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Criminal Law

Active v. Passive Euthanasia: Why Keep the Distinction?

Yale Kamisar

In the past two decades, we have witnessed a "sea change in public, medical, and legislative judgments" about "letting die" and the "right to die." But it is no less true today than it was 35 years ago, when I first wrote about this subject, that in Anglo-American jurisprudence active euthanasia (what used to be called "mercy killing") is murder.²

So far as the law on the books is concerned, it matters not that one who intentionally kills another human being "does so at the victim's request" or that "his motive is the worthy one of terminating the victim's sufferings from an incurable and painful disease."³ As one commentator recently explained it, "So great a value is put on life that a person may not waive his right to life; killing does not become nonculpable because the victim consented."⁴

But all this may change in the near future. As one of the nation's most forceful and eloquent opponents of active euthanasia, the University of Chicago's Leon Kass, observed several years ago, "So-called active euthanasia practiced by physicians seems to be an idea whose time has come."⁵

Not a few would say that Kass exaggerated the potency of the assault on the long-standing prohibition against "direct" or "active" euthanasia. After all, although most forecasters predicted in 1991 that Washington state would become the first jurisdiction in the Western world to legalize active euthanasia, Initiative 119 (euphemistically called the "death with dignity" or "aid in dying" referendum) went down to defeat. And last November, although once again early polls indicated overwhelming support for a similar proposal in California (Proposition 161), it, too, failed.

At first blush, these political setbacks for the active euthanasia movement seem fairly decisive. But I think not; they can be explained away or at least minimized. I believe that Kass's concerns are as well founded today as when he first voiced them in 1989.

Jack Kevorkian, the Michigan pathologist who practices as well as preaches assisted suicide, may have significantly affected the outcome in Washington. Less than two weeks before voters went to the polls, Kevorkian used his "suicide" machine twice in one night. From that point on, according to a spokesperson for the Hemlock Society in Seattle, "aid-in-dying" measure fell dramatically.⁶ At the very moment Kevorkian swung into action, a TV blitz against the measure hit the airwaves, and "Jack Kevorkian put a face on [people's] fear."⁷

But proponents of assisted suicide and active euthanasia have distanced themselves from Kevorkian, noting that the women whose deaths he assisted were not his patients and not terminally ill. They point instead to the "aid-in-dying" performed by Timothy Quill, a Rochester, New York, doctor who is also a member of the University of Rochester Medical School faculty. Quill was neither indicted nor disciplined by medical authorities for prescribing enough barbiturates to enable a long-standing patient to commit suicide following her refusal of treatment for a severe type of leukemia.⁸

The response to Quill's action and to the article he wrote in a medical journal spelling out what he had done and why has been "very positive" and has "moved public discussion away from the suicide machine."⁹ Many who were jolted, or at least greatly troubled, by Kevorkian's actions supported Quill.¹⁰

Although last November California voters defeated Proposition 161 by a 54 percent to 46 percent margin, support for the measure was impressive—considering that a coalition of 100 organizations (including the Roman Catholic Church, the California Medical Association, and the California Nurses Association) fought the proposal, nearly every major newspaper in the state editorialized against it, and opponents of the proposition spent more than $1 million on their campaign.¹¹

Moreover, opponents of Proposition 161 did not frontally attack the basic notion embodied in the measure as much as they raised fears that it lacked adequate protections.¹² They pointed out that although the initial directive had to be witnessed by two people not linked financially with the patient, no

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witnesses were mandated at the time of the actual request for and implementation of euthanasia;

- although an "enduring request" by a qualified patient was required, it was simply defined as one "expressed on more than one occasion" (perhaps only a day or several hours apart);

- there was no required "waiting period" after a patient decided to seek help in dying; and

- the proposal did not require a psychiatric evaluation to rule out treatable depression as a basis for the request. 13

Public Acceptance

Most opponents of Proposition 161 hammered away at its inadequate safeguards rather than its basic idea probably because they were well aware that "the marked increase in public acceptance of killing terminally ill patients... has been striking." 14 According to public opinion polls, not only does a large majority of U.S. citizens now support laws allowing terminally ill patients to refuse or stop life-sustaining treatment, 15 but many Americans now favor active euthanasia for incurable and comatose patients. 16

According to a close observer of the Proposition 161 contest, "The ranks of those voting no swelled as the opposition coalition focused its advertising during the final weeks on what worked a year earlier to bring down a similar measure in Washington state by a nearly identical margin (54-46): voters' fears that mistakes would be made." 17 But only six months before Proposition 161 went down to defeat, surveys showed that 75 percent of California voters supported the basic idea of physician aid-in-dying, 54 percent strongly so. 18

Thus, Alexander Morgan Capron, the former executive director of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research, now professor of law and medicine at the University of Southern California, had good reason to issue the following warning:

Proposition 161's defeat should not obscure the remarkable fact that millions of people are so fearful of how they think they'll be treated by the health care system when they're very ill that they'd rather be dead... Average people are... so dismayed at how death occurs in this country and so distrustful of physicians' ability or willingness to give them a "good death" that they will consider overturning thousands of years of medical ethics and societal prohibitions to legalize direct killing by physicians. 19

I noted earlier that Leon Kass observed recently that active euthanasia appears to be "an idea whose time has come." 20 But he was quick to add, "In my view, it is a bad idea whose time must not come—not now, not ever." 21

I agree. I was pleased when Washington's Initiative 119 went down to defeat in 1991 and when California's Proposition 161 met a similar fate last year.

But proponents of these measures are not easily discouraged. They can be expected to try again (perhaps in Oregon or Florida or in Washington a second time) with more finely honed versions of the measures that failed. And I share Professor Capron's concern that unless
health care providers who oppose active euthanasia "change those aspects of the system that make a quick death such an
attractive alternative, support for legalizing
euthanasia is sure to build and eventu­
tally to prevail." 22

In resisting the active euthanasia move­
ment in the years ahead I shall be aligned
with, and rooting for, Capron, Kass,
and such other well-known commen­
tators and spokespersons as Daniel Cal­
lahan, Arthur Caplan, Albert Jonsen,
John Pickering, and Susan Wolf. 23 But
the law and politics of euthanasia make
strange bedfellows. My anti-active-eutha­
anasia conferees are favorably disposed
toward, or at least willing to accept,
what used to be called, and I still call,
passive euthanasia—a practice that has
 gained wide acceptance. But I have al­
ways been greatly troubled by it.

I have reexamined the earlier writings of
my "allies" and read their most re­
cent contributions to the literature. 24
Insofar as they maintain that individual
acts of "direct" or "positive" or "ac­
tive" euthanasia are fundamentally dif fer­
ent from the "passive" or "negative"
variety—that the former is unacceptable
or intrinsically immoral while the latter
is permissible—I find many of their ar­
guments unpersuasive and none of them
convincing.

As Dean Guido Calabresi of Yale Law
School has pointed out, when we have
to make "tragic choices"—choices that
confront us when fundamental beliefs
clash—"we look for solutions which
seek to cover the difficulty and thereby
permit us to assert that we are cleaving
to both beliefs in conflict." 25 A good ex­
ample is how we have dealt with death,
dying, and euthanasia.

Beliefs in Conflict

Two sets of beliefs are in conflict. On
the one hand, we want to respect pa­
tients' wishes, relieve suffering, and put
an end to excessively burdensome and
seemingly futile medical treatment. On
the other hand, we shrink from the
concept of a life not worth living.
We want to affirm the supreme value of life.
We want to maintain the salutary prin­
ciple that the law protects all human life,
no matter how miserable a person ap­
pears or how worthless she happens to
feel.

In short, we want it both ways. The
two sets of beliefs are in conflict, or at
least in great tension, but somehow we
cling to both. 26

We say all human life is inviolate, but
we do not always mean it. We make
"quality of life" judgments, but we
deny it. We practice a kind of euthanasia
in a soft light, subdued by history, but
we would rather not examine this prac­
tice in the bright spotlight of utmost
analytic clarity.

As I see it, the purpose of the distinc­
tion between "direct killing" and "let­
ting die" is not (as some claim) to sepa­
rate deaths caused by human action
from those caused by the processes
of nature. Nor (as others claim) is it to
separate intrinsically immoral practices
from permissible ones. Rather, the pur­
pose of the distinction—or at least its

Many physicians fail to use
means that are now
available virtually all pain.

effect—is to have it both ways.

For a long time we have had it both
ways. In the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s—
as the many failures to indict, acquittals,
and suspended sentences attest—when
"mercy killing" occurred, the law in ac­
tion was "as malleable as the law on the
books [was] uncompromising." 27

In the 1970s the distinction between
"extraordinary" (or "heroic") and "or­
-dinary" medical treatment proved ser­
viceable. 28 Although the terms are so
spongy and were used so loosely that
the distinction is now widely rejected,
in its time this distinction, too, medi­
at ed or obscured the conflict between
our two sets of beliefs.

Calling a life-sustaining medical proce­
dure extraordinary was more an expres­
sion of the conclusion that the proce­
dure could ethically be discontinued
than it was a justification for doing so.
But the terminology reassured the pub­
lie that "only certain kinds of lifesaving
measures could be, and would be, ter­
minal; that disconnecting an uncon­
scious patent's respirator in some vague
way only constitutes a 'slight deviation'
from our official morality." 29

The extraordinary/ordinary distinction
has not fared well in the law of death
and dying. Another distinction, one
also rooted in Roman Catholic trad­
ition, has proved to have much greater
staying power—the distinction between
killing and letting die.

Interestingly, an increasing number of
those who defend the distinction are so
determined to keep a chasm between
the two practices that they insist that
the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures is not passive eu­
thanasia or any other kind of euthana­
sia and that to use the "E" word in this
context only causes confusion. 30
(I would say rather that it causes, and
ought to cause, concern.)

But I think one of the leading propo­
e nts of euthanasia (both active and
passive), the renowned British legal
scholar Glanville Williams, had it right
when, 20 years ago, he said,

A toehold for euthanasia is provided
by the practice of letting die, or what
is now called passive euthanasia. . . .
If this distinction between an act and
an omission is thought to be artificial,
its artificiality is imposed on us by our
refusal to accord the same moral freed­
dom for action as we do for inaction.
Pending a change of thought, the
concept of an omission is a useful
way of freeing us from some of the
consequences of over rigid moral atti­
dudes. 31

I have no doubt that Alex Capron,
Daniel Callahan, Leon Kass, and other
opponents of active euthanasia draw the
line at letting die as a matter of prin­
ciple. They support the "right to die,"
but strongly resist direct killing.

Many others, however, have never
been happy with this distinction. They
were willing to draw the line between
letting die and active euthanasia not as
a matter of principle but only as a mat­
ter of tactics. I count among them the
two leading euthanasia proponents of
our time—Glanville Williams and the
late Joseph Fletcher, the prominent
medical ethicist.

For them, the distinction was a ser­
viceable one because it afforded the
physician and the patient's family much
more room to maneuver than would be
possible if one had to proceed by lethal
injection—and it gave the rest of us, or
most of the rest of us, less cause for
alarm. But these people were always
committed to the realization of active
euthanasia. For them, acceptance of
the "right to die" was only a partial victory
—a stopgap measure. 32

They are no longer content to have
it both ways. They are not, and never
were, satisfied with euthanasia in a soft
light, subdued by history; they also
want it in a bright spotlight.

At a euthanasia conference held nearly
two decades ago, Fletcher maintained
that there is no real difference between letting die and active euthanasia: “A deliberate act of omission, when death is the goal or purpose or end sought, is morally the same [as] a deliberate act of commission.” 33 He argued that doctors ought to engage in both forms of euthanasia.

Fletcher’s views disturbed some who attended the conference. Another speaker warned that since some do not clearly distinguish between active and passive euthanasia and “since active euthanasia is morally repugnant to so many . . . this confusion has led many physicians to avoid the use of the very desirable, accepted passive form.” 34 According to this speaker, the distinction between the two forms of euthanasia had to be maintained “so that physicians will continue and in fact increase their use of this age-old passive form” and “to insure that passive euthanasia not be tainted in any way by the active euthanasia movement.” 35

Fletcher gave this response: “Though the alleged difference between [passive and active euthanasia] is not a real one ethically or philosophically or theologically regarded, it is arguably possible to separate them for pragmatic reasons of prudence and workability.” 36

Since that conference was held, doctors have greatly increased their use of the “age-old passive form” of euthanasia. Negative or passive euthanasia—even removal of the feeding tube—is now a fait accompli in modern medicine. That battle is over. And there is now more support for active euthanasia than there ever has been—and I fear that that support will grow even stronger.

Fletcher is no longer with us, but his allies and his followers are, and they are making their presence felt. They no longer feel the need to separate active euthanasia from the passive variety for pragmatic reasons. Passive euthanasia is now so well established that people of Fletcher’s persuasion are no longer concerned that it will be “tainted” by the active euthanasia movement.

Proponents of active euthanasia are in a strong position, and they know it. As they see it, the time has come to upset the compromise between letting die and direct killing. The time has come to move on to the next stage of euthanasia.

**Compromise Position**

“It is one thing to justify an act; it is another to justify a general practice.” 37 Thus, those who can imagine individual circumstances where active euthanasia would be hard to condemn (and I certainly can) may still oppose legislation authorizing the practice. We may do so, as Rutgers Law School’s Norman Cantor has argued, on the ground that “such a radical alteration” in the legal framework surrounding gravely ill patients “ought not to be instituted unless it is absolutely essential” 38—and no such showing has been made.

The reasons laypeople most often give for supporting active euthanasia are that it is inhumane to make patients suffer from intractable pain or that it is inhumane to keep them biologically alive when they seem to have “no life to live.” But many physicians fail to use means that are now available to relieve virtually all pain. 39 And though advances in medical technology have made it possible, as one commentator has put...
The new law establishes a commission to study the issue of assisted suicide. The commission is to report to the legislature within 15 months after the statute becomes effective, and the ban is to remain in effect until six months after the commission makes its recommendations. During this time the legislature will decide whether to continue the ban or to deal with the problem in some other way.

Assisted suicide is not quite active euthanasia. The final act, the act that brings on death, is performed by the patient himself, not another person (a physician or relative or friend). And there is always the possibility that the patient may change her mind and not carry out the final act. On the other hand, assisted suicide is certainly something more than passive euthanasia. At the least, it strikes me, it is a bridge between active and passive euthanasia.

Notes


2 Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed “Mercy-Killing” Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 970-71 n. 9 (1958) and accompanying text.

3 WAYNE LAVEE & AUSTIN SCOTT, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 320 (2d ed. 1986).

4 Kadish, supra note 1, at 885. But a leading medical ethicist has forcefully argued that “the right not to be killed should be waivable when the person makes a competent decision that continuing life is no longer wanted or a good, but is instead worse than no further life at all.” Dan Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10, 14 (emphasis added).


6 See Rebecca Powers, Some Call Kevorkian Poison to Group’s Goals, DET. NEWS, Feb. 2, 1992, at 4A.

In December 1992, shortly after Kevorkian had assisted in the deaths of two more people, Michigan enacted a law making assisted suicide a felony punishable by up to four years in prison. The law, which takes effect March 30, 1993, prohibits one who has knowledge that a person intends to commit suicide from “intentionally” “provid[ing] the physical means” or “participat[ing] in a physical act” by which that person attempts or commits suicide. (§7(1).) The prohibition does not apply to “withholding or withdrawing medical treatment by a licensed health care professional.” (§7(2).)
Structuring Your Settlement

Sixth in a series

Q. What assets can fund a structured settlement?

A. Historically the favorite asset for funding structured settlements has been an annuity (sometimes called a "settlement annuity") issued by a life insurer. This type of annuity is unlike other annuities in some respects; for example, a plaintiff cannot own one.

Recently U.S. Treasury bonds gained in popularity as funding assets, due mainly to 1988 tax legislation. IRC §130 was amended to permit the plaintiff to have a security interest in the funding asset(s) in an assigned structure.

Settlement annuities still have the dominant market share. Tort lawyers are more familiar with this product, and the payment is often preferable. A structured settlement annuity, with payments ranging from a few to 10 years, is usually a guaranteed income stream.

The flight to quality has also given a big boost to Treasury bonds. With a properly structured security interest against the assignee company—the Treasury bonds being the security—the risk to the plaintiff is, again, driven down into the "hard to measure" category.

Often both types of assets are used in a single deal. In certain climates the yield on a bond structure will about match the yield on a settlement annuity, but more often the settlement annuity will have a better yield. A structure funded by either asset will offer tax-free financial performance which, as to the conservative part of his or her portfolio, only the unusually fortunate plaintiff could match by investing an all-cash settlement.

Next Month: Structured Settlement Tax Tips

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