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Making sense of Japan's Yakuza Racketeers
How do legal, regulatory, and organizational systems affect the emergence and development of corporate extortion? The question arises whether the extortionist is a potential plaintiff seeking settlement, a labor union threatening to strike, or the lucky finder of the mouse-in-the-soda-bottle of urban legend. In each case, including those in which extortion may be lawful and even desirable, the extortionist's threat and the corporation's response depend on the institutional context in which the extortion takes place.

In the Japanese system, corporate extortion by sokaiya gangster-racketeers appears to be widespread. Although sokaiya (literally, "general meeting operators") take several forms, a sokaiya typically is defined as a nominal shareholder who either attempts to extort money from a company by threatening to disrupt its annual shareholders' meeting or works for a company to suppress opposition at the meeting. Surprisingly, Japanese executives pay sokaiya despite the fact that payment can result in civil and criminal liability not only for sokaiya, but for the executive as well.

Recent scandals involving some of Japan's largest and most prestigious financial institutions have thrust sokaiya into international headlines and vividly illustrate some of the problems of the Japanese and/or Asian economic systems. In spring 1997, prosecutors revealed that Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank (DKB), the fifth-largest corporation in the world, had paid sokaiya Ryuichi Koike a total of $96 million for his services. Koike then admitted that he used these funds to acquire a stake — significantly, for exactly the number of shares needed to give him the right to make proposals at shareholders' meetings — in each of Japan's "Big Four" securities brokerages. The brokerages subsequently paid Koike a combined total of nearly $6 million to keep their meetings quiet. The "Koike scandal" led to mass board resignations, to the arrest of 35 executives, to the suicide of a former DKB chairman, and ultimately to the dissolution of Yamaichi Securities and the collapse of the Japanese stock market. Six months later, eight executives of Hitachi, Toshiba, and three Mitsubishi group companies were arrested (and as of this writing, all but one have been convicted) for paying sokaiya amounts ranging from $16,800 to $72,000 — ostensibly for the use of a beach house — to keep their meetings quiet. Fewer than six months after that, prosecutors revealed that the exorbitant brochure-advertising fees that certain Mitsubishi group companies had paid a former flight attendant were actually disguised payments to her husband, a 30-year sokaiya veteran, to keep meetings quiet. In August 1998, two extortionists were arrested for leasing office plants (at prices to make a florist blush) to Japan Airlines in exchange for meeting protection, and Toyota and Nissan soon admitted that they had done the same.

These recent incidents appear to be part of a much larger phenomenon. Since criminal penalties were clearly imposed on payments to sokaiya in 1982, executives of 31 corporations — almost all of which are household names in Japan, and only one of which is not listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange — have been convicted of making payments to sokaiya. In a 1997 survey of large Japanese firms including giants such as NTT, Toyota, and Matsushita, nearly 90 percent indicated that they had been approached by sokaiya with extortionist demands of one kind or another. Another recent survey of 2,000 firms (1,200 responding) found that 77 percent had paid sokaiya. This generous corporate support is said to keep in
Estimates of how much money companies actually pay sokaiya vary. One study finds that typical sokaiya earn $20 to $200 per firm, twice a year. One firm's general affairs department chief states that his company's regular policy at one time was to pay small-time sokaiya ¥100,000 (about $800) per year, and to pay its "expert" sokaiya ¥300,000 to ¥500,000 ($2,400 to $4,000) per month, with bonuses of ¥2 million to ¥3 million ($16,000 to $24,000) around the time of the meeting. The firm's annual sokaiya budget was ¥500 million (about $4 million) for 2,000 sokaiya, which results in an average payment of $2,000 per sokaiya.
business 1,000 sokaiya who hold stock in nearly 12,000 companies.

Some commentators have argued that sokaiya are a cultural phenomenon, a reflection of the importance of harmony, politeness, and respect in Japan. After extensive research, including numerous interviews of Japanese managers, attorneys, prosecutors and sokaiya, I reach a different conclusion. In this article, I argue that a better explanation for the behavior of extortionists and managers in Japan lies in the choices that are determined by institutions. Specifically, I argue, first, that Japanese institutions lead to low levels of corporate disclosure. Because extortion correlates positively to secrecy, inadequate disclosure creates blackmail opportunities that can be used by sokaiya at any time. Second, I show empirically that long shareholders’ meetings in Japan send negative market signals that lead to stock price drops. Japanese executives pay sokaiya to avoid these negative returns. Concisely stated, Japanese firms choose to pay sokaiya because the Japanese system makes paying sokaiya less costly than the alternative.

I. A CORPORATE EXTORTION PRIMER

The question of why sokaiya successfully extort Japanese companies in spite of the law while sokaiya apparently do not arise in the United States, even in the absence of legal prohibitions, principally involves three factors: sokaiya, corporations, and corporate law.

A. Sokaiya

Although sokaiya play a variety of roles, they usually come in one of three varieties. First, there are fighters. Japanese managers have long known that one of the easiest ways to ensure an orderly shareholders’ meeting is to hire thugs to intimidate shareholders who want to speak. This rent-a-thug image is fueled by well-publicized melees of the early 1970s at Chisso Corporation, where sokaiya physically suppressed environmental activists, and at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, where sokaiya fought to a bloody finish with shareholders who protested the company’s production of military weapons for the Vietnam War. Relatively few incidents of physical shareholder repression have surfaced since that time, perhaps because sokaiya moved into other more profitable lines of business, perhaps because shareholders began to get the message through more subtle hints of violence.

Second, a few elite sokaiya are paid to keep other more dangerous sokaiya away from meetings. These sokaiya use various means to accomplish the task: intimidation, influence peddling, or outright payment. These sokaiya sometimes become corporate insiders, advising companies on how to deal with other troublemakers, how to organize meetings, and how to circumvent the law. As one such sokaiya (who prefers the title “consultant”) told me, “Sokaiya problem? What sokaiya problem? I show up. I give advice. I help. I do the same thing that a lawyer would do. And I’m cheaper, too. What’s the problem with that?”

Finally, and most commonly, many sokaiya make a living through blackmail. Sometimes sokaiya blackmail by threatening to reveal sensitive information at the public forum of shareholders meetings. Sometimes the blackmail is not related to meetings at all. A favorite sokaiya tactic is to request that a corporation subscribe to magazines published by the sokaiya; the underlying threat being that if the company does not subscribe, scandalous stories about the company will appear in the magazine.

Other popular tactics include organizing expensive golf tournaments, leasing potted plants, and holding karaoke singing contests. Japanese police arrested approximately 200 sokaiya (and related actors) each year on various extortion charges, but blackmail persists.

Blackmail might flourish in Japan — not just among sokaiya but in society as a whole — because of broad legal and social differences. But this does not seem to be the case. In a recent study, Judge Richard Posner found only 124 reported published opinions (among 3 million in the Westlaw database) in blackmail cases in the United States in the last century. I have serious doubts — as does Posner — about the reliability of using the number of judicial opinions as a measure of blackmail activity. But because good alternatives are scarce, and a comparison would be nice, I adopt a similar approach for Japan. I searched for all blackmail opinions in Hanrei Taikei, a ten-disc CD-ROM database that is the Japanese functional equivalent of Westlaw. After reading through all the extortion cases returned by the search, I was only able to classify 15 of them as informational blackmail — a small number indeed, and easily comparable with the U.S. number given the disparity in database size.

B. The Companies

When confronted by a sokaiya, companies have two options: pay or resist.

1. Pay A company’s general affairs department usually handles payments to sokaiya. Before 1982, many companies had their affiliated sokaiya form a queue at the door of that department on the day of, or the day before, their shareholders’ meeting. All in line received envelopes full of cash. Recent compensation schemes are more sophisticated. The 1997 Koike scandal involved off-the-books loans to a company owned by Koike’s brother (by DKB), purchases and repurchases of expensive golf club memberships (Daiwa Securities), and compensation for losses incurred through Koike’s discretionary “VIP” account (Nomura Securities), futures accounts (Nikko Securities), and Singapore International Monetary Exchange Nikkei Index accounts (Yamaichi Securities).

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Other evidence comes from the amounts companies spend on subscriptions to magazines published by sokaiya. The Koike scandal brought to light that Nomura Securities had been paying $70 million ($560,000) annually for subscriptions to 700 magazines. Subsequent investigation revealed that each of Japan’s large city banks subscribed to an average of 1,000 such magazines at a cost of $100 million ($800,000) annually.

One way to estimate the amounts companies pay is to calculate the average amount cited in court cases. From 1983 to 1998, Japanese courts sentenced executives from 36 firms who made payments to a total of 133 sokaiya. The total amount of the payments to sokaiya by these 36 firms is ¥474.4 million (about $3.8 million), representing a disbursement of about ¥3.57 million (about $28,000) per sokaiya or ¥13.18 million (about $105,000) per firm. The highest amount received by a single sokaiya was $94 million ($750,000), the lowest, $50,000 ($400). On one hand,
Enter the sokaiya. A skilled sokaiya can expertly deconstruct a balance sheet, querying discrepancies, errors, and omissions. Though the same may be true of analysts in the United States, sokaiya have more secrets to expose in Japan because less information is initially disclosed.

these figures may underestimate firms' total payments because many firms have relationships with more than one sokaiya. But on the other hand, these figures may overstate the payments, as prosecutors may let smaller payments slide, choosing to litigate only the large cases.

In short, it is difficult to determine how much firms pay sokaiya. Many of the managers I interviewed suggested that one reason this may be so is that firms pay sokaiya varying amounts depending on their relationship with the company, the quality of their information, the credibility of their threat, and their skills in performing other services for the company.

2. Resist. Of course, not all firms pay sokaiya. Those who do not pay either (1) are not bothered by sokaiya, (2) turn threatening sokaiya over to prosecutors, who pursue them on extortion charges, or (3) simply ignore sokaiya threats. Although the third strategy may seem to be the easiest course, a few executives who ignored sokaiya threats have become subject to acts of violence. One survey, conducted by a National Police Agency administrator, found 10 acts of violence against corporate officials during a one-year period alone. At least three of these incidents — assaults on executives of Tokai Bank, Fuji Film, and Sumitomo Bank — are linked to the refusal of those companies' executives to pay sokaiya.

C. The Law

Payments to sokaiya to suppress shareholders' rights have been illegal since the Commercial Code was promulgated in 1950. Under section 494 of the Code, it is illegal to make an "improper solicitation" with respect to the "exercise of shareholder rights." "Improper solicitation," courts have held, includes paying sokaiya to prevent others from "fairly speaking or fairly exercising their vote."

But this formulation of the law raised multiple problems of clarity for prosecutors and civil plaintiffs. These problems, and growing concerns about corporate gangsters in an internationalizing Japan, caused the Japanese legislature in 1981 to enact a full-scale revision of the Commercial Code aimed specifically at the elimination of sokaiya. Effective October 1982, prosecutors need no longer prove an "improper solicitation." Instead, they need only prove that a "benefit" was offered with respect to the exercise of shareholder rights, and in civil cases, if the benefit is "gratuitously offered" to a "specific shareholder," it is presumed that it is offered with respect to those rights.
The revisions imposed clear civil and criminal penalties on both sokaiya and management. The new code also introduced clear criminal penalties — up to six months' imprisonment or fines of up to ¥300,000 ($2,400) for both the originator of the benefit (management) and the recipient (sokaiya).

The "sokaiya provisions" of the Commercial Code create incentives against payments to sokaiya, and may have contributed to the decline in the estimated sokaiya population from about 6,000 pre-1982 to about 1,000 in 1997. But the provisions have at least three readily apparent problems. First, the six-month sentence specified by the code carries a statute of limitations of only three years. Second, the presumption that a benefit, if gratuitously offered, is made in connection with shareholders' rights, only arises if the payment is made to a shareholder. Third, the sokaiya provisions do not address the sokaiya magazine subscription phenomenon, which can be a significant sphere of sokaiya activity.

The Japanese judiciary has added an additional reason why the sokaiya provisions may not have the full impact that they otherwise could. In the scores of cases adjudicated since the sokaiya provisions took effect, only three sokaiya (in the Noritake, Ajinomoto, and Mitsubishi group cases) actually were sentenced to prison. All others received suspended sentences. In no case did any of the executives convicted in those incidents receive jail time — they all received suspended sentences. This is not an aberration from the Japanese criminal justice system as a whole, which sends fewer than 5 percent of its suspects to prison, compared to over 30 percent in the United States, but it does show that the sokaiya provisions are not being enforced to their fullest extent.

II. INFORMATION

Some sokaiya blackmail has nothing to do with shareholders' meetings. This is clearly evidenced by year-round sokaiya magazine subscriptions and implied in relevant case law. To put it another way, what would be the expected result if holding Japanese shareholders' meetings suddenly were made illegal? After executives sobered up from the tremendous parties that they surely would throw in celebration, sokaiya activity would continue as usual. Information with blackmail potential would still be available, and executives would still be vulnerable. The sokaiyas' broadcast of information would simply switch to some other forum.

A. Types of Information

The U.S. corporate governance system and U.S. corporate law regime, defined broadly to include regulatory institutions, makes available more useful information to independent investors, reducing the marginal costs to investors of information acquisition. In contrast, the Japanese system often keeps such information — most importantly, negative information — secret. Sokaiya normally blackmail corporations with three types of information: financial and accounting data, potentially scandalous information relating to corporate malfeasance, and private information about management.

1. Financial and Accounting Data. It is widely recognized that Japanese corporations do not disclose as much information as their U.S. counterparts. First, a Japanese corporation's annual report contains no mention of management compensation, as required in the United States. Second, Japanese reports do not break down sales by industry or business line, so it is difficult to determine a firm's profitability. Third, assets a Japanese firm holds in the form of securities are booked at the price at which the firm bought the shares, not the current market price. Finally, a Japanese financial statement usually is not specific about the method the company uses to depreciate its assets. The aggregate result is that the annual report, which is mandatory in both systems, contains significantly less useful information in Japan than in the United States.

A recent survey by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) further illustrates the point. The OECD studied the consolidated financial statements of several large public corporations and rated their disclosure of operating results relative to OECD guidelines as full or partial. Of 53 U.S. firms studied, 34 had full disclosure, and 19 had partial. The 25 British firms in the survey ranked similarly with 19 full, 6 partial. Of the 23 Japanese firms surveyed, the results were nearly opposite: only 2 firms had full disclosure, while 21 firms had partial disclosure. A similar survey by the Investor Responsibility Research Center found that on average, Japanese listed corporations were required by law to disclose only 40 percent of the information that is required in the United States.

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2. Past Bad Acts. More often, sokaiya use information regarding past corporate misdeeds to blackmail corporate executives. Sometimes the acts are illegal; sometimes they are merely embarrassing. A list of bad acts that sokaiya typically use for blackmail would include silently settled product liability claims, hiring and employment issues, bid-rigging, poor management practices, and other unreported liabilities.

It is difficult to determine whether Japanese firms on average commit more "bad acts" than U.S. firms or if more bad acts simply are kept secret. If the former is true, it is probably because Japanese overregulation creates incentives for firms to commit bad acts. An obvious case is that of now-defunct Yamaichi Securities. Yamaichi competed in what is perhaps the most heavily regulated sector of the Japanese economy: the securities industry. Unlike the United States, where brokerage fees were deregulated in 1975, commissions on securities transactions in Japan remained fixed until 1998. In order to maintain the accounts of its largest customers, Yamaichi agreed to perform "tobashi" transactions, the illegal practice of repurchasing losses that have been shifted so that favored customers do not have to report losses. Sokaiya learned of the arrangement and used it to blackmail Yamaichi.

3. Personal Information. Sometimes the information that sokaiya use to blackmail companies is purely personal in nature — an executive's extramarital affair, a director's criminal son, a manager's questionable background — all make excellent blackmail fodder and payments are usually made by the corporation, not the individual.

B. Information Concealment: The Role of Government and Governance

What elements would a regime need to facilitate the non-disclosure of negative information? First, it would need an organizational system that would tend to prevent negative information from being unwillingly released. Second, it would require minimal enforcement of disclosure requirements so that firms would (a) not get caught keeping secrets and (b) if caught, would not be too severely punished. Third, it would need some mechanism through which economy-wide (or at least industry-wide) unraveling effects could be deterred. In Japan, firms appear to benefit from all three elements.
1. Maintaining Secrecy. Three aspects of the Japanese corporate governance system help to maintain secrecy better than in the United States. First, the cross-shareholding (keiretsu) system common in the Japanese economy lessens the need for market-wide disclosure. If a small number of institutional shareholders hold a large percentage of a company's stock, there is lessened incentive to share information outside of that limited group.

Second, most large Japanese firms are affiliated with a main bank. Main banks are in some ways similar to non-financial cross-shareholders because their inside position reduces the need for public disclosure.

Finally, Japanese boards of directors are composed almost exclusively of insiders. The lack of outside directors may result in a reduced flow of information to sources outside the firm.

2. Enforcement. The Japanese disclosure regime is characterized by a lack of enforcement of disclosure laws by civil or criminal means relative to the level of enforcement in the United States. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission investigates an average of 150 to 200 cases annually. By contrast, from 1992 to 1995, the Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) investigated only six.

Virtually no securities fraud litigation, civil or criminal, occurs in Japan. Japan has no class action mechanism. Another potential enforcement mechanism, the shareholder derivative suit, has only those whose directors committed illegal acts. Japan’s judge-centered civil law system common in the Japanese environment in which it is often quicker to handle activities that they either

3. Deterring Disclosure. Even in the absence of mandatory disclosure provisions, competitive markets should still produce something close to the right level of information to investors. Firms with positive outlooks have every reason to disclose their rosy futures. Those firms with the next most favorable information then disclose, and the unraveling process continues until all firms disclose except for those firms with the worst information. At this point, investors can draw inferences about those firms’ financial outlook from their silence. In Japan, this “unraveling effect” appears not to occur as frequently or as deeply as it does in the United States.

The broad range of Japanese corporate secrets may limit unraveling as investors cannot be sure what type of information to seek. Some deterrence to the unraveling effect probably also results from direct coordination among managers of “competitive” firms.

But most importantly, corporate Japan may have mitigated the unraveling effect by relying on an institution — the bureaucracy — to monitor firms and keep disclosure at preset levels, in effect creating an “information cartel.” Although bureaucratic influence may come from a variety of different sources, I focus in particular on the most prominent ministry (particularly in recent sokaiya scandals), the Ministry of Finance (MOF). MOF serves as regulator, protector, and promoter of the financial services industry and securities markets. In many cases, MOF chooses protection and promotion over regulation. Examples abound; two recent events from January 1998 tend to confirm what had always been widely suspected:

- Two MOF financial inspectors were arrested on charges that they took bribes from Sumitomo Bank, Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, Sanwa Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Asahi Bank, and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in return for revealing inspection plans to the “MOF-tan” (a manager in charge of MOF relations) at those banks.
- Koichi Miyakawa, a former MOF financial inspector, admitted to the means to expose it.

4. The Reasons Why MFO Might Withhold Information Are Plentiful, and Suggest That the Incidents Recounted Above Are Not More aberrations. Sometimes the goal may be market stability. Sometimes MOF may withhold information in order to prevent firms from failing — a goal that can be observed in the United States in cases like the 1979 Chrysler Corporation rescue or the 1998 Long-Term Capital bailout — but that is supported more openly and invoked more frequently in Japan. Private interest, rather than public policy, is also likely; recent scandals suggest that bribery, at least in the form of lavish entertainment, if not cash, may be widespread. Even if outright bribery is limited to a few high-profile cases (which, unfortunately, appears not to be the case), it is no secret that bureaucrats' careers are determined by legislators, who receive large contributions from large corporations. Also a potential contributing factor is the practice of amakudari, through which former bureaucrats, especially in heavily regulated industries, retire to high-paying positions in the very companies that they formerly monitored, supported, and promoted.

The case is easy to overstate; I do not intend to imply that MOF or any other agency purposefully limits disclosure as a matter of policy (though they might). But through small steps and individual actions, MOF and other agencies can be effectively employed as institutional solutions to collective action problems, ensuring that “excessive” disclosure does not occur, and allowing all firms to profit while maintaining minimum disclosure policies.

C. Information Acquisition: Organized Crime Syndicates

A blackmail threat is only credible if the blackmailer has sensitive information and the means to expose it. Sokaiya are often able to acquire both by means of relationships to the yakuza or boryuhuden (Japan’s organized crime syndicates) and related groups.

Yakuza are more numerous and more pervasive in everyday Japanese life than their Mafia counterparts in the United States. The general explanation for this in the socioeconomic literature is that Japan’s overregulated economy, layered bureaucracy, and slow-moving court system create an environment in which it is often quicker and easier for corporations, individuals, and occasionally government itself, to turn to the yakuza than to legitimate organizations. In the corporate context, firms turn to sokaiya to handle activities that they either are not equipped to handle or are not willing to undertake directly. Companies can hire yakuza to enforce judgments, a skill at which gangs appear to be more adept than the legal system. Construction firms reportedly use yakuza to monitor bid rigging for public works projects. Such firms also turn to yakuza to bypass strict immigration laws so that Southeast Asian immigrants can be used on construction projects. For securities firms, one common use of yakuza is said to be the manipulation of stock prices, especially in the ramping of prices for new issues. For real estate firms, yakuza can be used to
intimidate stubborn holdout owners into vacating land at a low price, a niche created at least in part by Japanese landlord-tenant law, which heavily favors tenants. For lenders, sokaiya can assist with debt collection or may even purchase bad debts so that banks do not have to write them off (yakuza can then make the debtors offers that cannot be refused).

The problem for the corporation is that once it turns to the yakuza for private law enforcement, the yakuza, via sokaiya, can then use information gathered in performing the services to blackmail the company. And the company knows that the yakuza/sokaiya can follow through on the threat of exposure — after all, it is the yakuza's expertise in such matters that leads corporations to turn to them in the first place.

The foregoing is not meant to suggest that all firms hire yakuza to do their dirty work. The degree of involvement varies by industry, and it is doubtful that every firm in any industry would turn to the underground. These services are more available in Japan, and because of their sheer numbers, most firms — or at least vulnerable secret-holding employees of those firms — are likely to encounter organized crime representatives.

Mob ties help sokaiya in other ways. First, and perhaps obviously, yakuza can impose occasional threats of physical violence when necessary. Second, mob ties also help sokaiya maintain their monopoly over information that has blackmail potential.

As noted earlier, not all sokaiya are involved in blackmail. Some fill important roles of silencing dissenters, whether they are shareholders or other sokaiya. In this sense, yakuza/sokaiya are classic racketeers, mixing extortion with enforcement of illegal monopolies. Many yakuza/sokaiya, rather than working against the company, simply reinforce existing collusion between managers and large shareholders, providing services for which many managers pay.

Nor do all sokaiya have organized crime connections. A small group of sokaiya intelligentsia makes its living blackmailing corporations with information derived from standard securities analyses of firms' financial statements and other public documents. This group, which even includes a couple of corporate law professors, makes money more on analytical acumen than mob ties. Their tactics are more subtle, as they often send their written findings to the corporations, with attached cover letters suggesting that...
perhaps the companies might wish to purchase the information in lieu of more widespread publication.

D. Information, Reputation, and Regulation

Sokaiya choose their targets knowing that Japanese corporate secrecy has a dual effect. First, the lack of publicly available information in Japan means that the secrets that sokaiya can unearth have more blackmail potential than more public "secrets" of the United States. Second, the non-availability of information means that the release of such information poses a greater threat to the Japanese corporation than to its U.S. counterpart, as investors in Japanese markets should be more likely to attach meaning to relatively immaterial information than they would in U.S. markets.

This analysis implies that sokaiya will target firms with specific characteristics. A list of firms that pay sokaiya should be composed largely of (1) firms with secrets and (2) firms to whom the release of information would be the most damaging. Of course there is no such list. But a substitute does exist — a list of firms implicated in sokaiya payment scandals. Since 1982, executives of 36 companies have been sentenced for sokaiya payments (a 100 percent conviction rate). Executives of one other firm (Nomura Securities) have been arrested and pleaded guilty and agreed to pay more than $3 billion in civil damages. Of these 37 total firms, seven, or nearly 20 percent, are very large food, convenience, and department stores. Another 11, or almost 30 percent, are financial institutions. Combined, these two industry categories account for 18 of the 37 — roughly half — of sokaiya arrest incidents. The same industry categories account for only 13 percent of Tokyo Stock Exchange firms, and for an even smaller percentage of all public Japanese firms. This industry breakdown shows that reputation plays an important role in determining which firms tend to pay sokaiya. Game theory shows that "the power of reputation seems to be positively related to its fragility." Firms whose reputations are most easily shattered will value reputation more highly than other firms will. The applicability to financial institutions is clear; they operate in a highly competitive industry in which public trust is essential to success. Department stores in Japan function under similar constraints. Japanese department stores sell food, a commodity in which trust is essential. Moreover, the margins in retail in Japan, and especially in food retail, are comparatively very thin, and the market is quite competitive. In Japan, there are 120 retailers and 46 food retailers per 10,000 persons; in the United States the corresponding numbers are 59 and 7 per 10,000. This thin-margin environment in which multiple competitors are often selling identical products may lead some Japanese department stores to value their reputation more highly than corresponding U.S. firms.

The degree to which industry is regulated also seems to determine sokaiya targets. MOF plays a predominant role in the financial services industry. In the retail industry, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is in charge, heavily regulating retail stores with inefficient requirements relating to floor space, vacation days (a minimum of 24 days per year), and even requiring local merchant consent to the creation of new large stores. Heavy regulation may lead to questionable practices, the knowledge of which can be used for subsequent blackmail, or it may be a conduit for deterring the informational unraveling effect.

E. Uses for Negative Information, or Why Don't They Just . . . ?

Why do sokaiya choose to blackmail executives with negative information as opposed to using it to profit in some legal manner? While extortion-like uses for negative information can arise in all systems, institutions determine the form of the extortion. In the United States, three potential uses for negative information — securities lawsuits, financial instruments, and publication — are readily apparent. In Japan, however, these sources of profit are much more limited, and holders of negative information thus turn to extortion, whether as sokaiya or by selling information to sokaiya.

1. Lawsuits. Negative information in the United States is often used for profit by securities plaintiffs, or more specifically, by their attorneys. In the United States, as a congressional committee noted, securities
class litigation is “lawyer-driven” and often carried out by “professional plaintiffs” who own nominal interests in many different companies and who stand willing to lend their names to class actions in exchange for an extra “bounty” payment upon settlement. In such a system, nominal professional plaintiffs perform the same economic function as sokaiya: They simply exercise their claim legally after disclosure, while sokaiya make their claim illegally before the information can be disclosed.

In Japan, the class action system does not exist. The Japanese derivative suit mechanism creates little monetary incentive either for shareholders or their attorneys. Without a legal mechanism through which to profit from negative information, an illegal one emerged.

2. Financial instruments. Investors can profit on undisclosed negative information by the use of financial instruments such as put options or short sales. But due to heavy regulation, options and short sales are more difficult, more costly, and much less popular in Japan than in the United States.

Regulation aside, in the Japanese system, sokaiya blackmail has at least three advantages over trading. First, income earned from either short sales or options is a one-shot affair, while income earned from blackmail can be repeated at least once a year with continued threats of exposure. Of course, blackmail and trading are not mutually exclusive. A sokaiya could blackmail the company, short the stock, announce the information, and reap a dual profit — but then he would be unable to reap future profits using either method.

Second, sokaiya blackmail may be less risky. A holder of a short position or a put option has no way of determining whether, when, or to what extent market prices will actually fall. Short-sellers face additional risks. “Uptick” rules that prohibit short sales in a falling market prevent sokaiya from shorting after the release of the information. If multiple sokaiya attempt to short-sell, purchases required to cover their repayment obligations can actually drive prices up. Blackmail, on the other hand, involves almost certain payment, and the risk of arrest is minimal.

Finally, in a market of low informational availability, many companies may actually prefer blackmail to the use of financial instruments. Shorting is a viable investment strategy only if negative information is to be released. Companies have no desire to see negative information released. Accordingly, some should be willing to pay potential short-selling sokaiya significant sums not to short.

3. Publication. When cooperation leads to efficiency gains that the market fails to capture, “private order” economic institutions will emerge. Perhaps the cooperation of sokaiya with managers constitutes such a “private order” institution. But if there is so much valuable negative information out there, why don’t securities agencies, newspapers, or some other third party profit from it legally by selling it to investors?

Part of the answer may lie in the players in the game. The most likely distributors of the information would be securities houses and their affiliated research groups. These groups may not always have the proper incentives to research and convey to customer’s negative information. Japanese securities firms traditionally earn the bulk of their profits through commissions rather than from trading on their own accounts. Accordingly, their goal is to influence customers to buy more securities and pay more commissions. Moreover, as recent scandals have shown, the securities houses themselves are often so deeply mired in sokaiya activity that pointing out the mistakes of others could simply be a suicide request.

The media may constitute another source of negative information distributorship. But the Japanese media has long been known for its press club that rewards positive publicity for the news source over exposé reporting. Moreover, many Japanese media with enough capital to publish news of hidden corporate wrongdoing are often owned and affiliated substantially with the very large corporations on whom they would be reporting.

This leaves one particular group of actors with enough capital and consumer trust to fill the gap — foreign securities firms. Although foreign firms have been in Japan since 1961, their activity was relatively limited until the bubble economy that began in the mid-1980s. As new entrants to the market, establishing a reputation among Japanese securities customers was relatively difficult, and such firms were forced to be much more active in trading for their own accounts than their Japanese counterparts, who could rely on churning alone. But as foreign firms lured foreign customers to Japanese markets, and developed reputations in Japanese domestic markets, that picture began to change, and now the top four foreign firms conduct more retail trading than do the Japanese top four.

These foreign firms already may have affected sokaiya activity. The decline in sokaiya from 6,000 pre-1982 to about 1,000 in 1997 is often cited as a result of enforcement of the 1982 sokaiya provisions. But very little actually changed in 1982 — sokaiya activity was illegal before 1982, and a handful of arrests in the following years does not amount to rigorous enforcement. A better explanation for the decline of sokaiya may be the relatively unbiased dissemination of information by foreign firms in Japan. With fewer ties to listed firms and an initial reliance on trading wholesale rather than retail for profit, foreign firms are often said to be less reluctant to distribute (true) negative information about listed firms. Foreign firms can make legitimate use of negative information on which sokaiya would otherwise profit. As the foreign retail presence increases, their distribution of negative information to investors may further drive sokaiya out of business.

F. A Brief Comparative Test

If institutions determine how negative information is used, we would expect to see sokaiya-like actors in similar institutional environments. As it turns out, sokaiya-like actors are not unique to Japan. In South Korea, chongheoggun are “hecklers” who demand money from companies in exchange for pro-management services or speeches during shareholders meetings.

Although not identical, the similarity between Japanese and Korean institutions and organizations is more than cosmetic. Korean firms are arguably even more heavily regulated than Japanese firms. Korean chaebol look a lot like Japanese keiretsu and other cross-shareholding arrangements, and chaebol is written with the same Chinese characters used in Japanese for zaibatsu, Japan’s pre-war conglomerates. Similar institutions lead to similar results.

It could be that sokuiya simply plague Asian systems. But how, then, could Italian “disturbatori” be explained? Disturbatori are, as the International Herald Tribune has reported, “professional claques that get paid under the table not to disrupt a company’s annual shareholders’ meeting” — in other words, Italian sokaiya. Italy has no labels like keiretsu or chaebol for its corporate system, but its largest organizations are structured in the form of pyramidal groups of financial and operational firms. As in Japan and Korea, the state plays an inordinate role in corporate governance, and corruption scandals occur with some regularity. The Mafia parallel to yakuza is inescapable.
Shareholders' meetings seem to play a critical role in the sokaiya framework. Magazine subscriptions aside, most of the payments to sokaiya come just before a firm's shareholders' meeting. And sokaiyas' use of shitsumonjo — a written list of expository questions to be raised at the meeting that sokaiya submit to management to induce payment — also underscores meeting importance.

Two reasons explain the annual concentration of sokaiya payments. First, if management had to pay sokaiya year-round, accounting would be more difficult, and the risk of detection would increase. Second, annual payments are a mechanism by which the sokaiya can precommit to limited extortion. The sokaiya's implicit message to the firm is "pay me this one time and you won't see me again until next year."

Why shareholders' meetings? Don't firms know that in most cases, a shareholders' meeting is nothing but, as A.A. Berle Jr. aptly described it in Economic Power and the Free Society (1957), "a kind of ancient, meaningless ritual like some of the ceremonies that go on with the mace in the House of Lords?" Why do managers pay sokaiya to keep their meetings short and quiet? Who cares if a "meaningless ritual" of a meeting runs long?

A. The Role of Shareholders' Meetings

In both Japan and the United States, shareholders' meetings are usually meaningless rituals that have all the entertainment value of watching wet paint dry. In Japan, however, meetings take on heightened significance. Almost all Japanese corporations hold their shareholders' meetings on a designated "meeting day" in June. In 1998, 2,325 firms, including 95 percent of all firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, held their meetings on "meeting day."

Meeting time in Japan is all-important. The top story of the evening news on meeting day is usually the length of large firms' meetings. After their meetings, each of Japan's large commercial banks must call the Banking Department of MOF to report its meeting time. As the manager of one of those banks' general affairs departments told me, "This really puts us in a bind. If our meeting is too short, MOF thinks it's because we're paying sokaiya. If it's too long, they say, 'What's wrong? You got bad loans outstanding or something?'' As a consequence, most firms try to hit the magic number of 30 minutes for their meetings — and most succeed. In 1997, average meeting length on meeting day was 39 minutes, over 95 percent of meetings ended in less than an hour, and no questions were asked at 87.5 percent of meetings.

Companies employ a variety of strategies to keep meetings short. Some, of course, pay sokaiya. This tactic seems to work; firms that pay sokaiya tend to have short, orderly shareholders' meetings, while those that do not pay have long ones. Three recent stories illustrate the point. First, Sony, often held to be a model of good corporate governance practices in Japan, publicly announced in 1983 that to comply with the new sokaiya provisions, it unequivocally would have no further relations with sokaiya. Sokaiya responded by questioning Sony executives for over 13 hours at its 1984 meeting. The market responded negatively, "chilling" a two-month rise in Sony's stock price. Second, in contrast, Nomura Securities' most potentially volatile meeting was its 1995 gathering, in which it (1) announced a record $500 million loss and (2) reinstated as directors its former chairman and president, who had resigned four years earlier to take responsibility for sokaiya and loss compensation scandals. Nomura paid sokaiya Ryuichi Koike for his silence at the firm's 1995 meeting. The meeting lasted half an hour. Finally, department store Matsuzakaya's 1994 and 1995 meetings lasted 4 hours and 3 hours, respectively. Matsuzakaya executives began paying sokaiya in 1996. Its 1996 meeting lasted 19 minutes; its 1997 meeting, 38 minutes.

Executives in any country would prefer short meetings to long ones — even General Motors has measures in place to keep its meeting short, and almost all firms have policies to control unruly parties.

B. An Empirical Test

I hypothesize that if long meetings are more damaging than short meetings, on average, firms that have long meetings will have significantly negative stock returns. To test this hypothesis, I use the following method. A publication named Shiryōhan Shōji Homu (loosely, Corporate Data Book) publishes an accurate list of the length of the shareholders' meetings of virtually every large Japanese firm — 1,927 firms in 1997, and a total of 12,301 observations for the period 1990-97. From these lists, I constructed a dataset of all long meetings held on meeting day (when 95 percent of firms hold their annual meetings) by first-section Tokyo stock exchange firms during the eight-year period from 1990 to 1997. I define "long" as one hour or longer. My review of the Shiryōhan Shōji Homu data yielded 285 such long meetings. Of the firms that held these 285 meetings, all but five had complete stock price data in the Datasert electronic database, yielding a total of 280 observations. I then used financial economics methodology to conduct an event study designed to test the price effects on the firms' stock in the year of their long meeting for the two-day period beginning the day of the meeting.

The results were as follows. The average market adjusted returns for the entire sample of 280 firms with meetings of over one hour were relatively unexciting; they showed a statistically insignificant decline of .06 percent. Perhaps investors only care if a firm has an extraordinarily long meeting. To test this hypothesis, I split the 280 firms that had long meetings into two groups; those whose meetings lasted from one to two hours, and those whose meetings exceeded two hours. Again results were not very exciting and most were not statistically significant.

Finally, I split the sample into two groups: repeaters and non-repeaters. I define "repeater" as those firms in the dataset of long meetings whose meetings in the year previous preceding their long meeting also exceeded one hour. All other firms are non-repeaters. The reasoning behind this division is that if a firm regularly has long meetings, investors eventually learn that there is no information being signaled by the length of the firm's meeting. Electrical utilities, for instance, almost always have very long meetings; they were the only repeater firms in 1991, 1992, and 1994 to have meetings longer than two hours. But these meetings run long because of anti-nuclear protests, not sokaiya. And some meetings of Japanese firms with good investor relations programs run long for the same planned reasons that they might in the United States: speeches, entertainment, and hors d'oeuvres. Realizing this, the market should not react to the length of repeaters' meetings.

In fact, in my study, repeaters on average showed a slight, though insignificant increase in market adjusted returns during the meeting day window. The surprising story in my experiment was the set of firms that have long meetings out of the blue; that is, the non-repeaters. In the year of their long
meetings, these firms, on average, had statistically significant market-adjusted returns of -0.59 percent. Stated concretely, the data show that during the period 1990-97, if a company that did not regularly have long meetings suddenly had a long meeting, that company lost, on average, 0.59 percent of its value (adjusted for market risk and variation in the Tokyo Stock Price Index) during the two-day period beginning the day it held its meeting.

Faced with these stock price effects, how might each actor — managers, sokaiya, and shareholders — behave? Managers have incentives to pay sokaiya to keep meetings short, whether the payments are made to keep sokaiya quiet at meetings or as compensation for sokaiya suppression of “legitimate” shareholder voice. Sokaiya clearly have incentives to disrupt meetings, and given negative returns for long meetings, it may not be necessary that all of their information is always true or even always secret, so long as they can make the meeting run long and collect enough true information over time to maintain the signal’s validity. Finally and somewhat perversely, investors should in some cases welcome payments to sokaiya, as sokaiya, for a relatively trivial fee, can prevent an average loss in shareholder wealth of 0.59 percent.

Investors thus tend to buy the stock only of those companies that have short meetings. Of course, this pleases companies that usually have short meetings. But some companies — presumably those with such low information disclosure that shareholders can only acquire relevant information by asking lengthy questions at shareholders’ meetings — will tend to have long meetings. These companies have clear incentives to pool with (mimic) companies that have short meetings. Paying sokaiya helps them do so.

**CONCLUSION**

Why would rational executives of highly successful Japanese firms pay sokaiya racketeers to keep their shareholders’ meetings short? This article has shown that sometimes they pay sokaiya for blackmail, which is hardly a uniquely Japanese phenomenon. But sometimes the blackmail actually does center around shareholders’ meetings. The econometric data I have gathered suggest that because meeting length is correlated to share prices, payments to sokaiya to keep meetings short can increase shareholder wealth.

This wealth maximization potential is a direct product of Japanese corporate law, regulation, and corporate governance, which facilitate barren information markets. Sokaiya — often armed with mob connections that make their threats perfectly clear — simply take advantage of the fact that little information is disseminated. U.S. corporate blackmaill apparently does not reach the scale of that of Japan because the U.S. federal system, relatively unfettered by inefficient corporate law, heavy regulation, and other anti-competitive institutions, makes publicly available more information with blackmail potential.

The sokaiya payment institution persists because, given other existing institutions, almost all actors have reason to choose it over alternative choices. Obviously sokaiya can profit with little chance of detection. Managers and shareholders benefit, too. The Japanese press sometimes describes sokaiya-paying managers as gutless and cowardly. Managers counterattack with cries that they bravely pay sokaiya “for the good of the company.” On this issue, managerial and shareholder interests are aligned. Given that the system is one of non-disclosure, shareholders (and perhaps society as a whole) may derive further benefit from sokaiya activity, as sokaiya may serve as monitors of management behavior, forcing managers to calculate the cost of sokaiya bribes into the cost of their actions. And if MOF wants to prevent firms from failing, it, too, may have incentives to support sokaiya activity.

The institutional incentive structure implies that recent Japanese legislative efforts to curtail sokaiya activity may be of limited efficacy. In November 1997, the Japanese legislature enacted revisions to the Commercial Code designed (once again) to eliminate sokaiya. The new provisions increase criminal penalties for payment from imprisonment of 6 months or a $2,400 fine to 3 years and $24,000; impose criminal liability for sokaiya who demand payment (as opposed to liability only for receiving payment); and increase penalties for related wrongdoing such as money laundering and making false statements to regulators. This legislation may have some marginal effect. But even after the law — which ignores the institutional dynamics discussed in this article — was enacted (and several months after the most publicized scandals), 60 percent of surveyed directors, 79 percent of auditors, and 75 percent of managers still said that they would be unable to cut sokaiya ties in 10 years.

Despite these recent legislative attempts at reform, sokaiya influence remains pervasive. On a recent and utterly unscientific walk around Tokyo’s Kabutocho securities brokerage district, I saw three types of freshly-inked posters in brokerage windows. Eight firms’ posters warned sokaiya and other unsavory types to stay away. Four firms’ posters apologized for their recent sokaiya scandals. Three firms had posters announcing the dissolution of the firm. Breadwinning calligraphers and poster-printers can take comfort. Unless and until the incentive structures created by corporate law, corporate governance, and regulatory policy change to encourage more “stay away” signs, demand for sokaiya apology signs, and perhaps dissolution signs as well, is likely to persist.

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