Private Order and Public Institutions

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PRIVATE ORDER AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Comments on McMillan and Woodruff's 'Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order'

Ellen D. Katz*

In Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order,¹ John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff describe the private institutions that order commercial transactions in developing economies where commercial actors view the formal legal regime as unreliable. Presenting evidence from surveys of market participants in several Eastern European countries and in Vietnam, McMillan and Woodruff depict a system of private order that requires formal organization and the creation of institutions to share information and coordinate multi-party responses. These institutions do not simply offer a viable alternative to public procedures, but also enable commercial transactions to occur where the vacuum in public order would otherwise preclude valuable trades. In conclusion, however, the authors allude to the reliance of some private-order institutions on practices of exclusion, collusion, and physical violence that yield economic inefficiencies. This "downside" to private order, they assert, means that while private order in developing economies "can usefully supplement public law, [it] cannot replace it."²

This assertion is correct but incomplete. McMillan and Woodruff rightly note that private order is not a substitute for public governance, and that public-order institutions are needed to facilitate internalization of the negative externalities that private order produces. But public order serves a much broader and deeper function. Democratic public-order institutions, when accompanied by public-order norms of transparency and accountability, offer processes and policies of greater legitimacy and fairness than can private-order institutions. While the goal of the public realm ought not be to supplant private-

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². Id. at 2423.
order decisionmaking, the inclusiveness of democratic decisionmaking ultimately means that public order should be seen as the preferable form of governance, even if public order does nothing more than ratify the existing private-order system.

These comments will discuss the difficulty in structuring public institutions in a developing economy where a vibrant, though perhaps problematic, system of private order operates, and will address the role of public order more generally as a source of legitimacy for governance of any kind.

I. THE DOWNSIDE OF PRIVATE ORDER

A substantial literature celebrates the benefits of private order. Private order often provides greater efficiency and involves lower transaction costs than do public-order regimes. Many believe it achieves better results; that is, participants in the private-order regime view outcomes arising thereunder as preferable to those that might be produced by public-order mechanisms. Private-order institutions are often well-situated to monitor market conduct, and their decisionmakers remain close to and thus well-informed about industry practice. Private-order adjudicatory practices accordingly may produce more nuanced decisions than do public-order ones, particularly given the former's broader freedom to consider evidence that would generally be inadmissible in traditional law courts.

The very features of private order that have prompted so much celebration may also explain the problematic facets of private order that scholars have increasingly identified. Private-order institutions


4. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3, at 126-27; Charny, supra note 3, at 415-16; McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2425.

may rely on exclusionary entry barriers, which may be grounded on race, gender, ethnicity, or other characteristics; coordination among firms, which may yield collusive anticompetitive practices such as price-fixing; and graduated forms of coordinated sanctions, which may include physical violence and other forms of criminal activity.\textsuperscript{6}

Some of these so-called "downside" practices are evident, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the celebrated strategies used by various communities to prevent overuse of commonly held resources. Numerous studies challenge the notion that the tragedy of the commons is inevitable by identifying mechanisms through which communal resources can be managed in a sustainable manner.\textsuperscript{7} Most notably, a successful commons generally does not provide open access, and thus is not really a commons at all, for sustainable management typically requires some mechanism to limit access to prevent overexploitation of the so-called communal resource.\textsuperscript{8} Whether entry depends on membership in a social or ethnic group, or on other considerations, participation becomes notably and necessarily exclusive rather than inclusive. While norms of exclusion may yield benefits for the community and even for the environment,\textsuperscript{9} their particular instantiation may rest on irrational or otherwise objectionable discriminatory factors.

Communities managing a shared resource may also rely on an escalating series of sanctions to penalize participants and outsiders who breach management norms.\textsuperscript{10} Penalties progress from gossip to vandalism to other forms of violence, raising concerns regarding accountability and public order generally, and calling into question the purported efficiency of private-order norms governing punishment.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{6} See, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988); Braguinsky, supra note 5, at 519-22; Cheryl W. Gray, Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 1997, at 14; Hendley et al., supra note 5, at 19; McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2456; Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 51-62.

\item \textsuperscript{7} See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990), and THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS (Bonnie J. McCoy & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (collecting such studies). See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (arguing that resources in an unregulated open access commons will be depleted). But see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 37 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-57 (1967) (arguing that private property will replace communal management of resources).

\item \textsuperscript{8} See ACHESON, supra note 6, at 48-49 (discussing practices of lobster fishermen in Maine); RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL 72-106 (1995) (discussing the role of norms of exclusion in defining group membership); OSTROM, supra note 7, at 58-102 (evaluating common-pool resource management in divergent communities worldwide); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS, supra note 7 (providing evaluative examples of common-pool resource management in divergent communities worldwide); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2000) (discussing entry issues).

\item \textsuperscript{9} But see ACHESON, supra note 6, at 143-44 (noting depletion in resource despite enforcement of entry barriers); Robert Elllickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 95-96 (1989).

\item \textsuperscript{10} See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 6, at 73-76; ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 215-19; OSTROM, supra note 7, at 15-19; see also WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODYTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 77-109, 179-220 (1990).
\end{itemize}
Poorly structured public-order institutions may explain why less than optimal private-order practices evolve. As Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West note, governmental failure “to get the [public] institutions ‘right’” not only increases the costs for private actors seeking to utilize state procedures, but also contributes to what they term “dark-side public ordering.” Poorly structured legal institutions provide fertile ground for thriving criminal organizations that promise to provide and protect property rights more effectively than does the state. Just as an existing system of private order can dampen the incentive of public officials to create and nurture valuable legal institutions, badly designed legal institutions can inhibit vibrant private order and cause it to produce negative externalities.

Milhaupt and West, for example, demonstrate the link between various modes of organized criminal conduct in Japan and specific deficiencies in Japanese public-order institutions. They point to the significant holdout problems resulting from the virtual life estate Japanese law grants tenants, under which eviction becomes virtually impossible in practice. This has given rise to the jiageya, or “land fixers,” a class of private individuals employed by real estate developers and tenants alike to make threatening telephone calls, to organize disruptive activities, and otherwise to use physical violence to prompt evictions and resolve disputes.

Where public-order institutions are inadequate or even wholly absent, participants in unregulated private-order institutions may find that refraining from downside practices simply constitutes bad business. Absent a state-imposed penalty or other type of sanction, fixing prices or limiting participation to a restricted group may well present

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11. See Hendley et al., supra note 5, at 39; Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 45, 92-95; see also DIEGO GAMBETTA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE PROTECTION (1993); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 101-103 (1990) (comparing consequences of differing institutional heritages in North and Latin America); Bernard Black et al., Corporate Law from Scratch, in 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 245, 255 (Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996) (explaining that, in the face of weak state enforcement, Russian enterprise managers must lie on their tax reports, bribe state officials, pay off the mafia, and engage in other corrupt practices simply to stay in business); Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 22-23 (1984) (describing the poor fit between Brazilian culture and governing law).

12. Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 45; see also JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998) (describing failures of state planning).

13. Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 43-44; see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623-25 (1998); Mann, supra note 3, at 2228-29, 2272. Inadequate or otherwise problematic public policies need not, of course, promote private order’s “dark side,” and instead may simply prompt effective private-order institutions to develop. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3, at 1770-71.

14. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 68-69.
the most rational and efficient course of action, at least from the perspective of institutional members. This is not, of course, to say that all problematic facets of private order stem from purely rational behavior. Less than optimal private-order norms may result from information lags, changing technologies, moral considerations, cognitive biases, and even envy.\textsuperscript{15} But whether rational or not, private downside practices persist where neither the private institutions nor their members bear the immediate costs of the practices employed, and, even if long-term efficiency suffers, the individual benefits reaped outweigh (again from the individual’s or individual institution’s perspective) any aggregate loss in overall welfare. Consequently, private-order institutions will continue to engage in these practices absent a mechanism, be it public or private, to force internalization of the negative externalities produced.\textsuperscript{16}

II. FIXING AND FACILITATING PRIVATE ORDER

Private order’s downside leads McMillan and Woodruff rightly to conclude that “[w]e thus need public order to limit these abuses of private order.”\textsuperscript{17} How best to structure public-order institutions to accomplish this purpose is hardly self-evident, but three rudimentary principles should guide the effort.

A. Developing vs. Developed Economies

Private-order institutions exist in both developing and highly developed economies.\textsuperscript{18} In one sense, private order responds to a similar problem in both societies, namely a dissatisfaction with the existing public order as a mechanism to govern private relationships and to resolve disputes. Whether that dissatisfaction arises from a vacuum in the public realm, or from disagreement with or distaste for the substantive content of public law and the procedures that implement it, it finds expression in the creation of a system of private rules thought better to serve the interests of those adhering to them than do those in the public arena.


\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., Black, \textit{supra} note 11, at 247; Braguinsky, \textit{supra} note 5, at 517; Posner, \textit{supra} note 5, at 1711-25.

\textsuperscript{17} McMillan & Woodruff, \textit{supra} note 1, at 2458.

\textsuperscript{18} See, e.g., Bernstein, \textit{Private Commercial Law, supra} note 3; McMillan & Woodruff, \textit{supra} note 1, at 2432, 2438.
But while the origins may be similar, at least when broadly defined, the systems of private order in developing and developed economies may require wholly distinct responses from the public sectors. Seemingly successful public norms and programs from industrial or developed economies may be ill-adapted to the complex issues confronting less developed ones. For example, a developing economy may be characterized by a lack of experience with and commitment to competitive markets, the prevalence of bribery and acceptance of bribery as a means of doing business and transacting with public officials, and a history of opaque decisionmaking and adjudicatory processes.

In such a climate, a public prohibition on price-fixing with an accompanying private right of action in court might have little impact on anticompetitive private-order practices. Those injured by private-order collusion justifiably may lack confidence in public-order institutions to provide redress given that opaque decisionmaking and corruption have previously been the dominant characteristics of public dispute resolution. Public institutions, moreover, may lack personnel with sufficient experience with competitive markets to implement a ban on price-fixing or more open-ended public norms. Indeed, inexperienced or ill-trained public officials can make matters worse. And the absence of necessary supportive institutions, the class Milhaupt and West call "rights enforcement agents," can further hinder enforcement of public norms; accountants, appraisers, credit rating services, the private bar, and the press reduce uncertainty by bridging reputational and informational gaps among parties to commercial

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19. See NORTH, supra note 11, at 101 (describing failed adoption of U.S. and European law in Latin America); SCOTT, supra note 12 (noting problematic transfer of agricultural programs developed in western nations to less temperate regions, particularly in Africa); Black et al., supra note 11, at 245; Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000); Gray, supra note 6, at 15; Rosemm, supra note 11, at 22-23 (laws transplanted in Brazil not tailored to Brazilian culture, producing gap between law and practice).

20. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 11, at 67; Black et al., supra note 11, at 247; Black et al., supra note 19; Braguinsky, supra note 5, at 519-20; Gray, supra note 6, at 14; Hendley et al., supra note 5, at 22; see also Donatella della Porta & Alberto Vannucci, The 'Perverse Effects' of Political Corruption, 45 POL. STUD. 516, 537 (1997).


transactions and thereby facilitate enforcement of the public norms governing those exchanges.\textsuperscript{23}

These factors necessarily circumscribe the mechanisms available to public policymakers seeking both to remedy downside facets of private order and to facilitate implementation of its beneficial components. Accordingly, the design of public institutions in developing economies should be seen as a distinct project from the design (or redesign) of such institutions in developed ones. Blind mimicry of public-law structures utilized in highly developed economies will not only replicate the problematic features of those systems, but at best will ignore and more likely exacerbate the unique mix of problems confronting developing ones. Developing economies should not be seen simply as developed ones at an earlier stage of evolution.

\section*{B. The Need for Public-Order Norm Creation}

The existence of well-developed, operational private norms might suggest that the goal of public institutions in a developing economy should be restricted to facilitating implementation of private-order norms. Limited resources, it might be argued, ought not be wasted on an attempt to replicate what already exists, particularly given the extensive literature praising the ability of private-order institutions to develop norms that are often more efficient than those produced by the public sector.\textsuperscript{24} Better to concentrate on mechanisms to aid the smooth and efficient functioning of the private-order system.

Notwithstanding the facial allure of such a strategy, public-order institutions in a developing economy should seek not only to facilitate enforcement of sound and effective private norms, but also to promulgate substantive public norms governing primary conduct. Private order’s downside is not limited to problems of enforcement. The externalities produced by anticompetitive or discriminatory practices cannot be remedied by a public-order institution restricted to the efficient and unreflective enforcement of private-order norms. Where an unregulated private sector is characterized by such practices, the public realm should promulgate corrective public norms, although not necessarily strictly coercive ones,\textsuperscript{25} to force private-order institutions

\textsuperscript{23} See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 58; see also Ronald V. Gilson, \textit{Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing}, 94 \textit{YALE L.J.} 239, 255 (describing “transaction cost engineers”); Gray, supra note 6, at 16 (referring to “watchdog institutions”); Mann, supra note 3, at 2267-68 (describing role of “information merchants”).


\textsuperscript{25} See infra Section II.C.
to internalize the externalities they produce, and to act in ways that are efficient not only in the short run.  

And even where private-order norms appear productive and efficient in light of current market conditions, public-order institutions can help curb the potential for private-order inefficiencies in the future. Just as private-order systems may arise because of dissatisfaction with the content of substantive public-order norms, the continued development of considered public-order rules can function to keep a private-order regime from becoming sluggish. While private norms often may be more efficient, and indeed preferable to public-order rules, various factors may cause private norms to lag behind technological and other changes and thereby regulate private behavior less than optimally. The promulgation of public-order norms thereby should foster an ongoing dialogue between private- and public-order institutions about the optimal content of substantive norms.

Finally, in specified contexts, public intervention may be appropriate notwithstanding the fact that private-order practices may reflect rational considerations and yield policies deemed efficient from both short- and long-term perspectives. In other words, even where private order may be efficient and flexibly so, it may run counter to fundamental principles that a society, upon proper reflection, decides should not be subject to the calculus of efficiency.

C. Implementation Measures

Public-order institutions should foster implementation of both well-functioning private norms and the public-order rules that displace problematic private ones.

First, while some private-order institutions reject wholesale any interaction with public-order institutions, carefully targeted action by public-order institutions can facilitate implementation of robust and efficient private norms. Elinor Ostrom has explained, for example, how California provided public institutional facilities needed to implement a program devised by private parties and local governments to manage underground water storage basins in the Los Angeles met-

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27. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 3, at 282-83; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3, at 1770-71; Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 3.


29. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3, at 1770 (arguing private transactors may employ state procedures in end-game situations while preferring extra-legal norms in cooperative relationships they seek to preserve); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3, at 115; Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 3.
The state codified the local arrangement as state law; it opened its courts, subsidized the cost of litigation, and conferred standing on participants in the program to ease speedy resolution of disputes; and it provided important technical assistance to assess the stability and capacity of the underground basins. While the underlying arrangement was not a purely private one, Ostrom's observations regarding the state's role in facilitating sustainable management of this common pool resource indicate more broadly that the public realm can provide important institutional facilities to enforce and otherwise support promising norms produced by private order.

The reliance of certain private-order institutions on externality-producing enforcement mechanisms further supports the need for effective public implementation of some private-order norms. Private actors may rely on vandalism or other forms of physical violence precisely because the underlying private-order arrangement conflicts with an established public norm, as, for example, when the underlying arrangement is a loansharking contract. In this context, the public realm must either accept the violence or commit the resources necessary to curtail the underlying substantive private norm; simply providing an alternative mechanism to enforce the private norm will not suffice. Elsewhere, however, private-order norms may fully comport with public-order principles; the private norms designed to restrain overuse of a communal resource often provide such an example. Here the problem is not the underlying private norm, but the reliance of private-order institutions on unaccountable forms of self-help, including vandalism and other acts of physical violence, to enforce the norm. And while private order's ability to employ such measures may explain the efficacy of some private-order systems, public institutions, at least in theory, can offer an alternative remedy.

Second, where public-order institutions seek not to implement or improve the implementation of private norms, but instead to modify or supplant a substantive private-order norm that thwarts public concerns for efficiency and fairness, they should be wary of employing purely coercive measures. Such measures can, at times, advance public policy aims, but they often impose sizeable costs, both to the pub-

30. See Ostrom, supra note 7, at 133.

31. See, e.g., Acheson, supra note 6, at 73-76; Ellickson, supra note 3, at 215-19; Ostrom, supra note 7, at 15-19; see also Miller, supra note 10, at 77-109.

32. In this regard, the public realm's role mirrors that played by some private entities when public-order norms emerge without accompanying complementary enforcement mechanisms. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 58-60 (describing public-order enforcement gap).

33. Identification of such norms is not necessarily an easy task. See Posner, supra note 5, at 1726-27.

lic sector and to the private-order entities subject to them, and they are likely to engender counterproductive resistance by the regulated community.\textsuperscript{35} Public institutions themselves may lack the ability and resources to enforce them fairly and effectively.\textsuperscript{36}

A more promising strategy may be to encourage private-order implementation of the public norm.\textsuperscript{37} Various mechanisms exist to accomplish this, including technology-forcing laws that instruct designated private industries to internalize the externality they produce;\textsuperscript{38} market-based incentive structures;\textsuperscript{39} and rules that encourage private self-regulation.\textsuperscript{40} To varying degrees, a credible threat of wholly public enforcement mechanisms must generally lie behind these approaches.\textsuperscript{41}

Finally, when public procedures are employed to implement public norms, those procedures must be tailored to accommodate the power and resources of the public institutions that will oversee them. In developing economies marked by the difficulties discussed earlier, this


\textsuperscript{36} See, e.g., Braguinsky, supra note 5, at 517; Gray, supra note 6, at 14.

\textsuperscript{37} See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 1008-14 (1995); Posner, supra note 5, at 1729-32; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 923.


\textsuperscript{40} For example, the relatively new Russian corporate law seeks to increase opportunities for significant minority shareholders to protect their interests against self-dealing company insiders, notwithstanding weak procedures for public judicial oversight. The law increases the number of decisions that require shareholder approval, authorizes supermajority voting requirements, and restricts certain decisions to disinterested directors. See Black et al., supra note 11, at 248-51.

\textsuperscript{41} Effective implementation of public norms also requires the participation of the "rights-enforcement agents" that Milhaupt and West describe. Lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, credit rating agencies, and even the press acquire and share information and monitor behavior by both private and public actors. In developing economies where too few of these agents operate, public-order institutions should facilitate growth of this class through financial incentives, job training, and the removal of state-imposed or otherwise artificial barriers to entry. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 58-60; see also Gray, supra note 6, at 16.
means that the public realm may be required to adopt procedures that
sacrifice flexibility for clarity and that limit the discretion exercised by
public decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{42} Even the rigidity and formality of the English
writ system might provide a model approach. Notwithstanding the ex-
tensive criticism lodged against it, the writ system offered a fixed pro-
cess and standardized remedies that largely removed discretionary
power from the primary decisionmaker’s role.\textsuperscript{43} To be sure, rules that
sacrifice flexibility for clarity may fail to do justice in an individual
case. But a developing economy may well find that such a cost must
be incurred until the systematic deficiencies that mark emerging public
institutions are mitigated or ideally eliminated. At that time, more
nuanced, albeit less clear rules, the ones Carol Rose terms “muddy,”
can emerge.\textsuperscript{44}

III. THE LEGITIMACY OF PUBLIC ORDER

Private order is not, as McMillan and Woodruff appropriately con-
clude, a substitute for public order. The public realm performs, or at
least should perform, an important function in both developing and
developed economies by correcting problematic features of otherwise
well-functioning private-order systems, and by facilitating the smooth
implementation of effective private-order norms. It is not, however,
solely these functions that warrant state involvement when a system of
private order operates. The process of democratic deliberation, with
its accompanying norms of transparency, predictability, and account-
ability, offers the promise of more reflective and inclusive governance
than can even the most efficient private-order institution.

Private-order systems are, by definition, private, and accordingly
do not and need not embody “the legal norms and political consensus
on which state order is based.”\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, it is their freedom from these
constraints that yields much of private order’s effectiveness and pro-
ductivity. Private-order institutions may choose to hear from non-
members prior to adopting a policy or practice, but they need not do
so. Likewise, private-order decisionmakers can, but need not, employ
the rules that govern in public judicial proceedings; indeed, their abil-

\textsuperscript{42} See, e.g., James Spinner, Remarks Before the International Gathering of Experts on
the Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the Americas (Oct. 15-16,

\textsuperscript{43} See, e.g., F. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 295-375 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 271-84 (5th ed. Little, Brown & Co., 1956) (1929); MARTIN

\textsuperscript{44} Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, \textit{40 STAN. L. REV.} 577, 582-83
(1988). \textit{See also} Black et al., supra note 11, at 251 (expressing preference for bright-line
rules where emerging public institutions are weak).

\textsuperscript{45} Milhaupt & West, \textit{supra} note 5, at 92.
ity to consult evidence that would be inadmissible in public-adjudicatory processes arguably enables them to produce more tailored decisions than can public institutions. Participants in private-order institutions benefit in both the short and long term from these techniques.

Democratic public-order decisionmaking, by contrast, requires compliance with established procedural norms, including public processes in which all affected individuals and groups are or at least should be able to participate. The resulting process may well be unwieldy and the ultimate policy choice may itself yield inefficiencies. But these sacrifices find justification in the value produced by public participation itself. That participation both confers public legitimacy on the substantive decisions reached, regardless of their content, and fosters public acceptance of, if not agreement with, policy choices that are implemented. As important, the act of participation itself, wholly independent of the outcome produced, holds value as a mechanism to create and develop identity and community. As Frank Michelman has explained: "Through political engagement, persons or communities (or both, reciprocally) forge identities, and persons assume freedom in the 'positive' sense of social and moral agency. The value of the engagement is thus understood as inseparable from the self-constitutive value of identity and freedom."

The particular substantive policies that result from public participation in their creation provide a further basis to prefer public-order decisionmaking to private. Unlike private-order norms, public rules produced through the process of democratic deliberation should embody a conception of the common public good, as opposed to purely private preference. To be sure, public decisions often fall short of this aspiration, and a sizeable literature suggests that they will invaria-

46. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2425; see also Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3, at 126-27; Charny, supra note 3, at 415.

47. Cf. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 286-89 (1962) (describing influence of special interest groups on public decisionmakers); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-26 (1985) (describing the advantages "discrete and insular" groups have in forming well-organized lobbies).


policy is more aspirational than descriptive, that aspiration and a commitment to strive toward achieving it distinguish the public from the private realm and provide a basis to prefer the former over the latter. Private order is private preference, with no pretense that it defines or pursues a common good. And while those truly pessimistic about public order's ability to avoid capture and factional control might prefer private order for the transparency of its goals, a system that offers the promise and at times the reality of transcending individual self-interest in order to define and promote a common public good ought to be the object of our aspirations. Here, we should reject the notion that the best is the enemy of the good, and instead strive for the first-best solution, because it can be the only source of public legitimacy in a democratic society. In other words, the democratic political process should not be understood "as simply another sort of market."51

This does not mean that public-order institutions should aim to supplant the system of private order in whole or even in part. The scholarship on private order has demonstrated how, in many circumstances, private norms yield benefits that the public realm cannot effectively produce.52 Democratic public-order institutions are nevertheless needed to confer public legitimacy on well-functioning private-order norms. Particularly in developing economies where a vacuum in public order spurs the creation of private-order norms to structure transactions, public institutions should be developed to assess those norms, even if the process of democratic deliberation yields nothing more than acquiescence to or ratification of the extant system of private order. Such deliberation certifies the fairness and public acceptance of the private system and thereby confers public legitimacy that the private-order system would otherwise lack in a democratic society.53

Democratic public institutions thus are critical, and in this sense foundational, even where private order appears to function smoothly and efficiently. Their role is limited neither to repairing cracks in private order nor to fillings gaps in that regulatory system. Instead, an inclusive, transparent, and democratic public sphere ultimately provides the authoritative forum for deliberation about norms of governance. It provides the starting and ending point for public legitimacy, and thus the foundation of legitimacy for private order as well.

52. See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text.