Sentimental Stereotypes: Emotional Expectations for High-and Low-Status Group Members

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Three vignette studies examined stereotypes of the emotions associated with high and low status group members. In Study 1a, participants believed that in negative situations, high status people feel more angry than sad or guilty and that low status people feel more sad and guilty than angry. Study 1b showed that in response to positive outcomes, high status people are expected to feel more pride and low status people are expected to feel more appreciation. Study 2 showed that people also infer status from emotions: Angry and proud people are thought of as high status, whereas sad, guilty, and appreciative people are considered low status. The authors argue that these emotion stereotypes are due to differences in the inferred abilities of people in high and low positions. These perceptions lead to expectations about agency appraisals and emotions related to agency appraisals. In Study 3, the authors found support for this process by manipulating perceptions of skill and finding the same differences in emotion expectations.

Social hierarchy is one of the most frequently occurring forms of social organization. Hierarchies exist in so many kinds of groups in almost all cultures that people are probably rarely free from the influence of social status positions (Brown, 1985; Lonner, 1980; Mazur, 1973). These status positions and their influences are of extreme importance to many people who spend a great deal of time and energy trying to fulfill the expectations of their hierarchical position, to move up to higher positions, and to avoid being demoted to lower positions (Jones & Pittman, 1982; King, 1995; Winter, 1973).

Although concerns about social expectations related to status pervade people’s everyday lives, psychologists, for the most part, have ignored the omnipresence of social hierarchy. Consequently, there is very little empirical information about the effects of different social positions and the expectations of the people who occupy them.

We do know that people in high-status positions behave differently than people in low-status positions. People in high-status positions speak more often and interrupt others more than do people in low-status positions (Bales & Slater, 1955; Bavelas, Hastorf, Gross, & Kite, 1965; Ng, Bell, & Brooke, 1993). They have different gaze patterns (Ellyson, Dovidio, & Fehr, 1981; Exline, Ellyson, & Long, 1975) and different facial expressions (Dixson, 1977; Harper, 1985; Keating, 1985). These behaviors probably reflect both consequences of high and low status and people’s expectations about social status positions. That is, social status may in itself create behavioral differences but there also may be expectations about how people in high- and low-status positions should behave.

Behavioral differences between low- and high-status people, such as talking and interrupting, can be easily observed, remembered, and imitated; therefore, they are also easy to manipulate. Those who want to live up to

Authors’ Note: Some studies in this article were presented at the 1996 International Society for Research on Emotions Conference in Toronto, Canada. In addition, some of these studies appeared in the first author’s dissertation. The dissertation committee included Fiona Lee, Norbert Schwarz, and David Winter, all of whom provided valuable feedback. The authors would also like to express their appreciation to Jennifer Kaplan, Elaine Stando, and Sarah Stolaski for their assistance in collecting the data and to the anonymous reviewers and editor for their helpful comments. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Larissa Z. Tiedens, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 5015; e mail: tiedens@leland.stanford.edu.

the expectations for their position can learn to produce these behavioral patterns. Less visible correlates of social status position may be less easy to learn but may be just as important for social mobility. Expected differences in the underlying psychological processes of low- and high-status people may be less perceptible but confirmation or disconfirmation of these expectations may be quite powerful because people believe that psychological processing is especially diagnostic. If people in high-status positions are assumed to think and feel one way, whereas those in low-status positions are assumed to think and feel another way, then the expression of thoughts and feelings could influence perceptions of rightful status. And, because psychological processes are less easily imitated and manipulated than overt behavior, they may produce even stronger inferences about a person’s actual status.

In this article, we examine expectations about the characteristic emotions of people in high- and low-status positions. In addition, we investigate a possible cognitive process underlying these expectations.

There is even less research about the psychological differences between high- and low-status group members than there is about their behavioral differences. However, the research on behavioral differences between low- and high-status group members provides some clues as to possible psychological differences. In particular, some of the behavioral findings can be interpreted to suggest that there may be emotional differences between low- and high-status group members. For example, the facial expressions that have been associated with social status (Keating, 1985) also have been shown to be related to emotions (Ekman, 1979, 1993; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). The furrowed eyebrows and stiff lips of high-status group members are components of the facial expression of anger, and the tendency of those in lower positions to smile while averting their gaze is similar to the expression sequence Keltner (1995) found for embarrassment. In addition, certain behaviors linked to status in nonhuman primates, such as withdrawal, turning away, teeth gnashing, and hitting (Mitchell & Maple, 1985), correspond to action tendencies associated with various emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Again, the high-status behavior of teeth gnashing and hitting are behaviors that appear with anger, whereas the low-status behaviors of turning away and withdrawal occur with guilt, embarrassment, fear, and sadness. Furthermore, dominance behaviors such as pointing and interrupting betoken feelings of confidence and pride, whereas the slouched protective stance of low-status individuals suggests feelings of vulnerability and insecurity (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; Ridgeway, 1987; Yukil & Falbe, 1990). As parallels such as these mount, more and more researchers are beginning to suggest that emotions and social status may indeed be related (Clark, 1990; Kemper, 1991; Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990); preliminary investigations of emotional differences between people at different status levels suggest that there are differences in the emotions they actually experience (Conway & Pizzamiglio, 1996; Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998; Tiedens, Ellsworth, & Moskowitz, 1998).

These physical cues might also suggest to lay people that there are systematic differences in the emotions of low- and high-status group members. They may come to hold stereotypes about the inner experiences of group members. These stereotypes would lead people to expect certain emotional states based on status and could allow people to make inferences about the status level of individuals based on information about their emotional states. Certainly, such stereotypes, expectations, and inferences exist for gender, a characteristic often associated with status (Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Ridgeway & Dickema, 1989). People expect women to feel more sad than men, whereas they expect men to feel more angry than women (Birnbaum, 1983; Birnbaum & Croll, 1984; Fabes & Martin, 1991). In addition, people rate both male and female targets with angry expressions as more masculine than targets expressing other emotions (Algoe, Buswell, & DeLamater, 1998). Although these literatures can be interpreted as suggesting that people have stereotypes about status-related emotions, none of this research has directly tested that question or provide much theorizing about why people might hold these expectations or why there are differences in the emotional experiences of low- and high-status group members.

In our research, we have been arguing that the emotional differences between people at different status levels occur because people believe that status indicates ability, and we argue that this belief influences attributions of responsibility for positive and negative events. According to appraisal theories of emotions, differences in causal attributions or appraisals result in different emotions. Tiedens et al. (1998) demonstrated that people in high-status positions are likely to feel anger in response to negative outcomes, whereas people in low-status positions are likely to feel sadness and guilt. If the outcome is positive, then high-status people tend to feel pride, whereas low-status people feel appreciation. This pattern was uncovered both when status was randomly assigned in a laboratory situation and when people’s emotional ratings of social situations at work were examined. In the research presented here, our aim was to find out whether people have implicit knowledge of this process. We examined whether people have expectations about the causal appraisals and emotions of people
in low- and high-status positions. We predicted that (a) high-status people are expected to feel more angry and proud, whereas low-status people are expected to feel more guilty, sad, and appreciative; (b) angry and proud people are considered high status, whereas sad, guilty, and appreciative people are thought to be low status; and (c) similar patterns can be created by any information about differences in the skills and abilities. When a person is considered highly competent, they will be expected to be angry and proud, whereas a person who is considered to lack necessary skills and abilities will be expected to be sad, guilty, and appreciative. These patterns are important not only because they illuminate some of the challenges faced by people trying to live up to the expectations of their role but also because they indicate that stereotypes, which are usually considered to consist of perceptions of simple traits and behaviors, can also include assumptions about complex psychological processes.

**Expectations of Skill and Expectations About Emotions**

Research on social status consistently suggests that people hold trait-like stereotypes of people in low- and high-status positions. People tend to believe that high-status people are more competent, intelligent, and even better looking than are low-status people (Darley & Gross, 1983; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Humphrey, 1985; Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner, & Fillenbaum, 1960; Ng, 1980; Ridgeway, 1987; Rossell et al., 1997; Sande, Ellard, & Ross, 1986). A recent meta-analysis has shown that this evaluative effect is quite robust, occurring in a wide variety of contexts using numerous status manipulations and various evaluative measures (Georgesen & Harris, 1998). In short, high-status people are considered better. Amazingly, these attributions occur even when the participants understand that status was randomly assigned (e.g., Humphrey, 1985) and when the participants do not interact after being assigned to their status roles (Sande et al., 1986).

These stereotypes about ability may create other, more complex, expectations, such as expectations about causal attributions and emotions. Specifically, people may use status and the information status conveys about skill to assist them in deciding who is responsible for events. If status affects causal attributions, it could also affect emotions. Appraisal theories of emotion have demonstrated that people’s interpretations of events correspond to particular emotion states (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). According to appraisal theories, different people can have different emotional reactions to the same event because they interpret the situation differently. Appraisal theorists have shown that to understand which specific emotion a person feels in response to a situation, we need to know how he or she interprets the situation along the appraisal dimensions relevant to emotions. The attribution of agency, or causality, is a dimension of interpretation central to most appraisal theories of emotion (also see Wiener, 1985). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) found three major types of agency appraisal: (a) “I am responsible,” (b) “someone else is responsible,” and (c) “no one is responsible.” In their work, this agency appraisal distinguished among the negative emotions of anger, sadness, and guilt (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a). Negative events seen as caused by oneself evoke guilt, negative events seen as caused by circumstances (i.e., no one) evoke sorrow, and negative events seen as caused by other people evoke anger. Similarly, agency appraisals discriminate between positive emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b). Pride is associated with feeling personal responsibility for a positive outcome, and appreciation or admiration is evoked when someone else is considered responsible.

Appraisal theorists argue that these appraisals are essential components of emotions, yet at the same time, it is recognized that they are not the most readily accessible aspect of emotions (van Reekum & Scherer, 1997). Neither an observer nor the person experiencing the emotion necessarily has immediate access to the appraisals. They are not central to the intuitive psychologist’s theory of emotions, perhaps, in part, because they are unobservable. However, once people spend time reflecting on what they were thinking while experiencing an emotion, they systematically and reliably report an association between these appraisals and emotions.

Appraisals are not the only phenomenological component of emotions. Another more easily observed aspect of emotions is called “action tendencies.” Frijda (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) has argued that specific emotions can be distinguished by the extent to which they make a person feel like engaging in different behaviors. He has found that various phrases describing behavioral intentions map onto specific emotions (especially negative emotions) and to the appraisals associated with those emotions. For example, Frijda et al. (1989) found that the phrase “feels like I’m boiling inwardly” describes the experience of anger and of blaming someone else for a negative event. “Boiling inwardly” does not, however, describe the experience of people feeling guilty and blaming themselves for a negative event. Instead, the experience of guilt and of blaming oneself for a negative event is best captured by the phrase “wishing to disappear from view.”

At least for negative emotions, then, action tendencies provide another way to measure emotional experience or, in this case, expectations of emotional experience. Action tendencies are particularly interesting measures for questions about the expectations of emo-
tional experience because they are psychological in that they describe an experience or a feeling, not a behavior; yet, of all the phenomenological components of emotion, they may be the most closely related to observable behavioral outcomes of emotions. From an evolutionary perspective, then, they may be the most important component of emotions to recognize. So, for outsiders, action tendencies might be the most easily inferred component of emotion; thus, action tendencies might be the aspect of emotion for which there are the strongest expectations. Indeed, Frijda (Frijda et al., 1989; Frijda, Markam, Sato, & Wiers, 1995) has found that allowing participants to report on action tendencies adds considerably to the variance in emotions explained by appraisals.

In some situations, it is clear who or what is responsible for an outcome; however, in many situations, people may need to look for additional cues to infer responsibility. Status may be one cue that is used to determine agency. For example, if a group accomplishes a goal, the positive perceptions of high-status members may lead people to infer that a high-status member was probably responsible. Because low-status members are not perceived so positively, they may seem unlikely agents. The appraisal literature suggests that these different interpretations of agency should have consequences for people's expectations about others' emotions. Specifically, when the group succeeds, the high-status member will be expected to feel pride and the low-status member will be expected to feel appreciation.

What if the outcome is negative? Given the perceived inadequacy of low-status people, it may be easier for them to imagine that they did something wrong rather than imagining the admirable high-status people making an error. Again, these agency appraisals are likely to have consequences for expectations about emotions and action tendencies. If low-status group members are held responsible for negative events, then high-status people will be expected to feel angry at them and to feel as though they are boiling inwardly. Low-status people, however, will be expected to feel guilty and as though they would like to disappear from view.

Guilt and self-blame are avoided when possible, at least in U.S. culture (Ellsworth, 1994). Thus, in negative situations, low-status people may be expected to blame themselves less than their superiors blame them. Yet, even if low-status people are not expected to take total responsibility for negative events, then the psychology of hierarchy makes it difficult to blame high-status group members. After all, high-status group members are seen as superior. Thus, low-status people may compromise and decide that no one was responsible. If that appraisal is attributed to low-status group members, appraisal theory would predict that they would be viewed as sad (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The literature on action tendencies suggests that they would also be viewed as “feeling helpless.”

Expectations about the emotional states that characterize social positions may affect perceptions of people’s status. They may lead us to believe that if we know someone’s emotional state, we know their social position. These expectations may also influence our interactional styles with people at different social levels. They may lead us to take advantage of some and to defer to others. In short, information about others’ likely emotional responses may greatly influence our perceptions, feelings, and behaviors.

Overview of Research

To examine people’s stereotypes of the emotions that accompany social status positions, we used a vignette methodology. In Studies 1a and 1b, we examined the agency appraisals, agency-based emotions, and action tendencies attributed to high- and low-status group members. Study 1a examined negative emotions and Study 1b examined positive emotions. In Study 2, we provided participants with information about people’s emotional responses and asked them to infer their status. Finally, in Study 3, we examined the effects of perceptions of skill using a vignette about two characters of equal status but unequal skill.

The same base vignettes were used in all the studies; in each study, we predicted that high status and high skill would be associated with anger and pride, whereas low status and low skill would be associated with guilt, sadness, and appreciation. These expectations would be seen, we predicted, in the agency appraisals associated with these emotions, in the emotion ratings, and in the action tendencies related to these emotions. Furthermore, we predicted that the expectations for appraisals would be the weakest and the action tendencies would be the strongest because appraisals are the least visible component of emotion, whereas action tendencies reflect a generally more visible component of emotion (Frijda et al., 1989).

STUDY 1A: NEGATIVE EMOTION ASSOCIATES OF SOCIAL STATUS

Method

PARTICIPANTS

The study consisted of 25 males and 15 females. Their mean age was 24. The participants were recruited by two female experimenters from a lounge in a business school and were given candy in exchange for their participation.
Participants were given one of two versions of a vignette about two characters (one high status and one low status) in a business context. The first version read as follows:

Mr. Ames, the head advertising executive of Signal Advertising Agency, and his assistant Don have a meeting with a client to present an idea for advertising a new product. Mr. Ames has the materials for the slide presentation in his car and follows Mr. Donne, his supervisor, who has the directions to the meeting. Mr. Ames and Don lose each other in traffic. Mr. Donne gets to the meeting on time but cannot do the presentation because the visual aids are in his assistant’s car. By the time Mr. Ames gets there, the client is furious and they lose the account.

Version 2 read as follows:

Mr. Donne, the head advertising executive of Signal Advertising Agency, and his assistant Andy have a meeting with a client to present an idea for advertising a new product. Andy has the materials for the slide presentation in his car and follows Mr. Donne, his supervisor, who has the directions to the meeting. Andy and Mr. Donne lose each other in traffic. Mr. Donne gets to the meeting on time but cannot do the presentation because the visual aids are in his assistant’s car. By the time Andy gets there, the client is furious and they lose the account.

The versions differed only by which character was matched with which status. In the first version, Character 1 (the one with the directions) was high status and Character 2 (the one with the materials) was low status; in the second version, Character 1 (the one with the directions) was low status and Character 2 (the one with materials) was high status. Status was indicated by using the phrases “head advertising executive” for the high-status character and “assistant” for the low-status character. In addition, the high-status character was referred to by the title “Mr.,” whereas the low-status character was referred to by first name only.

After reading one of these vignettes, participants were asked to make agency appraisals by rating how much each of the characters held the other character responsible, held himself responsible, or held no one responsible. Then they rated how angry, sad, and guilty each character felt. Each of these ratings was made on an 11-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely. Participants also responded to action tendency questions (Frijda et al., 1989). We asked participants to choose between the phrases that Frijda et al. (1989) found to be most related to the emotions of interest we are studying: anger, sadness, and guilt. In a forced-choice format, participants were asked to mark whether “boiling inwardly” (the anger action tendency), “feeling helpless” (the sadness action tendency), or “wishing he could disappear from view” (the guilt action tendency) best described each character’s reaction.

A mixed-design MANOVA was used to examine the patterns of the appraisal ratings of high- and low-status characters. Participant gender and vignette version were used as between-participant variables and the appraisal measures were entered as within-participant variables. This analysis indicated that neither the vignette version nor the gender of the participants had a main effect (Fs < 1) or any interaction effects (all Fs < 1.5); therefore, the data were collapsed over these variables. Because the data from Versions 1 and 2 of the vignette were collapsed, in all of the following analyses, the high-status character represents both Mr. Donne from Version 1 and Mr. Ames from Version 2. Similarly, the data about the low-status character represents Andy from Version 1 and Don from Version 2. There were systematic differences of the versions of the vignette followed by the appraisal, emotion, and action tendency questions. The versions were handed out in random order. Participants were asked not to speak to anyone while doing the study. When they were done, they handed the questionnaire back to the experimenter and received some candy.

Results

EMOTIONS

Participants also rated the extent to which they thought each character felt guilt, sadness, and anger.
Again, a mixed-design MANOVA was run. This time, the six emotion ratings were the repeated measure variables and version and sex were again used as between-participant variables. There were no main ($F$s < 1) or interaction effects for version or sex ($F$s < 1.5); therefore, these variables were collapsed. The omnibus test indicated that there were differences in the emotion ratings, $F_{(5, 190)} = 12.81$, $p < .001$. The means and standard deviations for each of the emotion ratings as well as the results of the seven planned paired comparisons are presented in Table 2. The paired comparisons indicate unanimous and strong support for the hypotheses. The high-status character was rated as more angry than the low-status character, $t_{(39)} = 7.58$, $p < .001$, whereas the low-status character was rated as more guilty, $t_{(39)} = 2.65$, $p < .05$, and more sad, $t_{(39)} = 3.53$, $p < .01$, than the high-status character.

**ACTION TENDENCIES**

Differences in action tendencies were even more pronounced than differences in emotions. Consistent with the perception of the high-status character as angry, participants overwhelmingly believed that he would experience the action tendency for anger (i.e., boiling inwardly), $\chi^2(2) = 10.85$, $p < .005$.

**STUDY 1B: POSITIVE EMOTION ASSOCIATES OF SOCIAL STATUS**

**Method**

**PARTICIPANTS**

The study consisted of 22 men and 18 women who voluntarily participated. The mean age of this group of participants was 24. They were recruited by a female experimenter and were given candy for their participation.

**MATERIALS**

The positive vignettes followed a similar format as the negative vignettes of Study 1a. Status was demarcated in the same way, and again, there were two versions. The first version read as follows:

An airline company announced that it was taking bids from advertising agencies for a new advertising campaign. However, the word in the industry was that the airline planned to continue working with the same firm they had been using for 30 years.

When the airline met with the agency they had been working with, they were offended because the advertising firm assumed they would get the account. The airline company executives thought that the advertising...
representatives acted too familiarly and included details that are not usually worked out until a bid has been accepted.

Mr. Donne, an advertising executive, and Andy, his assistant, work for Signal Advertising and were given the assignment to design a campaign and present the ideas to the airline. Mr. Donne and Andy knew that winning the account would be very difficult so they worked hard to come up with a plan. They did not know that the airline was displeased with their previous advertisers when they met with the airline executives, so they were both nervous. Mr. Donne was so nervous that he spoke in a rather formal fashion and Andy’s nerves resulted in his forgetting to mention some of the details of their plan. Given the airline’s complaints about their previous advertiser’s presentation, they were pleased that Mr. Donne and Andy did not assume they would win the contract. The airline company felt as though they had been treated with respect by Mr. Donne and Andy; thus, the airline company accepted Mr. Donne and Andy’s bid.

Once again, there was another version to control for explanations having to do with the particular behaviors of the characters. In the second version, the low-status person was the one who spoke too formally and the high-status character forgot details.

As in Experiment 1a, after reading the vignettes, participants were asked to rate the appraisals and emotions of both characters on 11-point scales. They rated how much each character thought that the other character was responsible, how much they thought he himself was responsible, and how much they thought no one was responsible. The characters were also rated for how much pride and appreciation they felt. Because no one–agency appraisals are not clearly associated with a particular positive emotion, we did not include a no one–agency positive emotion. Also, there were no action tendency questions in this study because the action tendencies of positive emotions are not well differentiated (Frijda et al., 1989).

PROCEDURE

As in Study 1a, a female experimenter approached people sitting in a business school lounge and offered candy in exchange for participating in a short study. Those who agreed were given one of the versions of the questionnaire. When they finished, they handed it to the experimenter who then gave them candy.

Results

APPRAISALS

A mixed-design MANOVA was run to examine differences in appraisal ratings. The appraisal ratings were entered as within-participant repeated measures, and participant sex and vignette version were between-participant variables. Neither sex nor vignette version had a main effect ($F < 1$) or any interaction effects ($F < 1.5$). However, there were differences in how the participants answered the appraisal questions, $F(5, 160) = 40.82$, $p < .001$. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for each appraisal question as well as the results for the planned paired comparisons. The results show mixed support for the hypotheses. As in Study 1a, the general pattern exists: The low-status character was viewed as making more other appraisals than was the high-status character, $t(39) = 1.97$, $p < .05$, and the high-status character was viewed as making more self-appraisals than was the low-status character, $t(39) = 3.63$, $p < .01$. However, ratings for no one–agency appraisals for both characters were again significantly less than the other types of agency appraisals.

EMOTIONS

A mixed-design MANOVA was run to examine differences in the emotion attributed to the characters. Sex and vignette version were between-participant variables, whereas emotion ratings were within-participant variables. There were no main effects ($F < 1$) or interaction effects ($F < 1.5$) for sex or version so the data were collapsed over these variables. There were differences in the ratings of pride and appreciation, $F(3, 117) = 4.46$, $p < .01$, and as Table 4 indicates, these differences were highly supportive of our hypotheses. The low-status character was rated as feeling more appreciative than the high-status character, $t(39) = 2.44$, $p < .05$, whereas the high-status character was rated as feeling more proud than the low-status character, $t(39) = 2.82$, $p < .01$. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Status</th>
<th>Low Status</th>
<th>$t$ (for rows)</th>
<th>$p$ (for rows)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.67 (2.11)$_a$</td>
<td>6.25 (2.31)$_a$</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>6.88 (2.38)$_b$</td>
<td>5.94 (2.25)$_b$</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>2.50 (1.98)$_c$</td>
<td>2.58 (1.87)$_b$</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$ (for columns)</td>
<td>4.03 (other vs. Self)</td>
<td>6.84 (other vs. no one)</td>
<td>1.17 (other vs. Self)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$ (for columns)</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>ns (other vs. Self)</td>
<td>.001 (other vs. no one)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ at $p < .05; df = 39$. 

As in Study 1a, a female experimenter approached people sitting in a business school lounge and offered candy in exchange for participating in a short study. As in Study 1a, a female experimenter approached people sitting in a business school lounge and offered candy in exchange for participating in a short study.
Discussion

In these studies, our hypotheses about differences in emotion stereotypes corresponding to status positions were strongly supported. Our results suggest that there are stereotypes about which emotions go with different status roles. People expect those in low-status positions to feel more sadness, guilt, and appreciation and high-status group members to feel more anger and pride. These results are strong across measures but are particularly strong for action tendencies. This may be because the action tendencies are the measures closest to the visible manifestations of emotion. Similarly, in Study 1, the hypotheses were least well supported by the appraisal measures. Appraisals are the least visible aspect of the emotion process and not part of lay people’s conscious, commonsense view of emotions. Thus, expectations about them may be the least clearly formulated. This relative weakness of the appraisal measures is problematic, however, because it raises questions about whether the process underlying these stereotypes was correctly identified. That is, we claimed that differences in emotion expectations are due to differences in agency appraisals and agency appraisal expectations. Yet, although emotion expectation differences were found, there was little evidence for a mediational role of agency appraisal expectations.

The results of these studies illuminate directions for further study. First, a replication of the basic emotion patterns seems necessary. That was one of the purposes of Study 2. The other purpose was to find out whether the associations between social status positions and emotions lead people to infer status on the basis of emotions. If status suggests probable emotions, then emotions may signal probable status. Knowing that someone feels guilty or appreciative may lead people to infer that the person is low status. Similarly, learning of someone’s anger or pride may suggest that the person must be high status. In this way, emotions may convey social information and may have social consequences. High status may be attributed to an angry or proud person. And, once a person is perceived and treated as high status, high status has basically been achieved. Similarly, expressing sadness or appreciation could result in a loss of status.

In Study 2, we looked at whether information about emotion leads to inferences about status. Participants were presented either with a vignette in which one character was described as angry and the other was described as sad and guilty or a vignette in which one character was proud and the other was appreciative. Then they were asked to indicate which character was the executive and which character was the assistant.

Method

Participants

The study consisted of 71 people who served as voluntary participants. Their mean age was 39 (range = 18 to 74 years). The participants were recruited from a major metropolitan airport by a female experimenter and were given candy in exchange for their participation. The experimenter approached people waiting in airport gates; they had diverse career backgrounds. The sample included managers, computer programmers, realtors, restaurant workers, housewives, students, and others.
MATERIALS

Of the participants, 37 (18 women and 19 men) read a negative outcome vignette based on the vignette from Study 1a and 34 (20 women and 14 men) read a positive outcome vignette based on the vignette from Study 1b. In both the positive and negative conditions, there were two versions of the vignette. The first version of the negative outcome vignette read as follows:

X and Y work at Signal Advertising Agency. They have a meeting with a client to present an idea for advertising a new product. X has the materials for the slide presentation in his car and follows Y, who has the directions, to the meeting. X and Y lose each other in traffic. Y gets to the meeting on time but cannot do the presentation because the visual aids are in X’s car. By the time X gets there, the client is furious and they lose the account. X feels angry and Y feels sad and a little guilty.

The second negative version was the same except for the reactions of the characters. The second version ended with, “Y feels angry and X feels sad and a little guilty.”

The first version of the positive outcome vignette read as follows:

An airline company announced that it was taking bids from advertising agencies for a new advertising campaign. However, the word in the industry was that the airline planned to continue working with the same firm they had been using for 30 years.

When the airline met with the agency they had been working with, they were offended because the advertising firm assumed they would get the account. The airline company executives thought that the advertising representaives acted too familiarly and included details that are not usually worked out until a bid has been accepted.

X and Y work for Signal Advertising and were given the assignment to design a campaign and present the ideas to the airline company. X and Y knew that winning the account would be very difficult and so they worked hard to come up with a plan. They did not know that the airline was displeased with their previous advertisers when they met with the airline executives, so they were both nervous. X was so nervous that he spoke in a rather formal fashion and Y’s nerves resulted in his forgetting to mention some of the details of their plan. Given the airline’s complaints about their previous advertiser’s presentation, they were pleased that X and Y did not assume they would win the contract. The airline company felt as though they had been treated with respect; thus, the airline accepted Signal’s bid.

When X and Y found out the good news, X felt appreciative and Y felt proud that the airline had signed with Signal.

Again, there was a second version that was identical except that Y was appreciative and X was proud.

The two versions were used so that we could be sure that any patterns we found would be due to the emotional reactions of the characters rather than to the different behaviors of the characters. After reading one of the vignettes, participants were asked the following two questions: “Who is the executive?” and “Who is the assistant?” “X” and “Y” were listed after each question, and participants were directed to circle one.

PROCEDURE

The experimenter approached people waiting in the gates of the airport and asked whether they would be willing to participate in a study. She explained that to participate they would have to read a short vignette and answer two questions about what they had read. She said that it required approximately 5 minutes and that she would give them candy in exchange for participation. People who agreed to participate filled out the questionnaire and then were given their choice of candy bars.

RESULTS

NEGATIVE OUTCOME VIGNETTE

Participants who read a negative outcome vignette overwhelmingly believed that the character who was described as angry was the executive and that the character described as sad and guilty was the assistant. Of the 37 participants who read a negative outcome vignette, 32 believed that the angry character was high status and the sad/guilty character was low status, $\chi^2(1) = 19.70, p < .001$. This pattern occurred in both versions (Version 1: 15/18 participants, $\chi^2[1] = 8.00, p < .01$; Version 2: 17/19 participants, $\chi^2[1] = 11.84, p < .01$). Furthermore, both men and women rated the characters in this fashion (women: 16/18, $\chi^2[1] = 10.89, p < .01$; men: 16/19, $\chi^2[1] = 8.89, p < .01$).

POSITIVE OUTCOME VIGNETTE

The results for the positive outcome vignettes also were strongly supportive of our predictions. The proud character was viewed as high status and the appreciative character was seen as low status by 26 of the 34 participants who read a positive outcome vignette, $\chi^2(1) = 9.53, p < .01$. This pattern existed in both versions (Version 1: 13/17, $\chi^2[1] = 4.76, p < .05$; Version 2: 13/17, $\chi^2[1] = 4.76, p < .05$) and for both males (11/14, $\chi^2[1] = 4.57, p < .05$) and females (15/20, $\chi^2[1] = 5.00, p < .05$).

DISCUSSION

Both Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that status levels are associated with different emotions. High status is associated with anger and pride, whereas low status is associated with sadness, guilt, and appreciation. Emotions are inferred from status and status is inferred from emotions. Together, these experiments provide strong
evidence for the predicted relationships between status and expected emotions; however, neither provides much insight into the mechanisms that underlie or create these patterns. We argued that these patterns result from differences in the perceptions of the abilities and skills of low- and high-status group members. The goal of Study 3, therefore, was to test the idea that evaluative differences can create these patterns.

STUDY 3

High- and low-status people are perceived differently on a number of dimensions, including competence, intelligence, kindness, and attractiveness (Lambert et al., 1960). Although high-status people are rated higher on all these dimensions, the differences are greatest for traits such as competence and intelligence, which imply heightened ability (Humphrey, 1985). Thus, whereas high-status people are considered generally superior to low-status people, they are particularly thought to be more able than low-status people. A recent meta-analysis of this phenomenon concluded that this effect was empirically well established, robust, and generalizable to a number of social contexts (Georgeson & Harris, 1998).

If status implies ability and if the emotion patterns we have found are caused by this inference, then any information that implies the superior ability of one person over another should produce the same results as Studies 1a and 1b, even in the absence of status information. We tested this hypothesis in Study 3 by modifying the original negative outcome vignette (Study 1a). We took out the status difference by removing job titles and the use of “Mr.” and by describing both characters as managers of equal status who had worked at the company for the same amount of time. We manipulated inferences about ability by describing one character as having the technical skills necessary to work with the client than the other character (the one with the visual materials). This vignette read as follows:

Don and Andy are coworkers at Signal Advertising Agency. They have been working at Signal for roughly the same amount of time and are at the same level. Today, they have a meeting with a client to present an idea for advertising a new product. Don has the technical knowledge that is particularly important for working with this client. Although Andy has worked on as many and as big accounts as has Don, he does not have the technical skills relevant to this particular account.

When they go to the meeting, Andy has the materials for the slide presentation in his car and he follows Don, who has the directions, to the meeting. Andy and Don lose each other in traffic. Don arrives at the meeting on time but he cannot do the presentation because the visual aids are in Andy’s car. By the time Andy arrives, the client is furious and they lose the account.

Because Experiments 1a and 2a indicated that the behaviors of the characters did not affect any of the dependent variables, we did not include a condition in which the character with the visual materials had more skills than the one with directions. However, a control version was included. This version was the same except the two sentences about skills were left out. In both the skill differential questionnaire and the equal status/equal skill questionnaire, agency appraisals, negative emotions, and action tendencies were assessed for both characters using the same wordings as in Study 1a.

PROCEDURE

The procedure used in previous experiments was also used in this experiment.
TABLE 5: Study 3: Mean Appraisal Ratings for Skill Differentiated (Experimental) and Equal Status/Skill (Control) Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>High Skill Don</th>
<th>Low Skill Andy</th>
<th>Equal Don</th>
<th>Equal Andy</th>
<th>p &lt; (for comparisons between high skill Don and low skill Andy)</th>
<th>p &lt; (for comparisons between equal Andy and equal Don)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.41 (2.50)</td>
<td>6.23 (2.14)</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>ns</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>5.41 (2.15)</td>
<td>7.00 (2.41)</td>
<td>5.85 (2.72)</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>3.77 (2.49)</td>
<td>4.73 (2.57)</td>
<td>5.95 (3.65)</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t (for column comparisons)</td>
<td>2.15 (other vs. Self)</td>
<td>.92 (other vs. Self)</td>
<td>.83 (other vs. Self)</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.92 (other vs. Self)</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.05 (other vs. no one)</td>
<td>.05 (other vs. no one)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ. Number superscripts represent comparison tests between the experimental Don with the control Don and the experimental Andy and control Andy. Means with uncommon numbers differ significantly.

Results

APPRASALS

A mixed-design MANOVA was run to examine differences in the appraisal ratings. The appraisals were within-participant measures, and sex and vignette version (i.e., skill differentiated or equal) were between-participant variables. There was no main effect for sex, F(1, 38) = .01, ns, and there were not any interactions involving sex (Fs < 1.5). There was also no main effect for vignette version, F(1, 38) = 1.96, p = .17. The interaction between vignette version and appraisal ratings was marginally significant, F(5, 190) = 1.98, p = .08. The mean appraisal ratings for both characters in both conditions are presented in Table 5.

In the skill differential condition, the means were in the predicted pattern; however, the significance levels of some of the planned contrasts indicated that these differences could be due to chance. Participants believed that Don, the highly skilled character, would blame Andy (M = 7.41, SD = 2.50), the character without skill, more than Andy would blame Don, but this difference did not reach significance (M = 6.23, SD = 2.14), t(21) = 1.57, p < .15. Andy was also rated as significantly more self-blaming (M = 7.00, SD = 2.41) than Don (M = 5.41, SD = 2.15), t(21) = 2.28, p < .05, and more likely to make more situational appraisals (Andy: M = 4.73, SD = 2.57; Don: M = 3.77, SD = 2.49), t(21) = 2.00, p < .05.

The within-character comparisons also provided mixed support. The highly skilled Don blamed his partner more than he blamed himself, t(21) = 2.15, p < .05, or no one, t(21) = 5.14, p < .001. However, the self- and other appraisals attributed to Andy did not differ, and the no one–agency appraisal ratings for Andy were less than both other and self-appraisals for Andy.

In the condition in which the characters were not distinguished by skill or status there were, as predicted, no differences between the ratings of the two characters. The only reliable within-character comparison was the rating of Andy’s blaming (M = 7.40, SD = 2.72) to the rating of Andy’s blaming no one (M = 5.10, SD = 3.13), t(19) = 2.25, p < .05. Although this difference was not found for the equal Don, it is consistent with the results for almost all of the characters of very low no one–agency ratings in this study and in Study 1.

There were no reliable differences in perceptions of the highly skilled Don of the experimental condition and the equally skilled Don of the control condition or between the low-skilled Andy of the experimental condition and the equally skilled Andy of the control condition.

EMOTIONS

A mixed-design MANOVA with sex and vignette version as between-participant variables and the emotion ratings as within-participant variables indicated that neither sex nor version had a main effect on emotion ratings (Fs < 2, p > .15). There also were no interaction effects involving sex (Fs < 1.5). As expected, there was a main effect for emotion ratings, F(5, 190) = 4.62, p < .01, and an interaction between vignette version and emotion ratings, F(5, 190) = 4.41, p < .01. The mean emotion ratings for each character in each vignette are presented in Table 6. They provide strong support for the hypotheses.

In the skill-differentiated version, the highly skilled Don was seen as angrier (M = 9.23, SD = 2.18) than the low-skilled Andy (M = 6.00, SD = 2.60), t(21) = 4.88, p < .001, whereas Andy was seen as more sad (M = 8.00, SD = 2.94) than Don (M = 6.00, SD = 3.37), t(21) = 2.27, p < .05, and more guilty (M = 7.86, SD = 2.36) than Don (M = 6.80, SD = 2.72).
TABLE 6: Study 3: Mean Emotion Ratings for Skill Differentiated (Experimental) and Equal Status/Skill (Control) Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Skill Differentiated (Experimental) Condition</th>
<th></th>
<th>Equal Status/Skill (Control) Condition</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Skill Don</td>
<td>Low Skill Andy</td>
<td>p &lt; (for comparisons between high skill Don and low skill Andy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>9.23 (2.18) ( ^1 )</td>
<td>6.00 (2.60) ( ^1 )</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>5.68 (3.01) ( ^1 )</td>
<td>7.86 (2.36) ( ^1 )</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>6.00 (3.37) ( ^b )</td>
<td>8.00 (2.94) ( ^b )</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( t ) for column</td>
<td>3.86 (anger vs. Guilt)</td>
<td>2.15 (anger vs. Guilt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( df )</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p &lt; ) (for column)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Ratings were made on 11 point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Column means with uncommon letter subscripts differ. Number superscripts represent comparison tests between the experimental Don with the control Don and the experimental Andy and control Andy. Means with uncommon numbers differ reliably (\( p < .05 \)).

5.68, \( SD = 3.01 \), \( t(21) = 2.80, p < .05 \). The within-character comparisons between guilt and sadness were not reliable for either character, and both guilt and sadness differed from anger ratings for both characters.

There were no differences between the ratings of the two characters in the condition in which the characters had equal status and skills. Within-character comparisons indicated tendencies toward rating both characters higher in anger than in sadness (Don: \( t(19) = 2.52, p < .05 \); Andy: \( t(19) = 2.09, p < .10 \)).

Comparisons between the skilled Don and the equal Don did not reveal any reliable differences; however, there were differences between the unskilled Andy and the equal Andy. When Andy was described as a partner equal in status and skills, he was considered more angry \( (M = 8.20, SD = 2.17) \) than when he was a low-skill partner \( (M = 6.00, SD = 2.60) \), \( t(40) = 2.96, p < .01 \). The equal status/skill Andy was also considered less guilty than the low-skill Andy (control: \( M = 5.85, SD = 3.01 \); experimental: \( M = 7.86, SD = 2.35 \), \( t(40) = 2.42, p < .05 \). The sadness ratings were not significantly different.

ACTION TENDENCIES

The action tendency ratings for the two characters in the skill differential condition were as predicted. Fifteen participants indicated that Don (the high-skilled character) would feel as though he was “boiling inwardly” (the anger action tendency), whereas 6 chose the sad option “feeling helpless” and 1 chose “wishing to disappear from view” (the guilt action tendency). This tendency to assign Don to boiling inwardly rather than the other two options was reliable, \( \chi^2(2) = 13.73, p < .01 \). Participants chose different action tendencies to describe Andy. Ten of them chose wishing to disappear from view, 10 of chose feeling helpless, and 2 chose boiling inwardly, \( \chi^2(2) = 5.82, p < .10 \).

In the equal-status, nondifferentiated, skill condition, Don and Andy were assigned the exact same patterns of action tendencies. In both cases, 10 participants thought the characters would be boiling inwardly, 9 thought the characters would be feeling helpless, and 1 thought they would be wishing to disappear from view, \( \chi^2(2) = 7.30, p < .05 \).

Discussion

The results from Study 3 show that explicit manipulations of perceptions of skill produced the same basic patterns as manipulations of status levels in Study 1a. Highly skilled characters were seen in the same way as high-status characters; they were expected to feel angry and boil inwardly. Low-skill characters were perceived similar to low-status characters; they were expected to feel sad, guilty, and helpless and to wish they could disappear from view. That skill differences created the same patterns as status differences lends support to the hypothesis that people’s inferences about the skills of high- and low-status group members are involved in their status-emotion stereotypes.

The existence of the same appraisal pattern across studies supports the appraisal approach to this problem, but again, the appraisal data were substantially weaker than the data for emotions and action tendencies. Not only were some of the differences we expected nonsignificant but the ratings of the no one-agency appraisals were consistently far lower than the other appraisals for all characters. This pattern may be due to people’s desire to establish some cause for important events (Heider, 1944; Kelley, 1967; Weiner, 1986), but whatever its root,
these extremely low ratings may have overshadowed the more subtle differences between the self- and other agency ratings. The appraisal ratings may also have been less confirmatory than the other variables because emotions and action tendencies are more visible than attributions. It may be that the stereotypes we have uncovered are based on people’s observations of the expressions and behaviors of people in low- and high-status roles. These feelings and expressions might be rooted in appraisals but perhaps the stereotypes of them do not rely on such a complex process.

Study 3 also provided insight into the effects of status on perceived emotion by including a baseline condition. In this condition, in which participants were not provided with information on skill level, participants rated both characters’ emotions and action tendencies ambiguously but most similarly to the way they rated high-status and high-skill characters. This result suggests that high status is construed as the norm and that our most significant stereotypes may be reserved for low-status people. Perhaps the general findings and theories about attributions and emotions really best describe people who are, or think of themselves as, high status.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In these studies, we found, as expected, that high-status people were perceived as getting angry when things go wrong and low-status people were perceived as feeling sadness and guilt. When things turn out well, high-status group members are expected to feel pride and low-status people are expected to feel appreciation. We argued that these effects occur because people’s assumptions about the skills and abilities associated with status lead them to expect low-status people to be more responsible for negative outcomes than are high-status people, although high-status people are expected to be more responsible for positive events than are low-status people.

These results add depth to the study of stereotypes, the study of emotions, and the study of social hierarchy. Most research describes stereotypes as dispositional traits associated with certain groups. By identifying stereotypes about emotions, we have raised the possibility that people also hold stereotypes about complex internal psychological processes. That is, we may not only make inferences about dispositions and behavior from knowledge of social categories but we may also believe that we know how people think and feel.

That the stereotypes we studied were about emotions serves as a reminder of the social importance of emotions. Emotion researchers, after decades of attention to the internal processes involved in emotions, have begun to consider questions about the social causes and consequences of emotions (Fridlund, 1994; Kappas, 1996; Keltner et al., 1998; Parkinson, 1995), but our knowledge is still sparse. In this research, we have demonstrated that the perceived characteristics of social roles can tell us something about social expectations about emotions.

Social expectations about emotions are interesting, in part, because they may help us understand the social functions of emotions. One function implied in this research is that status-linked emotions may help to stabilize social hierarchies. Although disruptions in hierarchies occur, in general, hierarchies are marked by stability (Brown, 1985; Mazur, 1973). Emotions may maintain hierarchies in a variety of ways, three of which are suggested by these studies. First, emotional responses appear to have a circular relationship with hierarchical position. Experiment 1 indicated that high status implies anger and pride, and Experiment 2 indicated that anger and pride imply high status. The emotions permitted by status position may, in turn, imply social position, resulting in responses that reify and justify the status quo.

Second, the particular emotions associated with high and low status may have a maintenance function. Expectations of anger and pride from high-status people may lead to expectations of aggressive and coercive behavior and inhibit low-status people from challenging or questioning their superiors. Expectations of guilt, sadness, and appreciation from low-status people may reduce the likelihood that high-power people will feel obligated to explain or justify themselves and make abuse of power less costly.

Third, the existence of these expectations might create the occurrence of actual emotional responses in line with the expectations. These actual emotional responses would then, of course, reinforce the expectations. Thus, emotional expectations could create a self-fulfilling prophecy that ultimately places limitations on the social mobility of low-status group members.

Emotion stereotypes based on social status may also help explain situations in which hierarchical positions are questioned and challenged. When people violate emotion expectations, they might change perceptions about what level is most appropriate for them and/or make disruptive behaviors more likely. For example, a low-status person expressing pride, rather than appreciation, might communicate that she or he is highly competent and ought to be high status. Through such expressions, she or he might accrue status and power. Similarly, a high-status group member who expresses guilt and sadness, rather than anger, might appear particularly weak and may be willing to hand over power and status to others who may also interpret the guilt and sadness as an opportunity to attain more status for themselves.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS

To fully understand the implications of emotion stereotypes of social status positions, it is necessary to study actual emotional reactions in social hierarchies. We have begun such an investigation (Tiedens et al., 1998) and our results suggest that the emotion stereotypes described in the present research are accurate. The expectations do indeed seem to reflect people’s experience. Still, it is necessary to study the interplay between actual emotions in hierarchies and stereotypes about emotions in hierarchies. We not only need to know whether these stereotypes are accurate but also whether they affect people’s own emotional responses and their responses to the emotional displays of others.

We also plan to extend this investigation to hierarchies outside of work settings and to explore other appraisals and emotions that may be affected by social status. Although there is much that is common across hierarchies, they do differ, and our focus on business settings probably has not allowed us to uncover all the dynamics of status-emotion stereotypes. For example, business settings tend to be male oriented, and the characters in the vignettes were male. Although we did not find any evidence of differences based on the respondents’ gender, we might have if there were female targets or if other forms of social hierarchies were examined. By simplifying our studies and excluding female targets, we may have missed an important and interesting element of stereotypes about status and emotions (cf. Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). On the other hand, the similarity of the ratings of men and women may not be artifactual. Some researchers have suggested that gender differences are primarily due to differences in the social status and social roles of women and men (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). It may be that because our studies varied role status explicitly, gender was less important, as Eagly’s (1987) social role theory would predict. Certainly, understanding the relationships between gender, emotion, and status is important given the similarity between the stereotypes uncovered here and those held about the different emotions of men and women, but it may be that people’s stereotypes about the emotions of men and women are due to their stereotypes about low- and high-status people more generally.

Although the focus here was on agency appraisals, it is unlikely that this is the only dimension of appraisal relevant to social hierarchy and emotion. For example, certainty is another dimension of appraisal that has been shown to be important in discriminating among emotions (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and along which there may well be systematic variation between high- and low-status group members. High-status people likely experience more certainty due to their higher degrees of control, whereas low-status people likely experience more uncertainty due to their dependence on high-status people (Fiske & Depret, 1996). Differences along this dimension of appraisal would imply differences in the frequency and intensity of emotions such as fear and anxiety.

In addition, appraisal need not be the only avenue to differences in emotions between people of different status levels. Rather, there may also be differences in expression and physiological functioning. Indeed, the mixed support provided by the appraisal data suggests that further examination of these other processes could be useful in fully understanding why these emotion-status patterns exist.

Nonetheless, we believe that the data presented here indicate that our knowledge about the internal processes involved in emotions can be used to understand how emotions are related to social contexts. People have expectations about emotions based on social roles, and people make inferences about social roles based on emotions. By demonstrating these processes, these studies represent an important first step to understanding the complex relationship between emotions and the social world.

NOTES

1. By using these manipulations, we do not intend to imply that status can always be reduced to simply a title. Indeed, status is complex both in its causes and in its appearance. The complexity inherent in the definition of status and thus in its empirical realization is probably one reason that so little research on this topic has been completed. Using a simple manipulation, we believe, is one way to allow for the empirical investigation of such a tricky concept, but clearly, manipulations using other indicators of status would enhance the study of social hierarchy.

2. However, the action tendency questions were not in the same format as the other questions. They were forced choice rather than rating. The action tendency question may have revealed greater differences due to this format. At the same time, forced choice can obscure differences rather than enhance them.

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