I. Introduction

By most accounts, the pursuit of racial diversity in the modern U.S. workplace is ubiquitous. The extent to which firms genuinely care about achieving it may be debatable, but assertions of commitment to a diverse workforce have become a familiar corporate refrain. But does all this routine talk of racial diversity square with the legal status of workplace diversity initiatives? Arguably, there is a tension. Given recent developments, it is uncertain whether Title VII permits race-conscious hiring measures that seek workplace racial diversity, especially if such measures do not fit the mold of traditional affirmative action plans designed to remedy "manifest imbalances" associated with past discrimination.

This legal issue is one that the Supreme Court will eventually be called upon to resolve. In anticipation of that intervention, this chapter seeks to understand the significance of workplace affirmative action from a broader perspective that scholars have largely overlooked. We step back from the question of whether employer affirmative action can be doctrinally and theoretically justified by appeal to the value of diversity and examine, instead, the systemic role affirmative action plays in shaping workplace diversity. Significantly, our inquiry is not limited to workplace affirmative action plans. We focus our attention on university
affirmative action plans as well. We do so to investigate the relation between workplace diversity and what we hypothesize to be a critical determinant: the diversity of the colleges and universities that feed the employment market. We examine, in short, the causal relation between diversity in the workplace and diversity in the student bodies of higher educational institutions. We describe this often overlooked relationship to situate race-conscious hiring by employers in the context of other important systemic factors that contribute to the production of workplace diversity. Our hope is that the framework we employ will inform the debate about the legal permissibility of employer affirmative action that is sure to come.

For purposes of the discussion, we assume that it is an open question whether employers can invoke the value of diversity to justify their affirmative action policies. We assume further that, as recently restated by the Supreme Court in *Fisher v. University of Texas,* the value of diversity can justify a university’s consideration of race as one factor among many in deciding which applicants to admit. Given the accepted value of diversity in the constitutional setting and the common goals of educational affirmative action and of Title VII in general, many have argued that affirmative action is as desirable and as necessary in the workplace context as it is in the university. The thinking is that, because workplaces should be in equipoise with universities with respect to realizing the benefits of diversity, the normative justifications for diversity and the policy mechanism for implementing it—affirmative action—should be transplanted from the educational context to the employment context.

Multiple scholars have endorsed some version of the “transplant” argument. Some support their position with reference to the persistence of historical employment inequalities in the modern workplace. Others highlight the purposes of Title VII. Still others invoke empirical evidence showing how the presence of diversity can reduce discriminatory bias and harmful stereotyping.

We do not argue that the transplant approach is mistaken. The benefits of educational and workplace diversity may indeed be comparable. The problem is that scholars who justify affirmative action in the workplace by analogy to the educational context overlook the implications of a crucial fact: the university and the workplace are not separate and distinct institutional settings in which diversity is or is not achieved. They are part of a causally connected system. This is no small thing. It means that the policies and practices surrounding diversity in each context shape and influence the diversity that emerges in the other. Scholars, policymakers, and judges have largely ignored this crucial dynamic. They continue to frame affirmative action practices in the workplace
and those at colleges and universities as disaggregated diversity mechanisms. This limits our ability to understand fully what is at stake with respect to overruling *Grutter* and/or prohibiting affirmative action in the workplace. In this respect, analyses of diversity-based affirmative action in the employment context or the educational context are incomplete unless they take into account the consequences that rules permitting or restricting such action in either domain are likely to have for the system as a whole. We examine these consequences by way of a model that we call the "diversity feedback loop."

Three central features constitute our model: a *supply effect*, a *reiteration effect*, and a *demand effect*. The schematic below and accompanying texts describe how these three dynamics combine to create the diversity feedback loop.

**The Diversity Feedback Loop**

- The university, through its admissions policy, assembles a diverse student body (or not) that, on graduation, becomes a key supply of labor for potential employers—a *supply effect*.
- The diversity that exists in the supply of labor is, at least to some extent relocated to or "reiterated" in the workplace through the operation of employer hiring mechanisms—a *reiteration effect*. 

The basic dynamics are these:
• The employer's diversity hiring criteria exert a demand for employees who have particular characteristics, which can influence the criteria that universities use to determine the students they admit—a demand effect.

The remainder of this chapter elaborates on these dynamics to demonstrate that we stand a better chance of improving the diversity of universities and workplaces if we recognize that both domains are part of the same diversity system. This insight is relevant not only as a normative matter (whether it makes sense to promote affirmative action in both the workplace and the university setting) but also as a doctrinal matter (whether the legality of affirmative action in the context of the workplace should be coextensive with its legality in the context of the university).

Our argument unfolds in four parts. Part II discusses the supply and reiteration effects. These effects follow from the fact that universities are a gateway to the workplace. Today's student bodies are tomorrow's potential workforces. To the extent that employers rely on universities as a source of labor, universities function as a pathway through which diversity is supplied. The diversity of the university provides both a limit on and a template for diversity in the workplace.

Yet when employers hire from affirmative action institutions, their own diversity-enhancing selection measures might not mirror the measures implemented at the university admissions stage. When hiring, employers might seek to realize a conception of diversity that differs in significant ways from the educationally rooted ideal of a diverse student body. Actors in these two institutional contexts might therefore "screen" for diversity in distinctive ways. Part III explores the implications of the possible divergence between the employer and university diversity screens.

Part IV demonstrates how the hiring practices of employers can influence the admissions practices of universities in the educational context. Universities operate within multiple competitive markets. Among other things, they are competing to place their students with the best employers. Students, in turn, evaluate schools, at least in part, based on their placement rates. Universities with poor placement records are at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those with stronger ones. This creates an incentive for universities to supply the kind of diversity employers want. Doing so maximizes the likelihood that employers will hire the graduates of those universities. To the extent that universities structure their diversity initiatives to maximize the employment opportunities available to their graduates, employer diversity preferences influence the university's admission's regime. Part IV discusses this demand effect.
II. The Supply and Reiteration Effects

A. The Basic Supply Hypothesis

The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the composition of the relevant labor market can constrain an employer's ability to eliminate patterns of racial exclusion from its workplace. Of course, employers who engage in discrimination (or who practice affirmative action) can cause their workforces to be significantly less or more racially diverse than the available pool of qualified labor. But the fact remains that the makeup of that pool places certain limits on the composition of the employer's workplace. For example, if there are no Asian Americans in the labor pool, there will be no Asian Americans in the workplace, no matter what hiring preferences employers might use. Employers cannot create workplace diversity out of thin air. They need a supply.

The importance of educational diversity as a source of workplace diversity was emphasized in an amicus brief filed by Fortune 100 companies in the Fisher case. We quote directly from the brief:

But amici [Fortune 100 companies] cannot reach [the] goal [of a diverse workforce] on their own...When amici make decisions about hiring and promotion, it is critical that they be able to draw from a superior pool of candidates—both minority and non-minority—who have realized the many benefits of diversity in higher education. There can be no question that “[t]he Nation's future” does indeed continue to "depend[] upon leaders"—including business leaders—"trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."

The fact that employers rely on institutions of higher education to provide a supply of diverse labor implies that the achievement of racial diversity in the workplace will depend on not only the behavior of employers but also the behavior of educational institutions. Thus, workplace diversity is potentially affected by the use of affirmative action by universities at the admissions stage as well as by employers at the hiring stage. If this is so, understanding the conditions necessary for achieving workplace diversity requires isolating the expected effects of race-conscious selection measures at each stage. To what extent would we expect the diversity of the workplace to be affected by (1) the use of affirmative action in education and (2) the use of affirmative action by employers?

Our aim here is to provide a theoretical model that provides preliminary answers to these questions. But first, two specifications are in order. Though we believe that the model we describe below applies to employers who hire from highly selective colleges and universities generally,
for simplicity, we narrow our focus to law firms who hire their associates predominantly from highly selective law schools. We will refer to the law firms that hire in this way as "elite law firms" and the selective law schools from which they hire as "elite law schools." Of course, elite law firms do hire from nonelite law schools, and nonelite law firms do hire from elite law schools as well. The principal reason we limit our analysis to the "elite" context is to simplify our analysis. We note, too, that most of the literature on racial diversity and law firms focuses on elite law firms and suggests that elite law firms are more likely to hire from elite law schools than from nonelite law schools. Indeed, there is reason to believe that elite law firms will hire very few people of color from nonelite law schools. Focusing on elite law firms and elite law schools allows us to track a very real dynamic—the flow of diversity from elite law schools to elite law firms—and at the same time describe our theoretical hypothesis: namely, that the diversity of elite law school student bodies is a causal determinant of the diversity of elite law firm workplaces. This is true simply because whatever diversity exists in elite law firms has to come from somewhere, and we have stipulated that elite law firms hire from elite law schools.

The question then becomes: What affects the diversity of elite law schools? One answer is the school's admissions policy. The diversity of an elite law school student body is at least partly determined by the school's positive consideration of race as a factor in admissions—that is, its affirmative action policy. The more robust the elite law school's race-conscious affirmative action program is, the more diverse its student body will be; and the more diverse a law school's student body is, the more diverse its graduates will be. Since elite law firms, by our definition, hire from the labor pool formed by these graduates, it follows that the use of affirmative action by elite law schools is causally linked to the racial composition, and hence the diversity, of the workplace of these employers.

To summarize, a law school's admissions regime affects the diversity of the student body; the diversity of the student body shapes the diversity of the labor pool; and the diversity of the labor pool influences the diversity of law firms. These observations together make up the supply effect in the university-workplace relation. With this preliminary hypothesis in place, we now model how a legal rule permitting or restricting race-conscious hiring might modulate the movement of diversity from law school student bodies to the workplace of the law firm.
B. The Reiteration Effect: Default Case

We begin by establishing what we call a reiteration effect, or the basic tendency of the level of diversity that exists in the labor supply pool to be reproduced in the relevant workplace. As a predicate, we make four additional assumptions. First, for reasons previously discussed, we assume that, above some threshold of satisfactory academic performance, elite law firms are indifferent to grades. Second, we assume that the diversity of the group of students who achieve this level of academic performance is the same as the diversity of the student body overall. These first two assumptions imply that most graduates of elite law schools, including black and Latino students, are regarded by elite law firms as equally qualified to be hired as associates. Third, we assume that the graduates of all elite law schools who are interested in working in elite law firms are equally willing to accept positions in all elite firms, but that any given firm can lure any particular graduate by expending more resources on recruiting or offering a higher salary. Fourth, we assume that the law firm’s and the law school’s conceptions of diversity are congruent (including judgments about whether a particular individual will contribute to diversity).

With these assumptions out of the way, it is helpful to invoke a general axiom endorsed by the Supreme Court, albeit in the context of a rather different issue. According to the Court, “absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired.” This axiom, as applied to our model, suggests that in the absence of employer discrimination, the level of workplace diversity among elite law firms will, over time, be the same as the level of diversity that exists in law school student bodies. Whatever diversity exists in elite student bodies will be randomly supplied to all firms, with no single law firm having a higher or lower level of diversity than others, except by operation of chance.

This general axiom might strike some readers as an overly simplistic assumption, one that flies in the face of empirical evidence about ongoing employment discrimination. Some might argue that any model that accepts the Court’s assumption in the Teamsters case assumes away too much. Two responses are in order. First, if we do not assume away discrimination, that variable becomes a showstopper for our desired analysis. If employers are assumed to discriminate, then workplace diversity will be almost entirely a function of their exclusionary policies—period. Thus, we might learn more about the structural relationship between
educational and workplace diversity if we think about what we would expect to happen in the absence of discrimination.

Second, and perhaps more important, imagining what we would expect to happen in the absence of discrimination is a useful exercise because a comparison of the expected consequences of that assumption with real-world observations may provide a way to test whether the assumption is true. The assumption is not an idle one. Although it would be putting the point too strongly to say that the federal courts assume that employment discrimination does not exist, it is fair to say that they have not been sympathetic to plaintiffs who bring claims of discrimination.24 Our sense is that many people believe that employment discrimination is largely no longer a real problem and that if workplaces lack diversity, this is explained by a lack of qualified candidates, not by discrimination. The assumption behind this common belief is that if there were a qualified, diverse pool of people of color, firms would hire them, and their workplaces would become diverse. Note how this view aligns with the assumptions of our model—namely, the elite law school's student body diversity will be supplied fully and uniformly into the workplace.

In any event, our claim is that in a world where our basic assumptions hold true, the racial diversity that exists in the graduating student bodies of elite law schools will be uniformly distributed among all elite law firms, such that the level of diversity in the group of students who enter the elite workplace matches the level of diversity in the elite law school student pool overall. In other words, in the default conditions of our model, workplace diversity simply reiterates student body diversity.

C. Modeling the Reiteration Effect under Four Alternative Conditions

If full and uniform reiteration is expected in our model's default conditions, what might we expect to observe if we vary both the law firm's and the law school's behavior? That is the question we now address. We will examine how the supply of diversity from the law school to the law firm might vary under four specific conditions. Condition 1 assumes that the level of law school diversity is high and that the law firm is prohibited from using affirmative action. Condition 2 imagines a low level of law school diversity; here, too, the law firm may not use affirmative action. Condition 3 permits the law firm to use affirmative action and posits a high level of law school diversity. Under Condition 4, the law firm is also permitted to use affirmative action, but the level of law school diversity is low. We discuss below how each of these conditions might affect the
supply of student body diversity from the university (the law school) to the workplace (the law firm).


Suppose that there is a high level of racial diversity in the student bodies of elite law schools, such that the presence of racial minorities in these student bodies is as high as or higher than in the general population. (We might imagine a world in which all elite law schools were permitted under applicable state and federal law to consider the race of their applicants as a positive factor in the admissions process, and all elite law schools did in fact do so.) Stipulate also that law firms are not legally permitted to take race into account in their hiring decisions—that is, that the law requires formally color-blind hiring. What result should be expected for law firm diversity, given the assumptions of our model?

Assuming full compliance by law firms, we should expect that, over time, all elite law firms would come to have the same high level of diversity that is present in elite law school student bodies. That is to say, the diversity of the student bodies will be fully and uniformly supplied to the workplace. To understand why, recall that we are assuming, for purposes of analysis, that there is no explicit or implicit discrimination in the labor market. Insofar as firms are not going to differentiate among elite students (per our earlier hypothesis and explanation), we should expect student body diversity to be supplied to and randomly distributed among all elite law firms. We would also expect that, over time, every elite law firm would mirror the demographic of the elite law school student bodies from which they are populated. In short, under Condition 1, workplace diversity would be established at levels matching the diversity of the student pool, even without the utilization of employer affirmative action.

2. Condition 2: Low Educational Diversity, Employer Affirmative Action Prohibited

In this condition, suppose that elite universities have low levels of racial diversity, such that the proportion of racial minorities in their student bodies is significantly lower than their proportion in the general population. This scenario could emerge in a jurisdiction (like California) that prohibits the consideration of race in university admissions; the scenario could also occur if, at some future point, the Supreme Court overruled Grutter and held that affirmative action was unconstitutional in the
educational context. Assume, as in Condition 1, that the law prohibits race-conscious affirmative action hiring. What is the expected result?

As in Condition 1, we should expect that, under Condition 2, over time, all elite workplaces will come to share the demographic of the student bodies from which they draw. That is, all law firms will come to have an equally low level of racial diversity. A formally colorblind hiring rule, again assuming nondiscrimination, should reproduce the level of diversity present in the elite student body pool at the workplace level of the law firm. If the level of diversity in the overall pool of job candidates is low, then colorblind hiring should produce an equally low level of workplace diversity, uniformly distributed among firms.


In the third condition, stipulate that there is a high level of diversity in elite law school student bodies, as in Condition 1. But now suppose that employers are permitted (but not required) to consider job applicants' membership in a minority racial group as a positive factor in their hiring decisions, if doing so is reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the workplace. What outcomes should we expect? The short answer: roughly the same level and distribution of workplace diversity as in Condition 1, the condition with high diversity in the labor market and no affirmative action.

This might seem counterintuitive. One might think a rule permitting consideration of race for diversity purposes would lead to variances among law firms in their levels of diversity. But remember that firms are only permitted to employ affirmative action “if reasonably necessary” to ensure diversity. Since we stipulate in Condition 3 that there is a high level of diversity in the pool of available candidates, and given our overall assumption that this labor market is free of explicit or implicit forms of discrimination and biases, employers should not need to take race into account to yield meaningful diversity. A sufficiently high level of diversity in the pool of available candidates should, under formally color-blind hiring, be adequate to supply that same level of diversity uniformly across all law firms. Assuming that employers are aware of the racial demographics of the pool, it is reasonable to conclude that they would see little need to engage in affirmative action hiring and would refrain from doing so. Combining the results from Conditions 1 and 3, we can conclude that in conditions of high diversity in the available pool of job candidates, we should not expect overall levels or the distribution of workplace diversity across law firms to be significantly dependent on
whether or not employers are permitted to take race into account as a positive hiring factor for the sake of diversity.


Our final condition assumes that there is a low level of racial diversity in the student bodies of elite law schools. Recall that this is also the case in Condition 1. Stipulate now that, as in Condition 3, law firms are permitted (but not required) to consider job applicants' race as a positive factor in their hiring decisions. The caveat, again, is that they may do so only if reasonably necessary to create or maintain diversity in the workplace. Under this condition, what should we expect vis-à-vis the overall supply and distribution of diversity in the workplace?

The results will depend on the extent to which law firms give positive weight to race in their hiring decisions. If law firms behave uniformly, then the results of Condition 4 should be the same as Condition 2 (the condition with low education diversity and employer affirmative action prohibited). There are two ways in which employers could act uniformly.

First, all law firms might refrain from using affirmative action. This would render Condition 4 indistinguishable from Condition 2, so the same results should follow. Second, all law firms could decide to practice affirmative action. Under the default assumptions of our model, elite law firms are all on equal footing in terms of the likely success of their diversity initiatives. Thus, a university's student body diversity would be supplied uniformly to all elite workplaces. The overall level of resultant law firm diversity will also likely be uniform.27

But now, let us imagine that elite firms have different views regarding the importance of establishing diversity in their workplaces. Assume that some firms give high priority to having a diverse workforce, while other firms care less about diversity as such or are committed to an ideal of formally color-blind hiring. Suppose, in other words, that only some elite firms consider race as a positive consideration (call these "prodiversity" firms), while other firms do not take race into consideration at all (call these "color-blind firms"). Under these additional assumptions, what result should we expect for workplace diversity among elite firms?

In our model, the amount of diversity in the elite law school student body pool limits the diversity that can be reiterated into the workplace, so we should expect the overall level of diversity among all elite firms to be about as low as that observed in the candidate pool. But unlike in previous conditions, we would expect the distribution of that diversity to be
nonuniform across firms. Prodiversity firms, insofar as they see a greater value in establishing workforce diversity, will offer higher salaries or expend more recruiting resources to lure job candidates who would enhance or bolster the firm's diversity profile. Color-blind firms, who by definition care less about diversity or are ideologically committed to color-blindness, would have no reason to make the extra expenditures necessary to attract the diversity candidates away from prodiversity firms and so would be less likely to attract and hire them. Over time, therefore, prodiversity firms will come to have a higher level of workplace diversity than color-blind firms. As student body diversity continues to cluster in prodiversity firms from year to year, prodiversity firms will eventually achieve a level of diversity that is higher than the level of diversity available in the elite student body pool, and color-blind firms will eventually have a level of diversity that is even lower than the already-low level available in the candidate pool.

It may not seem particularly remarkable that in Condition 4, prodiversity firms will come to achieve more workplace diversity than color-blind firms, but there are two less obvious points that bear mentioning. First, Condition 4 is the only one of the four conditions in which we would expect anything other than a uniform distribution of diversity across all hiring firms. In all other conditions, including Condition 2, in which we stipulated that employers are permitted to engage in prodiversity hiring, we would expect the diversity of the workplace to be the same as the diversity of the relevant labor pool. Second, a comparison of Conditions 2 and 4 shows that where the diversity of the available candidate pool is very low, then an employment rule that permits but does not require prodiversity hiring will tend to result in a lumpy distribution of diversity among hiring firms, such that some firms will come to have high levels of diversity, while other firms will have minimal or no diversity. In contrast, an employment rule that requires color-blind hiring in conditions of low labor-market diversity will tend to produce an even, albeit low, level of diversity among all hiring firms.

D. Summary

Table 1 summarizes the results of the preceding four conditions.
Six conclusions follow from these results. First, even when one takes into account the diversity practices of firms—that is, whether they engage in or refrain from using affirmative action hiring—the diversity of law school student bodies (the diversity supply) remains crucial to the analysis. Second, a similar point can be made with respect to law: whatever the governing legal regime with respect to whether employers are permitted to use affirmative action, the diversity of university student bodies will play an important role in shaping the diversity of the workplace. These two points highlight the importance of affirmative action in the educational domain. It is a significant mechanism through which diversity is supplied to the labor market.

This brings us to our third point. Our model provides only two ways to achieve high diversity in all elite workplaces. One is to ensure high diversity in elite student bodies. The other is to induce all law firms to engage in affirmative action in conditions of job scarcity (creating an amplification effect). Fourth, the results of Condition 1 might lead one to conclude that we should jettison affirmative action in the employment context if we have robust affirmative action in the educational context. The latter will necessarily be supplied to the former. That is indeed the story our theoretical model tells. But a limitation of our model is that we assume away discrimination in the marketplace. If we add discrimination back into the model—and not necessarily invidious discrimination but simply implicit bias—the results under Condition 1 would change. For example, firms whose decision making reflected implicit bias would have a
lower level of diversity than firms whose decision making did not reflect this bias. For many proponents of affirmative action, this is precisely what affirmative action is designed to counteract—biases (implicit and explicit) in the labor market.

Fifth, understanding the foregoing limitation of our model is especially important in light of the Supreme Court's commitment to color-blindness and general judicial skepticism about workplace discrimination. This is a point we made earlier but bears emphasizing here. Condition 1 is, for us, decidedly theoretical. However, for the conservative justices on the Court, Condition 1 might be an assumed reality. That has implications for the future of affirmative action in the context of the workplace. If a majority of the Supreme Court concludes that workplace discrimination is a thing of the past, it could conclude that, even if affirmative action is necessary in the context of university admissions to achieve student body diversity, it is unnecessary in the context of the workplace, because the diversity of the student body would be reiterated into the workplace.

Our sixth and final conclusion is this: in low educational diversity conditions, rules that permit prodiversity hiring will likely result in racial clustering, and law firms will separate themselves over time into high-diversity and low-diversity workplaces. This has implications for jurisdictions like California that prohibit state universities from engaging in affirmative action. Some employees might find themselves in law firms in which there is meaningful diversity. Most will not. Still, to the extent that having meaningful diversity in some workplaces (Condition 4) is better than having low diversity across all workplaces (Condition 2), we should ensure that the prohibition of affirmative action in the context of education is not extended to the context of employment.

III. Divergent Diversity Screens: Complicating the Reiteration Dynamic

In modeling the supply of diversity from elite law schools to elite law firms in Part II of this chapter, we assumed that law firms and law schools share a common notion of "diversity." This need not be the case. A law firm might employ very different criteria than law schools. Law schools are admitting students to service multiple markets, including the public interest markets. As a general matter, these students are likely to be more racially conscious with respect to both their sense of selves and their normative commitments more generally. Moreover, as academic institutions, law schools will likely seek to admit at least some students
who they think will stir things up and facilitate the robust exchange of ideas.

Law firms, on the other hand, may want very different kinds of diversity. Their corporate market context will presumably shape the kind of—and how much—diversity they pursue. For example, while law firms are prohibited from invoking customer preferences to justify screening their application pool for racially palatable African Americans, it is hard not to imagine that some firms end up (at least implicitly) doing just that.

To recognize that law schools and law firms do not necessarily employ the same diversity screens is not to say that their diversity initiatives must be regarded as autonomous. Indeed, we claim just the opposite. For one thing, law firms and law schools might actually employ precisely the same diversity criteria (e.g., looking for people who will facilitate racial cooperation and understanding), in which case we might say that their screens expressly converge. For another, even when law firms and law school diversity criteria do not expressly converge in this way, the diversity that actually arises in each context could nevertheless appear to converge on a shared conception.

Suppose, for example, that law firms care more than law schools about weeding out individuals with poor teamwork attributes. One might assume that this could cause law firm diversity to diverge from law school diversity. That is possible. But on the other hand, law firms might find that the experience of a diverse elite law school prepares students of all backgrounds to work productively and harmoniously in heterogeneous social settings. If this were true, even law firms that prioritize teamwork might be happy to accept, without much further screening, whatever type of diversity law schools produce. The general point is that if law firms perceive value in the diversity produced by law schools, they might seek to capitalize on that value by reproducing it in their workplaces.

Finally, law school and law firm diversity initiatives are not autonomous in another way: any diversity criteria the law firm utilizes at the hiring stage will necessarily piggyback on the diversity efforts of the law school at the admissions stage. As argued above, the diversity of law schools creates the diversity of the labor pool from which law firms hire.

Keeping in mind these ways in which law school and law firm diversity initiatives are connected, we turn our focus in this section to how law school and law firm initiatives can diverge. To appreciate how law firm and law school diversity screening can diverge and the implications of that divergence for the reiteration effect, let us call the set of minority individuals who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action at the law school admissions stage “Law School Diverse” or “LS-Diverse” individu-
als. And let us call the set of minority individuals who are beneficiaries at the law firm hiring stage “Law Firm Diverse” or “LF-Diverse” individuals. Some minorities might be both LS-Diverse and LF-Diverse, while others might be neither.

Consider the ways in which the set of LS-Diverse individuals might relate to LF-Diverse individuals. Quantitatively, the LF-Diverse group could be larger than, smaller than, or the same size as the LS-Diverse group. Qualitatively, the LF-Diverse group could overlap the LS-Diverse group in whole, in part, or not at all. These various possibilities could be combined in a number of ways. We will not attempt to march through all of the permutations, but a few comments are in order.

For various reasons, the set of people who are the beneficiaries of LF-Diversity initiatives might be different from those who previously benefited from LS-Diversity initiatives. The two sets might be quantitatively different simply because universities and employers assign different weight to racial considerations in the selection process. A heavier weighting will naturally tend to result in a larger set of individuals who benefit from the diversity initiative.

There might also be systemic reasons for this quantitative divergence between LS-Diversity and LF-Diversity. For example, if law schools engage in robust affirmative action measures and succeed in creating highly diverse student bodies, who then form the labor pool from which law firms hire, law firms might perceive that there is less of a need for them to use pro-diversity affirmative action in order to achieve significant workplace diversity. They may assume, per our discussion in Part II, that the diversity in the labor market will naturally “trickle up” or be reiterated into the firm. This might be especially true of firms that conceive of themselves as nondiscriminatory. These firms would see little need to employ affirmative action as a prophylactic against the possibility of discrimination. Under this scenario, the set of people who benefit from LF-Diversity efforts may be low relative to the set of people who benefit from LS-Diversity efforts.

Law firm and law school affirmative action initiatives might also yield different sets of beneficiaries for reasons having to do with the context-dependent nature of diversity initiatives. LF-Diversity might be qualitatively different from LS-Diversity. Employers and universities might look for different characteristics in constructing their institutional diversities. For example, employers might screen candidates for compatibility with their corporate culture in ways that constrain their pro-diversity hiring. In some cases, what might appear to be facially neutral screening criteria could cause LF-Diversity selections to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity selections. A silly example: a law firm might
screen in favor of minority candidates who, in addition to attending elite law schools, attended prestigious private prep schools. But minority law students with prep school backgrounds might be less likely than others to have benefited from affirmative action at the law school admissions stage—that is, less likely to be LS-Diverse. If so, then law firm screening for minorities who attended prestigious private prep schools could cause LF-Diversity to be negatively correlated with LS-Diversity.

Law firm diversity and law school diversity might diverge in other ways. Elite law firms and elite law schools might have different ideas about the characteristics (in addition to simple racial phenotype) that could make one person preferable to another from the standpoint of enhancing the institution’s diversity. The basic educational goals and academic principles that define the mission of elite universities (of which elite law schools are a part) do not apply to most elite employers.\textsuperscript{32} The value of diversity in the educational context, or at least the value that has been assigned constitutional significance, encompasses a well-known mélange of goods, including enhanced educational discourse, eradication of racial stereotypes and other types of de-biasing, reduction of racial isolation, preparation for citizenship in a pluralistic society, providing good modeling for minority youth, creation of a visible path for minorities leading to leadership roles in society, and so on.\textsuperscript{33} Against the background of these interests, a law school might make special efforts to enroll students from racial minority groups who are most likely to bring an overtly “racial perspective” to classroom discussions. This might include minority students who have the least in common with most other students with respect to their backgrounds and experiences, in order to activate Bakke/Grutter discourse benefits.

Law firms might also have an interest in fostering diverse perspectives in the workplace on a different basis, such as the belief that this would improve their ability to anticipate client or customer needs. But overriding concerns about workplace harmony might make employers wary of hiring individuals who will have trouble fitting into the corporate culture.\textsuperscript{34} This does not mean that these institutions would seek individuals who dis-identify with their race or embrace a color-blind sense of self. Corporate cultures are increasingly interested in establishing so-called affinity groups—that is, groups that are organized around specific identities (such as being gay or lesbian, a person of color, or a woman). While these groups are less prevalent in the law firm context, elite law firms are still interested in hiring people of color who will perform palatable or modest forms of racial diversity work. The point is that it will be the rare elite law firm that would hire an African American applicant because
that person will shake up the firm's institutional culture. This is precisely the kind of person an elite law school might admit.

More generally, the benefits that law schools as academic institutions might seek to advance will not necessarily readily map onto the priorities of a typical (nonacademic) employer's workplace. To be clear, this is not to say that law firms will perceive no value in diversity. The point, instead, is that even when they perceive positive value in a diverse workforce, they may have different reasons than law schools for pursuing diversity.

A final reason that law firm diversity screens might be different from law school diversity screens is that the employer may be hiring from a pool that has already been made diverse through affirmative action at an earlier screening stage (the admissions process). This fact may have varying implications. One possibility is that a law firm might make fine distinctions between minority individuals within the pool who may have been equal beneficiaries of prodiversity admissions criteria. It might do so, for example, in order to screen out individuals who might clash with its corporate culture.

Much of the foregoing is speculative. That should not obscure that our analysis is theoretically grounded in the fact that law firms and law schools operate under different incentive systems with respect to their pursuit of diversity. The difference in their incentive structures means that elite law firms may utilize different diversity-screening criteria than law schools.

**IV. The Demand Effect**

In Part III, we explored the implications of law firms and law schools employing different diversity screens. We assumed that these diversity-promoting criteria are stable over time and that they are independently fixed within each context. In this part, we relax the latter assumptions to explore the possibility that universities might adjust their admissions policies in response to observed employment patterns, including employers' revealed preferences about the kind of diversity they want.

Elite law schools operate in a competitive market. While their primary mission may be educational and academic, they compete with each other to attract exceptional students who will enrich the community, perform to the highest academic standards, and make valuable contributions to society after they graduate. One way in which law schools attract students is by trying to outperform their peer institutions in placing their graduates in the most desirable jobs. If they are unable to compete with other law schools in achieving placement of graduates in the
job market, the best students will decide to matriculate elsewhere, which will erode the affected schools’ prestige and academic standing, eventually making it difficult for them to maintain their status among their elite peers. The fact that placement rates figure significantly in the overall ranking of law schools makes this dynamic all the more significant.

The competition to place graduates in desirable jobs gives rise to an incentive for universities to admit more of the types of students who are sought by employers when they graduate and fewer of the types of students who are not. Law schools may have multiple reasons to admit or not admit a particular type of student. In general, to the extent that employers actively seek graduates who possess some discernible set of characteristics, universities will have an added incentive to look for those characteristics in the students they admit. If law firms tend not to hire graduates with some set of characteristics, then law schools will have less reason to admit applicants fitting that type.

There is no reason that this demand effect should not apply to characteristics associated with enhancing workplace diversity. If elite law firms give priority in their hiring to elite law school graduates who possess diversity-enhancing characteristics, law schools will have an added incentive to screen in favor of those characteristics at the admissions stage. That is to say, other things equal, law schools that engage in affirmative action have an incentive to craft their diversity initiatives to give preference to applicants who are likely to become LF-Diverse graduates. The demand exerted by employers for graduates meeting their diversity criteria could cause law firm and law school diversity initiatives to converge over time. Whether this occurs will likely depend on the strength of the law firm’s diversity demand and the strength of the incentive for the law school to respond to this demand.

V. Conclusion: Some Implications of Our Model

Our point of departure was the claim that the diversity of law schools and of law firms is intertwined. What happens in one setting affects the other. We then moved on to show some of the specific ways in which the two contexts interact, including a discussion of how law firm diversity initiatives might modulate the flow of diversity from law schools to law firms and how those initiatives might in turn loop back to influence the behavior of law school admissions committees. We conclude by suggesting several implications of our account for the development and promotion of workplace diversity.

First, the existence of diversity in the supply of labor that feeds into the employment market is a necessary condition of workplace diversity.
Workplace diversity cannot be created from thin air. And insofar as law school student body diversity depends on educational affirmative action, it follows that educational affirmative action is a necessary condition of workplace diversity. In other words, in addition to constituting a law school's entering class, law school admissions constitute the future law firm application pool from which law firms hire.

Second, there is a quantitative and a qualitative dimension to this supply function. Quantitatively, the more aggressively prodiversity the law school's admissions criteria are, the more diverse its contribution to the hiring pool will be. Qualitatively, the stronger the convergence between the kind of diversity in which a law firm is interested and the kind of diversity a law firm seeks to advance, the greater the likelihood that the law firm will rely on the law school's graduates as its employment pool and thus the greater the likelihood that the law school's diversity will be reiterated into the law firm.

Third, by and large, we ought not worry about law schools engaging in "too much" affirmative action. Law firm behavior in this regard will be disciplined by the competitive markets in which they operate. But the same goes for the behavior of universities. Diversity initiatives in the educational context are, after all, voluntary. Universities have no reason to engage in affirmative action beyond a level that balances educational usefulness with whatever demand for diversity actually exists in the employment market.

Finally, we should query whether the story we tell about the demand effect means that law firms may be exerting too much pressure on law schools to conform their conception of diversity to the model that happens to prevail in the workplace. Law schools might have good reasons to offer admission to the iconoclastic, overtly racialized student with a penchant for challenging hierarchy and complacency with the status quo. But law firms might be more reticent in offering that student a job—and that might affect the law school's willingness to offer admission.

Similarly, law firms and law schools might have a very different sense of how much diversity is enough. "Critical mass" from a law firm's perspective might look quite different from "critical mass" from the perspective of the law school—and the former might end up shaping the latter. To put this another way, if law firms have a diversity saturation point or a diversity ceiling, law schools have an incentive to adjust their affirmative action efforts to keep the diversity of their student bodies below that level. The concern, in short, is that the demand effect can influence both the quantitative and the qualitative supply of diversity throughout the loop. This suggests that we ought to begin a conversa-
tion about whether there are ways to effectuate a counterbalancing force so that a law school's quantitative and qualitative commitments to diversity not only are shaped by but also shape how law firms articulate their vision of a diverse workplace.

About the Authors

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Notes


2. See especially Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (holding that Title VII does not permit race-conscious action to alleviate racial disparities in the workforce unless employer has "strong basis in evidence" that failure to take such action would result in liability for disparate impact).


6. See id. at 2421.


8. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1 (2005). Some scholars frame this argument in terms of the basic goals of antidiscrimination law,
including Title VII—namely, to eliminate racial disparities and inequalities in the employment context. See id. at 37–38. This entails increasing the numbers of racial minorities in workplaces where they are underrepresented—that is, increasing racial diversity in those contexts. Affirmative action is a sensible way to do that. So if the value of diversity justifies race-conscious action in the educational context, and if we agree that racial diversity also has positive value under Title VII, it would seem to follow that race-conscious action should also be justified in the employment context.


10. Significantly, even when scholars point out potential difficulties with the transplant approach, they generally treat the educational and workplace settings as separate domains of diversity. The question these scholars then ask is whether diversity really has the same value or function in these two settings and whether it follows that these different diversity domains should be subject to the same legal constraints.

11. Justice O’Connor’s argument that affirmative action helps establish a visible path to, and diversity at the level of, leadership (see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 382 (2003)), is consonant with what we call the supply effect. See also WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 128–31 (1998) (discussing reasons attendance at a selective university might enhance career opportunities). Our account goes beyond this insight by modeling how the diversity pathway functions and by showing that this linkage is just one aspect of the system that connects university and workplace diversity.


14. Although elite law firms may do some limited hiring from nonelite law schools, we suspect that for the most part, that hiring will not include black or Latino students. One explanation for this may be that, for reasons beyond the scope
of this chapter, blacks and Latinos perhaps tend to receive lower grades in law school than their white and Asian American counterparts. Because elite law firms hiring from nonelite law schools tend to limit their hiring to the very top of the graduating class, blacks and Latinos in nonelite firms might look proportionally underrepresented in the elite firm workplace were we to define the hiring pool to include nonelite firms. Such a definition might make our analysis more empirically grounded, but it would make it difficult for us to model the expected effects of racial diversity in the hiring pool alone, not confounded by the effects of employer selection for variables unrelated to race. By limiting the definition of the hiring pool to elite law schools, we can factor out this confounding variable. While elite law firms may care about the grades of blacks and Latinos at elite law schools, their focus tends to be on whether these—and other—elite law school students have met some threshold level of achievement, not on whether they are at the top of their class. The more “elite” the law school, the less significant the grades (again, above some threshold of academic performance). Consequently, even if blacks and Latinos at elite law firms receive lower grades than their white and Asian American counterparts, they are not outside of the elite law firm’s hiring pool. Thus, by limiting our definition of the relevant hiring pool to elite law school students, we can factor out the confounding variable of class rank with a simple (albeit still idealizing) stipulation: law firms are generally indifferent to grades in their hiring of elite law school graduates.

15. Of course, there are other factors involved. We do not claim that law school affirmative action is the sole determinant of elite law firm diversity. For our purposes, suffice it to say that it is one significant factor.


17. In the interest of being thorough, let us stipulate also that elite law firms generally do not hire students who fall below that threshold.

18. This assumption probably holds true at the top five or six law schools; for law schools further down in the rankings, the assumption may be much more contestable.

19. As discussed above, the purpose of this assumption is to enable us to theorize how workplace diversity might be affected by the level of racial diversity in law school student bodies and positive consideration of race (for the sake of creating diversity) by law firms and law schools.

20. We relax this assumption in Part III below.

21. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). The Court was addressing whether intentional discrimination could be proved using statistical evidence of disparities between the racial composition of the employer’s workforce and the local labor market.

22. Here we use “discrimination” to refer to actions—implicitly or explicitly motivated—based on bias, prejudice, or preferences that operate to the disadvantage of racial minorities. We do not count the use of prodiversity racial preferences as discrimination. We recognize that this is a contested question in the legal context of Title VII interpretation.

23. We might add that any observed statistically significant disparities in levels of diversity between firms could presumptively be attributed to discrimination (either intentional or not) or to positive employer preferences for diversity.

arguing that empirical data on low success rates for employment discrimination plaintiffs "raises the specter that federal appellate courts have a double standard for employment discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing employees' victories below while gazing benignly at employers' victories"); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, *Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law*, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 111, 159–62 (2011) (summarizing recent scholarship on judicial hostility toward employment discrimination claims).

25. The qualification in our hypothetical rule permitting consideration of race only if "reasonably necessary" is not based on current Title VII law. But if the Supreme Court were to recognize a diversity-based justification for affirmative action in hiring, we believe the Court would impose some limitation of this sort, if not an even more restrictive one.

26. In Condition 3, if an elite firm mistakenly believes that consideration of race is necessary for workplace diversity, the firm will end up with a level of diversity that is either equal to or higher than the level of diversity in the pool of available students. If the firm's prodiversity hiring results in a level of diversity that is equal to that in the pool, then the firm's "unnecessary" consideration of race should have no effect on the overall distribution of diversity among firms. If the firm, as a result of its positive consideration of race, produces a higher level of diversity in its own workplace than is present in the overall applicant pool, this might tend to cause an increased level of diversity relative to the firm's own workplace diversity. If so, this may tend to cause an increased level of diversity relative to the firms that perceive (correctly, according to our assumptions) that consideration of race is not necessary.

27. One might think that the answer would depend on the ratio of elite students in the available labor pool to available positions. If there are at least as many employment positions available as there are elite students looking for jobs, then the uniform application of affirmative action preferences by employers should not disrupt the full and uniform propagation of the low level of diversity that exists in the elite student pool to the workplace. However, if there are fewer employment positions available than elite students in the pool, affirmative action will cause minority workers to be hired at a greater rate than nonminority workers, which will result in a level of workplace diversity that is higher than the level of diversity in the candidate pool. In this case, one might argue that the diversity of the pool would not only propagate to the workplace but also be amplified. While this is theoretically possible, it seems equally possible that in conditions of job scarcity, employers would either consciously or unconsciously scale back their affirmative action hiring so as not to exceed a certain "saturation" point for workplace diversity. If so, then there would be no amplification effect.

28. See *supra* note 27.


30. We say this is likely—not certain—in our model because clustering would not occur if all employers act in perfect unison with respect to their permitted use of prodiversity preferences.

31. For purposes of this discussion, we still assume, as in Part II, that employers regard all graduates of elite universities as comparably qualified for positions in their workplaces, but we introduce the possibility that employers might consider characteristics other than objective qualifications in constructing their workforce.

33. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1130 (2013).


35. Significantly, law schools are very much aware of where their students end up. For at least the past two decades, largely because of law school rankings but also to facilitate alumni relationships and giving, schools have been keeping fairly accurate records about where their graduates end up.

36. We readily concede that other things may not be equal. For example, if LF-Diversity is insufficient to fully activate the educational benefits that might be possible with other modes of diversity, then universities might give priority to achievement of those educational benefits even at the cost of marginally lower employment of graduates. But our point is that employer demand for a particular type of diversity will exert a pull in that direction, not that the value of LF-Diversity will necessarily trump all other law school values.

37. We would not predict complete convergence because satisfying employer demand is only part of (and concededly, perhaps only a small part of) the educational benefit of a diverse student body. See discussion in Part III above.

38. At least two factors could shape the strength of this demand: the law firm's substantive commitment to diversity and the employer's symbolic commitment to diversity. With respect to the substantive commitment, an employer might be committed to diversity because it thinks (a) it is the right thing to do, (b) diversity will improve workplace efficiency and productivity, and (c) it provides access to markets. With respect to the symbolic commitment, an employer might simply want to signal (“showcase”) diversity to avoid the reputational costs of not doing so.

39. The strength of this incentive would turn on (a) how important employment rankings are to the overall ranking of the institution, (b) how much attention students pay to employment rates and/or rankings, and (c) whether jobs are scarce. As to the scarcity of jobs, we note that in conditions of full employment, the demand effect will be weak unless employers actively avoid hiring students who are LS-Diverse—a possibility that is factored out by our initial assumptions of Part II. The demand effect will be most pronounced when law firms implement diversity initiatives in conditions of job scarcity. In those conditions, LF-Diverse students will be hired at a disproportionately higher rate than all other students, giving rise to an incentive for law schools to admit more students fitting that profile.