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Reviewed Work: Escapism: The Logical Basis of Ethics by P.H. Nowell-Smith and Lemmon

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Certain philosophical considerations of the Anderson deontic calculus in Prior’s paper of the same title, it is argued, require a “radical reconstruction of the calculus.” The surprising and unpleasant result that Prior characterized as the “Paradox of the Good Samaritan” dissolves when “S” in the “LCpS” (p necessitates sanction) definition of “Fp” (p is forbidden) is interpreted as “someone ought to suffer the sanction.” This interpretation emphasizes the need to introduce the Andersonian simplification “in such a way that the sanction can only hang over the person who does the forbidden act.” Two approaches are discussed: (1) extra-systemic rubrics, and (2) extensions of the calculus to include quantifiers. The first requires many complicated restrictions on the interpretation of the calculus—and besides, it leads to a Robber’s Paradox; the authors prefer to incorporate the restrictions in a calculus with term-variables and predicate constants. The Samaritan situation is then stated ‘C LC-KHxyRzy-Rzy C-LCRzySz-LCKHxyRzySz’ (if x’s helping y whom z robs necessarily implies that z robs y, then if z’s robbing y necessarily implies that z is sanctionable, then x’s helping y whom z robs necessarily implies that z is sanctionable); and with the people straightened out, no “paradox” arises. The quantified extension proposed by the authors is along the same lines originally suggested by Anderson (see reference in preceding review, pp. 83–84).

The crux of the authors’ objection to Andersonian deontic logic is that when “p” in the “LCpS” definition of “Fp” is non-deontic, the interpreted calculus is “naturalistic” in the sense that it allows deontic statements to be deduced from non-deontic statements. Such naturalism is characterized as a “fallacy,” and no less than seven times, such an “Fp” is asserted to be untrue (“just not true,” “simply false,” “plain false,” “all false,” “cannot be true,” “must be false,” and “can . . . treat as false”) without discussing just why it is so unreasonable to premise or legislate that p necessarily implies S, i.e., that p is forbidden. What worries the authors is that the if-then relation between p and S is “logical” or “strict” implication. However, this does not to the reviewer seem to be sufficient reason to cast serious doubt upon Anderson’s principal thesis that it is useful to define “forbidden” in terms of an if-then relation between occurrence
of the forbidden state of affairs and occurrence of an undesirable result. It is likely that a more adequate formalization of if-then for this purpose can be defined than the LC of T, S4, or S5; but such a change seems more appropriately characterized as a "slight refinement" than as a "radical reconstruction." For purposes of normative discourse in law, the Anderson approach seems to the reviewer to be admirably appropriate when (1) 'if p, then S' is interpreted 'if the forbidden thing occurs, then there is a violation'; and (2) there is added a postulate which when interpreted indicates that if there is a violation, someone deserves deprivation.

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