermas, *Neoconservative Culture Criticism in the United*
Ultimately, then, what is important about Kupperman's analysis of terrorism is what it reveals about Curtis' perception of crime control. A more conservative, "surveillance and punish" reading of Curtis' community self-defense strategies seems indicated. "At its worst," comments Currie, "[community crime prevention] can degenerate into a kind of pulling-the-wagons-in-a-circle mentality..." (p. 58). It would be difficult to find a better description of Kupperman's politics of anxiety.38

IV. COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Perhaps the most important way of relating the work of Porter and Dunn on the Miami Riot of 1980 to that of Sandra Ball-Rokeach and James Short39 on collective violence in American Violence and Public Policy would be to situate the specific approach of each author in relation to methodologies of riot classification and interpretation developed during the past twenty years of theorizing about racial violence in the United States.40 But such a comparison is too ambitious for this

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37. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1975), and the discussion of Foucault's work in S. COHEN, supra note 6.

38. The most telling examples of what the terrorist threat can mean to American safety offered by Kupperman are the Tylenol poisonings of 1982 and the "terrorism theater" of Palestinians poisoning "a handful" of Israeli Jaffa oranges en route to America (pp. 191-92). Nevertheless, by early 1986, media hype had built anticipation of the arrival of unspecified Middle Eastern hit squads on American streets to the point that it seemed that the security managers would almost be disappointed (certainly less well employed) if terrorism did not come to the United States from abroad. Kupperman's "expertise" disintegrates when confronted with real world examples of the politics of terrorism such as that of the 1985 hijacking of TWA's flight from Athens to Rome. Interviewed on the Cable News Network by Bernard Shaw on June 30, 1985, Kupperman was asked whether he agreed with one of the American hostages who suggested the United States should at least think about the causes of anti-American political violence. Kupperman replied that it was a statement impossible to disagree with but dismissed analysis of causes with the observation that the causes of social unrest would be around long after he was gone. Interviewed on the Cable News Network program "Crossfire" on July 1, 1985, Kupperman suggested that after identifying who hijacked the TWA plane, we should "find them and kill them." One of the problems with killing people you think are guilty of crimes without first trying them is pointed out in Ottaway, Sheik's Involvement Never Proved, Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 26, 1985, at 15, col. 3 (Wash. Post reprint ed.) (What if it turns out you killed the wrong people?). Why this problem does not represent a major concern for Kupperman is dealt with in Cockburn, supra note 30, at 7. Even if the White House is relocated inside a bunker, "pulling-in-the-wagons" is not an answer to terrorism. See R. WRIGHT, supra note 29; Keeping One's Head About Colonel Gadafy, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.).


40. See, e.g., L. WILLIAMS & L. WILLIAMS II, ANATOMY OF FOUR RACE RIOTS: RACIAL CONFLICT IN KNOXVILLE, ELAINE (ARKANSAS), TULSA AND CHICAGO, 1919-1921 (1972); S. ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (1982); D. CAPECI, JR., THE HARLEM RIOT OF 1943 (1977); R.M. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM (1975); VIOLENCE IN AMERICA:
brief review, and thus I will focus instead upon what these and several other writers have said in common about the lessons we might learn from the racial confrontation that rocked the "Magic City" just six years ago.

1. Ball-Rokeach and Short review the conclusions and recommendations of the 1960s violence and crime reports with regard to collective violence and underline what was original about them; for example, the Kerner report's diagnosis of "institutionalized racism" (pp. 156-59). They suggest that the social conditions that were perceived from the vantage point of the 1960s as primary causes of collective violence have remained static or grown worse for most blacks and other poor people over the last twenty years.41 Why, then, the virtual disappearance of major urban uprisings in the 1970s and 1980s? Ball-Rokeach and Short argue that a combination of heavy investment in one of the 1960s reports' proposals (beefing up the arsenal of law enforcement), plus declining expectations that the increased risks involved in rioting would lead to any sort of positive social or governmental response, tipped the scales among those at the bottom of the social order in favor of despondency and immobilization, especially when confronted with a vigorous counter-riot of the rich under generally conservative Republican regimes in Washington.42

But why, then, the Miami Riot of 1980? The riot was the result of

41. Pp. 159-69. Beyond the argument cited by Ball-Rokeach and Short, see T.B. EDSALL, The New Politics of Inequality (1984); Davis, The Political Economy of Late-Imperial America, New Left Rev., Jan.-Feb., 1984, at 6, 18:

First, the "victory" in the War on Poverty is largely an artefact of income transfers within the working class which leave structural employment situations intact. Begin to remove these federal income supports, as Reagan has recently started to do, and the original 1960-level of designated poverty reappears. In fact, the pre-transfer inequality of market incomes has increased in the past generation. . . . The American economy has especially failed to re-integrate black male workers, whose participation rate in the labour-force (a key index of structural unemployment) has fallen from 80% in 1945 to barely 60% today.

Davis' argument that the civil rights movement and the war on poverty legislation failed to overcome the structural impediments built into late-imperial capitalist economic development in the United States is, of course, radically different from the assertion, made by Charles Murray and shared by fellow neo-conservatives George Gilder and Thomas Sowell, that federal programs designed to help the poor have actually made them worse off. For systematic criticism of the latter argument, see Jencks, How Poor Are the Poor?, New York Rev. Books, May 9, 1985, at 41.

poverty-stricken Miami blacks hitting bottom, a flash point at the opposite end (in a sense) of one social-psychological spectrum whose other terminus (hope for change, prospects of being socially integrated through employment and educational opportunities) had itself been a spur to civil disturbances in the period two decades earlier. It was in the middle ground of this dialectical field of violence where the right ingredients for revolt were missing (pp. 168-71). And, of course, in Miami Arthur McDuffie had been beaten to death by police officers who escaped criminal sanction (pp. 169-70). Thus the combination of a disturbing, downward economic trajectory for Miami's large black population with specific incidents of perceived police brutality precipitated an almost "third world" riot of despair:

[T]he cause of the Liberty City-Miami riot was more fundamentally due to a transformation of the Miami black community into an underclass. David Whitman, senior research assistant at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, contends that the most important condition giving rise to the Miami riot was the fact that, while economic prosperity was being experienced by whites and many Hispanics, a large proportion of the city's blacks had been relegated to an underclass of unemployables with little hope of escaping the dependency wrought by their structural irrelevance.43

rich" as a kind of backlash against the social gains made by the poor in the 1960s, see Davis, supra note 41, at 35:

Although the rhetoric of the various campaigns and tax rebellions that paved Reagan's road to power was vigorously anti-statist, the real programmatic intention was towards a restructuring, rather than diminution, of state spending and intervention in order to expand the frontiers of entrepreneurial and rentier opportunity. . . . All these modalities of professional, entrepreneurial and rentier claims on society presume, of course, the high and sustained rate of economic expansion typified by Sunbelt urbanization over the past few decades.

See also T.B. EDSALL, supra note 41, who argues that during the past two decades, the professional and business interests indicated by Davis have virtually taken over both national political parties:

Within the Democratic party, campaign fundraising, party rules, and the emergence of a dominant reform wing during the post-Watergate period have resulted in a disproportionate share of power going to an upper-middle-class, professional, highly educated, and relatively affluent elite. . . . At the top of the [Republican] party, however, an alliance of conservative ideological leaders, corporate chief executive officers, sunbelt entrepreneurs, independent oilmen, and key representatives of Washington's business lobbying community has been gaining a broad and legitimate claim to power.

Id. at 67-68. In short, most non-union-organized working Americans, the unemployed, and particularly the black underclass find themselves closed out of the national political parties. The subordination of the poor and racial minorities over the past twenty years has been the necessary result of what Davis describes as the "Watts riot of the middle classes," Davis, supra note 41, at 33, a riot to be sure without any urgent government study commissions.


Many ghetto residents feel cut off, isolated. Some lose hope. And, as witnessed in Miami's riots, some lose fear. Angry at police brutality or Cubans or unemployment or the system or whitey, or just bored with hanging out, these enraged individuals turn to senseless and wanton destruction . . . . Many of those participating in the Miami riot . . . "were not poor or unemployed or members of the criminal class." All were united by their rage. According to Dunn and Porter, they were protesting. But others would emphasize, as Eleanor Norton and Patricia Harris did in another context, that the value system of the underclass may have become the pervasive one in the Miami ghetto.
2. As suggested in the initial section of this review, a major purpose of the Porter and Dunn volume is simply to set out the events leading up to and constituting the Miami Riot of 1980 in the kind of detail essential to a full understanding of the ferocity of skirmishes along the borderland of what may have, in fact, become America’s “Gulag.”

Yet Porter and Dunn also spend considerable time evaluating the causes of the riot and its social texture. Like Ball-Rokeach

44. Ball-Rokeach and Short suggest that

[of all the recommendations made by the Violence, Kerner, and Katzenbach reports, those concerning the beefing up of the arsenal and size of law enforcement agencies received the most extensive financial and political support. None of these commissions envisioned reliance upon technological and strategic preparations that would “gulag” the ghetto by using fear to suppress collective protest.

P. 165. Yet that may well be what has happened. After sketching out the “gulag” future faced by America’s cities, of which the 1960s crime reports warned if we did not attend to questions of social justice, Currie adds:

[What most strikes me today about the commission’s scenario is that, with some exceptions, it came true to such an extent that we now simply take most of it for granted. . . . I was struck by this during a recent foray into the newly “revitalized” downtown area of a large, high-crime western city that shall remain nameless. The high-rise buildings were there, all right. Most of them seemed, indeed, to be banks; they gleamed and glittered and faintly oozed urban prosperity. But the guards were there, too — inside the buildings, in the lobbies and in the elevators; outside the buildings, in the parking garages (imagine the commission, in 1969, thinking it worthy of note that downtown visitors would insist on protected parking) and in the immaculate, if mainly deserted, plaza between the buildings.

P. 42. And as Carl Abbott describes it,

Downtown Atlanta rises above its surrounding city like a walled fortress from another age. The citadel is anchored to the south by the international trade centre and buttressed by the municipal stadium . . . . The sunken moat of I-85 with its flowing lanes of traffic reaches around the eastern base of the hill from south to north, protecting lawyers, bankers, consultants, and regional executives from the intrusion of low-income neighborhoods.

C. ABBOTT, THE NEW URBAN AMERICA 143 (1983), quoted in Davis, Urban Renaissance and the Spirit of Postmodernism, 151 NEW LEFT REV., May-June 1985, at 106. Davis adds: “It is not surprising that Los Angeles’s Portman-built new downtown (like that of Detroit, or Houston) reproduces more or less exactly the besieged landscape of [Atlanta’s] Peachtree Center. . . . In fact, Portman has only built large vivariums for the upper middle classes, protected by astonishingly complex security systems.” Davis, supra, at 106. Matching, however, the grand masters of contemporary medievalism stroke for stroke, the modern barbarians have waded out into the “sunken moat” of I-95 in Dade County, Florida, cudgels in hand; see Buchanan, Modern Highway Robbers Bedevil Motorists On I-95, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at 1A, col. 1:

The robberies usually take three forms: attacks on stranded motorists; assaults on cars trapped in bumper-to-bumper traffic; and attacks by holdup men who stop cars by hurling objects into the roadway. They throw tire rims, street barricades, nails, sometimes even oil drums. . . . In a pattern that emerged last month, men with guns hurled debris onto the ramp from State Road 836 to northbound I-95 at night, between 9:30 and 11:30 p.m. Cars are disabled, the occupants left helpless . . . . John S. Sherman, the mayor of Bal Harbour, complained to Gov. Bob Graham about the fences after two of his constituents, riding in a Rolls-Royce, were ambushed on I-95 on a sunny Saturday afternoon last month. Outraged, he asked for higher fences, emergency call boxes and more police patrol.

See also Buchanan, The Robbers: Crooks Hit and Run, Then Get Off Lightly, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at 20A, col. 1:

Profile of Miami’s I-95 highway robbers: wiry, slightly built, black, youthful, and unemployed. . . . [A]ll the robberies occurred on stretches of expressway bordered by black neighborhoods. “A white robber isn’t going to hang out there to commit a crime,” says Sally Heyman, a crime prevention coordinator. Often the attackers are juveniles. . . . Then there was a motorist, unidentified, who did not stop. When police arrested the 15-year-old several days later, they noticed an unusual marking on his arm. It was the mark of Michelin — a tire track, said Broussard.

See also The Victim: Assaulted Motorist Feels Like A Number, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at
and Short, they point out the differences between the 1980 riot and those of the 1960s, although Porter and Dunn emphasize — in addition to the contrast between riots of expectation and disillusion — the disparity between earlier riots where police alone were white targets of black violence and the Miami Riot where white civilians suddenly became fair game (Porter & Dunn, pp. 172-79). Comparatively speaking, it was when black violence finally moved close to the fringe of previously untouched white suburban areas that the South African government (in the name of protecting blacks from blacks) declared an official "state of emergency" during the summer of 1985, the first time it had done so since the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960.45

"To find prior incidents where blacks attacked and killed whites" in the U.S., according to Porter and Dunn, "one would have to look back to the race riots following World War I that occurred in East St. Louis, Chicago, and other cities. . . . Prior to the World War I disorders, there is no precedent to blacks killing whites unless one goes all the way to the sporadic slave rebellions that occurred before the Civil War."46 In at least one respect, we may indeed have gotten back to "slavery days": the disappearance of lower-income Americans (in-

20A, col. 5; Buchanan, Bump the Bandit If There's Danger, Experts Suggest, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at 20A, col. 5. 45. See A. Sachs, Justice in South Africa 216-18 (1973); L. Kuper, Genocide 197-204 (1981); Naude, supra note 14.

46. P. 177. On a somewhat less ambitious note, however, the authors observe that [s]ome of the antiwhite violence in Miami can be attributed simply to geography. Sixty-second Street in Liberty City, Grand Avenue in Coconut Grove and other streets in the ghetto are major north-south or east-west thoroughfares, used as much by whites as by blacks. And unlike Watts, Newark and Detroit, where the riots built slowly and whites had at least some warning to stay clear, in Miami many whites found themselves caught in the middle of a riot that suddenly erupted all around them. P. 176. Add the fact that even whites who expected a riot upon not-guilty verdicts in the McDuffie murder trial were caught off guard by the three-hour, weekend acquittal and I think you have found more sober reasons for the degree of antiwhite violence in Miami than looking to a comparison with early slave rebellions for an explanation.

The unusual proximity of very wealthy whites and very poor blacks in some parts of residential Miami may have reproduced the racially mixed neighborhood patterns more characteristic of urban America at the time of the World War I-era race riots. A growing physical distance separating the races has been one marked development of twentieth-century housing trends in large cities with substantial minority populations and may have contributed to the limited number of nonpolice whites killed in urban race riots during the 1940s and 1960s. See J. Kushner, Apartheid in America 1-3 (1980): "In 1961, the United States Commission on Civil Rights described the exodus of Whites to the suburbs and the resulting entrapment of Blacks and other minorities in the central cities as the 'white noose.' " The number of U.S. blacks living in racially mixed neighborhoods declined rapidly after the Second World War. Id. at 3; see also I. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 72 (1961): "On one plane, for instance, an acquaintance there comments that although she has lived in [Los Angeles] for ten years and knows it contains Mexicans, she has never laid eyes on a Mexican or an item of Mexican culture, much less ever exchanged any words with a Mexican."

There are other parallels between the Miami Riot of 1980 and some of the World War I-era civil disturbances; compare, for example, the comments by T. Willard Fair, president of the Miami Urban League, Porter & Dunn, p. 109, with those of black historian John Hope Franklin, Introduction to S. Ellsworth, supra note 40, at xvi-xvii (both men underscoring the disturbing
cluding blacks) from the voting booths and electoral rolls has reproduced some features of nineteenth-century, pre-democratic liberalism. As many commentators have recently pointed out, heavy voter abstention among the lower classes has resulted in an electorate significantly more middle class than the population at large. In the specific case of Miami's black underclass, Porter and Dunn demonstrate that political and economic clout has become so marginal that it is reasonable to ask whether archaic property or race disabilities placed upon the right to vote could further harm the black poor. This is increasingly the situation faced by minority groups across the country. Collective violence may become explicable within this context, but (in the United States, at any rate) it is difficult to see how it can lead to a solution to the problems of injustice and inequality (pp. 181-200).

3. In a helpful comparison of the Miami Riot of 1980 with the "massive street riots" in Liverpool, England, the following year, Philip Jenkins and Fred Hutchings evaluate collective violence in terms similar to those used by Porter and Dunn as well as Ball-Rokeach and Short. Emphasizing the decline of class position experienced by Miami's blacks coupled with waves of unemployment and right-wing direction in national policy (shared by the underclass of Miami with that of Brixton and Liverpool), collective violence becomes an increasingly likely event:

[T]he Kerner analysis of the riots as primarily a response to economic crisis and relative deprivation holds good; but the economic background has grown far, far worse, and improvement is not in sight in this fact that the number of whites killed by blacks in riots is significant to black self-confidence, self-respect, and ability to deal with previous fear of white violence).


[T]he 1982-84 drive expanded the active electorate without reducing its upscale tilt; it was a class stalemate. . . . Future registration campaigns are also likely to end in a class stalemate. Despite losing four of the last five Presidential elections, the Democratic National Committee does not seem ready to enlist new constituencies from the bottom, and the Republican National Committee and kindred right-wing movements have the financial resources, the organizational competence and the commitment to register enough people from the higher strata so as to equal or exceed non-partisan efforts among low-income groups. . . . The main organizing lesson of the 1982-84 registration campaign is that there is little hope for a more representative electorate until the registration system is reformed. The question is how to accomplish that in the face of opposition by the political parties.


century. Perhaps it is not to be hoped for within the present social or economic framework. Riots on the 1960s pattern are therefore very likely to recur in this decade — probably on at least as large a scale, and probably on new and more dangerous lines. Either they will be Miami riots, setting community against community, or they will be Liverpool riots, challenging governments and the social order.50

There could be no more appropriate note on which to close this review than the one sounded by Jenkins and Hutchings: that solutions to the problem of collective violence (and individual violence, as well) cannot be secured until we situate these forms of criminality within what Elliott Currie has described as the “larger, enviroring forces that, in fact, make or break living communities in the real world” (Curtis, p. 58), and deal effectively with these forces, even if it means radically altering our “present social or economic framework.”51 In perhaps the best single survey of where the present “economic framework” of late-imperial capitalist development is taking communities like Miami, Mike Davis points out:

As immigration flows — both legal and illegal — approach the 1901-1910 peak of trans-Atlantic migration, the long tracts of border zone have become an integrated economy of twin cities, one rich, one poor. . . . The accelerated formation of this borderlands economic system since the late 1960s has become integral to the new accumulation patterns characterized by a coordinated expansion of low-wage employment and middle-strata affluence. . . . Moreover, as labour-markets are transnationalized, their segmentation grows more extreme, and wages become subject to determination by bantustan-like conditions of social reproduction. Thus the neo-colonial logic of Sunbelt capitalism ensures that no fundamental challenge can be mounted against the domestic low-wage economy without a simultaneous change in the borderland structure of hyper-unemployment and domination.52

50. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). The Jenkins and Hutchings prediction may already have proven partially correct. See After Brixton the Hard Choices, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Oct. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (Wash. Post reprint ed.); Rosenzweig, Big Stick Approach to Britain’s Black Problem, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov. 24, 1985, at 13, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.) (exploring the “explosions of racial violence that shook Great Britain in September and October” of 1985).


52. Davis, supra note 41, at 29. Davis’ critique of contemporary capitalist development represents a sophisticated extension of the synthesis of two earlier modes of analysis, both generated in the 1960s. The first of these, initiated by Carl Oglesby at Antioch College in the summer of 1968, became known as the “Yankee/Cowboy” or “Rust Belt/Sunbelt” theoretical approach to explaining American demographic and political-economic change. See C. OGLESBY, THE YANKEE AND COWBOY WAR (1976); K. SALE, POWER SHIFT: THE RISE OF THE SOUTHERN RIM AND ITS CHALLENGE TO THE EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT (1975); K. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969); W.D. BURNHAM, supra note 47; Hearn, The Corporatist Mood in the United States, 56 Telos 41-57 (1983) (including bibliographic references to a range of works prescribing “industrial policy” solutions to the decline of the “rust belt” or “frost belt” region of the United States).

The second 1960s trend of analysis on which Davis builds was initiated by dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin and suggested that not only the relations
Thus the transformation of the "Magic City" into "murder city" (Dade County led the nation in murders for 1984)\(^{53}\) and the rise of between developed and less developed countries could be understood in terms of a "center/periphery" metaphor, but that domestic relations within both developed and less developed countries themselves could also be explained in terms of metropole and periphery. See A.G. Frank, \textit{Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America} (1968); A. G. Frank, \textit{Dependency Accumulation and Underdevelopment} (1979); S. Amin, \textit{Unequal Development} (1976); S. Amin, \textit{Imperialism and Unequal Development} (1977); \textit{Dependency Theory and Underdevelopment and Development}, in \textit{A Dictionary of Marxist Thought} 115-17, 498-500 (T. Bottomore ed. 1985); Buchanan, \textit{Center and Periphery: Reflections On the Irrelevance of a Billion Human Beings}, \textit{MONTHLY REV.}, July-Aug. 1985, at 86-97.

Davis' observations on "transnationalization" in the borderland economies with a resulting convergence of "first world" and "third world" political economy are of great significance. See Terrence Todman, President Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, quoted in Ambursley & Cohen, \textit{Crisis in the Caribbean: Internal Transformations and External Constraints}, in \textit{CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN} 1, 18 (F. Ambursley & R. Cohen eds. 1983) (emphasis added): "We no longer see the Caribbean in the same stark military security context that we once viewed it. ... It is possibly an even more troublesome prospect: proliferation of impoverished third-world states whose economic and political problems blend with our own." See also Farer, \textit{Contadora: The Hidden Agenda}, \textit{FOREIGN POLY.}, Summer 1985, at 39, 62:

Significant segments of the educated elite throughout the Caribbean Basin are by now animated by any major American initiative. [Consider] [t]he long history of U.S. involvement and the deep infiltration of American culture into their lives; the dense economic networks on which individual, family, and national well-being depend; and the profusion of personal ties and personal experiences (for example, Disneyland, Bloomington's, and the Inter-American Defense College). . . .

\textit{See also} M. Puig, \textit{Betrayed by Rita Hayworth} (1968); G. Cabrera Infante, \textit{Three Trapped Tigers} (1971). A popular xenophobic bumper sticker in South Florida reads: "Will the last American leaving Dade County please bring the flag." These are among the "larger, environing forces" outside of which it is difficult even to begin to understand the nature of violent crime in Miami.

\(^{53}\) Voboril, \textit{Dade County Murder Rate Leads Nation}, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at 1A, col. 1:

Dade County, nationally known for its exotic, violent crime, became the murder capital of the country last year, according to FBI statistics released Saturday. In 1984, Dade recorded 425 murders, according to the figures. That amounts to 23.7 murders per 100,000 Dade residents, the highest murder rate in any U.S. metropolitan area and three times the national level. Dade's overall crime rate was second only to that of metropolitan Atlantic City, N.J.

See Thompson, \textit{A Dog Took My Place}, \textit{ROLLING STONE}, Aug. 4, 1983, at 18, 23:

There is a whole new ethic taking shape in South Florida these days, and despite the rich Latin overlay, it is not so far from the taproot of the old American Dream. It is free enterprise in the raw, a wide-open Spanish-speaking kind of Darwinism, like the Sicilians brought to New York a hundred years ago and like the Japanese brought to Hawaii after World War II. . . . Rich is strong, poor is weak, and the government works for whoever pays its salaries.

\textit{See also Bar Growth Fastest With Out-Of-State, South Florida Members}, \textit{FLA. B. NEWS}, July 1, 1985, at 11, 11:

Led by rapid growth in most areas of South Florida and in out-of-state members, the Florida Bar grew by 136.8 percent between 1973 and 1984. . . . "Think big," said one of the Bar's top officials, "Think beyond your own borders." . . . Harry McGinnis, director of Bar Planning and Evaluation, said the growth of attorneys in South Florida tracks the growth of the population there. But there are other reasons, he said, adding, "With all the economic factors, it's a place for attorneys to practice."

\textit{See also} P. Lernoux, \textit{In Banks We Trust} 120-21 (1984):

Miami, the Wall Street of the $79 billion narcotics traffic, has attracted more than one hundred banks from two dozen countries. The most prestigious address is Brickell Avenue, a block from the bay, where gold-and-black skyscrapers rise incongruously above the palm trees. Coral Gables, the Latin-American headquarters of some one hundred multinational corporations, is also considered a chic bank location. . . . The smaller the bank, the more dubious the buyers it is likely to attract. "In Miami they have a saying in Spanish: 'The sharks are on the streets, not in the sea'. . . . You wouldn't believe how many people come in here to ask if the bank is for sale. . . ." "We used to have the same problem," agreed
post-civil rights movement collective violence in peripheral garbage heaps of upper-class, air-conditioned white society's pleasure-domed urban landscape, may simply be a sign of the times. The one having the two: Miami/Liberty City, San Diego/Tijuana, Brownsville/Mataroros (cf. Johannesburg/Soweto) transcend the criminal justice/criminal violence dichotomy and reveal the essential contour of our increasingly experimental relation to democracy in the U.S.A.

Aristides Sastre, president of Republic National Bank, "but it's become less prevalent because we've grown so much. I don't know anywhere else in the United States where people just walk in off the street and offer to buy the bank."

Lernoux's book is the best analysis of money, drugs, and politics in South Florida.