Protecting Freedom of Testation: A Proposal for Law Reform

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This Article addresses a problem ever more pressing in wealthy and aging societies like the United States: interference with freedom of testation by the use of wrongful means such as undue influence or will forgery to acquire benefits through inheritance. A detailed analysis of the remedies against interference with freedom of testation under inheritance law, tort law, and equity reveals that there is currently a significant under-deterrence of this undesirable behavior. Hence, this Article proposes a new remedy in order to protect freedom of testation more effectively: a disinheritance statute barring wrongdoers that have infringed upon someone’s freedom of testation from inheriting from their victims, not unlike the slayer statutes adopted by many state legislators in order to deal with “murdering heirs.” This statutory prohibition against inheritance in cases of interference with freedom of testation would do more than alleviate the identified under-deterrence problem. The proposed legislative reform would also conform with an important principle of American law: the idea that no one should profit from his wrongdoing. In addition, arguments in favour of the suggested proposal can be made by reference to the general trend towards a behavior-based inheritance regime and in view of the availability of similar rules in jurisdictions outside the United States.
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INTRODUCTION

*Heredis fletus sub persona risus est.* According to a Latin aphorism, the weeping of an heir is nothing more than laughter under a mask.1 One explanation for this cynical view of survivors’ grief is

1. See *Publicii Syri Sententiae* 16 (R. A. H. Bickford-Smith ed., C. J. Clay & Sons 1895). In academic writings today, the term “laughing heir” is used specifically to designate heirs that are so loosely linked to the testator that they suffer no sense of bereavement. Cf. David F. Cavers, *Change in the American Family and the “Laughing Heir”,* 20 *Iowa L. Rev.* 203, 208 (1935) (introducing the term by reference to the German phrase ”*der lachende Erbe*”); David V. DeRosa, *Note, Intestate Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do We Want to Get the Last Laugh?,* 12
that the acquisition of property through inheritance was an important source of individual wealth in ancient Rome—just as it is today in the United States. In the United States, like in many other jurisdictions, freedom of testation underlies the allocation of a person’s property upon death, giving the owner the right to designate beneficiaries. The less restricted this right is, the more potential there is for disappointment. Relatives and friends hoping to receive a share of the deceased’s estate might suddenly find themselves empty-handed because the testator revised his plans, or because he never intended to leave them anything in the first place. It is this uncomfortable situation—facing the chance of an increase in personal wealth, yet being at the whim of the testator—that sometimes leads to drastic action. Some people forge, destroy, or suppress wills, or deceive, unduly influence, or threaten the testator into making a will in their favor.

It is evident that such behavior—herein called “interference with freedom of testation” and described in more detail later—is wrong, irrespective of whether one adopts a welfarist or rights-based point of view. Moreover, there is reason to assume that, in a
wealthy and aging society such as the United States, interferences with freedom of testation will become more frequent in the future. First, because the next years will witness a giant intergenerational transfer of wealth, large sums could be gained from this kind of undesirable behavior. Second, because the population is aging and the elderly tend to be particularly vulnerable to behavior like undue influence, there will be more opportunities for interference with freedom of testation.\(^9\)

Against this background, the question of how interference with freedom of testation can be effectively remedied is a pressing one. Recently, it has received increased academic attention because of the rise of the tort for wrongful interference with inheritance.\(^11\) Under this remedy, “[o]ne who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance . . . that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance . . . .”\(^12\)

testation can be explained by reference to the costs of rent-seeking and rent-avoidance that are typically associated with it. Think, for example, of the resources that an interferor has to spend if he wants to find the testator’s will in order to secretly destroy it. These resources are wasted from society’s perspective. They do not create welfare for anyone. A similar waste of resources occurs if the testator, knowing of the possibility that his will might be destroyed by a disappointed descendant, takes special precautionary measures against such an act of interference, for example by buying a safe in which he places his will. These precautionary costs would be unnecessary in a perfect world (where wills are not suppressed), and thus they also waste resources. For a similar welfarist explanation of the undesirability of theft, see Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997).


10. See, e.g., Kenneth I. Shulman et al., Assessment of Testamentary Capacity and Vulnerability to Undue Influence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 722, 723–24 (2007) (stating that older adults are particularly likely to suffer from cognitive impairment and dementia and that these factors cause particular vulnerability to undue influence).


12. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979). Classifying the tort as a remedy against interference with freedom of testation might be considered controversial, given that the focus of the tort seems to be not on the wrong committed against the testator but rather on the wrong committed against the would-be beneficiary. Of course, both issues are inextricably linked. Hence, some conceptualize the tort as a claim derivative of the decedent’s rights, others as a primary claim of the disappointed beneficiary. See Diane J. Klein, The Disappointed Heir’s Revenge, Southern Style: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 79, 88–89 n. 12 (2003) [hereinafter Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits]. For a criticism of both conceptualizations of the tort, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 379–88.
Hardly recognized three decades ago, this remedy against interference with freedom of testation is now available in almost two dozen states\(^\text{13}\) and is also the subject of academic controversy.\(^\text{14}\) One reason for recognizing this tort is that antisocial conduct, like undue influence, should be deterred more effectively.\(^\text{15}\) Some argue that the traditional remedies against interference with freedom of testation—the probate will contest and the equitable action for restitution by way of a constructive trust—do not deter this kind of undesirable behavior sufficiently. Critics of the tort, however, hold the view that, rather than recognizing a conceptually flawed new tort, the under-deterrence problem should be tackled by reforming the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation.\(^\text{16}\)

This Article argues that both supporters and critics of the “new” tort for wrongful interference with inheritance are slightly mistaken when it comes to the question of how antisocial conduct directed at


\(^{14}\) For a powerful doctrinal attack on the tort both from the perspective of tort law and inheritance law, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11. See also Klein, Mountain States, supra note 13, at 2–3 (“To some . . . commentators, the need for such a cause of action is obvious and acute . . . . To others, the tort is an improper, unnecessary incursion on the probate court’s special procedures and evidentiary requirements . . . .”).

\(^{15}\) Cf., e.g., Irene D. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance or Gift—Suggestions for Resort to the Tort, 39 U. Tol. L. Rev. 769, 774 (2008) (stating that the possibility of attorneys’ fees being assessed as damages in tort and the availability of punitive damages might deter potential interferors); Klein, Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at 267–68 (stating that a tort approach may seem clearly preferable to a probate system in terms of deterrence); Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 239 (arguing that traditional remedies against interference with freedom of testation are deficient because they do not “deter certain tort defendants”); Marianna R. Chaffin, Comment, Stealing the Family Farm: Tortious Interference with Inheritance, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 73, 95 (2004); Rachel A. Ott, Comment, Intentional Interference with an Expected Inheritance: The Only Valid Expectancy for Arkansas Heirs is to Expect Nothing, 64 Ark. L. Rev. 747, 747 (2011) (arguing for a recognition of this tort in Arkansas because “[e]quity requires a system of deterrence for those who might wrongfully interfere with [the testator’s] wishes”).

\(^{16}\) See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391–92 (arguing that courts should consider reforming probate practice and restitution actions).
the decedent’s freedom of disposition should be deterred. Although traditional remedies against interference with freedom of testation—will contests and constructive trusts—are unsatisfactory from the point of view of deterrence,17 neither a legislative reform of the “old” remedies nor the “new” tort remedy will solve the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testation.18 This Article thus presents a novel solution to the under-deterrence problem: the adoption of a statutory bar from inheritance modeled after the existing “slayer statutes” addressing the problem of the “murdering heir.”19 Such a remedy would not only alleviate the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testation; it would also conform with basic notions of justice underlying U.S. succession law.20

The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a definition of interference with freedom of testation and presents an effect-based taxonomy of this kind of wrongful behavior. Part II examines the existing remedies against this behavior from the point of view of deterrence. Part III explains how a statutory bar from inheritance would alleviate the current problem of under-deterrence, presents additional arguments in favor of such a legislative reform, anticipates possible criticism, and defends the proposed solution against it.

I. THE WRONG: INTERFERENCE WITH FREEDOM OF TESTATION DEFINED

This Part focuses on the wrong for which this Article will eventually propose a novel remedy: interference with freedom of testation. It begins by offering a definition of the wrongful behavior. Next, it will look more closely to the effects of this behavior and, on that basis, distinguish between six standard cases of interference with freedom of testation. This effect-based taxonomy shall later serve as a basis for the analysis of the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation.

17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
A. The Wrongful Behavior

Freedom of testation has been described as the “first principle” of U.S. succession law.\textsuperscript{21} It reflects the commitment of American law to a conception of rights as instruments for promoting individual autonomy.\textsuperscript{22} Even though its precise definition is subject to debate, there is little doubt on what autonomy is essentially about. Originally referring to the self-rule of Greek city-states, the term autonomy, if applied to individuals, is understood today as the ability of a person to act “freely in accordance with a self-chosen plan.”\textsuperscript{23} By allowing testators to decide how their property will be distributed upon death, the law of wills provides an important opportunity to exercise self-determination in that sense.\textsuperscript{24}

Not every decision of an individual, however, can be called autonomous. For a decision to qualify, two conditions are commonly
considered essential. First, the individual must be mentally competent to make an autonomous choice (one can speak of “agency”). Second, he or she must be free from controlling influences of others (one can speak of “liberty”). The prerequisites of agency and liberty are embodied in several legal concepts relating to the writing of wills. The requirement that the testator be of “sound mind” in order to execute a valid will reflects the requirement of agency. The requirement that the will not be subject to undue influence, duress, or fraud reflects the requirement of liberty.

Interference with freedom of testation occurs whenever, from a legal point of view, a third party infringes upon the testator’s autonomy. Consequently, it comprises the just-mentioned group of cases where, as a result of duress, fraud, or undue influence, the testator is under the controlling influence of another person (this may be called “heteronomy”). In addition to these types of behavior, two other kinds of wrongs also have to be included in the definition of interference with freedom of testation: the forgery of wills and their suppression. In contrast to the aforementioned behaviors, the forgery of wills and their suppression are not directed at the testator himself. Rather, these acts can take place without any contact between the wrongdoer and the decedent. Their effect, however, if successfully undertaken, is not in any respect different from that of the first type of attack on the testator’s autonomy. If a forged will is executed, or if intestacy rules apply as a result of the suppression of the proper will of the testator, the property distribution upon the decedent’s death does not reflect his actual intent. In the following sections, wrongful interference with freedom of testation will include will forgery, will suppression, fraud, undue influence, and duress (if directed at a testator).

Applying these doctrines may of course prove tremendously difficult in practice. In particular, the concept of “undue influence” has

26. *See id.; cf.* Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment ch. 2, topic 2, intro. note (2011) (“[T]ransactional autonomy requires that a transferor’s consent to a transfer be both competent and legitimately obtained.”).
29. It seems that the term “heteronomy” has so far not been used to define interference with freedom of testation. For this purpose, I suggest using it in the broad sense of being under the controlling influence by another party and not in the specific sense given to it by Kant. *See generally* Simon Blackburn, *autonomy/heteronomy*, in *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* 31 (1994) (noting that heteronomy generally occurs when one’s will is controlled by another, while Kant specifically refers to heteronomy as “the condition of acting on desires that are not legislated by reason”).
proven notoriously problematic in litigation and is therefore subject to sharp academic criticism. For the definition of interference with freedom of testation in the abstract, however, these practical difficulties in drawing the line between autonomy and heteronomy do not matter. Not unlike the prerequisite that the testator be mentally competent, the requirement that the testator not be subjected to undue influence, duress, or fraud in order for a will to be valid is indispensable for a will to be the product of the testator’s autonomy.

B. The Effects of the Wrongful Behavior

In the definition of interference with freedom of testation offered, the outcome of such misconduct has only been described in the most general terms: the replacement of the testator’s autonomy by heteronomy. This description does not fully account for important differences in the possible effects of wrongful interference. These differences result from the fact that anyone considering interfering with another’s freedom of testation will adapt his behavior with reference to three important factors: (1) whether the testator has already executed a valid will; (2) whether, if already in existence, the executed will is in the potential wrongdoer’s favor; and (3) whether the testator is satisfied with the current status of his dispositions or plans to change it. These factors not only determine whether or not it makes sense for the potential wrongdoer to interfere with the testator’s freedom but also have an influence on what he will aim to do. For example, they will impact whether he will try to cause the testator to execute a new will or keep the existing will. Building on these insights, six standard cases of interference with freedom of testation can be identified.

In the first case, the wrongdoer (hereinafter “interferor”), by means of fraud, duress, or undue influence, induces the execution

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31. For a similar taxonomy, see Restatement of Restitution § 184 cmt. a (1937) (distinguishing between seven cases); Reinhard Zimmermann, “Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam condicionem facere potest” Kränkungen der Testierfreiheit des Erblassers – englisches im Vergleich zum kontinentaleuropäischen Recht, in 1 Unternehmen, Markt und Verantwortung, Festchrift für Klaus J. Hoff zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010, at 269 (Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2010) [in German] (distinguishing between five cases).
of a new will in his favor (or in favor of a third person whom the interferor wants to benefit). Any will that the testator executed before forming the new will is likely treated as revoked insofar as it is inconsistent with the new will.

The second case is in effect quite similar. Here, the interferor, instead of wrongfully inducing the testator to execute a will in his favor, decides to forge a will that designates the interferor as an heir. The result, if the interferor’s plan is successful, is a written document appearing as if it represents the testator’s free volition when in fact it expresses the interferor’s wishes.

In the third case, the interferor’s behavior is not directed at the production of a new document purporting to represent the testator’s free volition. Rather, it is directed at a document that already exists. Here, the interferor uses fraud, duress, or undue influence to induce the testator to revoke his will. Of course, such behavior makes sense only in cases where the mere revocation of the existing will is going to benefit the interferor. This requires either that he would receive a share of the testator’s estate under the respective jurisdiction’s intestacy laws or that there exists still another will that is beneficial to the interferor that will now be treated as if it were the final will of the testator.

In the fourth case, the departure point is usually the same as in the previous case. The interferor realizes that the testator has already executed an unfavorable will, but instead of wrongfully inducing the testator to revoke it, the interferor destroys or hides

32. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed in the following that the interferor acts for his own benefit. Where interference for the benefit of a third party requires a different legal analysis, this will be pointed out explicitly. See infra note 97.

33. See, e.g., In re Nutt’s Estate, 185 P. 393 (Cal. 1919) (testatrix’s physician withheld from her the information that she would die soon and thus brought her to execute a will in favor of the physician’s husband in return for a promise to provide care of her during her remaining lifetime). In re Nutt’s Estate is cited in the reporter’s notes as the basis for Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.3 illus. 6 (2003).


35. See, e.g., King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App. 1987) (awarding damages for tortious interference with inheritance on basis that decedent’s widow had forged will).

36. Whether will forgery is an option for the interferor will particularly depend on the testamentary formalities in the respective jurisdiction. Where private wills have to be attested by witnesses, forgery seems much harder than in jurisdictions that allow for holographic (i.e. handwritten) wills. For more on testamentary formalities in the United States, see Ronald J. Scalis, Jr., Testamentary Formalities in the United States of America, in 1 Comparative Succession Law: Testamentary Formalities, supra note 2, at 357.

37. In this case, the interferor would be an “heir apparent.” Cf. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 2.1 cmt. d. (1999).

38. See, e.g., Griffin v. Baucom, 328 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (concerning evidence that decedent’s wife, dissatisfied with her husband’s will, unduly induced him to destroy it so that his estate passed entirely to her).
the will. Again, such a plan will only be attractive if there is anything to be gained from the application of the respective jurisdiction’s intestacy laws or the probate of a previous will.

In the fifth case, the circumstances are quite different. The interferor is satisfied with the status quo but realizes that the testator intends to execute a will that would be disadvantageous to him. Thus, he uses wrongful means—i.e. fraud, duress, or undue influence—in order to prevent the testator from executing the will as intended.

The sixth case is only a slight variation, in which the interferor wrongfully prevents the decedent not from executing a new will but from revoking an existing one. The goal of the interferor is the same as in the previous case: preserving the existing estate plan of the decedent against the latter’s will.

It is these six cases of interference with freedom of testation that shall serve as the basis for an analysis of the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation. As shall be demonstrated, some of them cause greater difficulties for courts and legislators than others. One evident difficulty, however, is common to most cases of interference with freedom of testation: as a result of the wrongdoing, it is often almost impossible to establish with certainty the testator’s true intent. Only the testator himself could authoritatively answer the question of how he would have exercised his freedom of testation if he had not been threatened, deceived, or unduly influenced. Given that litigation over interference with

39. See, e.g., In re Robinson’s Estate, 270 P. 1020 (Wash. 1928) (holding that the previous court had not erred in refusing to confirm appointment of the decedent’s son as an executor, the son having been found by the court to be responsible for the suppression of his mother’s will).

40. See, e.g., Pope v. Garrett, 211 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1948) (decedent, when planning to sign a will shortly before her death, was prevented from doing so by two relatives using “physical force or . . . creating a disturbance”). Pope v. Garrett is cited in the reporter’s notes as the basis for Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.3 illus. 11 (2003). See also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 351–52 (using Pope v. Garrett as example for the functioning of constructive trusts as remedies in interference cases).

41. See, e.g., Brazil v. Silva, 185 P. 174 (Cal. 1919) (testator was deceived by beneficiary into believing that the will that he intended to revoke had been destroyed by beneficiary). Brazil v. Silva is cited in the reporter’s notes as the basis for Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.3 illus. 10 (2003); see also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 351–53 (using Brazil v. Silva as an example for the functioning of constructive trusts as remedies in interference cases).

42. This problem does not arise in the cases of will forgery and will suppression. Because the testator is not under the influence of the interferor in these cases, there is no reason to speculate what the testator’s mental state would have been if there had been no interference. This is not to say, however, that these cases may not cause evidentiary problems. In the case of a will forgery, it might not be possible to establish the authenticity of the purported will with certainty. Similarly, in a case of will suppression, it might be impossible to establish the
freedom of testation takes place posthumously, this testimony is obviously not available. Of course, courts might instead rely on evidence only in regards to past conduct of the testator and operate with inferences, presumptions, and burden shifting. Although such mechanisms might help when it comes to verifying the wrongful interference as such, they are inevitably less reliable when it comes to establishing the testator’s true intent, given that the latter is entirely part of the testator’s inner world. This “worst evidence” problem explains why remedying interference with freedom of testation is a serious challenge for any court or law reformer.

II. THE EXISTING REMEDIES—WHY THEY ARE NOT SATISFACTORY WITH REGARD TO DETERRENCE

American law recognizes several remedies that promise relief for interference with freedom of testation, some of them well established (i.e. will contest and constructive trusts) and one of them fairly recent (i.e. the tort action for interference with an inheritance). The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that neither the “old” remedies nor the “new” remedy are satisfactory when it comes to deterrence of interference with freedom of testation. Contrary to what some commentators suggest, even a legislative reform of these remedies would not solve the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testation.
A. Will Contests and Their Deficiencies in Terms of Deterrence

The classic remedy against interference with freedom of testation is the will contest, a proceeding that is brought in order to have a will either declared invalid or denied admission to probate. Typically, it can only be brought after the testator’s death and only by persons with a financial interest in the contest. The grounds of contest include, but are not limited to, most acts of interference with freedom of testation. The Restatement (Third) of Property explicitly states that a will procured by undue influence, duress, or fraud is invalid. In the comments, it is made clear that forgery is also a ground for contest. Despite its seemingly broad area of application, will contests are often criticized as providing an insufficient remedy against interference with freedom of testation. As shall be demonstrated, this criticism holds true, particularly if one analyzes will contests with regard to their suitability for deterring potential interferors.

The first reason why will contests are sometimes alleged to be an insufficient remedy are the special procedural difficulties that will contestants face. For example, depending on the jurisdiction, there are strict limits on standing and time limitations for bringing a contest. Moreover, some probate courts require a higher standard of proof (i.e. clear and convincing evidence) for certain allegations of interference with freedom of testation than is normally required in civil actions. These procedural hurdles are
substantial and might, at least to some extent, explain why will contests only rarely occur.\textsuperscript{54} Of course, one could justify these hurdles by reference to the fact that there seems to be a substantial risk of spurious will contests because of both the elusiveness of the concept of undue influence and the peculiarities of American civil procedure.\textsuperscript{55} This does not alter the fact that, from an interferor’s perspective, the “roadblocks”\textsuperscript{56} for will contestants are most welcome. They decrease the probability of a successful will contest being brought and thus increase the chance that an interference with freedom of testation will yield profit.

The second reason why will contests are often considered an insufficient remedy does not merely relate to modifiable details of their procedural design. Because will contests are merely a means for invalidating a wrongfully procured will, they obviously cannot offer relief in two of the typical cases of interference with freedom of testation that have been identified above:\textsuperscript{57} the prevention of the execution of a will (case five) and the prevention of the revocation of a will (case six).\textsuperscript{58} In case five, as a result of the interference,

\footnotesize{54. See e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, \textit{Will Contests–An Empirical Study}, 22 \textit{Real Prop. Prob. \\& Tr. J.} 607, 614 (1987) (presenting an empirical study according to which less than one percent of wills offered for probate in Davidson County within a period of nine years were contested). \textit{But see} Langbein, \textit{supra} note 45, at 2042 n.5 (1994) (noting that the amount of capacity litigation in the United States is still "very serious").

55. See e.g., Goldberg & Sitkoff, \textit{supra} note 11, at 346 (stating that the openness of undue influence suits to circumstantial evidence creates incentives for strike suits); Daniel B. Kelly, \textit{Strategic Spillovers}, 111 \textit{Colum. L. Rev.} 1641, 1685–86 (2011) (stating that “[n]egative expected value suits are common in . . . probate courts” and noting that will contests may be initiated only to extract a settlement); Langbein, \textit{supra} note 45, at 2042–45 (arguing that, \textit{inter alia}, the availability of jury trial in probate matters and the American rule of costs invite meritless will contests); Leopold & Beyer, \textit{supra} note 43, at 134–36 (arguing that the post-mortem probate system encourages spurious will contests); Scalise, \textit{supra} note 30, at 99–100 (arguing that undue influence suits are so common in the United States because American law creates incentives for suing outside of the merits of the litigation); Spivack, \textit{supra} note 30, at 286–90 (arguing that the continuing existence of the undue influence doctrine means that heirs dissatisfied with a will can use the threat of a will contest to gain a settlement).

56. Fried, \textit{supra} note 51, at 361.

57. \textit{See supra} Part I.B.

58. It should be noted that a will contest is also not the right remedy for cases three (wrongful procurement of a revocation of will) and four (suppression of a will). However, in these cases, it is, at least in principle, possible to offer the original will for probate. Of course, the revoked or suppressed will can only be admitted to probate if its due execution and content can be proven, for example on the basis of existing copies, drafts, or recollection. This will be very difficult in most cases, not least because there is a presumption that a lost will has been destroyed by the testator with the intention to destroy it. \textit{See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills \\& Other Donative Transfers} § 4.1 cmts. a, j, k (1999); cf. Fried, \textit{supra} note 51, at 364–66 (describing the difficulties faced by proponents of a destroyed will); Goldberg & Sitkoff, \textit{supra} note 11, at 377–78 (discussing the question whether probate offers adequate relief in case of will suppression by reference to \textit{In re Estate of Hatten}, 880 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).}
there is no will that could be invalidated.\textsuperscript{59} In case six, the will which the testator intended to revoke must nevertheless be admitted to probate because the necessary revocatory act on the will has not been performed.\textsuperscript{60} In both cases, even a legislative reform of the will contest cannot alleviate the under-deterrence problem.

Finally, from a deterrence perspective, there is a third reason why will contests are not a satisfactory remedy, even in cases where will contests are clearly applicable.\textsuperscript{61} If faced only with the possibility of a will contest, a potential interferor has, simply put, almost nothing to lose from his misbehavior. Even if the wrongfully procured will is determined to be invalid as a result of a will contest, the interferor will end in a financial position that is not substantially worse than the one he would have been in absent the wrongful interference.\textsuperscript{62} This is so because the interferor’s financial\textsuperscript{63} losses from a frustrated attempt of interference will usually only come from two sources. First, if the interferor (unsuccessfully) tries to defend the wrongfully purported will against contest, he will incur attorney’s fees and other related costs. Given that, at least in most cases, he will act in bad faith when defending the wrongfully procured will, the interferor will most likely not be able to recover his costs from the estate, irrespective of whether he acts as executor or as a mere beneficiary.\textsuperscript{64} Second, the interferor will incur opportunity costs


\textsuperscript{60} See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 illus. 10 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. g (1999). In some cases, however, the harmless error rule might apply to render the revocation effective. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 8.3 illus. 10 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 3.3 cmt. c, 4.1 cmt. g (1999).

\textsuperscript{61} On the basis of what has been said in the previous paragraph, it is clear that will contests can offer relief only in cases one (wrongful procurement of a will) and five (forgery of a will).


\textsuperscript{63} In addition to financial losses, there might of course also be reputational losses associated with a probate court’s finding that the will is invalid as a result of a wrongful act by the interferor. However, these costs will in most cases not be significant enough to exert substantial deterrence.

\textsuperscript{64} See, e.g., In re Faust’s Estate, 96 P.2d 680 (Kan. 1939) (holding that court may refuse to allow costs and attorney fees to be paid out of an estate when a will is denied probate and the executor acted in bad faith); In re Winckler, 651 N.Y.S.2d 69, 71 (App. Div. 1996) (citation omitted) (holding that allowing the proponent of a will who has procured the execution of the will by undue influence “to recover his attorney’s fees from the assets of the estate would be a ‘perversion of justice’ because it would allow the proponent of the will to profit by his own wrong”); Mitchell v. Smith, 779 S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that proponents who undertake to probate a will in good faith are entitled to have their costs paid
when planning and carrying out the interference with freedom of testation.\(^{65}\) In the case of a year-long campaign of undue influence, for example, these costs will likely be significant, given that, as a result of his interference attempt, the interferor will have substantially less time to pursue other activities. In most cases, however, opportunity costs will probably be negligible given that planning and carrying out the interference is unlikely to be very time-consuming.\(^{66}\)

From the perspective of a potential wrongdoer who weighs the probable gains from an interference with freedom of testation against the probable costs,\(^{67}\) the previously mentioned costs will probably not be substantial enough to exert a large deterrent effect. This is so because the probability of a successful contest of a wrongfully purported will is significantly less than one hundred percent, given the fact that interference with freedom of testation is not easily discovered and there are "roadblocks" for will contestants. For a rational actor, the expected costs of an interference will correspondingly be smaller, and interference with freedom of testation will thus almost always produce an expected gain.\(^{68}\) To illustrate,

from the assets of the estate, but not proponents of a will procured through undue influence); 96 C.J.S. Wills § 843 (2011) (noting that a denial of probate on the ground that it was procured by fraud or undue influence of the executor would indicate bad faith on side of the executor and would prevent him from recovering his expenses from the estate); cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-720 (2010) ("If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred.").

\(^{65}\) Of course, these costs arise independently of whether a will contest is successfully brought.

\(^{66}\) In particular, the opportunity costs of fraud, threat, duress, will forgery, and will suppression will hardly be substantial. In addition, it should be noted that with regard to these opportunity costs, the interferor has full discretion as to how much he wants to spend.

\(^{67}\) The idea that wrongdoers engage in a cost/benefits analysis before deciding to act is one of the premises of the economic analysis of deterrence. Of course, "real wrongdoers" do not always behave in a way that is consistent with the notion of \textit{homo economicus}, as behavioral economics have shown. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, \textit{A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics}, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 45–46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Within the scope of the present Article, it is not possible to address the abundant literature on how the insights from social sciences about people’s actual behavior require a modification of standard deterrence theory. With regards to interference with freedom of testation, it does not seem untenable, however, to take the idea of the rationally calculating wrongdoer as a starting point. After all, as opposed to other wrongs committed within the context of close personal relationships, interference with freedom of testation will in most cases clearly be motivated by the concrete prospect of economic gain and not by other motivations that are a priori incompatible with the idea of the calculating wrongdoer.

\(^{68}\) The significance of the probability of law enforcement for the issue of deterrence is also one of the central ideas of the economic analysis of deterrence. According to orthodox deterrence theory, a sanction that would deter optimally at an enforcement rate of one hundred percent should be multiplied by the inverse probability of its imposition to account for
think of a hypothetical legal system where a thief only risks having to compensate the owner for the value of the stolen property if his wrongful act is discovered and the owner successfully brings a claim in court. Such a legal system would be unsatisfactory when it comes to deterring potential thieves. Similarly, the threat of a will contest alone will not deter a potential interferor.

B. Constructive Trusts and Their Deficiencies in Terms of Deterrence

The previous Section demonstrated that will contests cannot serve as a remedy in some cases of interference with freedom of testation. To close this remedial gap, courts have, for a considerable time, made use of constructive trusts, an equitable remedy aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another. As such, these trusts are part of the law of restitution, i.e. the academically neglected part of American law.

the fact that enforcement is in reality not one hundred percent. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 262 (8th ed. 2011); Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 244 (2004); Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2186 (1999); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J. 421, 422–23 (1998); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 874 (1998). Within the context of the present Article, it is not possible to address the controversial question whether the so-called “multiplier principle” is a sound basis for legislative decisions regarding the sanctioning of wrongdoing. In any case, it does not seem unreasonable to continue the argument on the premise that law’s deterrent effect is in fact diminished (albeit to an unknown extent) when the probability of enforcement is less than one.

69. For an authoritative treatment of this problem from the perspective of law and economics, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1124–27 (1972).

70. See supra text accompanying note 58.


73. See Lionel Smith, Legal Epistemology in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 899, 910–11 (2012) (simultaneously pointing out and criticizing the fact that the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment is the only restatement in which constructive trusts are treated). In the 1920s, the American Law Institute originally planned to deal with the topic of constructive trusts within the Restatement of Trusts before later deciding that it would better be treated together with the topic of quasi-restatements as part of the Restatement of Restitution. See Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment, 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 297, 299–302 (2005).

74. Cf. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 1 reporter’s note a (2011) (“An incomparably more extensive literature on the theory of restitution and unjust enrichment has been produced in recent decades by scholars outside the United States.”); Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 993, 994...
that, according to common orthodoxy, deals with liability based on unjust enrichment.\footnote{See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 1 (2011) ("A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution."); Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 (1937) ("A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."); Palmer, supra note 71, at § 1.1. But see Hanoeh Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution 11–36 (2004) (criticizing the unjust enrichment reasoning).} In an action for restitution, the remedy of the constructive trust allows the court to direct that a specific piece of property to which the defendant holds title be transferred to the claimant in order to rectify unjustified enrichment.\footnote{See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 55 cmt. b (2011). For a famous articulation of the principle behind the constructive trust by Justice Cardozo, see Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919) ("A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee.").} Because property acquired through interference with an intended donative transfer is considered an unjust enrichment of the recipient at the expense of the intended beneficiary,\footnote{See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 46 cmt. a (2011). In addition, constructive trusts can also serve as a remedy in cases of wrongful interferences with inter vivos gifts. See id. at § 46(2). For the purpose of this Article, however, this is irrelevant.} constructive trust can offer relief in cases of interference with freedom of testation.\footnote{In addition, constructive trusts can also serve as a remedy in cases of wrongful interference with inter vivos gifts. See id. at § 46(2). For the purpose of this Article, however, this is irrelevant.} For several reasons, however, it would be wrong to assume that the constructive trust solves the problem of under-deterrence resulting from the deficiencies of the will contest as a remedy.

To begin with, constructive trusts do not constitute a generally available alternative to the will contest. Most jurisdictions ensure that an action in restitution is not used to circumvent the rules of procedure and limitation periods that apply in probate proceedings.\footnote{See id. at § 46 cmt. c; cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 351 ("[R]estitution by way of constructive trust is a gap-filling complement . . . .").} Consequently, a constructive trust may only be imposed where relief cannot be obtained in the probate court, i.e. in those cases where the execution or revocation of a will is prevented.\footnote{See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 46 cmts. c, e, i (2011); see also Restatement (First) of Restitution § 184 (1937) ("Where a disposition of property by will or an intestacy is procured by fraud, duress or undue influence, the person acquiring the property holds it upon a constructive trust, unless adequate relief can otherwise be given in a probate court.") (emphasis added). In addition to cases of wrongful prevention of the
all other cases, the probate proceeding, with its previously described problems in terms of deterrence, remains the only remedy against interference with freedom of testation (apart from the controversial interference with inheritance tort). Moreover, even in cases where constructive trusts may be imposed, they do not provide sufficient deterrence against interference with freedom of testation, insofar as they suffer from the same two deficiencies as the will contest: problems regarding the burden of proof and the level of sanctioning.

The burden of proving a constructive trust lies with the party seeking to establish it. If the consequence of establishing a constructive trust would be to overturn a formal testamentary disposition, courts may impose a higher standard of proof than in ordinary actions for restitution and require the standard applicable in comparable probate litigation, such as “clear and convincing evidence.” This in itself can cause substantial difficulties for potential plaintiffs. What is more problematic than the standard of proof, however, is the scope of issues that have to be established. For a constructive trust to be imposed, the claimant has to establish that “the defendant (i) has been unjustly enriched (ii) by acquiring legal title to a specifically identifiable property (iii) at the expense of the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights.” When it comes to interference with freedom of testation, this means that, for relief by way of constructive trust, unlike the case of will contests, it is insufficient to establish interference with the testator’s freedom of testation. The claimant must establish that, but for the wrongful interference, the claimant would have been the recipient

execution or revocation of a will where probate can never offer relief, constructive trusts are sometimes also imposed in other cases of interference with freedom of testation where relief in probate is simply very difficult to attain, namely the cases of wrongful procurement of revocation of a will and will suppression. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 46 cmt. d (2011); Palmer, supra note 71, at § 20.5. For an explanation why in the latter cases relief in probate is not a priori impossible, see supra note 58.


82. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 46 cmt. c (2011).

83. This is not to say that applying the same standard of proof in restitution actions as in probate litigation does not make sense when their effects would be virtually the same. Nor does it imply that the requirement of clear and convincing evidence in inheritance cases is an inadequate response to the “worst evidence” problem. However, irrespective of whether this particular standard of choice reflects a good policy judgment, one cannot escape the fact that, as a result of a stricter standard of proof, not only bogus claims but also well-founded actions are less likely to succeed. From the perspective of the interferor, this makes an action in restitution much less worrisome.

84. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 55 cmt. a (2011).
of specific assets of the decedent. Obviously, the latter issue can cause even more difficulties than the first. After all, in cases where the decedent is under the controlling influence of another party, one must establish how the decedent would have exercised his freedom of testation if there had been no interference. Because of the “worst evidence problem” that has been described above, this will often prove impossible. The only fact that can be proven is that the testator was prevented from freely exercising his autonomy—but not how he intended to exercise it. This problem is inherent in the concept of constructive trust, and it is the first of two reasons why constructive trusts are insufficient as a means of deterring interference with freedom of testation.

The second problem of constructive trusts stems from a lack of deterrence because of the degree of sanctioning. As indicated, constructive trusts form part of the law of restitution and, as such, are directed at preventing unjust enrichment, not at imposing penalties. Punitive damages are consequently not available by way of constructive trusts. This in itself would not lead to an under-deterrence problem if the unjust enrichment of the interferor would be rectified in most cases. After all, if an interferor were almost always barred from the profits of his wrongdoing, there would be virtually no incentive for him to act given that he would also have to

85. See, e.g., Ransdel v. Moore 53 N.E. 767, 771 (Ind. 1899) (“The rule established by the authorities is that when an heir or devisee in a will prevents the testator from providing for one for whom he would have provided but for the interference of the heir or devisee, such heir or devisee will be deemed a trustee, by operation of law, of the property, real or personal, received by him from the testator’s estate, to the amount or extent that the defrauded party would have received had not the intention of the deceased been interfered with.” (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 46 cmt. e, illus. 10 (2011) (presenting an example of a wrongful interference with an intended donative transfer and stating that a constructive trust can be imposed if the intended beneficiary can prove that, "but for the wrongful interference," he would have been designated as beneficiary (emphasis added)).

86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

87. See, e.g., U.S. v. Snepp 595 F.2d 926, 937 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[A] constructive trust depends on the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment.”); In re Estate of Corriea 719 A.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. 1998) (“The remedy of disgorgement, much like that of a constructive trust, is meant ‘to provide just compensation for the wrong, not to impose a penalty.’”) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. k (2011) (“The rationale of punitive or exemplary damages is independent of the law of unjust enrichment. The rules that govern such damages are part of the tort law of a given jurisdiction, often fixed by statute, outside the scope of this Restatement.”).

88. See, e.g., Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 239–40; cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 372 (noting that there are “almost certainly no punitive damages” in restitution actions with constructive trusts).

89. In this respect, it seems noteworthy that disgorgement of profits is explicitly advocated by some scholars of deterrence theory as the preferable sanctioning measure for activities that are always socially undesirable. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties
bear the opportunity costs of his interference and the litigation costs associated with being a defendant in an action for restitution. However, not unlike the case of the will contest, the likelihood of a constructive trust being imposed to rectify an interference with freedom of testation is much less than one hundred percent, even in cases where this remedy would in principle be available.

The previously described issues of burden of proof and the general difficulties of detecting interference with freedom of testation make a successful action in restitution unlikely. Thus, from the perspective of a rational wrongdoer, the financial risks associated with a constructive trust—the chance of losing one’s profits and incurring litigation costs—are correspondingly smaller. Hence, an interference with freedom of testation will in most cases produce an expected gain, even where constructive trusts are theoretically available as a remedy.

In conclusion, the preceding analysis of the “traditional” remedies against interference with freedom of testation suggests that will contest and constructive trust, even together, do not sufficiently deter potential interferors. In addition, a legislative reform of these remedies, as recommended by some commentators, would help only minimally to alleviate this situation. The problem that will contests are simply unsuitable for many cases of interference with freedom of testation is not simply a matter of procedural design that could be changed. The same holds true for the problem that constructive trusts require the establishment of certain facts that might often not be accessible, irrespective of the standard of proof that is applied.

C. Tort Actions and Their Deficiencies in Terms of Deterrence

The tort cause of action for wrongful interference with expectancy of inheritance is still a comparatively recent phenomenon and is not yet recognized in all jurisdictions, even though it has found recognition in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. It gives a

\[\text{and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 Rev. L. & Econ. 175, 182–83 (2005); Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims, 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 575, 581–82 (2008).}\]

\[90. \text{See supra text accompanying note 65.}\]

\[91. \text{For a brief discussion of the notion of the rational wrongdoer, see supra note 67.}\]

\[92. \text{For a discussion of the importance of enforcement probability for deterrence, see supra note 68.}\]

\[93. \text{See sources cited supra note 13.}\]

\[94. \text{See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979). For an overview of the developments that have led to a recognition in the restatement and a critique of this process, see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 357–61.}\]
disappointed heir the opportunity to recover damages if, as a result of another person’s interference with the decedent’s freedom of testation, the disappointed heir was prevented from receiving an inheritance. Thus, from a conceptual point of view, the marked difference between this tort action and the previously described action in restitution is as follows: whereas a constructive trust seeks to rectify an unjust enrichment of the defendant, this action in tort aims to compensate the plaintiff’s loss. Within the context of interference with freedom of testation, however, this conceptual difference hardly gives rise to practical consequences. In most cases of interference with freedom of testation, the disappointed heir’s loss will match the interferor’s gain. Nevertheless, there are (in many jurisdictions) differences between an action in tort and an action for constructive trust that are supposed to be of great relevance to disappointed heirs. Most notable are the availability of a jury trial, the chance of being awarded punitive damages, and the application of the ordinary civil preponderance of the evidence standard as opposed to the clear and convincing evidence standard used in probate. It is mainly for these reasons that legal practitioners consider the new tort action for wrongful interference

95. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979).
96. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 3 cmt. b (2011) (explaining the difference between restitution and an action for damages); Dobbs, supra note 72, at § 3.1 (explaining the remedial differences between restitution and damages).
97. This is not to say that the conceptual difference between, on the one hand, a focus on the defendant’s unjust enrichment and, on the other hand, a focus on the plaintiff’s loss never yields practical consequences. As a result of this conceptual difference, for example, a tort action is only available against the wrongdoer himself whereas constructive trusts can also be imposed on otherwise innocent third parties as long as they are unjustly enriched. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 46 cmt. a (2011). This is of great relevance in cases where the interferor does not act for his own benefit, but for the benefit of a third party. See supra note 32.
98. A disparity between the interferor’s gain and the disappointed heir’s loss exists, however, in case of consequential losses and non-pecuniary losses in the form of emotional distress. In many jurisdictions, such damages are available in a tort action for interference with inheritance. See, e.g., York Ins. Gp. of Me. v. Lambert 740 A.2d 984, 986 (Me. 1999) (holding that, even though the claim did not include allegations of emotional distress, “the general allegations of the interference with an expectancy of inheritance claim carry the possibility of an award for emotional distress.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 774B, 774A(1)(c) (1979); Ledford, supra note 59, at 339–40. Given the limited number of cases in which such damages are awarded, this disparity does not seem to be of substantial importance in the present context.
99. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 337; Klein, Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at 265.
100. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 774B cmt. e, 774 cmt. a (1979); Fassold, supra note 62, at 28; Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, supra note 12, at 88.
with expectancy of inheritance an attractive option, and why, as indicated above, some authors argue that recognizing this tort would help to close the deterrence gap left by the traditional remedies. It is doubtful, however, that the new tort action has substantial advantages over the traditional remedies against interference with freedom of testation when it comes to deterring this wrongful behavior.

The primary reason that will contests and constructive trusts have turned out to be dissatisfactory from a deterrence perspective concerns the hurdles faced by disappointed heirs with regard to issues of proof. In this respect, the new tort action fails to bring about significant improvement. This might sound counterintuitive given the fact that, at least in some jurisdictions, courts apply a lower standard of proof in tort actions for interference with inheritance than in will contests or actions in restitution. As the above analysis of constructive trust demonstrates, however, sometimes it is not so much the applicable standard of proof that creates problems for disappointed heirs but rather the scope of issues that have to be proven for the remedy to apply. This also holds true with regard to the tort action for interference with an expectancy of inheritance.

The elements of the interference tort that the plaintiff must establish are commonly held to be: (1) the existence of an expectancy; (2) intentional interference with that expectancy;
(3) independently tortious conduct (such as undue influence, fraud, or duress); 109 (4) reasonable certainty that, but for the tortious interference, the plaintiff would have received the expectancy; and (5) damages. Thus, not unlike the case of the constructive trust, it does not suffice to prove that there has been a wrongful interference with freedom of testation. From the first and fourth element of the tort, it follows that the plaintiff must also prove that, had there been no such interference, he would have received a larger inheritance. Hence, the plaintiff must establish that the decedent would have left something to the plaintiff absent the interference. 110 The difficulties associated with the latter issue have already been described above. Given the “worst evidence problem” and given the fact that the decedent’s true intent is entirely part of his inner world, there cannot be certainty about how he would have exercised his freedom of testation absent the interference. 111

In jurisdictions where the interference tort is recognized, courts are of course aware of the previously described difficulties. Hence, most of them require only “reasonable certainty” that, but for the interference, the disappointed heir would have realized his expectancy. 112 In many cases of interference with freedom of testation, however, this cannot solve the difficulties of proof. 113 What if, for example, the plaintiff can establish that the interferor burned the testator’s will, but can only speculate about its content? What if it can be proven that the testator was prevented from executing a will, but not whom he was planning to designate as heir? In cases like these, where it is simply impossible to come to any conclusion about the testator’s true intent, lowering the standard of proof does not

109. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B cmt. c (1979). As Professors Goldberg and Sitkoff point out, the characterization by courts and the restatement of undue influence and duress as “independently tortious” is actually inconsistent with tort doctrine. See Goldberg & Siktoff, supra note 11, at 393.

110. But see Fassold, supra note 62, at 27 (arguing that proof of the testator’s true intent is not necessary in a tort action for interference with inheritance); Shirley, supra note 102, at 18 (claiming that only proof of the defendant’s intent is necessary in a tort action for interference with inheritance). These statements are, however, incompatible with the elements of the interference tort as established by the courts. See Klein, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, supra note 12, at 88 n.27.

111. See supra text accompanying note 42.

112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B cmt. d (1979); Soehnel, supra note 107.

113. See Renfroe, supra note 51, at 398 (noting that “evidentiary difficulties of proving what the testator would have done” might cause problems for potential claimants under the interference tort).
help plaintiffs with valid causes of action. Even worse, such a step might also increase the risk of spurious claims. Thus, there is no reason to consider the interference with inheritance tort as an advantageous solution to the “worst evidence problem” in comparison with will contests and constructive trusts.

The second reason that will contests and constructive trusts have proven imperfect with regard to deterrence relates to the degree of sanctioning that may result. In this respect, the tort action admittedly has advantages insofar as it allows courts to award punitive damages. Even ardent critics of the interference tort concede that, with regard to deterrence, the imposition of over-compensatory damages may make sense in cases of interference with freedom of testation.114 The reasons for this have been outlined above: given the difficulties of detecting interference with freedom of testation, and given the procedural problems faced by potential plaintiffs, it is quite unlikely from the point of view of an interferor that his wrongdoing will be sanctioned at all. To account for this circumstance, sanctions for the interference should correspondingly be increased in order to ensure that the wrongful deed does not yield an expected gain in the eyes of the potential interferor calculating the prospective costs and benefits of his action.115

Nevertheless, it seems that punitive damages are awarded only rarely in cases of interference with freedom of testation.116 One reason for this is that, in most jurisdictions, the tort action for interference with inheritance may only be pursued where adequate relief in probate proceedings is not available. For determining the adequacy of relief in probate proceedings, it is irrelevant that punitive damages are available in tort.117 Even when the tort action can be pursued, as long as punitive damages are not awarded more often, potential interferors do not have reason to be significantly

114. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391 (“We do not deny that deterrence and punishment objectives might point toward awarding punitive damages for wrongful interference with inheritance.”).

115. Cf. sources cited supra note 68.

116. Cf., e.g., Dewitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 220 n.11 (Fla. 1981) (“[W]e can find no case authority allowing punitive damages in this type of action.”); Reaves, supra note 102, at 565 (“[M]ost jurisdictions have yet to decide whether punitive damages would be allowed for tortious interference in this noncommercial area.”).

more concerned about the interference tort than about constructive trusts. After all, in most cases, a judgment for compensatory damages will not be substantially different from a judgment for restitution of the interferor’s gain by way of constructive trust. Even if court practice were to change and punitive damages were imposed more frequently—a development that might be undesirable for reasons unrelated to the deterrence issue\textsuperscript{118}—the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom with testation would probably not disappear. Given the difficulties of proving the testator’s true intent posthumously, it appears that the likelihood of a successful action in tort is so small in many cases of interference with freedom of testation that the legal system’s imperfect enforcement could only be counterbalanced by punitive damages totally disproportionate to the individual wrongdoing—a step that courts obviously cannot take.\textsuperscript{119}

**D. Why Criminal Law Does Not Solve the Problem of Under-Deterrence**

Any analysis of whether a certain type of unsocial behavior is effectively deterred would be incomplete without also devoting some attention to criminal law. In regards to interference with freedom of testation, criminal law does not close the deterrence gap left by the imperfection of civil remedies. This is so for reasons related both to substantive criminal law and to criminal law enforcement.

In regards to the first aspect, deterrence deficits arise from the fact that not all forms of interference with freedom of testation can actually be prosecuted under criminal law. Interference with freedom of testation as such does not constitute a crime. Although some forms of misbehavior that amount to interference with freedom of testation do in fact constitute criminal offenses (e.g. the forgery of a will and the subsequent offering of the forged will for probate),\textsuperscript{120} other particularly relevant forms of interference, such as undue influence or duress, do not necessarily constitute crimes.

\textsuperscript{118} Cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391 n. 376 (objecting to the idea of recognizing the interference tort for the purpose of making punitive damages available on the ground that “tort law is not criminal law on par with criminal or regulatory law”).

\textsuperscript{119} See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (“[C]ourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered.”).

\textsuperscript{120} See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 470(c) (West 2010) (“Every person who, with the intent to defraud, alters, corrupts, or falsifies any record of any will . . . is guilty of forgery.”); Cal. Penal Code § 115(a) (West 1999) (“Every person who knowingly procures or offers any . . . forged instrument to be filed . . . in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed . . . under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a
Second, even where an act of interference with freedom of testation constitutes a criminal offense, the probability of enforcement will in most cases not be high enough to exert sufficient deterrence. Not only are the resources for criminal law enforcement limited, but public authorities will also often lack the information to prosecute interferences, given that acts of interference with freedom of testation typically take place within the context of private relationships. Since disappointed heirs will usually not receive a reward in return for reporting information about potential interferences to the authorities, their incentive to do so will often be imperfect.

In addition, interferors will benefit from the fact that the standard of evidence required for a criminal conviction (beyond reasonable doubt) is even higher than the standard applied in many probate proceedings (clear and convincing evidence). This decreases the probability of a criminal sanction for interference with freedom of testation even further. Hence, the institutions of criminal law will hardly deter potential wrongdoers from interfering with a testator’s freedom of testation.

III. The New Proposal for a Solution to the Under-Deterrence Problem

The previous Part demonstrated that the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation—will contests, constructive trusts, and tort law—are unsatisfactory when it comes to
deterring potential wrongdoers. In order to diminish this problem of under-deterrence, this Part proposes a statutory solution that is modeled after the so-called slayer statutes, which deal with the killing of a decedent by a prospective heir. To that end, Section A first gives a brief overview of the historic origin and function of these slayer statutes and demonstrates how they could serve as a blueprint for a statutory remedy against inference with freedom of testation. Section B then demonstrates how such a solution would help to remedy the problem of under-deterrence. Following that, Section C presents additional arguments in favor of the proposed solution before trying to anticipate, in Section D, the possible criticism and defending the proposed solution against it.

A. Slayer Statutes as a Model for Sanctioning Interference with Freedom of Testation

Slayer statutes are the codification of an older, but originally not universally recognized, common law maxim, the slayer rule, according to which a person who wrongfully and intentionally kills another person shall be denied any right to benefit from the wrong. The 1889 New York Court of Appeals decision *Riggs v. Palmer* is regarded as the most famous articulation of this principle. In that case, the defendant, a sixteen-year-old with the first name Elmer, poisoned his grandfather after the latter had voiced the intention of revoking some provisions in his will that were


124. See *Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers* § 8.4 cmt. a, reporter’s note 1 (2003).

125. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).

favorable to the defendant.\textsuperscript{127} Two of the decedent’s children then brought an action for the purpose of having the will provisions in the defendant’s favor annulled.\textsuperscript{128} A majority on the bench openly acknowledged that, if literally construed, the New York statutes regulating the making, proof, and effect of wills did not provide for such an annulment.\textsuperscript{129} Nevertheless, the court ruled that the provisions in Elmer’s favor should be declared ineffective because “public policy” dictated that “[n]o one [should] be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.”\textsuperscript{130}

Over the course of the twentieth century, \textit{Riggs v. Palmer} (or “Elmer’s case,” as it is sometimes referred to) gained some notoriety in jurisprudential debates about the legally binding character of abstract principles.\textsuperscript{131} With regard to the “murdering heir problem,” however, this debate became less practically significant over time because many state legislatures enacted slayer statutes.\textsuperscript{132} By codifying the slayer rule, wind was taken out of the sails of those complaining after \textit{Riggs} about unwarranted judicial legislation.\textsuperscript{133}

There is considerable variation among the states concerning the language and content of these codifications, particularly in respect to the types of killings and the types of benefits covered by the bar from inheritance.\textsuperscript{134} However, concerning the latter question, there is significant consensus that a slayer should be denied both statutory benefits with regard to the decedent’s estate, such as an

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Riggs}, 22 N.E. at 189.
  \item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.} at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
  \item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{Id.} at 189 (majority opinion); see also \textit{Id.} at 191 (Gray, J., dissenting).
  \item \textsuperscript{130} \textit{Id.} at 190 (majority opinion).
  \item \textsuperscript{132} See Sneddon, supra note 126, at 109; see also Anne-Marie Rhodes, \textit{Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving From Rules to Discretion}, 33 Orno N.U. L. Rev. 975, 979 & n.20 (2007) (reporting that as of 2007, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have slayer statutes); Spivack, supra note 123, at 10 (reporting that, as of 2012, forty-four states have slayer statutes, whereas the remaining states use common-law slayer rules).
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Such criticism was already raised by Justice Gray in his dissenting opinion in \textit{Riggs}, 22 N.E. at 191–93 (Gray, J., dissenting). For an overview of the debate at that time, see also Hennessy, supra note 126, at 109–70; Wade, supra note 123, at 717–18.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, \textit{The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity}, 71 IOWA L. Rev. 489, 496–99, 507–08 (1986); Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project, \textit{The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction}, 23 VAND. L. Rev. 929, 1089–94 (1970).\end{itemize}
intestacy share, and, if applicable, any benefits under the decedent’s donative documents, for example a will.\textsuperscript{135}

A slayer rule is also included in both the Restatements of Property and of Restitution.\textsuperscript{136} In each codification, the slayer rule immediately follows or precedes the rules on wrongful interference with freedom of testation in the form of fraud, duress, and undue influence.\textsuperscript{137} This close proximity is by no means coincidental. After all, homicide motivated by the prospect of inheritance can be classified as another form of interference with freedom of testation\textsuperscript{138} given that it deprives the killed person of the chance of changing his existing estate plan.\textsuperscript{139} Against this background, it is an obvious move to use the forfeiture principle of the slayer statutes as a means for addressing interference with freedom of testation in general. Surprisingly, however, such a proposal has not yet been voiced in the on-going debate about how to remedy interference with freedom of testation. The following Section shall sketch out what form such a disinheritance statute for interference with freedom of testation might assume.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-803(b), (c) (2010); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.4, reporter’s note 1 (2003) (listing the slayer statutes that are based on the UPC provisions); Spivack, supra note 123, at 10–11 (describing the typical content of a slayer statute).
\item \textsuperscript{136} Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 45 (2011); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.4 (2003).
\item \textsuperscript{137} See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment Part II (“Liability In Restitution”), Chapter 5 (“Restitution For Wrongs”), Topic 2 (“Diversion Of Property Rights At Death”) (2011) (comprising only § 45 (“Homicide: the Slayer Rule”) and § 46 (“Wrongful Interference With Donative Transfer”); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers Division III (“Protective Doctrines”), Chapter 8 (“Invalidity Due To The Donor’s Incapacity Or Another’s Wrongdoing”), Part B (“Protection Against Wrongdoing”) (2003) (comprising only § 8.3 (“Undue Influence, Duress, Or Fraud”) and § 8.4 (“Homicide–the Slayer Rule”)).
\item \textsuperscript{138} This would make the killing of the decedent the seventh case in the above-outlined list of standard cases of interference with freedom of testation. See supra Part I.B.; cf. Zimmermann, supra note 31, at 299 (having started with a list of five standard cases of interference with freedom of testation, Zimmermann includes the killing of the decedent as the sixth).
\item \textsuperscript{139} See Fellows, supra note 134, at 493 (noting that “slayers motivated by greed . . . potentially interrupt the normal disposition of property” because, inter alia, “the killings may deny the victims the opportunity to change their existing estate plans”); cf. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 46 cmt. a (“In a few cases outside these categories, comparable misconduct produces comparable results. Interference by homicide, while literally within the terms of the present section, receives separate treatment in § 45.”).
\end{itemize}
B. Possible Content and Application of a Disinheritance Statute for Interference with Freedom of Testation

A legislator contemplating the enactment of a statutory bar from inheritance in order to counteract interference with freedom of testation would primarily have to answer the following questions: (1) what kind of wrongful behavior should lead to forfeiture; (2) what kind of benefits should be forfeited; (3) who should take the forfeited property instead of the wrongdoer; and (4) how and by whom should the conditions for the forfeiture be proven? Given that all of these questions may give rise to complex considerations, this Article does not put forward an elaborate legislative proposal. For the purpose of enhancing the debate on remedies against interference with freedom of testation, it seems sufficient to give a general account of the possible content and application of a disinheritance statute for interference with freedom of testation.

In regards to the first question for a legislator contemplating such a disinheritance statute—what form of behavior should lead to forfeiture—there seems to be no reason to draw distinctions between the different types of interference with freedom of testation. Hence, fraud, duress, undue influence, will forgery, and will suppression should all trigger the bar from inheritance.

For the second question—the scope of forfeiture—slayer statutes suggest that a wrongdoer should in any case be barred from both testate and intestate succession. It seems that this would also be an acceptable starting point for a rule on interference with freedom of testation. In addition, a legislator has to consider whether other statutory benefits arising at the decedent’s death and benefits conferred by donative instruments other than wills should also be included in a forfeiture rule.

With regard to the third question—who should take the assets that would otherwise have gone to the interferor—slayer statutes

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140. Such statutory benefits can, inter alia, arise in form of an elective share, omitted spouse’s or child’s share, homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance. In the case of most slayer statutes, the wrongdoer is denied the latter benefits as well, in addition to the statutory benefits following from intestacy rules. See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code § 2-803(b) (2010); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.4 cmt. j (2005).

141. Such instruments include revocable trusts, retirement assets, and life insurance policies. Most slayer statutes cover them as well. See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code §§ 2-803(c), 1-201(18) (1969) (amended 2010); Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 45 cmts. e, f (2011); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.4 cmt. k (2003). Whether a bar from inheritance for interference with freedom of testation in general should be given an equally broad scope depends, again, on whether one should focus exclusively on deterrence or also on other aspects, such as testator’s intent.
also offer a workable solution. Most of them distribute property that the wrongdoer is barred from taking as if the latter had predeceased the decedent or disclaimed his interest.\(^{142}\) Enacting such a specific rule with regard to the distribution of the victim’s estate seems advantageous over relying primarily on principles of equity\(^ {143}\) given that only a clear-cut rule can be effectively applied within the probate proceeding. Sometimes, efficiency and legal certainty might of course come at the price of individual justice. If the estate is distributed as if the interferor predeceased the decedent, persons might benefit that the decedent did not intend to designate as beneficiaries. In such cases, however, equity could still be realized in a subsequent action for restitution.\(^ {144}\)

Finally, for the actual application of such a disinheritance rule, it follows from the foregoing that anyone who would benefit if the estate were distributed as if the interferor had disclaimed his interest should be able to invoke the interferor’s bar from inheritance in a probate proceeding. Not unlike a slayer statute or other measures against interference with freedom of testation, the burden should

\(^{142}\) See, e.g., Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-803(b), (c), 2-1106(b)(3)(B) (2010); Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 45 reporter’s note d (2011); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.4 cmt. j, k. It is subject to debate, however, whether the approach that treats the wrongdoer as predeceased should also be pursued in cases where it would allow the wrongdoer’s children to claim parts of the estate by means of representation. Some jurisdictions have rejected this consequence and limited the eligibility of the wrongdoer’s relatives to claim interests in the estate as a result of the wrongdoing. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 45 cmt. d (2011); 26B C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 66 (2011); Sneddon, supra note 126, at 113–21. The latter approach might also be preferable in a case of a bar from inheritance for interference with freedom of testation in general given that, otherwise, interferors would often profit indirectly from their wrongdoing.

\(^{143}\) The latter approach is taken by the Restatement of Restitution. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 45(3) (2011) ("Property the slayer is barred from taking is distributed as directed by statute or (in the absence of statutory direction) to the person with the paramount equitable claim.").

\(^{144}\) The need for an availability of such an equitable action can be demonstrated by the following example. Father A plans to disinherit his sons B and C and intends to designate the unrelated D as beneficiary of his estate. If B wrongfully prevented A from doing so, B would be disqualified from inheritance under the proposed disinheritance statute. Under intestate law, A’s estate would consequently be distributed as if B disclaimed his interest. Thus, the estate would go to C even though A was planning to disinherit him as well. In effect, C would thus gain a windfall profit as a result of B’s wrongful interference. In order to allow for the realization of A’s true intent, D should consequently be able to bring an action for restitution against C subsequent to the distribution of the estate. Such an action would of course face the same procedural and evidentiary hurdles as an action for restitution against B. After all, the very idea behind the proposed disinheritance statute is that D will often not be able to prove that A was intending to designate him as beneficiary, and that thus the existence of the disinheritance statute is needed to ensure that B faces a sanction for his wrongdoing. There is no reason, however, why B’s bar from inheritance should preclude a subsequent equitable action by D against C.
be on the party invoking the remedy to prove the requirements of its application. For the bar from inheritance to apply, the party appealing to it should have to establish that the purported heir has interfered with the decedent’s freedom of testation. In regards to the standard of proof, the internal coherence of succession law requires the application of the same heightened standard of proof as in the case of will contests or constructive trusts (i.e. clear and convincing evidence) where the effect of the rule would be to overturn a formal testamentary provision.  

From a perspective of deterrence, this might be imperfect. However, as will be demonstrated in the following Section, the major advantage in terms of deterrence of a disinheritance statute of the kind previously described over existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation will relate not to the applicable standard of proof, but rather to the scope of issues that have to be established.

C. How a Disinheritance Statute Would Help to Alleviate the Under-Deterrence Problem

1. Advantages of a Disinheritance Statute over Existing Remedies

The analysis of existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation identified two partially related reasons for the current problem of under-deterrence of this kind of wrongful behavior within American law: the burden of proof for claimants in tort law and equity and the inadequate sanctioning that the existing remedies impose.  

Both of these problems would at least partly be alleviated by a disinheritance statute of the kind that has been outlined in the previous Section.

First, the fundamental advantage of a disinheritance statute over constructive trusts and tort actions concerns the scope of facts that have to be proven. For the disinheritance statute to apply, it only has to be established that there was an interference with the decedent’s autonomy. What need not be answered is the question of how the decedent was planning to exercise his autonomy, i.e. whom he would have designated as heir in absence of the wrongful act. It is easy to imagine cases in which this could make a difference. A

145. Applying a more plaintiff-friendly standard of proof would in certain circumstances allow disappointed heirs to circumvent the rules of the traditional remedies against interference with freedom of testation. Such possibilities of circumvention already exist in cases involving the interference tort and are heavily criticized. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 365.

146. See supra Parts II.B–C.
plaintiff might, for example, be able to establish that the wrongdoer burned the decedent’s holographic will (case four), but not be able to prove its content. He might be able to demonstrate that the decedent was threatened into executing a certain will (case one), but not be able to prove which provisions the testator would have made in the absence of the wrongful act. Similarly, he might be in a position to show that the testator was prevented from executing a will (case five), but not be able to prove what kind of disposition the testator intended to make. The reason for this difficulty of proof with regard to the testator’s intent is straightforward and has been described above as the “worst evidence problem.” Whereas the act of interference is, at least to some extent, a “fact of the outer world,” the testator’s intention is not. The very effect of the interference is to prevent the testator’s true intent from materializing in the outer world. Thus, there will often be no sources to establish the testator’s intent other than the testator himself; he, however, will no longer be present at the time of the court proceeding. Therefore, it seems almost an obvious solution that proof of the interference be the sole requirement for a remedy to apply.

When it comes to deterrence, the second advantage of a disinheredance statute over the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation concerns the level of sanctioning. As demonstrated, one problem of constructive trusts and tort actions with merely compensatory damages is that the wrongdoer has barely anything to lose; if he is caught and a successful action is brought, he is at most stripped of the fruits of his wrongdoing. A disinheredance statute works differently. It is not only the wrongdoer’s gains that are taken away, but also any entitlements under intestate succession or other parts of the will that were (potentially) not affected by the interference.

To illustrate how this can in fact make a substantial difference, let us imagine the following fact pattern: the wealthy and widowed A has two sons—B and C—that would each be entitled to fifty percent of her estate under the local intestacy statutes. A considers this a fair distribution of her property and thus decides not to execute a will. B, however, is unhappy with the mother’s decision and considers threatening her into executing a will under which he, B, would be entitled to the whole of A’s estate.\footnote{147. For similar fact patterns showing the deficiencies of will contests, see Klein, Fourth Circuit, supra note 13, at 266 (using an example with four siblings); Klein, First, Second, and Third Circuits, supra note 13, at 247.} Under a legal system where only will contests, constructive trusts, and tort actions (with compensatory damages) are available to remedy interference of
freedom of testation, the avaricious $B$ has a strong incentive to move ahead with his plan. If his threat were discovered and a successful action brought, he would still be allowed to keep half of his mother’s estate, i.e. the portion he would have received under the intestacy laws anyway. In contrast, under a legal system with a disinheritance statute, $B$ would risk losing his fifty percent intestacy share with this plan. Interfering with $A$’s freedom of testation would thus entail significant expected costs that, ideally, would make the whole enterprise unprofitable.\(^{148}\)

2. Remaining Problems and Why a Bar from Inheritance is Still a Good Solution

As demonstrated, enacting a disinheritance statute would substantially deter interference with freedom of testation. However, a statute of the kind described would by no means completely solve the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testation. In fact, for two reasons, it is likely that the under-deterrence problem would remain substantial, even after the adoption of such a solution.

First, even though a disinheritance statute causes fewer problems of proof than the traditional remedies, the conditions for its application are by no means easy to prove. Interference actions such as will suppression, forgery, undue influence, fraud, and harassment are typically not conducted openly. Therefore, proving the “outer fact” of the interference action often can be almost as difficult as proving the “inner fact” of the true intent of the testator. This is particularly true in the case of undue influence where, as two commentators put it, courts are facing the “profound difficulty of reconstructing the subtle dynamics of familial and other close personal relationships.”\(^{149}\) These difficulties will in turn decrease the likelihood of the disinheritance rule being applied and consequently also diminish the risks of an interference action.

Second, and more importantly, with regard to potential interference who would not receive anything from the decedent’s estate absent their interference action, a disinheritance statute is an empty threat. There are simply no benefits under succession law from which they could be barred. If, for example, returning to the

\(^{148}\) It is important to note, however, that in many cases one will not know how $A$ would have crafted his estate plan if $B$ had not interfered with his freedom of testation. After all, it is not uncommon that testators change their estate plans at a late stage of their lives. For a discussion of this aspect, see infra Part III.C.2.

\(^{149}\) Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 344.
previous example, A had already executed a will leaving his complete estate to C, B would again have nothing to lose from interfering with A’s autonomy because, absent the interference, he would end up empty-handed anyway. It is worth pointing out that this deficit in the deterrence effect of a disinheritance statute would be significantly smaller if persons closely related to the descendant were generally entitled to a fixed portion of his estate even against the deceased’s wish. At least for them, then, there would always be benefits that could be forfeited, and thus something to lose from interfering with freedom of testation. American law contains such provisions on “forced heirship” only to a comparatively limited extent. With the exception of Louisiana, all American states allow testators to disinherit their children; protection against intentional disinheritance is only afforded to surviving spouses. Ironically—and with only slight exaggeration—by restricting the testator’s freedom less than other jurisdictions, American law makes it harder to deter interference with it.

It is important to note, however, that the two qualifications with respect to the effectiveness of a disinheritance statute do not, strictly speaking, constitute arguments against its enactment. In particular, they do not contradict the conclusion that, both with regard to issues of proof and the measure of sanctioning, a disinheritance statute

150. For interferors that are not closely related to the decedent, the existence of such provisions would of course not make any difference. Regrettably, there are no empirical studies that investigate whether interference with freedom of testation is typically committed by members of the decedent’s family or by outsiders.

151. This would of course require including such “compulsory portions” in the scope of a disinheritance statute.

152. For an overview of the law on compulsory heirship in the different European legal systems, see, e.g., Inge Kroppenberg, Compulsory Portion, in 1 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 357 (Jurgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2012); cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 342 (noting that the absence of compulsory rules regarding a right of the decedent’s next-of-kin to inherit makes American law unique among modern legal systems); Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Freedom of Testation in the United States, in FREEDOM OF TESTATION / TESTIERFREIHEIT 143, 144–45 (Reinhard Zimmermann ed., 2012) (contrasting the American rejection of the concept of forced heirship with the approaches in France and Germany).

153. Even in Louisiana, however, the protection of children against intentional disinheritance has been limited in recent years. See Vincent D. Rougeau, No Bonds but Those Freely Chosen: An Obituary for the Principle of Forced Heirship in American Law, 69 CIV. L. COMMENTS, Winter 2008, at 1, 2 (noting that a law that came into effect in 1999 in Louisiana gives parents greater freedom from forced heirship once their children reach twenty-three years of age).

154. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, supra note 30, at 519.

155. See id. at 469–519.

156. The absence of forced estate entitlements in American law is sometimes also seen as a reason for the fact that capacity litigation and allegations of undue influence are more frequent in the United States than in Europe. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 63, 64–65 (1978) (pointing out that the typical plaintiff in testamentary capacity litigation is the disinherited child, a figure unknown to European law).
The statute has substantial advantages over the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation. If enacted in addition to these existing remedies, and not as a substitute, a disinheritance statute will decrease the problem of under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testation—even if it will most likely not fully solve it. In this context, it is also noteworthy that other solutions proposed in favor of protecting freedom of testation more effectively would require much more radical and costly changes to American law than the introduction of the proposed disinheritance statute. In particular, the sometimes advocated introduction of an “authenticated will,” as it exists in civil law countries, where a notary determines that the testator has capacity and is free of the controlling influences of others, would constitute a significantly larger challenge in terms of institutional design.

D. Additional Arguments in Favor of a Disinheritance Statute

This Section will now present three additional arguments, beyond deterrence, in favor of the suggested solution that can be found outside the instrumentalist logic applied so far.

1. A Wrongdoer Should not Benefit from His Wrong

The principle that was so powerfully articulated by the court in Riggs—a wrongdoer should not benefit from his wrong—is one of the most frequently cited justifications for slayer statutes. This principle can also be used to justify a bar from inheritance in cases of interference with freedom of testation wherever it is impossible

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158. See Kenneth G. C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal & Reinhard Zimmermann, Testamentary Formalities in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in 1 COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW: TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, supra note 2, at 432, 448–49.

159. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45 cmt. a (2011) (“The law of unjust enrichment forecloses the possibility that a person might benefit from committing a felonious and intentional homicide.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. a (2003) (“The principle of this section is that a person who, without legal excuse or justification, is responsible for the felonious and intentional killing of the decedent . . . is denied any right to benefit from the wrong.”); Fellows, supra note 134, at 490.
to reconstruct with reasonable certainty how the testator would have devised his estate plan absent the wrongful interference.\textsuperscript{160} After what has been said above about the “worst evidence problem,” it is clear that this is not an insignificant group of cases.

To illustrate, consider a straightforward fact pattern, similar to the one used earlier.\textsuperscript{161} Widower A has two sons—B and C—that would each be entitled to fifty percent of his estate under the applicable intestacy statutes. B threatens A into executing a will under which he, B, would be entitled to the whole of A’s estate. B’s wrongful action is discovered. In contrast to the earlier example, however, this time it cannot be reconstructed how A would have distributed his estate if B had not threatened him. He might not have executed a will at all; he might have left everything to C, or to B (even though that is unlikely); or he could have devised a totally different plan. If a will contest were brought under such circumstances, A’s will would be denied probate and intestacy rules would apply. Consequently, B could still claim half of his father’s estate. Despite the will contest, B would thus profit from his wrongdoing in all those cases where A would have left him less than his intestacy share if B had not threatened him.

Starting from the premise that an interferor should not profit from his wrongful interference with the testator’s freedom of testation leads to the conclusion that the interferor should be barred from inheritance in cases like the one just presented where the testator’s preferred estate plan is unknown. Of course, there is no way to be sure that A was actually planning to disinherit B completely. His plan may well have been to leave B half of his estate, or even more. Thus, one might argue that the principle that no one should profit from his wrong cannot justify a bar from inheritance in such cases, given that it is impossible to know that such a disinheritance would merely strip the interferor of the profits of his wrongdoing instead of also taking something away from him that he would have received even absent his wrongdoing. Such an argument, however, would ignore the fact that, in a case like this, it was the interferor himself who has created the situation where we cannot reconstruct the testator’s true intent. If the true intent of a testator cannot be established because of interference with freedom of testation, it is fair that the resulting uncertainty be resolved at the expense of the

\textsuperscript{160} To avoid confusion, this is a different question from the one discussed in the previous paragraph where it was asked how the testator would have devised his estate if he had had the chance to do so in full autonomy and with knowledge of the wrongful act of the interferor. In this paragraph, by contrast, the question is what the testator would have done if the wrongful act had never taken place.

\textsuperscript{161} See supra text following note 149.
wrongdoer. Otherwise, the wrongdoer would profit from a situation that he himself wrongfully created. Thus, it seems reasonable that the law should draw the adverse inference that the testator would not have left anything to the interferor had he been able to exercise his freedom of testation without interference.

2. The General Trend Towards a Behavior-Based Inheritance Regime and the Theory of the “Expressive Function” of Law

The last few years have witnessed an increasing number of U.S. legal scholars advocating for inheritance rules that take the behavior of presumptive heirs towards the decedent into account. Thus, bars to inheritance on the basis of the following types of misconduct have been proposed: domestic violence between spouses; physical and sexual abuse of minor children by their parents; abandonment of minor children by their parents; failure to support a minor child by his father; and domestic elder abuse. Authors of such proposals often refer to the fact that some state jurisdictions and model codes already have certain fault-based bars to inheritance. Examples of existing behavior-based inheritance bars include statutes barring adulterous spouses from inheriting.
statutes barring persons liable for physical abuse of an elder or dependent decedent from inheriting,\textsuperscript{169} statutes barring parents who abandoned their child from inheriting,\textsuperscript{170} statutes barring from inheritance on basis of spousal abandonment,\textsuperscript{171} and bars resulting from a termination of parental rights.\textsuperscript{172}

In support of these disinheritance statutes, three rationales are particularly often brought forward: (1) deterrence;\textsuperscript{173} (2) realization of the testator’s intent;\textsuperscript{174} and (3) the importance of the law expressing social values by condemning certain behavior.\textsuperscript{175} The relevance of the first of these arguments—deterrence—with regard to the suggested solution to the interference with freedom of testation problem has already been addressed in detail.\textsuperscript{176} The value of the second argument—the testator’s intent—will be addressed separately in the next Part.\textsuperscript{177}

The third argument—that law should speak out against unacceptable behavior—provides some support for the suggested

\textsuperscript{169} See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259 (West 2002); see also Spivack, supra note 164, at 274 (reporting that elder abuse bars inheritance in four states).

\textsuperscript{170} See, e.g., UNIF. PRORATE CODE § 2-114(a)(2) (2010) (barring a parent from inheriting from a minor child if there is evidence that immediately before the child’s death the parental rights could have been terminated on the basis of, inter alia, nonsupport, abandonment, abuse, or neglect); see also Rhodes, supra note 132, at 982–85 (noting that eleven states currently have statutes that bar inheritance based on child abandonment and discussing the history behind these statutes): Spivack, supra note 163, at 273 n.119 (citing state statutes that bar inheritance based on child abandonment as well as other articles that discuss these statutes).

\textsuperscript{171} For an overview of existing spousal abandonment statutes as of 2011, see Spivack, supra note 163, at 273 n.118.

\textsuperscript{172} See, e.g., UNIF. PRORATE CODE § 2-114(a)(1) (2010) (barring a parent from inheriting from a child if parental rights were terminated). \textit{But see} Brown, supra note 164, at 552–57 (pointing out that not all of the statutes dealing with the termination of parental rights explicitly extinguish the right of the terminated parent to inherit and that some even explicitly preserve the right). For a critique of a mandatory bar on inheritance in a case of a termination of parental rights, see \textit{id.} at 569–81 and Spivack, supra note 163, at 270–71.

\textsuperscript{173} See, e.g., Monopoli, supra note 166, at 281–82; Preble, supra note 163, at 412; Dumond, supra note 167, at 215. \textit{But see} Brown, supra note 164, at 560–61 (calling the notion that the threat of losing inheritance rights will deter parents from abusing their child “fanciful”): Spivack, supra note 163, at 259 (stating that it is unlikely that a bar on intestate succession would deter many abusers).

\textsuperscript{174} See, e.g., Spivack, supra note 163, at 270. \textit{But see} Monopoli, supra note 166, at 277 (doubting, on basis of child psychology, whether minor children would want their parents to be barred from inheritance on the basis of abuse); Brown, supra note 164, at 561–62 (following Monopoli’s argument with regard to presumptive child intent); Spivack, supra note 163, at 284–87.

\textsuperscript{175} See, e.g., Brown, supra note 164, at 587; Monopoli, supra note 166, at 282; Preble, supra note 163, at 412; Spivack, supra note 163, at 259–61; Shepherd, supra note 163, at 475–76.

\textsuperscript{176} See supra Parts III.C.1, III.D.1.

\textsuperscript{177} See infra Part III.E.2.
disinheritance statute. After all, interference with freedom of testation is both disapproved of in society and harmful. Thus, it is fair to conclude that succession law should clearly condemn such behavior. The value of the theory of law’s “expressive function” is disputed. With regard to inheritance rules in particular, it has been argued that using law to make statements about the moral value of certain behavior is neither legitimate nor efficacious. Against this background, it might at least seem debatable whether succession law should really take all sorts of misbehavior towards the decedent into account and whether the trend towards a behavior-based inheritance regime is in fact a good development.

Irrespective, however, of what stance one should take in the debate over a behavior-based inheritance regime, there are valid arguments on either side for including a bar to inheritance on the basis of interference with freedom of testation. If, on the one hand, one believes that succession law should take into account misbehavior towards the decedent, then it is a natural step to include interference with the decedent’s freedom in the list of unacceptable behavior that acts as a bar to inheritance. If, on the other hand, one is skeptical whether questions of domestic abuse, child neglect, adultery, etc. should be addressed via succession law, there is still reason to enact a disinheritance statute for interference with freedom of testation because, in contrast to the aforementioned behavior, interference with freedom of testation is immediately directed at the disposition of property upon death. Addressing it within the frame of succession law thus seems a conceptually sound solution.

3. Comparison to Civil Law Systems

Including a section on “comparative law” in an argument for law reform may generate skepticism. Even ardent proponents of


181. For the purpose of this Section, the term “comparative law” is basically equivalent to “the study of foreign law,” i.e. law from jurisdictions that are not part of the United States. In
comparative legal scholarship acknowledge that, strictly speaking, the study of foreign legal systems is of little normative value. Ultimately, arguing that a certain rule should be adopted because other jurisdictions have enacted it would mean deducing “an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’”182

When it comes to justifying behavior-based bars from inheritance, however, it has been a recurring pattern in U.S. legal discourse to refer to civil law solutions. Thus, in Riggs v. Palmer, for example, the court’s majority mentioned provisions in the French Civil Code and Roman law in support of their decision to bar Elmer from receiving his grandfather’s estate.183 Similarly, in the ongoing debate about the desirability of a behavior-based inheritance system, it is quite common for supporters of such a system to refer to the civil law doctrine of “unworthiness to inherit.”184 Hence, it seems that, at least within this context, there is a particular openness in U.S. succession law discourse to comparative law observations.

Therefore, it is helpful to point out that there is precedent in other jurisdictions for the suggested solution of a bar from inheritance on the basis of interference with freedom of testation. The mentioned civil law doctrine of “unworthiness to inherit” works essentially like a bar from inheritance185 and, thus, similarly to the statutory solution proposed in this Article. In many civil law jurisdictions, interference with freedom of testation constitutes the core area of application of this concept.186 This makes it all the more

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183. See 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (“Under the civil law, evolved from the general principles of natural law and justice by many generations of jurisconsults, philosophers, and statesmen, one cannot take property by inheritance or will from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered. . . . Code Nap. § 727; Mack, Rom. Law, 530, 550.”); cf. Wade, supra note 123, at 716 n.4 (referring also to the civil law doctrine of unworthy heirs in the context of the debate on slayer rules).
184. Cf., e.g., Monopoli, supra note 166, at 259 n.8 (referring to a “[t]elephone conversation” with John Langbein about the concept of unworthiness of heirs in civil law); Rhodes, supra note 165, at 530 (referring to the Roman bars from inheritance on the basis of “indignitas”); Spivack, supra note 163, at 268 (referring also to Roman law).
185. For a concise historical and comparative account of this doctrine, see Reinhard Zimmermann, The Present State of European Private Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 505–08 (2009).
186. For Germany, see BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl.] 1 122, as amended, § 2339, para. 1 (Ger.) (naming as grounds for unworthiness to inherit, inter alia, the intentional, unlawful killing of the deceased, the prevention of the execution or revocation of a will, the procurement of a will by deceit or duress, and the suppression or forgery of a will). For the situation in other European jurisdictions, see Zimmermann, supra note 185, at 505–06.
surprising that U.S. authors, even though referring to this doctrine when discussing the general possibility of behavior-based bars from inheritance, have never discussed it as a potential model for dealing specifically with the interference problem. That some civil law jurisdictions already deploy a bar from inheritance on the basis of interference with freedom of testation does not as such constitute an argument in favor of adopting a similar solution in the United States. It might, however, be of some value when it comes to demonstrating that the suggested solution is not a legislative experiment but rather has already been tested in practice.

E. A Short Rebuttal of Possible Criticism of the Proposal

The proposal presented in this Article—sanctioning interference with freedom of testation with a bar from inheritance—would in effect mean that, from the perspective of succession law, a person who unduly influences a testator is treated like a person that murders him. Such a proposal is likely to be met with criticism. Hence, the remainder of this Article anticipates possible critiques and demonstrates how they can be rebutted.

1. Over-Deterrence?

Given that a major argument in favor of this proposal is its deterrence potential, a possible counterargument from within the instrumentalist framework might be that the enactment of a disinheritance statute for interference with freedom of testation leads to over-deterrence. However, interference with freedom of testation is undesirable per se; the preferable level for this activity is zero. Consequently, when it comes to interference actions themselves, a danger of over-deterrence does not exist. Even sanctions for per se undesirable behavior can, however, create a problem of over-deterrence if there is a risk that courts might mistakenly classify socially desirable behavior as the kind of behavior that triggers the sanction. With regard to most interference acts, the risk of such false positives seems to be rather small. The chance, for example, that a

187. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
188. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 340, for a call for “modesty in top-down reform of the common law through innovative . . . provisions that have not been tested in practice or vetted in the literature.”
189. For an explanation of the undesirability of interference with freedom of testation from a welfare-oriented perspective, see supra note 8.
court would mistakenly believe that a will forgery has occurred seems negligible.

With regard to undue influence, however, the risk of false positives cannot easily be brushed aside, given the noted difficulties of applying the doctrinal concept of undue influence in practice.\textsuperscript{190} It seems nevertheless doubtful that this creates a strong argument against the suggested solution. For there to be a case against the proposed solution, it would first have to be demonstrated that there is a socially desirable activity, such as friendly interaction with the decedent, on which the existence of a disinheritance statute has a chilling effect. Second, it would also have to be demonstrated that the welfare loss caused by over-deterrence after the enactment of a disinheritance statute is in fact larger than the welfare loss caused by under-enforcement in the absence of a disinheritance statute. None of these requirements seem likely to be present.

2. Violation of Testator’s Intent?

The central goal of the proposed disinheritance statute is the protection of the testator’s autonomy. Thus, the value of this proposal would be seriously undermined if the proposed protection mechanism—i.e. the bar from inheritance—were itself in conflict with the testator’s intent.\textsuperscript{191} This would be the case if one could convincingly argue that a testator whose freedom has been interfered with would not want the interferor to be disqualified from inheritance. A similar point is sometimes made with regard to slayer statutes. Even if murdered by his designated heir, so the argument goes, a testator would prefer the murderer not to end up empty-handed.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{190} See supra note 30 and accompanying text; cf. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 391–92 (pointing out that increasing the sanctions for interference with freedom of testation would “magnify the costs of error in policing the murky line between permissible persuasion and impermissible overpersuasion”).

\textsuperscript{191} It should be pointed out, however, that even if such a conflict between the testator’s intent and the bar from inheritance existed, it would not be impossible to justify the suggested disinheritance statute by reference to the testator’s autonomy. After all, one of the central ideas behind the proposed bar from inheritance is its deterrent effect. If potential interferors are discouraged by the prospect of a bar from inheritance, the need for imposing the sanction will not arise.

\textsuperscript{192} See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Absurd Results, Scrivener’s Errors, and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 25, 72 (2006) (“[P]arents might still wish their children to receive an inheritance in [case they are murdered by them].”); John C. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, Issues in Legal Scholarship, 2002, at 1, 10 (“The very people whom I expect to inherit from me . . . are the very people whom I would want to forgive and let them have my stuff in the hopefully remote possibility that they were to murder me.”).
Absent any empirical evidence, however, such references to the hypothetical intent of the testator are drawn from mere speculation. With regard to slayer statutes, the weakness of these references is illustrated by the fact that the testator’s intent is invoked not only against, but also in favor of, such statutes. At the moment of death, as some authors argue, the testator would have most likely revoked his dispositions in so far as they benefited the slayer. In that sense, a slayer statute would merely help to realize the testator’s true intent. The same point could be made with regard to the suggested disinheri tance statute for cases of interference with freedom of testation. After all, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that a testator whose freedom has been interfered with would have preferred not to leave anything to the interferor if he had been able to make an autonomous disposition with knowledge of the interference attempt. Given the common sentiment that interference with freedom of testation is morally wrong and demonstrates bad character, there is no reason to see why this assumption should be less likely to be true than the assumption that the testator would have left his disposition unchanged even if he had been able to exercise his autonomy with knowledge of the previous interference. In conclusion, one can thus say that the hypothetical intent of the testator can at least not be invoked against the suggested bar from inheritance for interference with freedom of testation.

3. Unconstitutional Forfeiture?

A possible challenge to the suggested disinheri tance statute might also be brought on the ground that many state constitutions

193. Cf. Spivack, supra note 123, at 17 (criticizing the testamentary intent rationale for slayer statutes and noting that “speculation and imagination are all we can use”).
195. Admittedly, the justification of a bar from inheritance by reference to the testator’s (hypothetical) intent would not work if, and insofar as, the forfeiture related to benefits that the testator could not deny the wrongdoer anyway. This is the case with regard to benefits, such as the elective share, that arise from mandatory family protection provisions.
explicitly prohibit forfeiture of a criminal’s estate. Such an argument, however, would most likely not be successful, as the history of the establishment of the slayer statutes demonstrates. Even though some state courts originally refused to recognize the slayer rule on the basis of the constitutional prohibitions of forfeiture, it seems undisputed today that the standard slayer statute does not violate such a constitutional prohibition. The rationale for this view has already been spelled out in *Riggs v. Palmer*, where the majority pointed out that the slayer rule “takes from [the wrongdoer] no property.” A slightly more elaborated way of presenting this so-called “owned interest rationale” would go as follows: technically speaking, one can only forfeit something in which one holds a property right; the mere expectation of an inheritance before the decedent’s death does not constitute such a property right; thus, a slayer statute that merely bars a slayer from acquiring property cannot violate the prohibition on forfeiture. This rationale should also apply to the disinheritance statute that has been proposed above with regard to interference with freedom of testation.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to analyze the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation to determine their ability to deter this kind of undesirable behavior sufficiently, and, second, to demonstrate why a statutory bar from

196. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 9 (“[N]o conviction can work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.”). For an overview of similar constitutional and statutory provisions, see Fellows, supra note 134, at 538 n.147.

197. See, e.g., McAllister v. Fair, 84 P. 112, 113 (Kan. 1906) (“[It is not] easy to attribute to the Legislature an intention to take from a criminal the right to inherit as a consequence of his crime, since the Constitution provides that no conviction shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.”). For further references to similar decisions, see, e.g., Maki & Kaplan, supra note 123, at 911 n.58.

198. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 134, at 544–45; Hennessy, supra note 126, at 171–73. *But see*, e.g., Bradley Myers, *The New North Dakota Slayer Statute: Does it Cause a Criminal Forfeiture?*, 83 N.D. L. REV. 997, 1025 (2007) (arguing that a slayer statute that deprives the killer of any interest in property held in joint tenancy with the victim constitutes a criminal forfeiture).

199. 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889); see also Hennessy, supra note 126, at 171–72.

200. This term seems to have been established by Fellows, supra note 134, at 540–42.

201. See, e.g., *Restatement of Restitution* § 187 cmt. c (1937); Hennessy, supra note 126, at 171–73; Wade, supra note 123, at 720. *But see* Fellows, supra note 134, at 542–45 (holding slayer statutes constitutional, but rejecting the “owned interest rationale” and proposing a different rationale); Sneddon, supra note 126, at 106 (agreeing with the alternative interpretation of Fellows); Julie J. Olen, Comment, *’Til Death Do Us Part: New York’s Slayer Rule and In re Estates of Covert*, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1346 n. 24 (2001) (agreeing with the alternative interpretation of Fellows).
inheritance for interference with freedom of testation would enhance the deterrence of such behavior and also accord with important principles underlying the law of succession.

The analysis of the existing remedies against interference with freedom of testation in Part II leads to the conclusion that there is currently under-deterrence of interference with freedom of testation. This problem results in particular from the following three factors: (1) the inapplicability of will contests in many cases of interference with freedom of testation; (2) the insufficient degree of sanctioning that all three available remedies—will contests, tort actions, and constructive trusts—provide; and (3) the difficulty of proving the conditions for the application of constructive trusts and tort actions. It has also been demonstrated that the problem of under-deterrence cannot be solved merely by legislative modification of the existing remedies.

Part III, therefore, suggests adopting a new remedy against interference with freedom of testation as a supplement to the existing remedies. The suggested disinheritance statute would alleviate the described under-deterrence problem, primarily because of two advantages over the existing remedies. First, it would not be necessary to demonstrate how the testator would have exercised his freedom of testation in the absence of the interference. Second, the bar from inheritance would entail a sanction for many interferors and thus solve the problem that they currently have little to lose from an interference.

In addition to being advantageous from a deterrence perspective, a bar from inheritance helps to ensure that an interferor does not profit from his wrongdoing in cases where, as a consequence of the interference, it can no longer be established how the testator would have devised his estate plan. Other factors also support the conclusion that a bar from inheritance for interference with freedom of testation would fit well in the system of succession law: (1) the general trend towards a behavior-based inheritance regime; (2) the availability of similar solutions in jurisdictions outside the United States; and (3) the fact that, within the United States, almost all jurisdictions have already adopted bars from inheritance for the problem of the “murdering heir”—a problem that, when viewed conceptually, is essentially nothing other than a highly aggravated form of interference with freedom of testation.

In sum, the proposal made in this Article aims to improve the protection of freedom of testation in a way that is in line with the established principles of the American law of succession. Acting on
the proposal would allow legislators to address the ever more urg-
et problem of interference with freedom of testation without hav-
ing to implement costly institutional reforms. While the pro-
posed disinheritance statute would not completely solve the inter-
ference problem, it would still make a difference, given that it
would ensure that many potential interferors would have some-
thing significant to lose from violating another’s freedom of
testation.