Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States

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The assertion of that principle at that time, was the word, “fitly spoken” which has proved an “apple of gold” to us. The Union and the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple — not the apple for the picture.
— Abraham Lincoln

In his earlier work, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspiration, Professor Gary Jacobsohn compared a number of modern theories of constitutional interpretation with natural law premises such as Lincoln’s theory that the Constitution cannot be interpreted without considering the goals of the Declaration of Independence. He asserted that modern scholars’ failure to “relat[e] the exercise of judicial power to the broader purposes and aspirations of the [American] polity” was a weakness undermining the validity of their theories. Lincoln’s theory, he argued, was more honest and more in tune with Professor Jacobsohn’s own theories. Jacobsohn concluded his work by encouraging judges to “ask themselves how it is possible for them, as judges, to interpret — understand and apply — our fundamental law if they reject, or simply are ignorant of, its presuppositions.” In Apple of Gold, an analysis of constitutionalism in Israel, he follows the attempts of the Israeli Supreme Court to develop its own constitutional interpretive theory and suggests that the
attempt, at least, comports with Lincoln’s, and Jacobsohn’s, natural law ideals.

*Apple of Gold* compares Israeli and American constitutionalism and evaluates efforts to transplant American principles to Israel. Professor Jacobsohn uses the Declarations of each nation to provide the framework for analyzing the similarities and differences between the two polities. The American Declaration of Independence embodies the “ethos of individualism” (pp. 4-5). In contrast, the 1948 Israeli Declaration of Independence affirms the existence of the Jewish people as a nation (p. 7). This contrast between individualism and national identity provides the framework for Jacobsohn’s reflections.

In the first two chapters, Professor Jacobsohn lays the foundations for his comparisons. In “Two Declarations” (pp. 3-9) and “Two Constitutions” (pp. 9-17), he describes the fundamental distinctions between the two political systems. The American Declaration provides for natural justice principles that “are effectively the basis of nationhood” (p. 9). Those principles, he asserts, officially achieve authority in the Constitution, thereby giving both documents a singular purpose (p. 9). The Israeli Declaration embodies a similar commitment to individual rights principles, but they are not the sole vision of that document. Instead, they share space with the vision of the Jewish people as a nation. The competition between its two visions is why, Jacobsohn asserts, Israel has not achieved a written constitution (p. 9). Consequently, constitutional development has taken place in the courts and, on a parallel track, in the Knesset. In “Alternative Pluralisms” (ch. 2), Jacobsohn argues that, although both states contain subgroups of diverse origins, the difference in national vision leads to divergent constitutional processes (pp. 18-54). The American process leads to assimilation, and the Israeli process begets stratification. Professor Jacobsohn poses “the one great American counterexample, Native Americans” as a comparison (p. 52). He describes the development of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 as a noble effort, but one doomed to unsatisfactory results because it was “grounded on premises that ignored the essential fact that Native Americans were a minority who did not fit the prevailing model of constitutional and political pluralism” (p. 19). Protecting group autonomy, a “constitutional anomaly” in America, is the norm in Israel (p. 23). Not only

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9. The second section of the Declaration includes the following:

The State of Israel will . . . be based on the precepts of liberty, justice and peace taught by the Hebrew prophets; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of race, creed or sex; will guarantee full freedom of conscience, worship, education and culture . . . .

P. 7.

10. The Knesset is the Israeli legislative body.

does Israel recognize group identities, its government supports their continuing vitality. Accordingly, Israel has a strong sense of community (pp. 35-44) and departs from traditional American-style republicanism (pp. 44-52).

These themes provide the undercurrent for the next four chapters, in which Professor Jacobsohn describes the development of constitutionalism in Israel. In early efforts, the Israeli Supreme Court attempted to define who is a Jew. Jacobsohn infers that, in deciding that a Jew who converted to Catholicism is no longer a Jew for the purposes of the Law of Return but the children of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother are, the Court tried to balance the twin bases of Jewishness — religion and individual choice. Although the decisions appear somewhat contradictory, they represented a compromise which chose an objective, secular definition of nationality (pp. 64-66). While the American perspective would demand this effort (p. 71), the Israeli vision rejected it and refused to diminish the religious element of Jewish nationality. Jacobsohn predicts, however, that since "secular, democratic aspirations" are one of the two competing fundamental visions in Israel, they will continue to surface in the debate.

Chapter Four analyzes both Israel's failure to adopt a written constitution and the mechanisms developed in its place (pp. 95-135). Professor Jacobsohn suggests first that America's ability to produce a written constitution was possible because there was consensus on the "set of political principles that would serve as developmental guidelines of the nation" (p. 104). Israel, on the other hand, has multiple visions whose priority has not been settled (pp. 100-06). Thus, Jacobsohn perceives the ongoing constitutional debate as Israel's attempt to solidify its vision.


13. Pp. 70-80 (discussing Shalit v. Minister of Interior, 23(2) P.D. 477 (1970), translated in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 12, at 35). The halakic (orthodox) definition of a Jew is a person "whose mother was Jewish or converted to Judaism." P. 55 n.1. For commentary on Shalit, see Benjamin Akzin, Who Is a Jew? A Hard Case, 5 Isr. L. Rev. 259 (1970).

14. Rufeisen seems to hold that Jewishness is based on religion, yet Shalit finds Jewishness outside of religion. Justice Landau's concurrence in Rufeisen provides some consistency, suggesting that Rufeisen's religious decision "denied his national past." SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 12, at 22 (emphasis added). Shalit's denial of Jewishness' religious basis apparently did not cross the national line.

15. After Shalit, the Knesset amended the Law of Return to require both the Orthodox definition of Jewishness, supra note 13, and nonmembership in any other religion. "In effect, then, the secular position on the separability of religion and nationality was rejected." P. 71.

16. "[U]nlike the American example, religion in Israel is more than an influence on national identity; it is a constituent part of that identity." P. 79.

17. "The challenge of balancing these commitments in a manner that retains respect for the constitutional sanctity of both of them will doubtless ensure the continuing presence of this issue on Israel's political and legal agenda." P. 80.
Additionally, Chapter Four analyzes the development of judicial review in Israel against the background of judicial review in America (pp. 110-35). Professor Jacobsohn depends heavily on an article by Robert A. Burt, who "maintains that the emergence of judicial review in both countries is best understood as an institutional response to the presence of fundamental societal conflict" (p. 113). As examples of fundamental conflicts in American law, Jacobsohn cites the Federalist-Republican clashes preceding *Marbury v. Madison* and the divisiveness of slavery leading to the Missouri Compromise and eventually *Dred Scott*. In Israeli history, he cites the 1967 Six Day War as the conflict preceding the *Elon Moreh* decision and the political party struggles surrounding the *Bergman* case. However, while the U.S. Supreme Court used the written Constitution to establish judicial review and judicial supremacy, Professor Jacobsohn indicates that the absence of a written constitution led the Israeli Supreme Court to develop a position of judicial restraint (pp. 124-32). Although its decisions have been central in many divisive political issues, the Court has intervened cautiously, preferring to leave many fundamental decisions to the legislature. Without the certainty of a written document, Jacobsohn favors the prudence of the Court's chosen path.

This position is consistent with the views Professor Jacobsohn introduced in his earlier work, *The Supreme Court and the Decline of...*  

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19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. "[T]he Court has already become a principal player in the great issues that divide the body politic." P. 132.
26. Professor Jacobsohn argues that Justice Landau and others did not want to "inappropriately enmesh the judiciary in controversies more amenable to political resolution." P. 130. In this philosophy, one sees the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court's "political question" doctrine. *See Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Constitutional Aspiration, in which he theorized that “constitutional aspiration” requires the participation of all branches of government, not just the judiciary.  

28 For a discussion of Professor Jacobsohn’s “constitutional aspiration” theory, see Book Note, Natural Law and the Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 874 (1988). Burgess, supra note 7, at 13–22, discusses the pros and cons of departmentalist theories, including Jacobsohn’s.

29 The Knesset did not merely resist “wrong” Supreme Court decisions; it amended Basic Laws to overrule them. P. 71 (discussing amendment to the Law of Return following Shalit); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. For one Justice’s endorsement of these reactions, see p. 129 n.94.

30 “A Court pursuing the more libertarian aspirations of the nation’s founding agenda can and ought to be checked by a Knesset that is more sensitive to the other parts of that agenda . . . .” P. 135.

31 This is not surprising, since it follows his own ideas. Professor Jacobsohn “[r]egrettably” recognizes that his “is not a widely shared view, mainly because . . . judges and scholars . . . embrace the teaching contained in the aphorism that the Constitution is what the judges say it is.” P. 134. For more objective reasons why such views are not widely shared, see Burgess, supra note 7, at 19–22.

32 P. 152. The absence of a written constitution makes judicial legislation easier because
cational function.\textsuperscript{33} Again, he asserts that the texts for this pedagogical task of the "republican schoolmaster" (p. 162) have been, and should be, borrowed selectivity from America.\textsuperscript{34} The educative role is particularly crucial and risky, he asserts, because the Court is developing and interpreting its constitutional text simultaneously (pp. 168-73). On a parallel track, the Knesset also adds "lessons" regarding the sanctity of Israel as a Jewish state.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, the Court's desire to educate the populace on democratic individual rights theory must not overshadow the other aspiration of Israeli constitutionalism — the preservation of the Jewish state.

No issue demonstrates the differences between the American and Israeli constitutional visions more clearly than that of free speech. Chapter Six delves deeply into free speech cases from both nations to drive home the distinction (pp. 177-227). In particular, Professor Jacobsohn contrasts the American tolerance of the Nazi march through Skokie, Illinois\textsuperscript{36} with the Israeli suppression of Rabbi Meir Kahane.\textsuperscript{37} Whereas the American vision requires tolerance, "Israeli law, in its criminalization of various types of offensive speech, resists a Holmesian toleration of what we hate . . ." (p. 219). Viewed from the perspective of its fundamental vision, each nation's approach "can
readily be assimilated into an argument for individual liberty rightly understood" (p. 227).

Professor Jacobsohn concludes as he began: with Israel's continuing tug-of-war over adopting a written constitution, especially a bill of rights (ch. 7). He infers that American critics who chastise Israel's ambivalence as false constitutionalism have ignored once again the twin goals of Israel's political culture. Consequently, Jacobsohn exhorts Israelis to remain deaf to the critics and continue their quest to forge a "picture of silver" that truly fits their "apple of gold."

In his introduction to Apple of Gold, Professor Jacobsohn proclaims two goals:

What I have sought to do in this book is contrast particular features of the constitutional cultures of Israel and the United States that are relevant to an assessment of constitutional transplantation. While these two polities constitute the specific focus of the analysis, my hope is to contribute more broadly to an improved understanding of the nature of constitutionalism. [p. 12]

Professor Jacobsohn succeeds admirably in his first goal. His examples are thought provoking and reflect the depth of his research and the stellar sources to which he had access. As a historical account of Israel's constitutional struggles, Apple of Gold is both educational and engaging. Regarding his second goal, whether Jacobsohn has succeeded in illuminating the current constitutional discourse depends on whether one finds his theory of constitutional aspiration persuasive. If it is persuasive, the Israeli experience serves as an example of how the exercise of constitutional development is properly shared between the courts, the legislature, and ultimately the people. If it remains unconvincing, one must applaud nonetheless Apple of Gold's energetic efforts to display Professor Jacobsohn's "republican schoolmaster" aspirations.

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38. "The raison d'etre of constitutional government is the preservation of liberty; whatever other goals it may have, a regime that identifies itself as constitutional, but fails to pursue this goal, is simply not what it purports to be." P. 231.

39. "The presence or absence of such a document is not essential to a determination of whether constitutionalist claims are legitimate ... [especially] where a commitment to liberal democratic principles is to be reconciled with the establishment of the state as a homeland for a particular people." Pp. 235-36.

40. In addition to thorough historical and legal research, Jacobsohn interviewed, among others, six former or current Justices of the Israeli Supreme Court.