Resolutions Without Resolve: Turning Away from UN Security Council Resolutions to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

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RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT RESOLVE:
TURNING AWAY FROM U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS
CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

Emma K. Macfarlane*

In 2008, the United Nations first recognized rape as a war crime with the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1820. Since then, the fight against conflict-related sexual violence has become a frequent subject of Security Council Resolutions. But what, if anything, has changed? Wartime sexual violence is still prevalent today and shows no signs of slowing down. This Note argues that Security Council Resolutions are not an effective method to prevent conflict-related sexual violence. The procedural weaknesses in passing Security Council Resolutions and the structure of the Security Council itself may do more harm than good to the efforts to end wartime sexual violence. Instead, this Note finds a solution in an unlikely realm: using voluntary pollution prevention programs as a template to address wartime sexual violence. In examining the parallels between the two issues, this Note suggests a new framework for addressing wartime sexual violence, relying on three factors in particular: adequate and consistent funding to key organizations, regular and credible monitoring of vulnerable communities, and the credible threat of enforcement.

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**Introduction**

“The world must draw a red line on the impunity of abusing women in war.” — Dr. Denis Mukwege, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2018.¹

Nadia Murad’s story shocked the public conscience.² Ms. Murad is a Yazidi woman whose hometown is in Sinjar, a district in the moun-

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tains of northern Iraq. In 2014, ISIS soldiers kidnapped Ms. Murad from her home. She was held as a sex slave for three months as she and several hundred other girls and young women were subjected to repeated beatings and rapes. Ms. Murad eventually escaped and made her way to a refugee camp near Mosul. She is now an activist for Yazidi women and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, frequently recognized along with gynecologist Denis Mukwege for their advocacy on behalf of victims of sexual violence. Ms. Murad’s work includes rebuilding communities that have suffered through wartime violence; sustainably redeveloping her homeland in Iraq; working with local community groups to promote projects that focus on healthcare, water, and hygiene; and sponsoring education initiatives for women.

The conflict-related sexual violence that Ms. Murad experienced has existed since at least the twentieth century, and almost certainly before this time despite a dearth of documentation. No geographic region has been immune. It frequently occurs during times of conflict as it is a brutal yet effective way to maintain control over a civilian population. Its physical, emotional, and psychological implications are trauma.

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5. Id.
6. Id.
7. About Nadia Murad, supra note 3.
matic and long-lasting, and the shame survivors experience can often times prevent subsequent reports of the widespread sexual violence. The experienced trauma together with the lack of reporting is exactly what makes wartime sexual violence so effective.

In an effort to globally address wartime sexual violence, the United Nations (“U.N.”) first recognized rape as a war crime in 2008 with the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820. Other resolutions soon followed. They ranged from responses to specific wars in which sexual violence was committed, like Resolution 2429 (adopted in 2018) that addressed sexual violence taking place in Sudan and South Sudan, to those with broader purposes, like Resolution 2331 (adopted in 2016) that addressed the nexus between sexual violence, terrorism, and transnational organized crime. These resolutions have been met with mixed responses from national governments, international lawyers, and human rights lobbyists due to their varied purposes and effects.

This Note argues that Security Council Resolutions are an ineffective mechanism to respond to conflict-related sexual violence as they do more damage than good. Instead, the U.N. should turn to alternative methods of action that have proved successful in other areas of international law. This Note uses the paradigm of pollution prevention to more effectively address wartime sexual violence.

Section I provides a brief history of wartime sexual violence and describes the Security Council Resolution enactment process. Section II describes the procedural difficulties inherent in using Security Council Resolutions to end wartime sexual violence. It concludes that Security Council Resolutions are not only an ineffective method to end wartime sexual violence, but also frequently lead to damaging discourse that ultimately backtrack women’s rights on an international scale. Section III proposes an alternative to Security Council Resolutions, which more effectively addresses wartime sexual violence. The proposal adopts meth-

12. Id.
ods used in voluntary pollution prevention programs to eliminate sexual violence as a weapon of war through U.N. organs. Adequate and consistent funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforcement are each explored as tools that may supplant ineffective Security Council Resolutions.


A. Wartime Sexual Violence

This Section will provide fundamental historical context for sexual violence during armed conflict and detail the relation between this atrocity and Security Council Resolutions. First, it is important to understand what this violence is. This Note interchangeably uses “wartime sexual violence,” “conflict-related sexual violence,” and “sexual violence during armed conflict.” It intentionally avoids the term “rape as a weapon of war” due to its narrower connotations. Wartime sexual violence is not limited to rape; it concerns violence on a much broader spectrum, including “sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage,” and all other forms of sexual violence linked to a conflict. The term “conflict,” in turn, includes situations of “mass armed conflict or ‘lethal intergroup violence.’” A formal declaration of war is not necessary. Indeed, even if only one side is in a position to partake in systematic violence, this may still establish a conflict zone.

22. Id.
23. Id.
weeks of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Hutu majority engaged in rampant sexual violence against the Tutsi minority. While there was no formal declaration of war, this constituted wartime sexual violence all the same.

Two additional key facts undergird this Note’s discussion of conflict-related sexual violence. First, the perpetrators of sexual violence during armed conflict are not exclusively male, and those subjected to it are not exclusively female. Although targeting transcends gender, those most commonly subjected to wartime sexual violence are women. Second, wartime sexual violence is inextricably linked to the basic human rights of women. Wartime sexual violence has been equated to acts of torture, genocide, and terrorism. Its psychological, physical, and social consequences can each prove deadly. Survivors describe a range of devastating mental health repercussions: shame, sadness, anger, fear, anxiety, and depression persist after the violence, and these feelings may

25. See id.
27. LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004 325 (Hum. Rts. Watch. ed., 2004), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B64A-B9SE]. This takes into account the sexual violence against men and boys that often goes unreported. See Leatherman, supra note 17, at 54. While data on the levels of wartime sexual violence against LGBTQIA+ individuals, including transgender, non-binary, and gender nonconforming individuals, is incomplete, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention notes that this demographic experiences sexual violence during peacetime at similar or higher rates than straight, cisgender individuals, in addition to higher rates of hate-motivated violence. Sexual Assault and the LGBTQ Community, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-assault-and-the-lgbtq-community [http://perma.cc/4VVD-SQEV]. It seems possible—if not likely—that these statistics would carry into a wartime setting.
29. Pieter Kooijmans, the Former Special Rapporteur on Torture, opined: “Since it was clear that rape or other forms of sexual assault against women in detention were a particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and right to physical integrity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an act of torture.” U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR.21 (Feb. 21, 1992).
30. Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20, at ¶ 32.
31. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
be further augmented by unwanted pregnancies. These traumas, along with living through the experience of sexual violence itself, can render survivors pariahs within their own communities. Worse, survivors may later be subjected to domestic violence or family-led honor killings in communities that view any sexual activity outside of marriage as shameful or as bringing dishonor. Sexual violence during armed conflict is a uniquely devastating form of violence that has catastrophic effects on the mental and physical health of survivors.

Sexual violence during times of conflict has been called “as old as warfare.” While this may be true, to assert that sexual violence is always present in wartime or during a conflict is to suggest a “natural” pairing between the two phenomena. This proposition is in itself destructive. Not only does it conceal the diversity of conflict-related violent experiences, but it also downplays sexual violence as an inevitable consequence of conflict. Commentators have argued that viewing sexual violence as a foregone conclusion during wartime leads to ignoring...
sexual violence as an abuse of human rights. Instead, it is accepted as an “unfortunate but inevitable side effect of sending men to war.”

The true reach of sexual violence during conflict is difficult to gauge. Historically, few measures have been taken to record sexual violence against women during armed conflict. Today, flawed methods of determining the number of victims result in estimates plagued by both over- and undercounting; as such, when data is produced, the range of estimated victims is wide. For example, estimates of the number of sexual violence victims during the 1994 Rwandan genocide range from 250,000 to 500,000 individuals. Regardless of the lack of conclusive data, what is clear from these estimates is that sexual violence during times of conflict is far from behind us. The former United Nations Secretary-General termed this type of violence a “present-day atrocity” and characterized its use as a common tactic of modern warfare.

Responses to wartime sexual violence have varied on both national and international levels. The focus of this Note centers on international responses, but frequently, national non-governmental coalitions have effectively contributed in responding to wartime sexual violence. For example, women-led civil society organizations have mobilized politically to protest the threat of conflict-related sexual violence in their countries. La Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres is a grassroots feminist move-

42. See id. at 32 (arguing that viewing sexual violence in war as not inevitable strengthens the grounds for holding perpetrators accountable).
46. Id.
ment in Colombia that was instrumental in negotiating a solution to the country’s 1996 armed conflict between the government and guerrilla groups. The organization, still in existence today, describes itself as “feminist, pacifist, and anti-militarist,” and was formed in a response to the violence women faced in conflict zones. The mandate of La Ruta Pacífica is to showcase the effects that war has on women’s bodies and to demand both accountability and a negotiated solution to conflict. The effectiveness of these national responses cannot be understated: Any international solution is necessarily undergirded by the support of national coalitions such as La Ruta Pacífica.

Governments have also worked to prioritize legislation to strengthen protections against wartime sexual violence and to dedicate comprehensive services to survivors. For example, in March 2020, the Sudanese government signed a Framework of Cooperation with the United Nations to address the sexual violence that has occurred for years within the Darfur region. Among other stipulations, the agreement commits both the Sudanese government and the United Nations to develop and support legislation to bolster protections against wartime sexual violence. The agreement also lays out commitments to provide wide-ranging health services and support to survivors, and stipulates enhanced methods to investigate and prosecute perpetrators. Through these responses, among other methods, the United Nations has played a large role in bringing wartime sexual violence to the fore of international conversations on human rights.

51. Id.
53. RUTA PACÍFICA DE LAS MUJERES, supra note 50.
54. Garcés, supra note 52.
56. Id.
58. See, e.g., Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20.
B. United Nations Security Council Resolutions

The U.N. has a number of mechanisms at its disposal to address the issue of wartime sexual violence and the organization has deployed these tools with varying levels of success. One such method is the Security Council Resolution.

The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs of the United Nations and is tasked with maintaining international peace and security. To this end, the Security Council has the power to pass resolutions which serve as “formal expressions of the opinion or will of United Nations organs.” The topics of Security Council Resolutions range from the safety and security of peacekeepers; to commentary on human rights circumstances in a particular country; to topics applicable to a range of geographic areas, like the threat of terrorist acts. In its capacity as a keeper of peace and security, the United Nations Security Council has attempted to address wartime sexual violence through resolutions.

The Security Council is composed of fifteen members. Five members are permanent, collectively known as the “Permanent Five”—China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and ten are non-permanent, elected for two-year terms by the United Nations General Assembly. Resolutions are passed by an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen Security Council members. All members of the “Permanent Five” have veto power under the U.N. Charter. Thus,

60. Resolutions, supra note 13.
61. See S.C. Res. 2518, 1 (Mar. 30, 2020). Peacekeepers are U.N. agents “called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.” What is Peacekeeping, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping [https://perma.cc/L5DV-CCEH].
64. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
65. Id.
68. See id. ¶ 3.
if any member of the Permanent Five votes against a resolution, the res-
olution will fail. 69

The Security Council derives its authority to adopt resolutions
from the U.N. Charter. It may enact a resolution under one of two
chapters of the Charter. Different international legal consequences flow
from resolutions adopted under the respective Chapters. Chapter VII of
the Charter allows the Security Council to deploy forces by land, sea, or
air to enforce peace and security. 70 Further, it permits U.N. Member
States to take more aggressive measures to address resistance against
peacekeeping operations when more protection-oriented measures have
failed. 71 These initial protection-oriented measures typically take place
under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter which governs the pacific settle-
ments of disputes. 72 Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are generally
considered to be legally enforceable, while those adopted under Chap-
ter VI are understood to be non-binding. 73

This is not to say that non-binding U.N. resolutions passed under
Chapter VI can never contribute meaningfully to international peace
and security. But in terms of conflict-related sexual violence, the efficacy
of these resolutions is a matter of debate. 74 Ten years after the enactment
of the first Security Council Resolution addressing wartime sexual vio-
ence, 75 this weapon of war is still often used with impunity. 76 That sex-

69. Note that only a veto (or vote against a resolution) forces any resolution to fail entire-
ly. Members of the Permanent Five may abstain from voting with no effect on the
outcome of the resolution, providing that the resolution receives the requisite support
from other members of the U.N. Security Council. SEC. COUNCIL REP., THE VETO
/X295-RYKE]. For more information on the process of abstaining from Security
Council votes, see Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstentions from Voting
and Absence from Meeting, 60 YALE L.J. 209 (1951).
70. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 45, 50.
71. See SEC. COUNCIL REP., SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII: MYTHS
Council Action Under Chapter VII”) [https://perma.cc/6VJ3-BGER].
73. See id. at 7, 9; see also S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019); Sexual Violence Monitoring,
PEACEWOMEN, http://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/sexual-violence-
indicators-and-monitoring [https://perma.cc/8ZGB-ZaZj].
74. See SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 71, at 9. See also Sophie Huvé, The Use of
U.N. Sanctions to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, GEORGETOWN INST.
FOR WOMEN, PEACE & SEC. 23-26 (2018), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Use-of-UN-Sanctions-to-Address-Conflict-related-Sexual-
Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVB5-2XEX].
75. See S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008).
ual violence during wartime continues unabated and is even increasing in an alarming number of regions throughout the world.\(^{77}\) is but one indicator that existing Security Council Resolutions have been and will continue to be an ineffective tool to address this issue.

II. The Deficiencies of Security Council Resolutions in Addressing Wartime Sexual Violence

Problems with addressing conflict-related sexual violence through Security Council Resolutions chiefly stem from the procedural aspects of passing those resolutions. Section II.A details how the consensus-building process necessary to pass a resolution can cause a regression in Security Council precedent, which in turn causes a backsliding of women’s rights. Section II.B outlines how the Security Council voting structure creates undesirable incentives for powerful members to veto resolutions that might be used to address human rights abuses within their own borders. Section II.C identifies how the Security Council’s limitations necessarily position the protection of women from sexual violence as a means to an end. This creates a hierarchy that subverts women’s rights, making them secondary to international peace and security. Finally, Section II.D showcases how, in spite of over a decade’s worth of Security Council Resolutions addressing the subject, there is a dearth of normative and behavioral change surrounding sexual violence during conflict.

A. The Drawbacks of Consensus-Building

On April 29, 2019, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2467 on Women, Peace and Security.\(^{78}\) It was lauded by the

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United Nations as strengthening justice and accountability and for its “survivor-centered approach in the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence.”

At first blush, the text of the Resolution is encouraging. The Resolution calls upon United Nations Member States to provide care to survivors of rape during situations of armed conflict without “any discrimination,” and draws attention to “groups that are particularly vulnerable or may be specifically targeted” in conflict and post-conflict situations. The Resolution also requests that the Secretary-General report periodically on Member State compliance and steps taken to implement the Resolution. Finally, Article 35 of the Resolution encourages countries to adopt and regularly refresh fully funded national action plans to progress the U.N.’s Women, Peace and Security Agenda. This initiative stresses the importance of women’s equal participation in post-conflict reconstruction and in the promotion of peace and security. It also encourages the incorporation of all gender perspectives in U.N. efforts to promote and maintain peace and security.

Finally, Resolution 2467 includes a number of firsts. These include welcoming regular briefings by women from civil society groups on conflict-related sexual violence and addressing the unique hardships of mothers of children born from rape.

For the first time, the Security Council addresses the situation of mothers of children born of sexual violence and their children in detail and spells out the challenges facing them, such as economic and social marginalization, physical and psychological injury, statelessness, discrimination and lack of access to reparations. The resolution requests the Secretary-General to provide a report to the Security Council on this topic until 2021.
These developments should not obscure the reality that the consensus-building process diluted the Resolution and resulted in a watered-down decree that varied widely from its original form. 86 Certain aspects of Resolution 2467 are a regression. Notably absent from Resolution 2467 is any mention of sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence during armed conflict. 87 This is significant because it is a marked backslide from previous Security Council Resolutions which have recognized the sexual and reproductive rights of women for over twenty years. 88 Further, the word “gender” is conspicuously absent from the text of the resolution. 89 This is meaningful because it signals that transgender individuals are excluded from the scope of the resolution. 90 Moreover, it departs from past practice where the term was used liberally in resolutions addressing conflict-related sexual violence. 91


86. For example, a series of insights produced by the Security Council Report on evolving Security Council actions explains:

Three permanent members of the Council (China, Russia, and the US) expressed opposition to several aspects of the text during the negotiations, and at various stages of the process, all three threatened to use their veto. The original draft resolution was ambitious. Designed to focus on a “survivor-centered approach” to preventing and responding to sexual violence in conflict, it addressed several issues that were controversial for these permanent members. Among the contentious issues were whether to include language on the sexual and reproductive health of victims of sexual violence, whether to establish a formal mechanism (that is, a working group) on sexual violence in conflict, references to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and recognition of LGBTI as a vulnerable group.


87. Id.


89. In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note 86.


91. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1820 art. 11 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 2331 Preamble, ¶¶ 8, 19 (Dec. 20, 2016); S.C. Res. 2429 Preamble, ¶¶ 7, 11, 19, 27, 35, 39, 44, 56 (July 13, 2018).
Finally, because the Security Council implicitly adopted the Resolution under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, compliance with the Security Council’s recommendations is not mandated and no enforcement actions can be taken. Although this does not mean U.N. members may flout the resolution with impunity, holding states accountable is a difficult endeavor. Member states are well aware of this: Although the Council passed the Resolution with strong support—thirteen votes in favor and two abstentions from permanent members China and Russia—U.N. Member States such as China still flouted attempts to establish a formal mechanism implementing the Resolution, thereby frustrating its effectiveness.

The negotiations leading to Resolution 2467 and its final outcome give insight into why Security Council Resolutions are manifestly deficient in addressing and preventing conflict-related sexual violence. Three key issues remained on the table throughout much of the negotiations involving Resolution 2467: the use of the term “gender” within the text of the Resolution, the desired implementation mechanism for the Resolution, and the inclusion of a reference to sexual reproductive

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92. See infra Section II.B.
93. However, as has been made known by the International Court of Justice, under Article 25 members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 25; CHRISTINE CHINKIN & MADELEINE REES, COMMENTARY ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION: CONTINUED STATE OBLIGATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT 2467 4 (2019), http://www.lse.ac.uk/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2019/Final-WPS-Commentary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JLW-9XWH]. Although U.N. Members have agreed to accept and abide by Security Council Resolutions, in practice, there is little way to enforce this under Chapter VI.
95. In Hindsight: Negotiations on Res. 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note 86.
rights and services. Actions by the United States, China, and Russia led to the elimination of text addressing each of these issues. As explained below, the discussions between permanent members and their veto powers are emblematic of the larger problem of using Security Council Resolutions to address and prevent sexual violence as a weapon of war.

First, the United States threatened to veto the resolution if it included any mention of sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence. The Trump administration objected to this language for fear of it being construed as in support of abortion. That members of the Security Council bowed to the United States’ objection is stunning when one considers the international community’s stated views on a woman’s right to abortion following rape: The Human Rights Committee’s position is that “countries must provide safe, legal and effective access to abortion . . . most notably where the pregnancy is the result of rape”; the Committee Against Torture notes that forced pregnancy in the context of sexual violence constitutes torture; and both the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) and the Commission on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities state that legal abortion is a “prerequisite for safeguarding . . . human rights to life, health, equality before the law and equal protection of the law, non-discrimination, infor-

96. Id.
mation, privacy, bodily integrity and freedom from torture and ill treatment.”

Despite the consensus in the international community that abortion is a vital human right, the United States’ opposition was effective. The language in support of sexual and reproductive services for survivors was eliminated. This illustrates one of the key weaknesses in using Security Council Resolutions to address human rights issues in general, and conflict-related sexual violence in particular: Thanks to the permanent members’ veto power, even one regressive state administration can erase years of global progress on the development of human rights norms through their insistence on the inclusion or omission of choice terms within a resolution’s text.

Two other countries’ objections following the resolution’s passage also exemplify this devastating power dynamic. After Resolution 2467 passed, China and Russia objected to the creation of a working group on sexual violence in conflict (in essence, an accountability mechanism) by way of feeble explanations denouncing an overload of bureaucracy and shortage of “extensive discussions.” This pretext was to be expected: Both countries frequently vote against or abstain from Security Council Resolutions affirming human rights.

Finally, the Security Council eliminated the word “gender” due to an enduring campaign by the Trump administration to remove the term


103. A U.N. General Assembly report explains:

> China and Russia in particular made clear their reluctance to see a working group at present, with China saying that “it is important to have extensive discussions well in advance” before creating “special mechanisms,” and Russia declaring that it was concerned “about the efforts to increase the number of bureaucratic United Nations bodies in order to create the appearance of robust activity.”

In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, *supra* note 86.

from all U.N. human rights documents. Commentators have described this as an “ongoing strategy to undermine the recognized human rights of transgender individuals.” This is consistent with past actions by the Trump administration to ensure that transgender persons are not accorded the same protections as cisgender women and girls. For example, in a previous U.N. draft document promoting gender equality, the U.S. administration under Trump recommended that the section be clarified to refer to only women and girls. The transphobic actions of the Trump administration demonstrate the power dynamics of the Permanent Five in action. Put simply, it only takes one backwards administration to implement unacceptable changes within the text of a Security Council Resolution.

Despite Resolution 2467’s deficiencies, Member States such as France saw it as a step in the right direction. This is unsurprising when one considers the deference accorded to Security Council Resolutions on the international stage. There is a dominant narrative propped up by the media and some members of the international community that Security Council Resolutions are both effective and powerful. Throwing the weight of at least three of the permanent members behind the text of any Security Council Resolution related to conflict-related sexual violence serves not only to highlight the issue to an international audience, but can even elicit united action from U.N. Member States and U.N. committees to support the Resolution’s mandate.

When evaluated on the strength of their signaling function, however, the power of Security Council Resolutions may also be their greatest weakness. Security Council Resolutions either seek to “confirm [the Council’s] support for the validity and enforcement of the relevant in-

105. Borger, supra note 90.
106. Id.
110. See, e.g., ALEXANDER THOMPSON, CHANNELS OF POWER: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. STATECRAFT IN IRAQ 204-10 (2010).
ternational norms and instruments,” or “impact, qualify or modify the existing legal position under international law.” That is to say, omissions speak just as powerfully as affirmative statements. With the Security Council’s deliberate elimination of text supporting access to reproductive health services, Resolution 2467 backslid Security Council precedent by at least ten years. Earlier resolutions in 2009 and 2013 both recognized the need for and promoted access to reproductive health services for victims of sexual violence during wartime. The United States’ well-publicized rejection of terms supporting access to these services modifies the U.N.’s previous position that these services are vital, taking a step back rather than confirming their value. Germany, the drafter of Resolution 2467, was forced to accede to U.S. demands or risk foregoing the resolution entirely. And herein lies the difficulty: Is the greater risk to deny the passage of any Security Council Resolution, or to pass one that implicitly regresses the Security Council’s stance on women’s rights?

B. Undesirable Incentives

The voting structure of the Permanent Five is the second reason that Security Council Resolutions cannot sufficiently address wartime sexual violence. Even if the omissions discussed above insisted upon by the United States are not viewed as significant, the divided votes from the Security Council’s permanent members should be. When 40% of the permanent members decline to support a resolution condemning sexual violence in conflict, claims of the Resolution’s “landmark” status and its characterization as a “powerful new instrument” in the United Nations’ arsenal for addressing wartime sexual violence become far less convincing.

115. See Landmark U.N. Sec. Council Res. 2467, supra note 78.
Security Council Resolutions can also be a dangerous tool when used to negotiate texts on human rights, and particularly the rights of women. China and Russia, two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, have left unaddressed grave abuses of women within their respective states \(^\text{116}\) and are thereby incentivized to withhold support for resolutions pertaining to human rights. Similarly, these states are more likely to push back against effective mechanisms such as working groups, which could conceivably be used to support human rights within their own nations’ borders. \(^\text{117}\)

C. The Protection of Women as a Means to an End

The third problem with using Security Council Resolutions as a mechanism to respond to sexual violence as a weapon of war stems from the mandate of the Security Council itself. The very framework of the Security Council prevents its members from addressing wartime sexual violence in a way that fully recognizes women’s rights as human rights. The Security Council’s mandate only allows the Council to create binding resolutions—those created under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter—in order to protect international peace and security. \(^\text{118}\) This means that resolutions must position the prevention of sexual violence against women as a means to that end, rather than a goal in and of itself. \(^\text{119}\)


\(^{118}\) U.N. Charter, art. 23.

\(^{119}\) For example, Resolution 1820 explains:
tecting women is within the purview of the Security Council only inso-
far as women are a peacebuilding resource. 120 Sexual violence during
wartime must be prevented because it “negatively affects women’s role
as agents of peace.”121 It is the structure of the U.N. Charter itself that
promotes this harmful discourse. To create an effective, binding, and
enforceable resolution addressing the prevention of wartime sexual vio-
lence, the issue must be framed as a mere stop on the road toward the
end result of peace and stability within nations.

Of course, the skeptic will be quick to note that the Security
Council is not solely limited to the binding resolutions of Chapter VII,
and can therefore take certain actions without needing to meet Chapter
VII’s restrictive demands. Resolutions brought forth under Chapter VI
of the U.N. Charter are non-binding, but unlike Chapter VII, the man-
date to act only for purposes of “international peace and security” does
not exist.122

While this may make Chapter VI resolutions easier to pass, two key
issues remain with these resolutions. First, they are only binding on
states that consent to their application.123 If the country upon which the
U.N. wishes to impose the resolution is itself a perpetrator of wartime
sexual violence,124 enforcement becomes exceedingly difficult, as it is un-
likely that even a non-binding resolution will earn the support of the of-
fending country. Second, the legality of non-binding Security Council

The Security Council . . . [is d]eeply concerned also about the persistent
obstacles and challenges to women’s participation and full involvement in
the prevention and resolution of conflicts as a result of violence, intimi-
dation and discrimination, which erode women’s capacity and legitimacy
to participate in post-conflict public life, and acknowledging the negative
impact this has on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including
post-conflict peacebuilding.

S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 11.
120. Id.
122. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Hum. Rts., & Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affs., 110th Cong. 29 (2008) (prepared statement of Michael J.
Matheson, Visiting Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University
Law School).
123. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 49 (1998).
124. For example, wartime rape by government forces occurred during the conflict in Dar-
fur to which the Security Council responded with Resolution 1769. S.C. Res. 1769
(July 31, 2007); HUM. RTS. WATCH, FIVE YEARS ON: NO JUSTICE FOR SEXUAL
darfur0408webwcov.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9XA-97HZ].
Resolutions is frequently challenged on jurisdictional grounds.\textsuperscript{125} And even those resolutions stipulating efforts to end sexual violence against women that do go unchallenged have historically been ineffective.\textsuperscript{126} In sum, the need for consensus, nations’ undesirable and conflicting incentives, and viewing the protection of women as a means to an end are near-insurmountable obstacles that render Security Council Resolutions an ineffective transnational mechanism to prevent wartime sexual violence.

D. Dearth of Lasting Normative and Behavioral Change

In the decade since Security Council Resolutions have begun to address the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, behavioral norms surrounding the use of this type of violence in war have not undergone any significant changes. Resolution 1888 (2009) was the first to call for any obligation or implementation mechanism to prevent sexual violence as a weapon of war.\textsuperscript{127} Since then, Resolution 1960 (2010) went further by calling for annual reports identifying perpetrators credibly suspected of committing sexual violence to hold them accountable.\textsuperscript{128} Three years later, Resolution 2106 (2013) acknowledged that men and transgender individuals could be targets and victims of conflict-related sexual violence, overturning the assumption that only women are affected by these atrocities.\textsuperscript{129} In spite of this progression in Secu-

\textsuperscript{125} As Malihe Behtar and Hassan Savari explain:

\begin{quote}
The text and spirit of the charter does not recognize the Security Council as an authority with infinite jurisdiction. Granting permission to the Security Council of States to make binding decisions doesn’t mean that the Security Council can go beyond its jurisdiction directly or indirectly. In this regard legality of Security Council resolutions . . . have been challenged. These resolutions [are] contested by one or some States. These challenges [raise] judicial review of the Security Council decisions.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{126} Wright, \textit{supra} note 13, at 101 ("The United Nations deferred formal recognition of rape as a war crime until 2008, when it passed S.C. Res. 1820 (Resolution 1820). Efforts to end sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) failed despite a detailed U.N. strategy to end atrocities."); Crawford, \textit{supra} note 112 ("Resolution 1960 recognizes the all-too-frequent gap between Security Council resolutions and actual commitments by the U.N. and its Member States, and it demonstrates frustration with combatants’ continued use and tolerance of sexual violence.").

\textsuperscript{127} Crawford, \textit{supra} note 112 at 113.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Id.}
rity Council discourse, wartime sexual violence is still considered acceptable in many parts of the world, and perpetrators are neither consistently nor effectively held accountable.\footnote{130. \textit{Id.}}

### III. A New Solution to Address Wartime Sexual Violence

Since U.N. Security Resolutions have failed and will continue to fail to effectively stem wartime sexual misconduct, U.N. Member States must turn to alternative mechanisms for addressing and preventing sexual violence during armed conflict. Inspiration may be found in an unlikely setting. The international practices used to create voluntary pollution prevention programs provide an unorthodox yet effective template to address wartime sexual violence.\footnote{131. \textit{See generally Donald G. Chittock \\& Kenneth F.D. Hughey, A Review of International Practice in the Design of Voluntary Pollution Prevention Programs, 19 J. CLEANER PROD. 542 (2010) (examining the features of successful voluntary pollution prevention programs undertaken by Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States).}} These international practices reveal parallels between the two issues and provide a new framework for addressing wartime sexual violence—one that does not rely on ineffective Security Council Resolutions.

Section III.A details the common themes of the global fight against pollution and the prevention of wartime sexual violence. This analysis underscores why U.N. Member States should turn to the Voluntary Pollution Prevention Framework to address sexual violence as a weapon of war. Section III.B discusses the application of the Voluntary Pollution Prevention Framework to wartime sexual violence and identifies three crucial factors to the success of international cooperation in this realm: Adequate and consistent funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforcement.

#### A. Common Themes Between the Fight Against Pollution and the Prevention of Wartime Sexual Violence

The fight against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war shares three key similarities with the global fight against pollution. First, in each case, there is a dearth of international action despite consensus that a problem exists. Second, when initiatives are undertaken, follow-through and execution are exceedingly rare. Finally, solving both issues
requires cooperation on a global level. Examining the solutions to these problems in the pollution context may prove useful in tackling the prevention of sexual violence during conflict.

i. Consensus

The primary similarity stems from the fact that despite widespread consensus among industry experts on the environmental and economic effects of pollution, international consensus on plans for action remains lacking. Within the past four years alone, the United States withdrew from the landmark Paris Climate Accord; Brazil’s president committed to the destruction of the Amazon by way of defending deforestation as “cultural”; and China refused to make any promises to take stronger climate action at the 2019 U.N. Climate Action Summit, despite excoriation from an official at the World Resources Institute and from other climate change advocates and diplomats.


133. See Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/Y8TZ-A2DH]. Critics of the United States’ withdrawal note that this may have a devastating effect on the agreement as a whole. Concerns abound that other nations will follow in the United States’ steps to leave; that this is not within the world’s best interests, as we are on the brink of a global climate catastrophe; and that the Paris Agreement was the “most realistic approach for all of the nations of the world to positively address climate change.” Fran Ulmer & Carlos Curbelo, Commentary: U.S. Should Not Withdraw from Paris Climate Accord, CORDOVA TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.thecordovatimes.com/2019/12/16/commentary-u-s-should-not-withdraw-from-paris-climate-accord/ [http://perma.cc/VYW9-B8L4].


135. Among other issues, environmental advocates wanted China to make commitments to move away from fossil fuels; to show initiative and a commitment to taking climate change seriously; and to meet global expectations for environmental leadership that belie its position as a major world economy. See Somini Sengupta & Lisa Friedman, At U.N. Climate Summit, Few Commitments and U.S. Silence, N.Y. TIMES
Consider a simplified explanation of incentives that drive environmental policies. The United States’ stated reason for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement was because it was “unfair” to the United States compared to the Agreement’s treatment of China and India. The United States further protested that complying with the Agreement departed from the administration’s “America First” policy. Brazil’s reluctance to act on environmental conservation efforts stemmed from President Jair Bolsonaro’s position that environmental regulations must be relaxed to encourage economic growth. China refused to take a stronger stance on climate change based on resource concerns: A past green initiative created a heightened demand for certain fuels, which at the time produced a shortage of the resource and left millions without heat.

As with the prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war, competing motivations in the realm of voluntary pollution prevention have created a tradition in which powerful nations fall short of commitments to robust transnational action plans. Under President Trump, the United States refused to advocate for services that might be interpreted as endorsing abortion within Security Council Resolution 2467 for fear of betraying the Republican Party’s position of opposing the procedure at all costs. China is also unwilling to sign onto resolutions that endorse human rights for fear of the implications that endorsing such resolutions might have on China itself. These competing motivations prevent full, effective commitments from both countries to address wartime sexual violence.


137. Id.


141. See supra Section II.A.

142. See Richardson, supra note 104.
ii. Follow-Through

The second similarity between these two global issues is a general failure to execute, even when commitments are made on the international level. Domestic implementation of any plan to cut down on pollution requires extensive public infrastructure to ensure success.\textsuperscript{143} The commitment to reduce pollution is more than a high-level pact. It requires an in-the-weeds monitoring system of both small and large industry players alike, a system that must be comprehensive and thorough.\textsuperscript{144} Likewise, the prevention of wartime sexual violence extends beyond sweeping resolutions that fail to create a world in which wartime sexual violence ceases to exist. Barring a stark international cultural shift in which every woman is recognized as having full human rights and allotted a position of respect in each society—a goal to work towards, certainly, but that would be naïve to expect in the near future—the commitment takes cooperation and work. There is an ongoing obligation to address the problem before it arises,\textsuperscript{145} to deploy defensive mechanisms during the conflict itself,\textsuperscript{146} and to aid survivors afterward through the provision of sexual reproductive services and mental and physical therapy.\textsuperscript{147} The prevention of wartime sexual violence and voluntary pollution prevention programs have meaningful, core similarities. By studying these programs, the international community may be better able to implement initiatives that will succeed in the prevention of wartime sexual violence.

iii. International Buy-In

A final similarity between the two issues pertains to how the global community can reach a permanent solution. Solving both issues requires a reliance on cooperation at an international level. Voluntary environmental approaches oftentimes include collaboration between individual businesses, industry associations, and regulatory agencies or central gov-

\textsuperscript{144} See Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 548.
\textsuperscript{145} See infra Section III.B.
\textsuperscript{146} See infra Section III.B.
This cooperation among a panoply of national actors parallels the range of players that the U.N. must bring together in a country to combat sexual violence as a weapon of war.  

B. *The Application of the Voluntary Pollution Prevention Framework to Addressing Wartime Sexual Violence*

Environmental law has identified several key features of successful voluntary pollution prevention programs that may be applicable to the prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war. In 2010, environmental law Professors Donald Chittock and Kenneth Hughey conducted a study surveying voluntary approaches to industry-wide pollution prevention programs in Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Chittock research identified key features of successful programs, at least three of which are applicable to the prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war: Adequate and consistent funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforcement. As the study notes, and as an apt precaution when weighing strategies to prevent wartime sexual violence, no single mechanism is likely to work in all circumstances. These three approaches are intended to serve as preferred alternatives to Security Council Resolutions. Unlike Security Council Resolutions that risk backsliding international progress, the three recommended mechanisms have the benefit of being more practically effective while pushing forward the conversation surrounding women’s rights.

The following proposal will elaborate on how each of the three factors identified in Chittock’s study can prove useful in the context of addressing wartime sexual violence. The piecemeal nature of this solution might be unattractive to some. This tripartite solution, however, has the benefit of being realistic. Neither a unilateral change to the approach nor the creation of a new multilateral framework would be an effective answer to how the international community combats conflict-related sexual violence. Although this proposal may be dissimilar to current approaches, it has the advantage of building upon pre-existing structures whenever possible and incorporating mechanisms readily accepted by

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148. Chittock, supra note 131, at 542.
150. See Chittock, supra note 131, at 542.
151. Id. at 543.
the international community. In sum, a series of small, realistic fixes to the current system is preferable over a theoretically elegant yet practically unworkable solution.

i. Adequate and Consistent Funding

The first element of the new framework is adequate and consistent funding for programs that combat conflict-related sexual violence. In the pollution prevention context, the most successful pollution prevention programs in the Chittock study had the benefit of consistent funding.\footnote{Id. at 542.} Other scholars have highlighted this as the “single, most important element” in ensuring the success of the programs.\footnote{Michael Peters & R. Kerry Turner, SME Environmental Attitudes and Participation in Local-Scale Voluntary Initiatives: Some Practical Applications, 47 J. ENV’T PLAN. & MGMT. 449, 457 (2004) (noting that a second key part of this “element” was the “co-ordination of certain key players who would enable appropriate contacts to be made and would be able to attract the necessary funding”).} The Chittock research found that reliable financing helped anti-pollution efforts in two ways. First, the researchers found that adequate and consistent funding worked to solidify pollution prevention’s place as one of the “mainstream goals” in national environmental management programs.\footnote{Chittock, supra note 131, at 545.} Second, the funding worked as a positive incentive to bring key industry players into the fold of the voluntary programs.\footnote{Chittock and Hughey note that a “collaborative relationship with industry” players is one of the key features of a successful voluntary pollution prevention program. See id. at 542.} The consistent stream of capital helped to persuade the actors in question that longevity of the program was assured.\footnote{Id. at 547, 550.}

One key criticism of the Chittock research should be addressed up front. Commentators have noted that the five countries within the Chittock study were each wealthy, developed nations.\footnote{The countries were Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at 542.} One may therefore question whether the study’s outcomes would be the same in less affluent countries. To this point, even if initiatives such as adequate and consistent funding would not have produced a significant positive effect on the lifespan of developing countries’ pollution prevention programs, this does not diminish the study’s use as a template for the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence. It would be naïve to assume there is a
“one size fits all” method that would work for each country, region, or city in which violence is occurring. But to write off adequate and consistent funding as a failure because certain research has yet to be conducted would be a mistake.

Based on the findings of the Chittock study, this Note argues that adequate and consistent funding should also be applied in efforts to prevent sexual violence as a weapon of war. States such as France and Germany have the political will and resources to spend on this cause. As such, they need not waste diplomatic efforts on the negotiations of a “watered-down” Security Council Resolution. Instead, these countries can and should redirect their energies toward securing voluntary funds for U.N. offices with the bandwidth to address this issue.

Voluntary funds are one way for states to exert soft power or informal governance over international organizations (IOs) and their subsidiaries. IOs are institutional actors like the United Nations whose membership is composed of at least three nation states. There are two main ways that IOs are funded by their members. The first type of IO funding scheme is a restricted voluntary system of funding. In this instance, state donors contribute funds earmarked for specific uses to the IO. This allows members of an IO not only to determine the size of their monetary contribution to the organization, but also to earmark how their donations are used. In other words, it creates a system of governance in which nations assign their funds to projects of their choosing. To illustrate the popularity of this mechanism, approximately 80% of the World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) voluntary funds are restricted for specific uses by their donors, as are 100% of the


159. See Schulz, supra note 158.


162. See Graham, supra note 160, at 173-74.

163. See id.

164. See id. at 174.
voluntary contributions donated to the United Nations Economic Social Council (“UNESCO”). Thus, donors have the power to shape the agendas of IOs through their contributions.

Restricted voluntary funding schemes stand in contrast to unrestricted voluntary funding methods. In the latter scenario, donors do not earmark their monetary donations, providing the IO with more freedom to implement its various goals. In the context of preventing and addressing wartime sexual violence, the use of a restricted voluntary funding scheme for donations to IOs is preferable to one that uses unrestricted voluntary funding, to ensure that this issue is the priority of IOs.

The restricted voluntary funding scheme also has two distinct advantages over the use of Security Council Resolutions. First, countries that wish to bypass the aforementioned political holdups of Security Council Resolutions may instead publicly earmark their donor funds to U.N. offices. This can signal the attention of the country in question to conflict-related sexual violence and encourage other Member States to do the same in turn.

One existing office to which nations may direct their funds is the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (“SRSG-SVC”). The role of the SRSG-SVC is to provide coherent and strategic leadership; to work effectively with existing U.N. coordination mechanisms; and to engage in advocacy efforts with governments, parties to armed conflict, and civil society. Another potential target of Member States’ voluntary funding contribution is Women’s Protection Advisers (“WPAs”), which takes on the role of advising during peacekeeping and special political missions in the midst of conflict-related sexual violence. By directing restricted voluntary funds to these offices, U.N. Member States could send a stronger message than any non-binding Security Council Resolution brought forth by divided members and lacking an implementation plan ever could. Instead of issuing resolutions “calling upon” other countries to help the cause, states can and should lead by example. This message would become even more powerful should states band together in donative coalitions for this common cause.

165. See id. at 173.
166. Id. at 173.
168. See id.
169. See id.
Second, adequate and consistent funding from the U.N. into offices such as the SRSG-SVC will help states fulfill the due diligence aspect of their positive obligations. These include educating employees of the judicial system and ensuring credible, thorough criminal investigations when crimes do occur. This will work to deter and ultimately prevent future violations.

Critics have argued that restricted voluntary funding is problematic because it distorts IO program priorities and moves IO programming decisions outside the organization itself to individual donors. In the WHO example, critics contend that restricted voluntary funds are more often “aimed at diseases that capture the public’s attention, like HIV/AIDS,” rather than aligned with the true distribution of diseases worldwide. But without voluntary funding to organizations such as the SRSG-SVC, there is a risk that victims and survivors in conflict-ridden areas risk being deprived of sorely needed aid. Even if one accepts the premise of the argument in the context of the WHO, the circumstances surrounding wartime sexual violence are very different. Restricted voluntary funding must be considered against the backdrop of Security Council Resolutions which have done little to quell wartime sexual violence; in this context, arguments about the model management of IO funds verge on idealism.

A final point in support of restricted voluntary funding over Security Council Resolutions comes from behaviors that may accompany U.N. Member States’ donations. Donations to IOs such as the SRSG-SVC from powerful actors coupled with naming and shaming to prod other donors to do the same has the potential to create a ripple effect of positive outcomes. In keeping with the analogy of pollution prevention, consider what has been coined as the “Greta Thunberg Effect.” Thunberg is a seventeen-year-old Swedish environmental activist. Her

170. See MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-02 (2011).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 160, at 175, 186.
173. Id. at 189.
174. See generally Graham, supra note 160.
2019 speech at the U.N.’s Climate Action Summit castigating members for their inaction on climate change was the pinnacle of her widely broadcast efforts to name and shame world leaders on environmental failures. Thunberg’s campaign has had tangible effects. Teenagers across the world are committing themselves to climate activism at a higher rate and earlier age than previously recorded. Some consider Thunberg to be responsible for the incoming European Commission making the climate emergency its topmost priority. And perhaps most striking, there has been a fourfold increase in investments in carbon-reducing projects in developing countries since Thunberg rose to popularity. Voluntary funding can force these changes as it is a multifaceted method. Motivated U.N. Member States that use voluntary funding in conjunction with call-outs for other states to follow their example could prove extraordinarily effective in ending conflict-related sexual violence.

ii. Regular, Credible Monitoring and Threat of Enforcement

The final two factors that will aid in addressing wartime sexual violence are best analyzed together as they are often interrelated. They are, first, regular and credible monitoring, and second, the threat of en-


178. Chiu, supra note 175.

179. Ian Wishart & Ewa Krukowska, Europe’s $13 Trillion Climate Plan Might Be About to Get Serious, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-01/europe-s-13-trillion-climate-plan-might-be-about-to-get-serious [https://perma.cc/GD9S-3BEM]. Note that there is a rich debate surrounding which individuals get international media recognition for their activism. BIPOC individuals’ efforts are frequently excluded from the dominant narrative and a movement has emerged (spearheaded by young activists such as Vanessa Nakate) to recognize and support diversity in environmental activism. See Kenya Evelyn, ‘Like I Wasn’t There’: Climate Activist Vanessa Nakate on Being Erased from a Movement, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/29/vanessa-nakate-interview-climate-activism-cropped-photo-davos [https://perma.cc/GD9S-3BEM].

forcement. In the Chittock study, the most effective pollution prevention programs were those with successful monitoring practices.181 These included enhanced public and private monitoring networks, senior management commitment, and transparency through public reporting.182 The most successful prevention programs also made use of strong enforcement measures.183

U.N. members should make use of monitoring systems already in place184 and leverage them for this cause. Consider the example of female genital mutilation (FGM) of young girls, a practice in thirty countries around the world.185 The United Nations Population Fund (“UNFPA”) along with the United Nations Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”) have had great success in accelerating the elimination of the practice, providing more than 3.2 million women in seventeen countries with FGM protection and services.186 They achieved this progress primarily through the provision of care and protection services, local political backing, and community-led engagement efforts that act as monitoring systems to deter and prevent FGM in their respective countries.187

The provision of care and protection services is also important within the context of wartime sexual violence. Ensuring that victims of wartime sexual violence have access to abortion and other sexual health services is a requirement under international law.188 It is also a painfully practical necessity, as survivors forced to carry a child conceived during wartime sexual violence may be ostracized by their community, subject to spousal abandonment and violence, and even killed for the perceived dishonoring of their family.189 All these effects are felt on top of the mental and physical agony of the violence itself.190 The provision of

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181. Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 545-46.
182. Id. at 545.
183. Id.
184. See discussion supra Section III.B (detailing the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict initiative).
185. Although FGM is practiced in thirty countries around the world, note that four countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan) account for approximately 42% of all cases. 6 Facts About Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), WORLD VISION (2019), https://www.worldvision.org/child-protection-news-stories/female-genital-mutilation-fgm-facts [https://perma.cc/6NKS-UDDQ].
187. Id.
188. GLOB. JUST. CTR., supra note 32, at 1-2.
189. Id. at 5.
190. Id.
sexual health services and abortion for survivors of wartime sexual violence may allow women to escape the piling on of more lasting psychological, economic, and physical burdens.\footnote{191}

To be truly effective, any strategy to combat sexual violence as a weapon of war must begin before conflict arises.\footnote{192} For example, studies have shown that a link exists between regions that have high levels of domestic violence during peacetime and the incidents of sexual violence that take place during armed conflict.\footnote{193} Within the pollution context, prevention programs were more successful when there were high levels of commitment by local government;\footnote{194} similarly, to prevent sexual violence during wartime, there must be high levels of commitment by local authorities during times of peace to credibly crack down on instances of violence against women.\footnote{195} Ensuring the development of successful monitoring systems during times of peace addresses the causes of the issue instead of merely quashing the symptoms. Arguably, by the time a U.N. resolution is deemed necessary to address sexual violence as a weapon of war, it is already too late. Monitoring may therefore prove far more effective at combating the use of this violence.

In addition to preventative measures such as those described above, the threat of credible enforcement to intervene in and punish wartime sexual violence must also exist. This should come through additional funding and training for U.N. peacekeepers. U.N. peacekeeping missions can be remarkably effective. As of July 2020, there are over 100,000 active peacekeepers taking part in thirteen missions around the world.\footnote{196} It is a truly global effort, in that more than 120 countries contribute personnel to the peacekeeping forces.\footnote{197} The forces contribute to a variety of efforts, from supporting local regional police on the ground in efforts to end violence; to deterring extrajudicial violence and kidnappings in areas of conflict; to strengthening security, the rule of law,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{191. \textit{Id.}}
\footnote{194. Chittock & Hughey, \textit{ supra} note 131, at 546.}
\footnote{195. Nadj, \textit{ supra} note 193.}
\footnote{197. \textit{Id.}}
\end{footnotes}
and human rights.\textsuperscript{198} Peacekeeping is also cost-efficient. The U.N. peacekeeping budget is less than half of 1\% of the amount spent on militaries globally, yet more than eight times as effective as compared to when the United States acts in similar missions by itself.\textsuperscript{199}

Still, two main problems persist with U.N. peacekeeping missions: inadequate funding and a harmful culture. Each is difficult to separate from the other. Because U.N. peacekeeping missions are far from perfect as they currently exist, solutions are needed before they can play an effective role in enforcement actions. A mere six years ago, a U.N. declaration named sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers as, “the most significant risk to U.N. peacekeeping missions.”\textsuperscript{200} Some scholars suggest that despite operational directives to prevent this abuse—curfews, non-fraternization policies, uniform requirements, and off-limit locations—success has been limited and sexual abuse by peacekeepers has merely been “pushed underground.”\textsuperscript{201} Commentators opine that training for peacekeeping operations currently functions as an administrative rubber stamp rather than a meaningful program that instills peacekeepers with shared values, knowledge, and practical know-how.\textsuperscript{202} The training program is bereft of opportunities to think critically, and procedural compliance is considered to be of greater value than reckoning with problematic social structures that prop up cultures of sexual violence.\textsuperscript{203}

This is a staggering failure in the U.N. peacekeeping culture. Worse, initiatives to correct failures in peacekeeping operations tend to be reactive and largely concerned with the risk to the U.N.’s image, instead of addressing the root of the issue. As Professors Jasmine-Kim Westendorf and Louise Searle note:


\textsuperscript{202} Id. at 383.

\textsuperscript{203} Id.
Despite powerful statements about the ‘cancer’ of [sexual abuse and exploitation during peacekeeping operations] and the U.N.’s commitment to addressing it, the advancement of [sexual abuse and exploitation] policy has been largely reactive, occurring in surges prompted by public outcry at incidents reported in international media . . . Paradoxical though it may seem, [the U.N.] seems concerned with both protecting its image and developing robust [sexual abuse and exploitation] framework; but the former creates incentives to downplay difficulties in the latter . . . thereby impairing the chances of arriving at robust assessments of [sexual abuse and exploitation] allegations and policy which might lead to improved approaches.

This analysis reveals several areas that must be improved for peacekeeping forces to reach their full potential in eliminating wartime sexual violence and to prevent peacekeeping forces from committing the same crimes that they are deployed to prevent.

First, nations must retreat from lofty pronouncements on global statements of principle, such as U.N. resolutions, and use voluntary funding sources to promote transparency and true change within peacekeeping operations through proactive rather than reactive measures. Second, as in the pollution context, commitment by “senior management” and public reporting is key. Funds must be devoted to the creation of a system whereby superiors in charge of peacekeeping operations are incentivized to report instances of sexual exploitation by personnel within their ranks with the knowledge that material punishments of

204. Id. at 382. Westendorf and Searle continue:

One key weakness is that policy has been developed at the international level in response to major media events with little input from the field about challenges already faced in implementing SEA policies . . . This individualized understanding of SEA masks the diverse range of factors that create circumstances in which individuals choose to exploit or abuse, and obscures the practical challenges that middle- to high-ranking officials pose when they refuse to deal with allegations or are simply too occupied with ‘hard security’ issues to take ‘gender issues’ seriously. Further, a compliance-based approach assumes that robust accountability mechanisms will deter breaches of rules—a logic for which there is little evidence in relation to CRSV, and which is further undermined by the low rates of criminal charges or material punishments for perpetrators of SEA.

205. Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 545.
perpetrators will be issued and enforced.\textsuperscript{206} This will almost certainly require individualized training to recognize and punish any sexual violence that occurs.\textsuperscript{207} At present, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations is woefully underfunded for this task.\textsuperscript{208}

There is no lack of ideas to solve sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers; rather, the problem lies in the capacity, expertise, and money to implement those ideas.\textsuperscript{209} States with an interest in funding effective programs to prevent sexual violence during times of conflict should view peacekeeping as an integral part of the solution.\textsuperscript{210} Solving the liquidity crisis that the U.N. peacekeeping forces currently face and earmarking funds for robust training practices for the troops will work to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers. Further, this will serve to reinforce the threat of credible enforcement against would-be perpetrators of sexual violence during times of conflict.

Conclusion

U.N. resolutions are frequently used as well-intentioned efforts to draw international attention to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. However, they are not only ineffective, but can be damaging to the status of and discourse surrounding women’s rights. Each resolution is a gamble: Recent history has shown that disagreements during negotiations and the threat of a veto by a Permanent Five member are likely to derail any meaningful form of progress.

More useful and effective U.N. mechanisms exist and should be used in place of Security Council Resolutions. Solutions may be found by looking to the successes of voluntary pollution prevention programs:

\textsuperscript{206} Westendorf & Searle, supra note 201, at 383.
\textsuperscript{207} Id.
\textsuperscript{208} Id. Westendorf & Searle elaborate:

The problem facing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the volume of personnel required to undertake mandatory training: latest statistics show 117,306 military and civilian personnel from at least 125 countries serving in 16 [peace keeping operations]. The vast number of personnel poses the risk that training becomes more an administrative requirement than a tool for effective prevention.

\textsuperscript{209} Id.
\textsuperscript{210} Peacekeeping has the potential to be an effective force in reducing sexual violence. See Karin Johansson & Lisa Hultman, U.N. Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual Violence, 63 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1656, 1678 (2019).
Consistent funding by way of voluntary restricted funding; regular, credible monitoring; and the credible threat of enforcement by U.N. peacekeeping operations may turn the tide on the prevention of sexual violence during wartime. U.N. members should not eschew collaboration on these commitments, but should also exercise independence in pushing toward these goals. This should be the case even if the countries in question are not fully supported by the most powerful states within the U.N.

Although discourse surrounding the prevention of wartime sexual violence has arguably moved past its history of being sidelined as a “feminist research agenda,” there is still a lack of accountability and rigor surrounding estimates of sexual violence during conflict.211 This means that a large amount of wartime sexual violence still remains unreported,212 notwithstanding the extraordinarily grim numbers of which we are aware.213 When unanimous agreement is unreachable yet urgently needed, as in Security Council Resolutions, states must make use of institutional mechanisms that currently exist within the U.N. that do not require compromise or concessions. This may come through the provision of voluntary funds to U.N. offices such as the SRSG-SVC and WPA, coupled with naming and shaming of other states who refuse to do the same; through support for U.N. funds that aim to eliminate violence against women during times of peace; and through voluntary funding for the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Sexual violence during times of conflict is sure to emerge time and again in new and ongoing conflicts if new strategies are not explored. It is incumbent upon Member States to assume responsibility for these preventable tragedies. The realistic methods outlined within this Note should be the first steps toward a workable and collaborative effort to end wartime sexual violence. $\$$

211. Palermo & Peterman, supra note 45.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20, at 10-30.