Legislating *Chevron*

Elizabeth Garrett

*University of Southern California*

---

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr

Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

---

**Recommended Citation**


Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss8/5

---

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
LEGISLATING CHEVRON

Elizabeth Garrett*

One of the most significant administrative law cases, *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*,1 is routinely referred to as the “counter-Marbury.”2 The reference suggests that *Chevron’s* command to courts to defer to certain reasonable agency interpretations of statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with the declaration in *Marbury v. Madison* that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”3 According to the consensus view, *Chevron* deference is consistent with *Marbury*, as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the power to make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling gaps in regulatory laws.4 In saying what the law is, courts determine that the law demands deference to the agency’s decision. As Henry Monaghan wrote before *Chevron*: “A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency.”5 His use of the passive tense here.

* Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.A. 1985, University of Oklahoma; J.D. 1988, University of Virginia. — Ed. I appreciate helpful comments from Rachel Barkow, Jody Freeman, Andrei Marmor, Tom Merrill, Eric Posner, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule, and conversations with Linda Cohen, Barry Friedman, Dennis Hutchinson, and Jim Rossi.


2. For perhaps the first such reference, see Cass R. Sunstein, *Law and Administration After* *Chevron*, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, *Law and Administration After* *Chevron*]. See also Jim Rossi, *Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing* *Skidmore Within the Architecture of* *Chevron*, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2001) (stating *Chevron* “has taken on canonical status as the ‘counter-Marbury’ for the administrative state”).

3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

4. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, *Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine*, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 215 (2002); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., *Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of* *Skidmore*, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 746-47 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, *Chevron’s Domain*, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 863 (2001). A very few scholars resist the notion that congressional delegation can solve the *Marbury* problem apparently caused when courts are not the primary interpreters of the law. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, *Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State*, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 477 (1989); see also LOUIS L. JAFFE, *JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION* 563 (1965) (twenty years before *Chevron*, discussing judicial deference to agency interpretations and noting that the propriety of the practice “assumes, of course, that under our system of law an agency may not only apply rules but may make them”). This Symposium will no doubt shed new light on this debate.

could obscure one important part of his formulation: It is Congress that has conferred such lawmakership power on the agencies; thus, judicial deference stems from an understanding that it is emphatically the province and duty of the legislative department to determine whether agencies or the courts should determine policy by interpreting statutes.6

Congressional delegation is important not just to reconcile modern administrative law with Marbury; it is also the reason provided by courts to justify strong deference to agency interpretations of law. Chevron held that

[j]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.7

Although it cut back on the scope of Chevron, United States v. Mead Corp.8 underscored that strong judicial deference is a product of either an explicit or implicit delegation by Congress.9 In the first Part of this Article, I discuss the various ways courts have reached decisions about the delegation issue and provide a brief assessment.

In the end, none of the judicial methods to determine whether Congress actually delegated law-interpreting authority to agencies can satisfactorily achieve that objective. Without explicit congressional direction regarding which institution, courts or agencies, should have the primary role in interpreting statutes, the institutional choice is necessarily made by courts when they decide cases that require such interpretation. Although they tend to justify their decisions by reference to congressional intent, in the absence of such intent or without effective methods to ascertain it, the judicial branch decides whether or not to defer to agencies based on judges’ views of policy, institu-

---

6. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2086, 2129-31 (2002) (arguing that Chevron, when viewed as a rule of interpretation, can be changed or eliminated by Congress because the Chevron canon is a “starting-point rule,” but suggesting that Congress may be limited in how much deference to agency interpretations it can demand from the courts given the nondelegation doctrine).

7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.


tional competence, and other factors. Some scholars have argued that, if the decision has been effectively left to the courts, judges should devise and consistently apply a general rule of construction of regulatory statutes based on an explicit consideration of the institutional capacities of courts and agencies. Recourse to congressional intent is inevitably unavailing, the argument goes, so courts should more transparently base their approach on other factors.

My project in this Article is not to argue in favor of a particular rule of judicial review but rather to focus on a feature common to all of them. Whether courts search for some direction from Congress or whether they allocate interpretive authority based on other factors, all methods of judicial review provide that a clear congressional instruction overrides any judicial rule. As Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman explain:

The conclusion that *Chevron* rests on an implied delegation from Congress . . . has important implications for *Chevron*’s domain: It means that Congress has ultimate authority over the scope of the *Chevron* doctrine, and that courts should attend carefully to the signals Congress sends about its interpretative wishes. 11

Similarly, those who argue in favor of a consistently applied interpretive regime based on institutional, nonintentionalist grounds anticipate that “clear instructions of Congress”12 can vary the effect of the default. Why hasn’t Congress more often taken advantage of this power to signal its intentions clearly? Does its silence allow us to assume that Congress virtually always agrees with the judicial approach in these cases? Are the procedural hurdles faced by Congress in passing legislation with clear directives to courts and agencies so formidable that the opt-out features in all the judicial approaches are illusory?13 Are we sufficiently confident that Congress has a realistic opportunity to communicate clearly when it wishes to depart from whatever approach the courts are currently applying? If

---


12. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 926; see also Einer Elhauge, *Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules*, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 2027, 2126-48 (2002) (justifying *Chevron* as a default rule of statutory interpretation because it allows courts to better approximate current enactable political preferences and thereby to minimize political dissatisfaction, and supporting *Chevron*’s application, with certain limitations, “unless Congress indicates otherwise”).

the opt-out feature of all these methods of judicial review is not a real option for Congress, then the emphasis put on the possibility of congressional involvement in justifying an approach or in constructing a default rule is misplaced at best, and serves as deceptive and confusing window dressing at worst.

To the extent that anyone mentions the possibility of greater congressional involvement,\textsuperscript{14} it is quickly dismissed because Congress seldom provides explicit instructions allocating this sort of policy-making authority. In addition, it is seen as unrealistic to expect that Congress will improve its performance.\textsuperscript{15} In the second Part of this Article, I describe a mechanism that could provide Congress an opportunity to provide explicit instructions about law-interpreting authority. Low expectations for congressional performance stem in part from a failure to think creatively about the kinds of legislative vehicles available to Congress and about internal rules that can structure its deliberation. Past discussions assume that Congress could signal its delegation decision in one of two ways. First, Congress could pass a broad statute that would allocate the law-interpreting function either to agencies or courts with respect to all statutes unless subsequent laws vary the default rule. Arguably, Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act\textsuperscript{16} is a broad statement delegating that authority to courts, contrary to the rule adopted in \textit{Chevron}.\textsuperscript{17} Alternatively, Congress could make the decision with respect to each statute, perhaps also amending previously enacted statutes that are silent on the issue.

I suggest that Congress has another way to communicate its choice among institutions. In statutes that periodically reauthorize administrative agencies and large federal programs or that annually appropriate funds to agencies, Congress could determine on an agency-by-agency basis whether to delegate the power to make policy through

\textsuperscript{14} Merrill briefly discusses this option, considering both the possibility that Congress might pass a broad statute or that it would provide instructions statute-by-statute. See Merrill, \textit{The Mead Doctrine}, supra note 11, at 824-25.

\textsuperscript{15} See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 203, 227.


\textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, \textit{Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation}, 96 NW. U. L. Rev. 1239, 1249 (2002) (reading § 706 as an express congressional affirmation of "judicial power over law declaration"). \textit{But see} Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 871 ("Chevron deference is consistent with the APA's direction to courts to decide all relevant questions of law because virtually all the statutes that reflect an implicit delegation of interpretational authority either postdate the APA or have been reenacted since its passage, . . . . In effect, every time Congress has made an implied delegation to an administrative agency, it has silently amended section 706 of the APA."). Michael Herz disputes such a reading of § 706 and \textit{Chevron}, noting that the APA states that no subsequent statute can supersede or modify the APA unless it does so expressly. \textit{See} Michael Herz, \textit{Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia}, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1667 (1991) (citing § 559 of the APA).
statutory interpretation with respect to all statutes that the agency administers, or with respect to some subset of decisions. Congress could define that subset using a procedural metric, as the Court appears to do in *Mead*, or on some other basis. The congressional decision could be based on the variety of factors, including those identified by courts and others as relevant to whether a delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies makes sense. In particular, Congress could assess the performance of each agency and judge whether it is the best entity to make the policy decisions inherent in interpreting vague or ambiguous statutory language. Congress would also have the ability to revise its determination over time as it reassessed agency performance.

This proposal is designed to take seriously the feature of judicial review of regulatory statutes that contemplates the possibility of an active role for Congress. There are two decisions in the context of regulatory policy that require choices between institutions. First, either Congress or the judiciary has to decide which governance institution has the primary responsibility for shaping regulatory policy through statutory interpretation. This decision implicates the design and authority of administrative agencies; it is a decision that determines the contours of the policymaking process over time. In part because of the tension between modern regulatory precedents and *Marbury*18 and in part because the decision to vest an institution with law-interpreting authority is such a vital aspect of policymaking, the various proposals for judicial review provide Congress the first opportunity to make the choice of interpreters. But if Congress does not fill this role for some reason, the courts must decide whether to interpret the statute themselves or defer to reasonable agency views. Which institution is the primary interpreter is thus the second institutional-choice decision, and it can be made on various grounds, all of which Congress is better suited to consider but which are not impossible for courts to assess and apply.

In this complex interplay among the various government players, we could be more confident that Congress actually has the capacity to intervene occasionally, or even frequently, if a procedural framework made the issue more salient to lawmakers when they decided other similar issues of regulatory design. To put it more bluntly, if we want to pay more than lip service to the notion that Congress might be a vital player in decisions to allocate interpretive authority to other institutions, we should think seriously about procedures that could empower legislators in this realm. If we decide that actual congressional involvement will never or only rarely occur, even with new

18. See Antonin Scalia, *Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law*, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 513-14 (discussing the tension between modern administrative law approaches and *Marbury*).
action-prompting procedures, then our attention would be better focused on developing judicial strategies to allocate interpretive authority without reference to congressional intentions.

I. DISCOVERING — OR CONSTRUCTING — CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO DELEGATE

The traditional challenge presented by the interaction of *Chevron* and *Marbury* is to determine in a particular case whether Congress actually has delegated law-interpreting power to an agency. There are occasional explicit delegations, just as there are sometimes specific statutory provisions revealing that Congress has determined that courts should interpret statutory terms without any enhanced attention to the agency's views. Such explicit instructions may have once occurred more frequently than they do now. Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts argue that in the first half of the twentieth century, Congress followed a drafting convention to signal its intention to authorize agencies to act with the force of law. Merrill and Watts maintain this power included the ability to interpret ambiguous language and fill statutory gaps. Pursuant to this convention, as these authors understand it, when Congress delegated to an agency the authority to engage in rulemaking along with a specific provision authorizing it to impose sanctions for violations of such rules, Congress intended agencies to act with "force of law" and for courts to defer to reasonable agency decisions. The courts failed to pick up on this coded signal, but the congressional convention may demonstrate that the legislature has sometimes considered the delegation issue and reached a conclusion, albeit one cryptically conveyed.

Express congressional instructions are rare, so in most cases a court must work to determine if there has been an implicit delegation.

19. For cases dealing with relatively explicit delegations to agencies, see *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977) ("Congress in § 407(a) expressly delegated to the Secretary the power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes 'unemployment' for purposes of AFDC-UF eligibility. In a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary, rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term."); and *Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.*, 322 U.S. 607, 613-14 (1944) (finding such a delegation in statute that qualified a term with the parenthetical "(as defined by the Administrator)"). Merrill and Hickman argue that an explicit delegation to an agency of rulemaking authority should be understood as an intentional delegation to the agency of primary interpretive authority as well. See Merrill & Hickman, *infra* note 4, at 874-77. Cases consistent with that view include *Herweg v. Ray*, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); *Rowan Cos. v. United States*, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); and *Schweiker v. Gray Panthers*, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981). Barron and Kagan provide an example of Congress explicitly instructing courts to determine interpretive issues "without unequal deference" to the agency view. See Barron & Kagan, *infra* note 4, at 216 n.58 (citing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6714(e) (2000)).


21. *Id.* at 475.
The cases reveal various approaches to this question, some that are more rule-like in nature, and others that rely on more open-textured standards. Courts have moved between the two approaches, currently resting somewhere in the middle. Moreover, even when courts have adopted a relatively bright-line rule apparently requiring deference to agencies in many circumstances, in practice judges have often resisted deferring to agency interpretations, deciding instead that the statutory language clearly compels only one result. In the absence of explicit congressional communication, any quest for congressional intent may obscure what is actually occurring: the judiciary is determining whether to defer to an agency interpretation without any guidance, implicit or otherwise, from Congress.

Although courts deferred to some agency interpretations of statutes before *Chevron*, the basis for deference was not entirely clear and often seemed to rest on the agency's power to persuade the court that its interpretation, a product of its expertise, was the best understanding of vague or ambiguous language. *Chevron* can be understood as adopting a rule-like presumption that statutory silence or ambiguity should be read as an implicit delegation to agencies. The rule-like quality of *Chevron* was in part a reaction to the complex, multifactor approach to judicial deference used in the pre-*Chevron* era. By providing a clear default rule that all cases of statutory ambiguity would be understood as a delegation to the agency to determine the meaning of the text, *Chevron* attempted to provide certainty and predictability for Congress, agencies, and the regulated. The most enthusiastic proponent of *Chevron* as an across-the-board presumption, Justice Scalia, does not argue that it would capture actual congressional intent in many, or even most cases. Indeed, as a textualist, Scalia is not particularly concerned with congressional intent in any context; he has expressed strong doubts that it is a coherent concept. Instead, he maintains that "any rule adopted in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can legislate."
The connection between *Chevron*'s presumption and actual congressional wishes is further undermined because the presumption has been applied to all regulatory statutes, not just those passed after the Court changed its approach from a multifactor analysis to a strong presumption. For statutes enacted before 1984, including the Clean Air Act provision at issue in *Chevron*, Congress could not be presumed to have relied on the default rule and therefore used ambiguity to signal its delegation of law-interpreting authority to agencies.

Notwithstanding the lack of connection between the presumption and an actual congressional intent to delegate in many contexts, proponents argue that the rule allows for certainty in the future. If the rule is applied consistently, Congress can draft statutes in reliance on the default regime.\(^{27}\) Thus, if Congress is silent about which institution has the primary responsibility for interpreting unclear statutory text, the legislature can be fairly understood as intending that agencies fulfill that role. In addition, an across-the-board presumption offers the promise of reducing judicial decision costs. In theory, a bright-line rule that ambiguity or silence results in deference, absent congressional instructions to the contrary, is easy for judges to apply, particularly compared to a multifactor standard. Finally, use of the rule has been justified because any errors (measured against the baseline of what Congress intended) occur in favor of policymaking by a more democratically accountable institution, the executive branch, rather than by the insulated, unelected, and life-tenured judicial branch.\(^{28}\)

*Chevron*'s rule-like quality has caused substantial unease for some judges and scholars, however, largely because of the doctrinal importance of congressional delegation.\(^{29}\) For many, the key question remains whether *Chevron* leads to deference only, or even mainly, in cases where Congress actually delegated interpretive power to the agencies, or whether the rule is overinclusive, requiring judicial deference even in cases where Congress had no intent or would have preferred a more aggressive judicial stance.\(^{30}\) Moreover, in practice, *Chevron* has not provided a certain background regime against which Congress can act, a factor which may undermine Congress's ability to

\(^{27}\) See Scalia, supra note 18, at 517 (suggesting that for statutes enacted after the adoption of the *Chevron* presumption, congressional silence might fairly be read as a delegation to an agency to provide meaning for vague or ambiguous terms).

\(^{28}\) See, e.g., Manning, supra note 5, at 627 ("*Chevron* adopts a background presumption that reconciles now firmly established conceptions of delegation with constitutional structure. It is more consistent with the assumptions of our constitutional system to vest discretion in more expert, representative, and accountable administrative agencies.").

\(^{29}\) A rule like *Chevron*'s may be persuasively defended on grounds other than congressional delegation, a possibility I will discuss further infra text accompanying notes 76-79.

\(^{30}\) See, e.g., Farina, supra note 4, at 470-71.
implement any desire to provide express directives. The scope of *Chevron* is unclear, and judges can avoid deferring to the agency interpretation if they find that statutory meaning is unambiguous. By aggressively employing methods of statutory construction, courts decide cases at Step One of *Chevron*, thereby saying what the law is in the traditional sense, and avoiding deference to reasonable agency understandings that the judges do not share. Scalia has acknowledged that one reason he supports *Chevron* as an across-the-board presumption is that his method of interpretation allows him to resolve many cases at Step One, avoiding the distasteful prospect of accepting an agency view with which he disagrees. In addition, at Step Two a judge can avoid deferring to an arguably reasonable interpretation by finding conflicts between the agency’s policy decision and the judge’s reading of the relevant statute’s purposes or goals.

Several commentators have observed after conducting various studies of the case law that the effect of *Chevron* on judicial outcomes has not been as significant as one might have expected, although many have found some increased level of judicial deference to agency interpretations. In addition, it was not entirely clear until recently

---

31. Steven Croley, The Scope of *Chevron* (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Scope of Judicial Review portion of the Project on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA’s Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc. Merrill recently observed that the *Chevron* rule has elements of a more open-textured standard, undermining the predictability that it promises, although it is more rule-like than the judicial approach before 1984 and than the approach in *Mead*. See Merrill, *The Mead Doctrine*, supra note 11, at 808-09, 818.


33. See Scalia, supra note 18, at 521.

34. M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of *Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council* (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the Scope of Judicial Review portion of the Project on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA’s Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/abachevron1.doc. Ronald Levin has argued convincingly that many of these cases are really Step One cases although the statutory interpretation by the court is done when assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation. He terms such cases “belatedly discovered clear meaning” cases. See Ronald M. Levin, *The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered*, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1283-84 (1997).

whether other justices shared Scalia's view that *Chevron* operates as an across-the-board presumption. In *Mead*, the majority rejects such an understanding, claiming it is an inaccurate portrayal of judicial practice. If Congress and interest groups are uncertain about the application of the judicial rule, crafting a legislative response is more difficult.

Given the doctrinally pivotal role of congressional delegations in legitimizing deferential judicial review, some have advocated that the courts should work to discern in each case whether Congress intended, or would have intended, that the agency interpret unclear statutory language. Writing a few years after *Chevron*, then-Judge Breyer agreed with Scalia that congressional intent to delegate in these cases is a "kind of legal fiction" in that it is often constructed by courts without any explicit directive from the legislature. Breyer argued that courts should work to find implicit congressional intent by analyzing what a reasonable legislator would have intended with regard to the delegation issue, in light of all the practical circumstances surrounding the particular enactment. In other words, to reduce errors in the judicial determination of whether Congress wanted or would have wanted to delegate law-interpreting powers to an agency, courts should employ a multifactor approach reminiscent of the pre-*Chevron* analysis. But this approach is not wholly satisfactory for those pursuing an intentionalist course either. The use of such a standard imposes high decision costs on the judiciary; and even if judges use such an approach in a sophisticated manner, they may still misjudge whether Congress intended, or would have intended, to delegate law interpretation to the agencies.

Recently, the Court has tried to resolve the disagreement by adopting a sort of middle ground. In *Mead*, the Court articulates a standard of judicial review that has both rule-like and standard-like components. The objective of the new approach is the same as the objective articulated in *Chevron*: to discover Congress's intent as to which institution — courts or agencies — should make policy by inter-

---


38. Id. at 370-73; see also Farina, *supra* note 4, at 528 (acknowledging difficulty for courts of a multifactor and nuanced approach but arguing that it is constitutionally compelled).
interpreting ambiguous or vague statutory language. Mead holds that deference is appropriate when “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addressed ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law.” Mead holds that deference is appropriate when “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addressed ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law.” To reach a conclusion that an agency has the power to regulate with the force of law, Mead appears to allow judges and agencies to rely on a safe harbor, holding that “it is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”

Thus, when an agency promulgates its statutory interpretation as part of notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, or formal rulemaking, courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous text because they should infer that Congress has delegated that authority to agencies when it accorded them the power to act through such procedures.

If the choice of format entirely determined the level of deference and controlled the finding of implicit congressional delegation, Mead’s formulation would have the virtues of a relatively predictable rule, albeit one with a narrower scope than Chevron’s broad presumption. But the Court went on to say that “the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.” Thus, circumstances other than the formality of procedures authorized by Congress can give rise to deference because of delegation, but Mead provides little guidance about what those circumstances might be. In general, courts should assess factors that suggest Congress intended the agency to act with force of law, an inference easily drawn, the Court says, when Congress allows agencies to use certain procedures to regulate, but also possible in other unspecified circumstances.

To the extent that Mead posits a general rule to discern implicit congressional intent, the link between the procedure authorized and the amount of law-interpreting authority delegated is not immediately

39. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 479 (noting that the Mead Court “made clear that Chevron deference is grounded in a congressional intent to delegate primary interpretive authority to the agency”).

40. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.

41. Id. at 230. Merrill and Watts argue that the agency’s use of such procedures is itself not sufficient to allow a conclusion that Congress intended the agency to have the power to act with force of law. The determination of Congress’s intent should be a separate inquiry from the question whether the agency then used the procedures necessary to promulgate a regulation with legislative force. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 477-81.

42. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.

43. For an indictment of Mead’s hybrid approach, see Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003).
clear. As Ronald Levin has observed, "If the notion that Congress regularly contemplates *Chevron* deference in passing regulatory legislation is a fiction, as it seems widely agreed, surely the notion that Congress regularly makes decisions about whether a *given procedural format* should trigger *Chevron* deference is even more of a fiction."44 David Barron and Elena Kagan similarly argue that in some cases Congress may want courts to exercise independent and relatively aggressive judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes even when the interpretation is provided through formal procedures or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Conversely, in some cases Congress may want "to give interpretive authority to an agency separate and apart from the power to issue rules or orders with independent legal effect on parties."45 The point is that *Mead*’s safe harbor is not necessarily an accurate proxy for congressional delegation to agencies, although perhaps it is a tighter fit than the broader *Chevron* rule because it affects a smaller subset of agency decisions and considers one factor that is surely relevant to discovering actual intent. But by raising the procedural issue to a safe harbor, *Mead* sacrifices the objective of getting the delegation question right in favor of certainty and predictability — a goal that it then undermines by suggesting vaguely that other circumstances might also dictate substantial judicial deference.46 Supreme Court opinions since *Mead* can be read to suggest that the Court is returning to a multifactor approach, assessing a variety of considerations relevant to either discovering an implicit congressional delegation or determining what a reasonable legislature would have done in a particular case.47

The challenges posed for courts by a multifactor standard are substantial because so many factors might be relevant. As Barron and Kagan observe: "Congress’s view on deference (were Congress to consider the matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-specific and agency-specific variables, not readily susceptible to judicial understanding or analysis."48 Various relevant factors can be discerned from the case law and other discussions of the formulation of regulatory

---


46. Some judicial deference may be appropriate even to interpretations by agencies that are not promulgated through formal procedures and that do not exhibit any other features that would allow courts to infer that Congress delegated the law-interpreting function to the agency. But in these cases, deference is due because the agency interpretation is persuasive and reflects superior expertise, a less stringent level of deference provided in *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).


policy. Any judicial attempt to discern congressional intent or to conclude what the legislature might intend if members thought about the issue could require consideration of at least four types of issues, some of which have not played a role in judicial deliberations in the past.

First, the kind of question arguably delegated to the agency is relevant in the inquiry. Whether Congress has delegated broadly or narrowly, whether the issue lies in the particular expertise of the agency and of experts generally, whether it depends primarily on qualitative or quantitative assessments, and whether it relates to other areas in which the agency has broad authority would be appropriate considerations. *Chevron* mentions some of these factors as justification for finding delegation in ambiguity.

Second, as *Mead* indicates, the kind of procedure authorized by Congress and used by the agency seems pertinent, but more than just the formality of the process ought to be considered in the application of a multifactor standard. For example, the transparency of the process, the degree of participation by affected interests, and the legal effect of the action that will emerge from the process (i.e., whether the ruling is broadly applicable and perhaps whether it is self-executing) all seem relevant considerations.

Third, Barron and Kagan have argued that deference ought to rest in some degree on who in the agency has made the actual interpretive decision, so that only decisions made by "the official Congress named in the relevant delegation" would qualify for *Chevron* deference. One might disagree with the emphasis that Barron and Kagan place on this factor, but it certainly is a candidate for consideration, at least in some circumstances.

Fourth, although seemingly overlooked in the case law, characteristics of the particular agency are no doubt relevant to Congress when it decides whether to delegate law-interpreting powers. Notwithstanding the importance of this factor, none of the judicial approaches,

---

49. See, e.g., Molot, *supra* note 17, at 1255-56.


52. See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, *After "Hiding the Ball" is Over: How the NLRB Must Change Its Approach to Decision-Making*, 33 Rutgers L.J. 523, 565 (2002) (discussing NLRB cases where courts have emphasized this factor).

53. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, *supra* note 4, at 891 (discussing this factor in a different context).


whether they are rule-like or standard-like, make distinctions on the basis of which agency is interpreting the statute.\textsuperscript{56} Instead, \textit{Chevron}'s rule has been applied to any ambiguous statutory language, regardless of which agency was charged with administering the regulatory program. Similarly, \textit{Mead}'s safe harbor of certain formal procedures is available for any agency that has been granted the power to use such formats for policymaking. The absence of agency-specific considerations in the analysis seems strange, at least to the extent that the tests purport to discern actual congressional intent. Congress’s decision to delegate authority to a particular agency is informed by both its view of agency capabilities generally and the reputation and qualifications of the particular agency.

Notwithstanding their apparent relevance, courts tend to refrain from explicitly considering agency-specific variables, even when they use multifactor standards rather than across-the-board rules. Of course, determinations of agency expertise, arguably relevant to \textit{Chevron} deference, perhaps available under \textit{Mead}, and certainly relevant to \textit{Skidmore} deference, can involve varying degrees of agency-specific evaluations.\textsuperscript{57} One suspects that courts also treat agencies differently on the basis of their reputations, although this factor is not expressly identified as influential.\textsuperscript{58} For example, some have noted that the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") seems to be given less deference, in part because of its preference to make policy through adjudication and not rulemaking\textsuperscript{59} but also because its

\textsuperscript{56} A task force appointed by the American Bar Association’s Section on Taxation to study the effect of \textit{Mead} on tax law is currently drafting a report that views \textit{Mead} as an invitation to determine deference on an agency-by-agency basis. It will also argue that special considerations apply in the tax law context justifying deference to a variety of pronouncements not limited to those produced by notice-and-comment rulemaking. See E-mail from Ellen Aprill, co-author of Task Force Report, to author (June 10, 2003) (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{57} See Rossi, \textit{supra} note 2, at 1135-36 (discussing in context of deference to rulings by the EEOC).

\textsuperscript{58} See Abramowicz, \textit{supra} note 50, at 1739 (“Perhaps courts already consider agency reputation implicitly, seeking to curtail agencies with a reputation for stretching their authority or achieving ideological objectives.”); see also JAFFE, \textit{supra} note 4, at 557 (making general point well before \textit{Chevron}); Jerry L. Mashaw, \textit{Agency Statutory Interpretation, Issues in Legal Scholarship} (Dynamic Statutory Interpretation series, Article 9, 2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9 (observing generally that agencies have different reputations depending on their behavior); Schuck & Elliott, \textit{supra} note 35, at 1021-22 (finding different “success” rates for different agencies, but suggesting that those differences could be a function of subject matter or procedural choice, rather than of agency reputation).

\textsuperscript{59} It appears that interpretations adopted in formal adjudications do receive \textit{Chevron} deference, a conclusion buttressed by \textit{Mead}. See Croley, \textit{supra} note 31, at 3 (describing application of \textit{Chevron} to formal adjudications). Scholars have argued whether such deference in the context of formal adjudications is appropriate, however, and the judicial treatment has not been consistent. See Hayes, \textit{supra} note 52, at 564-71 (discussing scholarly debate and judicial opinions, but concluding that deference to NLRB adjudications is appropriate under \textit{Chevron} and \textit{Mead}).
reputation makes it suspect in some quarters.60 Other agencies with problematic reputations, like the Federal Election Commission and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may also receive less deference in practice, although this reality is seldom explicitly stated in opinions.61

If one wants to determine whether Congress really has delegated law-interpreting power to an agency, assessing the characteristics and general reputation of the agency is crucial. Relevant factors include whether the agency is independent or under the direct control of the President;62 whether the agency is subject to capture by powerful interest groups and what sort of interest-group activity typifies its regulatory environment; how politically salient the issues within the agency’s jurisdiction are for the general public; the political pressures brought to bear on the agency by Congress, its committees, and the President; and indications that the President, the Office of Management and Budget, or other executive-branch officers do not trust the agency. How these factors play out in each case is not obvious. For example, does evidence that the President is not pleased with the agency’s regulatory decisions indicate that the agency relies on expertise, rather than politics, to set policy? And how should an agency weigh political considerations with other factors in interpreting its organic statute?

This list of factors is by no means exhaustive, although its breadth and complexity provide a sense of the challenge to courts in applying multifactor standards. The complexity is increased because the mix of factors will change over time as Congress’s view of appropriate delegations changes, or as the relationship among the branches evolves. Moreover, the factors will sometimes point to different conclusions about the congressional delegation even within the same statute, adding to the complications.63 In short, both types of judicial

60. Not only might judges, particularly conservative ones, view the NLRB with distrust, but the statutory framework in which the Board operates might suggest that Congress views the agency as less deserving of deference. See Merrill, The Mead Doctrine, supra note 11, at 832. Merrill and Hickman argue that less deference is appropriately paid to NLRB interpretations made through adjudication because the Board’s orders are not self-executing. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 4, at 892. But see Barron & Kagan, supra note 4, at 219 (arguing that the fact courts must execute NLRB adjudicatory orders ought not to make a difference in the level of deference).

61. The observation in the text is based in part on my experience as a clerk in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and on the views of other clerks, including Richard Primus, the moderator of this panel. Both agencies have received Chevron deference in the past. See William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 731 (2002).

62. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 2150 (noting that Chevron has not been applied in a way that differentiates between independent and executive agencies, contrary to what one might have expected if the doctrine were based on the presence of presidential accountability for agency action).

63. See Farina, supra note 4, at 472 (discussing Breyer’s approach).
approaches — the across-the-board presumption which provides certainty (at least in theory) at the price of errors in determining congressional intent and the more nuanced standard which imposes decision costs on the judiciary with uncertain improvements in the error rate — have limitations. The fact that both types of judicial review are not entirely satisfactory may explain why courts have been unable to settle on one or the other and, for the time being, are inconsistently applying an uneasy combination of the two.

Although both *Marbury* and modern administrative law precedents indicate that Congress decides whether agencies or courts will be the primary interpreters of regulatory statutes, and that courts merely ascertain congressional intent as they determine "what the law is," the reality is that the judiciary, not Congress, is in the driver's seat. Express congressional directives are virtually nonexistent, and courts are often unable to accurately find an implicit delegation or guess what the legislature might have done had it thought about the matter. Thus, the first institutional-choice decision — which institution decides who will be the primary interpreter of unclear statutes — has been effectively resolved in favor of courts. One suspects that, among other considerations, the judges' views of the wisdom of the agency's interpretation affect the strength of their deference.64 It is not surprising that courts often determine that deference is unwarranted; then judges do not face the unattractive prospect of upholding agency interpretations with which they do not agree. In other words, courts are interested parties with respect to the second institutional-choice determination, and unsurprisingly, they make the choice in favor of judicial primacy in many cases. But because judges understand that the doctrine demands they obey any congressional instruction, the jurisprudence has been unstable as courts vacillate among various unsatisfactory methods purporting to enable them to find congressional intent. Courts seem unwilling to eschew the inquiry into intent altogether and to explicitly embark on the formulation of a judicial doctrine, perhaps one based solely on institutional considerations, that could provide more certainty for regulated parties, agencies, and Congress.

But is this the only possible state of affairs? How would the second institutional-choice decision — whether agencies or courts have the primary responsibility to interpret statutes — be resolved if Congress

64. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, *Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test*, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 474-75 (1996) (finding that "the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial deference, but rather does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy outcomes more to the Court's liking"); Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 35, at 108-09 (predicting correctly that the relatively politically conservative Supreme Court justices would adopt doctrines requiring less deference to agency interpretations as the Democrats had more influence on agency outcomes).
more frequently provided clear instructions? Whether such explicit congressional directives are likely or even possible is the question I turn to next.

II. PROVIDING CONGRESS THE OPPORTUNITY TO LEGISLATE CHEVRON

The decision to delegate law-interpreting authority to an agency or a court is different from the sort of delegation decision Congress usually makes in the regulatory context. Typically, Congress enacts substantive policy, and the extent of detail it provides in the delegation will determine how much discretion the subsequent policymaker has as it pursues regulatory objectives. Here, however, the delegation concerns which institution is given the discretion to set policy — courts or agencies. Congress can provide more or less detail to constrain the discretion, and the level of detail may be affected by the congressional view of the institution that will exercise the discretion. At first glance, it may seem unlikely that in many cases Congress could reach agreement about the choice of interpretive institution when it could not also enact a sufficiently specific law so that substantial interpretation would be largely unnecessary. But the two decisions are not identical. For example, Congress may decide to delegate interpretive authority when it establishes the agency and designs its structure. At that point, Congress and interested parties will not be sure of all the precise issues that the agency will confront as it pursues its regulatory agenda, so achieving substantive specificity may be difficult. Or lawmakers may not agree on the resolution of specific substantive issues, leaving statutory terms vague or ambiguous, but a majority may prefer that the agency serve as the primary institution for filling statutory gaps. Thus, while the frequency with which Congress might be able to explicitly delegate the interpretive role when it cannot also precisely legislate on the substantive issues is not certain, it is likely that such occasions will arise.

As I discussed above, many factors are relevant to determine institutional competence to make policy within the authority delegated through vague, ambiguous, or incomplete language. These factors relate to the nature of the issue, the procedures through which agency interpretations will be reached, the position of the agency official likely to adopt the interpretation, the reputation and expertise of the agency itself, the need for a relatively independent determination rather than a decision infused with politics and specific regulatory missions, and the need to integrate an interpretive decision into a

complex regulatory framework. Congress is better suited than the courts to weighing these factors in the larger context of designing the regulatory state and the entities that will administer it.


Congress, because of its frequent interactions with agency personnel, has a better sense than the judicial branch of the expertise that can be brought to bear by a particular agency on a question of statutory interpretation. Lawmakers either already know or can easily gather information — using committees, staff, and witnesses — about the larger statutory framework in which an agency works, the general level of discretion accorded to the agency, and the reputation that the agency has developed over time and enjoys currently. Little of that information will be available to a court trying to determine, within the confines of a particular case dealing with specific facts and parties, whether it should defer to an agency interpretation of a few words of statutory text. In addition, Congress can revise its decision to delegate authority to an agency or the judiciary to account for changes in the regulatory environment, changes that are often related to expertise but might also turn on shifts in the political environment. A court finds revision more difficult, because it must wait for an appropriate case, because of the institutional constraint of precedent, and because it often lacks the information necessary to justify altering course. Thus, Congress has technocratic advantages over courts for a variety of reasons: its institutional design, access to experts, repeat interactions with the agency, and a more comprehensive perspective.

Political considerations also play a vital role in any decision to allocate law-interpreting authority to an agency or to the judiciary because interpretation in these contexts is an aspect of regulatory policymaking. Determining the appropriate regulatory program, including identifying regulatory objectives, prioritizing among various objectives in a world of limited resources, and choosing the means to reach the objectives considered most worthy of attention, necessarily and appropriately involves both expertise and politics. Agencies are sensitive to the demands of two political principals that they serve — the President and Congress — and constantly balance those demands within the structure of the regulatory framework put into place by an earlier group of lawmakers and shaped by the history of actions of other Presidents and executive-branch officers.66 Chevron's preference that agencies interpret ambiguous statutory language or fill in statutory lacunae was based in part on the Court's understanding of the

66. See Mashaw, supra note 58, at 14 (discussing various political influences at work to shape agency policymaking).
relevance of policy and politics to such determinations and its own institutional limitations in this respect. Yet, it might be the case that, in some circumstances, the enacting Congress will prefer that policymaking through interpretation be more insulated from current political pressures than is possible in the agency environment, even in an independent agency that is somewhat separate from the President. Whatever the allocative choice, it is based in part on political considerations — that is, deciding how extensive a continuing role politics should play in regulatory policymaking is itself a political decision, taking account of the need to consider current political realities during implementation of a regulatory structure devised in the past.

Once it is acknowledged that political considerations are legitimate factors, along with expertise-related considerations, in the interpretation of regulatory statutes, the desirability of Congress’s playing a more active role in allocating law-interpreting authority either to agencies or courts becomes apparent. Congress has the comparative advantage over the judiciary in making the determination concerning the appropriate role of politics and making it publicly. Courts are loath to discuss political factors transparently in their opinions. In a related context of judicial review of the reasonableness of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s decision to rescind certain passive-restraint regulations during the Reagan Administration, only Justice Rehnquist explicitly addressed the clear political overtones of the agency’s decisions:

The agency’s changed view of the [passive-restraint] standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a different political party. . . . A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.

The unwillingness of the State Farm majority to discuss the presence and importance of political considerations reflects a general judicial distaste for such analysis. Courts either try to avoid the political analysis — which denies them access to an important consideration in the decision whether to allocate law-interpreting authority to agencies or retain it themselves — or they obscure the role that such an analysis

plays in their decision, thereby undermining the ability of the public to understand and evaluate regulatory policy. The first strategy leads to incomplete decisionmaking, and the second is incompatible with norms of democratic accountability. Thus, Congress's comparative advantage is not merely technocratic, it is also democratic. The more democratic institution is the more competent institution to make political decisions that should reflect policy judgments of representatives who must answer to the people.

If Congress has a greater capacity to compare the judicial and executive branches and determine which should be given law-interpreting power in the context of the larger regulatory scheme, why not require better evidence that Congress has actually made the delegation decision? One answer is no better evidence is required. Congress would generally want courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory text, so a default rule allocating the power to agencies captures what is usually the right answer. Such a default rule would be intent mimicking in the way that some contract default rules work to decrease transaction costs by specifying what parties would typically want.\textsuperscript{69} If the default rule operated successfully, Congress would have to enact express directives only in the small number of cases where it prefers that courts serve as the primary interpreters of vague and ambiguous language. The default rule would thus allow Congress to deploy its limited resources more effectively.

Recently, Einer Elhauge has advanced an innovative argument to support the contention that \textit{Chevron} as a default rule best captures congressional intent.\textsuperscript{70} He describes \textit{Chevron} as a way for courts to reach outcomes most likely to accord with the enacting legislature's wishes because use of the doctrine favors interpretations consistent with \textit{current} enactable political preferences:

In choosing between default rules [of statutory interpretation], the enacting government would realize that a rule that stuck only to enacting preferences would maximize its preference satisfaction in the future over the statutes it enacted. But a rule that tracked current enactable preferences would maximize the enacting government's preference satisfaction during its time in office over all existing statutes, including those enacted by previous legislatures.\textsuperscript{71}

There is also some empirical evidence, albeit very anecdotal, that legislative staff are aware of \textit{Chevron}, and thus congressional silence may be accurately understood as a desire for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations. Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter


\textsuperscript{70.} Elhauge, \textit{supra} note 12.

\textsuperscript{71.} \textit{Id.} at 2085.
provide a case study of the Senate Judiciary Committee suggesting that at least some aides are relatively well informed about some canons of construction, including the *Chevron* doctrine.\(^{72}\) Nourse and Schacter's work may not be generalizable, particularly because the Judiciary Committees are more aware of court decisions and judicial methods of interpretation than other committees.\(^{73}\) Moreover, it is not clear from their study how much the knowledge of a particular canon actually affects legislative drafting.\(^{74}\)

One problem with justifying *Chevron* on the ground that it best mirrors congressional intent is that it is not clear that an intent-mimicking default rule is appropriate here. When important constitutional values are at stake, as *Marbury* suggests they are in this context, the default can be set so that it protects those values and requires Congress to state explicitly that it wishes to adopt a policy close to the constitutional gray area.\(^{75}\) If the realities of the legislative process make it unlikely that Congress actually can enact express directives, however, a *Marbury*-inspired default rule means that courts will defer to agencies in only a handful of cases. In that case, a compelling normative argument can be mounted for the opposite approach: an across-the-board presumption of deference to agencies. In the face of persistent congressional silence, courts should choose a rule that allocates lawmaking authority to the democratically accountable and more expert agencies, rather than to the judiciary. Perhaps that allocation comports with congressional intent, but that is not seen as the primary justification for the rule, which is a pragmatic approach to deal with the reality of congressional inaction. Congress, rather than courts, may have the better technocratic and democratic credentials when it comes to allocating the power to interpret laws, but Congress does not discharge this responsibility. It is thus better to adopt a rule that places primary interpretive authority with the agencies, rather than the courts, because of the former's superior technocratic and democratic credentials.\(^{76}\) As this discussion demonstrates, the default rule of judicial review for regulatory statutes can be chosen without paying much attention to what Congress intended or might have intended. Instead, it can be set according to one's vision of the appropriate role of agencies and courts in policymaking through statutory

---


74. Nourse & Schacter, *supra* note 72, at 601 (noting there was a “common sense” of drafting that might be influenced by canons (internal quotation marks omitted)).

75. See Garrett, *supra* note 69, at 685-86.

interpretation, but with an opt-out provision that allows congressional variance.

Some current scholarship is concerned with determining the right background rule for courts to adopt. These scholars sometimes treat congressional intent as a relevant but not paramount concern, but more importantly they appear to have given up on the notion that Congress might decide how to allocate law-interpreting authority in any but the rarest of cases. To put it another way, these scholars accept that the first institutional-choice decision I have identified — whether Congress or the courts will decide which institution has the power to interpret regulatory statutes — has been essentially made in favor of courts. Thus, they seek to focus our attention on ways to improve the judicial decision about whether or not to defer to agencies. For example, Cass Sunstein argues that such a judgment should be based on institutional attributes, and he favors locating law-interpreting authority in the agencies because of their “democratic pedigree.” In addition, interpretation of ambiguous terms in regulatory statutes is closely related to “an understanding of underlying facts,” and agencies have the better technocratic credentials to make these judgment calls.

Merrill and Watts also favor judicial adoption of a bright-line rule, although they link their proposal more closely to ascertaining actual congressional intent. Their historical analysis of judicial review of regulatory statutes concludes with a discussion of various default rules, or canons, that courts could apply in a rule-like fashion. They favor a particular approach based on their understanding of the drafting convention used by Congress in the first half of the last century, but their primary conclusion is that the judiciary should adopt some sort of general rule, rather than an ad hoc application of a standard, because then Congress will “know[] what to say in a statute to delegate” the “power to an agency to act with force of law.” They envision a dialogue between Congress and the courts in which the legislature communicates relatively clearly with judges through statutory language. If that institutional discussion takes place, courts can more legitimately reach conclusions about congressional intent to delegate. Interestingly, all the current scholarly approaches to the question of judicial review include some role for Congress to play. If the judicial approach is conceived as intent-mimicking, then it must be grounded

77. Id. at 1056.
78. Id. at 1057; see also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 925-28 (arguing in favor of institutional approach in variety of contexts including interpretation of regulatory statutes); Vermeule, supra note 43, at 360-61 (giving serious consideration to adopting the Mead procedural safe harbor as a rule of judicial review and adopting an institutional approach throughout his analysis).
79. Merrill & Watts, supra note 20, at 579.
on some theory about congressional intent and the ability of Congress to vary the rule when its intent is different. If the rule is set for some other reason, either to empower the judiciary to interpret the law in the context of regulatory statutes (as it does with respect to other statutes) or to empower agencies to use statutory interpretation as a policymaking tool, room is left for Congress to strike the balance differently in a particular case. Presumably, the congressional opt-out feature of the default rule proposals is designed to be real and not illusory, although few commentators hold out much hope that Congress will respond frequently, if at all. Such pessimism has an empirical basis. Despite the invitation to Congress to interact with the courts in setting the appropriate level of judicial review, Congress generally remains silent. That silence is mystifying no matter what general approach to judicial review one favors because it seems unlikely that Congress would never — or almost never — want to vary the background interpretive regime.

Perhaps Congress’s silence reflects its confusion about the default rule. Scholarly proposals, like those discussed above, favor consistent application of a bright-line rule that would provide Congress with a clear interpretive background. This vision of the optimal approach to judicial review diverges substantially from the reality of the judiciary’s zigzagging course through a variety of approaches, each of which is applied inconsistently. Even after the *Chevron* decision, its scope remained unclear, and judges increasingly found deference unnecessary as they aggressively used interpretive techniques at Step One. The application of the recently adopted *Mead* approach has so far been similarly inconsistent. Without a certain interpretive background, Congress does not know where to focus its attention. It is certainly unrealistic to think that it will delegate clearly in every statute, so the inability to target intelligently may reduce the chance that it targets at all. Even in the unlikely event that courts choose a presumption and stick with it, it is not clear that any judicial canon can be frequently salient to lawmakers during the legislative process. Staff members and experts in the legislature may think about judicial doctrines when crafting bills, but these considerations often fade in the press of legislative business.

Congress may therefore have failed to enter into a dialogue with the courts either because it has no clear idea of what it is responding to, or because it forgets that an invitation to communicate has been offered. A legislative rule backed up with enforcement procedures

---

80. For example, Nourse and Shacter’s case study does not reveal what legislative staffers thought the *Chevron* canon actually meant or how they thought courts applied it. See Nourse & Schacter, *supra* note 72, at 600-01 n.56.

could serve as a reminder to Congress because it would be more broadly and frequently salient to lawmakers, particularly if the internal rule was triggered when legislation relevant to the agency's authority was being considered. A legislative rule is not a complete solution. No procedure can eliminate lawmakers' desire to sometimes avoid making difficult political decisions or to use open-textured language to garner majority support for controversial bills. Rules can empower a few members who seek clear resolution of such issues to force a vote of the body on the matter, however.

B. Devising an Action-Prompting Mechanism to Structure Congressional Decisionmaking

Congressional silence may be primarily the product of congressional unwillingness to address the issue. Rather than taking responsibility for choosing the law-interpreting institution with respect to regulatory statutes, lawmakers may often seek to avoid the decision by punting it to the judiciary. But it seems unlikely that Congress would avoid making the institutional-choice decision in virtually every case. Surely, there are some instances where enough lawmakers, either because of constituent pressures, ideology, or party pressure, would be willing to provide clear instructions if they had the power under congressional procedures to bring the matter to the attention of the full body. The widespread acceptance of the conclusion that Congress is very unlikely to provide clearer directives allocating law-interpreting authority to agencies or courts is supported by an unduly cramped view of the legislative vehicles available for Congress to use as a means of communication, and a general ignorance in legal scholarship of various internal enforcement mechanisms that can increase the chance of congressional consideration of particular issues. Only two kinds of legislative vehicles have been discussed in the literature as mechanisms for Congress to use to opt out of a default rule of judicial review; both have limitations.

First, Congress could pass a broad statute allocating the law-interpreting power to either agencies or courts with respect to all questions of ambiguous language, or perhaps assigning the power to agencies in certain defined circumstances (such as when they use particular procedures) and to courts in all other instances. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act appears to be such a general articulation of institutional choice, requiring "the reviewing court [to] decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.\textsuperscript{83} The Bumpers Amendment, considered by Congress in the 1970s and early 1980s, was this sort of statute designed to underscore that the judiciary should determine the meaning of provisions in regulatory statutes in the same way that they interpret text in other statutes.\textsuperscript{84} Had the Bumpers Amendment passed, courts arguably would not have been justified in according substantial deference to agency interpretations, but could have considered them only as extrinsic evidence from an expert source.

This legislative approach has certain advantages. It applies the congressional rule to all statutes, even those enacted in the past. It can exempt certain statutes from the blanket rule in a savings provision, just as it can vary the rule in subsequent enactments through express provisions. Such a congressional enactment might also be more salient to Congress than a judicially adopted across-the-board presumption, and thus spark more consideration of the delegation issue when Congress enacts new regulatory statutes. In addition, interest groups may be less influential with respect to a general provision than they would be in the context of statute-specific provisions.\textsuperscript{85} Such a broad statute forces interest groups to operate behind a somewhat opaque veil of ignorance because they cannot be sure of their positions on all affected statutes, or they may be in different positions depending on the program and agency.\textsuperscript{86}

Nonetheless, such "superstatutes" in the regulatory arena have been problematic for many in Congress who believe that a one-size-fits-all or one-size-fits-mostly-all approach is heavy-handed. Others may be worried that applying such a general rule to all previously enacted statutes would be unwise and lead to unanticipated consequences. Because Congress cannot possibly predict all the possible applications of the general rule, it may be better to resolve the delegation issue in a more targeted way, or to leave the decision to a judici-


\textsuperscript{84} Under Senator Bumpers's legislation, courts would have been required to "independently" decide all questions of law, including statutory interpretation questions. See 121 CONG. REC. 29956-58 (Sept. 24, 1975) (statement of Sen. Bumpers on S. 2408); Regulatory Procedures Act of 1981: Hearing on H.R. 746 Before the House Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 54-63, 918-20 (1981).


ary that proceeds in a case-by-case way. Nonetheless, there has been some support for the approach in the past; the Bumpers Amendment was nearly enacted, passing the Senate unanimously, only a few years before the Court decided *Chevron*.

Alternatively, Congress could make the delegation decision with respect to each regulatory statute. Not only does this seem unlikely given past behavior and institutional limitations, but the approach also affects only statutes enacted in the future. For a more comprehensive solution, Congress would be required to embark on a parallel effort to assess past statutes and decide what guidance is appropriate. Congress does not typically undertake retrospective analysis of past regulatory statutes, even when it adopts new procedural approaches that will apply broadly to future laws. Even if lawmakers wanted to review old statutes and amend them to include instructions about law-interpreting authority, the sheer number of regulatory statutes renders the task a formidable one. Given limited time and energy, legislators would review only a few enactments, leaving the rule with regard to the others to courts to determine.

Although pessimistic conclusions about Congress's ability to respond to a general rule of judicial review and delegate clearly are understandable, we can expect more from Congress, particularly if its attention is brought to a realistic mechanism through which to communicate. Such a mechanism could be action forcing, or more likely it would be action prompting in that Congress could still avoid making an explicit decision, notwithstanding the procedural reform. There are promising legislative mechanisms that could be slightly reconfigured to make it more likely that Congress was aware of its power to vary the rule of judicial review and to empower groups of lawmakers who wished to urge consideration and passage of express direction. These legislative vehicles represent a middle-ground approach between a broad statute along the lines of the Bumpers Amendment and a time-consuming statute-by-statute assessment.

87. See Merrill, *Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent*, supra note 35, at 1031 (arguing that a Bumpers-amendment approach would be an "overreaction").


89. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000) (applicable only to new mandates). Although Title III required the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to review unfunded mandates generally, there were no enforcement provisions in this title, unlike the provisions affecting new mandates. See also Merrill, *The Mead Doctrine*, supra note 11, at 824 ("Congress does not have the time or institutional capacity to review and amend all existing delegations to agencies to add the appropriate tag line to assure the desired allocation of interpretational authority is reached.").
Congress currently reviews agencies periodically, every few years when it reauthorizes agencies or large programs administered by agencies, and annually when it appropriates money to keep the government operating. Congress could use these periodically considered legislative vehicles to instruct courts and agencies about its decision with regard to law-interpreting authority. Provisions in these bills could instruct that law-interpreting authority was delegated generally to a particular agency, that it was delegated to an agency in all cases where particular procedures were used, that it was delegated only with respect to certain statutes, or that it was not delegated to the agency at all. These bills would allow Congress to resolve the issue in a more targeted way than a superstatute would, but it would similarly provide a format where the delegation would apply to previously enacted statutes within an agency's jurisdiction and to subsequent statutes.

Three different kinds of legislative vehicles — authorization laws, appropriations bills, and omnibus appropriations legislation — could be used by Congress; however, the formats are not equally well-suited to provide an appropriate context for congressional deliberation and decisionmaking. First, authorizing legislation is by far the optimal vehicle for such provisions. As Allen Schick explains:

Authorization bills design agencies, and a crucial part of agency design is what kind of lawmaking authority, including the power to interpret ambiguous language, the agency should receive and how it should deploy that power. Again, this type of delegation decision is different from the typical one in a regulatory statute: here, Congress is deter-

---

90. Executive-branch departments and agencies are funded through discretionary spending, which means that Congress evaluates the agencies and their funding needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See Elizabeth Garrett, *Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process*, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 398-400 (1998) (describing discretionary spending and budget process generally). Some programs administered by agencies are not funded through discretionary appropriations but instead receive funding through direct spending, which means their funding occurs automatically until Congress amends or repeals the underlying statute. Social Security, Medicare, and some transportation and agriculture programs are examples of this sort of direct or mandatory spending. Although these programs are not reviewed through the annual appropriations process and may not be reviewed periodically through the reauthorization process, they are administered by agencies that rely on discretionary funds, so the decisions about law-interpreting authority relating to these direct spending programs could be made when agency funding is before Congress.

mining the design of regulatory institutions, not the details of its substantive policy instructions. Thus, the decision seems particularly well suited to the environment of authorizing bills; the deliberative process on the *Chevron* issue would be enhanced if it occurred during a comprehensive evaluation of the agency.

There are two kinds of authorizing legislation. An organic or enabling statute sets up the agency or program; it contains broad grants of authority, establishes jobs and duties, and spells out policy details. Related legislation authorizes the appropriation of funds for particular responsibilities or programs; these laws provide the basis for subsequent and separate appropriations bills that actually provide funding.92 Since the 1960s, Congress has increasingly used temporary authorizations of the second type so that it will have opportunities to oversee, reconsider, and change programs on the basis of experience and the implementing agency’s performance.93 In some cases, events have caused Congress to change programs and agencies from permanent authorizations to temporary ones in order to increase oversight. Thus, programs like the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Superfund, federal welfare laws, and the Rural Electrification Loan Restructuring program, and agencies like the Department of Justice, NASA, and the Securities and Exchange Commission must be reauthorized periodically.

One advantage of using the authorization process to consider which institution should have primary responsibility to interpret regulatory statutes is that it may structure interest-group activity in a relatively productive way. In many cases, the key to shaping interest-group behavior is to construct an environment in which groups can bring forth information that will help lawmakers decide on their course of action94 but also an environment that has enough uncertainty in it that groups are not entirely sure how any particular decision will advance their interests. The latter feature restrains the ability of groups to pursue their narrow self-interest, although there must be enough information about the future so that policymakers can legislate with sufficient detail.95 A moderate amount of uncertainty for affected parties is present during the authorization process, which typically runs on a three-, five-, or even ten-year cycle. When agencies and large programs are being designed, or when they are being redesigned


95. See Vermeule, *supra* note 86, at 428 (discussing information-neutrality tradeoff).
in the reauthorization process, interest groups have some experience with the agencies and can anticipate the areas of regulatory emphasis, so they will work to influence lawmakers and to provide them with relevant information about the agency's performance. At the same time, however, interest groups may not be entirely certain of which particular issues the agency will place on the top of the regulatory agenda in the next few years. Thus, they may not be sure whether they will prefer courts or agencies to have the primary responsibility for statutory interpretation, a situation that can restrain self-interested behavior to some extent.

In other words, the focus during the authorization, or reauthorization, process is more likely to be on broader issues of design, like the choice of which institution will wield primary interpretive authority, and not as much on specific issues that have arisen relating to particular regulatory decisions. Certainly, some substantive issues will be important, and to the extent Congress leaves their resolution to courts or agencies by drafting ambiguous or vague statutory language, lawmakers and interest groups will be greatly influenced on the institutional-choice decision by the substance of the issues left open. The longer the period of time between reauthorizations, however, the more likely the institutional-choice decision will be made for reasons other than those related to specific issues. The legislative players understand that many more unanticipated issues are likely to be raised before the agency over a five-year period than over a two-year period. They cannot be entirely sure which institution is likely to favor the outcomes they support when the substance of future decisions is uncertain and the composition of the institutions themselves may change. A presidential term lasts only four years, and the federal judiciary can shift significantly over a five-year period. If the institutional-choice decision is nevertheless made primarily with a view to a particular, very important substantive issue, it will have consequences well past that decision, a factor that will play some role in the design decisions.

To ensure that Congress actually considered the delegation issue and reached some decision that was clearly expressed in the legislation, the legislature could adopt internal rules mandating that these provisions be included in any authorization bill reported out of committee. A modern committee report contains a great deal of mandatory information, some required by budget rules, some by other congressional rules. In the House, for example, each committee report contains relevant oversight findings and recommendations, cost estimates, a statement of the constitutional authority supporting enactment of the bill, an estimate of the costs of any federal mandate on
state and local governments, and a preemption statement. Despite many rules deal with the content of committee reports, congressional rules could encourage lawmakers to place any delegation of law-interpreting authority in the legislation itself to ensure that courts and agencies understood that the instruction has the force of law.

Internal rules governing the content of legislation and committee reports could be enforced in both houses through a point-of-order process. Points of order allow members of Congress to object to the consideration of laws that violate congressional rules and to force a vote of the body before deliberation can proceed. In the Senate, some budget points of order are enforced through supermajority voting requirements so that a three-fifths vote is mandated to waive the objection. In the House, the point-of-order process can be made more effective by prohibiting waiver of any such objections in the special rule promulgated by the Rules Committee that structures floor deliberation.

The enforcement provisions should be calibrated to ensure that Congress would have an opportunity to consider the issue of delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies while not providing those who want to obstruct passage of the underlying bills too great a strategic advantage. In this context, a relatively low level of enforcement is required, because the *Chevron* issue is not especially different from other delegation issues that do not receive enhanced protection. Thus, the procedure should rely on simple majority votes to waive the points of order and should require that a group of lawmakers agree to raise the objection rather than allowing only one member to stall any bill on this ground. If this mechanism is envisioned as a procedure that will be used only infrequently to vary the application of a consistently applied judicial default rule, then the enforcement mechanisms should be even less stringent, requiring a relatively large group of lawmakers to trigger them and perhaps allowing waiver in the House by a special rule.

Enforcement would be easier here because interest groups affected by regulation would have an incentive to lobby Congress either to withhold the authority from agencies or to transfer traditional law-interpreting power to them from the courts, depending on how they expected to fare in a particular forum. Various interest groups would

---


97. Currently, congressional points of order can be raised by a single lawmaker unless some other procedure has effected a waiver. Rules could be drafted, however, to require that several lawmakers formally signal their desire to raise a point of order, much as occurs now in the Senate with cloture petitions. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, *Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress*, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1326-30 (2001) (discussing an enforcement mechanism that would require a group of lawmakers to trigger it in the context of a proposal for a congressional framework to improve constitutional decisionmaking).
be affected differently by the decision, so there would likely be groups on both sides of the issue. Scholars who have brought theoretical frameworks to bear on the question of whether regulated groups generally prefer court interpretation to agency interpretation have reached differing conclusions. It seems safe to say that interests have various objectives, and that their views on the institutional choice question will change over time. In addition, study of the process of interpretation used by courts and agencies suggests that the two different institutions use different methods and assess information like legislative history and canons of construction differently. Agencies may often reach different conclusions than courts about the meaning of contested statutory language because their interpretation is necessarily infused with their views of their larger regulatory missions. Indeed, different agencies may approach interpretation differently. These differences in interpretive approach would be relevant to interest groups and lawmakers. Such differences could lead interest groups to favor one interpreter or the other in particular circumstances, depending on how they expected the different approaches to influence substantive outcomes.

Although sometimes the existence of contending interest groups encourages Congress to avoid deciding a matter, leaving it to be resolved by courts or agencies, a procedural framework can make abdication more difficult or change the message of congressional silence. For example, once an internal rule required Congress to delegate law-interpreting authority to agencies in particular legislative vehicles, failure to make such a delegation might be read by courts as a signal for judges to act as primary interpreters of regulatory statutes. Groups that prefer agency interpretation would know that they would


99. See generally Mashaw, supra note 58 (discussing institutional differences and recommending different approaches); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990) (discussing different institutional capacities and incentives with respect to the use of legislative history).

100. See Mashaw, supra note 58, at 23 (discussing differences between Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Health and Human Resources).

be less likely to convince a court to defer and thus have a greater incentive than they do today to convince Congress to delegate explicitly. Alternatively, if the courts adopted one of the approaches urged on them by some scholars and decided to apply a canon consistently that requires deference to agencies either whenever statutory text is ambiguous or a particular decisionmaking procedure is used, then congressional silence would empower agencies. No matter what the default rule applied by courts to determine the effect of congressional silence, once it is clearly established, interest groups will respond accordingly, focusing their efforts on taking advantage of the action-prompting mechanism put in place by the internal congressional rule.

Although authorizing legislation is the best vehicle for directives about law-interpreting authority, it would not solve the problem for all statutes and all agencies. First, some agencies and programs have permanent authorizations so periodic assessment is not institutionalized. Nevertheless, Congress could revisit programs and agencies with permanent authorizations and amend the statutes, and it might be somewhat more likely to do so if the delegation issue were made salient by a new congressional process affecting reauthorizations and new authorizing legislation. Second, Congress occasionally fails to authorize programs to which it nonetheless appropriates money. Although internal rules require that programs have current authorizations before appropriations are in order, Congress can waive these rules expressly or implicitly by passing an appropriations law that establishes or continues funding for the program or agency. Congressional rules discourage substantive legislation on appropriations bills, but such riders are commonplace and have the force of law once enacted.

Accordingly, a second legislative vehicle — appropriations bills — could be used in some instances where the authorization process was unavailable. Any new procedure requiring Congress to delegate law-interpreting authority expressly should also apply to appropriations bills, encouraging explicit statements of delegations for programs that are either permanently authorized or not currently authorized. The Congressional Budget Office maintains lists of such programs so it is not difficult to discover when a delegation should occur in an appropriations bill. A point-of-order process could be used to enforce the rule.

Using the appropriations process is not the best way to make the decision. One of the reasons that legislative riders on appropriations bills are discouraged by congressional rule and judicial decision is that the deliberation surrounding such bills focuses less on program design and more on funding levels. In the frenzy that can accompany spend-

102. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 92 (required by § 202(e)(3) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act).
ing decisions, lawmakers may be less attentive to details of program and agency design. The system of dividing authorization bills from appropriations measures is supposed to ensure a dual level of oversight with the substantive committees shouldering the primary responsibility for institutional design. The delegation of law-interpreting authority is more clearly in the competence of the authorizing committees than in that of the appropriations subcommittees. Furthermore, appropriations bills are considered and passed annually, rather than every few years, and this frequency is not optimal for decisions about law-interpreting authority or other fundamental aspects of regulatory design.\footnote{103}

Nonetheless, in the real world of the legislative process, the appropriations subcommittees have a great deal of responsibility over substantive details of programs and exercise some oversight. Thus, they have the expertise to make this decision, at least compared to courts. Moreover, if the substantive committees understand that they would cede their power to allocate law-interpreting power to other legislators should they fail to live up to their responsibility, they would have an incentive to provide directives to courts and agencies. If Congress provided its directions about law interpretation in an appropriations bills through the mechanism proposed here, courts would not be justified in applying the traditional canon that construes riders to appropriations bills narrowly.\footnote{104} The procedural mechanism and increased scrutiny would ameliorate the concerns about deliberative pathologies that undergird the use of the canon in other contexts.

Of course, just as substantive committees sometimes fail to pass authorizing legislation, in some years Congress fails to pass all the appropriations bills. In such years, the government is funded either through continuing resolutions or, once an overall agreement on funding has been reached, through an omnibus appropriations bill.\footnote{105} These legislative vehicles are not especially conducive to substantive provisions like those delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies, although they can contain substantive provisions and riders. They provide the least desirable context for Congress to legislate \textit{Chevron} issues because the environment in which they are considered and passed makes it very likely that Congress would ignore any action-prompting mechanism and override any enforcement procedures.

\footnote{103. See discussion \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 94-95.}

\footnote{104. See \textsc{William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, \& Elizabeth Garrett}, \textit{Legislation and Statutory Interpretation} 172 (2000) (discussing the canon).}

\footnote{105. Fiscal year 2003 was such a year; Congress did not complete work on eleven of the thirteen appropriations bills until February, over four months late. It finally enacted them in one large omnibus act. See Carl Hulse, \textit{Spending Bill Is Approved, With Its Storehouse of Pork}, \textsc{N.Y. Times}, Feb. 14, 2003, at A24 (criticizing both the process and the substance of the omnibus appropriations bill). Between the end of fiscal year 2002 and passage of the omnibus act, the government was funded through a series of continuing resolutions.}
Thus, I do not recommend extending the procedure to include these bills when the other two legislative formats have not produced a clear legislative instruction. In years where the appropriations process breaks down (which tends to affect only some agencies and programs because usually a few of the thirteen appropriations bills are passed) and the authorization process is unavailable, previously enacted provisions allocating the authority would remain in effect. If such provisions had not been passed or had expired, the courts could proceed in the absence of a congressional delegation, interpreting the regulatory statute as they interpret other laws and considering agency views as persuasive but not controlling authority. Alternatively, if the judiciary was convinced that a background default rule of deference to the agency was justified on normative grounds, then courts would understand silence to signal congressional acceptance of deference in this instance.

A procedural framework would make this issue of delegation more salient to lawmakers, and it would encourage the use of legislative vehicles that are regularly considered. The structure of these laws would enable Congress to make the proper trade-offs, thinking globally about agencies' institutional competence, more specifically about a particular agency's abilities, and finally about particular statutes and programs within the agency's jurisdiction. Although it seems likely that Congress would often prefer to delegate this aspect of policymaking power to agencies, over which it has more influence than it does over the independent judiciary, the legislature would likely reach the opposite conclusion at least some of the time. Not only would some interest groups work to influence the legislature to favor the courts in some instances, but in the past Congress has demonstrated a preference for courts to act as the primary interpreter of regulatory statutes. The Administrative Procedure Act contains such a statement, and the Bumpers Amendment, which nearly passed Congress, favored courts over agencies in all circumstances. Senator Bumpers justified his proposal by arguing that courts would ensure greater fidelity to congressional desires, whereas agencies would follow the lead of the president or implement their own policy goals notwithstanding congressional intent.106 Many in Congress are unlikely to share Bumpers's preference because they hope to use their power over agencies through oversight, appropriations, and jawboning to influence regulatory outcomes. But the history of legislative action in this arena suggests that Congress would sometimes delegate to courts or restrict the delegation to agencies, particularly when it would have the opportunity to revisit its decision in the future.

C. Limitations of the Action-Prompting Mechanism and the Need for a Continuing Judicial Role

Although promising, this proposal has some evident limitations. First and foremost is the concern that Congress would continue to evade its responsibility and avoid express delegations notwithstanding the procedural framework. If Congress remains silent even after adopting a procedural structure to prompt a decision, courts might be justified in taking primary responsibility for interpreting regulatory statutes. Under the traditional approach that is tied to congressional intent, deference on the basis of delegation would seem inappropriate in such circumstances. Adopting such a procedure would signal that Congress hoped to provide better directives to courts; therefore, the absence of an express delegation would have a different meaning than it does now. To put it another way, if the background rule is that courts are the primary interpreters of ambiguous statutory text, then congressional silence could be taken to mean that Congress had made the institutional-choice decision in favor of allowing courts to carry on their usual role.

Alternatively, congressional silence could be understood as a decision by Congress to let courts determine which institution, courts or agencies, should have the primary responsibility to make policy through statutory interpretation. In this case, courts might decide, perhaps on institutional grounds, to adopt and consistently apply some default rule of deference, understanding that the action-prompting procedure in Congress would make it more likely that the legislature could vary the default when it wanted to. The point here is a general one: judicial doctrines should take account of the realities of the legislative process, and legislative process should be reconfigured to allow Congress a realistic opportunity to take advantage of opt-out provisions in default rules of judicial review, whatever the content.

Second, the possibility that Congress might allocate law-interpreting power away from an agency if lawmakers decided the agency’s performance was unacceptable would increase the influence of current Congresses over agencies. This in turn might increase the political pressures on agencies, particularly pressures related to current political passions. Moreover, it would especially increase the influence of the committees responsible for authorization and appropriations bills because they would make the initial decision about delegating law-interpreting authority.107 The full House or Senate

107. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1443, 1501-02 (2003) (arguing that oversight techniques tend to empower submajorities in Congress that may subvert the objectives of the full body as articulated in statutory commands); Molot, supra note 17, at 1291 (noting that “it is far from clear that the policy preferences of legislative oversight committees accurately reflect the views of the House or Senate as a whole”); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Ac-
would be unlikely to revisit the decision in the context of deliberation on a lengthy legislative proposal dealing with many aspects of an agency or with many funding decisions. Of course, these committees already have significant influence over agencies because of their oversight activities, their control over agency budgets, and other formal and informal tools used to influence administrators. Agencies routinely balance the demands of their competing principals — Congress and the President — within the structure of the regulatory program enacted by yet a third principal, a previous Congress. While my proposal might marginally increase the influence of current lawmakers, particularly those on oversight committees, I do not see it as significant enough to profoundly affect current dynamics.

Third, and relatedly, Congress might decide how to allocate authority between agencies or courts solely on political grounds. For example, a Democratic Congress, angry at the policies pursued by the Environmental Protection Agency under a conservative Republican president, might decide to punish it by instructing courts to pay no special attention to agency views on statutory interpretation. Of course, this objection is no different from accusations that can be leveled at Congress with respect to any delegation of regulatory authority. Political considerations are not illegitimate in this realm; regulatory policy should be based on a mix of technocratic issues and on political perspectives that take account of the wishes of the electorate. Both change over time, and Congress and the executive branch take account of them as they determine regulatory policy.

It is not clear to me why this context poses a greater risk of inappropriate political power plays than other arenas. On the contrary, Congress might feel somewhat more constrained here for several reasons. First, if lawmakers “punished” agencies by taking away law-interpreting power, they would allocate that power to judges who might be less likely to take account of current congressional preferences and who would still pay some attention to agency views as an extrinsic source of meaning. So the punishment might rebound, leaving Congress reliant on an institution that it influences less effectively.

countability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1075-82 (2001) (discussing effect of congressional oversight when the members of oversight committees have outlying preferences); see also Mashaw, supra note 58, at 23 (noting that effective agencies already take current political developments into account when making regulatory decisions).


109. See DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 151-54 (1999); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 107.
than it does the agency and that often trusts agencies as the repositories of expertise more than it trusts the legislature.

Second, the use of the authorization process to make the allocation decision would have interesting temporal effects. Reauthorizations occur every few years, sometimes every five years or even longer, so lawmakers would be aware that if they delegated interpretive power to the courts, that decision would likely stay in place for some time, perhaps past the term of the president with which Congress disagreed. Of course, Congress could revisit its decision at any time, but an action-prompting mechanism tied to the reauthorization process is necessary because Congress does not often act without some sort of prod. Thus, although no decision allocating law-interpreting power would be final, it would likely be reassessed in light of changes in the political environment only when Congress considered a reauthorization proposal. Using authorization legislation for the *Chevron* choice would decrease the chance of severe punishment because the decision would have some durability, but any overreaction that occurred could be reassessed within a reasonable time and in a different political climate.

Even in cases where Congress delegated law-interpreting authority to an agency, courts would have some independent role to play. First, courts would determine the scope of the delegation and ensure that the agency had not exceeded its authority nor regulated past the jurisdiction Congress granted it. Deference to agency determinations of these issues would be inappropriate because agencies are interested parties, with incentives in some cases to overreach and in some cases to evade responsibility that clearly had been placed on them. The court's job would be to determine the scope of the congressional delegation, a task made easier with express congressional directives not to second-guess the agency's decision to regulate particular entities or to deal with problems that arguably come within its mandate. The issue of whether *Chevron* deference can be applied to jurisdictional questions has not been clearly settled by the Court. In my view, ensuring an independent judicial analysis to determine the scope of the delega-

---

110. See, e.g., Monaghan, *supra* note 5, at 6 (“Where deference exists, the court must specify the boundaries of agency authority, within which the agency is authorized to fashion authoritatively part, often a large part, of the meaning of the statute.”).

111. See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, *Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations*, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992-93 (1999) (arguing for independent role for judiciary to determine jurisdictional questions and acknowledging that judicial practice remains unsettled); Sunstein, *Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State*, *supra* note 24, at 446 (arguing that deference to agency is inappropriate in context of question “whether agency jurisdiction extends to new or unforeseen areas”); Sunstein, *Law and Administration After Chevron*, *supra* note 2, at 2099 (“The principal reason [for an independent judicial role] is that Congress would be unlikely to want agencies to have the authority to decide on the extent of their own powers. To accord such power to agencies would be to allow them to be judges in their own cause, in which they are of course susceptible to bias.”).
tion is vital to ensure that a relatively impartial entity determines the boundaries of agency authority.

Applying this limitation would be somewhat problematic, however. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a question that concerns the agency’s jurisdiction, which would merit independent assessment by the judiciary, and a question of applying delegated authority to a borderline case, in which deference to the agency’s decision would be appropriate either when Congress has signaled that agency views on the meaning of statutes should be controlling or when the judicial default rule understands congressional silence as such a delegation. One way to resolve the difficulty is to require an independent judicial role only with respect to broad jurisdictional issues that either expand agency power substantially or restrict it significantly.112

Second, courts should require that agencies provide reasons for their decisions to exercise their delegated law-interpreting power in a particular way.113 Not only are explanations important to promote agency accountability and transparency of decisionmaking, but agencies should not be allowed to adopt interpretations of statutes that are clearly erroneous. Only by assessing the analysis that supports a particular interpretation of vague or ambiguous language can the courts discharge their duty under the Administrative Procedure Act to reject agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”114 As long as the agency has acted within the authority delegated to it by Congress, the court should accept any reasonable interpretation supported by an explanation, but it would retain a very limited role to play to take care that the agency did not act irrationally or unreasonably. Perhaps the best way to think about this sort of judicial review is to understand it as a method to detect clear mistakes.115

112. See Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, supra note 2, at 2100.

113. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 26 (2001) (“The path of American administrative law has been the path of the progressive submission of power to reason. The promise of the administrative state was to bring competence to politics.”).


115. The role I envision for the courts here is similar to the role Thayer argued they should undertake with regard to constitutional review of congressional action, with the additional requirement that agencies provide explanations for the interpretations they select. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893); see also Monaghan, supra note 5, at 13-14 (discussing Thayer’s suggestion of judicial review only for clear error and arguing that such a deferential standard of review might be consistent with Marbury if one separates the question of the existence of judicial review from its scope); Zeppos, supra note 98, at 299 (drawing analogy between Chevron deference and Thayerian review).
In proposing that courts retain a limited role to police the scope of Congress’s delegation to agencies, to ensure reasoned explanations, and to guard against clear error, I am aware that courts might use any grant of power to avoid deferring to agencies and to retain primary law-interpreting authority. Particularly in the realm of distinguishing jurisdictional questions from other questions, the dividing line is blurry, and judgment calls are necessary. Judges could use any exception as an invitation to push the judicial camel, nose-first, into the policymaking tent. But if Congress had expressly directed that agency interpretations of statutory language should be “controlling” or otherwise indicated that courts should defer to agencies, deference might actually occur more than it does now in the world of judicially constructed rules. In practice, *Chevron* has resulted in less deference than one might have expected, and courts routinely find “clear” statutory meaning at Step One through the use of canons and other interpretive methods. Although judges could still evade congressional directives to defer using similar techniques, they might be less likely to do so in the face of an explicit congressional directive. Particularly when the doctrinal justification for deference rests on congressional delegation, even the most aggressive judge might find ignoring a clear directive passed pursuant to a procedural framework problematic. Although the concern about judicial opportunism is a real one, it seems more problematic to deny any role to the courts, and such a course might well be constitutionally impermissible given *Marbury* and the structure of separated powers.

### III. Conclusion

Fundamentally, *Marbury v. Madison* is a case about allocating power among institutions of governance. Thus, as we assess *Marbury* at its bicentennial, we should use it as a springboard to consider the relationship among modern governance institutions, which include not only Congress and the courts, but also administrative agencies. Under current doctrine, informed by *Marbury* and administrative law precedents like *Chevron*, the role that agencies play in law interpreting and other matters is largely left to Congress to determine when it delegates authority to the executive branch. In the absence of clear congressional directives, courts have, in the guise of constructing legislative intent, made the decision themselves whether to retain the power to interpret statutes or allocate it mainly to agencies by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations. Whether the judicial approach is couched in terms of congressional intent, or uses some other basis for allocating the power to make policy through interpretation, the judicial approaches all envision that Congress has continuing power to vary any judicial default rule.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of congressional power to over­
ride the judiciary with respect to which institution should interpret
laws, no one seriously expects Congress to act in most cases. We have
accepted the courts’ predominant role in this area, in part because of
low expectations with regard to legislative performance. But a proce­
dural framework could be crafted to encourage lawmakers to use
regularly enacted legislative vehicles to provide clearer guidance to
courts and agencies regarding their roles with respect to statutory
interpretation. If, notwithstanding adoption of such a vehicle,
Congress still failed to provide direction, congressional silence would
have more meaning, although the meaning would depend on the
default rule of judicial review adopted by courts. When Congress
remains mute despite the opportunity to instruct clearly, some would
argue that the role Marbury envisioned for the judiciary would be ap­
propriate even in the context of regulatory statutes. Or courts might
adopt and consistently apply a bright-line rule favoring agency inter­
pretation over judicial interpretation, based on technocratic, demo­
cratic, or other institutional considerations. In that case, the action­
prompting congressional procedure would allow Congress a meaning­
ful opportunity to vary such a default.

My own preference is for the second default rule based on my
assessment of the institutional considerations. But the point of this
Article is not to argue in favor of one or the other default rule, but to
present a proposal that makes more meaningful the aspects of judicial
review of regulatory statutes that envision a role for Congress. No
matter what the judicial default rule, the procedural framework
described here would make the possibility of its application more sali­
ent to Congress, and it would encourage the legislature to consider
any variance of the default rule in the appropriate context of authori­
zation bills or, when necessary, appropriations bills. Once judicial
review is situated in the model of a continuing process of interaction
among courts, Congress, and agencies, we can better understand the
importance of providing all these groups with the tools they need to
communicate with and respond to the other branches.