1989

Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Acquittals

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REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON

DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS

'Truth in Criminal Justice'
Report No. 6

Office of Legal Policy

July 31, 1987
The Executive Summary for REPORT No. 6 appears on the next page. The full Report, including a Table of Contents, follows the Executive Summary.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Report examines the language, history and purpose of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. It concludes that the clause prohibits government appeals in felony cases whenever a reversal would result in a new trial.

As the Report points out, the government’s inability to appeal from acquittals where the appeal would result in a new trial does impede the search for truth in criminal justice. However, this inability to appeal in felony cases is well grounded in the original meaning of the fifth amendment’s guarantee that no person shall be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”

Although historical evidence suggests that the prohibition on government appeals which would result in new trials does not apply where the acquittal was based on a defective indictment, the Report does not recommend challenging a venerable line of cases to the contrary. Similarly, while the evidence is quite strong that the prohibition applies only to felonies, precedent invoking the double jeopardy clause in misdemeanor cases is firmly enough established to counsel against urging the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.

The Report does, however, recommend that the Department consider seeking explicit judicial recognition of the government’s right to appeal errors of law in a bench trial, when findings of fact clearly support a guilty verdict on proper application of the substantive law. Such an appeal right is fully supported by the fifth amendment’s original meaning, and does not appear to be at odds with recent case law. On the negative side, judicial recognition of such an appeal right might encourage a larger proportion of defendants to opt for a trial by jury, rather than a bench trial. Such a development might increase the incidence of wrongful acquittals.

Finally, the Report suggests that a further study be undertaken to explore additional ways of accommodating the government’s need to seek correction of legal error, while still preserving the defendant’s constitutional immunity from retrial. Such a study might examine: (1) whether government appeals of errors of law in jury trial by special verdict could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and (2) the possible use of pretrial appealable orders framing charges to the jury, and resolving evidentiary issues in advance of trial.
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INTRODUCTION

As part of a continuing series of papers on impediments to the search for truth in criminal investigation and adjudication, the Office of Legal Policy has carried out a review of the law governing double jeopardy prohibitions on federal government appeals of criminal acquittals. These prohibitions undermine the search for truth in criminal adjudication by allowing some wrongly acquitted, culpable individuals to go unpunished. The results of our review are set out in this Report.

Under current American law, state and federal prosecutors are not authorized to appeal a judgment of acquittal handed down by the finder of fact, despite any errors favorable to the defendant that may have been committed at trial. A convicted defendant is not, however, similarly restricted; he is authorized to appeal on grounds of error. This disparity of treatment undermines the search for truth in criminal justice. Culpable individuals who have been convicted may nevertheless be set free as a result of technical errors committed at trial. At the same time, culpable individuals who have erroneously been acquitted because of mistakes by the fact finder or errors of law are shielded from government appeals that could have corrected trial court errors. As a result, society's interest in ferreting out the truth and punishing those who have committed crimes is compromised. As Justice Holmes stated in arguing for the constitutionality of federal government appeals of acquittals, "[a]t the present time in this country there is more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected to tyranny." That statement rings even truer today than it did over eighty years ago. Allowing prosecutors to appeal erroneous acquittals would not lead to governmental tyranny; to the contrary, it would further the interests of justice.

Whether appeals of acquittals are constitutionally permissible is, however, an entirely separate question. In order to address

that question in a principled fashion, this Report analyzes the original meaning of the double jeopardy clause.

Part I of this Report examines the original meaning of the double jeopardy clause. After setting forth eighteenth-century definitions of the double jeopardy clause’s key terms and tracing the development of the double jeopardy concept in England and in the American colonies, Part I analyzes the insertion of the double jeopardy clause into the fifth amendment of the Constitution. An analysis of the circumstances surrounding that clause’s enactment in light of the eighteenth century understanding of the double jeopardy principle reveals that the double jeopardy clause in general was aimed at preventing multiple trials or punishments for the same felony. That purpose suggests that government appeals of felony acquittals resulting in new trials, subject to a few possible exceptions, would run afoul of the double jeopardy clause. The evils of multiple trials or punishments would not, however, be implicated by government appeals of felony acquittals not resulting in new trials. Accordingly, while the matter is not free from doubt, we conclude that the double jeopardy clause should not be read to prohibit government appeals of felony acquittals that do not result in new trials. We also conclude that the double jeopardy clause, read in accordance with its original meaning, does not apply to misdemeanor cases.

Part II of the Report surveys federal case law development of the Constitution’s double jeopardy clause, with particular attention paid to the treatment of appeals from verdicts. This survey reveals that the federal courts have consistently adhered to the rule that the double jeopardy clause bars federal government appeals of acquittals, if those appeals would result in new trials. Nevertheless, recent case law indicates that the government retains substantial authority to appeal judicial determinations providing for the release of criminal defendants, as long as those determinations do not constitute “acquittals” by the trier of fact.

Part III of the Report briefly reviews the double jeopardy treatment of government appeals from acquittals in the states and in selected foreign jurisdictions. Early state case law holdings did not authorize government appeals of acquittals. Before 1969 (the year in which the federal double jeopardy clause was made fully applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment) the vast majority of the states barred the government from appealing acquittals. Only two jurisdictions (Connecticut and Wisconsin) explicitly authorized such appeals from
errors of law in all cases. Two additional states (Arkansas and West Virginia) only allowed appeals of acquittals when the infraction charged was a minor misdemeanor not punishable by imprisonment. Four jurisdictions (Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and North Carolina) only allowed appeals of acquittals secured by the defendant's fraud or collusion. England does not authorize the government to appeal acquittals. Several commonwealth nations, however (Canada, New Zealand, India, Ceylon, South Africa, and the Australian State of Tasmania) allow questions of law to be appealed following an acquittal. The government generally may appeal acquittals in civil law nations.

Part IV briefly explores the policy ramifications of the double jeopardy clause's application to appeals of acquittals. First, we quickly survey policy arguments advanced in favor of allowing the government to appeal acquittals. We conclude that while those policy arguments are strong, they must give way to the results of our original meaning analysis, which suggests that subject to a few exceptions, only appeals not requiring new trials in felony cases are constitutionally permissible. Next, we suggest a possible approach, rooted in recent case law, for highlighting the proper scope of the United States' ability to make constitutionally permissible appeals of acquittals. Such an approach might emphasize that the double jeopardy clause in no way bars appeals of acquittals, when such appeals do not result in new trials. Consistent with this approach, we recommend that the Justice Department consider seeking an appropriate case to argue that the government is entitled to appeal a bench trial acquittal, on the ground of legal error, when correction of the error would allow a verdict of guilty to be entered without a new trial. We discuss the potential drawbacks, as well as the possible benefits, of establishing a limited governmental right to appeal bench trial acquittals. We close this Report by suggesting that a follow-up study be done of additional ways in which society's interest in ascertaining the truth in criminal proceedings can be served through government appeals that do not violate the double jeopardy clause. Such a study might examine (1) whether government appeals of errors of law in jury trials by special verdict could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and (2) the possible use of pretrial appealable orders (agreed upon at a pretrial conference) framing charges to the jury and resolving evidentiary issues.
I. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

Part I of this Report assesses the original meaning of the double jeopardy clause, with particular reference to the appealability of acquittals. First, we survey eighteenth century definitions of the double jeopardy clause's key terms. Because these definitions, in and of themselves, shed relatively little light on the appealability of acquittals, we then turn to historical sources. After surveying the history of the double jeopardy concept in England and in America, we discuss the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the United States Constitution's double jeopardy clause. Finally, taking into account eighteenth century definitions and historical analysis, we then set forth what we believe to be the probable original meaning of the double jeopardy clause, as applied to government appeals of acquittals.

A. The Words Of The Double Jeopardy Clause

The fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause specifies, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." An effort to understand the original meaning of this provision should begin with an examination of eighteenth and early nineteenth century dictionary definitions of its key terms—"same," "offense," "twice," "jeopardy," "life," and "limb."

Noah Webster's 1828 American Dictionary defines "same" as "[i]dentical; not different or other." This definition confirms the common sense understanding that the double jeopardy clause prohibits the government from placing a person twice in jeopardy for the identical offense.

"Offense" ["offence"] is defined by Samuel Johnson's 1755 Dictionary as "crime; act of wickedness." Giles Jacob's 1772 Law Dictionary defines "offense" ["offence"] as "an act committed against a law or omitted where the law requires it, and punishable by it . . . . [A]ll offenses are capital, or not: capital, those for which the offender shall lose his life: not capital, where an offender may forfeit his lands and goods, be fined and suffer

2. N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (reissued 1967) [hereinafter WEBSTER's DICTIONARY].
3. S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1755) [hereinafter JOHNSON's DICTIONARY].
corporal punishment, or both; but not loss of life." 4 Similarly, Webster defines "offense" as "[a]ny transgression of law, divine or human." 5 In short, it appears that the word "offense" in the double jeopardy clause should be read as having meant originally a crime punishable by law.

The word "twice" is defined by Webster as "[t]wo times . . . . [d]oubly." 6 This definition accords with the modern understanding of that word, indicating that the double jeopardy clause prohibits the government from placing an individual two times ("doubly") in jeopardy.

The word "jeopardy" is not defined by Johnson or by Jacob, but Webster's Dictionary states that "jeopardy" means "[e]xposure to death, loss or injury; hazard; danger; peril." 7 This suggests that the word "jeopardy" in the double jeopardy clause should be read to have meant "risk," "danger," or "peril." While the phrase "twice in jeopardy" or "double jeopardy" may have been a term of art, we have identified only one eighteenth century case law or treatise reference to "double jeopardy." In Respublika v. Shaffer, 8 a Pennsylvania court stated without citation that "[b]y the [common] law it is declared that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. . . . [T]his prohibits] the oppression of a double trial." 9 This statement suggests that "double jeopardy" or "twice in jeopardy" possibly may have been viewed as a shorthand reference to prohibitions on retrials for the same offense. We believe, however, that this possible inference should not be accorded a great deal of weight, given the absence of any other recorded references to double jeopardy as a term of art. Other eighteenth century American lawyers and judges may have assigned a somewhat different meaning (or, alternatively, the same meaning) to the phrase "double jeopardy"; we simply do not know.

The term "life or limb" is not defined in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century dictionaries that we have examined. "Life" is defined by Jacob as "[u]nion and co-operation of soul with body; enjoyment or possession of terrestrial existence." 10 Similarly, Webster states that "in man, [life is] that state of be-

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5. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Id. Our research provides no clear indication that the phrases "jeopardy" or "double jeopardy" were legal terms of art in the eighteenth century.
8. 1 Dall. 137 (Pa. Oyer and Terminer 1788).
9. Id.
ing in which the soul and body are united." Webster states that a "limb" is "an extremity of the human body; a member; . . . as the arm or leg." The verb "to limb" is, according to Johnson, "[t]o tear asunder;" Webster defines "to limb" as "[t]o dismember; to tear off the limbs." Read literally, these definitions would appear to suggest that jeopardy to "life or limb" referred to processes that put a person in peril of losing his life or having his limbs dismembered.

We believe, however, that the term "life or limb" was a term of art that was not meant to be read literally. The historical meaning of this term can be gleaned by reference to Lord Coke's seventeenth century definition of the phrase "life or member." The Second Part of Coke's Commentaries defines the phrase "judgment of life or member" ("jugment de vie et de membre") as meaning "he shall be attainted of felony." Similarly, the Third Part of the Commentaries says of the term "[j]udgment of life or member" that "[t]hese words do imply felony." Consistent with these definitions, the 1848 edition of Dwarris' Treatise on Statutes states that "[e]very crime, the perpetrator of which is, by any statute, ordained to have judgment of life or member, is a felony: although the word felony be not contained in the statute." This statement in an early nineteenth century treatise strongly suggests that Lord Coke's seventeenth century understanding of the term "life or member" still held sway in the eighteenth century. Accordingly, substituting the word "limb" for "member," we believe it highly probable that the term "life or limb" originally was meant as a reference to crimes punishable as felonies. Felonies were offenses punishable by forfeiture of lands or goods, plus additional punishment, if so specified by the law.

12. Id. Similarly, Johnson's Dictionary, supra note 3, states that a limb is "a member".
15. Given the fact that Webster's Dictionary, supra note 2, defines "limb" as "member" (see supra text accompanying note 12), we believe that it is entirely justifiable to read the phrase "life or limb" merely as an alternative formulation of the term "life or member."
19. Blackstone defined a "felony" as "an offense which occasions a total forfeiture of either land or goods, or both, at the common law, and to which capital or other punish-
Putting these definitions together, the words of the double jeopardy clause appear to prohibit the government from twice placing any person in peril of suffering punishment as a felon for the same act. It is conceivable—though by no means certain—that the clause may also have been understood to prohibit the retrial of an individual on the same felony charge. This reading, in and of itself, is not highly illuminating—it tells us very little about the practical scope of the double jeopardy clause. Specifically, it does not answer the questions of whether and under what circumstances government appeals of acquittals would violate the clause. To shed light on these questions, it is necessary to consider the historical development of the double jeopardy concept in England and in America.

B. Historical Development Of The Double Jeopardy Concept

The double jeopardy concept has a long and complicated history. The following discussion will summarize those aspects of that history that are relevant to the issue of government appeals of acquittals. After reviewing the development of the double jeopardy concept in England and in America, we will examine the formulation of the Bill of Rights' double jeopardy clause.

1. The Development of Double Jeopardy in England

No reference to double jeopardy appears in the Magna Carta. Nevertheless, by the late thirteenth century the glimmerings of
a former judgment barrier offering partial protection from reprosecution were apparent. The attempt to restrain private complainants from instigating repeated prosecutions was codified in 1281 in the Statute of Westminster. By the fourteenth century, the plea of “autrefois acquit,” or “formerly acquitted,” had begun to develop, whereby a defendant could seek to block a second trial by citing his previous acquittal of the same offense.

During double jeopardy’s early development, criminal procedures could be instituted either by common law “appeal” (at the behest of a private party) or by “indictment” (at the behest of the crown). By the early fifteenth century it was settled by statute that an acquittal after a jury trial on charges initiated by appeal was a bar to prosecution for the same offense by subsequent indictment. Conversely, an acquittal on an indictment was deemed a bar to the initiation of a suit by appeal on the part of the injured party, but this was altered by the Statute of 1487. After the Statute, neither a conviction nor an acquittal on an indictment acted as a bar to a prosecution by way of appeal, for the same offense, if the appeal was brought within a year and a day of the conviction or acquittal.

By the seventeenth century, English double jeopardy protection had evolved into four common law pleas: autrefois acquit (former acquittal), autrefois convict (former conviction), autrefois attaint (former attainted), and pardon. Those pleas, referred to in Coke’s Institutes, were described in some detail a century later in Blackstone’s Commentaries. They prevented the retrial of a person who had previously been acquitted, convicted, attainted (adjudged worthy of punishment), or pardoned for the same offense. Blackstone explained autrefois acquit as follows:

22. See id. at 12-13, citing 1 Britton, De Legibus Anglicanès 104, 112 (Nichols trans. 1865). According to Sigler, an acquitted individual could not be reprosecuted at the instance of the original accusing private party, but apparently could be reprosecuted at the instance of the crown.
23. 13 Edw. I, c. 12 (1281). The Statute of Westminster stipulated that the fact that “the life of the defendant was in jeopardy” in a previous case resulting in the defendant’s acquittal was the basis for a suit of malicious prosecution against the appellors.
24. The criminal appeal was not abolished (by statute) until 1819. 59 Geo. III, c. 46 (1819).
25. 9 Hen. V, fo. 2, pl. 7 (1421); 34 Hen. VI, fo. 9, pl. 19 (1455).
26. Trin. 21 Edw. III, fo. 23, pl. 16 (1346); Mich. 44 Edw. III, fo. 38, pl. 35 (1369).
27. 9 Hen. VII, c. 1 (1487).
29. See 4 W. Blackstone, supra note 19, at *335-37.
First, the plea of autrefois acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense. And hence it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. Therefore, an acquittal on an appeal is a good bar to an indictment on the same offense. And so, also, was an acquittal on an indictment a good bar to an appeal by the common law; and therefore, in favor of appeals, a general practice was introduced not to try any person on an indictment of homicide till after the year and day within which appeals may be brought were past, by which time it often happened that the witnesses died, or the whole was forgotten. To remedy which inconvenience the statute 3 Henry VIII, c.1 (Star Chamber, 1487), enacts that indictments shall be proceeded on, immediately, at the king's suit for the death of a man, without waiting for bringing an appeal, and that the plea of autrefois acquit on an indictment shall be no bar to the prosecuting of any appeal.30

In short, according to Blackstone, once an individual had been “fairly” tried and acquitted of a crime in a proceeding brought by common law appeal, he could not be charged with the same offense in a subsequent indictment. By virtue of being found “not guilty,” an acquitted individual would be “forever quit and discharged of the accusation, except he be appealed of felony within the time limited by law.”31 While an acquittal following an indictment in principle did not bar a future prosecution by way of common law appeal, Blackstone stated that by his time private appeals had “ceased to be in common use.”32

30. Id. at *335-36. (In this passage Blackstone employed the term “appeal” to designate a criminal charge brought at the behest of a private party—not to signify an appellate proceeding in the modern sense.) In a similar vein, Hawkins’ analysis of autrefois acquit revealed “that an Acquittal in one County for [a particular offense] . . . may be pleaded in Bar of a subsequent Prosecution for the same [offense] . . . in another County.” 2 W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1724 ed.), reprinted in AMERICAN LAW: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 370 (S. Katz & M. Horwitz eds. 1972).
31. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *361.
32. Id. at *316. The unpopularity of private appeals stemmed from the fact that the appellor would be imprisoned and fined in the event of the appellee’s acquittal. Id. As stated supra in note 24, the private appeal was formally abolished in 1819.
In eighteenth century England, the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict could be interposed only on the basis of an actual verdict of acquittal or conviction. Accordingly, in modern American terms, "jeopardy attached" for purposes of invoking those pleas at the time an acquittal or conviction was entered. This standard for determining when jeopardy attaches remains in force today in England.

A richer understanding of the development of double jeopardy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be gleaned from English cases. In 1660, the Court of King's Bench held that the Crown prosecutor had no right to seek a new trial after an acquittal. The court noted (without specific citation) that on two instances during Cromwell's rule a prosecutor's appeal had been allowed. Those holdings, however, were deemed non-binding, inasmuch as they were "in the late troublesome times, and by the parties' assent." Why the accused assented to a new trial was not explained. One year later, in Rex v. Jackson, the court denied a motion for a new trial following an acquittal for perjury. The court noted that the acquittal had been secured by the beating and private imprisonment of the witnesses to perjury. The court reporter explained simply that the new trial motion "was denied, it being in a criminal case, wherein the party being once acquitted, shall never be tried again." The court reaffirmed these holdings in Rex v. Fenwick & Holt. The court's reasoning in Fenwick & Holt was summarized by the eighteenth century legal treatise writer Charles Viner:

[A] report of this case communicated to me from a manuscript of Lord Chief Justice Kelyng, he says, that Hyde C. J. Twisden and himself agreed, that no trial ought to be where the party was once acquitted for any crime that concerns life, or member, or which would make the party infamous; and says the mischief might be very great if the party should be put to a new trial, for then his adversary would see where he failed, and might use ill means to prove what he failed in before; and that upon search,
no precedent was found that ever any new trial was granted in such case except two in the time of the late troubles, which his brother Twisden said were by consent, and that the Court did not regard those precedents, as differing from all in good time.40

This language indicates a belief that the prosecution should not be entitled to “see where it failed” at the first trial in order to perfect its case at retrial.

Subsequent holdings adhered to the principle that no new trial would be granted following an acquittal. For example, in Rex v. Davis,41 following defendants’ acquittal for assault, the prosecution obtained affidavits of fact tending to show defendants’ guilt. The court denied the prosecution’s motion for a new trial, stating that “there could be no precedent shown for it [a new trial] in case of acquittal.”42 In Rex v. Jones,43 the court opined that “it is inconsistent with reason not to grant a new trial where a man is acquitted by his own artifice of a crime not capital; for it is unjust (as hath been observed), that where a man hath committed one crime, he shall have it in his power to avoid justice by committing another.” Despite this policy concern, however, the court “admitt[ed] [it] to be law” that an acquittal could not be appealed.44 Other cases held similarly.45

There were a few extremely limited exceptions to the rule forbidding appeals of acquittals. In Rex v. Furser,46 the defendant, who had been indicted, “had entered notice of trial in the [court’s] office book,” apparently without giving direct notice to the prosecutor. The defendant was then acquitted, apparently without the prosecutor’s knowledge. The court granted a new trial, citing a statute that required defendant to give notice of trial. The extremely brief (14 line) case report gives no indication that any precedent prohibiting a new trial after acquittal was being overturned, or even being considered. Accordingly, this case is perhaps best viewed as sui generis. It may merely

40. C. Viner, A General Abridgement of Law and Equity 479 (2d ed. 1793).
42. Id.
43. 8 Mod. 201, 207, 88 Eng. Rep. 146, 149 (K.B. 1724).
44. 88 Eng. Rep. at 149. This case involved a quo warranto proceeding against individuals who had falsely claimed to hold a public office; several judges opined that this was not a criminal proceeding at all.
reflect an understanding that the prosecution must be allowed to appear at trial and thereby prosecute an indictment.

The other possible exceptions involved acquittals when indictments had been preferred to test a civil right—mainly indictments for non-repair of a highway. Eighteenth century and early nineteenth century cases did not allow appeals from such acquittals. By the mid-nineteenth century, however, new trials were allowed in such cases. This exception was a narrow one: if the accused was in danger of imprisonment, a new trial would not be granted.

One late eighteenth century case allowed an appeal in a *quo warranto* proceeding. This case, however, did not constitute an exception to the rule against appeals of acquittals in criminal cases: the court plainly stated "that of late years a quo warranto information ha[s] been considered merely in the nature of a civil proceeding." Similarly, *Wilson v. Rastall* and *Calcraft v. Gibbs* are not exceptions. In *Wilson* the court allowed a new trial to recover penalties for bribery, when judicial error had yielded an initial verdict favorable to the defendant. Justice Kenyon stated that while a new trial could not be allowed in a criminal case, "I consider this as a civil action." *Calcraft* involved a dispute as to whether defendant had been poaching on lands formerly owned by his master. In allowing a retrial following a judgment for defendant, Justice Kenyon, citing judicial error, implicitly assumed that this was not a criminal proceeding.

The Crown apparently did have a limited right to bring a writ of error in eighteenth century England. The 1788 edition of *Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown* summarized the scope of this right as follows:

> I take it to be settled at this day, that wherever the indictment, or appeal, whereon a man is acquitted, is so far erroneous (either for want of substance in setting out the crime, or of authority in the judge before whom it was

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51. Id. (emphasis added).
54. 100 Eng. Rep. at 1286.
taken), that no good judgment could have been given upon it against the defendant, the acquittal can be no bar of a subsequent indictment or appeal, because in judgment of law the defendant was never in danger of his life from the first; for the law will presume prima facie that the judges would not have given a judgment, which would have been liable to have been reversed. But if there be no error in the indictment or appeal, but only in the process, it seems agreed, that the acquittal will be a good bar of a subsequent prosecution, notwithstanding such error; the best reason whereof seems to be this, That such error is salved by the appearance.56

In short, Hawkins’ summary appears to indicate that a writ of error could be filed following an acquittal only if the initial indictment was “defective” in that it failed to state an offense (“want of substance in setting out the crime”) or the trial court lacked jurisdiction (“want . . . of authority in the judge before whom it was taken”). In those special situations, the defendant never was in jeopardy in the first place. If, however, there was error “in the process” by which an individual was brought within a court’s jurisdiction, an acquittal would bar that individual’s reprosecution, since the defendant’s appearance “corrected” the error.56 Elsewhere Hawkins deemed it “settled” (presumably subject to the exceptions noted above) that a court could not “set aside, a verdict which acquits a defendant of a prosecution properly criminal.”57

Hale’s Pleas of the Crown also discussed the writ of error following an acquittal.58 Hale implicitly indicated that a writ of error could be brought if an individual was found by special verdict to have committed an act that constituted a “murder or other felony,” but the court mistakenly adjudged the act committed not to be a felony. If no writ of error was brought, a plea of “autrefois acquit” would bar a subsequent prosecution, according to Hale. Hale also indicated that a judgment of acquittal could be reversed if the acquittal was due to the defectiveness of

56. Consistent with Hawkins' conclusion, Chitty's Treatise states that “[a] mere error in the former process . . . will not render that prosecution [which resulted in an acquittal] nugatory, because the reason which relates to errors in the indictment will not apply, and the defendant might legally have been convicted.” 1 J. CHTTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 458 (Am. ed. 1836).
57. 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 628.
58. The following discussion is based on 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 247-248, 394-395 (1778 ed.).
the indictment. Hale advanced no other possible grounds for granting writs of error brought by the prosecution following an acquittal.

Thus, eighteenth century English sources indicate that the prosecution apparently could appeal a criminal acquittal (bring a writ of error) in only three situations: (1) when the trial court lacked jurisdiction (and thus the defendant was not legally in jeopardy); (2) when the initial indictment was fatally flawed (and thus the defendant was not legally in jeopardy); and (3) when facts were found indicating the offense charged had been committed, but the trial court erroneously held that the facts found did not constitute a crime. Under all other circumstances an acquittal could not be appealed (and the plea of autrefois acquit would bar a new trial), even if errors were committed at trial. While a few eighteenth century instances of new trials following "acquittals" in civil actions for penalties are recorded, new trials following acquittals in criminal proceedings were strictly barred.

By the eighteenth century the defendant's rights of appeal were substantially broader than the prosecution's. Starting in the 1670s, the court of King's Bench began to hold that a defendant could obtain a new trial under certain circumstances. Those holdings overturned earlier precedents denying defendants the right to a new trial upon proof of error in the initial trial. There remained, however, substantial restrictions on defendants' appeal rights. Even in the eighteenth century, the defendant's writ of error could not be taken in capital cases without the crown's permission. According to one commentator, the court could grant a new trial after defendant brought a writ of error, "[n]ot on the merits, but only for irregularity in the proceedings." The writ of error was discretionary in misdemeanor

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59. In advancing this proposition, Hale, id. at 394-95, discussed Vaux's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 77 Eng. Rep. 992 (Q.B. 1592). In that case, Vaux was acquitted of poisoning Ridley, on the ground that the indictment was defective because it did not expressly allege that Ridley had received and imbibed poison. A retrial was allowed after this defect was cured, and Vaux was convicted.


63. I. Chirv, supra note 56, at 654.
cases, but by the end of the eighteenth century a writ of error could be brought "for notorious mistakes in the record." In sum, by the end of the eighteenth century the double jeopardy principle was well entrenched in English law. That principle generally barred the crown from obtaining the reindictment and retrial of an individual who had been acquitted of a crime. The crown was, however, apparently authorized to appeal acquittals when the original indictment was defective; when the original trial court lacked jurisdiction; or when an error of law caused a special verdict's factual finding of felony mistakenly to be characterized as no felony. At the same time, English law was beginning to recognize the right of the individual to appeal convictions obtained in proceedings tainted by error.

2. The Development of Double Jeopardy in America

The double jeopardy concept was exported to England's American colonies in the seventeenth century. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of legal principles, provided that "[n]o man shall be twice sentenced by civil justice for one and the same crime, offense, or trespass." That principle, reiterated in the Massachusetts Code of 1648, influenced the development of the law in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey.

Eighteenth-century colonial legal developments confirm the recognition accorded the double jeopardy principle in the colonies. In New York, even though the plea of autrefois acquit generally was not employed, double jeopardy protection was bestowed upon individuals, reportedly owing to "the solicitude of royal officials that there be no double prosecutions." Specifically, it was agreed in colonial New York (consistent with En-

64. 4 Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws of England 456 (1846 ed.). According to Stephen, if the defendant won a reversal, "he remains liable to another prosecution for the same offence; for the first being erroneous, he never was in jeopardy thereby." Id. at 458.
65. The precise nature of double jeopardy protection was apparently not, however, fully settled in 18th century England. Viner, for example, provided various "examples of shifting double jeopardy rules in eighteenth century English practice." J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 21 (citing C. Viner, A General Abridgement of Law and Equity 368-73, 375 (1st ed. 1785)).
66. The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts 46 (M. Farrand ed. 1929).
67. See J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 22.
lish practice) that a "motion [for a new trial] did not lie after acquittal." 69 A 1783 Connecticut decision forbade the second trial of a citizen once he had been acquitted; 70 another contemporaneous Connecticut holding proclaimed that "a new trial is not to be granted, in a criminal cause, to a prosecutor, unless the acquittal was procured by some fraud or malpractice." 71 The status of double jeopardy in Pennsylvania is reflected in a 1788 common law decision stating that "[b]y the law it is declared that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . . [This prohibits] the oppression of a double trial." 72 In colonial Virginia a criminal defendant was entitled to make a special plea alleging a former acquittal or conviction of the identical crime charged, or a former attainder for any felony, as well as the fact of a pardon. 73 A 1788 South Carolina case held that in a qui tam or penal action, "the court will seldom grant [the state] a new trial, as these kind of penal actions are considered as hard and rigorous ones." 74

The double jeopardy concept was first accorded constitutional status in the New Hampshire Constitution of 1781. 75 Article XVI of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights provided in pertinent part: "No subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime or offence." 76 No other constitution adopted during the revolutionary period contained a double jeopardy clause.

69. J. GORBEL & T. NAUGHTON, supra note 68, at 279.
70. Gilbert v. Marcy, 1 Kirby 401 (Conn. 1783).
71. Hannaball v. Spaulding, 1 Root 86, 87 (Conn. 1783).
73. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 24. Those pleas, which replicate the double jeopardy pleas described by Blackstone, reflect the fact that "[t]he Virginia criminal law tended to be closer to English law than that of most colonies." Id.
74. Steel v. Roach, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 63, 64 (1788) (denying government's motion for new trial following verdict for defendant in trial for evasion of state revenue laws). It is unclear from this short case report whether new trials were ever granted in qui tam or penal actions.
75. One colonial constitution contained a res judicata clause. Section 64 of the Fundamental Constitutions of [North] Carolina (1669) provided that "[n]o cause shall be twice tried in any one court, upon any reason or pretence whatsoever." J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 28 n.119. That clause was dropped in the state's 1776 constitution. J. SIGLER, supra, at 28.
3. Double Jeopardy in the Federal Constitution

A double jeopardy clause was not included in the original federal Constitution. During the state ratifying conventions, however, Maryland and New York drafted prohibitions against double jeopardy for possible inclusion in the Constitution's Bill of Rights. The Maryland clause provided "that there be no appeal from matter of fact, or second trial after acquittal; but this provision shall not extend to such cases as may arise in the government of the land or naval forces." The New York clause stated "[t]hat no Person ought to be put twice in Jeopardy of Life or Limb for one and the same Offence, nor, unless in case of impeachment, be punished more than once for the same Offence." No other state conventions proposed a double jeopardy clause.

James Madison included a double jeopardy clause in his original draft of the Bill of Rights. On June 8, 1789, Madison's double jeopardy provision was proposed in the House of Representatives as a constitutional amendment. It read as follows: "No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense." The House debated the double jeopardy provision on August 17, 1789. Representative Egbert Benson of New York stated that the House (sitting as a committee of the whole) could not agree to the amendment as it stood, because its meaning was rather doubtful. In providing that no person should be tried more than once for the same offense, the clause was contrary to the established principle that a defendant was entitled to more than one trial, according to Benson. Benson presumed that the "humane intention of the clause" was to prohibit more than one punishment; accordingly, he moved to amend the clause by striking the words "or trial."

77. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 732. This was the third of thirteen amendments approved by a majority of a committee appointed by the Maryland ratifying convention to draft constitutional amendments. Those amendments were drafted at the end of April, 1788. After a minority on the committee insisted on their right to present alternative amendments to the full state convention, the committee majority elected not to forward any recommendations. Accordingly, the double jeopardy amendment was not officially adopted by the Maryland convention; it was, however, circulated in pamphlet form. Id. at 729.

78. Id. at 912. The New York convention ratified the federal Constitution, accompanied by a proposed bill of rights (including the double jeopardy clause), on July 26, 1788. Id. at 854.

79. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1027.

80. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (1789), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1111.
Representative Roger Sherman of Connecticut approved of Benson’s motion. According to Sherman, if a person were acquitted at an initial trial, he ought not to be tried a second time; but if anything should appear in the record of the first trial, suggesting that the conviction should have been set aside, the defendant was entitled to the benefit of a second trial. Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts agreed with Sherman, insisting that instead of securing the liberty of the subject, the clause as drafted would abridge the privileges of those who were prosecuted.81

Representative Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire approved of the clause as drafted, which he deemed declaratory of the law as it stood. He feared that changing the clause might make it appear that Congress desired to change the law by implication, and expose a man to the danger of more than one trial. Representative Livermore added that according to the “universal practice” in Great Britain and the United States, persons who are guilty of crimes—but who are acquitted for want of evidence—shall not be tried a second time for the same offense.82 Representative Livermore apparently did not address the question of whether an acquittal due to errors of law warranted a second trial.

Upon being put to a vote, Benson’s motion to amend the double jeopardy clause lost by a considerable majority. Representative George Partridge of Massachusetts then moved to insert after the words “same offense” the words “by any law of the United States.” That motion also was defeated.83

On August 20, 1789, the double jeopardy clause as phrased by Madison was approved by the House. On August 24, 1789, the constitutional amendments that had been approved by the House were submitted to the Senate. As submitted, the double jeopardy clause remained unchanged.84 On September 3, 1789, the Senate substantially changed the double jeopardy clause to read that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb by any public prosecution.”85 The reasons underlying this change in wording are not recorded. On September 9, 1789, the

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81. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753-54, reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1111. The record does not reveal what Representative Sedgwick believed those “privileges” included.
82. Id.
83. Id. Sigler states that the defeat of Partridge’s motion permits “the speculation by negative inference that double jeopardy may have been intended to apply to the states and the federal government alike.” J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 30-31.
84. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 31, citing 1 S. Jour. 105 (1789).
85. 1 S. Jour. 160-68 (1789) (quoted in B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 1149).
Senate combined and renumbered the proposed constitutional amendments; the present day fifth amendment, which included the double jeopardy clause, was designated Article VII.  

A conference committee of Madison, Sherman, and John Vining of Delaware from the House met with Senate appointees on September 21 to resolve differences with respect to the proposed Bill of Rights. At some point, the conference committee eliminated the words “by any public prosecution” from the Senate’s double jeopardy clause. The circumstances surrounding this change are not recorded. On September 25, 1789, the Senate concurred in the amendments to be proposed to the state legislatures, as amended.  

In summary, the draft double jeopardy clause changed in form significantly during its consideration by the First Congress. The June 1789 House version read “no person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same offense.” The subsequent September 1789 Senate version stated “that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb by any public prosecution.” The September 1789 House-Senate conference committee version read “no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The final clause as adopted by Congress (after being joined with other clauses in the fifth amendment) read “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  

The double jeopardy clause, now embedded in the fifth amendment, was ratified by the requisite number of states, although according to one scholar, “many state legislators were not certain of its meaning.” Over time, the federal double jeopardy clause influenced state constitutional development. At present, 35 state constitutions in total contain double jeopardy clauses that closely resemble the federal provision.

86. J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 31, citing 1 S. Jour. 119, 130 (1789). Although Congress proposed twelve initial amendments to the Constitution, the first two were not ratified by the states, so the remaining ten became the Bill of Rights.
87. J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 31-32, citing 1 Annals of Cong. 83, 88 (1789).
88. J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 33. Sigler adds that “it is doubtful that Massachusetts ever ratified the portion of the fifth amendment which affects double jeopardy.” Id., citing Dangel, Double Jeopardy in Massachusetts, 16 B.U.L. Rev. 384 (1936). Unfortunately, there is virtually no recorded information on the states’ reaction to the double jeopardy clause during the ratification period.
89. J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 33-34. According to Sigler, seven states provide constitutional protection against subsequent trials only in cases of prior acquittal. Id. at 34. In all, 45 state constitutions contain double jeopardy clauses.
C. The Probable Meaning Of The Double Jeopardy Clause

As the foregoing historical review suggests, the text and enactment history of the double jeopardy clause do not clearly establish its meaning. There is no historical evidence as to what the Congress intended when it altered Madison's version of the double jeopardy clause. The insertion of references to "jeopardy" and "life or limb" suggests the possibility that New York's proposed double jeopardy clause served as a model. It also strongly indicates that the clause was meant to protect individuals charged with a felony, given the apparent eighteenth century English understanding that crimes punishable by "life or member" were felonies. While the phrase "life or limb" may define the class of individuals (accused felons) protected by the clause, that phrase does nothing to clarify the scope of the protection afforded them. In order to address the scope of the clause's protection, we must consult extrinsic historical sources.

In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story opined that the double jeopardy clause applies generally to bar second trials for the same offense, no matter what the punishment. Story's position was probably largely correct, if the term "offense" is interpreted as meaning "felony." As previously indicated, at least one late eighteenth century American case seemed the rule against being put "twice in jeopardy" as a prohibition against a "double trial." Furthermore, as the preceding historical discussion illustrates, by the late eighteenth century it seems to have been a generally accepted principle in England and America that, subject to a few exceptions, an individual could not be retried for the same felonious transgression at the behest of the government.

90. Sigler states that "[i]n all probability, the drafters of the clause intended to alter Madison's proposal only with a view to its clarification." Id. at 32.
91. See supra text accompanying note 78.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
93. 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 659 (1833). According to Story, the double jeopardy clause "is another great privilege secured by the common law. The meaning of it is, that a party shall not be tried a second time for the same offence, after he has once been convicted, or acquitted of the offence charged, by the verdict of a jury, and judgment has passed thereon for or against him." Id., citing W. Hawkins, supra note 55, ch. 35; 4 W. Blackstone, supra note 19, at *335.
95. As the preceding discussion of eighteenth century English law indicates, new trials following "acquittals" could only be granted in civil proceedings for penalties. This statement does not apply, however, to new trials following criminal acquittals because the trial court lacked jurisdiction; because the indictment was defective; or because the trial court erroneously ruled that an offense which was found to have been committed
That principle, embodied in Madison's version of the double jeopardy clause, was agreed to by the House of Representatives; the only controversy in that body centered around whether the clause should be refined to negate an implication that a defendant could not be tried again following an erroneous conviction. As will be recalled, the original House draft of the double jeopardy clause specifically prohibited "more than one . . . trial for the same offense." The House of Representatives debate on this version (previously summarized) shows unanimous support (among the debaters) for the proposition that an acquitted defendant should not be subject to a new trial. Indeed, Representative Livermore went so far as to state that even clearly guilty individuals who had been acquitted for want of evidence should not be retried. Each of the debaters focused on how best to protect the accused individual's rights; no concern was expressed at all about promoting any governmental interest in securing convictions. To the contrary, the one concern expressed was that the House's version of the double jeopardy clause might by its terms unfairly preclude convicted defendants from securing a new trial. Roger Sherman, who had supported the convicted defendant's right to obtain a new trial in appropriate circumstances, sat on the House-Senate conference committee that eliminated the House's language prohibiting "more than one trial." In and of itself, this does not demonstrate that the final double jeopardy clause established a convicted defendant's right to a retrial. This evidence does render unlikely, however, the possibility that the House-Senate version was not meant to protect an acquitted individual's right to avoid being retried.

In short, the rapid approval (apparently with little debate) of the Senate's substitute double jeopardy clause in no way suggests an essential departure from the general understanding of the House's double jeopardy concept. The prohibition on placing a person "twice . . . in jeopardy" certainly echoes the Madisonian bar to "more than one punishment or trial." Historical treatises indicate that "life or limb" is probably best read was not a felony. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59. In the first two cases, the defendant was never legally in jeopardy; and, in the third case, facts were found that supported a verdict of guilty.

96. The deletion of Madison's prohibition on more than one trial conceivably might be interpreted as a concession to those who believed that a convicted defendant might be entitled to a second trial under appropriate circumstances.

97. A second trial posing the risk of punishment would once again expose an acquitted individual to the danger of "death, loss or injury," Webster's definition of "jeopardy." See supra text accompanying note 7. Furthermore, as previously shown, the bar against being placed "twice in jeopardy" was viewed by at least one court as prohibiting
as a shorthand phrase for a crime punishable as a felony. In sum, while the matter is not free from doubt, it seems probable that the double jeopardy clause originally was meant to bar the second punishment or second trial of an individual acquitted of a felony, except perhaps in the few special situations noted above.

1. Government Appeals Resulting in New Trials

Consistent with this most probable interpretation of the double jeopardy clause, it would appear to follow that the clause bars the government from appealing an acquittal of a felony, in order to obtain a new trial, except perhaps in a few special cases. As previously noted, Hale and Hawkins indicated that appeals of acquittals (writs of error) were not authorized in eighteenth century England, except in three special situations: (1) the initial trial court lacked jurisdiction; (2) the initial indictment was defective; and (3) facts were found demonstrating that an offense had been committed, but the court erroneously held as a matter of law that the conduct was not a felony. Alternatively stated, the third exception would appear to allow the government to appeal an “acquittal” that clearly would have been a “conviction,” had the law correctly been applied to undisputed findings of fact.

We have found no evidence bearing on the question of whether these exceptions to the “no appeal” rule were recog-
nized in the American colonies. Even assuming that they were, however (on the ground that colonial lawyers viewed Hale and Hawkins' *Pleas of the Crown* as persuasive authorities), the general rule barring appeals of acquittals is done very little harm. In the first two situations cited above, the proceedings were invalid *ab initio*; the accused individual actually was not placed in jeop-
dardy. In the third situation, the defendant's guilt actually had been established; the defendant had in reality been “convicted,” according to a correct legal classification of his actions.

2. *Government Appeals Not Resulting in New Trials*

We have found no textual or historical evidence bearing on the status of government appeals of felony acquittals that do not result in new trials. An appeal not for the purpose of securing a new trial presumably would not contravene the plain words of Madison’s double jeopardy clause, which merely prohibited “more than one punishment or trial for the same offense.” Whether such an appeal would contravene the Constitution’s double jeopardy clause—which prohibits an accused individual being “twice put in jeopardy”—is less than apparent. Two alternative positions are colorable.

On the one hand, to the extent such an appeal is viewed merely as the continuation of a single criminal proceeding, that appeal arguably does not twice expose an accused individual to “danger” or “peril.” In support of this position, it might be noted that Webster defines “to appeal” as “[t]o call or remove a cause from an inferior court to a superior judge or court.” Thus, an appeal involves the removal of a single cause (involving a single jeopardy in the criminal context) to a new court, rather than the creation of a second cause.

On the other hand, to the extent a felony “acquittal” definitively sets an individual free from a charge, any appeal by its very nature arguably exposes that individual anew to the possibility of harm implied by the word “jeopardy.” In support of this position, it might be noted that Webster defines “acquittal” as “[a] judicial setting free from the charge of an offense; as, by verdict of a jury, or sentence of a court.” If an acquittal “sets an

101. As discussed *infra* in Part IV of this Report, the appeal of an acquittal on the ground of legal error might not result in a new trial, if correct application of the law to undisputed findings of fact in the initial proceeding would have supported a verdict of guilty.

individual free” from a charge, the initial jeopardy flowing from that charge has, presumably, been terminated. Thus, according to this logic, the appeal of an acquittal (even an appeal that would not require a new trial) inevitably exposes an individual to jeopardy of punishment for a second time.

While the matter is not free from doubt, we believe that the better reading is that the double jeopardy clause, as originally understood, probably does not preclude government appeals of felony acquittals, if such appeals would not result in new trials. Eighteenth century commentaries and formulations of the double jeopardy principle stressed the principle’s prohibition against second trials of individuals who had been acquitted—they were not cast in terms of a prohibition against government appeals that did not bring about new trials.108 Similarly, Madison’s draft of the double jeopardy clause prohibited multiple trials or punishments, not appeals. The limited discussion of Madison’s draft in the House of Representatives focused not on appeals, but, rather, on multiple punishments and multiple trials. (Indeed, it may be that none of the debaters had contemplated the possibility of an appeal not resulting in a new trial.) There is no evidence to suggest that the final version of the double jeopardy clause was aimed at anything other than the twin evils of multiple punishments and multiple trials. Appeals not resulting in new trials do not implicate those evils. For all of these reasons, we have tentatively concluded that the double jeopardy clause should not be deemed a barrier to appeals of felony acquittals that would not result in new trials. We acknowledge, however, that we have been unable to unearth any case law evidence bearing directly on this conclusion.

103. This statement arguably should be slightly qualified; the Maryland state constitutional convention’s draft double jeopardy clause provided “that there be no appeal from matter of fact, or second trial after acquittal”. Because this clause was phrased in the disjunctive, it is arguable that an “appeal from matter of fact” may have included appeals that did not involve a new trial. This argument is undermined, however, by the absence of any evidence regarding the existence in the 18th century of appeals that did not involve new trials. Moreover, as previously noted, this double jeopardy proposal was not adopted by the Maryland convention. See supra note 77. Blackstone’s statement that “an acquittal on an indictment [was] a good bar to an appeal by the common law” (see supra text accompanying note 30) is not a second possible qualification. In that passage, Blackstone employed the word “appeal” to designate an original criminal proceeding brought at the behest of a harmed individual; he was not referring to the removal of a criminal proceeding from a lower court to a higher court.
D. Summary

Analysis of the double jeopardy clause's original meaning prompts the following three tentative conclusions: (1) the clause was intended to apply only to felony cases (i.e., individuals acquitted of misdemeanors do not appear to be protected by the double jeopardy clause);104 (2) the clause appears to prohibit the government from appealing an acquittal of a felony, if a successful appeal would result in a new trial—except perhaps when the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the initial indictment was defective,105 or the law was mistakenly applied to undisputed findings of fact indicating guilt; and (3) while the matter is subject to doubt, the clause probably does not prohibit the government from appealing an acquittal of a felony, if a successful appeal would not result in a new trial.

II. FEDERAL CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO APPEALS

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."106 This section briefly surveys the federal case law development of that provision, with particular attention to its applicability to appeals.

A. Historical Summary Of The Cases

1. Key Nineteenth Century Cases

The first Supreme Court decision to provide a substantive construction of the double jeopardy clause was Ex Parte Lange.107 A jury convicted the defendant in Lange of violating a

104. This conclusion is at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), discussed infra at notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
105. This conclusion is at odds with United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), discussed infra at notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
106. U.S. Const. amend. V.
107. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). The few earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with the double jeopardy clause had not attempted to define the scope of protection afforded by that clause. For example, in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (Story, J.), the Court never even directly mentioned the clause in holding that the dis-
federal statute that prohibited the theft of mail bags. The statute specified a penalty of imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $200. The trial judge, however, sentenced the convicted defendant to one year in prison and a $200 fine. The defendant began his prison term immediately and paid the fine the next day. After five days, the defendant was returned to the trial court for the purpose of vacating the prior judgment. The court vacated the first judgment and sentenced the defendant to one year in prison, without giving defendant credit for the fine paid or reimbursing him. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the resentencing of the defendant violated the double jeopardy clause. (Thus, the court ordered that the prisoner be released, inasmuch as the sentence under which he was being held was without authority.) The Court's interpretation of the clause has been cited in numerous subsequent double jeopardy cases:

If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully punished for the same offense. And although there have been nice questions in the application of this rule to cases in which the act charged was such as to come within the definition of more than one statutory offence, or to bring the party within the jurisdiction of more than one court, there has never been any doubt of its entire and complete protection of the party when a second punishment is proposed in the same court, on the same facts, for the same statutory offense.108

charge of an individual charged with a capital offense due to a hung jury jury did not preclude that individual's retrial.
108. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 168. The Court in Lange also concluded that the double jeopardy clause protects individuals charged with misdemeanors as well as those accused of felonies:

If we reflect that at the time this maxim [that no man shall more than once be placed in peril upon the same accusation] came into existence almost every offense was punished with death or other punishment touching the person, and that these pleas [autrefois acquit and autrefois convict] are now held valid in felonies, minor crimes, and misdemeanors alike,. . . we shall see ample reason for holding that the principle intended to be asserted by the constitutional provision [the Double Jeopardy Clause] must be applied to all cases where a second punishment is attempted to be inflicted for the same offense by a judicial sentence.

Id. at 173. This holding appears to be at odds with original meaning: the term "life or limb" apparently was understood as referring to felonies in the eighteenth century. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19. We do not believe, however, that any attempt to overturn the Lange holding would be successful. This holding is, we believe, far too well entrenched to be overruled.
Nineteen years later, in *United States v. Sanges*, the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that the government had a common law right to appeal an unfavorable judgment. Absent express statutory authority, the Court stated, the government could not appeal an adverse final judgment, whether resulting from a verdict of acquittal or from a pretrial ruling on a question of law. While the Court implied that Congress could authorize appeals by the government, it did not address the constitutionally permissible scope of such legislation.

*United States v. Ball* involved the applicability of the double jeopardy clause to reprosecution after an acquittal and to retrial after appellate reversal of a conviction. The government indicted Ball and two others for murder. The jury acquitted Millard F. Ball but found his codefendants (John C. Ball and Robert E. Boutwell) guilty, and the trial judge entered judgment on the verdicts. The Supreme Court, on a writ of error, reversed the convictions because the indictments were fatally defective. On remand, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the grand jury reindicted all three defendants for murder. After the judge denied Millard F. Ball’s plea of former acquittal and codefendants’ plea of former conviction, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all three. The Supreme Court, per Justice Gray, reversed Millard F. Ball’s conviction but upheld the other two convictions. Addressing himself first to Millard F. Ball’s reindictment, he rejected the “English rule” that defective indictments could not legally place an individual in jeopardy. Justice Gray reasoned that the rule would unfairly grant a prosecutor a second opportunity to convict whenever he could discover a defect in the original indictment. The Court held that a verdict of acquittal on the general issue of guilt on an indictment whose defect is not objected to before verdict bars a second indictment for the same offense. Justice Gray distinguished between a void judgment of acquittal before a court lacking ju-

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109. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
110. *Id.* at 318. The government had sued on a writ of error after the trial judge sustained the defendant’s demurrer and quashed the indictment. Strictly construed, *Sanges* proscribed only review by writ of error, but the rationale applies equally to review by appeal. Under current law, the United States is authorized to appeal from a district court’s dismissal of an indictment except where the double jeopardy clause forbids further prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982).
111. 165 U.S. 662 (1896).
112. *Ball v. United States*, 140 U.S. 118 (1891). The indictments failed to allege that the victim died within a year and a day of the assault, an essential element of the crime.
risdiction, which did not bar reindictment, and a voidable judgment on a defective indictment, which could be challenged by defendant but not by the government. In dictum, Justice Gray stated that Sanges supported this proposition: "The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution." Justice Gray upheld, however, the convictions of John C. Ball and Robert E. Boutwell, "because it is quite clear that a defendant, who procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offense of which he has been convicted."

2. The Kepner Decision’s Rejection of “Continuing Jeopardy”

The Supreme Court squarely addressed the double jeopardy status of federal acquittals in Kepner v. United States. Sitting without a jury, a trial judge found Kepner, a Filipino attorney, not guilty of embezzlement. Consistent with local custom, the government appealed to the Philippine Supreme Court, which reversed Kepner’s acquittal, found him guilty, and sentenced him to prison. Kepner appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that a double jeopardy provision in the Philippines’ organic law extended fifth amendment protection to the Islands. A five to four majority of the Court agreed with Kepner’s interpretation of the organic law. The majority adopted Justice Gray’s Ball dictum as conclusive and held that the government could not appeal from an acquittal. In dissent, Justice Holmes formulated the “continuing jeopardy” concept: "[I]t seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing

114. 163 U.S. at 669.
115. Id. at 672 (citations omitted).
116. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
117. Analyzing the majority’s opinion, one commentator stated that “the Court apparently equated appeal with reprosecution within the constitutional prohibition. Either the Court believed that reversal on appeal results in a constitutionally proscribed retrial or that the appeal itself violates the constitutional ban, because both represent a threat to the defendant’s freedom.” Comment, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 314 (1974).
jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause."  

Holmes asserted that a rule prohibiting appeals was inconsistent with existing precedents allowing retrial after hung juries and after appellate reversals of convictions. While Holmes specified that his analysis applied only to government appeals from errors of law, it has been pointed out that the "continuing jeopardy" concept justifies appellate review of factfinding as well.

3. Twentieth Century Rejections of Appeals of Acquittals

Over half a century later, the Supreme Court held that even an "implicit acquittal" entitled a defendant to protection from double jeopardy in Green v. United States. The defendant in Green was charged with first degree murder. The judge instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of either first or second degree murder, and the jury convicted the defendant of the lesser offense. The conviction was overturned on appeal and the defendant was awarded a new trial. The defendant was charged with and convicted of first degree murder at the second trial. The defendant objected to the first degree charge on double jeopardy grounds, and the Supreme Court upheld this claim. The Court held that, although the first jury had not returned an express verdict of acquittal as to the first degree charge, the jury's conviction of the lesser offense constituted an implied acquittal of the greater charge. Adhering to the premise that verdicts of acquittal are final, the Court concluded that the implicit acquittal absolutely barred a second trial for first degree murder, thereby treating the implicit acquittal as if it had been an express verdict.

The Supreme Court next squarely dealt with appellate review of an acquittal in 1962. In Fong Foo v. United States, the trial judge determined during testimony at trial that the prosecutor had refreshed the memory of an important witness. Citing this "prosecutorial misconduct" and the "lack of credibility" of two other government witnesses, the judge directed the jury to acquit. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial judge to vacate the acquittal and reassign the case for trial. The Supreme Court reversed, per curiam. Relying on the

118. 195 U.S. at 134.
119. Id. at 135.
120. See Comment, supra note 117, at 315.
121. 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957).
122. 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam).
Ball dictum, the Court held that a final judgment of acquittal by a court with jurisdiction in a trial on a valid indictment is unreviewable. In doing so, the Court distinguished an acquittal from a prejudgment termination such as a mistrial. Justice Clark dissented. He objected to the majority’s reliance on a midtrial acquittal as grounds for automatically precluding retrial. Reasoning that the retrial issue should be a policy decision, Justice Clark stated that “[t]he word ‘acquittal’... is no magic open sesame.”

The Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in *Benton v. Maryland* affects the double jeopardy status of all state criminal proceedings (including appeals of acquittals). In *Benton*, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause applies fully to the states. Benton was convicted of burglary and acquitted of larceny in a Maryland trial court and he appealed. Defendant’s case was remanded to the trial court by the Maryland Court of Appeals for reindictment and new trial. On retrial, Benton was convicted of both burglary and larceny and he appealed. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court, per Justice Marshall, held that Benton’s retrial on the larceny count after an initial acquittal violated the double jeopardy clause. In so holding, the Court overruled *Palko v. Connecticut*, which had held that federal double jeopardy standards were not applicable against the states. The Court found “that the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Seven years after *Benton*, in *United States v. Morrison*, the Court made it clear that the prohibition against government appeals of acquittals also applied to bench trials, in which a judge rather than a jury acts as the trier of fact. The Court stated that

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123. *Id.* at 143. The distinction between mistrial and acquittal has been criticized on the ground that an improper mistrial has the same harmful effect on the accused’s interest in being absolved as an erroneously declared acquittal. See *Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem*, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1286 (1964). One commentator has belittled this criticism, stating that it “overlooks a functional justification for distinguishing the two: an acquittal not only connotes finality, but also signifies a decision on the merits, even if erroneous. Mistrial, by contrast, contemplates another trial and provides a valuable tool for just and effective criminal administration.” *Comment*, supra note 117, at 316 n.71.

124. 369 U.S. at 144 (Clark, J., dissenting).


127. 395 U.S. at 794.

128. 429 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
"[s]ince the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment nowhere distinguishes between bench and jury trials, the principles given expression through that clause apply to cases tried to a judge."\textsuperscript{129}

One year later, in \textit{United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.},\textsuperscript{130} the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause bars an appeal by the government from a trial judge's judgment of acquittal after a deadlocked jury is discharged. The Court reasoned that the "controlling constitutional principle" of the double jeopardy clause is the prohibition against multiple trials. The Court stated that "where a government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended."\textsuperscript{131} In \textit{Martin Linen Supply}, a second prosecution would have been required had the government's appeal been successful; accordingly, the government appeal was barred.

Shortly thereafter, in \textit{Sanabria v. United States},\textsuperscript{132} the Supreme Court addressed the status of pre-verdict acquittals that are issued as a matter of law. In \textit{Sanabria} the trial judge acquitted the defendant after trial had commenced but before a final verdict was rendered. The judge based his ruling on a clearly erroneous interpretation of the statute in question\textsuperscript{133} and on the insufficiency of evidence created by his erroneous exclusion (at the defendant's request) of certain prosecutorial evidence.\textsuperscript{134} The government appealed on the ground that the judgment of acquittal, though unreviewable as to one basis of liability, was reviewable as to a second, discrete basis of liability. The court of appeals agreed, and remanded for a new trial of the purportedly reviewable charge. The Supreme Court, per Justice Marshall, reversed. The Court first rejected the theory that the single-count indictment contained two discrete bases of liability, then stated flatly that "there is no exception permitting retrial once the defendant has been acquitted, no matter how 'egregiously erroneous' . . . the legal rulings leading to that judgment might be."\textsuperscript{135} In a brief one paragraph dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist, stated that "there is misdescription by the trial court of its order, and, [therefore], . . . the defendant petitioner's maneuvers [defendant's successful motion to exclude

\begin{itemize}
  \item 129. \textit{Id.} at 3.
  \item 130. \textit{430 U.S.} 564 (1977).
  \item 131. \textit{Id.} at 569-70.
  \item 132. \textit{437 U.S.} 54 (1978).
  \item 134. \textit{437 U.S.} at 59, 68.
  \item 135. \textit{Id.} at 75 (citations omitted).
\end{itemize}
certain prosecutorial evidence] should result in a surrender of his right to receive a verdict by the jury that had been drawn.\textsuperscript{136}

4. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Acquittals

Unlike acquittals at the trial court level, appellate court rulings that are tantamount to acquittals do not invariably bar retrials. From \textit{United States v. Ball}\textsuperscript{137} to \textit{Burks v. United States}\textsuperscript{138} it appeared to be "[a]n established principle of [federal] criminal procedure . . . that a defendant can be retried for an offense when his prior conviction for that offense has been set aside on appeal."\textsuperscript{139} In \textit{Burks}, however, the Court held that when an appellate court reverses a conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence at trial, a defendant cannot be retried. A jury convicted Burks of using a dangerous weapon while committing a bank robbery. His principal defense was insanity. The trial court denied defendant's motions for acquittal and new trial, and he appealed from these denials. The appeals court agreed with Burks that the government's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to refute the insanity plea, and remanded to the district court for a determination of whether a directed verdict of acquittal should be entered or a new trial ordered.\textsuperscript{140} The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ruled that the double jeopardy clause barred further prosecution of the defendant. The Court stated:

Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's \textit{verdict} of acquittal—no matter how erroneous its decision—it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Id.} at 80-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{137} 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
\textsuperscript{138} 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{United States v. Burks}, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976).
\textsuperscript{141} 437 U.S. at 16.
Four years later, in *Tibbs v. Florida*, the Supreme Court narrowed the *Burks* exception by distinguishing between reversals due to insufficient evidence and reversals due to the weight of the evidence. In *Tibbs* the Florida Supreme Court reversed defendant's murder and rape convictions at a jury trial, citing its disagreement with the weight accorded the evidence by the jury. The trial court denied the state's motion for a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed, granting the state's motion. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling. The Court pointed out that a reversal due to insufficient evidence means a rational factfinder could not convict the defendant when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. In contrast, a reversal due to the weight of the evidence is appropriate when a reviewing court finds that, although the evidence was sufficient to submit the question to the jury, it disagrees with the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence. The Court ruled that the defendant could only be retried in the latter situation. Justice White's dissent (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) expressed concern that some defendants who merited acquittal at trial would be retried because reviewing judges who actually doubted the sufficiency of the evidence might base reversal on the weight of the evidence.

The Supreme Court further limited *Burks* in *Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon*, upholding Massachusetts' two-tier trial system that permits a defendant to be retried without appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence at his first-tier trial. A criminal defendant can choose a jury or a bench trial under Massachusetts law. A defendant can appeal a jury conviction but not a bench trial conviction; he may, however, petition for trial *de novo* in the latter case. Lydon was convicted of possessing tools for breaking into automobiles at a bench trial. He then requested trial *de novo*, but before it began, he moved for dismissal of the trial judge's decision on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency. The motion was denied, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected Lydon's appeal, reasoning that a defendant is not placed in double jeopardy when trial *de novo* is the only relief available from a conviction alleg-

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143. *Id.* at 40-41.
144. *Id.* at 42-43.
145. *Id.* at 42-43.
edly based on insufficient evidence. Lydon then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court held that *Burks* conferred on the defendant the constitutional right not to be retried if the evidence was insufficient at his first trial. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice White relied on Holmes' "continuing jeopardy" concept (set forth in *Kepner*). According to the Court, "continuing jeopardy" underlies the general rule allowing retrial after an appellate reversal. The two-tier system can be regarded as "a single, continuous course of judicial proceedings" terminated neither by Lydon's first-tier conviction nor by his claim of evidentiary insufficiency. In *Burks*, the Court merely held that appellate reversals due to insufficient evidence are the equivalent of trial level acquittals and thus terminate the initial jeopardy. *Burks* did not determine whether a defendant who alleged evidentiary insufficiency has the right to appellate review, before retrial, of the evidence at his first trial. Justice White concluded that the right to trial *de novo* gives "a defendant more—rather than less—of the process normally extended to defendants in this nation." Accordingly, the Massachusetts system passed constitutional muster; it provided benefits to the defendant without allowing "governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect.” Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment but rejected the majority's reliance on the notion of continuing jeopardy. Justice Brennan viewed "continuing jeopardy” as little more than a label that had never been accepted by a majority of the Court.

148. Lydon v. Justices of Boston Municipal Court, 536 F. Supp. 647 (1982). The district court granted the writ, concluding that Lydon was "in custody" and had exhausted state remedies. The court relied on the Supreme Court's 1969 holding that the double jeopardy clause is fully enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 125-27.
150. In reversing, the Court relied heavily on its decision in Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), which upheld from double jeopardy attack an earlier version of Massachusetts' two-tier system. In **Lydon**, the Court stressed that the two-tier system merely allows a convicted defendant a second chance at acquittal on the facts. 466 U.S. at 310-12 (citing Ludwig, 427 U.S. at 632).
151. Id. at 308-09.
152. Id. at 305-06, 309.
153. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)).
154. Id. at 315-19 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgment).
The Supreme Court further underscored the limited scope of the Burks holding in Richardson v. United States. Richardson had been tried for three narcotics violations. The jury acquitted him of one count and failed to return a unanimous verdict on the remaining two. A mistrial was declared as to the latter two counts. The trial court denied Richardson's motion for acquittal based on evidentiary insufficiency and scheduled a retrial. Richardson argued on appeal that Burks and Abney v. United States entitled him to interlocutory review of the evidence at his first trial. The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion stressed that the double jeopardy clause's protections are relevant only when there has been an event terminating the original jeopardy. Retrial following a hung jury does not violate the double jeopardy clause, given "society's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws." The Court concluded that a different rule would interfere with the administration of justice. In dissent, Justice Brennan reasoned that, under Burks, the defendant had the right to appellate review of his evidentiary insufficiency claim prior to a new trial. Justice Brennan argued that the majority's approach contravened the double jeopardy principle of allowing the state only one fair opportunity to prove its case. He emphasized that under the Court's holding a defendant constitutionally entitled to an acquittal at trial who is not acquitted cannot avoid retrial. Nevertheless, a defendant who is tried before a judge or jury that demands sufficient evidence or a defendant who was acquitted due to mistakes of fact or law will not be retried. Justice Brennan deemed such diverse outcomes logically inconsistent.

Very recently, in Smalis v. Pennsylvania, a unanimous Court ruled that a trial judge's granting of a demurrer based on insufficiency of the evidence constitutes a non-appealable acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. Petitioners were charged with various crimes in connection with a fire in a building they owned that killed two tenants. Following the close of the prose-

156. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Court in Abney held that the special nature of the double jeopardy right placed a pretrial order denying defendant's double jeopardy claim within the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule, rendering the order appealable.
158. 468 U.S. at 324 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)).
159. Id. at 324-26 (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1949)).
160. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
cution's case in chief at their Pennsylvania state court bench trial, petitioners filed a demurrer challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court sustained the demurrer, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed the state's appeal on the ground that it was barred by the double jeopardy clause. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that the granting of a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of an acquittal and that, for double jeopardy purposes, a defendant who demurs at the close of the prosecution's case in chief "elects to seek dismissal on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence."

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Citing Sanabria, Justice White's opinion stated that "a ruling that as a matter of law the State's evidence is insufficient to establish his factual guilt . . . is an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Justice White rejected Pennsylvania's argument, based on Lydon, that resumption of petitioners' bench trial following a reversal on appeal would merely constitute "continuing jeopardy." According to Justice White, "Lydon teaches that '[a]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy.' . . . Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause." In short, "[w]hen a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal itself has no proper purpose. Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end to the proceedings against him."

5. Appealable Discharges Not Constituting "Acquittals"

Pretrial discharges have been held not to pose the double jeopardy obstacles presented by acquittals. In Serfass v. United States, the Supreme Court pointed out that a pretrial dismissal occurs prior to the time when jeopardy attaches, and held, therefore, that a defendant is not exposed to double jeopardy if the government appeals and subsequently resumes prosecution. In Serfass, an indictment for draft evasion was dismissed upon the defendant's pretrial motion alleging that he had been denied

162. Id. at 144.
163. Id. at 145.
164. Id.
165. 420 U.S. 377 (1975)
full consideration of his conscientious objector status. The court of appeals rejected defendant's double jeopardy objections to the government's appeal of the dismissal, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court ruled that "[w]ithout risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy."

Double jeopardy likewise does not bar government appeal of a judge's posttrial discharge following conviction by the trier of fact. According to the Supreme Court in United States v. Wilson, this follows from the fact that a successful government appeal of a post-conviction judgment would allow reinstatement of the guilty verdict without threat of actual repressecution. A jury found Wilson guilty of unlawful conversion of union funds, but the trial judge granted defendant's post-verdict motion to dismiss on grounds of pre-indictment delay. The court of appeals rejected the government's appeal on double jeopardy grounds, deeming the dismissal an unreviewable acquittal. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that a new trial was not required for reinstatement of the guilty verdict. The Court stated that "a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact."

The Supreme Court applied the principle laid down in Wilson to bench trials in United States v. Jenkins. Following a bench trial, the trial judge dismissed Jenkins' indictment for failing to report for induction into the armed services. The judge reasoned that it would be unfair to apply retroactively a Supreme Court ruling that local draft boards need not consider post-induction-order claims for conscientious objector status. The Second Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for lack of jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act; the court of appeals believed that Jenkins had been acquitted and that appeal was barred regardless of the need for a second trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed, but on grounds different from those relied upon by the Second Circuit. According to Justice Rehnquist, Wilson held that "[w]hen a case has been tried to a

166. Id. at 391-92.
167. Such posttrial discharges in federal court are authorized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c).
169. Id. at 345.
jury, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit an appeal by
the Government providing that a retrial would not be required
in the event the Government is successful in its appeal."

That principle applied in the instant case, since the double jeopardy
clause does not distinguish between bench and jury trials. Be-
cause the Court could not discover a clear resolution of the fac-
tual issues against Jenkins in the trial court, the dismissal of the
government's appeal was allowed to stand. The Court noted
that, with no finding of guilt to reinstate, remand to the trial
court for additional findings would have been required if the
government's appeal succeeded. The Court concluded that such
a remand would be inappropriate: "The trial, which could have
resulted in a judgment of conviction, has long since terminated
in [Jenkins'] favor. To subject him to any further such proceed-
ings at this stage would further violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. . . ."

The Supreme Court also has held that a midtrial dismissal se-
cured by defendant on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence
does not create a double jeopardy bar to government appeals in
*United States v. Scott.* After hearing all of the evidence and
before submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge granted
Scott's motion to dismiss the first two counts of a three count
indictment for distribution of narcotics. The judge ruled that
Scott had been prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. Thereafter
the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty as to the third count.
The court of appeals denied the government's appeal of the two
trial court dismissals. The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded to that court for consideration of the
merits of the government's appeal. The Court pointed out
that Scott could have awaited verdict, and, in the event he was
found guilty, entered a post-verdict motion for dismissal. In-
stead, Scott elected to seek early termination of his trial on
grounds unrelated to his guilt or innocence. His motion pre-
vented the government from securing a determination of guilt or

173. 420 U.S. at 365.
174. *Id.* at 370. *Jenkins* was subsequently rejected by the Court in United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), to the extent that it barred every reversal of a mid-trial dis-
missal that would lead to the resolution of factual issues on remand. *See infra* note 176.
175. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
176. In doing so the Court (by a five to four majority) overruled its holding in United
States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), that any mid-trial discharge of a defendant would
bar further proceedings if a resolution of factual issues would be required on reversal and
remand.
177. If such a motion had been granted, the government could have appealed. *See*
discussion of Wilson, *supra* text accompanying notes 167-69.
innocence by the jury empaneled to try him. Accordingly, Scott had no double jeopardy right to avoid a second trial. As one commentator has noted, Scott indicates that dismissals based on legal grounds—which do not implicate factual guilt or innocence—are to be treated differently than dismissals based on factual grounds. The latter dismissals are barred from reconsideration on double jeopardy grounds, while the former are not. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, rejected this "fact/law" distinction as "insupportable in either logic or policy."

The "fact/law" distinction set forth in Scott was discussed most recently in Rodrigues v. Hawaii. Rodrigues was indicted on several counts of sodomy and rape. Prior to the empanelling of a jury, Rodrigues' attorney raised the defense of mental disease. The trial judge suspended the preliminary proceedings, and, after a ten day hearing on the insanity issue, entered an acquittal on grounds of insanity. The state appealed, and the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in a divided opinion, reversed and remanded on the ground that the trial court erred in weighing the evidence as to insanity. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, and Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. The dissent noted that the trial judge concededly had sat as a "trier of fact" on the insanity issue. As Justice Brennan pointed out,

[the issue in the instant case—an issue neither discussed nor addressed in Serfass—is whether jeopardy attaches to an acquittal based upon a resolution of a factual element of the crime that occurred prior to the empanelling of a jury or the calling of the first witness. . . . Because we have not addressed the question and because it is of some importance, I believe that plenary consideration is appropriate.]

Appeals of sentences, unlike appeals of acquittals, are not barred by the double jeopardy clause. In United States v. DiFrancesco, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3576, which allows the United States to appeal to the court of appeals the sentence given a "dangerous special of-

178. See 437 U.S. at 96-99.
180. 437 U.S. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
fender” by a district court, and allows the court of appeals to affirm the sentence, impose a different sentence, or remand to the district court for further sentencing proceedings. The Court deemed it well established that a sentence in a non-capital case “does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.” The Court emphasized that “the prosecution’s statutorily granted right to review a sentence . . . does not involve a retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic issue of guilt or innocence.”

Before closing this discussion, a brief comment concerning the “attachment” of jeopardy is in order. As previously noted, under English law an individual is not considered “in jeopardy” until a verdict of acquittal or conviction is entered. In contrast, under American case law, jeopardy is said to attach in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and sworn. In a bench trial, attachment occurs when the judge begins to hear the evidence. As Justice Powell’s dissent in Crist v. Betz points out, the rule that jeopardy attaches when a jury has been empaneled and sworn appears to confuse a common law rule of jury practice with the concept of double jeopardy. Justice Powell marshals evidence suggesting that in the early nineteenth century, the double jeopardy clause was not deemed to bar retrials of individuals in cases in which a jury had been dismissed prior to rendering a verdict. According to Justice Powell, it was understood during that period that jeopardy attached at the time of conviction or acquittal and not before.

Nevertheless, the question of when jeopardy attaches has no direct bearing on the central issue addressed by this Report—the appealability of acquittals. Whether or not jeopardy

184. Id. at 134.
185. Id. at 136.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
189. See 437 U.S. at 43-46.
190. See id. at 44. Justice Powell notes that Justices Washington and Story originally believed that jeopardy attached at the time of conviction or acquittal. See United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 14,858) (Story, J.); United States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 212 (C.C.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 15,321) (Washington, J.) (“the jeopardy spoken of in [the fifth amendment] can be interpreted to mean nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of the prisoner, and the judgment of the court thereupon.”) As late as 1833, Justice Story opined that the double jeopardy clause meant “that a party shall not be tried a second time for the same offense, after he has once been convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged, by the verdict of a jury, and judgment has passed thereon for or against him.” 3 J. Story, supra note 93, at 659.
attaches at an earlier stage, it is clear, at the very least, that jeopardy has attached by the time an acquittal is entered. There is no eighteenth century evidence, nor evidence in contemporary English practice to suggest that jeopardy does not attach until after the government has appealed an acquittal. Thus, even if American case law were to revert to eighteenth century norms and hold that jeopardy attaches at the time of conviction or acquittal, the government's right to appeal an acquittal could not justifiably be expanded. In any event, despite the technical rules of attachment, the preceding case law discussion reveals that the courts have seen fit to allow government appeals in a variety of situations after evidence has begun to be heard or a jury has been empaneled. For these reasons, this Report does not concern itself further with the "attachment of jeopardy" question.

B. Summary Of Case Law Principles

The preceding case law discussion illuminates double jeopardy obstacles to federal government appeals of judicial terminations that favor defendants. Under current case law, it is well established that terminations deemed "acquittals" cannot be appealed by the government (Kepner). This rule, which is aimed at forestalling successive prosecutions, applies to implied acquittals (Green); to acquittals by the judge as trier of fact (Morrison); and to a trial judge's judgment of acquittal in the face of a deadlocked jury (Martin Linen Supply). The rule holds even when an acquittal is due to trial court errors of law (Sanabria). Whether a trial is to the jury or to the bench, this rule protects defendants from post-acquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence (Smalis).

Despite the flat rule barring appeals of acquittals, the government retains substantial latitude to obtain new trials when the jury is unable to reach a verdict at the initial trial or when convictions are set aside, and to appeal dismissals in criminal cases. The double jeopardy clause does not bar a retrial following a hung jury (Richardson), nor does it bar retrials following appellate court rulings that set aside convictions, provided those rulings are not based on insufficiency of the evidence (Burks). Furthermore, appellate court reversals of convictions based on different interpretations of the weight accorded the evidence do not bar retrials (Tibbs). Convicted defendants in "two-tier trial" jurisdictions do not appear to have a double jeopardy right to appeal, based on insufficiency of the evidence, as long as a trial
de novo is available (Lydon). In addition, the double jeopardy clause does not bar government appeals of pretrial discharges (Serfass), midtrial dismissals on legal grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence (Scott), or posttrial discharges following conviction by the trier of fact (Wilson). Finally, there is no double jeopardy bar to government appeals of sentences (DiFrancesco).

In sum, current judicial precedents allow the government to appeal a wide variety of pretrial, midtrial, and posttrial determinations providing for the release of criminal defendants. Only acquittals by the trier of fact—whether explicit or implicit—invoke the double jeopardy clause's prohibition on government appeals.

III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY TREATMENT OF GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

We now briefly survey the double jeopardy treatment of government appeals of acquittals as it developed in the fifty states and in foreign jurisdictions. Our discussion of state double jeopardy law covers the period prior to 1969, when the Supreme Court held in Benton v. Maryland191 that the federal Constitution's double jeopardy clause is fully enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment. Since Benton, federal constitutional restrictions on appeals of acquittals have applied fully to the states.

A. The Treatment Of Government Appeals Of Acquittals In The Fifty States192

The adoption of the federal double jeopardy clause inspired various states to adopt state constitutional double jeopardy provisions. Pennsylvania adopted a double jeopardy clause in 1790, followed by Kentucky and Delaware in 1792. Large numbers of states followed suit in the nineteenth century. By the time of Benton v. Maryland, forty-five of the fifty state constitutions contained double jeopardy clauses.193 Thirty-seven state consti-

192. The discussion of the double jeopardy status of appeals in the 50 states draws upon our independent research into early American case law. A good overview of the state law treatment of double jeopardy is found in J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 77-115.
193. Id. at 78-79. Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont were the only five states whose constitutions contained no double jeopardy clause.
tutions largely followed the federal formula that no person shall be twice put in "jeopardy," while eight constitutions provided that after an acquittal a person shall not be tried again for the same offense (the New Hampshire formula). No state constitution, however, indicated (and none indicates today) what is meant by "jeopardy" or by "the same offense." Furthermore, no state constitution addressed (or today addresses) the status of government appeals of acquittals.

Early- and mid-nineteenth century state cases indicate a widely held understanding that, at common law, the state could not bring a writ of error following an acquittal. In 1817, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in dismissing an appeal by the state after an acquittal of perjury, stated that "[a] writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of the common law that no one shall be brought into jeopardy for one and the same offense.. . . Because of this rule it is that a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case, where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for the defendant, but not against him." In 1820, the General Court of Virginia dismissed a writ of error filed by the Commonwealth's attorney to reverse a judgment for defendant on demurrer to an information for unlawful gaming. The Court simply stated that "no writ of error lies in a criminal case for the Commonwealth." In 1836, the Illinois Supreme Court summarily dismissed a writ of error sued out by the state to reverse a judgment of acquittal upon exceptions taken at a trial by jury. The court held that, under common law, a writ of error would not lie on behalf of the people in a criminal case. In 1848, the New York State Court of Appeals dismissed the state's writ of error following judgment for defendant on a demurrer to an indictment for perjury. After consulting historical precedents, the court concluded that "[t]he weight of authority seems to be against the right of the government to bring error in a criminal case." In 1849, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in companion cases that a writ of error did not lie in a criminal case on behalf of the Commonwealth.

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Id. at 79, n. 6. The list of state constitutions lacking a double jeopardy clause has not changed. SACHS, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS: A 50-STATE INDEX 47, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE (1980) (updated periodically).

194. State v. Reynolds, 4 Haywood 110 (Tenn. 1817).
197. People v. Corning, 2 N.Y. 9, 17 (1848).
year, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed a writ of error sued out by the state upon a judgment quashing an indictment against the defendant. The court concluded that "the rule seems to be well settled in England, that in criminal cases a new trial is not grantable to the Crown after verdict of acquittal, even though the acquittal be founded on the misdirection of the judge. This is the general rule, and obtains in the states of our union." Similarly, decisions in Wisconsin and Florida held that the state was not entitled to a writ of error to reverse a judgment quashing an indictment, and discharging the accused.

Early case holdings in four jurisdictions—North Carolina, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana—accorded some recognition to the state's right to file writs of error in criminal cases. None of those holdings, however, clearly established the right of the state to appeal an acquittal.

In State v. Haddock, an individual who had been convicted of stealing a bell moved for arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment did not set forth whose property the bell was. The Pitt County Court arrested the judgment, and the North Carolina Superior Court affirmed. In a very brief, rather confusing one paragraph opinion, the Superior Court stated that "an appeal will lie for the State where the defendant is acquitted or otherwise discharged upon an indictment, as well as for the defendant who is convicted. Though,. . . were this res integra, [I] should not be of that opinion upon the words of the acts relative to appeals." The court went on to affirm the arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment's failure to specify the property's owner was "a matter of substance." Because this case involved an initial conviction, rather than an acquittal, the court's statement that "an appeal will lie. . . when the defendant is acquitted" should be read as dictum. Consistent with this conclusion, the North Carolina Superior Court

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200. State v. Kemp, 17 Wis. 669 (1864); State v. Burns, 18 Fla. 185 (1881).
201. 2 Hayw. 162 (N.C. 1802).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The peculiar reference to "res integra" or "a single cause" may have reflected the fact that the defendant originally was convicted of stealing the bell but simultaneously was acquitted of stealing a heifer. (Presumably these two alleged thefts involved the same transaction and were tried together, though the brief Superior Court opinion does not make this absolutely clear). If so, the court may have been suggesting that it would not have entertained an appeal by the state of that acquittal.
held in *State v. Jones* that the state prosecutor could not appeal Jones' acquittal of an unspecified crime. According to the court, "[t]he state, in a criminal prosecution, is not entitled to an appeal under any of the provisions of the act of Assembly regulating appeals: this appeal, therefore, must be dismissed." In 1821, in *State v. Buchanan*, the Maryland Court of Appeals sustained a writ of error by the state to reverse a judgment in favor of defendants on demurrer to an indictment for conspiring to occupy the premises of a bank building without the permission of the building owners. In support of allowing the state's appeal, the court cited a number of unreported cases handed down in Maryland between 1793 and 1817. The court also noted Lord Hale's statements (discussed above in this Report) to the effect that the crown could bring a writ of error in the cases of: (1) a defective indictment; or (2) conduct found by the jury to have occurred that is incorrectly characterized by the court as not being a felony. It must be recognized, nevertheless, that no acquittal actually had been handed down in the Buchanan case—rather, the trial court merely had granted a demurrer to the indictment. Moreover, the Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently changed its position and barred government appeals of acquittals. In *State v. Shields*, that court denied the state's motion for a new trial following defendant's acquittal of forgery, despite an 1872 statute granting both the accused and the state authority to tender bills of exceptions to trial court rulings in criminal cases. The court concluded that "absent some clear and definite expression of the legislative will to" the contrary, the "settled rule of the common law," which prohibited retrial following an acquittal, would stand. The statute under review in *Shields* did not clearly displace the common law rule, the court concluded.

In several early cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entertained writs of error by the prosecution in criminal cases. None of these cases, however, involved appeals of acquittals. In *Commonwealth v. Taylor* defendant was convicted of breaking and entering and thereby inducing a miscarriage by the aggrieved homeowner's wife. The trial court arrested judgment upon the ground that the offense charged was not indictable,
and the state brought a writ of error. The Supreme Court entertained the writ (without commenting upon its authority to do so) and reversed the trial court’s ruling, thereby allowing the conviction to be reinstated. In Commonwealth v. McKisson the trial court granted defendant’s motion to quash an indictment for fraudulently tricking a farmer out of his heifer, on the ground “that the assertion of a falsehood which common prudence could guard against is not indictable.” The state filed a writ of error and the Supreme Court reinstated the indictment, reasoning that the offense charged was indictable. Once again, the Supreme Court did not seek to justify its decision to hear the appeal. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Church, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entertained, without comment, prosecution’s writ of error following the trial court’s quashing of an indictment for criminally damming a river. The Supreme Court reinstated the indictment, ruling that the trial court had erred in determining, as a preliminary matter, that the dam in question was not covered by Pennsylvania’s statute prohibiting the erection of certain dams.

Two early Louisiana cases entertained state appeals from quashed indictments. In State v. Jones, the trial court quashed defendant’s indictment for assault with a dangerous weapon, and the state appealed. The state prosecutor “admitted that no appeal could be prosecuted by the State so as to affect a verdict of acquittal.” The Louisiana Court of Errors and Appeals reinstated the indictment, holding that a Louisiana statute allowed the state to appeal quashed indictments. At the same time, the court emphasized that according to the common law of England and of most of the states—and the general opinion of the bar—the state could not bring a writ of error in a criminal case. Similarly, in State v. Ellis, the Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated an indictment for assault with a dangerous weapon that had been quashed before trial. The supreme court ruled that the Louisiana Constitution authorized the state to file criminal appeals “where the indictment has been quashed before a trial, or held bad upon a demurrer . . . [, because] [i]f the prisoner has not been tried he has not been in jeopardy.”

211. 8 Serg. & Rawle 420 (Pa. 1822).
212. Id. at 421.
213. 1 Pa. 105 (1845).
214. 8 Rob. 573 (La. 1845).
215. Id.
217. Id. at 391.
In sum, the few early state cases that authorized prosecutorial appeals in criminal cases involved pre-verdict quashed indictments, or trial court decisions to set aside guilty verdicts. None of these cases evinces a historical understanding that the state could appeal acquittals. Indeed, a number of these cases contain strong language to the contrary.

Most states continued to view government appeals of acquittals unfavorably throughout the nineteenth century. A 1935 American Law Institute (ALI) survey revealed that only in Connecticut (whose constitution contained no double jeopardy clause) could the state "appeal from an acquittal of the defendant for error on the trial; . . . [i]n all of the other states the state [wa]s not allowed a new trial after an acquittal for errors prejudicial to the state upon the original trial." According to the ALI, state decisions disallowing government appeals were "based, in some cases, on the fact that there is no common law or statutory authority for such procedure, in others on the fact that the constitution either prohibits a second trial for the same offense after an acquittal, or provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The ALI cited Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington cases as illustrating appeal prohibitions based on the theory that there was no statutory or common law authority for such procedure. Michigan, Missouri, Rhode Island, and Texas cases were given as examples of the view that retrial was barred by state constitutional provisions prohibiting an acquitted person from being tried again for the same offense. Precedents from Arkansas, California, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Washington, and West Virginia were of-

218. ALI, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 111 (Official Draft 1935) (commentary to § 13) [hereinafter ALI: DOUBLE JEOPARDY]. As of 1935, the only state statute authorizing the government to appeal an acquittal was Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6494, which authorized the State of Connecticut to appeal "all questions of law arising on the trial of criminal cases." ALI: DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra, at 112.

Applying this statute, the Connecticut Supreme Court held in State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110 (1894), that where the defendant was indicted for murder and at trial the court excluded evidence material to the state, the state could have a new trial following defendant's acquittal. This decision viewed the government's appeal as the continuation of "one single jeopardy."

219. ALI: DOUBLE JEOPARDY, supra note 218, at 111.

220. Id. at 114-115 (citing State v. Newkirk, 80 Ind. 131 (1881); State v. Johnson, 2 Iowa 549 (1856); State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878); State v. Anderson, 3 S. & M. 751 (Miss. 1844); State v. Hall, 3 Nev. 172 (1867); State v. Herrick, 3 Nev. 259 (1867); State v. Crede, 63 N.C. 506 (1869); State v. Reynolds, 4 Hayw. 110 (N.C. 1817); State v. Solomon, 6 Yer. 360 (Tenn. 1834); and State v. Hubbell, 18 Wash. 482, 51 P. 1039 (1898)).

221. Id. at 115 (citing People v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529 (1886); State v. Spear, 6 Mo. 644 (1840); State v. Lee, 10 R.I. 494 (1873); and State v. Burris, 3 Tex. 118 (1848)).
ferred as instances in which new trials were prohibited because of stated constitutional provisions that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.222

The universally held (except in Connecticut) principle that the state could not appeal an acquittal on grounds of error was subject to two slight qualifications in a few jurisdictions. First, a few cases in Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and North Carolina held that an acquittal procured unfairly by the fraud or collusion of the defendant constituted no bar to a second prosecution for the same offense.223 In contrast, an Indiana case held that where fraud had been perpetrated through bribery of the state's attorney by persons acting in the defendant's interest, the acquittal obtained could not be collaterally attacked and was a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense.224 Second, courts in Arkansas and West Virginia upheld statutes that permitted state appeals of acquittals in misdemeanor cases punishable by fine only, on the ground that such appeals did not involve a threat to the defendant's life or limb.225

State law holdings that prohibited government appeals of acquittals remained largely intact between 1935 (the year the ALI surveyed state double jeopardy law) and 1969 (the year Benton v. Maryland was handed down). One state, Wisconsin, emulated Connecticut's example by enacting a statute that allowed the state as well as the accused to appeal criminal judgments "upon all questions of law."226 This law was upheld as consistent with Wisconsin's constitution in 1943.227 No other state followed suit.

222. Id. at 115-116 (citing State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169 (1845); People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467 (1869); People v. Royal, 1 Scam. 557 (Ill. 1839); Commonwealth v. Ball, 126 Ky. 542 (1907) (appeal not allowed although clear error of fact produced acquittal); State v. Anderson, 3 S. & M. 751, 753 (Miss. 1844); State v. Hubbell, 18 Wash. 482 (1898); and Ex parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S.E. 529 (1915) (appeal not allowed despite state's claim that verdict of acquittal was contrary to the law and the evidence)).

223. Id. at 104 (citing State v. Ketchum, 113 Ark. 68, 167 S.W. 73 (1914) ("rigged" initial prosecution instituted at defendant's behest and tried before defendant's cronies deemed not to have constituted an initial jeopardy); McDermott v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1227 (1907); Price v. State, 104 Miss. 288, 61 So. 314 (1913); State v. Swepson, 79 N.C. 632 (1878)).

224. Id. at 105 (citing Shideler v. State, 129 Ind. 523, 28 N.E. 537 (1891)).

225. Taylor v. State, 36 Ark. 84 (1880); Jones v. State, 15 Ark. 261 (1854); Moundsville v. Fountain, 27 W. Va. 182 (1885). In Ex parte Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 366 (1915), the West Virginia Supreme Court clarified its Moundsville holding by stating that the state could not constitutionally appeal the acquittal of any crime punishable by fine and imprisonment—even a misdemeanor. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal Constitution's double jeopardy clause applied to misdemeanors in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).


227. State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W. 2d 117 (1943).
In sum, prior to the incorporation of the double jeopardy clause, only two states, Connecticut (whose constitution contained no double jeopardy clause) and Wisconsin, authorized the government to appeal an acquittal on the basis of error. Courts in four other jurisdictions (Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, and North Carolina) held that acquittals resulting from the defendant's fraud or collusion did not bar a second prosecution. Courts in two states (Arkansas and West Virginia) only upheld appeals of acquittals involving misdemeanors not punishable by imprisonment. The settled rule in the vast majority of states was that the double jeopardy principle (whether as a matter of constitutional law, statutory law, or common law) barred the state from appealing an acquittal.

B. The Double Jeopardy Treatment Of Government Appeals Of Acquittals In Foreign Countries

Foreign jurisdictions take differing views as to the double jeopardy status of government appeals of acquittals. Below we briefly survey the treatment accorded such appeals in several common law and civil law jurisdictions.

Canada, unlike the United States, grants the government a limited right to appeal from acquittals. Section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "[a]ny person charged with an offence has the right if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried for it again or punished for it again." The Canadian courts have stated that this clause does not abridge the government's right to appeal questions of law following an acquittal. In Regina v. Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott, the Supreme Court of Canada held that section 11(h)

does not preclude the limited right of appeal against an acquittal, given to the Crown in indictable matters on questions of law alone, by s. 605 of the Criminal Code. Such a right of appeal existed in Canada for almost 100 years prior to enactment of the Charter [of Rights] and has become an established part of the criminal process.

The word "finally" in this paragraph [section 11(h)] was obviously intended to avoid abrogating this well-established right of appeal. There are valid policy reasons for permitting Crown appeals on questions of law alone to ensure the correct and uniform interpretation of the criminal law.\textsuperscript{230}

English double jeopardy law has been summarized as follows:

In England there is a common law prohibition against a person being twice put in peril for the same offense. Statutory provision is made that no offender shall be liable to be punished twice for the same offense, even as to summary proceedings in the magistrate's courts. The Crown has no right of appeal in the case of an acquittal or where the trial court has sustained a demurrer or motion to quash [judgment].\textsuperscript{231}

The general English prohibition against government appeals of acquittals was emphasized in Regina v. Middlesex Quarter Sessions (Chairman), ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions.\textsuperscript{232} In this case the (appellate) Divisional Court refused to quash an acquittal, despite the trial judge's "deplorably irregular" decision to direct a verdict of not guilty shortly after the prosecution had opened its case. In upholding the acquittal, "however improperly obtained," Lord Chief Justice Goddard twice referred to the absence of a single case setting aside an acquittal after the recording of a verdict of not guilty.\textsuperscript{233} The general prohibition against government appeals of acquittals remains settled law in England.\textsuperscript{234} Section 36(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 for the first time gave the English prosecutor a limited right to request an appellate review of a disputed point

\textsuperscript{230} This case holding is summarized in 2 CAN. CHARTER OF RIGHTS ANN. 16-7-11 (Sept.-Oct. 1986).

\textsuperscript{231} J. Sigler, supra note 20, at 125 (quoting National Ass'n of County and Prosecuting Attorneys, A Comparative Study of Criminal Law Administration in the United States and Great Britain, 50 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 67 (1959)) (emphasis added). In at least one sense the English treatment of appeals is more favorable to defendants than the American rule; when a conviction has been quashed on appeal, the English criminal defendant is put in the same position as if he had been acquitted by the jury on the trial level. See id. at 130.

\textsuperscript{232} 2 Q.B. 758 (1952).

\textsuperscript{233} For a discussion of this case, see Note, Double Jeopardy: Appeals and Foreign Convictions, 101 LAW Q. REV. 15, 16 (1985).

\textsuperscript{234} See id. at 15-17.
of law following a criminal acquittal. This procedure is not, however, an appeal: the acquittal stands, without regard to the legal interpretation rendered by the appellate court. The House of Lords has held, however, that an acquittal is not a bar to subsequent criminal proceedings where the initial summary trial before magistrates was so fundamentally flawed that it was not a trial at all.

The double jeopardy principle is accorded great respect throughout the British Commonwealth. Chief Justice Barwick of the High Court of Australia has stated, for example, that "[a] verdict of acquittal must not be challenged in a subsequent trial, nor may the accused be denied the full benefit of such a verdict." At the same time, however, New Zealand, India, Sri Lanka, and South Africa have passed laws authorizing a government appeal from an acquittal on a point of law. The Australian states are divided on the question of Crown appeals. Tasmania, for example, permits a Crown appeal, while New South Wales allows "moot appeals" of legal questions that leave an acquittal undisturbed.

Unlike the common law jurisdictions, countries with civil law systems generally allow the government to appeal acquittals:

The French criminal procedure, like most of the civil law systems, allows the prosecution a right of appeal from the

235. Criminal Appeal Act 1972, § 36(1), states that "[t]he Attorney General may, if he desires the opinion of the Court of Appeal on a point of law which has arisen in the case, refer that point to the court, and the court shall, in accordance with this section, consider the point and give their opinion on it." Section 36(1) is discussed in Walker & Walker, The English Legal System 506 (1985).

236. Criminal Appeal Act 1972, § 36(7), specifically provides that the outcome of an appellate reference under section 36(1) shall have no effect upon the acquittal in that case. Walker & Walker, supra note 235, at 506. Indeed, the acquittal defendant's identity "must not be disclosed during the proceedings in the Court of Appeal except by his consent." Id. In short, section 36(1) is not designed to affect the outcome of the particular case in which the prosecution files a post-acquittal appellate reference. Rather, that section is meant to facilitate "quick ruling" by the Court of Appeals "before a potentially false decision of law has too wide a circulation in the courts." Id. at 506 (citing Re Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1975), [1975] Q.B. 773, 778).


judgment of the court of first instance in most cases. This is permitted even though the purpose be to secure a more severe sentence, and “since this procedure is generally alien to common law concepts, there may be a tendency to regard it with suspicion and to ask whether it is not counter to the constitutional right against double jeopardy or to due process of law.”

Thus, for example, even Japan—apparently the only civil law jurisdiction to have enacted a constitutional double jeopardy clause—permits state appeals from prior acquittals. The government, however, must apply to the Japanese Supreme Court before filing an appeal. In Italy, a “criminal judgment may be reviewed as to fact or law, or both . . . [all of] the parties to the initial proceedings [the judge, the public prosecutor, and the accused] have a complete discretion as to the initiation of any further proceedings for the review of the decision of first instance.”

In short, England does not permit the government to appeal acquittals. England does, however, allow the subsequent criminal prosecution of an acquitted defendant if the initial proceeding was so “fundamentally flawed” that it was not a trial at all. Several Commonwealth jurisdictions (Canada, India, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, South Africa, and two Australian states) afford the government some right to appeal questions of law following an acquittal. The government generally is allowed to appeal criminal trial court determinations—including acquittals—in civil law jurisdictions.

241. J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 140 (quoting Snee & Pye, Due Process in Criminal Procedure: A Comparison of Two Systems, 21 Ohio St. L.J. 467, 499 (1960)). While Sigler mentioned appeals of sentences, it appears clear from context that Sigler was referring to appeals of acquittals as well as convictions.

242. Id. at 141 (citing article 39 of the Japanese Bill of Rights, which provides that “no person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy”).

243. Id. at 144 (citing Abe, Criminal Procedure in Japan, 48 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 365 (1957)).

244. Id.

IV. Policy Ramifications

This section briefly considers the policy ramifications of the double jeopardy clause's application to appeals of acquittals. The discussion begins with a review and assessment of the policy arguments for and against allowing government appeals of acquittals. Although the arguments favoring appeals seem strongest, it appears that they generally must be rejected in light of the double jeopardy clause's original meaning. The discussion then turns to a possible limited program the government may wish to consider pursuing in order to secure some additional convictions of culpable individuals in the face of unfavorable trial court dispositions. Such a program might stress that the double jeopardy clause in no way precludes government appeals in criminal trials, when such appeals would not result in a new trial. The Justice Department might consider seeking explicit judicial recognition of the government's right to appeal errors of law in a bench trial, when findings of fact clearly support a guilty verdict. The Report closes by suggesting that a follow-up study be done of additional ways in which society's interest in ascertaining the truth in criminal proceedings might be served through government appeals that do not violate the double jeopardy clause. Such a study might examine: (1) whether government appeals of errors of law in jury trials by special verdict could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and (2) the possible use of pretrial appealable orders (agreed upon at a pretrial conference) framing charges to the jury, and resolving evidentiary questions in advance of trial.

A. Policy Arguments For and Against Allowing Government Appeals

Policy arguments in favor of allowing government appeals of acquittals have been advanced since the early part of this century. In his dissent in United States v. Kepner, Justice Holmes stressed that since convicted defendants were allowed to appeal errors at the trial court level, by a parity of reasoning the government should be entitled to appeal errors prejudicial to its interests that resulted in acquittals. Both situations, according to
Holmes, involved “one continuing jeopardy,” rather than double jeopardy.\textsuperscript{246}

Over 20 years later, a \textit{Yale Law Journal} commentary deemed it an “absurdity” that a verdict favoring the defendant (an acquittal) should be treated as conclusive, while a verdict favoring the government (a conviction) should be treated as inconclusive.\textsuperscript{247} According to that commentary, state laws authorizing government appeals of acquittals would help ensure that a higher proportion of culpable individuals are brought to justice; would prevent individual miscarriages of justice; would improve the quality of substantive and procedural law by correcting trial court errors; and would encourage better behavior by counsel for defendants, thereby increasing the prestige of criminal law practice.\textsuperscript{248}

In 1935, the American Law Institute (ALI) voted to approve a final draft on \textit{Administration of the Criminal Law} which set forth the following rule: “Where a person has been acquitted generally, and in the course of the trial a material error has been made to the prejudice of the State, the State shall be entitled to a new trial.”\textsuperscript{249} In adopting this rule, the American Law Institute implicitly relied on the theory that the appeal of an acquittal involves “one continuing jeopardy.”\textsuperscript{250}

A 1960 \textit{Harvard Law Review} article concluded that, in place of the rigid constitutional rule forbidding government appeals of acquittals, “a flexible rule balancing protection of the individual against the state’s interest in securing convictions seems preferable.”\textsuperscript{251} According to that article, it is not clear that allowing government appeals would necessarily diminish the protection afforded defendants. The article maintained that, if appeals were allowed, the government would come under constitutional pressure to present all its claims at one trial, rather than withhold some claims and pursue a new indictment and trial in the

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\item 195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904).
\item Miller, \textit{Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases}, 36 \textit{Yale L.J.} 486, 496 (1927).
\item See id. at 503-512. At the time this commentary was written, state statutes permitting government appeals of acquittals were not deemed contrary to the federal Constitution; the Supreme Court did not hold that the double jeopardy clause applied to the States (through the fourteenth amendment) until 1969. \textit{See} Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
\item ALI: \textit{DOUBLE JEOPARDY}, supra note 218, at 13.
\item Id. at 112 (commentary to § 13, citing Connecticut cases). The ALI acknowledged that its proposal ran counter to the trend in the law, admitting that “[t]he only state in which the state may after an acquittal secure a new trial for errors on the first trial prejudicial to the state is Connecticut.” \textit{Id}. The ALI has not revisited the double jeopardy issue since 1935.
\item Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 99, at 14.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
event the first trial resulted in an acquittal. Consistent with this reasoning, another commentary concluded that “a procedure allowing retrial only where error existed should be preferred by an accused to the present system, under which the prosecution may secure retrial without regard to the fairness of the first trial by obtaining a second indictment almost indistinguishable from the first.”

Although there is considerable force to these policy arguments in support of allowing government appeals of acquittals, it must be acknowledged that not all commentaries have viewed such appeals in a favorable light. It has been argued, for example: (1) that a rule barring retrials following an acquittal by the factfinder has the desirable effect of preventing the wrongful conviction of some innocent people; (2) that unrestricted government appeals of acquittals could lead to unjustified harassment of individuals; (3) that the government appeal of an acquittal unjustifiably frustrates the defendant's interests by increasing the chance of an erroneous conviction; and (4) that government should not be allowed to capitalize on the increased probability of conviction resulting from reprosecution of an ac-

252. See id. The article also speculated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel has been applied restrictively, to the defendant's detriment, “perhaps again as a product of the innate desire to afford the state a chance at some point to present a case against the defendant free from error.” Id. at 14-15 (citation omitted). “Under current law, a defendant, whether acquitted or convicted at a first trial, may be confronted with identical evidence at a second trial for an offense that could have been joined and tried in the initial prosecution. The [double jeopardy] clause bars such an action only if the offenses in each trial are the ‘same.’” Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 962, 963 (1980); see also Thomas, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323 (1986)(discussing Supreme Court standards for determining whether successive prosecutions are aimed at the “same offense”).

253. Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 362 (1956). According to that commentary, “the interest of the community in convicting the guilty would be advanced under a system that would guarantee one fair and full opportunity to try the case against the accused instead of conditioning allowance of a second trial on the accident of whether more than one ‘offense’ can be squeezed out of a criminal transaction, or on the artfulness of a prosecutor framing indictments.” Id; see also Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 542 (1949) (stressing that “prosecutors often utilize the ‘different offense’—‘same evidence’ technique only in order to further the goals of justice, i.e., where the previous proceedings have ended with a legally unjustifiable acquittal which cannot be reversed due to statutory prohibition of state appeals”).


256. See Comment, supra note 117, at 349.
quitted defendant. The first, third, and fourth points are essentially variations of the same argument.

We find the nonconstitutional policy arguments against allowing appeals of acquittals unconvincing. Any trial creates a theoretical risk of convicting the innocent. There is no reason to believe that this risk is any greater on retrial following an acquittal than at an initial trial. Furthermore, because retrials following acquittals would be premised on trial error, we believe that such retrials would often yield additional convictions of guilty individuals without creating a significant risk of the wrongful conviction of innocent persons. Allowing government appeals would do no more than accord recognition to society's interest in having one fair, error-free opportunity to establish the truth and bring a criminal to justice. That interest outweighs any interest the defendant may have in the unassailability of an acquittal that was demonstrably caused or facilitated by error in the trial proceedings. Moreover, the defendant's rights would no more be “jeopardized” by appeals of acquittals than by mistrials or hung juries that result in new trials. In both situations the government is afforded another opportunity to establish guilt following a defective or inconclusive earlier proceeding, and the case for providing such an opportunity is particularly strong where it can be established to the satisfaction of an appellate court that the earlier proceeding was infected by error prejudicial to the government.

Furthermore, in light of the great solicitude accorded the rights of the defendant under our criminal justice system and control over the reversal and retrial decisions by an impartial court of appeals, we believe that government appeals would not bring about “unjustified harassment” of individuals. The possibility of a government appeal on the ground of error would, however, diminish the incentive for the defense to attempt to interject legal and factual errors into trial proceedings, in the hope of securing unjustified acquittals. Under the current one-sided approach, in contrast, such tactics may be relatively attractive from a defense standpoint.

In sum, we believe that a government right of appeal would tend to promote the fairness and expeditiousness of criminal trials, thus increasing the probability of correct verdicts and enhancing the efficiency of criminal adjudication. The search for truth in criminal justice would thereby be promoted.

Nevertheless, we believe that a general rule authorizing the government to appeal all acquittals—at least to the extent such appeals result in new trials—must be rejected on constitutional grounds. As Part I of this Report demonstrates, the double jeopardy clause, read in accordance with its original meaning, does not appear to permit the government to appeal an acquittal of a felony in order to obtain a new trial, except perhaps in three special cases. While the Constitution could, of course, be amended to allow the government to appeal acquittals, we do not recommend that the Department advocate such an amendment. Given the longstanding English and American legal tradition that looks upon appeals of acquittals with disfavor (a tradition reflected in the practice of most states before incorporation), an amendment authorizing appeals would predictably generate a furor. Accordingly, despite the strong public policy reasons in favor of allowing government appeals, we believe that such a constitutional modification would stand no realistic chance of being adopted.

Nevertheless, we are not precluded from advancing a more limited program, aimed at securing some additional convictions of culpable individuals in the face of unfavorable trial court dispositions. Possible initiatives that might be pursued as part of such a program are considered below.

B. Vindication Of The Government’s Right To Appeal Certain Acquittals

In light of the original meaning principles derived in this Report, the Justice Department may wish to develop a program aimed at vindicating the government’s right to appeal acquittals in certain limited, well-defined situations. The Department may wish to set the stage for this program through articles or addresses highlighting the original meaning of the double jeopardy clause, as applied to government appeals.

First, the Department could emphasize that the double jeopardy clause in no way precludes government appeals in criminal cases.

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259. These three cases, recognized by Hawkins, supra note 55, and Hale, supra note 58, would authorize a government appeal when the trial court lacked jurisdiction, when the initial indictment was defective, or when the law was mistakenly applied to findings of fact supporting a guilty verdict. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) holding, original meaning analysis suggests that there should be no constitutional barrier to government appeals of acquittals in misdemeanor cases.
cases, when such appeals would not result in new trials. This fundamental proposition repeatedly has been recognized by the Supreme Court in recent years.\textsuperscript{260} Analysis of the double jeopardy clause's original meaning\textsuperscript{261} tends to support that proposition: the evil at which the clause generally appears to have been directed is the threat of multiple trials or multiple punishments.

The Department could emphasize the importance of that principle in public pronouncements and in briefs filed in court. In addition to case law references, our argument could be supported by strong policy statements. Thus, we might focus on the important public interest in promoting the search for truth in criminal trials to ensure that criminally culpable individuals are brought to justice. Government appeals may advance that vital goal by overturning erroneous court rulings that would otherwise allow criminals to go free. The incarceration or other punishment of a higher proportion of criminals would provide socially desired response to wrongful activity. It would also further protect the public, by removing dangerous individuals from the streets and by creating additional disincentives to criminal conduct. We also should emphasize that the appellate determination of questions of law, arising out of appeals that would not bring about new trials, would not constitute harassment of defendants.

Justice Department controls over the filing of appeals would further minimize the risk of unfairness to defendants. In short, we should take advantage of favorable legal precedents and policy considerations to argue that all government appeals of acquittals are permissible, when such appeals are based on errors of law and do not require retrial of the defendant.

Second, the Department could point out that while the double jeopardy clause bars most government appeals of acquittals, there are certain exceptions to this rule. Specifically, given the writings of Hawkins and Hale, the Department could explain that the double jeopardy clause, properly understood, does not bar the government from appealing an acquittal when the law

\textsuperscript{260} See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1977) ("where a government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended"); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975) ("the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit an appeal by the Government provided that a retrial would not be required in the event the Government is successful in its appeal"); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) ("a defendant has no legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact").

\textsuperscript{261} See supra Part I.
was mistakenly applied in a bench trial to findings of fact supporting a guilty verdict.  

We recommend that the Department consider seeking an appropriate case to argue that the government is entitled to appeal a bench trial acquittal, when correction of the error would allow a verdict of guilty to be entered without a new trial. The following discussion focuses on the merits—and possible drawbacks—of this initiative.  

This discussion proceeds in light of the fact that the United States, under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, enjoys broad statutory authority to file appeals in criminal cases, subject to the limitations imposed by the double jeopardy clause.  

We believe that the Department would stand an excellent chance of obtaining sanction for government appeals of errors of law in a bench trial, when findings of fact clearly support a guilty verdict. In a bench trial, an erroneous interpretation of law or a misapplication of law to the facts may yield a “legally defective” verdict of acquittal. If an appellate court determines that the trial judge actually resolved against the defendant all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt, and would have found him guilty under the correct legal standard, it

262. Departmental statements could also mention the existence of original meaning evidence supporting the government’s right to appeal an acquittal: (1) in a misdemeanor case; (2) when the trial court lacked jurisdiction; and (3) when the initial indictment was defective. We would not recommend, however, focusing heavily (if at all) on these areas, inasmuch as we do not recommend that appeals be brought invoking these three exceptions.

263. We do not recommend that the Department seek to appeal a misdemeanor acquittal on the ground that the double jeopardy clause does not apply to misdemeanors. It is extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court would overturn Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), which holds to the contrary. Similarly, we do not recommend that the Department seek to appeal an acquittal on the ground that the original indictment was defective. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896), which holds that even legally defective indictments place an individual in jeopardy, would not likely be overruled by the Supreme Court. Moreover, an attempt to overturn Ball would undoubtedly confront the argument that such a reversal of well-established precedent would unfairly authorize government prosecutors to benefit from their own mistakes (defective indictments). Finally, we do not recommend that the Department seek to appeal an acquittal on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. We presume that in federal criminal adjudications that proceed through trial to a final verdict, the trial court will very rarely lack subject matter jurisdiction over the matter that was adjudicated.

264. The first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. II 1984) specifies that:

[i]n a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.

would be appropriate for the higher court to order the entry of a verdict of guilty in place of the "mistaken" verdict of acquittal. By not requiring a new trial, such an action by the reviewing court would remain faithful to the apparent general purpose of the constitutional double jeopardy principle.

Support for this approach can be drawn from the following statement in *United States v. Jenkins*:265

If the [trial] court prepares special findings of fact... it may be possible upon sifting those findings to determine that the court’s finding of ‘not guilty’ is attributable to an erroneous conception of law whereas the court has resolved against the defendant all of the factual issues necessary to support a finding of guilt under the correct legal standard.266

Once an appellate court’s “sifting” of the facts indicates that a verdict of guilty should have been entered, it follows logically that such a verdict can be entered immediately. The conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court’s recognition (based on its holding in *United States v. Wilson*) “that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar an appeal when errors of law may be corrected and the result of such correction will simply be a reinstatement of a jury’s verdict of guilty or a judge’s finding of guilt.”267

The proposed judicial clarification of the United States’ authority to appeal errors of law in bench trials does, however, have one drawback: by allowing certain appeals from bench trial acquittals it somewhat increases a defendant’s incentive to request a jury trial, rather than a bench trial. As a result, the proportion of bench trials relative to jury trials may fall. To the extent bench trials are less likely to result in the wrongful acquittal of a defendant, the greater use of jury trials might paradoxically bring about a fall (rather than a rise) in the conviction rate of guilty individuals.

The likelihood of this paradoxical result occurring may, however, be rather small. It is not at all clear that the proposed case

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266. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) reads: “In a case tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts specially. If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact appear therein.” The Supreme Court’s reference to “special findings” in Jenkins was dictum, since the Court could not find a clear trial court resolution of factual issues against the defendant in that case.
law clarification would substantially affect a defendant’s incentive to opt for a jury trial. Moreover, assuming proper federal court judicial supervision of jury trials, it is not apparent to what extent jury trials are more likely than bench trials to yield wrongful acquittals. Finally, any rise in wrongful acquittals attributable to jury trials would have to be weighed against any fall in wrongful acquittals stemming from government appeals of bench trial verdicts.

On balance, we believe that a judicial recognition of the government’s authority to appeal from a bench trial acquittal on the ground of legal error probably would be desirable. Nevertheless, the Department should not fail to weigh the possibility that such a judicial recognition might paradoxically increase (rather than decrease) the incidence of wrongful acquittals in deciding whether to pursue this issue.

C. Follow-Up Study On Government Appeals Of Acquittals

This Report closes by recommending that a follow-up study be done of additional ways in which society’s interest in ascertaining the truth in criminal proceedings might be served through government appeals that do not violate the double jeopardy clause. Such a study might examine: (1) whether government appeals of errors of law in jury trials by special verdict could be allowed, consistent with the sixth amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions; and (2) the possible use of pretrial appealable orders (agreed upon at a pretrial conference) framing charges to the jury, and resolving evidentiary issues.

1. Government Appeal of an Acquittal, Based on Errors of Law, in a Jury Trial by Special Verdict

First, the follow-up study might explore whether the government has the authority to appeal, on the ground of legal error, an acquittal in a criminal jury trial by special verdict, when the findings of fact support a guilty verdict. In justifying such an appeal, the Department could invoke the eighteenth century understanding (expressed by Hale) that an appeal is not barred

268. The sixth amendment question is whether the original meaning of the criminal jury trial guarantee permits verdicts on special questions.
when facts adduced at trial supported a finding of guilt, but the
trial court erroneously held that the act committed was not a
crime. The Department could also point out in support of such
an appeal right that the correction of trial court legal errors
would not require a new trial. Because a special verdict (similar
to special findings in a bench trial) sets forth with precision the
factual predicates underlying a verdict, the correction of legal
error on appeal presumably would allow a verdict of guilty to be
entered without further trial court proceedings. Thus, constitu-
tional objections to appeals resulting in new trials could not le-
gitimately be raised.

Opponents of such an appeal right might rejoin that there is
little direct evidence that eighteenth century American lawyers
accepted Hale’s understanding that legal errors undermining ac-
quittals could be reversed on appeal. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, critics might argue that a special verdict procedure per-
mitting the displacement of an acquittal would violate a
criminal defendant’s sixth amendment right to a trial by jury. In
order to assess (and, if appropriate, rebut) such an argument,
the follow-up study should explore the original meaning of the
sixth amendment’s jury trial guarantee.

2. Pretrial Appealable Orders, Framing Charges to the Jury

Second, the follow-up study might explore the use of pretrial
appealable orders, framing charges to the jury and resolving evi-
dentiary issues. Such orders would be arrived at in a pretrial
conference involving the judge, the prosecution, and the defen-
dant. They would permit the government to appeal from legal
error, while subjecting the defendant to only one trial. Govern-
ment authorization to appeal pretrial orders dealing with jury
instructions and resolving evidentiary issues would require an
appropriate amendment to the federal government appeals stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. 270

269. The only early American case we have found that approvingly cites Hale for this
proposition is State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317 (Md. 1821) (discussed supra at text
accompanying note 207).
270. The second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 already provides for appeal by the
government “from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evi-
dence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after
the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indict-
ment or information.”
Opponents of such a statutory reform might refer to the difficulty of deciding upon appropriate jury instructions at the pre-trial stage. They might also cite the general policy that disfavors expansion of interlocutory appeals. Accordingly, the follow-up report should discuss possible ways of countering these arguments. For example, the government might respond that in many criminal prosecutions the issues would have been sufficiently well developed by the time of trial as to permit draft jury instructions. When this was not the case, the statute would not require that jury charges be prepared. Furthermore, the government might stress that the social benefits stemming from the correction of plain errors would outweigh the additional burden on the judicial system associated with occasional government appeals of jury instructions. Finally, the government might point out that authorizing the appeal of jury instructions might at times work in the defendant's favor. At present, some judges may have an incentive to "bend over backward" in close cases and not frame questionable jury instructions that would favor the defendant, since judges know that the government cannot appeal instructions on the ground of legal error after an acquittal. This incentive would be eliminated by a provision allowing the government to appeal jury charges.

In short, a statutory change providing for the pretrial framing of appealable jury instructions might guard against legal error prejudicial to the government more effectively without jeopardizing other legitimate interests. Accordingly, such a modification merits serious consideration in a follow-up report.

Conclusion

The review of the policies implicated by government appeals of acquittals prompts two general conclusions. First, based on constitutional considerations, the Department should not assert a general right to appeal acquittals. Second, this general conclusion is subject to a few exceptions. In light of those exceptions, the Department should consider seeking an appropriate case to argue that the government can constitutionally appeal a bench trial acquittal, on the ground of legal error, when correction of the error would allow a verdict of guilty to be entered without a new trial. The Department should weigh the benefits against the potential drawbacks of such an initiative. Finally, this Report closes by recommending that a follow-up study be done of additional ways in which society's interest in ascertaining the truth
in criminal proceedings might be served through government appeals that do not violate the double jeopardy clause.