A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by Attorneys Representing "Innocent" Capital Defendants

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A DEADLY DILEMMA: CHOICES BY ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING "INNOCENT" CAPITAL DEFENDANTS

Welsh S. White*

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2001
INTRODUCTION

A lawyer who represents a capital defendant with a strong innocence claim must allocate her resources between the separate guilt and penalty phases1 of the capital case. Expending resources in preparation for a penalty trial may result in less attention to securing the acquittal on the capital charge at the guilt trial that would make the penalty phase moot. But focusing primarily on proving the defendant's innocence at the guilt trial means less preparation in the case of a guilty verdict. Once a defendant is convicted of a capital offense, a lawyer must also make strategic decisions about the penalty phase. By focusing primarily on reasserting the defendant's claim of innocence, she can seek to convince the jury that they should spare the defendant because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt. Alternately, she can accept the jury's verdict at the guilt stage and focus primarily on introducing mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's background to the jury. In dealing with these critical strategic choices, what should the lawyer do?

In Wiggins v. Smith,2 the Court held a capital defendant's attorney's decision to focus solely on reasserting the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial to be ineffective assistance of counsel.3 This decision demonstrated that capital defendants' attorneys' decisions to focus primarily or exclusively on reasserting defendants' claims of innocence at the penalty stages of capital trials will not automatically be viewed as reasonable strategic choices. As I will discuss below, the attorneys in Wiggins made some unusually

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1. Capital cases are bifurcated: first, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of any of the offenses with which he is charged; then, if the jury has found the defendant guilty of a capital offense, the jury decides whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or a lesser punishment. Although the precise issues to be determined at the penalty trial vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the penalty jury invariably makes its sentencing determination after considering aggravating factors introduced by the prosecution and mitigating evidence introduced by the defense. See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 306-07 (providing examples of capital-sentencing statutes).


3. Id. at 535.
questionable decisions, making it difficult to determine how to apply the Court's holding to other fact patterns. To consider issues that arise more frequently, it is useful to consider Ronnie Chandler's trial for capital murder. Although Chandler's case is not necessarily typical, the problems presented for Chandler's attorney in that case exemplify some of the problems likely to be encountered by an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence.

Near a small, rural lake in Piedmont, Alabama, Charles Jarrell killed his brother-in-law, Marty Shuler, on May 8, 1990. In 1991 the United States indicted David "Ronnie" Chandler for capital murder under the federal death-penalty statute, claiming that Chandler was a drug kingpin who had hired Jarrell to kill Shuler. Subsequently, Chandler retained Drew Redden, an able and experienced criminal-defense attorney, to defend him at trial. Redden immediately began preparing Chandler's case. After interviewing "at least 67 witnesses" in the Piedmont area, Redden determined that the government's case against Chandler was weak. He "actively pursued acquittal" at trial and did not prepare for the penalty trial, which would only take place if Chandler was convicted of the capital-murder charge.

At trial, Jarrell, the government's chief witness, testified that Chandler had offered him $500 to kill Shuler, whom Chandler believed to be a police informant. Jarrell said that he accepted this offer, received a gun from Chandler, and drove Shuler to Snow's Lake, where the two engaged in target practice before Jarrell shot Shuler twice, killing him. Jarrell claimed that he then met Chandler and together they hauled "Shuler's body away for burial."

5. Id.
6. At the time Chandler hired him, Redden had tried over 1000 cases. Id. at 1310 n.3. He was a former Assistant U.S. Attorney and President of the Alabama Bar, a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers and the International Society of Barristers, and listed in America's Best Lawyers "for his criminal defense work" and described as "an extremely talented defense counsel, probably the best in the state . . . ." Id. (quoting prosecutor).
7. Id. at 1310.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See supra note 1.
12. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
14. Id.
Redden impeached Jarrell's testimony by showing he had made several "inconsistent statements."\textsuperscript{15} When first arrested, Jarrell stated that he had not killed Shuler.\textsuperscript{16} Later he said that he accidentally shot Shuler,\textsuperscript{17} and then that he had murdered him out of "personal animosity."\textsuperscript{18} Finally, after receiving the government's promise that, in exchange for his testimony, neither he nor his son would be prosecuted for killing Shuler,\textsuperscript{19} Jarrell implicated Chandler in the murder.\textsuperscript{20}

Redden also showed that Jarrell never received $500 from Chandler\textsuperscript{21} and had consumed twenty-three beers just before shooting Shuler.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, Redden presented evidence indicating Jarrell's motive for killing Shuler. Shuler had married Jarrell's sister and Redden introduced evidence showing that Jarrell was angry at Shuler because he had been an abusive husband.\textsuperscript{23} Jarrell even admitted that less than a year before he killed Shuler he had attempted to murder his brother-in-law because of the escalating abuse. At that time, after telling Shuler "he was going to kill him," he placed a "pistol against Shuler's nose and pulled the trigger," but the gun did not fire.\textsuperscript{24} At Chandler's trial, Jarrell told the jury that "'[t]he Lord didn't intend for [Shuler] to die that night.'"\textsuperscript{25}

Although the government's murder charge depended almost entirely on Jarrell's testimony, the jury convicted Chandler of capital murder, thus setting the stage for the penalty trial.\textsuperscript{26} The verdict shocked Redden.\textsuperscript{27} He had expected an acquittal and had done nothing "to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial."\textsuperscript{28} In a last-minute attempt to save his client's life, Redden asked "Chandler's wife . . . to round up witnesses who could speak up for Chandler" at

\begin{itemize}
\item[15.] Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
\item[16.] Id.
\item[17.] Id.
\item[18.] Id. at 1311.
\item[19.] Rankin, supra note 13.
\item[20.] Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1311.
\item[21.] Id. at 1310.
\item[22.] Rankin, Seeking Justice, supra note 13.
\item[23.] Id.
\item[24.] Id.
\item[25.] Bill Rankin, Pot Dealer May Be 1st Executed as 'Drug Kingpin,' ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 23, 1994, at G1 [Hereinafter Rankin, Pot Dealer].
\item[26.] Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1310.
\item[27.] Rankin, Pot Dealer, supra note 25.
\item[28.] Bill Rankin, Hard Times for Death Row Appeals?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 31, 2000, at 1A.
\end{itemize}
the penalty trial, which was to begin the following day.\(^{29}\) Extremely distraught, she could identify only her preacher.\(^{30}\)

At sentencing, Redden’s primary argument was that the jury should not impose the death sentence because of its lingering doubt as to Chandler’s guilt. He also noted the defendant had no prior convictions and called his wife and mother to testify.\(^{31}\) In rebuttal, the prosecutor reminded the jury that even Charles Manson and “‘Jack the Ripper had a mother.’”\(^{32}\) The jury unanimously recommended that Chandler “be sentenced to death.”\(^{33}\)

Chandler later sought to vacate his death sentence on the ground that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.\(^{34}\) Specifically, he claimed that Redden’s representation was unreasonable because he failed to “investigate and... present character witnesses” at sentencing.\(^{35}\) Chandler’s new attorney presented twenty-seven witnesses who testified to numerous occasions on which Chandler had assisted others in need of help. Martha Heath, for example, testified that Chandler bought her son two new pairs of shoes after seeing him running shoeless “around Piedmont’s projects.”\(^{36}\) Elaine Freeman testified that Chandler gave her neighbor’s family money to pay for their son’s burial when he died in an auto accident.\(^{37}\) Jerry Masters testified that Chandler helped erect a fellowship hall at [a] church and “‘didn’t charge a penny.’”\(^{38}\) Others testified that Chandler built a porch so a disabled man could enter and exit his house, gave needy mothers bags of groceries, and donated heavily to charities.\(^{39}\) Chandler claimed that Redden’s failure to do the investigation necessary to find these witnesses constituted deficient performance, thus satisfying the first prong of *Strickland v. Washington*’s test for ineffective assistance of counsel.\(^{40}\)

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30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1312.
34. Id.
35. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. For other mitigating evidence presented at the hearing, see Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1312 n.8.
40. In *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court held that in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show both that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and that the defendant was “prejudiced” by his attorney’s deficient performance, id. at 692.
The Eleventh Circuit, in a 6-to-5 decision, rejected Chandler's claim. The court concluded that "focusing on acquittal at trial and then on residual doubt at sentencing (instead of other forms of mitigation) can be reasonable... especially when... the evidence of guilt [is] not overwhelming."\(^{41}\) Because the government did not possess a strong case against Chandler, the court held that Redden acted reasonably.\(^{42}\) His decision to vigorously seek an acquittal at the expense of an investigation into mitigating evidence did not fall "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."\(^{43}\) The court thus affirmed Chandler's death sentence.

After Chandler's death sentence was affirmed, Jarrell admitted that his testimony at Chandler's trial had been false.\(^{44}\) Nevertheless, Chandler's subsequent efforts to obtain relief from the courts have been unsuccessful.\(^{45}\) In 2001, however, President Clinton commuted his death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.\(^{46}\)

Chandler's case has attracted substantial media attention because of the doubts as to his guilt.\(^{47}\) Over the past decade, there have been a surprisingly large number of cases in which defendants sentenced to death have been exonerated.\(^{48}\) And stories like Chandler's may suggest that the cases in which defendants on death row have been

\(^{41}\) Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 (citation omitted).

\(^{42}\) Id.

\(^{43}\) Id. at 1327.

\(^{44}\) Chandler Challenges Conviction, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 23, 2001, at SC.

\(^{45}\) Id.

\(^{46}\) Id.

\(^{47}\) See, e.g., American Justice: Marijuana and Murder (A&E television broadcast, Sept. 19, 2001) (recounting the events leading to Chandler's conviction as well as the important events that followed — i.e., Jarrell's recantation, the Eleventh Circuit's affirmation of Chandler's death sentence, and former President Clinton's commutation of that sentence).

\(^{48}\) Determining the number of defendants sentenced to death who were actually innocent in the sense that they had no involvement in the crime with which they were charged is, of course, difficult. Barring unusual circumstances, a court that reverses the conviction of a defendant sentenced to death does not even attempt to determine the defendant's actual guilt or innocence. Most often, a court will simply reverse the defendant's conviction, granting the government an opportunity to retry the defendant if it does so within a specified time. In a surprising number of cases, however, DNA or other evidence has provided seemingly conclusive proof that defendants sentenced to death were innocent of the capital offense for which they were convicted. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got to Do with It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 537 (2002) (observing that in November 1998, a conference held at Northwestern University "brought national press attention to the fact that as of then, seventy-five men and women whom American juries had sentenced to die... had been exonerated as innocent"). Since 1973, evidence of a defendant's innocence has freed 111 people from death row. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (current as of July 28, 2003).
exonerated through DNA-testing\(^49\) or other evidence of a wrongful conviction\(^50\) are only the tip of the iceberg. The Chandler case thus exemplifies a situation in which a possibly innocent defendant who is sentenced to death is unable to obtain relief from the courts.

The Chandler case also illustrates the difficulties of appropriately allocating resources for attorneys representing capital defendants with strong innocence claims. Chandler’s attorney’s decision to focus primarily on obtaining a favorable verdict at the guilt trial is not

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\(^50\) When a defendant who claims she was wrongly convicted seeks relief through the appellate process, she is likely to encounter formidable obstacles. See Lissa Griffin, *The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective*, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1271 (2001). Appellate courts do not have the authority to hear new evidence, and most such courts cannot “reverse a conviction because they believe that the jury was wrong.” *Id.* These courts can review an alleged wrongful conviction, but they must do so on the grounds that the trial court convicted the appellant on insufficient evidence. *Id.* When doing so, a court may examine only record evidence and must view that “evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” *Id.* (quoting *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It must then determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.* (quoting *Jackson*, 443 U.S. at 319) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Convicted defendants may also seek a “new trial based on newly discovered evidence.” *Id.* at 1292. Such trials, however, are “rarely granted” due to “severe time limitations” and the need to “show a very high probability of success on the merits.” *Id.* In federal courts, for example, Rule 33 of the *Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure* requires that a motion for a new trial “be made within three years of final judgment.” *Id.* at 1292-93. The rule also requires a court to grant

- a new trial . . . only where:
  
  (1) the [new] evidence . . . [has] been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the new trial . . . [has shown] diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (3) the evidence relied on [is] not . . . merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence [is] . . . material to the issues involved; and (5) [the evidence] [is] of such [a] nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal.

*Id.* at 1293 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Thompson v. United States*, 188 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).


Finally, even when a defendant can show that it is likely she was wrongfully convicted, obtaining executive clemency is generally difficult. In most jurisdictions, the clemency power is “entirely discretionary” and subject to the “political process.” *Griffin*, supra, at 1299. As there is no constituency “favoring the release of convicted criminals,” *id.*, executive clemency is unlikely to be granted unless the defendant can make a compelling showing that she was wrongfully convicted.
unusual, especially for criminal-defense attorneys with limited experience in representing capital defendants.51 Like Chandler’s attorney, inexperienced attorneys may believe that preparing for the penalty trial will be unnecessary because the defendant will not be convicted of the capital offense at the guilt trial. In addition, because the attorney is seeking to maximize the defendant’s chances at the guilt trial, she may decide that searching for mitigating evidence to be introduced at the penalty trial is not an optimal use of her limited resources.

Even if the attorney believes that there is some chance that the defendant will be convicted of the capital offense and that introducing mitigating evidence at the penalty trial could be valuable, she may still believe that the proper overall strategy is to focus almost entirely on maximizing the defendant’s chances at the guilt trial. When the attorney adopts this strategy, her options at the penalty trial (if it occurs) will generally be limited. In most cases, the failure to investigate mitigating evidence prior to the guilt trial will make it impossible to introduce significant mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. Since the penalty trial usually takes place immediately after the jury finds the defendant guilty of the capital offense, the defense will almost never have sufficient time between the guilty verdict and the beginning of the penalty trial to conduct the kind of investigation that would produce persuasive mitigating evidence.

In other cases, either the defendant’s wishes or the lawyer’s view of the significance of the defendant’s claim of innocence may shape the lawyer’s strategy. A defendant who has a strong claim of innocence may be especially likely to tell his attorney that, in the event of a penalty trial, no mitigating evidence should be presented. The defendant may believe that, because he has a strong claim of innocence, all of his attorney’s efforts should be directed toward securing his acquittal; if he is convicted, he doesn’t care whether he is sentenced to death. He may even tell his attorney, “Free me or fry me.” If the lawyer believes the client has a strong claim of innocence, moreover, she may conclude that seeking mitigating evidence is unnecessary because, even if the defendant is convicted, the best strategy at the penalty trial will be to focus exclusively on reasserting the defendant’s claim of innocence. A lawyer familiar with death-penalty scholarship may justify this strategy by pointing to empirical studies that show that a jury’s lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt is the factor that will most strongly lead them to spare the defendant’s life.52 Based on these studies, the lawyer may assert that in

51. See infra text accompanying note 138.
52. See, e.g., William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 27 (1988) (presenting interviews from jurors in ten Florida cases that indicated that jurors’ lingering
appropriate cases it is best to argue solely on the ground of lingering
doubt, thus maximizing the likelihood that the jury will spare the
defendant's life on the basis of this factor.

For more than two decades, however, experienced capital-defense
attorneys have recognized that introducing mitigating evidence
explaining the defendant's background and history to the penalty jury
is generally the best way to dissuade the jury from imposing a death
sentence. As the Supreme Court observed in *Wiggins v. Smith*, the
1989 ABA Standards provide that an attorney representing a capital
defendant has an obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available
mitigating evidence" prior to trial. In view of these established
professional norms, under what circumstances, if any, can a defense
attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of
innocence reasonably conclude that she need not conduct an
investigation for such evidence? And when the attorney makes this
decision, under what circumstance will her failure to investigate
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

Although one might think that the answers to these two questions
would be the same, the Court's decisions in *Strickland* and its progeny
indicate otherwise. In determining whether a capital-defense
attorney's failure to investigate or to introduce mitigating evidence at
a penalty trial is ineffective representation, courts must apply
*Strickland v. Washington* 's two-prong test for determining whether
counsel was ineffective. As to the first prong — whether the attorney's
representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" —
*Strickland* requires courts to afford substantial deference to an
attorney's strategic choices. The *Strickland* Court determined that
strategic choices made after a full investigation of the facts and law are
"virtually unchallengeable" and that "choices made after less than
complete investigation are reasonable" if "reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation." The Court
added, moreover, that counsel's performance must be judged on the
doubt as to the defendant's guilt was the most important factor to jurors who voted for life
(summarizing data relating to lingering doubt).

53. *See Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 323-24, 335-37 (1983); Welsh S. White, Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
323, 341-42, 361.


55. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989) [hereinafter 1989 GUIDELINES].

56. For an explanation of *Strickland*'s two-prong test, see *supra* note 40.


58. *Id.* at 690-91.
basis of "information supplied by the defendant." Applying these standards, lower courts have frequently held that strategic choices not to seek or not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial will not constitute deficient performance when based on either instructions from the defendant, or the attorney's view as to the importance of reasserting the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial.

Wiggins v. Smith, however, took a different view. There, the Court made clear that in at least some situations, a capital defendant's attorney's failure to seek mitigating evidence cannot be justified by a strategic decision to focus on reasserting the defendant's claim of innocence at the penalty trial. The Court's analysis indicates that in evaluating a capital defendant's attorney's performance, the practices of experienced capital-defense attorneys, as reflected in professional standards such as the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, will at least sometimes provide the norms against which the attorney's performance must be measured. In assessing the reasonableness of strategic choices by attorneys representing defendants with strong claims of innocence, it is thus appropriate to illuminate these norms through examining and explaining strategic choices made by defense attorneys who specialize in capital cases.

In this Article, I will contrast the choices of defense attorneys with wide experience in capital cases with those made by defense attorneys who lack such experience, and assess Wiggins's possible impact on the question of whether the latter group's choices constitute deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test. Broadly stated, my thesis is that in representing capital defendants with a strong claim of innocence, certain axioms that govern the practices of experienced capital-defense attorneys should be viewed as professional norms, and, in most instances, a capital-defense attorney's failure to comply with these norms should constitute deficient performance within the meaning of Strickland.

In developing this thesis, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly explains Wiggins's holding and identifies and discusses three situations of particular concern in which Wiggins's application is

59. Id. at 691.

60. See, e.g., Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1012 (2002); Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897 (4th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2002); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998).

61. See, e.g., Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 331 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 1245 S. Ct. 1513 (2004); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710 (11th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Kokoraleis v. Director of Ill. Dept. of Corr., 963 F. Supp. 1473, 1486-87 (N.D. Ill. 1997).

unclear. Parts II and III then seek to illuminate the appropriate standard of care for attorneys representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence by considering the practices attorneys with varying levels of experience report using and eschewing when they deal with strategic choices relating to the penalty trial in capital cases. Part II addresses strategic choices that arise when a defense attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence is preparing for the penalty trial, focusing especially on decisions that are influenced by the attorney's view of her resources or the instructions she has received from the capital defendant. Part III addresses strategic choices that arise when the attorney is deciding what type of mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial, focusing first on the circumstances under which the attorney should argue lingering doubt to the penalty jury, and then on the effect that the attorney's decision to argue lingering doubt should have on her strategy with respect to introducing mitigating evidence. By drawing upon interviews with experienced capital-defense attorneys63 and penalty-trial transcripts64 that reveal the ways in which they implement their strategic choices, I approach these issues through the lens of choices that many expert attorneys found reasonable across the variety of circumstances that arose in actual cases.

Drawing from various sources, including the material presented in Parts II and III, Part IV seeks to define the professional norms that should govern defense attorneys' strategic choices when they are representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. As I have indicated, my thesis is that these norms should not only serve as guides to defense attorneys but also as the standards that must be met when the attorney's performance is being measured against the first prong of the Strickland test. I conclude by commenting on some of the broader implications of the issues discussed in the Article.

63. In preparing this Article I have interviewed twelve criminal-defense attorneys, most of whom have had extensive experience defending capital defendants (i.e., participating as a defense attorney in more than twenty capital cases), and two mitigation experts who have had extensive experience providing social histories (based on investigations for mitigating evidence) for capital defendants. When I rely on specific information provided by any of these people, the name of the person interviewed and the date of the interview appear in the footnote.

64. The penalty-trial transcripts referred to (as well as others not quoted) were sent to me by attorneys or mitigation experts involved in the cases. These transcripts are on file with the author.
I. **Wiggins v. Smith's Impact on Counsel's Strategic Choices**

In *Wiggins v. Smith* the Court considered an ineffective assistance of counsel case in which the reasonableness of a capital defendant's attorneys' decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence was at issue. The government sought to justify the attorneys' failure to conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence on the ground that the attorneys had made a tactical choice to focus their penalty-trial strategy entirely on relitigating the defendant's guilt. The Court's refusal to accept the government's position throws into doubt at least some capital-defense attorneys' strategic choices to focus solely on lingering doubt or other innocence claims at the penalty trial. How many depends, in part, upon the extent to which the *Wiggins* holding extends beyond the particular facts of that case. It is thus useful to explain the Court's holding and to identify issues that the Court's opinion left unresolved before assessing *Wiggins's* immediate and long-term impact.

A. *The Wiggins Decision*

Kevin Wiggins was charged with the murder of Florence Lacs, a seventy-seven-year-old woman who was found drowned in the bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland, on September 17, 1988. Ms. Lacs was last seen alive on the afternoon of September 15 when a government witness said Wiggins thanked Ms. Lacs for watching his Sheetrock. Geraldine Armstrong, Wiggins's girlfriend, testified that Wiggins picked her up at about 7:45 p.m. on September 15. At that time, Wiggins was driving Ms. Lacs's Chevette and was in possession of her credit card, which Wiggins and Armstrong used when they went shopping that evening and the next day. When Wiggins was arrested, he told the police that he had found Ms. Lacs's car with the keys in it in a restaurant parking lot on September 16 and that Armstrong "didn't have anything to do with this." The government also sought to establish through expert testimony and other evidence that Ms. Lacs had been murdered on September 15,
the same day on which Wiggins had been seen in the vicinity of her apartment.\textsuperscript{70}

The government's case was thus based primarily on evidence that Wiggins was seen near the victim's apartment shortly before the time of her murder and had possession of property taken from her apartment after the time of the murder.\textsuperscript{71} No eyewitnesses or forensic evidence supported the government's claim that Wiggins had been in Ms. Lacs's apartment on September 15. On the other hand, an unidentified fingerprint was found in the apartment and the police did have other possible suspects, especially Armstrong's brother, who lived just below Ms. Lacs's apartment.\textsuperscript{72}

The defense sought to refute the government's case by showing that Ms. Lacs was not dead when Wiggins was shown to be in possession of the property taken from her apartment. To establish this claim, Dr. Kaufmann, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that, "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Mrs. Lacs' time of death was no earlier than 3 a.m. on Saturday, September 17."\textsuperscript{73} If Ms. Lacs had not been killed until September 17, the government's case against Wiggins was obviously insufficient to establish his guilt.\textsuperscript{74}

The defense elected to have the defendant's guilt determined by a judge sitting without a jury. The judge rejected Dr. Kaufmann's conclusion as to the time of Ms. Lacs's death. He then concluded that Wiggins's possession of property taken from a recently murdered victim combined with the other circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.\textsuperscript{75}

The defense chose to have Wiggins's penalty trial before a jury. In order to obtain a death sentence, the government had to prove that

\textsuperscript{70} The medical examiner testified that the victim had been murdered and that the date of death could have been September 15. In addition, a friend of the victim's testified that on September 15 the victim had been wearing the clothes that were found on her murdered body on September 17, and Wiggins's employer testified that Wiggins had been working near the defendant's apartment on the afternoon of September 15. \textit{Id.} at 632-34.

\textsuperscript{71} In addition, two inmates testified that Wiggins confessed to the murder while incarcerated; in arriving at a verdict, however, the trial judge indicated that he did not believe either of these inmates. \textit{Id.} at 634.

\textsuperscript{72} See Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 n.9, 557 (D. Md. 2001).

\textsuperscript{73} Wiggins, 288 F.3d at 634.

\textsuperscript{74} Even if the government's evidence relating to Ms. Lacs's time of death was accepted, the government's case against Wiggins was weak. Indeed, the federal district judge who considered the case on habeas concluded that Wiggins was entitled to relief on the ground that "no rational finder of fact could have found Wiggins guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt." Wiggins, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 554.

\textsuperscript{75} In reaching this verdict, the trial judge relied on five factual findings: (1) Wiggins was in the vicinity of the apartment at the time of the murder; (2) he gave a false statement to the police about the stolen goods; (3) he knew the victim; (4) the victim was wearing the same clothes on September 15 as she was when she was found dead on September 17; (5) the victim's apartment had been ransacked. \textit{See id.} at 555-56.
Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree," meaning that he actually killed Ms. Lacs\textsuperscript{76} and that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.\textsuperscript{77} One month prior to the scheduled beginning of the penalty trial, defense counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of the penalty trial so that the defense could first present evidence showing that Wiggins did not kill Ms. Lacs and then, if necessary, present a mitigation case. The defense claimed that "separating the two cases would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting their claim that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder."\textsuperscript{78}

Approximately one month later, the judge denied the defense's bifurcation motion and the penalty trial began. In her opening statement, one of Wiggins's two defense attorneys told the jury they would "hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins actually killed Lacs."\textsuperscript{79} She also told them they were going to hear evidence relating to Wiggins's life and that he had "had a difficult life."\textsuperscript{80} During the penalty trial, however, the defense introduced no evidence relating to Wiggins's life history.\textsuperscript{81} Instead, it again introduced expert testimony attacking the government's theory as to Ms. Lacs's time of death.\textsuperscript{82} In essence, the defense sought to convince the jury that Wiggins could not have "actually killed" the victim because he was not guilty of her murder.

At the conclusion of the penalty trial, the judge instructed the jury that Wiggins had been convicted of the first-degree murder of Ms. Lacs and that they were required to accept that conviction as "binding" even if they believed it "to have been in error."\textsuperscript{83} He then explained the standard for determining whether Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree" and instructed them that, if they found that Wiggins was a "principal in the first degree," they should determine whether the death penalty should be imposed by weighing

\textsuperscript{76} Under Maryland's capital-sentencing statute, the jury may not impose the death penalty unless it first concludes that the defendant was a "principal in the first degree." MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 2-202(a)(2)(i) (2002). Under Maryland law, "[a] principal in the first degree is one who actually commits a crime, either by his own hand, or by an inanimate agency, or by an innocent human agent." State v. Ward, 396 A.2d 1041, 1046 (Md. 1978).

\textsuperscript{77} MD. CODE. ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 2-203(i)(2)(i) (2002) (stating that a jury must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating evidence).

\textsuperscript{78} Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515.

\textsuperscript{79} Id.

\textsuperscript{80} Id.

\textsuperscript{81} Id.

\textsuperscript{82} Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16.

\textsuperscript{83} Joint Appendix of Petitioner and Respondent at 369, Wiggins v. Smith.
the aggravating and mitigating factors.\textsuperscript{84} The jury imposed a death sentence.\textsuperscript{85}

Wiggins claimed that his trial attorneys were ineffective because they failed to conduct a full investigation for mitigating evidence relating to Wiggins’s personal history.\textsuperscript{86} Wiggins’s attorneys had obtained some information relating to his background, including a presentence investigation report prepared by the Division of Parole and Probation and DSS records “documenting [Wiggins’s] various placements in the State’s foster care system.”\textsuperscript{87} They had not, however, retained a forensic social worker to prepare a full compilation of Wiggins’s social history, even though funds for that purpose were available.\textsuperscript{88} Wiggins’s senior attorney explained that the attorneys had decided, well in advance of trial, “to focus their efforts on ‘retrying the factual case’ and disputing Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder.”\textsuperscript{89} They thus believed that compiling a social history was unnecessary because they did not want to present a shot-gun defense that might dilute the force of the evidence disputing Wiggins’s responsibility.\textsuperscript{90}

The Maryland state courts rejected Wiggins’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, concluding that his attorneys had made a “deliberate, tactical” decision to concentrate their efforts on convincing the penalty jury that Wiggins was not responsible for the murder.\textsuperscript{91} Wiggins challenged this ruling in a federal writ of habeas corpus.\textsuperscript{92} In view of the applicable federal habeas statute,\textsuperscript{93} the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Maryland state courts’ ruling denying Wiggins’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an “unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”\textsuperscript{94} In order to establish this, Wiggins first had to show that his attorneys’ decision to curtail investigation so that they did not have Wiggins’s complete social

\textsuperscript{84} Id.
\textsuperscript{85} Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516.
\textsuperscript{86} Id.
\textsuperscript{87} Id. at 523.
\textsuperscript{88} Id. at 524.
\textsuperscript{89} Id. at 517.
\textsuperscript{90} Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 517.
\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 518.
\textsuperscript{92} Id.
\textsuperscript{94} Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 518 (quoting Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (D. Md. 2001)); id. at 520.
history was deficient performance under the first prong of the \textit{Strickland} test.\textsuperscript{95}

In \textit{Strickland}, the Court had said that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."\textsuperscript{96} The \textit{Wiggins} Court thus had to determine whether Wiggins's attorneys' strategy of curtailing investigation so as to focus on relitigating the defendant's guilt was reasonable.

In addressing this issue, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion focused on a capital-defense attorney's obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence. Justice O'Connor stated that Wiggins's attorneys' decision to curtail the investigation "fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989" because "standard practice in Maryland in capital cases" at that time "included the preparation of a social history report."\textsuperscript{97} She indicated, moreover, that Wiggins's attorneys' decision could not be attributed to lack of resources because "the Public Defender's office made funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker" who would prepare the necessary report.\textsuperscript{98}

The majority also observed that "[t]he ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence,'"\textsuperscript{99} adding that based on both the ABA Guidelines and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, this investigation should delve into various topics, including the defendant's "family and social history."\textsuperscript{100} Justice O'Connor referred to these standards as "well-defined norms,"\textsuperscript{101} thus implying that, in the absence of a reasonable justification for a defense attorney's failure to conduct an investigation into reasonably available mitigating evidence, the attorney's failure to conduct such an investigation would constitute deficient performance under \textit{Strickland}.

Justice O'Connor further concluded that Wiggins’s attorneys' decision to curtail investigation could not be justified as a reasonable

\textsuperscript{95} In addition, Wiggins had to show that his attorneys' deficient performance constituted prejudice under the second prong of the \textit{Strickland} test. See supra note 40. In order to obtain relief under § 2254(d)(1), moreover, Wiggins had to show that the Maryland state court's conclusion that the defendant had not established that his attorney's performance was deficient constituted an "unreasonable application of federal law." \textit{Wiggins}, 539 U.S. at 518 (quoting \textit{Wiggins v. Corcoran}, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (D. Md. 2001)).

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Strickland}, 466 U.S. at 690-91.

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Wiggins}, 539 U.S. at 524.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Id}.
strategic decision; rather, the attorneys' decision to abandon their investigation when they did "[made] a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible." 102

B. Three Unresolved Issues

Although Wiggins simply applied Strickland's ineffective assistance of counsel test, the Court's analysis indicates that its view of the standard of care required by an attorney representing a capital defendant may have evolved since Strickland was decided in 1984. 103 Although in Strickland the Court implied that professional standards such as those articulated in the ABA Guidelines would not necessarily define the standard of care for criminal-defense attorneys, 104 the Wiggins majority indicated that at least the ABA Guidelines relating to a capital defendant's attorney's obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence" does articulate the standard of care for a defense attorney representing a capital defendant. Furthermore, the defense attorney may not trump this obligation by simply asserting that she adopted a strategy that focused exclusively on reasserting the defendant's possible innocence at the penalty trial.

In assessing Wiggins's application to other situations in which a capital-defense attorney curtails investigation because she opts for a strategy of reasserting a claim of innocence at the penalty trial, three questions seem especially significant. First, in defining counsel's duty to investigate for mitigating evidence, what does the Court mean by "all reasonably available mitigating evidence?" Second, can a capital-defense attorney justify a decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence because of the defendant's request that no such evidence be presented at the penalty trial? And, third, when may the attorney make a reasonable decision to curtail investigation (or not to present mitigating evidence) on the basis of a strategic choice that relates to the quality of the available mitigating evidence?

1. The Duty to Investigate for "All Reasonably Available Mitigating Evidence"

As explained by the Court, Wiggins provides a clear example of a case in which the mitigating evidence that counsel failed to investigate was "reasonably available." At the time of Wiggins's trial, "the Public Defender's office made funds available for the retention of a forensic

102. Id. at 527-28.

103. For the argument that the standard of care required by a capital defendant's attorney would evolve as the Court became more familiar with the practices of experienced capital-defense attorneys, see White, supra note 53.

104. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
social worker”105 who would prepare a report relating to the defendant’s background. Using funds to obtain such a report would not have affected the extent to which counsel would have resources available for the guilt trial because the guilt trial had already been completed. In Wiggins, the mitigating evidence was thus “reasonably available” not only because counsel could obtain it but also because it could be obtained without any strain on existing resources.

In other cases, the availability of potential mitigating evidence will not be so clear. In most jurisdictions, judges have discretion as to the amount of funds to be allocated to capital-defense attorneys for investigation.106 In exercising this discretion, judges may limit the number of expert witnesses or inform the attorney that the total amount of funds for investigation cannot exceed a certain amount.107

105. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.

106. In most states, statutes provide judges with wide discretion as to the expenses to be allocated for the investigation and preparation of a capital case. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 987.9 (West Supp. 2004) (allowing counsel to request funds for payment of “investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense” and stating that “a judge . . . shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an appropriate amount of money to defendant’s attorney”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (2003) (authorizing court to grant authorization for “investigative or expert services or other similar services” necessary to protect defendant’s constitutional rights “in a reasonable amount to be determined by the court”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.052(f)-(g) (Supp. 2004) (allowing counsel to request and court to grant reasonable “advance payment of expenses to investigate potential defenses”). See generally Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Equal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 820 (claiming that judges routinely use their discretion to deny defense counsel the funds needed to adequately investigate a case and often do so by requiring counsel to show the need for such funds — “a showing that frequently cannot be made without the very . . . assistance that is sought”).

107. See, e.g., United States v. Hurn, 52 M.J. 629, 633 (1999) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist when the court had already appointed a psychologist), aff’d on other grounds, 58 M.J. 199 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 416 (2003); Commonwealth v. Shabazz, Nos. CR0300337-00 & CR02-856, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 74 (Mar. 31, 2003) (finding that the trial court properly limited mitigation specialist to twenty hours to establish a factual basis for a full investigation for mitigating evidence); State v. Daniel, No. W2000-00981-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 967, at *33-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 28, 2001) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a mitigation specialist because defendant failed to make the required showing that (1) defendant would be deprived of a fair trial without such assistance and (2) there was a reasonable likelihood that such assistance would materially assist the defense). But see Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1384 (Ind. 1996) (finding abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to limit a mitigation specialist to twenty-five hours of investigation, but establishing no clear standards for determining when a judge’s failure to authorize a defense investigation will constitute an abuse of discretion).

The judge’s authority to exercise discretion under these statutes is limited, however, by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1975), which holds that, upon a sufficient showing that his mental condition will be a significant factor in a capital case, a capital defendant is entitled to compensation for a psychiatrist to assist the defense. Lower courts have interpreted Ake as requiring compensation of other defense experts upon an adequate showing that they are needed to assist the defense in developing a significant issue. See White, supra note 53, at 342. Under Ake, a judge should not be permitted to limit the number of expert witnesses or to limit the compensation for experts if the defense makes a sufficient showing that an expert is needed to develop a particular type of mitigation evidence. In practice, however,
In cases where a capital defendant has a strong claim of innocence, his attorney may believe — rightly or wrongly — that she should opt for presenting the strongest defense at the guilt stage rather than diminishing the resources available for that purpose by requesting funds to investigate for mitigating evidence. In this situation, the attorney may opt either not to investigate for mitigating evidence at all or to curtail the investigation for mitigating evidence so as not to diminish the resources available for strengthening the defendant's defense at the guilt stage.

In applying Wiggins to these situations, courts will have to decide whether counsel's obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence" encompasses an obligation to seek to obtain all such evidence or only an obligation to seek "mitigating evidence" that can be obtained without placing a strain on the resources available for other purposes.

2. The Defendant Instructs the Attorney Not to Look for Mitigating Evidence

In Wiggins, there was no indication that the defendant had given his attorneys any instructions relating to investigating or introducing mitigating evidence. In cases where a capital defendant has a strong claim of innocence, however, it is not unusual for the defendant to instruct the attorney that she is neither to investigate mitigating evidence nor to present it at the penalty trial in the event the defendant is convicted at the guilt trial. In addition, at some point during pretrial preparation, the defendant may instruct the attorney either to stop investigating mitigating evidence entirely or to curtail some particular aspect of the investigation, such as interviewing members of the defendant's family. While lower courts have addressed various situations in which a capital defendant instructed his attorney to curtail investigation into mitigating evidence, Wiggins did not involve such a situation and the Court did not indicate whether Wiggins's holding would apply in such cases.

prior to Wiggins, "many defense lawyers [did] not do a good job of mak[ing] a showing of the need for funds." Email from Stephen Bright to author (Aug. 31, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bright email]. For further discussion of Ake, see notes 268-270 infra and accompanying text.

108. In some cases, the defense attorney's belief that she must choose between allocating resources to the guilt and penalty stages may be mistaken. If the attorney can make an sufficient showing under Ake, arguably she should be entitled to compensation for expert witnesses at the penalty trial regardless of the funds already expended for expert witnesses at the guilt trial. See supra note 107.

109. See, e.g., infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text (describing one such case).

110. See infra notes 274-282 and accompanying text.
3. **Strategic Choices to Ignore Potential Mitigating Evidence**

At Wiggins's post-conviction hearing, Wiggins's senior attorney explained the attorneys' decision to curtail investigation, testifying that prior to trial they decided not to introduce mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's background because they did not want to dilute his claim of innocence.\(^{111}\)

In *Strickland* and at least two later cases\(^{112}\) the Court held that, under the circumstances presented in those cases, a capital defendant’s attorney’s decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence was a reasonable strategic decision and, therefore, did not constitute deficient performance. In *Wiggins*, on the other hand, the Court held that, assuming Wiggins's attorneys' decision to curtail investigation was a strategic decision, the decision was unreasonable. The question remains whether, under *Wiggins*, a decision to curtail investigation and instead emphasize evidence related to innocence can ever be reasonable. If so, when?

Characterizing Wiggins's attorneys' decision as strategic is questionable. As the Court indicated,\(^{113}\) if the attorneys' bifurcation motion filed prior to the penalty trial had been granted, the attorneys would not have had to worry about the possibility of diluting the evidence of Wiggins's innocence that was presented at the penalty trial. The attorneys would have been able to introduce that evidence during the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding and, if that strategy was unsuccessful, introduce mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background at the second phase.\(^{114}\) As the Court stated,\(^{115}\) there was thus reason to believe that the attorneys' decision was based on “inattention” rather than strategy.\(^{116}\) Should the Court desire to limit its holding in *Wiggins*, it could distinguish *Wiggins* from other situations in which a capital-defense attorney curtails investigation for mitigating evidence on the ground that in *Wiggins* the attorneys' decision to curtail investigation was not really a strategic choice, but rather a result of inattention or incompetence.

\(^{111}\) *Wiggins*, 539 U.S. at 517.


\(^{113}\) *Wiggins*, 539 U.S. at 515-16.

\(^{114}\) *Id.* at 526.

\(^{115}\) *Id.* at 534.

\(^{116}\) *Id.* at 526. At the opening of the sentencing hearing, defense counsel “entreated the jury to consider not just what Wiggins 'is found to have done,' but also 'who [he] is.' ” *Id.* She then informed the jury that it “would 'hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life.' ” *Id.* Despite these comments, however, counsel never presented any evidence relating to ‘Wiggins' history.’ *Id.*
The majority stated, however, that “assuming [Wiggins’s attorneys] limited the scope of their investigation for strategic reasons,” their decision was unreasonable. To justify this conclusion, Justice O’Connor explained that the attorneys’ decision to abandon their investigation when they did “[made] a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible.”

But why would it be unreasonable for the attorneys to decide that they would curtail the investigation into Wiggins’s background because they wanted to focus exclusively on relitigating his guilt? The attorneys’ reasoning might be as follows: (1) The evidence of the defendant’s innocence was so strong that it was likely to have a powerful effect on the sentencing jury; (2) Presenting mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background might dilute the strength of that evidence, making it less likely that the jury would spare the defendant because of its lingering doubt as to his guilt; (3) Therefore, pursuing mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background was unnecessary because the attorneys would not choose to introduce such evidence at the penalty trial.

The majority’s analysis indicates that this type of reasoning is untenable. Justice O’Connor concluded that competent performance in the Wiggins case required a fuller investigation because in view of “the strength of the available evidence, a reasonable attorney might well have chosen to prioritize the mitigation case over the responsibility challenge,” or at least to adopt both “sentencing strategies” since they were “not necessarily mutually exclusive.” In other words, regardless of the attorneys’ assessment of the strength of the evidence showing Wiggins’s innocence, the attorneys could not automatically opt for a strategy that focused solely on presenting this evidence. The Court’s analysis thus suggests that, at least in the absence of an adequate investigation, a capital-defense attorney’s decision to rely solely on relitigating the defendant’s guilt at the penalty trial is unreasonable.

The majority was less clear, however, in delineating the circumstances under which a capital defendant’s attorney can make the strategic decision to curtail investigation because her preliminary investigation convinces her that a full investigation for mitigating evidence would be unproductive. In Wiggins, the preliminary investigation indicated that the potential mitigating evidence related to the defendant’s troubled childhood and severe mental problems. Wiggins thus indicates that, in the absence of a substantial

117. Id. at 527.
118. Id. at 527-28.
119. Id. at 535
120. Id.
investigation, an attorney's strategic decision to reject the possibility of introducing this type of mitigating evidence is unreasonable. The Court's analysis does not suggest, however, that an attorney could never reasonably make a strategic choice to curtail investigation because she concluded that seeking additional mitigating evidence would be unproductive. On the contrary, the Court intimated that an attorney would be able to justify such a choice in cases where the attorney could reasonably conclude that she would not want to introduce potential mitigating evidence because of a concern that it would be unproductive or double-edged.121

Based on Wiggins's holding and analysis, the circumstances under which a capital defendant's attorney's strategic choice to curtail an investigation for mitigating evidence will constitute deficient performance is thus also unclear.

II. PREPARING FOR THE PENALTY TRIAL

A. The Division of Responsibility Between Lawyer and Client

In representing a criminal defendant, a defense attorney must ordinarily be guided by her client with respect to the nature of the defenses presented.122 If the defendant tells his attorney to present a defense at the guilt stage, the attorney will ordinarily be required to present that defense, even though she is convinced that it is very weak.123 Similarly, if a competent capital defendant insists that the attorney present no evidence at the penalty stage in the event he is convicted of the capital offense, the attorney must adhere to her

121. The Court cited with apparent approval earlier cases in which it had held that a capital defendant's attorney's decision to curtail investigation was reasonable because the attorney reasonably concluded that the evidence likely to be disclosed by further investigation would be double-edged or unproductive. See id. at 2537 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

122. With respect to a lawyer's responsibilities, most states now follow the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.2(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." For statutes codifying this rule, see, for example, N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003). The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which was replaced by the ABA Model Rules in most states but is still followed in a few states, also requires that attorneys pursue their clients' desired course of action. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5 (1983).

123. However, an attorney cannot assist her client in "conduct that [she] knows is . . . fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003). The ABA defines "fraudulent" as "conduct that . . . has a purpose to deceive." Id. at R. 1.0. Thus, an attorney cannot follow a client's directive to present a defense that he or she knows to be false. For states codifying this rule, see, for example, N.C. REV. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003); PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003).
client's wishes. In practice, however, while the defendant makes the final decision, the defendant's attorney will often be able to exert influence that will significantly affect that decision. David Bruck, a South Carolina defense attorney who has participated in hundreds of capital cases and is now a Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney who advises attorneys appointed to represent federal capital defendants, states that one of a criminal-defense attorney's most important roles is to "make an assessment of the strength of the defendant's various possible defenses and to advise the defendant as to which of those defenses should be presented to the jury and how they should be presented." When the defendant initially asserts an implausible claim of innocence, for example, an experienced defense attorney will often be able to dissuade the defendant from asserting that claim at trial.

When a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence directs his attorney not to investigate or introduce mitigating evidence at the possible penalty trial, however, the psychological dynamics involved are likely to be more complex. In this situation, the defendant's position probably emanates from his belief that he should not be convicted of the capital offense. He thus believes that his attorney's focus should be exclusively on presenting the strongest possible defense at the guilt trial. If the attorney insists on preparing for the penalty trial, the defendant may resent the implied suggestion that a penalty trial may be necessary. His response may be, "I told you I was innocent. If you are preparing for the penalty trial, that means you don't believe I am innocent. If you don't trust me when I tell you I am innocent, I don't trust you to represent me when my life is at stake." If the defendant is forced to contemplate the possibility of a conviction at the guilt stage, moreover, he may be inclined to believe that, if the jury confounds his expectations at the guilt trial, he doesn't care what happens at the penalty trial. In fact, it is not uncommon for defendants with strong claims of innocence to say to their attorneys, "I don't want

124. For example, in Zagorski v. State, the defendant told his attorney before trial that "if convicted, he preferred death instead of a possible life sentence." Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998). He then instructed counsel neither to investigate nor present mitigating evidence. Id. The defendant remained firm in his decision, even after his attorney informed him "about the importance of and the need to investigate" for mitigating evidence. Id. The attorney then followed the defendant's instructions. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that counsel acted reasonably. The court stated that "when a competent and fully informed defendant instructs counsel not to investigate or present mitigating evidence at trial, counsel will not later be adjudged ineffective for following those instructions." Id. at 657.


126. Email from Michael Millman to author (Nov. 10, 2003) (on file with author). For approaches through which a capital-defense attorney may effectively counter this response, see infra text accompanying notes 145-149.
you to present any evidence at the penalty trial. If the jury convicts me, I'd rather die than be sent to prison."\(^{127}\)

**B. The Difference Between Experienced and Inexperienced Capital-Defense Attorneys**

A capital-defense attorney's approach to the issues presented in this scenario is likely to vary depending on the extent of her experience with capital cases. Criminal attorneys lacking experience in capital cases will be naturally inclined toward focusing their energies almost exclusively on the guilt trial. Stephen Bright, the Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, who specializes in capital cases, explains that these defense attorneys, who are usually skilled and experienced at raising issues of reasonable doubt in noncapital cases, are unfamiliar with the capital-defense attorney's role of arguing for the defendant's life at the penalty stage of a capital trial.\(^{128}\) In fact, these lawyers may perceive that Bright's view of the lawyer's role at the penalty trial — finding the social and biographical evidence relating to the defendant's life and then presenting it to the jury in a way that will "humanize" the defendant so that the jury has a fuller understanding of who the defendant is, where he has come from, and why he is the way he is\(^{129}\) — is "a job that should be done by a social worker rather than a lawyer."\(^{130}\) When a lawyer with this perspective has a client who requests that she focus primarily or exclusively on the guilt trial, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will be inclined to minimize the extent to which they prepare for the penalty trial, using the client's instructions to justify a focus they might make in any event.\(^{131}\)

In addition, criminal-defense lawyers lacking experience in capital cases may dismiss the importance of preparing for the penalty trial.

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128. Telephone Interview with Stephen Bright (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bright Interview] (notes on file with author).

129. Attorneys with experience in capital cases have long recognized the importance of introducing mitigating evidence that will humanize the capital defendant, thereby leading the penalty jury to empathize with the defendant. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 53, at 321-24, 335-37; White, supra note 53, at 361. For an account of a recent capital case in which a capital defendant's attorney was able to obtain a life sentence for his client by presenting evidence at the penalty trial that traced the defendant's troubled history, thereby obtaining the penalty jury's empathy, see Alex Kotlowitz, In the Face of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, (Magazine), at 32.

130. Bright Interview, supra note 128.

131. Bright email, supra note 107. Bright points out that, even if the client does not give the lawyer any instructions, lawyers lacking experience in capital cases will tend to focus disproportionately on the guilt trial and not enough on the penalty trial because they are "more comfortable with the guilt phase." Id.
because they share their client's view that he will be acquitted of the capital offense. Michael Burt, a former federal death-penalty resource counselor who frequently advises attorneys representing capital defendants,\textsuperscript{132} says that lawyers with experience in ordinary criminal cases, but not in capital cases, often "grossly underestimate the difficulty in convincing a death-qualified jury that there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."\textsuperscript{133} Burt states that "death-qualified juries do not evaluate evidence in the same way as other juries and are thus much more likely than other juries to credit the prosecution's evidence and less likely to acquit the defendant or to find him guilty of a lesser [i.e., noncapital] offense."\textsuperscript{134} Others with wide experience in capital cases not only share Burt's view but state that death-qualified juries' conviction proneness (i.e., its tendency to convict more readily than a non-death-qualified jury) has increased in recent years.\textsuperscript{135} Experienced practitioners have a sense that in recent years increasing doubts about the death penalty have led to the exclusion of more fair-minded people from death-qualified juries.\textsuperscript{136} As a result, capital defendants are "losing more good jurors than ever."\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{132} From 1989 to 2002, Burt was head trial attorney in the San Francisco Public Defender's Office. Telephone Interview with Michael Burt (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Burt Interview] (notes on file with author).

\textsuperscript{133} Id.

\textsuperscript{134} Id.

\textsuperscript{135} Michael Charlton, a Texas attorney who has participated in dozens of capital cases, for example, stated that with respect to determining issues related to guilt or innocence, "the difference between ordinary juries and death-qualified juries is far greater than most people realize." Telephone Interview with Michael Charlton (Mar. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Charlton Interview] (notes on file with author). A death-qualified jury is one in which the prosecutor is allowed to exclude potential jurors on the ground that their opposition to capital punishment impairs their ability to render a proper verdict on a capital defendant's guilt or punishment. For an explanation of the current law relating to death-qualification, see note 136 infra. For data relating to the differences between death-qualified and non-death-qualified juries, see generally Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror Attitudes About the Death Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 715, 725 (1998) (providing analysis of studies relating to death-qualifying the jury indicating that the death qualification process produces juries that in comparison to the normal population have "a 44% increased probability . . . to vote for conviction").

\textsuperscript{136} In most jurisdictions, the rule allowing the government to have a death-qualified jury took root during the nineteenth century. In order to obtain jurors who would not refuse to convict or to sentence a capital defendant to death because of their opposition to capital punishment, the prosecutor was permitted to exclude veniremen whose scruples about capital punishment might render them incapable of voting for a conviction or a death sentence in a capital case. See Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-Qualification Reexamined, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1986). In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court limited the prosecutor's right to exclude such veniremen to cases in which the veniremen made it unmistakably clear that their views against capital punishment would lead them to vote automatically against the death penalty or to decline to impose a verdict that could result in a death sentence. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), however, the Court sharply limited Witherspoon, holding that a prosecutor may exclude a venireman when there is sufficient evidence that her views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as
Defense attorneys who are unaware of this difference may mistakenly believe that their ability to convince the jury of a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt will obviate the necessity for a penalty trial. Indeed, Burt states that it is not unusual for attorneys who lack experience in such cases to "talk themselves into thinking they don't have to worry about the penalty phase because they have a great shot of winning the case."  

Burt adds that some lawyers soliciting his advice have asked him to "validate their decision" not to seek mitigating evidence in preparation for the penalty phase of a capital trial because their clients, who are presenting claims of innocence at the guilt trial, do not want them to present such evidence. Indeed, even some attorneys who have had experience in capital cases can remember capital cases in which they did no preparation for the penalty phase because they believed that their client's strong claim of innocence would prevail at the guilt trial.

Burt and other attorneys who specialize in capital cases unequivocally reject this approach. Because they are aware that even a defendant with a strong claim of innocence may be found guilty of a capital offense, these attorneys state that a lawyer representing a capital defendant should always prepare for the penalty trial. At a minimum, the lawyer should prepare a social history of the client. This history, which can generally be best assembled by an expert who has a background in psychology or social work, will trace the defendant's life from birth (or in some cases even before he was born)

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137. Interview with Russell Stetler (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Stetler Interview] (notes on file with author). Stetler is the director of Investigation and Mitigation for the New York State Defender Organization. He supervises investigators and mitigators in all capital cases handled by his office.

138. Burt Interview, supra note 132. For a fuller explanation of Burt's view on this point, see Michael N. Burt, Overview: Effective Capital Representation in the Twenty-First Century, in 1 CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL 7 (1998 ed.).

139. Burt Interview, supra note 132.

140. Michael Charlton remembered at least one case in which he and the other defense attorneys representing a Texas capital defendant decided to do no preparation for the penalty stage of the case because they were confident that the defendant would be acquitted. Even though that defendant was in fact acquitted, Charlton said that his present policy is to prepare for the penalty trial whenever he represents a capital defendant. In addition, he stated that he would make every attempt to pursue this policy even if his client stated that he did not want to have mitigating evidence presented at the penalty trial. Charlton Interview, supra note 135.

141. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132.

142. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
to the present. The history should be based on a wealth of data: information provided by the defendant's family members and people who have known him during the various stages of his life, the defendant's school and other institutional records, reports from mental-health professionals or other experts who have examined the defendant, and other relevant data. One of the purposes of the social history is to provide defense counsel with potential mitigating evidence to be presented at the penalty trial.

A capital defendant who objects to the idea of introducing mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is, of course, likely also to object to the idea of preparing a social history that includes potential mitigating evidence. Experienced capital-defense attorneys say that there are at least two ways to deal with such objections: If the defendant would agree that a death sentence is a worse alternative than a life sentence, the attorney can emphasize to the client that it is "always necessary to prepare for the worst." The attorney might tell her client that, even though she is hopeful that the defendant's trial defense will be successful, she wants to be prepared for every contingency. Therefore, it is essential that the attorney be prepared to present persuasive mitigating evidence at the penalty trial in the event the defendant is found guilty of the capital offense.

In addition, the defense attorney can truthfully tell her client that investigating the defendant's background may lead to evidence that will assist the defense at the guilt stage. Witnesses who are familiar with the defendant may be able to testify to his good character, thereby convincing the jury that the defendant is simply not the kind of person who could have committed the crime. If the government is introducing the defendant's incriminating statements to establish his guilt, evidence relating to the defendant's mental problems may be used to cast doubt on his statements' reliability.

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143. For examples of social histories compiled by mitigation experts, see White, supra note 53, at 325-29. In order to compile an adequate social history, the mitigation expert will often need the assistance of other court-appointed experts. See id. at 342-44.

144. See id. at 341-42.

145. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Burt Interview, supra note 132.

146. Burt Interview, supra note 132.

147. Id.; Telephone Interview with Gary Taylor, Austin, Tex., Attorney for capital defendants, (Mar. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Taylor Interview] (notes on file with author).

148. A defendant in a criminal case is allowed to have witnesses testify to his good character for the purpose of showing that, in view of his character traits, he was less likely to have committed the crime charged. Character witnesses often testify to the defendant's peaceful reputation, for example, for the purpose of showing the defendant was less likely to have attacked the victim. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watkins, 843 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 2003).

149. Interview with John Niland, Federal Death Penalty Resource Attorney for Texas (Mar. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Niland Interview] (notes on file with author). For an analysis of cases in which capital defendants with mental problems were convicted on the basis of
When dealing with a capital defendant who persists in objecting to the introduction of mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, experienced capital-defense attorneys will sometimes exert considerable pressure on the defendant to change his mind. Richard Jaffe, an Alabama defense attorney who has represented dozens of capital defendants, provides an example. Jaffe was appointed to represent Gary Drinkard at his retrial for a capital offense. At his first trial, Drinkard, who consistently maintained his innocence, had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the penalty trial in that case, Drinkard's attorney presented no mitigating evidence because Drinkard had instructed him not to. After Drinkard's conviction and death sentence were reversed, Jaffe and two other attorneys represented Drinkard at his second trial.

While these attorneys were preparing for Drinkard's second trial, Drinkard indicated that, if he was again convicted of the capital offense, he still did not want to have any mitigating evidence presented at the penalty trial. He stated that he would rather be executed than spend the rest of his life in prison. When Jaffe was informed of this, he met with Drinkard for the first time. He told Drinkard that they had a great defense team and that he thought the investigation and preparation for trial was going very well. He then told Drinkard that he could not continue to be a part of the defense team if Drinkard persisted in his refusal to have mitigating evidence introduced at a possible penalty trial. When Drinkard asked why, Jaffe replied, "I don't defend people who want to die." Drinkard then changed his mind and signed an agreement that stated that he was willing to have his attorneys present mitigating evidence on his behalf in the event that there was a penalty trial. The agreement was ultimately irrelevant, however, because Drinkard was acquitted at his second trial.

The pressure exerted by Jaffe on Drinkard may seem aggressive. Stephen Bright observes, however, that capital-defense attorneys will often have to be very forceful in dealing with defendants who do not want to have evidence presented at the penalty trial. Logic and other police-induced false confessions, see Welsh S. White, *Confessions in Capital Cases*, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 601.

151. *See id.* (reversing a conviction because evidence of prior bad acts was improperly admitted at trial).
152. Jaffe Interview, *supra* note 127.
153. *Id.*
154. *Id.*
155. *Id.*
156. *Id.*
persuasive techniques that might be successful in other contexts are less likely to be successful with such defendants because they may be incapable of either focusing on the penalty trial or understanding the impact that the failure to prepare for that trial may have on the jury’s ultimate decision. In Bright’s judgment, however, the “failure to prepare for the penalty trial” is not a viable option because introducing mitigating evidence that “will provide the jury with an in-depth understanding of the defendant” and the people connected to him is generally the only way that defense counsel can avoid a death sentence. When there is a disagreement between the attorney and the client, it is thus imperative that the attorney use every permissible means to convince the defendant that the defense should present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial.

C. The Attorney’s Obligation to Investigate in Preparation for the Penalty Trial

From the capital-defense attorney’s perspective, convincing the defendant that the defense needs to investigate for the purpose of presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty trial is important because it will facilitate the investigation. Even if the defendant does not agree that the defense should introduce mitigating evidence at a possible penalty trial, however, the attorney should nevertheless insist that an investigator compile a complete social history of the defendant. From the attorney’s perspective, the social history is indispensable for two reasons: first, as Michael Burt explained, it may uncover evidence relevant to the guilt trial; second, the attorney needs the fruits of the investigation to provide the defendant with information that will enable him to make an informed choice with respect to his options at the penalty trial.

As previously indicated, a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence may be unable to focus on the penalty trial prior to the guilt trial. In order to ensure that the defendant makes an informed decision as to the strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial, the defense attorney will thus sometimes have to postpone the final discussion of this issue until the defendant has been convicted of the capital offense. In order to make the defendant fully aware of his options at that time, however, the attorney must be aware of the

157. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
158. In addition to providing information relating to his own background, the defendant may be able to identify witnesses or significant aspects of his life that will be valuable to the investigator compiling the defendant’s social history.
159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
nature of any potential mitigating evidence so that she will be able to explain to the defendant the value of introducing that evidence at the penalty trial.\textsuperscript{161}

When a capital defendant has no objection to presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, the defense attorney's obligation to investigate will generally be clear. As the Court observed in \textit{Wiggins}, the ABA Guidelines have long provided that a capital-defense counsel's investigation should "comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence."\textsuperscript{162} Neither the ABA Guidelines nor any other source suggests that a capital-defense attorney's obligation to investigate mitigating evidence varies depending on the strength of the capital defendant's defense at the guilt trial.

Is there any basis for concluding that an attorney's obligation to investigate should vary depending on this factor? Since every lawyer knows that defenses that appear rock solid before trial sometimes may be eviscerated in court, a capital-defense attorney surely cannot rely on the fact that the capital defendant's claim of innocence will be so strong as to negate the possibility of a penalty trial.

Some defense attorneys may believe, however, that in certain types of cases there is no need to investigate mitigating evidence because, even if the defendant is convicted of the capital offense, the proper strategy at the penalty trial will be to rely entirely on persuading the jury that they should not sentence the defendant to death because of their lingering doubt as to his guilt. When the government's case is based on weak circumstantial evidence, for example, the defense attorney may assert: first, if the defendant is convicted, a lingering-doubt argument should be made to the penalty jury; and, second, since

\textsuperscript{161} The latest \textit{ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases} clarify the nature of the capital-defense attorney's obligation. They first explain the nature of the problems presented. Some defendants "initially insist they want to be executed — as punishment for their crimes or because they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in prison." ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 10.5 cmt. (2003) [hereinafter 2003 GUIDELINES]. Others "want to contest their guilt but not present mitigation." Id. Counsel, however, cannot "simply acquiesce" to these desires because they usually reflect "overwhelming feelings of guilt or despair rather than a rational decision." Id. Thus, according to the new ABA Guidelines, "[t]he investigation regarding guilt should be conducted regardless of any admission or statement by the client that evidence bearing upon guilt is not to be collected or presented." Id. Guideline 10.7(A)(1) (emphasis added). The same holds true for the penalty phase. Id. Guideline 10.7(A)(2). Counsel may not simply advise her client of the possible trial or penalty alternatives and then follow the client's directives as to which ones he or she wants to pursue. An investigation must be conducted. Id. Guideline 10.7 cmt. Without a "thorough investigation with respect to both phases of the case," counsel cannot reasonably advise her client "about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client's competency to make such decisions." Id. Guideline 10.7 cmt.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Wiggins}, 539 U.S. at 524.
a jury’s lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt is the factor that is most likely to lead the jury to spare the defendant’s life, the attorney should not dilute the force of the lingering-doubt argument by introducing mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s background. In order to assess this claim’s validity, it is necessary to consider under what circumstances the strategy of relying solely on a claim of lingering doubt at the penalty trial is reasonable.

III. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STRATEGY AT THE PENALTY TRIAL

A. The Effect of the Defendant’s Claim of Innocence at the Guilt Trial

When a capital defendant who presented a claim of innocence at the guilt trial is convicted of the capital offense, the defendant’s attorney will often need to consider whether she should continue to assert the defendant’s claim of innocence at the penalty trial. Even though the jury rejected this claim at the guilt stage, the attorney may believe that she should continue to assert this claim, arguing that jurors should vote to spare the defendant’s life if they have any residual or lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. If the attorney does decide to argue that the jury should spare the defendant’s life because of lingering doubts as to his guilt, she may have to make other difficult decisions, including how she should present the lingering-doubt claim and what other evidence and arguments will be compatible with that claim.

When the defense attorney believes that the claim of innocence presented at the guilt trial was strong, she may firmly believe that she should continue to press this claim at the penalty trial. When the jury in a capital case does have a lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, it seems clear that it will view such a doubt as one of the strongest possible reasons for sparing the defendant’s life. If the defense attorney has asserted a claim of innocence that seemed strong to her, she may naturally believe that at least one of the jurors will be sufficiently persuaded by that evidence to have a lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, and, in some jurisdictions, even one such juror may be enough to avoid a possible death sentence. In capital cases

163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

164. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

165. Under most sentencing statutes, the jury must unanimously agree to impose the death sentence. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iv)-(v) (West Supp. 2004) (stating a capital jury must unanimously decide to impose a death sentence, otherwise the judge will end the jury’s deliberations and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) (stating the jury must unanimously find aggravating factors and if they cannot do so, the court “shall impose a sentence other than death”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (2002) (requiring a “unanimous recommendation of death” and if the jury cannot agree to a sentence, the sentence must be “imprisonment for life without parole or imprisonment for life”).
where a strong claim of innocence was presented at the guilt trial, some defense attorneys will thus believe that the best penalty-trial strategy is to argue that the jury should not impose the death penalty because of their lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt. In some of these cases, moreover, these attorneys apparently believe that the argument relating to lingering doubt is the only argument that needs to be presented at the penalty trial. Instead of also presenting other mitigating evidence that might give the jury additional reasons for sparing the defendant's life, they rely solely on the argument that the jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt should lead it to impose a life sentence.

The experienced capital-defense attorneys with whom I spoke, however, uniformly reject a strategy that places undue emphasis on convincing the jury that has just convicted a defendant that there is a lingering doubt as to that defendant's guilt. As I have already indicated, jurors on a death-qualified jury are likely to evaluate evidence in a way that is strongly favorable to the prosecution. These jurors are thus significantly less likely than the normal population to perceive a lingering doubt, or any kind of doubt, as to a criminal defendant's guilt. In addition, members of any jury may believe that once the jury has returned a guilty verdict, that verdict resolves all possible doubts against the defendant. Indeed, they may feel that a defense attorney's argument that there is still a lingering doubt as to guilt is disrespectful to the jury in the sense that it challenges the legitimacy of their recently returned verdict.

Additionally, empirical data indicate that one of the factors that is most likely to lead jurors to spare a capital defendant's life is their

166. In several cases, lower courts have held that a capital defendant's attorney made a reasonable choice to rely primarily or exclusively on the strategy of arguing "residual" or "lingering" doubt at the defendant's penalty trial. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 715-16 (11th Cir. 1999).

167. See, e.g., Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corrs., 331 F.3d 764, 787-88 (11th Cir. 2003) (trial counsel argued residual doubt following defendant's conviction and did not present much mitigating evidence out of concern that it would do more harm than good); cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1513 (2004); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (trial counsel presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial and primarily a residual doubt claim at the penalty trial); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 716 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).

168. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.

169. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 1576-80 (describing how after returning a guilty verdict, penalty jurors frequently fail to perceive a difference between reasonable and residual doubt; rather, they view their verdict as foreclosing any doubt as to the defendant's guilt).

170. Id. at 1578 (telling how some jurors feel insulted at the suggestion that they should have lingering doubts; these jurors fervently believe that they "would not have convicted the defendant in the first place had any such doubt existed").
perception that the defendant is remorseful. 171 When the defense has asserted that the defendant is innocent during the guilt trial, the defendant cannot credibly express remorse for committing the crime at the penalty trial. If the defense argues lingering doubt at the penalty trial, however, the jury may view this argument as the strongest possible indication of the defendant’s lack of remorse. If the defense insists that there is still a doubt as to whether the defendant committed the crime, then clearly the defendant not only lacks remorse for his crime, but is not even willing to take the first step toward accepting responsibility for committing it. 172

Experienced capital-defense attorneys thus conclude that even in cases where a strong claim of innocence has been presented at the guilt trial, the defense should sometimes make no reference to the possibility of lingering doubt at the penalty trial. 173 Instead, the defense should take the position that the guilt and penalty trials are completely separate proceedings. If one attorney represented the defendant at the guilt trial, it may be helpful to have a new attorney represent him at the penalty trial. That attorney may begin by telling the jury that the defense accepts the jury’s verdict. She will then explain that the case has now entered a new stage in which the jury will have to decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life in prison and that, in deciding this question, they will need to “look at who the defendant is.” 174 The attorney will then proceed to present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant’s background, including his childhood, his mental health, the difficulties he has encountered, his accomplishments, and other circumstances, including perhaps “the suffering [the defendant’s family] will go through if [the defendant] is sentenced to death.” 175 Although the attorney may hope that some jurors will refuse to vote for the death penalty because they have a lingering doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, 176 she may decide not to refer to this possibility during the

171. John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 144, 164-65 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (making the same observations as Sundby, supra note 52, at 1578); Sundby, supra note 52, at 1566 (detailing interviews in which jurors “frequently articulated . . . that they likely would have voted for a life sentence instead of death had the defendant expressed remorse”).

172. See Sundby, supra note 52, at 1574 (concluding, based on interviews with jurors, that “a defendant’s degree of remorse is largely a reflection of whether the defendant is at least acknowledging the killing or whether he is refusing to accept any responsibility for the killing”).

173. Bright Interview, supra note 128.

174. Burt Interview, supra note 132.

175. Bright email, supra note 107.

176. According to experienced capital-defense attorneys, juries in capital cases sometimes decide during the guilt trial that they will not impose the death sentence. Jurors who have some doubt as to the defendant’s guilt may agree to vote for a guilty verdict only
penalty trial but instead to focus entirely on presenting mitigating evidence that will provide the jury with a multilayered picture of the defendant.

As in every capital case, defense attorneys who have presented a claim of innocence at the guilt trial will have to make choices as to the nature of the mitigating evidence to be presented at the penalty trial. In a typical case, the investigation of the defendant's social history will yield a wide array of evidence. Some of this evidence could be presented at the penalty trial for the purpose of explaining why the defendant committed the crime: perhaps his mental problems reduced his ability to control his conduct, or the abuse he was subjected to as a child made him more prone to respond aggressively to stressful situations.177

In cases where the defense has presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt stage, experienced capital-defense attorneys state that they will be less likely to introduce mitigating evidence designed to explain why the defendant committed the crime. Their reasoning is that it is essential for the defense to maintain a consistent theory throughout the capital trial.178 If the defense has maintained throughout the guilt trial that the defendant did not commit the offense, introducing evidence at the penalty trial that seems to explain why he committed it may lead the jury to view the defense attorney as disingenuous. If the defense’s penalty-trial evidence provides an explanation for why the defendant is likely to respond to a stressful situation with violence, for example, the jury may feel that defense counsel should have presented this evidence at the guilt stage rather than asserting a claim of innocence without providing information that would have helped the jury assess that claim.

When it is possible, the defense will thus try to present only mitigating evidence at the penalty trial that is consistent with the defendant’s claim of innocence at the guilt trial. Such evidence, which attorneys refer to as “good-guy” evidence, may include evidence relating to the defendant’s good character, his good employment record, or as in the Chandler case, the help he has provided to others in various situations.179 Even if strong evidence of this type is not available, the defense might at least be able to present testimony that

on the condition that the jury will not impose the death sentence. Bright Interview, supra note 128; Bruck Interview, supra note 125.

177. See White, supra note 53, at 360-65.


179. In some cases, capital-defense attorneys will be able to introduce evidence relating to the defendant’s positive contributions in prison. In one case, the defendant’s mitigating evidence related to the fact that he had defused a dangerous situation in prison, thereby probably saving another prisoner’s life. Jaffe Interview, supra note 127.
the defendant is a nonaggressive individual who does not have a prior history of violent behavior.

If significant good-guy evidence is introduced, it will dovetail with the claim of innocence asserted at the guilt trial. Through presenting this evidence, the defense attorney hopes to revive any doubts that members of the jury may have had as to the defendant's guilt. In the course of explaining who the defendant is, the defense attorney hopes to reinforce the idea that the defendant is not the kind of person who would have committed this crime. Some experienced capital-defense attorneys can recall cases in which, after they had presented strong good-guy mitigating evidence, the penalty jury not only declined to impose the death penalty but asked if they could change the guilty verdict they rendered at the guilt stage,180 a possibility that is foreclosed by the rule that the jury cannot change its verdict after it has been accepted by the court.181

Unfortunately, in some cases in which the defendant has maintained his innocence during the guilt trial, good-guy evidence that could buttress this claim at the penalty trial will be noticeably lacking. The only potential mitigating evidence will be witnesses who may be able to provide a sympathetic portrait of the defendant but can do so only by testifying to his problems, which may include, for example, "severe mental impairment perhaps resulting from organic brain damage and a profoundly troubled childhood in which the defendant was subjected to horrendous abuse and profound neglect."182 Evidence of this type is double-edged in the sense that, while it does explain where the defendant has come from and how he got to be the way he is, it also has the potential to not only eliminate any lingering doubts jurors might have had as to the defendant's guilt, but also to strengthen their perception that sparing his life will enhance the danger to society, a consideration that empirical data indicate will weigh heavily in the penalty jury's decision.183

180. Charlton Interview, supra note 135; Niland Interview, supra note 149.

181. In determining the scope of a jury's authority to change its verdict in a capital case, courts have invariably concluded that "the authority of a jury to amend or correct a criminal verdict terminates with the beginning of the next phase of the proceeding." See David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Criminal Law: Propriety of Reassembling Jury to Amend, Correct, Clarify, or Otherwise Change Verdict After Jury Has Been Discharged, or Has Reached or Sealed Its Verdict and Separated, 14 A.L.R. 5th 89, 172 (1993).

182. Charlton Interview, supra note 135. According to Stephen Bright, it is not at all unusual for a capital defendant to have this kind of background. Bright Interview, supra note 128.

183. Results from the Capital Jury Project show that jurors "who believed the defendant would be a future danger [were] more likely to vote for death . . . than [those] who believed otherwise." Blume et al., supra note 171, at 165. Such jurors fear that "unless the defendant is executed he will be released from the secure confines of prison too soon." Id. at 176. Death, they believe, is "the only real way to guarantee the defendant's incapacitation." Id.
The choice of whether to present double-edged mitigating evidence or to present little or no mitigating evidence might seem to present a dilemma for a capital-defense attorney. When confronted with this choice, however, experienced capital-defense attorneys invariably conclude that mitigating evidence must be presented, even if there is some chance that the jury may view it as double-edged. Stephen Bright states that in a capital case, defense counsel should always present mitigating evidence that will explain the defendant's background and history to the jury, thereby enabling the jury to gain an understanding of the defendant as a person.184 As another experienced attorney explains, "You have to put the jury in the defendant's neighborhood" so that the jurors will be able to "understand where he's been" and "what it was like growing up in the way he did."185

If no mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's background is presented, the jurors are likely to feel they "have no reason to spare the defendant's life."186 On the other hand, even double-edged mitigating evidence can be used to present a powerful case for life by causing the jury to empathize with the defendant. According to John Niland, an experienced Texas capital-defense attorney, if the evidence is effectively presented, the jurors may end up at least feeling that they have some understanding of the difficulties the defendant has experienced, in which case they will be less inclined to impose the death penalty.187 In nearly all capital cases, experienced capital-defense attorneys thus opt to introduce double-edged mitigating evidence when introducing such evidence is the only means of explaining the defendant's life.188

184. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
185. Charlton Interview, supra note 135.
186. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
187. Niland Interview, supra note 149.
188. Defense counsel may also be able to take measures to neutralize the adverse effects of potentially double-edged mitigating evidence. When dealing with mitigating evidence that is double-edged because it suggests that the defendant is the kind of person who would be likely to have committed the crime — the defendant's violent or troubled background, for example — defense counsel can sometimes argue that this evidence provides an explanation for why the police might mistakenly suspect the defendant of the crime. Niland Interview, supra note 149. If the mitigating evidence is double-edged because it suggests that the defendant may pose a future danger to society, moreover, defense counsel may be able to neutralize this evidence by introducing evidence that shows the defendant will not pose any danger to society if he is incarcerated for life. Evidence relating to the defendant's prior good conduct in prisons or other institutions, for example, may show that the defendant is dangerous only when he is in an unstructured environment. If he is sentenced to life in prison, he will not be a threat to anyone. In some cases, however, the extent to which defense counsel can neutralize the effect of double-edged mitigating evidence may be limited.
B. Arguing Lingering Doubt at the Penalty Trial

Even though arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury is often risky, experienced capital-defense attorneys believe there are situations in which such arguments should be made. In deciding whether to argue lingering doubt, these attorneys will consider various factors, including the length of the jury's deliberations, the strength and nature of both the government's and the defendant's case, the nature of the defense's possible penalty-trial evidence, and the law of the jurisdiction relating to whether evidence or argument relating to lingering doubt may be introduced. In most cases, these same factors will also play an important part in determining the content of the attorney's lingering-doubt argument, the extent to which the attorney will introduce other mitigating evidence, and the ways in which the attorney will interweave the arguments relating to lingering doubt with those relating to the other evidence. In order to illustrate experienced capital-defense attorney's strategies, I will provide examples of several lingering-doubt arguments, and then a fuller description of two penalty arguments, which illustrate the context in which lingering-doubt arguments are presented and the methods through which skilled capital-defense attorneys interweave these arguments with those based on different types of mitigating evidence.

1. Examples of Lingering-Doubt Arguments

In some cases, an experienced capital-defense attorney will decide to argue lingering doubt only if the jury's lengthy deliberations at the guilt stage signal that at least some of the jurors have doubts as to the defendant's guilt. When the jury's deliberations indicate the possibility of such doubts, the defense attorney will advert to the jury's deliberations in her closing argument, explaining to the jurors that, if any of them had doubts as to the defendant's guilt for the capital offense, this provides a reason why they should vote against the death penalty.

This kind of argument can be effective even if the issue that precipitated lengthy jury deliberation related to the defendant's degree of guilt rather than his total innocence. For example, in a case involving William Brooks, a young African American charged with robbing, raping, and intentionally shooting to death a young white woman, Brooks's attorney, Stephen Bright, did not dispute that Brooks had robbed, raped, and shot the young woman, causing her death. The defense did maintain, however, that the shooting was accidental rather than intentional. At the guilt trial, the jury

189. Bright Interview, supra note 128.
adjudicated Brooks guilty of capital murder, but only after engaging in lengthy deliberations relating to the question of whether the shooting was intentional or accidental.\(^{190}\)

In his penalty-trial argument, Bright referred to the jury's lengthy deliberations as a reason why the death penalty should not be imposed:

And we told you about the circumstances of the gun going off and you spent a day agonizing over that and I'm sure discussing it back and forth and you came to the decision you came to. But I'd suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that part of that struggle is a reason for voting for a life sentence in this case, the fact that it was a close question, a difficult question, a question that obviously some of you had different views about before you came to an ultimate agreement on it. But if there's some lingering question among any of you as to exactly what happened when all those events were going on out there, that's a reason to consider life and vote for life because that goes to the degree of culpability and blameworthiness in this case.\(^{191}\)

Bright's argument was obviously directed to the members of the jury who had earlier had difficulty in concluding that the defendant had intentionally shot the victim. While not criticizing those jurors' decision to join with the majority in returning a verdict of guilty of capital murder, Bright's argument emphasized that each juror should reconsider whether she had any lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt and, if she had such a doubt, to use it as a basis for declining to vote for the death sentence.

When the government's case has obvious weaknesses — a key government witness has been shown to be unreliable, for example — the defense attorney may decide to make a lingering-doubt argument in a way that exploits this weakness. In making this argument, the attorney will generally be careful to avoid any express or implied criticism of the jury's verdict. David Bruck observes that, in such cases, he will sometimes begin his argument relating to lingering doubt by telling the jury that, based on the evidence they had to work with and the standard of proof they were required to apply, their verdict was at least reasonable.\(^{192}\) After thus making it clear that he respects the jury's verdict, Bruck will then explain that the jury should adopt a different perspective in deciding whether the evidence is strong enough to warrant a death sentence.

Bruck's lingering-doubt argument on behalf of Paul Mazzell provides an apt example. At Mazzell's guilt trial, the chief government

\(^{190}\) Case Example: Presenting a Theme Throughout the Case, S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (stating jury in Brooks case deliberated for a day before returning a "verdict of guilty of malice murder").

\(^{191}\) Id. at 23.

\(^{192}\) Bruck Interview, supra note 125.
witness was Danny Hogg, who testified under a grant of immunity that he and another man obeyed Mazzell's orders to bring the victim to Mazzell and that Mazzell alone killed the victim. Hogg's testimony was impeached by his past criminal record, his own admission that he had given false testimony at an earlier trial, and his admission that his grant of immunity would be revoked if the government concluded that he himself had killed the victim. Three witnesses testified that Hogg had in fact killed the victim and the prosecutor acknowledged to the jury that Hogg was not a believable witness. The jury nevertheless convicted Mazzell of capital murder.

At the penalty trial, Bruck began his lingering-doubt argument as follows:

I want to preface this by saying again that what I'm about to say is not to quarrel with your verdict or say you made a mistake. You took the evidence as it existed in the courtroom during the past week or two; and you, consistent with your oath, applied your good judgment to that evidence, and you found beyond a reasonable doubt that Paul was guilty. And I'm not going to quarrel with that in any way, shape or form.

Bruck then moved to the question of how the jury should approach the evidence in deciding the question before it at the penalty stage:

The evidence presented to you, as it had been pulled together by the State over the last week or two, was guilty; but before you can put this man to death based on that evidence you have to be sure of a fourth thing beyond a reasonable doubt, and that is that the evidence that was given to you and that you had to make do with as it had been pulled together and hammered into shape by the time you had to deliberate, that that evidence will never, never change. And you have to be sure of that beyond a reasonable doubt. Y'all know exactly what I'm talking about.

You have to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hogg won't come up next month, next week, ten years from now, long after Paul has been executed and buried and, for whatever reasons of his own, his interests having changed, he's not going to come along and say: "Well, I'm kind of embarrassed to say this now, but I didn't tell the truth at the trial." You have to be sure of that because, if Paul was still doing his life sentence in prison and Mr. Hogg happened to say that, something can be done about it; but if he's executed, it can't.

Michael Burt asserts that the argument that evidence of the defendant's guilt "may change" has more resonance today than it did in the past because of jurors' awareness of cases in which convicted defendants have been exonerated. In order to draw on this awareness,
a capital-defense attorney may begin by telling the jury that she respects its verdict, but in reaching the judgment that an individual is guilty of a crime "we are dealing with human institutions that we know are fallible."196 The attorney may then refer to cases in which defendants convicted of crimes were later exonerated and state that in those cases the government's evidence seemed to establish the defendants' guilt and the juries that convicted those defendants were convinced that their verdicts were correct.197

In some cases, the attorney will seek to draw even closer parallels between the present case and prior wrongful convictions. When the prosecution's case has obvious weaknesses, Bruck will tell the jury that in cases in which convicted defendants were later exonerated there were "always warning signs."198 He will then explain some of the types of evidence that constitute warning signs — government witnesses who change their stories, for example, or disputed forensic evidence — and show that those same warning signs are present in the case before them.199

In arguing lingering doubt to the penalty jury, an experienced capital-defense attorney will often assert that the jury should not impose the death penalty unless they find that the government's evidence meets a higher standard of proof than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that governed their deliberations at the guilt stage. Michael Burt states that in California, a capital defendant's attorney will sometimes begin orienting jurors as to the differing standards of proof at the voir dire stage.200 The attorney may even use one or more diagrams to illustrate the different standards of proof required at different stages of the proceedings, including, perhaps, reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant, probable cause to arrest him, proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict him of the capital offense, and proof beyond any doubt to sentence him to death.201 After the defendant has been convicted of the capital offense, the attorney at the penalty trial will then refer to the earlier schematic presentation and remind the jury that they should not impose the death penalty unless the evidence of guilt meets the most stringent standard. In some California cases, this argument will be especially effective because the trial judge's lingering-doubt instructions will reinforce the attorney's argument that the prosecution's evidence of

196. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
197. Bruck Interview, supra note 125; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
198. Bruck Interview, supra note 125.
199. Id.
200. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
201. Id.
guilt should be required to meet a higher standard of proof at the penalty stage.\textsuperscript{202}

Even when they expect no help from the judge's instructions,\textsuperscript{203} however, experienced capital-defense attorneys will still sometimes argue that the jury should apply a higher standard of proof before imposing a death sentence. Even if the judge sustains a prosecutor's objection to this argument, the defense may still benefit. The objection will call the jury's attention to the issue of lingering doubt and perhaps signal to them that the prosecutor does not believe that his case has been proved beyond any doubt. The prosecutor's objection, moreover, may give the defense attorney an opportunity to reinforce to the jury the message that it has the ultimate responsibility for deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed.

\textsuperscript{202} See, e.g., People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 386 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a jury instruction on lingering doubt may be required by statute if warranted by the evidence). But see People v. Medina, 906 P.2d 2, 29 (Cal. 1995) (holding that jury may consider lingering doubts in penalty phase, but there is no federal or state constitutional right to a jury instruction). In some California cases, judges have instructed the penalty jury as follows:

Although proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been found, you may demand a greater degree of certainty for the imposition of the death penalty. The adjudication of guilt is not infallible and any lingering doubt you entertain on the question of guilt may be considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty, including the possibility that at some time in the future, facts may come to light that have not yet been discovered.


Alternatively, counsel may request a special separate instruction, such as the following instruction requested in the case of People v. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990):

Each individual juror may consider as a mitigating factor residual or lingering doubt as to whether defendant intentionally killed the victim. Lingering or residual doubt is defined as the state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubts.

Thus if any individual juror has a lingering or residual doubt about whether the defendant intentionally killed the victim, he or she must consider this as a mitigating factor and assign to it the weight you deem appropriate.

Email from Michael Burt (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Burt email] (source on file with author).

\textsuperscript{203} In most jurisdictions, the judge will not instruct the penalty jury that its lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt may be considered as a mitigating circumstance. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988); Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1163 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1146 (2004); State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 1074, 1116 (N.J. 2002); Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 38 (Ky. 1998); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 326 (Miss. 1997); Evans v. State, 926 P.2d 265, 284 (Nev. 1996); State v. Garner, 665 N.E.2d 623, 632 (Ohio 1995); State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Rogers, 836 P.2d 1308, 1328 (Or. 1992); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196, 211 (Va. 1991); Ruiz v. State, 772 S.W.2d 297 (Ark. 1989); Melson v. State, 775 So. 2d 857, 898 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999), aff'd, 775 So. 2d 904 (2000); Bernay v. State, 989 P.2d 998, 1012 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999). Courts that have considered the question have generally held (or stated in dicta) that a capital defendant is not entitled to have the judge charge the penalty jury that its lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt may be considered as mitigating evidence. See Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174 (dicta); Holland v. State, 705 So. 2d 307, 354 (Miss. 1997); People v. Harris, 676 N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); State v. Fletcher, 555 S.E.2d 534, 544 (N.C. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 846 (2002); State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1122-23 (Ohio 1997).
In the Mazze case, for example, after pointing out to the jury that it was possible that the chief government witness might later change his story, Mr. Bruck added that he didn’t know whether that would happen. He next addressed the level of proof the jury should require to sentence the defendant to death and the prosecutor objected:

Mr. Bruck: But before you put a man to death on their testimony, you have to be sure beyond all doubt that it will never happen. And that’s ridiculous. Who can be sure of that beyond all doubt?

Mr. Stoney: Your honor, I object. The law is not all doubt. It’s a reasonable doubt, you Honor.

The Court: Reasonable doubt, Mr. Bruck.

Mr. Bruck: Yes, sir. The amount of doubt that you feel you’re willing to tolerate before you put a man to death, of course, is between you and your own conscience. And I won’t go into that anymore.

Bruck, however, did further refer to the subject of the standard of proof. After talking about mistakes that have been made in the court system, he emphatically stated, “The death penalty is for cases where there can’t have been any kind of mistake, and this is just not such a case.” After explaining why Mazzell’s case was not one in which there could not have been a mistake, Bruck adverted to the prosecutor’s earlier objection, using it to emphasize the jury’s responsibility for determining whether a death sentence should be imposed:

Mr. Stoney jumps up and objects and says: “Well, its not beyond all doubt. Its just beyond a reasonable doubt.” Well, that’s fine for him to say, and that’s fine for the law to say; but the responsibility for whether Paul Mazzell lives or dies is not on Mr. Stoney. It’s not even on Judge Fields. It’s on each individual one of you.

Through this argument, Bruck effectively communicated to the jury the reasons why it would be appropriate for them to decline to impose the death penalty unless the prosecutor established the defendant’s guilt beyond any doubt.

2. Two Penalty-Trial Arguments

Excerpts from two penalty-trial arguments provide a fuller picture of the strategic choices skilled defense attorneys make when

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204. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 1995.
207. Id. at 1996.
presenting a lingering-doubt argument. In particular, the arguments in these two cases — one from California and one from New York — illustrate the ways in which different attorneys direct the jury's attention to the issue of lingering doubt, interweave arguments relating to lingering doubt with arguments based on mitigating evidence, and highlight the importance of humanizing the defendant so that the jury will have a reason to spare his life.

The Henderson Case

Philip Henderson was convicted of capital murder in California, a state that allows the consideration of lingering doubt as a mitigating factor.208 Henderson, represented by Michael Burt and James Pagano, was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of auto theft.209 Ray and Anita Boggs, their one-year-old child, Ray, Jr., and Anita Boggs's unborn fetus210 were found dead on or about February 28, 1982, in the area underneath their apartment (which was on stilts) and in the backyard of the apartment building. Ray had been shot to death and Anita had been strangled.211 The Boggs family had been killed about six weeks earlier, during the second week of January 1982, and items belonging to them had been taken from their apartment at the time of their death.212

The police investigating the case determined that Philip Henderson and his wife, Velma, had stayed at the Boggs's apartment in January 1982. When contacted by the police, Henderson told them he and his wife had last seen the Boggses on January 11, the day on which the Hendersons left San Francisco to go to Florida. Henderson did not tell the police that he had taken Boggs's property or that he had noticed anything unusual in the apartment before he and his wife left for Florida.

The police then discovered that Henderson and his wife had sold property that belonged to Ray Boggs during their trip to Florida.213 In addition, witnesses noticed that Henderson had in his possession a .22 caliber long rifle similar to a rifle belonging to Boggs.214 A criminalist testified that the bullet retrieved from Ray Boggs's brain was fired

208. See text accompanying note 241 infra.
210. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (Deering 2003) (making the premeditated killing of either a living person or an unborn fetus first-degree murder).
211. Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 842.
214. Id. at 842-43. One of these witnesses also testified that Henderson told him that he and his wife were "on the run." Id. at 843.
from a .22 caliber long rifle. While the expert could not positively identify the rifle possessed by Henderson as the one that had fired the bullet, he testified that the identifying characteristics of a bullet fired from that gun were “consistent with the characteristics found on the bullet which killed Ray Boggs.”

Henderson testified in his own defense. He denied the murders but admitted that he and his wife stole Boggs’s property on January 11. He testified that Boggs was involved in selling drugs and that on one occasion he had been threatened by two men, including one called “Hawaiian Jimmy,” who beat Boggs on the head with a cane. He testified that he and his wife decided to leave for Florida because they were frightened by Boggs’s drug business and the violence that accompanied it.

Henderson claimed that on January 11 he and his wife had helped Ray Boggs look for Boggs’s wife, who was missing. When they returned to the Boggs’s apartment that evening, the apartment was in disarray and Ray Boggs’s rifle was off the rack and leaning against the wall. The Hendersons became frightened by the circumstances and decided this would be a good time to leave. Because they had little money, “they decided to steal the Boggses’ property.” Among other things, they took Ray’s rifle and truck. Later, Henderson sold some of the stolen property. He admitted that he had initially lied to the police about his activities because he did not want to be prosecuted for stealing Boggs’s property.

In order to rebut the defense’s suggestion that people associated with Boggs in selling drugs might have murdered him, Edward Ramos, also known as “Hawaiian Jimmy,” testified for the prosecution on rebuttal. Ramos admitted threatening Boggs with physical injury because Boggs owed him money for work he had done on Boggs’s truck; but he claimed that he never hit Boggs and that Boggs had paid him at least part of the money he owed by giving him a $50 check on January 7, 1982.

After five or six days of deliberations, the jury found Henderson guilty of two counts of capital murder and several lesser crimes. Because the defense had presented a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial, Henderson’s attorneys decided to present evidence and argument relating to lingering doubt at the penalty trial.

During the penalty trial, the defense introduced evidence relating to the defendant’s innocence that had not been admitted and would not have been admissible during the guilt trial. Most significantly,

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215. *Id.*

216. *Henderson, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 844.*

217. *Id.* He also testified that “[a] few weeks later” he attempted “to collect the rest of the money [Boggs] owed.” *Id.*
Rose Marie Hunt testified. She was a close friend of the Boggses and the godmother to the Boggses’ one-year-old child and she also knew the Hendersons as well as other people associated with both families during the period when the murders occurred. She opined that Mr. Henderson should be given a life sentence because “there’s other parties involved in this that hasn’t been brought forth.”218 Asked to explain, she broke down in tears and testified from her wheelchair:

I believe that if he’s executed in the gas chamber he may be executed as an innocent victim. And I believe at that time when the true people have (been) found out, there will be no way to bring him back to life like there is no way to bring my friends back to life. I believe that if he is put to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, that if he is guilty, then he’s punished. If he is not guilty, he has the possibility of coming out and the real people being convicted.219

Other witnesses who knew Henderson also testified that in their opinions Henderson was not guilty of the killings that had been committed.220

During his closing argument at the penalty trial, the prosecutor specifically addressed the issue of lingering doubt. He first referred to the testimony of the witnesses who expressed the opinion that Henderson was not guilty. He argued that these witnesses lacked the knowledge necessary for an informed opinion. He pointed out that some of the witnesses could not assess the defendant’s propensities at the time of the crime because they had not seen him for many years.221 In the case of Ms. Hunt, he emphasized that she had not attended the guilt trial. He then said: “She didn’t listen to the evidence. She didn’t consider that evidence. That’s like someone being a Monday morning quarterback who didn’t even watch the game the day before. I object to that. I think that’s real inappropriate.”222

After thus seeking to dismiss the testimony of the defense’s lingering-doubt witnesses, the prosecutor argued that the jury’s verdict at the guilt stage should preclude the defense from establishing lingering doubt as a mitigating factor:

Now, if there is a doubt in your mind, I like to think — I like to think that you’ll resolve that in the guilt phase. And I think you did on certain of the offenses. I think you gave the defendant every benefit of every doubt that he was ever able to get. . . . But I submit to you any doubt was

219. Id. at 6957.
220. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
221. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7152 (referring to witnesses basing their opinion on “someone they knew ten years ago, 15 years ago, 19 years ago in the case of Mr. Comorato [who] knew the defendant when he was ten years old”).
222. Id. at 7153.
resolved in that jury room in the guilt phase. And I'll submit to you that it's rather, it's rather a strong word, and I apologize, but it's rather insulting to get up here and say may be you were wrong, just may be you were a tiny bit.223

Consistent with the empirical data relating to capital jurors' attitudes,224 the prosecutor's assertion that defense counsel's lingering-doubt argument was "insulting" seemed designed to lead the jury to weigh that argument against the defendant because it represented a refusal on the part of the defense to accept the jury's verdict.225

The prosecutor's primary argument, however, was that the jurors should view their verdict at the guilt stage as foreclosing any doubts as to the defendant's guilt. After characterizing the lingering-doubt argument as insulting, the prosecutor returned to this theme:

People have to make decisions. If we never made decisions, we would never move. Some of you in occupations make decisions, life and death decisions on a daily basis. You have to make decisions. You made your decision, let's go with it now. If you are going to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole, I hope you do it for other than lingering doubt. I think that is selling yourself short. That is a cop out.226

The prosecutor thus continually sought to reinforce the idea that, through its verdict at the guilt stage, the jury had resolved all doubts against the defendant.

Defense counsel James Pagano, who had not participated in the guilt trial but was the primary attorney during the penalty trial,227 made the final argument to the penalty jury.228 Early in the argument, Pagano referred to the jurors' lengthy deliberations, observing that it showed they were "serious about [their] job."229 A little later, he specifically responded to the prosecutor's argument relating to lingering doubt, emphasizing that a higher standard of proof should be required to impose the death penalty:

And in spite of what counsel said, lingering doubt is very valid here especially in the facts and circumstances of this case.... You can find somebody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we explained that to you in the voir dire. There is that higher area, just that little bit more. And they allow you because this is the death penalty case.230

223. Id. at 7154.
224. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
226. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7154-55.
228. In California, the defense always has the opportunity to make the final penalty-trial argument in a capital case. Id.
229. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7171.
230. Id. at 7173.
Consistent with David Bruck’s approach, Pagano next asked the jury to visualize how the case might look to them in the future:

And you can say yes, I believe I found this is the guy, that did it beyond a reasonable doubt, but would you five years from now, ten years from now, 20 years from now, this is the guy that did it, he really did it.

Having developed the framework for arguing lingering doubt, Pagano proceeded to argue that specific aspects of the case “cried [out] for lingering doubt.” He argued, for example, that the jury should give weight to Rose Marie Hunt’s opinion: “[N]obody knows the cast of characters that hung out at 753 Webster Street or that other milieu down at Jack In The Box better than Rose Marie Hunt. And the child’s godmother is telling you you may have the wrong person here, better give it some attention.” He also argued that, in view of the circumstantial nature of the government’s case, the jury should give weight to the witnesses who testified as to Henderson’s nonviolent character: “There is no smoking gun here . . . it is circumstantial evidence. Mr. Henderson was on trial. It was reasonable for you to conclude, perhaps, what you did. But now in the penalty phase you’ve got to know a little bit more about Phil Henderson.”

During the rest of his argument, Pagano talked primarily about the defense witnesses who had testified on Henderson’s behalf at the penalty trial. Since this testimony could accurately be characterized as good-guy evidence, Pagano was able to effectively interweave two interrelated arguments: the witnesses’ testimony showed that Henderson’s was “a life worth sparing” and that “[t]here [was] a lingering doubt” as to his guilt.

During the latter part of his argument, Pagano focused primarily on the penalty-trial evidence relating to Henderson’s background and character. He talked about Henderson’s life, including the people who cared about him, his nonviolent character, and his kindness to children. Through this argument, Pagano sought to humanize Henderson and to convince the jury that his life was worth sparing. Pagano also referred to testimony that indicated Henderson would not

231. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
232. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7173.
233. Id. at 7174.
234. Id.; Burt Interview, supra note 132.
235. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7177.
236. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
237. Henderson Record, supra note 218, at 7172-85.
238. Id. at 7186-92.
be a threat to anyone if he were incarcerated for life. He ended by urging the jury to accept the alternative of life imprisonment.

In accordance with California law, the judge instructed the jury that, in deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, one of the mitigating factors they could consider was "any lingering doubt you may have about his guilt." After a relatively short deliberation, the jury returned a sentence of life without possibility of parole.

The McIntosh Case

The penalty trial of Dalkeith McIntosh, who was convicted of capital murder in New York, is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, the defense counsel's lingering-doubt argument was unorthodox but highly effective, thus demonstrating that skilled capital-defense attorneys will adopt different approaches depending on myriad circumstances, including the attorney's sense of the rapport she has been able to establish with the jury. Second, the case provides a striking example of the axiom that, whether or not there is an issue of lingering doubt, mitigating evidence explaining the defendant's background and history must be presented to the penalty jury.

McIntosh was charged with two murders and felonious assault. The prosecution claimed that he shot his estranged wife, who was a corrections officer, one of her daughters, and her six-year-old grandson. The two women died but the six-year-old survived and testified against McIntosh. McIntosh had previously been charged with assault in a domestic incident involving his estranged wife; the prosecution's theory was that McIntosh killed his wife to prevent her from testifying against him in the assault case and then shot the others because they witnessed him murder his wife. McIntosh also had several other prior convictions, including at least one for assault and battery and some for marijuana offenses.

The shootings took place on a secluded street in a sparsely populated area just outside Poughkeepsie, New York. At the time of the shooting, the three victims were in a "Volkswagen bug," which was stopped in the middle of the street. A motorist driving in the opposite direction arrived just as the shooter, a black male, fled into a wooded area on the large grounds of a closed state psychiatric hospital. Police

239. Id. at 7188.
240. Id. at 7194.
241. Id. at 7205.
242. Burt Interview, supra note 132.
244. Stetler Interview, supra note 137.
responded quickly. About a half hour later, an officer on the opposite side of the hospital grounds saw McIntosh walking toward town through a swamp. When he asked McIntosh to stop, McIntosh ran; the pursuing officer eventually placed him under arrest.

The six-year-old witness identified McIntosh as the shooter. McIntosh's principal trial attorney, William Tendy, argued that this child, who had a long history of mental and emotional disorders, was highly vulnerable to suggestion and that the circumstances under which he identified McIntosh made the identification unreliable. To support the child's identification, the government also presented evidence that, more than a year after the crime, an environmental clean-up crew clearing the swamp where McIntosh was seen by the police found a no-longer-operable handgun, and an FBI analyst testified that the bullet lead in this handgun matched the lead in the slugs that killed the victims. Since the swamp had been thoroughly searched at the time of McIntosh's arrest, Tendy vigorously attacked the government's effort to establish a connection between McIntosh and the newly discovered murder weapon. At the conclusion of the guilt trial, McIntosh was convicted of four counts of capital murder.245

At the penalty trial, Tendy made both the opening statement and closing argument to the jury. Early in his opening statement, he told the jury he was "going to be honest with" them and "do things some people told me not to do."246 He then said,

I disagree with your verdict. I have to say that. I know I'm not supposed to. I know it's not something you want to hear, but it's something I'm going to say. I have tried to be as honest with you as I can. I hope you respect that. I know you have been honest with us, especially with me, and I respect that as well. So I accept the verdict. I have to. I'm no use to this man if I don't. I accept it. I understand it, I respect it, but I disagree with it.247

As Tendy indicated, his statement was contrary to the orthodox view that the defendant's attorney should not risk antagonizing the penalty jury by expressing disagreement with its verdict.248 By emphasizing his "respect" for the jury and its verdict, however, Tendy

245. The jury convicted McIntosh of intentionally murdering his estranged wife in the same transaction in which he intentionally murdered her daughter and vice versa. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.27(3) (Consol. 2003). The jury also convicted McIntosh of intentionally killing his estranged wife's daughter to prevent the daughter from testifying as a witness to the murder of his estranged wife and of killing the daughter to prevent her from testifying about the attempted murder of the estranged wife's grandson. See id.


247. Id. at 28.

248. See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
sought to deflect any hostile reaction to his statement. Since he had already established a good rapport with the jury, moreover, his openness and candor may have had the effect of enhancing rather than diminishing the jury’s confidence in him.

After some further comments relating to his disappointment with the jury’s verdict,249 Tendy stated that the purpose of the penalty trial was “to decide if this man lives or dies.”250 In explaining how the jury should approach this decision, he referred to the fact that a juror’s lingering doubt could be a basis for voting against the death penalty.251 He also told the jury that the defense would present witnesses that would enable them to “learn a little bit about this man.”252

Tendy then provided an overview of the defendant’s life story and alluded to the conflict between himself and the defendant with respect to presenting this story to the jury:

It’s a very, very sad story. He doesn’t want it told. This man doesn’t want this story told, he doesn’t want to hear it, and I have taken that decision away from him. There’s some painful memories here. . . . I think . . . that his punishment really began the day that he was born and will continue until the day he dies.253

During the penalty trial, the defense presented witnesses who developed the salient details of McIntosh’s sad story, which included an impoverished childhood in Jamaica, horrendous child abuse, and the defendant’s struggles to overcome severe mental and physical problems.

Some of this evidence was certainly “double-edged” in the sense that it might lead the jury to believe that the defendant’s prolonged exposure to abuse would enhance his propensity toward violence, thereby increasing both the jury’s confidence in its earlier guilty verdict and its sense that, if McIntosh’s life was spared, he might be dangerous in the future.254 Nevertheless, the defense presented McIntosh’s tragic life story in graphic detail. In his final argument to the jury Tendy emphasized some of the most horrendous aspects of McIntosh’s history:

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249. At Tendy’s request, the judge asked the jury whether the fact that they had rejected Tendy’s arguments during the guilt stage would affect their ability to listen to his arguments at the penalty stage. Tendy’s Opening Statement, supra note 246, at 30. In addition to explaining his feelings about the jury’s verdict, Tendy in his opening statement explained to the jury why he had asked this question. *Id.*

250. *Id.* at 31.

251. *Id.* at 32.

252. *Id.* at 34.

253. *Id.* at 35.

254. Introducing the evidence, moreover, opened up the possibility that the jury would learn of McIntosh’s prior convictions, including his prior conviction for assault and battery. See *supra* note 244 and accompanying text.
This man was born to a mother who never wanted him and a father who abandoned him. All he ever knew was hatred and cruelty. That's what he was raised on. He had a stutter so bad that he was afraid to speak, and when he did everybody laughed at him, taunted him, and he became so afraid that finally he shut down, stopped talking as a child. 

... And brutalized . . . beyond anything that I could ever imagine. Whipped until he was cut and bleeding, whipped with sticks soaked in salt water so when the cuts were there they would burn from the salt. . . . This was a small child. This is mitigation.  

Later in his argument, Tendy reiterated that he did not "believe[] [McIntosh] committed these crimes." Nevertheless, he also made a powerful statement explaining why McIntosh's tragic history should be relevant to the jury's sentencing decision. He told the jury that to make that decision they needed "to walk in this man's footsteps." In recounting those footsteps, he focused especially on the significance of the brutal child abuse:

If your mother savagely beat you as a child, took out a whip and whipped you with it until your skin bled, until your skin was cut and salt got into the wound and made it burn, if she took a board and beat you with it, took a pot and hit you with it until your head was bleeding, and she took your head and slammed it against walls, and if she took a wooden board with a nail in it and beat you while your flesh was being cut telling you she wants you dead, tell me where you would all be right now? You want to talk about a choice?  

In this part of the argument, Tendy's point seemed to be that the abuse McIntosh suffered impaired his capacity to govern his conduct, thus reducing his culpability for any crimes he may have committed. Although this argument — and the vivid description of the abuse that supported it — could have had the potential for undercutting Tendy's arguments based on lingering doubt, Tendy obviously believed that that was a risk worth taking. In order to humanize McIntosh, Tendy presented the full history of McIntosh's childhood so that the jury would be able to see not only the man Dalkeith McIntosh but "also . . . that little boy."  

In charging the jury, the judge in McIntosh's case said nothing about "lingering doubt" but, in accordance with New York law, told them that they could return a life sentence even if they found that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.\textsuperscript{260} After fairly short deliberations,\textsuperscript{261} the jury returned with a life sentence.\textsuperscript{262}

IV. \textbf{THE STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING STRATEGIC CHOICES BY ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CAPITAL DEFENDANTS WITH A STRONG CLAIM OF INNOCENCE}

In this Part, I will address the three issues left unresolved by \textit{Wiggins}. Drawing from the material presented in Parts II and III, I will seek to articulate axioms that govern the strategic choices of experienced capital-defense attorneys when they are representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence. Based not only on the material presented in these Parts but also on the \textit{ABA Guidelines}, lower court cases, and, to some extent, the implications of \textit{Wiggins} itself, I will contend that these axioms should also define the standard of care that must be met by an attorney who is representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence.

A. \textit{The Attorney's Obligation to Investigate for Reasonably Available Mitigating Evidence}

In \textit{Wiggins}, the Court placed its imprimatur on a provision of the \textit{ABA Guidelines} declaring that an attorney representing a capital defendant has an obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence." In \textit{Wiggins}, of course, it was obvious that the mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's social history was "reasonably available" — not only in that it could be obtained but also in that it could be obtained without placing an additional strain on the other resources available to the defense for investigation.\textsuperscript{263} In other situations, however, attorneys representing capital defendants with strong claims of innocence may confront difficult choices relating to resource allocation.

An attorney who believes the defense needs substantial resources to support the defendant's claim of innocence, may also know from experience that the judge who allocates resources for defense investigation will not allocate sufficient resources to allow both what the attorney considers necessary to prepare for the guilt trial and what seems necessary to obtain the kind of in-depth social history of the defendant that would produce powerful mitigating evidence. If the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{260} Stetler Interview, \textit{supra} note 137.
\item \textsuperscript{261} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{262} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{263} \textit{See supra} note 105 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
judge has already granted the attorney substantial funds for investigation that will support the defendant's alibi, for example, the attorney may believe that the judge will not allocate funds for the mental retardation expert that the defense attorney believes is necessary to provide a meaningful analysis of the mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's possible mental retardation. Or the attorney may know that, given the resources already allocated to the defense, the judge will sharply limit the hourly rate to be paid to a mental-health expert, thus rendering it impossible for the defense to obtain the kind of mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's mental impairment that a more skilled mental-health expert would be able to provide. In these situations, what is the extent of the attorney's obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence?"

When the resources available for a capital defendant's defense are limited, the defendant's attorney must make difficult decisions relating to resource allocation. The defense attorney's obligation to investigate available mitigating evidence does not mean that she must curtail the investigation relating to the guilt trial in order to fulfill this obligation. The attorney may reasonably decide to obtain funds for a forensics expert who she believes will enhance the defendant's chances at the guilt stage, for example, even if she knows that once the judge has authorized this expenditure, she will be unlikely to grant funds to conduct an adequate investigation of the defendant's possible mental impairment.

But even if the attorney's choices result in her not having the resources necessary to conduct a full investigation of potentially available mitigating evidence, she should make a record showing that she has sought such an investigation. At a minimum, she should ask the court to appoint a social worker (or other mitigation expert) who can conduct a full investigation of the defendant's social history. Depending on the circumstances, she should also request funds that will allow an adequate investigation of the other areas that, as Wiggins noted, the ABA Guidelines have identified as providing sources for mitigating evidence. These include the defendant's "medical history, educational history, employment and training history, . . . prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences." In some cases, for example, the attorney might be able to show the need for a mental-health expert to conduct a meaningful

264. If the attorney believes allocating resources for the purpose of strengthening the defendant's case at the guilt trial must be the defense's first priority, she will generally be able to make that priority clear through presenting motions relating to these issues before making motions designed to obtain a full investigation for mitigation.

265. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.

266. Id. (citing 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 11.8.6).
investigation of the defendant's medical background or an expert in a specific culture to investigate the effect of religious or cultural influences on his conduct.267

Through requesting these resources, the defense attorney would make a record of the types of investigation she believed necessary to present the "available" mitigating evidence. The attorney's request, moreover, would alert the judge as to the extent and nature of potentially mitigating evidence. If the judge denied some or all of the attorney's request and the defendant subsequently received a death sentence, the defense would be able to raise on appeal the question of whether the capital defendant was provided with adequate resources to present the available mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. In some cases, the attorney would have a strong argument that, based on Ake v. Oklahoma,268 the court's failure to provide adequate compensation for the experts needed to assist the defense in obtaining "any reasonably available mitigating evidence" violated the defendant's right to due process.269 In all cases the attorney would have fulfilled her obligation to seek such evidence. The scope of the system's obligation to provide adequate resources for the necessary investigation would be a question to be decided by the reviewing courts.270

B. The Attorney's Obligation to Investigate for Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Instructs Her Otherwise

The ABA Guidelines speak directly to the situation in which the capital defendant instructs his attorney not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial. In a sentence that appears immediately before the portion of the Guidelines relied on in Wiggins, the 1989 Guidelines provide, "The investigation for preparation of the sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any initial

267. See, e.g., Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding counsel ineffective due to failure to conduct investigation that would have produced, inter alia, expert testimony about the difficulty of adolescent immigrants from Hong Kong assimilating to life in North America; this evidence would have humanized the defendant and could have resulted in a life sentence, even though the defendant had been convicted of thirteen murders).


269. See supra notes 107-108.

270. Wiggins appears to recognize that introducing "any available mitigating evidence" will be a critical factor for the defense in many, if not most, capital cases. Whether Ake requires compensation for the expert requested by the defense should thus depend on whether the defense can make a sufficient showing that the expert is necessary to assist in obtaining or evaluating such evidence. But cf. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 284-85 (2003) (arguing that though Wiggins implies mitigation specialists "are not far outside the constitutional fold," courts have been reluctant to hold Ake requires them "at nearly every turn").
assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered."271 At least as to a capital-defense attorney’s obligation to investigate mitigating evidence, the Wiggins majority appeared to accept the ABA Guidelines as establishing “norms” for competent representation by capital defendants’ attorneys. Unless there is some basis for rejecting the ABA Guidelines’ statement that a capital-defense counsel has an obligation to investigate despite her client’s initial instructions to the contrary, this portion of the Guidelines should also be viewed as establishing the standard for competent performance in capital cases.

The strongest argument for rejecting this provision of the ABA Guidelines is that it needlessly interferes with a capital defendant’s autonomy. As I have indicated,272 a capital defendant has the right to make a binding decision as to what, if any, mitigating evidence will be introduced at the penalty trial. Since the attorney must respect her client’s choice to have no mitigating evidence introduced at the penalty trial, a reasonable argument exists that it would be competent representation for her to comply with the client’s direction not to investigate mitigating evidence. After all, there will be no need to investigate mitigating evidence if it has already been decided that mitigating evidence will not be introduced at the penalty trial.273

The ABA Guidelines seem to be predicated on the view that, unless the attorney conducts a full investigation of potential mitigating evidence prior to trial, the defendant will not be able to make an informed decision as to the sentencing strategy to be pursued at the penalty trial.274 Lower courts addressing the attorney’s constitutional obligation to investigate mitigating evidence despite the defendant’s contrary instructions have focused on this issue.

271. 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 11.4.1(c). In February 2003, the American Bar Association updated these Guidelines to read “The investigation regarding penalty should be conducted regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be collected or presented.” 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 161, Guideline 10.7.A.2.

272. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

273. As Michael Burt observed, however, investigation for evidence relating to the defendant’s social history will often reveal evidence that will strengthen the defendant’s case at the guilt trial. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Moreover, since defense counsel cannot predict in advance what this investigation will produce, she will generally not be able to assess the likelihood that it will yield such evidence. In most cases, the defense attorney should thus be required to insist on at least some investigation for mitigating evidence in order to prepare for the guilt trial in the capital case.

274. According to the 1989 Guidelines, an attorney must first investigate and “evaluate the potential avenues of action and then advise the client on the merits of each.” 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guideline 11.4.1 cmt. The most recent version of the Guidelines states that “[c]ounsel cannot reasonably advise a client about the merits of different courses of action, the client cannot make informed decisions, and counsel cannot be sure of the client’s competency to make such decisions, unless counsel has first conducted a thorough investigation.” 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 161, Guideline 10.7 cmt.
Citing the *ABA Guidelines' language, the Sixth Circuit has held that a full investigation of mitigating evidence “should be conducted regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered.” Without citing the *Guidelines*, the Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in a case in which a capital defendant’s attorney justified his failure to investigate for mitigating evidence by asserting he was complying with his client’s instructions. The Sixth Circuit concluded that, unless the attorney investigated for mitigating evidence, the defendant would have no “understanding of competing mitigating strategies,” and thus would be unable to make an informed decision as to the proper sentencing strategy. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendant would be unable to make an informed choice because the attorney’s “failure to investigate clearly affected his ability to competently advise [his client] regarding the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible mitigating strategies.”

Other cases have held, however, that an attorney may comply with her client’s directions to abandon investigation of mitigating evidence so long as the attorney adequately advises the defendant regarding the consequences of not investigating. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that “a lawyer who abandons investigation into mitigating evidence in a capital case . . . must at least have adequately informed his client of the potential consequences of that decision and must be assured that his client has made [an] ‘informed and knowing’ judgment.”

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276. See Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding defense attorney’s failure to investigate for mitigating evidence in compliance with his client’s instructions was ineffective assistance because it “affected his ability to competently advise Battenfield regarding the meaning of mitigation evidence and the availability of possible mitigation strategies”).

277. *Coleman*, 268 F.3d at 447.

278. *Battenfield*, 236 F.3d at 1229.

279. See, e.g., Williams v. Calderon, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a capital defendant’s attorney’s failure to investigate for mitigating evidence was reasonable when the defendant informed him that no evidence should be presented at the penalty trial and that, before accepting these instructions, the attorney “discussed the purpose of mitigation evidence with [the defendant] and discussed what evidence could have been presented”), aff’d, 306 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2001); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tenn. 1998) (holding that a capital defendant’s attorney’s failure to investigate for mitigating evidence was reasonable when the attorney followed the defendant’s instructions to neither investigate nor present mitigating evidence and the defendant remained firm in his instructions even after the attorney informed him “about the importance of and the need to investigate” for mitigating evidence); see also cases cited in *infra* note 280.

280. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 838 (9th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 942 (2002); see also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the *Silva* holding).
importance of presenting mitigating evidence,'281 the court has determined that the attorney acted reasonably in following the defendant's decision not to investigate.282

But it is not clear that every capital defendant will be able to make an informed decision relating to the investigation for mitigating evidence even after the attorney fully explains the potential significance of mitigating evidence? It might depend on the reasons for the defendant's original instructions. A defendant who believes locating mitigating evidence is unnecessary because he won't be convicted of the capital offense obviously presents a different problem than one who prefers a sentence of death over one of life imprisonment. Arguably, the latter defendant is in a better position to make an informed choice relating to sentencing strategy.283

Regardless of the defendant's reasons, however, the defendant will generally be unable to make an informed decision with respect to whether mitigating evidence should be presented at the penalty trial until after the attorney has conducted a full investigation. If a defendant justifies his instructions on the view that the mitigating evidence will be unhelpful in the guilt trial and will be unnecessary in the penalty trial because he will achieve an acquittal, the attorney should have ready responses. First, in the absence of data gleaned from an investigation, nobody — including the defendant — can know whether the investigation will produce helpful evidence. Second, the outcomes in capital trials are always unpredictable. And if the defendant argues that, even if the penalty phase proves necessary, the investigation will produce nothing of value, the attorney should reiterate that, absent the fruits of the investigation, the defendant lacks the information necessary to determine whether it will produce sufficient evidence to lead the penalty jury to spare his life.

Determining the scope of the attorney's obligation to investigate is more difficult when the defendant purports to prefer execution over life imprisonment or to prefer execution over subjecting his family and friends to the aggravation of supplying mitigating evidence. If a competent capital defendant makes an informed decision to seek execution rather than life imprisonment at the penalty trial, the defense attorney is required to respect that decision.284 If the

281. Hayes, 301 F.3d at 1068.

282. Id.

283. Even if a seemingly competent defendant expresses this preference, his attorney must be alert to the possibility that the defendant may change his mind and that his choice is made "without a full appreciation of the consequences." Bright email, supra note 107.

284. See, e.g., Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. 1998). It should follow, moreover, that the attorney should also be required to respect a defendant's informed decision to opt for execution rather seeking a life sentence under circumstances that he views as imposing intolerable burdens for either himself or his loved ones.
The defendant’s decision to opt for execution in the event of conviction should be viewed as an informed decision as to the objective to be pursued at the penalty trial, the attorney should thus be required to respect that decision.

A defense attorney should not assume, however, that a capital defendant’s pretrial decision to opt for a death sentence at the penalty trial, in the event it occurs, is a fully informed decision. When confronted with a capital trial, a defendant, especially one who claims he is innocent, will be much more likely to be focused on the guilt trial at which he may be acquitted than on a penalty trial, which will take place only if he is convicted of a capital offense. In most cases, it is thus reasonable to assume that the defendant will not be able to make an informed decision as to the objective to be pursued at the penalty trial until the jury’s verdict at the guilt trial forces him to confront the reality of that trial.

In order to ensure that a capital defendant can make a fully informed decision as to whether to seek a sentence of life imprisonment or death at the penalty trial, the defendant’s attorney should thus provide the defendant with the opportunity to make his final decision only after the verdict at the guilt stage forces the defendant to focus on the stark, available sentencing alternatives. In order to provide the defendant with a meaningful opportunity to make a decision at this stage, however, the attorney would ordinarily have had to conduct a full investigation for available mitigating evidence prior to the guilt stage. Otherwise, if the defendant’s final decision is that he wants to seek a life sentence at the penalty trial, the attorney will not ordinarily have sufficient time to find the mitigating evidence that she would need to introduce in order to maximize the chances of obtaining that objective.

Accordingly, if a capital defendant instructs his attorney prior to trial either not to investigate or to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence, the attorney should nevertheless have an obligation to investigate for all reasonably available mitigating evidence. Failure to comply with this obligation, moreover, should constitute deficient performance within the meaning of the first prong of the *Strickland* test.

C. The Attorney’s Obligation to Make a Reasonable Strategic Decision Relating to Potential Mitigating Evidence

*Wiggins*’s analysis indicates that a defense attorney’s strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence because she wants to focus primarily or exclusively on reasserting the capital defendant’s innocence at the penalty trial must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny. Justice O’Connor recognized that, prior to conducting a full investigation for mitigating evidence, an attorney
may not reasonably conclude that introducing such evidence would be unnecessary or counter-productive simply because the argument based on the defendant's innocence is so strong. Rather, her opinion recognized that, when the potential mitigating evidence is persuasive and not double-edged, combining the mitigating evidence with evidence or argument relating to the defendant's innocence will likely be a more effective sentencing strategy than relying solely on reasserting the defendant's innocence.285

Through its citation to earlier cases,286 Wiggins indicates that a capital defendant's attorney's decision to curtail investigation will be a reasonable strategic choice if the attorney's preliminary investigation justifies a conclusion that introducing the potentially available mitigating evidence would be unhelpful or counter-productive. Under what circumstances can an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence reasonably reach this conclusion? More specifically, when may such an attorney reasonably conclude that the investigation for mitigating evidence can be abandoned because the evidence likely to be found will be double-edged in the sense that it may convince the jury either that the defendant's guilt for the offense of which he was convicted is more certain or his potential danger to society is increased?

Based on Wiggins itself, a capital defendant's attorney cannot reasonably conclude that introducing mitigating evidence relating to a defendant's troubled childhood or severe mental problems would be so double-edged that the attorney can curtail investigation for such evidence. In discussing the Wiggins attorneys' sentencing strategy, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the mitigating evidence available in Wiggins did not show that Wiggins had previously engaged in violent conduct.287 She thus concluded that the evidence "contained little of the double edge"288 and intimated that introducing it at the penalty trial would have been compatible with the strategy of reasserting the defendant's innocence.

Although Wiggins thus suggests that a capital defendant's attorney could make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence when the preliminary investigation reveals that the defendant had engaged in prior violent conduct,289 the ABA

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285. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
287. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536.
288. Id. at 535.
289. In addition to explaining that the mitigating evidence in Wiggins did not show prior violent conduct, the Court also distinguished its holding in Darden v. Wainwright. In Darden, the Court held that counsel can reasonably curtail investigation when "the decision to present a mitigation case would . . . result[] in the jury hearing evidence that [the defendant]
Guidelines do not provide that the attorney should abandon the investigation for any such reason. And the material presented in Parts II and III of this Article indicate that experienced capital-defense attorneys would certainly not curtail the investigation into a defendant's background because of concerns that tracing his social history would reveal that he engaged in violent or other anti-social conduct.

In the McIntosh case, for example, the defendant's attorney certainly had reason to believe that, based on the defendant's prolonged exposure to violence during his childhood, investigation of his background might reveal that he had engaged in violent behavior as an adult. In fact, the investigation of mitigation evidence showed that the defendant had engaged in such conduct and had at least one assault-and-battery conviction. McIntosh's attorneys, however, chose to present that mitigating evidence despite the possibility that the jury would view McIntosh as a more violent person. Introducing evidence that would provide the jury with a full picture of the defendant's troubled history was an indispensable aspect of their sentencing strategy.

In fact, skilled capital-defense attorneys agree that, regardless of whether the defendant has a strong claim of innocence at the guilt trial, the defense attorney must present mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's background at the penalty trial. If the defendant's background includes prior violent conduct, obviously the attorney does not want to emphasize this (or allow the prosecutor to emphasize it) at the penalty trial. Nevertheless, an experienced capital-defense attorney would be very unlikely to curtail an investigation for mitigating evidence simply because she believes it would be likely to uncover evidence showing the defendant has engaged in prior violent conduct.

The investigation should be conducted because it may reveal other mitigating evidence that can be introduced without exposing the jury to the defendant's prior violent conduct. Moreover, even if no such

had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525 (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)). However, Wiggins's attorneys "uncovered [nothing] in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless." Id.

290. The ABA Guidelines state that "[u]nless a plea bargain has resulted in a guarantee on the record that the death penalty will not be imposed, full preparation for a sentencing trial must be made in every case." 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 55, Guidelines 11.8.1-11.8.6 cmt (second emphasis added).

291. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.

292. In some cases, for example, the defendant's attorney would be able to introduce mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's troubled childhood without opening the door for the introduction of violent acts committed by the defendant when he was an adult.
evidence is discovered, an experienced capital-defense attorney will nearly always opt to introduce mitigating evidence that provides the jury with an opportunity to "walk in the defendant's footsteps," regardless of whether it also exposes them to the defendant's prior violent or antisocial conduct. As Stephen Bright said, if the attorney does not "humanize" the defendant by presenting a nuanced narrative of his past, the penalty jury will be likely to feel that it has no reason to spare the defendant's life.

While Wiggins did not hold that a defense attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence can never make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence, it indicated that the professional norms for capital-defense attorneys are expressed in the ABA Guidelines, which in turn reflect the practices of skilled and experienced capital-defense attorneys. Based on these norms, an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence should almost never be able to make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence. Such a decision should nearly always constitute deficient performance under the first prong of the Strickland test.

CONCLUSION

Even those who favor the death penalty believe that our system of capital punishment should operate so that the risk of executing an innocent person is minimized. Data showing that innocent defendants have frequently been convicted and sentenced to death have therefore provoked increasing public concern. When so many innocent defendants have been and undoubtedly still are on death row, it is almost inevitable that some will not be exonerated in time to avoid execution. As Justice O'Connor stated in a speech given in

293. See supra notes 257-258 and accompanying text.

294. Michael Burt stated that he would not be concerned about introducing background evidence that would expose the jury to the defendant's prior violent conduct unless it "opened up the possibility of the prosecutor admitting aggravating circumstances, that would be commensurate with the crime charged." Burt Interview, supra note 132. Thus, the defense should be concerned if admitting mitigating evidence would allow the prosecution to show the defendant had previously been involved in a murder or an attempted murder but should not be concerned if the prosecutor could only be able to show that the defendant had previously been involved in burglaries, assaults, or other charges significantly less serious than the capital charge.

295. See supra text accompanying note 157.

296. See Welsh, supra note 149, at 981-82.

297. See, e.g., infra note 299.

298. As of August 29, 2002, 12 of the 110 DNA-cleared cases were cases in which the exonerated defendant was at one point sentenced to death. See http://innocenceproject.org/case/index.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
2001, "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed." 299

Unfortunately, the strategies employed by some attorneys who represent capital defendants with strong claims of innocence may exacerbate the extent to which innocent defendants are sentenced to death. An attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence who focuses primarily or exclusively on seeking to obtain an acquittal at the guilt trial will inevitably find it difficult to present an optimal penalty-phase defense and, as a result, will increase the likelihood that the jury will sentence the defendant to death in the event that they find him guilty of the capital offense. Although a jury's lingering doubt as to the defendant's guilt can be a strong factor in producing a life sentence, defense attorneys are inclined to overestimate the likelihood that the death-qualified jury that convicted the defendant will in fact have a lingering doubt as to his guilt. If the jury has no lingering doubt about the defendant's guilt and the defense attorney introduces little or no mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, the penalty jury will be likely to conclude that there is no reason to spare the defendant's life. As a result, death penalties are likely to be disproportionately imposed in cases in which the defendants' attorneys believe the defendants have strong claims of innocence — a pool of cases that includes many, if not most of those in which the defendants are actually innocent. 300

With respect to monitoring defense attorneys' representation of capital defendants, the Court's decision in Wiggins is certainly a positive development. Although Wiggins's holding could be confined to the specific ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presented in that case, the Court's analysis may have been animated, at least in part, by its recognition of concerns relating to the administration of capital punishment, including not only attorneys' inadequate representation of capital defendants but also the risk of executing an innocent defendant. If so, then the fact that Wiggins involved a defendant with a strong claim of innocence may have been significant. The Court's holding could provide at least a first step toward decreasing the likelihood that defendants with strong claims of innocence will be

299. Marla Elena Baca, O'Connor Critical of Death Penalty: The First Female Supreme Court Justice Spoke in Minneapolis to a Lawyer's Group, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), July 3, 2001, at A1, A16.

300. In some cases involving defendants who are actually innocent, the evidence presented at trial may appear to establish the defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. This may occur, for example, when the government introduces the defendant's false confession into evidence and the defendant's attorney fails to present any persuasive reasons for disbelieving the confession. For a description of one such case, see Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington's Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001) (describing the case of Earl Washington, Jr., a mentally retarded defendant who was convicted and sentenced to death on the basis of his false confession to the rape and murder of a young woman).
sentenced to death, thereby reducing the risk that an innocent person will be executed.

As I explained in Part II, Wiggins's holding could be limited in at least three ways. First, an attorney's obligation to investigate for available mitigating evidence could be defined so as to include only the obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence that can be obtained without placing a strain on existing resources. Second, an attorney's obligation to investigate for mitigating evidence could be limited to situations in which the attorney does not receive contrary instructions from the defendant. Third, an attorney could be afforded the right to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence on the basis of a strategic decision when she perceives that the evidence likely to be revealed will be double-edged in the sense that it is likely to conflict with her claim that the defendant was innocent of the capital offense.

If Wiggins is to be interpreted in a way that will significantly diminish the risk of sentencing innocent capital defendants to death, none of these limitations should apply. As to the attorney's duty to investigate for mitigating evidence, the ABA Guidelines, recognized by Wiggins as articulating professional norms for capital-defense attorneys, are clearly premised on the view that a defense attorney must investigate for any reasonably available mitigating evidence in every capital case. Even if she knows that the court will limit the resources for defense investigation and believes that investigation relating to the defense at the guilt trial is more important than investigation for mitigating evidence, the attorney should file a motion with the court requesting the appointment of an investigator who can trace the defendant's background and social history. And, whenever other investigators or experts appear necessary to seek and to render meaningful the available mitigating evidence, the attorney should request further funds.301

In accordance with the ABA Guidelines, a capital defendant's attorney's obligation to investigate for all reasonably available mitigating evidence should also apply regardless of the defendant's contrary instructions. Interpreting the attorney's obligation in this way will ensure that a capital defendant will be able to make an informed decision as to the sentencing strategy to be adopted at the penalty trial, if it occurs. Protecting a capital defendant's right to make an informed choice as to this question is especially important, moreover, when the defendant has a strong claim of innocence because, prior to the guilt trial at which he hopes to be acquitted, such a defendant may be unable to focus on the consequences of adopting a particular

301. In some cases, the motion would make it clear that the evidence found by the first investigator will determine whether other experts need to be appointed.
sentencing strategy at a penalty trial, which will only occur if his hopes for acquittal are disappointed.

Finally, while Wiggins indicated that a capital defendant can make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence, the Court also appeared to recognize that the standard against which such strategic choices must be measured should be one that reflects the practices of skilled and experienced capital-defense attorneys. Based on the practices of these attorneys, the following rule should be adopted: an attorney representing a capital defendant with a strong claim of innocence can never make a reasonable strategic decision to curtail investigation for mitigating evidence simply because she wants to emphasize the defendant's innocence at the penalty trial. Even if the potentially available mitigating evidence appears likely to be double-edged, the attorney representing such a defendant should conduct a full investigation and, barring very unusual circumstances, should introduce at least some of the mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, if it occurs.

In Wiggins, the Court appeared to recognize that by 1989 the norms of practice for capital-defense attorneys had evolved to the point where the attorney ordinarily has the obligation to investigate for "all reasonably available mitigating evidence." Through following the provisions of the ABA Guidelines relating to searching for mitigating evidence, capital-defense attorneys can reduce the likelihood that innocent capital defendants will be sentenced to death. And through applying Wiggins's holding in ways that reflect the underlying rationale of these guidelines, courts can take a meaningful step toward monitoring attorneys' performance in a way that will reduce the risk of an innocent defendant's execution.