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Ability to Pay

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The landmark Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 transforms the landscape of consumer credit in the United States.¹ Many of the changes have been high-profile and accordingly attracted considerable media and scholarly attention, most notably the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.² Even specific consumer reforms, such as a so-called “plain vanilla” proposal, drew hot debate and lobbying firepower.³ But when the dust settled, one

¹ Thanks to colleagues at Berkeley conference and to Michael Barr, Adam Levitin, Katie Porter, and Adam Pritchard for reviewing drafts, as well as Carol Yur for research assistance.


profoundly transformative innovation that did not garner the same outrage as plain vanilla and CFPA did get into the law: imposing upon lenders a duty to assure borrowers’ ability to repay.⁴ Ensuring a borrower’s ability to repay is not an entirely unprecedented legal concept, to be sure,⁵ but its wholesale embrace by Dodd-Frank represents a sea change in U.S. consumer credit market regulation. This article does three things regarding this new duty to assess a consumer’s ability to pay mortgage loans. First, it tracks the multifaceted pedigree of this requirement, looking at fledgling strands in U.S. consumer law as well as other areas such as securities law; it compares too its more robust embrace in foreign systems. Second, it offers conjecture regarding just how this broadly stated principle might be put into practice by the federal regulators. Finally, it provides a brief normative comment, siding with the supporters of this new obligation on lenders.

I. Description: What Is It and Where Did It Come From?

A. Ability to Pay: The Statutory Requirements

As enacted, Dodd-Frank section 1411(b) amends TILA chapter 2 (15 USC 1631 et seq.) by inserting a new section 129C. Title XIV of Dodd-Frank is subtitled the “Mortgage Reform and Anti-predatory Lending Act,” and section 1411 provides the following new obligation on all mortgage lenders (originators and brokers):

MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS.

(a) Ability to Repay.

(1) In general.—In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board, no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments.⁶

In fleshing out the discharge of this duty, Dodd-Frank continues:

(3) Basis for determination.—A determination under this subsection of a consumer’s ability to repay a residential mortgage loan shall include consideration of the consumer’s credit history, current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or

⁴ Dodd-Frank at § 1411, 124 Stat. 2142.
⁵ See infra the discussion of U.S. precedents and analogues.
⁶ Id.
the residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources other than the consumer’s equity in the dwelling . . . . A creditor shall determine the ability of the consumer to repay using a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the term of the loan.7

Similar requirements of assuming repayment ability are found in the cognate-spirited Credit CARD Act, with near-identical terminology.8 (CARD preceded Dodd-Frank in passage, but its content is part of omnibus reform of the financial markets.)

B. Past as Prologue: Pre-Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulations

Those versed in contract law doubtless appreciate the departure from the spirit of caveat emptor that these revisions impose. Contract Law 101 insists that you are not your brother’s keeper,9 and this is especially so with lenders. “[A]bsent special circumstances, a loan does not establish a fiduciary relationship between a commercial bank and its debtor.”10 Caselaw repeatedly affirms that lenders need only look out for themselves and has consistently rejected attempts to inject a duty to analyze the borrower’s ability to pay.11 “[T]he lender has

7 Id., at 2143.
8 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 109, 124 Stat. 1743 (2009) (“A card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer under an open end consumer credit plan, or increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card issuer considers the ability of the consumer to make the required payments under the terms of such account.”).
9 See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817):

The maxim of caveat emptor could never have crept into the law, if the province of ethics had been co-extensive with it. There was, in the present case, no circumvention or manoeuvre practised by the vendee, unless rising earlier in the morning, and obtaining by superior diligence and alertness that intelligence by which the price of commodities was regulated, be such. It is a romantic equality that is contended for on the other side. Parties never can be precisely equal in knowledge, either of facts or of the inferences from such facts, and both must concur in order to satisfy the rule contended for. The absence of all authority in England and the United States, both great commercial countries, speaks volumes against the reasonableness and practicability of such a rule.

no judicially imposed duty to ensure ability to repay the loan . . . ”12 In fact, “lenders do not even owe borrowers a duty of care to avoid negligence in the lending process . . . ”13 One bank lawyer confidently asserted that “Strong public policies support a solvent financial system and low barriers to home ownership and these policies militate against exposing mortgage lenders to fiduciary duties and litigation risks.”14

No more under Dodd-Frank. This is a huge change to commercial law. Yet the seeds of change were cross-metaphorically percolating well before 2010. Consider the recent history of residential mortgage regulation.15 Prior to 1982, there were good, old-fashioned rules (not standards) imposed by statute on mortgage originators, such as, for example, the hard cap of a 90% loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for improved real estate loans issued by national banks and maximum thirty-year full amortization terms for residential mortgages.16 Then the headiness of 1980s deregulation brought such developments as the Garn-St. Germain Act17 (and the related Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act),18 which boldly dispatched such backward-thinking, heavy-government suffocation of consumer credit. Recall that the Community Reinvestment Act was passed in 1977,19 and so such deregulatory moves were not


13 Id.; see, e.g., Nymark v. Heart Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1093 n. 1 (1991) (“The relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-client is not fiduciary in nature. A commercial lender is entitled to pursue its own economic interests in a loan transaction. This right is inconsistent with the obligations of a fiduciary which require that the fiduciary knowingly agree to subordinate its interests to act on behalf of and for the benefit of another.”); Tenenbaum v. Gibbs, 813 N.Y.S.2d 155, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“Plaintiffs have no distinct cause of action to recover damages for negligence because, as a mortgagee bank, Eastern Bank did not owe any duty of care to ascertain the validity of the documentation presented by the individual who falsely claimed to have authority to act on behalf of the borrower corporation.”).

14 Hirsch, supra note 12, at 11-12 (citation omitted).

15 Mortgage regulation has a complex and institution-specific history in this country, dating back well before the 1970s. This historical analysis is restricted to the 1980s and beyond to underscore the significance of the 1982 changes.


only consonant with the spirit of the 1980s but could be couched in the credit-opening rhetoric of bringing homeownership to historically underserved communities under the civil-rights era policies of the CRA. 20 With traditional mortgage lenders liberated from their “stodgy” underwriting standards, housing would come to everyone at last! 21

Post Garn-St. Germain, regulators basked in their newfound freedom. One could have predicted history unfolding two ways at this inflection point: (1) regulators might have taken over to “fill the void” after the rollback and promulgate an all-encompassing swath of regulation to discipline (or, depending on one’s priors, suffocate) the mortgage market in the post-LTV cap environment, or (2) regulators might have “gotten the message” and taken a hand-off, light-touch approach, loath to impose regulations that could be seen as mere retreads of the now-unfashionable LTV limits. Regulators got the message. The OCC, for example, considered using its rulemaking power over national banks to craft new underwriting restrictions on mortgages (along the lines of, e.g., a new LTV cap), but politely declined: “Decisions concerning the forms and terms of national bank lending are properly the responsibility of each bank’s directorate and management.” 22 One by one, regulations were systematically eliminated over origination standards for real estate loans. 23 The last to fall – proscriptions on loans with an LTV ratio greater than 100% and those with longer than forty-

20 This linking of the CRA with relaxed underwriting standards is a common bank lobbying move. See infra note 21. Of course, an even more cynical account would be one of trying to save the thrifts during a high-inflation period by facilitating “product innovation,” such as adjustable rate mortgages. In retrospect, encouraging thrift risk-taking may not been such a great idea. See FDIC, The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/.

21 I use “stodgy” particularly here because it was the characterization used by the ABA’s Vice-President and Senior Counsel for Regulatory Compliance at a lively recent speech. See Feddis, supra note 3. Her gist was that the banks were faulted for being too “stodgy” in underwriting mortgages in the 1970s, but are now being mulcted in being too carefree. Moreover, as she pointed out, one man’s “suitability” could be another’s “discrimination,” if more rigorous underwriting standards effect a disparate minority impact. (See also Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 144 (Feb. 7, 2007) (statement of Douglas Duncan, Senior Vice-President, Mortgage Bankers Association) (“[T]he consequences of a suitability requirement for mortgage lenders is that overly cautious lenders may violate the letter of federal anti-discrimination laws and the spirit of community reinvestment laws.”).) Thus the pejorative use of “stodgy” seems intended to downplay the benefits from further stringency in underwriting standards (imposed by government regulation). Fair enough, from a lobbyist’s perspective, I suppose, but I will offer my own characterization of compelled increased underwriting stringency as “prudential, crisis-averting cost internalization” just to see if it has a better ring.


year amortization terms – were finally repealed in 1996.\textsuperscript{24} In less than two decades, mortgage lenders had gone from facing hard LTV caps to facing discipline by the market alone, with all its attendant foibles.\textsuperscript{25}

There was some attempted backlash. In 1991, Congress jumped in and required regulators to adopt uniform standards for real estate lending in the FDIC Improvement Act.\textsuperscript{26} This finally prompted the OCC to issue its “Real Estate Lending Standards.”\textsuperscript{27} But again, a light-touch approach prevailed; the OCC eschewed rules in favor of “guidelines” that included general admonitions toward “prudential underwriting standards.”\textsuperscript{28} OTS followed suit.\textsuperscript{29} Even with these interventions, however, the policy impetus was with “safety and soundness” – the underlying mandate for depository institution regulation – not with any duty to the borrower as the beneficiary of some form of protective relationship.\textsuperscript{30} Thus even when goaded by Congress into action, the agencies remained deep in the thrall of free-market laissez faire that was the legacy of Garn-St. Germain. How strong was their resistance-to-regulate urge (and how ill-conceived in 20/20 hindsight)? Consider the aforementioned \textit{Real Estate Lending Standards}. They specifically excluded – as of course unrelated to the safety and soundness of the underlying depository institution – all loans that were “sold promptly after origination.”\textsuperscript{31} (After all, what greater assurance to the safety and soundness of a bank than getting a loan off

\textsuperscript{24} See id. at 12.

\textsuperscript{25} The paradigmatic “20% downpayment” was thus the result of government regulation, not a social thrift ethic.

\textsuperscript{26} Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 304, 105 Stat. 2354 (1991). In the notice of final rulemaking for the uniform standards, the federal banking agencies rationalized:

The legislative history of section 304 indicates that Congress wanted to curtail abusive real estate lending practices in order to reduce risk to the deposit insurance funds and enhance the safety and soundness of insured depository institutions. Congress considered placing explicit real estate lending restrictions in the form of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio limitations directly into the statute. Earlier versions of the legislation included specific LTV limits. Ultimately, however, Section 304 was enacted without LTV limits, or any other specific lending standards. Instead, Congress mandated that the federal banking agencies adopt uniform regulations establishing real estate lending standards without specifying what these standards should entail.


\textsuperscript{27} Supra note 26 at 62,890.

\textsuperscript{28} Id. at 62,889.


\textsuperscript{31} Supra note 26 at 62,896, 62,900.
its books through prompt securitization? Who cares about those loans – what possible impact could they have?)

Concomitant to this robust resurgence in *caveat emptor* starting in the 1980s was a rise in abusive mortgage practices. This run-up in unscrupulous lending culminated in yet another congressional intervention: the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994. HOEPA allows the Fed to regulate high-cost (i.e., subprime) mortgage loans. Thus its regulatory panoply chiefly descends only upon loans that trip a high-cost trigger. For example, HOEPA applies to refinancing loans (not purchase-money loans) only when the rate exceeds 10% above the like-duration U.S. treasuries rate. HOEPA is of particular interest to examining Dodd-Frank’s ability to pay mandate because one of the duties HOEPA imposes upon lenders whose loans trigger its scrutiny is analysis of an “ability to repay” – but only, as interpreted, for lenders who are shown to have engaged in a “pattern or practice” of asset-based lending, i.e., originating loans based on (at best) collateral appraisals alone or (at worst) the incentive to generate fees.

HOEPA thus had some kick, but it was of limited effect. The Fed was only given jurisdiction over lenders whose products triggered the high-cost loan threshold; the OCC and OTS continued to oversee their own depository institutions. Each did pass its own set of regulations in 1996, but the regulatory thrust was perhaps not as expected. For example, OCC’s big regulatory move was to confirm the permissibility of ARMs – and announce federal pre-emption of that decision over contrary ARM-banning state laws.

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32 Compare Dodd-Frank at § 1413(k)(1) (augmenting assignee liability), 124 Stat. 2141.
36 The scope of HOEPA was tinkered with over the years, but the big change came in 2008, contemporaneous with the negotiation of Dodd-Frank, in which the Fed extended HOEPA’s reach to all mortgage originators under a new national legal standard. See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,526 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
examiners that guidance documents should not be confused with regulations.”38 Thus while
there were some regulatory stirrings, doubtless prompted in part by HOEPA, no meaningful
change to mortgage underwriting – or mortgage regulation – occurred during the 1990s.

By the turn of the millennium, however, the federal regulators took more active
notice.39 In June 2000, the Treasury Department/HUD issued a joint report on “Curbing
Predatory Home Mortgage Lending,” documenting the inadequate and gap-filled coverage of
TILA, HOEPA, and RESPA as statutory interventions for abusive mortgage lending.40 The joint
report recommended reforms, including, quite specifically, relaxing/repealing the restriction on
HOEPA’s asset-based lending ban to only “pattern or practice” lenders (in other words,
expanding the imposition of a duty to analyze borrower’s ability to repay).41 Furthermore, the
OCC and OTS finally joined the Fed and the National Credit Union Administration to promulgate
a set of “Interagency Guidelines on Subprime Lending.”42 (One suspects the pressure applied
by state regulators who led the charge, such as North Carolina, had made continued under-
activity at the federal level implausible.)43 In these new Subprime Lending Guidelines, the

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38 Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 1,162, 1,163-64 (Jan. 17, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 545, 556,
545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590 (final rule).

39 So did Congress. See, e.g., Predatory Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong., (July 26, 2001); Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and

http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf. Many of the recommendations of this report, if followed,
may have mitigated or averted the housing market crisis.

41 Id. at 77-78. The Joint Report had numerous other recommendations, including working within the HOEPA
framework by changing its trigger threshold. See id. at 86-88.

guidance). Note these guidelines were passed on an effective interim basis; the final version of the guidelines did
(Dec. 29, 2005) (proposed guidance). There were also earlier guidances touching on the issue, such as, e.g.,
loans would be viewed by supervising regulators as “imprudent.”

43 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 24-1.1F(c)(1) (requiring ability to pay analysis of so-called “rate spread” loans). North
Carolina also was an earlier mover on anti-flipping laws. See id. at 24-10.2(c) (1999) (“No lender may knowingly or
intentionally engage in the unfair act or practice of ‘flipping’ a consumer home loan. ‘Flipping’ a consumer loan is
the making of a consumer home loan to a borrower which refines an existing consumer home loan when the
new loan does not have reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower considering all of the circumstances,
including the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the borrower’s
circumstances. This provision shall apply regardless of whether the interest rate, points, fees, and charges paid or
payable by the borrower in connection with the refinancing exceed those thresholds specified in G.S. 24-
1.1E(a)(6).”); see also Georgia Fair Lending Act, H.B. 1361 (2002) (prohibiting flipping within five years a new home
regulators begrudgingly admitted that much mortgage lending in the subprime market was abusive – although they still insisted it was a problem only to the extent it imperiled the safety and soundness of regulated depository institutions. 44

Significantly, roughly contemporaneous with the drafting of the Subprime Lending Guidelines, the OCC and OTS in 2003 for the first time embraced imposing a duty on lenders – at least in the subprime market – to analyze borrower’s “ability to repay” mortgages. 45 The OCC’s “Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices” 46 and “Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices in Borrowed and Purchased Loans,” 47 both cautioned banks against – but did not prohibit them from – issuing or buying mortgages made without analyzing the borrower’s ability to pay. A year later, these cautions ripened into regulations that explicitly prohibited mortgages issued without the lender considering the borrower’s ability to pay. 48

The scope of these anti-predatory mortgage rules, however, was limited, only applying to depository institutions and their subsidiaries (but not, bafflingly, to their mortgage-

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44 Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,250 (Dec. 29, 2005) (proposed guidance) (“O]ur concern is elevated with nontraditional products due to the lack of principal amortization and potential accumulation of negative amortization. The Agencies are also concerned that these products and practices are being offered to a wider spectrum of borrowers, including some who may not otherwise qualify for traditional fixed-rate or other adjustable-rate mortgage loans, and who may not fully understand the associated risks.”).

45 The FTC also determined subprime loans made knowing debtors cannot repay are unfair and deceptive. See Ronald G. Isaac, Assistant to the Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, before the California State Assembly Committee on Banking and Finance on Predatory Lending Practices in the Home-Equity Lending Market (Feb. 21, 2001) (prepared statement available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v010002.shtm) (cataloguing enforcement efforts over several years that included a settlement with national subprime lender engaged in asset-based lending).


originating affiliates—although they too eventually came under their reach). Moreover, they were promulgated in conjunction with a pre-emption decision of state predatory lending laws, some of which were quite expansive in their protection of mortgage borrowers, and so the net regulatory effect was unclear (i.e., the trade-off between widening the scope of federal protection but voiding state protections was uncertain). Certainly the relaxation in credit by macroeconomic policy following the early 2000s tech-bubble correction provided counter-pressure to attempts to rein in mortgage credit. Thus while the mid-2000s saw the first emergence of an “ability to pay” duty imposed on mortgage lenders through regulation, it seems to have been a half-hearted effort of considerable foot-dragging. For example, the decision to omit the clearly mortgage-dominated “affiliates” of banks and thrifts until 2006 from subprime mortgage lending regulations is difficult to explain away as regulatory caution; the more likely narrative of a reluctant regulator has been noted even by the popular press. (Anyone skeptical of a cynical account of regulatory capture by these federal mortgage overseers should consider that Countrywide’s decision to relinquish its bank charter so it could relocate its regulatory oversight to the OTS from the OCC was quite candidly explained as driven by the OTS’s wisdom to interpret the Subprime Lending Guidelines with more “restraint.”)

Finally, in the grand tradition of belated government regulatory action to crisis, only in 2008 after the housing collapse was well afoot did the Fed amend TILA’s Regulation Z to ban high-cost HOEPA-esque loans (defined as ones with rates over prime plus 1.5% for first liens) made without the lender analyzing the borrower’s ability to pay and verifying income and assets. The 2008 Regulation Z amendment was significant because, even though limited to high-cost mortgages that tripped its HOEPA-like trigger, it was not restricted to specific covered entities (such as depository institutions or their affiliates). All mortgage lenders fell under its scope. (Since the amendments did not come into force until October 1, 2009, however, they of course had no appreciable impact on the housing market collapse.)

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50 Id. at 1908-11.
51 See, e.g., DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 101 (“Enforcement actions have, however, rarely been brought [by federal banking regulators] for originating or purchasing loans without regard to ability to repay.”).
53 Barbara A. Rehm, Countrywide to Drop Bank Charter in Favor of OTS, AM. BANKER, November 10, 2006, at 1.
55 In fact, some amendments applied not just to all mortgage lenders but all residential mortgages (not just high-cost ones), such as, e.g., the proscription against coercing real estate appraisers to inflate valuations). See Truth in Lending, supra note 36, at 44,522-23.
56 Opponents to Dodd-Frank predictably claimed that the Regulation Z amendments should be allowed time to
Understandably, Dodd-Frank’s 2010 injunction on all mortgage originators – of all mortgages – to consider a borrower’s ability to repay the loan was a watershed. Not only did it cut through the crazy-quilt of OCC, OTS, the Fed, and others by casting a uniform statutory duty on all mortgage lenders, it applied for the first time to all mortgage loans – having seen the contagion from the subprime market to the Alt-A market and beyond – a duty irrespective of

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57 States appeared ahead of this regulatory curve. Minnesota, for example, passed a statute requiring analysis of ability to pay (and verification of income) of all loans. See 2007 Minn. Sess. Laws Ch. 18, §58.13(1)(a)(23).
of a complex (not to mention easily evaded) jurisdictional trigger. “Ability to pay” had been adopted whole hog.

C. Suitability? Analogues Outside the Mortgage Regulation World

Reviewing the fitful development of the ability to pay duty might suggest that it was a foreign concept to American law. That is not true. The requirement to gauge a borrower’s ability to pay is in fact similarly spirited to “suitability” requirements found in securities regulation (and other areas). Broker-dealers, even when not full-fledged fiduciary investment

58 Note the jurisdictional trigger survives today embedded within Dodd-Frank’s definition of “qualified mortgages.” See Dodd-Frank at 2145-50, discussed in Part II, infra. HEOPA has had a tumultuous enforcement history. For example, in 2001, the Fed amended TILA to address consumer advocates’ complaints that creditors were structuring high-cost loans as open-ended home equity lines expressly to evade HOEPA requirements. See Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,614-15 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (“[Section] 226.34(b) explicitly prohibits structuring a mortgage loan as an open-end credit line to evade HOEPA’s requirements, if the loan does not meet the TILA definition of open-end credit . . . . Where a loan is documented as open-end credit but the features and terms or other circumstances demonstrate that it does not meet the definition of open-end credit, the loan is subject to the rules for closed-end credit, including HOEPA if the rate or fee trigger is met”). Still, the charge that HOEPA’s triggers were too easily evaded remained:

Unfortunately, at the same time, HOEPA has had little success in eliminating those abusive practices it identifies. As consumer advocates have been arguing for years, HOEPA’s points and fees triggers are simply too high. As a result, very few subprime loans – less than one percent in 1999 – fall within HOEPA’s points and fees trigger and are subject to regulation. Predatory lenders have successfully managed to conduct the bulk of their abusive activities using rates just below the HOEPA triggers but still high enough to provide enormous room for exploitation and profitability.

Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case For States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 355-56 (2005); see also Christopher Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 59 (2005) (bemoaning that HOEPA failed to prevent “most abusive costs associated with predatory mortgages” and offering example that “mortgage lenders commonly exclude yield spread premiums from calculation of the HOEPA points and fees trigger”).

59 The all-encompassing reach of Dodd-Frank renders the continued relevance of HOEPA’s triggers unclear. That is, if only high-cost loans fall under HOEPA’s purview, but all loans are now subject to the Dodd-Frank ability to pay duty, then at least that aspect of HOEPA is redundant. Bizarrely, Dodd-Frank itself amended parts of HOEPA’s (seemingly redundant) high-cost loan definitional triggers. At a recent conference on consumer enforcement under Dodd-Frank, I asked a regulator about this (off-record) and was met with the worldly response that yes, Dodd-Frank did reveal some legislative inelegance and redundancy.

60 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 requires insurance products to be “suitable and appropriate for the consumer.”) Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999), Subtitle C, 113 Stat. 1422-24. The act requires a majority of states to enact reciprocal laws or uniform laws governing the licensure of individuals and entities authorized to sell and solicit insurance no later than three years after the act was enacted. States satisfy the uniformity requirement when they “establish uniform criteria to ensure that an insurance product . . . sold to a
advisers, owe their clients a duty to recommend only “suitable” investments, mindful of the client’s particular circumstances.\

This suitability burden has a long pedigree, tracing back to the 1930s. The Maloney Act of 1938 charged the SEC to register self-regulating securities agencies, such as the NASD, in order “to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.”\(^\text{62}\) NASD Rule 2310, passed in 1939, in turn imposes a duty regarding non-institutional clients to obtain information on the customer’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and “such other information used or considered to be reasonable by a [broker-dealer] in making recommendations to a customer.”\(^\text{63}\) (Thus were born the check-boxes we enjoy when opening a brokerage account.) Other kindred entities followed suit; the NYSE’s Rule 405, while not explicitly cast as a suitability rule, is referred to as the “Know Thy Customer Rule,” and has been interpreted to require a suitability analysis.\(^\text{64}\)

The SEC itself has not explicitly passed a suitability rule, although its practices have been to read one into its general anti-fraud proscription and its broad injunction of “fair dealing.”\(^\text{65}\)

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\(^{61}\) See Hirsch, supra note 12, at 21-24 (“Suitability is a concept recognized in the securities law that imposes a duty on a securities broker to sell only securities to a buyer that are ‘suitable’ for the buyer based on the buyer’s financial wherewithal, tax status, investment objectives and other factors.”). The suitability obligation is only triggered when the securities broker-dealer recommends a specific purchase; the obligation is not present when the broker is given an order of self-directed trading. \textit{Id.}, at 26-27, 29. Some have argued, however, that the duty should expand to encompass brokers acting in any capacity given the implicit expectations of clients. \textit{See}, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, \textit{Brokers as Fiduciaries}, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 439 (2010).


\(^{63}\) NASD Conduct Rule 2310 (formerly Article III, Section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice).


Relatedly, the SEC has, with a few exceptions, eschewed direct ex ante regulation in favor of case-by-case adjudication that delineates this suitability standard incrementally. Moreover, the case-by-case adjudication of suitability does not even occur at the SEC; it actually occurs primarily through NASD self-discipline (i.e., FINRA arbitrations), albeit with occasional SEC direct enforcement against wayward broker-dealers. A private right of action for suitability is also implied under the securities law but has not been known to generate landmark awards.

Accordingly, although the SEC’s suitability standard has not been elaborated through regulation, it has developed over time with a rich interpretative history. Not only has that history shown the content of the standard but also its deep-seated paternalism. Consider, for example, that it has been determined to be no defense to a suitability violation to plead disclosure; unsuitable investment recommendations are categorically prohibited, regardless of what the broker tells the client. This paternalism reveals that while suitability is most

66 Those few exceptions included the SECO Rule for Non-NASD brokers that governed before mandatory registration was passed in 1983, which required “reasonable grounds to believe ... [a] recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3, as well as Rule 15c2-5 on margin trading, see id. at § 240.15c2-5. The SEC does have what might be considered “indirect” ex ante suitability regulations, such as the categorical exclusionary effects of the accredited investor rules of Regulation D, see id. at § 230.501, §§ 230.505-506, and more specifically Rule 15g-9’s restrictions on trading in penny stocks, see id. at § 240.15g-9, http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-51983.pdf, but for the most part has declined promulgating direct ex ante rules squarely on topic.

67 See Macey et al., infra note 43, at 839.


69 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, § 10(b) (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958); see also, e.g., SEC v. Ainsworth, No. EDCV 08-1350 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (SEC suit against group of securities brokers alleging they sold unsuitable securities to customers with little formal education, did not speak English fluently, and lacked funds necessary to purchase the securities recommended by defendants absent refinancing).

70 See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 817 (2009) (“SEC and federal courts have found broker-dealers personally liable for suitability violations under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, under which private rights of action are implied.”); cf. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a party has no private right of action against an exchange for violating its own rules); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that SRO suitability rules do not create a private right of action); Kathleene Engel and Patricia McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L.R. 1255, 1316, 1338-39 (2002) (describing how “low and uncertain damage awards” reduce the number of suitability cases and that punitive damage awards are capped at $11,000 under FHA limits).

71 See In re Stein, S.E.C. Release No. 47335, 79 SEC Docket 1777 (Feb. 11, 2003), 2003 WL 431870, at 2 (“Registered representative does not satisfy the suitability requirement simply by disclosing the risk of an investment that he or she has recommended.”).
avowedly not a fiduciary duty, it is, like a duty to analyze ability to repay, a strong abrogation of *caveat emptor*.

Given this lengthy history of usage in the securities arena, it is perhaps not surprising this quasi-fiduciary concept of suitability was on the minds of many leading up to the passage of Dodd-Frank. Indeed, one of Dodd-Frank’s precursors, the would-be Borrower’s Protection Act of 2007, went so far as to propose that “[i]n the case of a home mortgage loan, the mortgage brokers shall have a fiduciary relationship with the consumer, and each such mortgage broker shall be subject to all requirements for fiduciaries otherwise applicable under State or Federal law.”

The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007 (that mostly found its way into Title XIV of Dodd-Frank) ended up taking a more modest approach, avoiding the contentious concept of suitability and instead suggesting tweaks to the “high-cost loan” trigger for HOEPA in order to expand its regulatory reach over problematic mortgages. Expressly bowing to the charged nature of suitability and not wanting a fight, sponsor Rep. Frank assured, “We felt a suitability standard was too vague. . . . We don’t want to give people an obligation that is too vague and obscure because you can scare people away from doing anything. We think these [proposals] are less subjective than suitability.”

Similarly, the Final Guidance on Subprime Mortgage Lending from 2007 (implementing the *Subprime Lending Guidelines*, discussed above) made clear that while the participating agencies were passing specific regulations proscribing certain lending practices, they were most unequivocally not going to embrace suitability:

The Agencies disagree with the commentators who expressed concern that the proposed statement appears to establish a suitability standard under which lenders would be required to assist borrowers in choosing products that are appropriate to their needs and circumstances. The commentators argued that lenders are not in a position to determine which products are most suitable for borrowers, and that this decision should be left to borrowers themselves. It is not the Agencies’ intent to impose such a standard, nor is there any language in the Statement that does so.

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76 Id. at 37,572.
The final pre-enactment draft of Dodd-Frank, while eschewing suitability outright, did get close. In addition to shouldering lenders with the affirmative duty to analyze ability to repay that is the subject of this article, it even sought to propose a specific “net tangible benefit” test for refinancing loans (building on the plausible theory that loans saddled on debtors who cannot repay them confer no actual benefit). While this net tangible benefit requirement was left on the cutting room floor to ensure passage at the last minute, the surviving ability to pay requirement captures most if not all of the content of that rule. (Some have argued that suitability and ability to pay are wholly different concepts, but that is debatable.)

Thus it was not just the regulatory trial balloons in the 1990s and beyond in the mortgage oversight realm that gave rise to the Dodd-Frank ability to pay analysis duty, securities law played a rich parallel role too.

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77 See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. sec. 202, § 129B(b)(1)-(b)(3). (“No creditor may extend credit in connection with any residential mortgage loan that involves a refinancing of a prior existing residential mortgage loan unless the creditor reasonably and in good faith determines, at the time the loan is consummated and on the basis of information known by or obtained in good faith by the creditor, that the refinanced loan will provide a net tangible benefit to the consumer.”), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr3915eh/pdf/BILLS-110hr3915eh.pdf. The net tangible benefit requirement persists at state law. See supra note 43.

78 See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 832, 836-37 (borrower’s ability to repay is a necessary but not sufficient condition of suitability). Bankers’ lobbyists fear both. See Duncan, supra note 21, at 127 (opposing ability to pay rules as “too prescriptive”) and 140 (opposing suitability standards as “too subjective”).

79 To be sure, the latter is technically a constitutive factor of the former, but in the context of a residential mortgage it is surely the lion’s share of the relevant consideration: requiring lenders to consider a borrower’s ability to repay creates enough quasi-fiduciary obligation that the marginal imposition of, say, an additional assessment of the suitability of a fixed or adjustable-rate mortgage (both of which have already been found affordable) seems negligible. This conclusion does not lead me to advocate a suitability standard but rather simply to point out that I think much if not most of the normative goal has been achieved through ability to pay.

80 Interestingly, some creative litigants have sought to advance suitability duties for mortgage brokers by extending state unfair/abusive practices laws. See, e.g., Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp., 2007 WL 2572362; Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp. (D. N.J. Sept. 4, 2007), 2008 WL 1902108 (D. N.C. April 25, 2008).
D. Foreign Cognates

A duty to consider ability to pay, while perhaps late-coming to the American scene, has existed in other countries’ laws for some time. France, for example, has prohibited banks to advise borrowers to assume more debt than they can repay, and even has a quite specific 33% debt service cap on disposable income.81 Denmark, which has been singled out for praise by the IMF for its stable mortgage market regulation, passed a 2003 Mortgage-Credit Loans and Mortgage-Credit Bonds Act, capping residential, owner-occupied mortgages at 80% LTV.82

Others too have been galvanized by the mortgage crisis. For example, the Canadians in October 2008 changed minimum standards for government-backed mortgages (mortgages with less than 20% down-payments, for which the government mandates mortgage insurance) to impose upon the lender a “reasonable effort to verify that the borrower can afford the loan payment.”83 (In February 2010, the permissible principal amount a homeowner can take out in refinancing such a mortgage was lowered from 95% to 90%.)84 In the most populous province of Ontario, moreover, provincial regulators went even further and in 2008 adopted an express suitability standard for mortgage brokers, which requires consideration of “the needs and circumstances of the borrower,” as well as the implementation of procedures and practices to ensure “the suitability of a mortgage . . . for a borrower.”85

84 Id.
Australia went beyond a mere duty to analyze ability to repay to an even broader affirmative duty of “responsible lending” in its National Consumer Credit Protection Act of 2009. Such duty includes within it an obligation to assess “whether the credit contract will be unsuitable for the consumer if the contract is entered or the credit limit increased.”

Australia’s suitability duty expressly requires consideration of the likelihood the consumer will be unable to comply with the financial obligations of the contract or whether compliance will engender “substantial hardship” on the consumer.

Australia’s invocation of a duty of “responsible lending” implicates a hotly contested policy debate that has been brewing in Europe for some time. There, several civil jurisdictions place fiduciary-like responsibility squarely on lenders. For example, Germany recognizes “sittenwidrige Überschulduing” (immoral overburdening with debts) in its domestic law, and Sweden’s Consumer Credit and Banking Act bans the extension of credit to borrowers who cannot be expected to repay (allowing a private remedy of “debt adjustment” by the borrower for violation). These strong consumer protections by way of saddling arms-length lenders with affirmative duties to consider the needs of others helped ground a movement at the European Union level to revise its Consumer Credit Directive to impose upon member states standardized policies of policing lending practices. (This project ultimately ended up excluding mortgage products from its scope, but they in turn faced their own regulation, discussed below.)

The initial proposed EU Consumer Credit Directive, floated in 2002, had a “responsible lending” section that contained an obligation to gauge a debtor’s ability to repay. But this concept met marked opposition from the United Kingdom, which in commentary expressed “doubts about the value of a ‘responsible lending’ provision.” Consequently, the next draft in 2005 whittled down this duty to become one of only “advising” and “providing adequate

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87 Id. at Chapter 3, Part 3-1, Division 4, § 116(1)(b), Chapter 3, part 3-2, Division 3, § 129(b).
88 Id. at Chapter 3, Part 3-1, Division 4, § 118(2)(a), Chapter 3, part 3-2, Division 3, § 131(2)(a).
89 See Udo Reifner et al., CONSUMER OVERINDENTEDNESS AND CONSUMER LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 100-01 (2003).
90 Id. at 100.
information,” with an explicit admonition that the borrower bears ultimate responsibility of deciding what credit is appropriate. When the credit collapse hit, however, the UK’s resistance to burdening lenders with unfair duties lost punch; the final version of the directive, as enacted in 2008, while employing vaguer language than the initial draft, unquestionably shifts most responsibility back to the lender: “Member states should take appropriate measures to promote responsible lending practices . . . .” Expanding, the directive chides: “It is important that creditors should not engage in irresponsible lending or give out credit without prior assessment of creditworthiness . . . ."

In March 2011, the European Commission followed up on the Consumer Credit Directive with its carved-out proposal for a Directive on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property. The proposal “requires the creditor to assess the consumer’s ability to repay the credit,” clarifying that if the “consumer’s creditworthiness results in a negative prospect for his ability to repay the credit over the lifetime of the credit agreement” the creditor must refuse credit. This mortgage lending proposal builds upon the practices of many member states. A 2009 Public Consultation, for example, catalogues how Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, and the Netherlands already require suitability assessments of mortgage products based on the consumer’s personal circumstances. The proposed mortgage directive, however, is at once both expansive and vague. In terms of the scope of ability to pay, it capaciously counsels considering “all necessary factors that could influence a consumer’s ability to repay . . . including, but not limited to, the consumer’s income, regular expenditures, credit score, past credit history, ability to handle interest rate adjustments, and other existing credit commitments.” It further demands acquisition of “necessary information regarding the

95 Id. at 6.
97 Id.
99 Id. at 11, 35. Article 5(1) mandates that credit providers act “in accordance with the best interests of the consumer,” which sounds fiduciary. Id. at art. 5(1).
101 PROPOSAL, supra note 98, at Preamble, para. 24. It further requires
consumer’s personal and financial situation, his preferences and objectives.” On the other hand, whether that translates into specific rules is left up to each country: “Member States may issue guidance on the method and criteria to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness, for example by setting limits on loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratios.” Furthermore, a suitability-like duty arises in a provision that requires the lender to “identify products that are not unsuitable for the consumer given his needs, financial situation and personal circumstances.”

The Europeans thus have not only had suitability (and even fiduciary duties) imposed on their lenders for some time, they are clearly strengthening and expanding those duties in EU-wide responses to the economic crisis. Indeed, even previous holdout the UK has apparently had second thoughts on the efficacy of market discipline alone. In an FSA Discussion Paper of 2009 of Mortgage Market Review, an “Affordability Assessment Model” was put forward to require lenders to assure credit be extended only to homeowners who could afford repayment. The Model further imposes an obligation to verify affordability by calculating the borrower’s “free disposable income” that is available for debt service. FSA backed off, however, from suggestions for more rule-based limits, such as a hard LTV cap or debt-to-income (“DTI”) cap on residential mortgage loans. FSA’s Mortgage Market Review of 2010 confirmed this affordability approach and even considered stricter rules for “credit impaired” borrowers, such as a 20% “buffer” in calculating free disposable income.

102 Id. at art. 14(4); see also id. at art. 17(b) (requiring gathering of “necessary information” on “personal and financial situation, preferences and objectives so as to enable recommendation of suitable credit agreements”). Article 17(a) even mandates lenders to consider a “sufficiently large number of credit arrangements.” Id. at art. 17(a).

103 Id. at Preamble, para. 24.

104 Id. at art. 14(5). The Proposal implements the suggestion of the 2010 Working Paper preceding the proposal that “the creditor . . . should thoroughly assess the suitability of credit contracts for the consumer’s personal and financial circumstances on the basis of sufficient information, where appropriate obtained from the consumer.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER ON RESPONSIBLE MORTGAGE LENDING AND BORROWING 9 (July 2010) available at http://www.fininc.eu/gallery/documents/efin-news/work-paper-resp-lending-2010-07-22.pdf. Unlike “hard” suitability under US securities law, however, the Working Paper envisions an insistent consumer being able to proceed with an unsuitable credit contract after express disclosure, warning, and written waiver — waiveable (“soft”) suitability, but suitability nonetheless. Id. at 8-9. The Proposal seems to have shut this down. See PROPOSAL, supra note 98, at art. 29(1) (“[C]onsumers may not waive the rights conferred on them by . . . this Directive.”).


106 Id. at 12.

107 Id. at 11, 37.

Finally, quick mention should be made in discussing other jurisdictions’ approaches to mortgage market regulation to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Because the mortgage meltdown had global systemic ramifications, Basel too became involved in offering recommendations for banks. Minimum underwriting standards, including repayment capacity analysis, effective income verification, and “appropriate” LTVs, have all been included in Basel’s suggestions, although with nowhere close to the specificity found in many domestic proposals.

This brief comparative law overview shows how some countries have had ability to pay, suitability, and even full-throated responsible lending duties imposed upon mortgage credit providers for some time. It also shows a convergence of concepts and terminology. The panic-inducing collapse of global mortgage markets may well have herded countries toward a harmonizing regulatory path, where a duty to ensure ability to repay no longer seems innovative but commonplace. While it would likely be overstatement to contend that we are witnessing the emergence of a harmonized global standard, it is fair to observe that what seems like a shocking innovation to U.S. consumer law may be nothing more the U.S. catching up (some would argue being led astray) to where most other developed mortgage markets already are.

E. Academic Support

Finally, just as Elizabeth Warren agitated for a consumer financial protection agency for some time, so too have academics been keeping the pressure on for some form of suitability or similar duty on mortgage lenders. Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy (the latter of whom is now tapped to run one of the CFPB’s mortgages unit) win the salience award for their 2002 Texas Law Review article, in which they propose “a duty of suitability in subprime mortgage lending.” Making their case, Engel and McCoy “draw upon suitability in securities and insurance” to explain that the “new duty of suitability puts the onus of preventing predatory lending on those who can afford it most cheaply (i.e., predatory lenders and brokers) by authorizing the federal government and aggrieved victims to sue for loan reformation.


110 Id. at 15-7.

111 Some countries have even broader consumer protection laws that are so protective that suitability would appear subsumed. See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, 2008, Republic of South Africa, Part G (“Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions”).


114 See Engel and McCoy, supra note 70, at 1259.
disgorgement, and damages."115 (Note that even Engel and McCoy were not so bold as to suggest blanket application of suitability to the entire mortgage market – as Dodd-Frank does – just to the subprime market; it is amazing what an intervening global economic collapse will do.) Their focus on private remedies to enforce newly placed duties on lenders mirrored other agitants’ cries that demanded more dramatic remedies to combat the “reckless lending” infecting the consumer credit markets.116

Engel and McCoy were not alone. Daniel Ehrenberg also advocated suitability, borrowing more directly from securities law.117 Some even made the argument that suitability could (and should) be attached under current securities law, under the theory that mortgage sales could be seen as transactions “in connection with” purchase and sale of securities.118 In addition to like-minded supporters, there were also the critics, such as Todd Zywicki and Jack Guttentag, the latter of whom snorted, “Nobody makes loans known to be unaffordable at the outset except collateral lenders . . . and perpetrators of fraud.”119 One of the more bizarre critiques came from Anthony Yezer, who protested that a suitability standard would be tough for the average bank because loan officers would need to have committed to memory hundreds of their products to discharge this duty effectively.120 (Even leaving aside the likelihood that a broker-dealer surely needs familiarity with a similar number of investment products to discharge his suitability duty, and the fact that securities law has not collapsed under the weight of such a rule, one is left wondering just how non-repeat mortgage borrowers would be better situated to memorize such offerings than their loan officers.)121 Finally,

115 Id.


118 See Macey et al., supra note 43, at 792, at 809, 813 (arguing, inter alia, a subprime mortgage might a “note” for securities law purpose (and not a mere “debt”) under the Reves test because “we believe that some mortgages have crossed the line between financial vehicles used to finance personal consumption (which are not securities) and financial instruments with significant investment components that should be categorized as notes regardless of the fact that there is a consumption component involved”).


121 Engel and McCoy also noted the inherent regressivity of such an argument, pointing out that because “suitability is appropriate for financial instruments that have been the traditional province of the affluent, certainly
Richard Posner contributed his requisite chime-in, arguably signaling conclusion of the intellectual discussion.\(^{122}\) Thus, Dodd-Frank’s ability to repay duty can be seen not just as the output of gradual change working its way through the field of extant U.S. mortgage regulations (coupled with the unprecedented housing market collapse), but as the product of a convergence of intellectual pressure from domestic regulators, state legal entrepreneurs (like North Carolina),\(^{123}\) non-mortgage regulators in the securities field, foreign jurisdictions, and academic commentators.

II: **Analysis: What Will It Actually Look Like?**

Dodd-Frank offers remarkable specificity in many aspects. Consider, for example, the highly detailed timeline setting deadlines for the passage of specific regulations.\(^{124}\) By contrast, there is little guidance in the statute on just how this landmark duty to analyze ability to pay should be enforced. For example, in the United Kingdom, regulators expressed serious reservation about the “inflexibility” of imposing strict caps on LTV and DTI to bar certain types of loans.\(^{125}\) On the other hand, within the HOEPA framework, there is ready willingness to set very specific numerical rules, right down to the jurisdictional trigger.\(^{126}\) How should we read between the statutory lines with Dodd-Frank? For instance, is the expansion of the duty to analyze ability to pay to all loans (rather than just high-cost ones) an implicit decision that Congress wants the reach of regulation to be as broad as possible?

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\(^{123}\) This article has avoided an extensive survey of state laws, other than a brief comment, *supra*, at note 43. For a good discussion of state-level innovations, see Hirsch, *supra* note 12, at 30-33 (describing, e.g., Colorado as imposing a “quasi-fiduciary duty” on mortgage brokers). See also Engel & McCoy, *supra* note 70 at 1299-1305 (discussing state law remedies for predatory lending).

\(^{124}\) See Dodd-Frank at 2136, § 1400(c) (regulations under Title XIV become effective twelve months after the Board issues final regulations and guidelines and the Act requires the Board to issue final regulations within eighteen months after the transfer date); see also 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252-53, (Sept. 20, 2010) (transfer date is July 21, 2011, when “consumer financial protection functions” currently carried out by the Federal banking agencies, as well as certain authorities currently carried out by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission, will be transferred to the CFPB”); Dodd-Frank at 2148, §1412(3)(ii) (HUD, Dept. of Agriculture, Dept. of Veterans Affairs and the Rural Housing Service shall in consultation with the [Federal Reserve] Board prescribe rules defining the types of loans they insure, guarantee or administer that are qualified mortgages for the purposes of the safe harbor provision). On the transfer date, “consumer financial protection functions” carried out by Federal banking agencies, HUD and FTC will be transferred to CFPB; specifically CFPB will “assume responsibility for consumer compliance supervision of very large depository institutions and their affiliates and promulgating regulations under various Federal consumer financial laws” and “take steps to implement the risk-based supervision of nondepository covered persons.” 75 Fed. Reg. 57,253.

\(^{125}\) See *supra* note 107.

\(^{126}\) See *supra* note 34; see also Dodd-Frank at 2146-47, §1412(2)(c), 124 Stat. 2157-60, §1431.
A. Legislative Guidance

The relevant commands of the statute itself are intriguing in this respect. They begin with a standard-like injunction of barring loans that are underwritten without analyzing the borrower’s ability to repay.127 This broad exhortation is followed by a statutory list of mandated factors to consider, which includes the “consumer’s credit history, current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio or the residual income the consumer will have after paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources other than the consumer’s equity in the dwelling or real property that secures repayment of the loan.”128 This is a comprehensive-sounding list, to be sure, but one that actually requires no specific weighting of any of its constitutive elements. Moreover, the statutory specificity continues even down to the next level of implementation, where the duty to verify income is in turn micromanaged regarding which documents to requisition: W-2s, tax returns, payroll receipts, etc.129 Countless other examples abound of this statute-level detail, such as how to account properly for an ARM or non-fully amortizing loan in working the ability to repay analysis.130

Perhaps most significantly, the statute also provides a specific presumption to interpret the ability to repay, in a section captioned, “Safe Harbor and Rebuttable Presumption.” Section 1412 amends (as amended!) TILA section 129C after subsection (a) with a new subsection (b):

(b) Presumption of Ability to Repay. —

(1) In General.—Any creditor with respect to a residential mortgage loan, and any assignee of such loan subject to liability, may presume that the loan has met the requirements of subsection (a), if the loan is a qualified mortgage.

(2) Definitions.—

(A) Qualified Mortgage.— [defining the term over a page of statutory text, including in relevant part: “(vi) that complies with any guidelines or regulations established by the Board in relation to ratios of total monthly debt to monthly income, alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after payment of total monthly debt, taking into account the income levels of the borrower and such other factors as the Board may


128 Id. at 2143, § 129C(a)(3). One positive attribute of the comprehensiveness of this list is that its flexibility to consider future income dispatches many of the parade of horribles advanced by detractors of regulation. See, e.g., Zywicki, supra note 119, at 79 (presenting example of medical resident on the cusp of profound salary increase).

129 Id. at § 129C(a)(4).

130 Id. at 2144, § 129C(a)(6).
determine relevant and consistent with the purposes of described in paragraph (3)(B)(i).”  

Note that this highly detailed statutory definition is in turn followed by a broad re-definition authority conferred in the subsequent subsection:

(3) Regulations.

(B) Revision to Safe Harbor Criteria. -- The Board may prescribe regulations that revise, add to, or subtract from the criteria that define a qualified mortgage upon a finding that such regulations are necessary or proper to ensure that responsible, affordable mortgage credit remains available to consumers in a manner consistent with the purposes of this section, necessary and appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this section and section 129B to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance with such sections.”

Making sense of this interpretative presumption is difficult. At first blush, it seems a back-door resurrection of the excised “plain vanilla” rules that sought to privilege certain forms of standard form mortgages (by according safe harbor) over others. That is, by defining qualified mortgages to exclude negative-amortizing mortgages, ones with certain high balloon payments, etc., Dodd-Frank effectively privileges the residuum by according them a rebuttable presumption of demonstrated ability to repay. It is not complete safe harbor from statutory scrutiny, to be sure, but exemption (or, more precisely, rebuttable exemption) from one of its more significant and transformative requirements. On the other hand, the privilege is perhaps a hollow one, because in the multi-pronged definition of “qualified mortgage” lies the express criterion of compliance with the Fed’s/Bureau’s guidelines and regulations relating to DTI,

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131 Id. at § 1412, 124 Stat. 2145-46. Note that, cruelly, “Qualified Mortgages” are expressly different from “Qualified Residential Mortgages.” The latter are part of the sexpartite multi-agency “Risk Retention Rules” that were promulgated in initial proposed form on March 31, 2011. In requiring sponsors and securitizers of asset-backed securities to retain 5% of the credit risk for each securitization transaction, the regulators propose exempting issuances that entirely comprise “qualified residential mortgages.” Credit Risk Retention by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission, 144-45 (March 31, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 244) (proposed rulemaking), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11062.html. While the definition of “qualified residential mortgage” is stringent, rule-based and includes an “ability to pay” requirement (28% “front end” mortgage DTI and 36% total “back end” DTI), id. at 20, 127-30, 144-45, that definition “should not be interpreted in any way as reflecting or suggesting the way in which the Qualified Mortgage standards under TILA [per Dodd-Frank]may be defined either in proposed or final form.” Id. at 103-04.

132 Id. at § 1412(b)(3), 124 Stat. 2148. On the transfer date, the authority over safe harbor criteria will go to the CFPB. See id. at § 1061(b), 124 Stat. 2036.

133 See supra note 3 at 9-10.
which surely stands in as a regulatory proxy for ability to pay.\textsuperscript{134} Thus mortgages that have a demonstrated ability to pay through Fed guidelines are rebuttably presumed to have an ability to pay! (Perhaps this is not gibberish; for example, were the Fed to decline to issue any DTI guidelines at all, then the safe harbor would presume ability to pay for otherwise qualified mortgages, and hence the privileging would be doing some work. But if we anticipate a subversive Fed trying to undermine the Act through refusal to pass DTI guidelines, why would such a Fed not just exercise its regulatory power to define “qualified mortgage” more broadly to exempt everything, as it clearly has power to do under section 1412(b)(3)(B)?) In sum, it is not clear the enabling legislation provides much in the way of helpful guidance regarding delineation of ability to pay.

B. Kindred Regulations

Limited but nevertheless useful insight on how to interpret ability to pay can also likely be gleaned from the regulations just promulgated under CARD that seek to provide guidance on that statute’s duty to assess “ability to pay.”\textsuperscript{135} The Fed took its crack with Proposed Rules in October 2009 and followed up with Final rules in February 2010. The regulations provide credit card lenders with a safe harbor if they assess repayment following certain assumptions, which include that the full line of credit is drawn for new accounts and that the “real” APR (not the teaser) is applied, but do not assume any fees are incurred (other than mandatory ones such as annual ones) for fear they are “too speculative.”\textsuperscript{136} (The inclusion of annual fees came after protest over the “no fees” aspect of the Proposed Rule.)\textsuperscript{137} Safe harbor does not require verification of income, assets, etc., as is mandated under Dodd-Frank, because such a requirement is “burdensome,” finds the Fed, especially for telephonic applications; plus there is “no evidence,” it insists, of income-inflating liar loans in the credit card market.\textsuperscript{138} Most toothlessly, alas, the ability to pay analysis only requires scrutiny of the ability to make the minimum monthly payment, not (as suggested by one commentator on the Proposed Rules) scrutiny of payment that amortizes the loan within a reasonable period of time. This omission

\textsuperscript{134} See Dodd-Frank, at § 1412(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 2145-46.


\textsuperscript{137} 75 Fed. Reg. 7722.

was grounded in part on statutory text of the specific “ability to pay” provision in CARD.\textsuperscript{139} (Perhaps this lender leniency is why one banking lobbyist praised CARD’s ability to pay regulations as having “worked OK, with some tweaks.”\textsuperscript{140})

One recurrent comment after the Proposed Rules came out was for “more guidance” on just how to measure ability to pay. This resulted in the Fed’s inclusion in the Final Rule of two interesting additions. First, at the prodding of consumer advocates, numerical ratios were injected: lenders must now “consider” the borrower’s debt to income ratio, debt to assets ratio, or “residual income” (defined as the income left after the debtor services debt – but not living expenses, so perhaps this is “quasi-net income”), although there is no specific trigger of what might constitute an excessive ratio.\textsuperscript{141} Second, at the pushing of industry, the Fed allowed the use of “reasonable policies and procedures” to estimate a borrower’s “obligations” in assessing ability to pay, including income and asset estimates based on “empirically derived, demonstrably and statistically sound models.”\textsuperscript{142} The Fed’s discussion of the rules reveals strong lobbying and a clear aversion by industry to conduct individual borrower analysis beyond credit score review, modeling, and other quantitative algorithms.\textsuperscript{143} (One worries about reliance on statistical models after the financial collapse of 2008, but maybe the Fed envisions a brave new world of even bigger, more unsinkable, models.) It is interesting to note that these rules were being finalized during the jockeying over Dodd-Frank, which may explain the incorporation of greater specificity into that statute’s text that follow wording from the Fed’s regulations interpreting CARD (\textit{e.g.}, “residual income”).

Whether and to what degree these CARD regulations will help shed light on Dodd-Frank remains to be seen. Indeed, even the revisions to the rules were insufficient guidance for some, requiring a still further set of “clarifying” amendments that came down in March 2011,


\textsuperscript{140} See Neddis, \textit{supra} note 3.

\textsuperscript{141} 75 Fed. Reg. 7660. “Residual income” is used elsewhere in federal housing regulation, such as by the Dept. of Veterans Affairs in its underwriting standards for VA loans. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity House Committee on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (April 16, 2008), (statement of Judith Cade, Director Loan Guaranty Service, Dept. of Veterans Affairs) (“Lenders underwriting VA loans must ensure that the contemplated terms of repayment bear a proper relation to the veteran’s present and anticipated income and expenses, and that the veteran is a satisfactory credit risk. VA’s credit standards employ the use of residual income guidelines and debt-to-income ratios in determining the adequacy of the veteran’s income.”). For a good discussion of this construct, see John Eggum, Katherine Porter and Tara Twomey, \textit{Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification}, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1136.

\textsuperscript{142} 75 Fed. Reg. 7660, 7718, 7720.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Cf.} Ruth Simon, \textit{Banks Get Back to the People Business}, WALL STREET JOURNAL, at C1 (March 7, 2011) (discussing return to “character analysis” in loan underwriting in addition to numerical scoring).
dealing with such down-in-the-weeds detail as how to define “household income.”144 To the extent this moving target can be tracked, it certainly seems consistent with further emphasis on highly specific rules, a topic explored in more depth immediately below.

C. Rules or Standards?

What about the perennial rules vs. standards debate? In lobbying against the imposition of a suitability standard, the Mortgage Bankers Association warned against the perils of a “subjective” standard of suitability, taking the position (as a back-up to rejecting the suitability standard altogether) that were a federal intervention made, it would have to be “clear and objective,”145 i.e., a rule.146 Yet at the same time it lobbied against subjectivity in opposing a standard such as suitability (and, by analogy one assumes, ability to repay), the Mortgage Bankers Association also railed against the dangers of a DTI ceiling of 45%.147 Some rules are apparently better than others. Section 1412 of Dodd-Frank clearly indicates that the Fed could indeed say a borrower with a DTI above 45% lacks ability to pay, and so perhaps the most significant interpretative impact of the qualified mortgage rebuttable presumption of ability to pay is not so much its content (which could be rendered meaningless) but its explicit countenancing of specific rules, such as DTI caps. Indeed, it is that possible approach that so frightened regulators in the UK,148 and perhaps explains the Europeans’ ambivalence.149 As discussed just above, the CARD regulations seem to be grasping toward rules that include “consideration” of rule-like debt-to-income formulas, but in a watered-down sense that allow a modeling bypass.

Accordingly, my conjecture is that as Dodd-Frank unfolds, we will see the proliferation of many specific rules and formulas that in turn will be revised over time.150 That is, in

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145 Hirsch, supra note 12, at 27 (quoting lobbying positions).

146 It also insisted that any mortgage reform not entail a private right of action as a remedy, although one fails to see how this follows from its insistence on objectivity over subjectivity. See id.

147 Id.


149 See supra text accompanying note 103.

150 I make this prediction mindful of the explicit disassociation by the CFPB’s proto-head. See infra note 155. That may well be her intention, but she will have to reverse a tide of rule-orientation. For the latest manifestation of such rule-enthusiasm, see Credit Risk Retention supra note 131, at 20, 127-30 (multi-agency release specifying the
prognosticating on the rules-standards continuum, I see rules rising ascendant. My prediction stems from a culmination of factors: first, the specific cue in section 1412 to embrace such rules as a DTI ratio; second, the proliferation of prohibitory rules already in the statute (e.g., ban on prepayment penalties for unqualified mortgage, ban on mandatory arbitration for residential mortgage loans under an open end consumer credit plan, etc); third, the conceptually contagious “niggling” provisions of the express statutory text, such as section 129C’s insistence on which types of tax documents to examine in underwriting a debtor’s loan; fourth, baseline hyperactivity of newly created and newly invigorated federal agencies; and finally, bureaucratic hindsight conviction that the recent housing collapse might have been avoided had we simply retained rules like the pre-1982 hard LTV caps on residential mortgages. One can even envision categorical bans of certain products (the analogy of the accredited investor rule from securities law’s Regulation D comes to mind). The power of the Fed to expand and contract the definition of a “qualified mortgage” as it sees fit surely suggests the lesser power to pass such categorical rules banning products it sees as generating an inherent risk of inability to pay. And rules and categories certainly seem popular with the

“risk retention rules” under Dodd-Frank, which exempt “qualified residential mortgage” securities from the 5% retention requirement, which in turn are defined as mortgages where there is a mortgage DTI ratio of no more than 28% and total DTI ratio of no more than 36%).

151 Dodd-Frank at § 1412(b)(2)(A)(vi), 124 Stat. 2146. Technically, one might envision a Fed regulation banning an “unreasonable DTI” (i.e., a standard), but that borders on silly. Then again, in interpreting CARD, the Fed only required vague “consideration” of DTI. See supra, note 135 at 108.


153 See id. at § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151.

154 Id. at § 129C(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2143.

155 The activity level of an agency will depend on its head, a point emphasized by many. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 11 (emphasizing criticality of CFPB’s first director). Elizabeth Warren, one possible contender, has made clear she has no intention of a regulatory binge if at the helm of the CFPB. Embracing a position of the Financial Services Roundtable, Warren opines, “Instead of creating a regulatory thicket of ‘thou shalt nots,’ and instead of using ever-more-complex disclosures that drive up costs for lenders and provide little help for consumers, let’s measure our success with simple questions. . . . . Instead of layering on regulations that don’t fully protect consumers, a better approach would focus on how to give consumers the power to make the right choices for their families — and, at the same time, to ease the regulatory burden for the lenders.” Victoria McGrane and Maya Jackson Randall, Banking’s Scourge on Charm Offensive, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Mar. 25, 2011) (reporting on prepared remarks to the Financial Services Roundtable from September 2010).

156 See supra note 66. Note that the proto-CFPB head, at least in some contexts, appears to like categorical rules. “It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames and burning down your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage that has the same one in-five chance of putting the family out on the street.” Warren, supra note 112, at 8. But compare supra note 178.
swath of regulations rolling out under Dodd-Frank. Although the normative debate of preference for rules or standards in regulating residential mortgages is not one I will wade into at present (leaving the reader to review the interesting observations of others), I will close by noting that the proto-head of the CFPB, while at times having expressed interest in rules, has gone on record in agreeing with banking industry leaders in the need to have flexible regulatory standards.

D. Sister Statutory Fields

How else might an “ability to pay” duty be operationalized? One area that has confronted this problem recently has been bankruptcy law, where the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) mandated an “ability to pay” screen for chapter 7 (liquidation) bankruptcy through revised 11 U.S.C. section 707(b). There, Congress took two approaches to measuring ability to repay debts in the bankruptcy context: a gross income screen and a net income screen. For gross income, the statute deems bankrupt debtors unable to repay their debts as a matter of law if they earn less than the applicable state median gross income. For net income, the statute specifies a highly detailed and routinized test of permissible budgetary expenses that is largely driven by IRS guidelines used by field agents negotiating repayment schedules with tax

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157 The March 31, 2011 Risk Retention Rules, see supra note 131, while explicitly impermissible to rely upon in interpreting the mortgage lending ability to pay rules, do provide interesting insight on the presence of categorical distinctions in analyzing ability to pay. For example, the rules explicitly say that ability to pay should be scrutinized differently for an automobile loan (current income and DTI) than for a business loan (liabilities, leverage, and coverage ratios). Id. at 150-52, 161-62.

158 Vincent DiLorenzo offers interesting analysis on whether Dodd-Frank signals an end to what he contends was the disastrous “principles-based” standards approach that prevailed after 1982. He sees Dodd-Frank as clearly “two steps forward” toward the resurgence of rules, but also feels the blanket quasi-cost-benefit constraint on generating new regulations, see Dodd-Frank at §1031, 124 Stat. 2005-06, as “a step backward” toward standards. DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 62-66, 81-83. Interestingly, Engel and McCoy too desire rules to standards, arguing that the concept of suitability in the securities laws context (which generated standards) would transpose poorly to mortgages. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1343-44.

159 See supra note 156, infra note 178. Warren’s comments are presumably intended as an olive branch to the lending industry, but it is not clear (at least to me) that standards are strictly preferable to rules by the regulated entities. Maybe they think standards provide plausible deniability for captured regulators? It seems equally likely, as a theoretical matter, that they might actually prefer the certainty of brighter rules.


161 Id. at § 707(b)(6)-(7); cf. § 707(b)(3) (re-imposing ability to pay for means-test passers under certain circumstances).
delinquents.162 What the brief experience of BAPCPA to date has taught us, however, is that even a highly routinized “means tests” crafted by ex ante rule can create a maelstrom of ex post litigation. For example, in the few years since its effective date, already three means test statutory disputes have required Supreme Court intervention.163

This ominous BAPCPA lesson could lead to several possible outcomes. First, it might embolden the Fed to seize upon per se gross income rules, deeming some products categorically off limits for certain income demographics (or categorically permissible for others). Second, it could be ignored (or passingly acknowledged) by a resolute Fed ready to bite the bullet of crafting net income rules.164 Note that England, for all its insistence of not wanting to have hard and fast rules like LTV or DTI caps, apparently believes it will be able to police an obligation on lenders to calculate “free disposable income,” a number that includes deductions for “committed expenditures for the borrower’s and borrower’s dependents (income tax, national insurance, utility bills, alimony and maintenance payments, school fees) as well as personal expenditures (food, clothing, health and personal care, transport, recreation and holidays).”165 As such, the Fed might use the UK as a guinea pig in coming up with its own BAPCPA-like list of deductions in getting to the appropriate “income” that grounds the ability to pay analysis. (It is also, of course, possible the Fed learns the ultimate BAPCPA lesson and tries to fob everything off to the IRS.)166

E. Complicating Considerations

Complicating the analysis of what ability to pay regulation will look like is the issue of pre-emption. Weighing in on a long-fought battle,167 Dodd-Frank makes clear that federal pre-emption of state consumer protection laws is lifted; federal law is to become a “floor” from

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162 Id. at § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V) (“The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service . . . .”).


164 This seems unlikely based on the experience of the new CARD amendments to Regulation Z, supra note 135, at 108. There, the Fed initially suggested that lenders be required to consider a debtor’s “obligations” in gauging ability to pay in its proposed rules, but then when pressed for more guidance in the final rules, simply suggested “consideration” of specific financial ratios, such as DTI, DTA, or something called “residual income,” which was defined as income after service of debts (which is better thought of as “quasi-net income”).

165 Mortgage Market Review, supra note 105, at 16, 23. I am mindful of Fannie and Freddie’s automated underwriting systems, which provide perhaps some basis of measuring ability to pay, but I have diminished confidence in the output of those institutions.

166 Note that either path would be consistent with a prediction of rules-orientation.

which more consumer-protective states are free to depart upward.\textsuperscript{168} This raises the prospect that some practices that survive categorical proscription at the federal level may nevertheless be banned by specific states (so long as not creating an actual conflict).\textsuperscript{169} Compounding this potential confusion is the restriction on remedies. One of the fighting lines in the battle over Dodd-Frank was the creation of a private right of action for consumers, which was resolved in favor of industry by generally omitting such relief.\textsuperscript{170} But the new pre-emption rule now implies a state could permit its own consumer protection laws that do allow private rights of action to persist and grant consumers newfound powers, liberated from the yoke of federal pre-emption.\textsuperscript{171} (Indeed, Dodd-Frank’s resurrection of assignee-liability suggests that even more putative defendants will be added to the mix than perhaps previously imagined.)\textsuperscript{172} The final aspect of this wildcard is the rollback of mandatory arbitration.\textsuperscript{173} Not only will many matters of dispute now reach court for public, media-attracting resolution, but the full judicial powers of preclusion and precedential effect will attach. Accordingly, while I foresee myriad rules coming out of the regulatory maw in the upcoming years, I cannot foresee at the same time the interpretation of those rules (or similar, stronger state ones) effectively being

\textsuperscript{168} See Dodd-Frank, at § 1041, 124 Stat. 2011.


\textsuperscript{170} This is a crude generalization. Some significant private causes of action survive and are enhanced under Dodd-Frank. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank at § 1404, 124 Stat. 2141 (creating cause of action against mortgage originators that violate § 129B of the Truth in Lending Act, a prohibition on steering incentives); § 1413, 124 Stat. 2148-9 (allowing defense by recoupment or setoff to residential foreclosure by asserting creditor violated prohibition on steering incentives or ability to pay standard); § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151 (prescribing that no residential mortgage loan term can waive a statutory cause of action or bar a consumer from bringing an action for damages or relief in connection with any alleged violation of Title XIV provisions). For discussion of the private action battle, see Hirsch, \textit{supra} note 12, at 27. That said, a generally private cause of action for violations of the statute is neither express nor implied.

\textsuperscript{171} Indeed, many state “unfair and deceptive acts and practices” statutes (UDAPs) provide for private causes of action, unlike the FTC Act. See National Consumer Law Center, \textit{Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices}. Engel and McCoy discuss the uses of these statutes in combating predatory lending. See Engel & McCoy, \textit{supra} note 61, at 1303-105. For an example of a recovery, see, e.g., Leff v. EquiHome Mortgage Corp. (D. N.J., Sept. 4, 2007) (unsuitable mortgage for 82-year-old homeowner violated state UDAP).

\textsuperscript{172} See Dodd-Frank, at § 1404, 124 Stat. 2141.

\textsuperscript{173} Id. at § 1414(e), 124 Stat. 2151.
transferred to, or perhaps even hijacked by, the courts. (Imagine at the extreme a resurgence of the heady 1960’s unconscionability caselaw.)

In final analysis, then, notwithstanding the pre-emption and private action wrinkles, the most likely implementation of the new ability to pay duty will be a proliferation of constantly updating rules emanating from the Fed. Naysayers, of course, predict whatever comes out will be indecipherable: “We have such nebulous terms as ‘reasonable ability to repay.’” But those are cheap shots. As discussed above, suitability standards have been around for decades in securities law, and somehow that system has survived.

III. Comment: What Does It All Mean?

Whatever its form of implementation, the question arises whether shouldering banks with a requirement to assess their customers’ ability to pay will be all that big deal. It will. This is so both for the actual doctrinal effect as well as the broader expressive significance. The actual doctrinal effect will unfold through the effective nationalization of underwriting standards that the Fed/Bureau will exercise under its new regulatory powers. That is a return to 1982. The broader conceptual leap (as we saw with the U.K.’s crumbling resistance to “responsible lending”) lies in dispatching the fictions that acquiring a suitable mortgage is fully up to the borrower alone and that assessing its rightful fit is up to him alone too as an arms-length contractual counterparty. Relatedly, the duty to analyze ability to repay constitutes recognition of the failure in relying upon market forces alone to discipline lenders (i.e., admitting the natural profit motives of lenders did not assure the extension of credit to repayment-likely borrowers). A duty – an affirmative mandate imposed by the state – now lies on mortgage lenders to assure their erstwhile contractual adversaries can pay back their loans. The imposition of this new, proto-fiduciary duty fundamentally changes the landscape of how we understand the debtor-creditor relationship in the consumer realm. This transformation is significant, but it comes of course with two very likely consequences: first, an increased paternalistic regulatory mindset (pejoratively, the rise of the “nanny state”), and second, reduction/rationing in mortgage credit.

174 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Hirsch, supra note 12, at 36-42 (discussing private litigations seeking relief against lenders for “unsuitable” mortgages).


176 Although I must confess to being a non-expert in securities law. Conducting the rich empirical research of asking a colleague who is, I was informed that the FINRA arbitrations are actually quite useless in crafting standards for “suitability,” because the generalist arbitrators are usually poorly versed in underlying securities laws and norms.

177 A co-participant at a recent conference on the CFPB gets credit for the insight that ability to pay is effectively a compulsory underwriting term.

178 See supra note 155.
Lest there be any doubt, paternalism was Epithet Number One hurled at Dodd-Frank in the battles over its passage. As one opponent railed, “This is Uncle Sam telling you, with a couple of exceptions, if you can’t qualify for a 30-year fixed mortgage, then we are going to deny you the homeownership opportunity in America, because we are smarter than you. We know better than you. We have to protect you from yourself.”\(^{179}\) Condemned another, “That is not the American Dream; that’s the Government Dream.”\(^{180}\) The title of one prominent jurist’s Op Ed said it all: “Treating Financial Consumers as Consenting Adults.”\(^{181}\)

Dodd-Frank is paternalistic – highly so. Supporters can squirm at this attribute as a necessary evil, distract critics with the panglossian distinction between “libertarian” and “ordinary” paternalism,\(^{182}\) or otherwise try to deflect this charge by changing the subject. But the better approach is to confront it head on and celebrate the law’s inherent paternalism.\(^{183}\) After all, the evil (for those who see it as an evil) of paternalism lies in reducing the autonomy and dignity of private contracting actors.\(^{184}\) But if the market is malfunctioning,\(^{185}\) and


\(^{180}\) Id. at H5183 (Rep. Neugebauer).

\(^{181}\) See Posner, supra note 122. In what he presumably considers hyperbole, Posner rhetorically questions regarding prepayment penalties, “[M]ortgages that include such penalties compensate by charging a lower interest rate. Is the choice among such alternatives really beyond the cognitive competence of the average home buyer?” The Fed has some insight on that question. In a recent study, it found 68% of respondents could not identify whether a mortgage disclosure statement revealed that the underlying mortgage contained a prepayment penalty, and only 5%, having found it, could identify what that penalty amount was. See James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, Fed. Trade Comm’n, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS 78-79 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf.

\(^{182}\) See id. (“Mr. Thaler, whose views are taken seriously by the Obama administration, calls himself a ‘libertarian paternalist.’ But that is an oxymoron. He is a paternalist with a velvet glove—as the agency will be.”).

\(^{183}\) For one article doing so, see Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial Freedom, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 1079, 1119 (2010) (“If greater financial freedom means giving people unlimited choices and the unfettered opportunity to go deeper into debt, then less financial freedom and fewer choices would be better for many people because it would make them happier and ultimately increase their well-being.”).

\(^{184}\) For a nice roundup of Kantian concerns, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205, 220 (2000) (discussing concern that paternalistic legal interventions accord “insufficient respect for the underlying valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the autonomous agent”).

\(^{185}\) Note too that the economics of the subprime market are fiercely contested. For example, in a scholarly debate on the merits of regulatory intervention, both Engel & McCoy and Zywicki & Adamson lay greater claim to Stiglitz & Weiss’s informational asymmetries, see Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1981). See Engel and McCoy, supra note 70, at 1258, 1278, 1280-84; Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 119, at 71, 73, 78-82. The latter claim that their basic model suggests it is madness to saddle the lender with a duty to know the private information of the borrower, while the former retort that the complexity of current credit instruments and sophistication of credit scoring algorithms actually do diminish (and arguably reverse) the asymmetry.
especially if the basis of that malfunction is in part deception, then the autonomy concerns largely evaporate. Moreover, with autonomy concerns set aside, the instrumentalist benefits of using the lenders as the policy targets is clear. (As for the sub-debate of “hard” vs. “soft” paternalism, I can nudge the reader into considering the emerging draft of the EU directive on responsible mortgage lending. Under that proposal (at least in its first iteration), mortgage lenders will be burdened with a suitability duty toward their borrowers, but the duty may be waiveable with sufficient disclosure.)


187 See, e.g., id. at 432-34 (discussing reasons lenders, rather than borrowers, are more likely to be cheapest-cost implementers of oversight policy); Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1336-37 (same, regarding mortgage lenders specifically).


189 See supra note 104 (suggesting this option may actually have been eliminated by the most recent version proposal). But cf. Engel & McCoy, supra note 70, at 1348 (counseling against waiver as permissible autonomy intrusion justified by utilitarian considerations).
The second grievance with the new ability to pay duty is simply the well known lament of usury law opponents: reduction in credit availability, either through pernicious substitution or outright rationing.190 “The more likely result of stricter mortgage origination rules is a return to rationing, which could result in lower overall homeownership since some of the recent increase in homeownership was due to the ability of subprime borrowers to access credit.”191 This worrying even made it into the legislative debates. One opponent complained, for example, that “this bill . . . will functionally be taking away homeownership opportunities from American people. . . . So, ultimately what we are going to have are fewer mortgages being made.”192 Another predicted that homeownership after Dodd-Frank will be made “more expensive and less available to those people who need it the most.”193

Again, the appropriate rejoinder to this rhetoric is direct admission and confrontation.194 One of the intended consequences of Dodd-Frank is for fewer people to acquire mortgages — those who lack the ability to repay them in the cold calculus of rigorous underwriting. Of course there will be errors, both Type I and II.195 The question is whether one type is preferable to the other. The mantra of increased homeownership as an intrinsic social good presumes the former are better than the latter, but that is far from clear.196 On the


191 Zywicki and Adamson, supra note 119, at 78.


194 Consider in this regard the emerging UK proposal envisions making it even harder for “credit impaired” borrowers to get a mortgage by requiring a 20% “buffer” in calculating “free disposable income.” See Consultation Paper, supra note 108.

195 Indeed, some researchers have noted that credit restriction may be ill-founded. See, e.g., Debbie Guienstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst, & Wei Li, Center for Responsible Lending, Unfair Lending: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages (2006). This might be considered a “Type I ½” error.

196 See, e.g., Subprime Mortgage Lending: Benefits, Costs, and Challenges, Remarks of Fed. Bd. Member Edward M. Gramlich, Financial Services Roundtable Meeting, May 21, 2004 (noting that increased foreclosures of subprime loans “do not seem high enough to challenge the overall positive assessment” of increased homeownership). Professor DiLorenzo explores Governor Gramlich’s comments on subprime lending in more detail in his comprehensive analysis, including his clashes with then-Chairman Alan Greenspan. See DiLorenzo, supra note 23, at 80. The implementation of this vision through legislation such as the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 et seq., and its related enabling of HUD to target “goals” of portfolio percentages of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to LMI, see HUD’s Proposed Affordable Housing Goals: Fannie Mae’s
contrary, the spillover effects of the housing collapse – shown in the dropping property values of the non-foreclosed neighbors – has sharpened our appreciation of the dangers of “false grantings” of mortgage credit.197 Even staunch critic Jack Guttentag admits, “Perhaps the costs associated with borrowers who fail [in their mortgages] – costs to both themselves and their communities – more than offset the benefits to those who succeed.”198 (And this worry was published in 2007, when the ice was just beginning to crack.) Accordingly, rather than awkwardly tap-dance around the reduction in mortgage origination possible from Dodd-Frank’s elimination of asset-based mortgage lending, I embrace it and find its likely social costs dwarfed by its welfare benefits.

**Conclusion**

While they are not fiduciaries, mortgage lenders are now no longer arms-length contractual counterparties: they have a duty to assess a prospective borrower’s ability to repay her loan.199 Reliance on the asset value alone, or on flipping the debt to another through securitization, will no longer suffice. This dramatically transforms the debtor-creditor relationship in the residential mortgage market. This article has tried to chart the source of this innovation by showing how it did not spring fully formed from Chris Dodd’s head. Lenders’ duties of “responsible lending” (in the European parlance) have a rich pedigree, both domestic and foreign. The article also offered conjecture as to how this new duty will unfold in the United States, predicting a swath of new technical rules of great specificity from appropriate agencies. Finally, it briefly registered its alignment with the supportive normative camp: Dodd-Frank is not just a big deal for the mortgage markets, but a good deal. Properly interpreted, the duty to analyze ability to repay could re-align the residential mortgage market and ensure that 2008 becomes a closed chapter in commercial law history.

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197 A rich literature exists on this topic. Foreclosures drag everyone down. *See, e.g.*, Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent W. Yao, *Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values*, 38 J. REAL ESTATE FINAN. ECON. 387 (2009) (collecting studies on the threat foreclosures pose to neighborhood property value); Center for Responsible Lending, *Soaring Spillover: Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billion in 2009 Alone; 69.5 Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average Over Next Four Years, 91.5 Million Families to Lose $1.9 Trillion in Home Value; $20,300 on Average* (May 2009) (estimating that foreclosures in 2009 caused 69.5 million neighboring homes to experience price declines averaging $7,200 per home, resulting in a $501.9 billion devaluation in total property values).

198 Guttentag, *supra* note 119.

199 As a black letter matter, the duty of course runs to the borrower. Given the negative social consequences of the housing market collapse, however, an interesting argument can be made that the duty is owed to the public more broadly. Such a contention, while conceptually intriguing, likely faces an uphill doctrinal battle under current law. *See, e.g.*, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).