PART II

THE CONFERENCE ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS
Chapter IV

The Opening of the Diplomatic Negotiations

I

The Eisenhower Proposal

*The Conclusion of the Conference of Experts*

As the Conference of Experts drew to a close, it became apparent to the participants, and to the outside world as well, that it would result in a report accepted by the scientists of both East and West. Drs. Fisk and Penney informed President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan of the probable nature of the agreement several days before the conclusion of the Conference, and the American press began to forecast the outcome as early as August 10, 1958.¹

This development would clearly call for new policy decisions, especially by the United States. Since the United States had proposed the Conference, and since American diplomats and politicians had consistently argued that the principal obstacle to disarmament was lack of agreement on controls, the United States bore a special onus for making the next move.

*The Committee of Principals*

The task of preparing the American response devolved upon a small group of officials within the Administration who had major responsibilities in the fields of foreign policy and national security. This group had met informally during the first half of 1958 in connection with the preparations for the Conference of Experts. Later, when negotiations for a nuclear test ban became an actual prospect, it came to be called the Committee of Principals. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy

Commission, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology were regular members of the Committee. In addition, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was what might be described as an ex officio "nonvoting" member, and the Director of the United States Information Agency attended occasional sessions.

Whether an individual's role in a group such as the Committee of Principals is determined principally by his title and position within the Administration or by his own personal views is a moot point and in any case obviously varies with the individual, the strength of his convictions and personality, his experience, and the issue under consideration. It is obvious though that policies emerging from such committees are always a montage of departmental and agency viewpoints admixed with personal attitudes. Therefore, it is important to list the individuals who were involved. Under the Eisenhower Administration the Committee of Principals consisted of: John Foster Dulles, until he was replaced by Christian Herter in April 1959; Neil H. McElroy, until he was replaced as Secretary of Defense by Thomas S. Gates in December 1959; CIA Director Allan W. Dulles; John A. McCone, who succeeded Lewis L. Strauss as Chairman of the AEC in July 1958; Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., until he was replaced as the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology by Dr. George Kistiakowsky in July 1959; Gordon Gray, who succeeded Robert Cutler as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs in July 1958; and, occasionally, USIA Director George V. Allen, or their deputies. When the Kennedy Administration assumed power in January 1961, the personnel of the Committee of Principals was changed to Dean Rusk, Robert S. McNamara, Allan W. Dulles, Glenn T. Seaborg, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, McGeorge Bundy, and, occasionally, Edward R. Murrow, or their deputies.

During the first three and a half years of the diplomatic negotiations, the Committee of Principals held somewhat more than thirty formal meetings. Although American policy relating to the negotiations was generally developed at a lower, "working," level, especially in the so-called Interdepartmental Working Group, the members of which came from the same departments and agencies as were represented on the Committee of Principals, this policy usually was at least discussed by the Committee of Principals before being
approved by the President. In those instances in which it reached a
decision, the Committee usually made a definite recommendation to
the President. Decisions in the Committee of Principals were always
the result of agreement, rather than voting. If it proved impossible
to obtain agreement in the Committee, the issue could be taken to
the President for resolution; however, this was seldom done. Al­
though the Committee was sharply divided on a number of issues
during the Eisenhower Administration, there were strong pressures
against raising disputes to the Presidential level. To take a strong
position necessitating a submission to the President would have
risked alienating individuals whose collaboration was essential for
the matter at hand and also in other vital endeavours. In such cir­
cumstances, an individual must regard an issue as being of particular
importance before he will risk the possible consequences of elevating
the dispute to the highest level. Moreover, in this case there was
another inhibition. President Eisenhower strongly preferred to re­
ceive an agreed recommendation. At times, when he was con­
fronted with conflicting views, he would call for further study and
discussion to see if the dispute could not be resolved. Under the
Kennedy Administration, the Committee of Principals was much
more united, and it also received firm Presidential directives. Thus,
in both administrations, the device of appeal was seldom used.

President Eisenhower's Statement of August 22

When this group began to formulate the American response
to the anticipated successful conclusion of the Conference of Ex­
perts, Secretary of State Dulles was in New York at the Emergency
Special Session of the General Assembly which met from August
8 until August 21, 1958, to consider the crisis in the Middle East.
He was represented in the discussions by the Under Secretary,
Christian Herter.

Although no brief formulation can adequately portray several
complex positions, the viewpoints expressed in the Committee of
Principals can be summarized in the following fashion. The De­
partment of State strongly felt that the United States should take
the lead in proposing negotiations for a test ban. The reasons for
this varied with individuals. It was partly a matter of wanting to
respond to and capitalize on public pressures; to put the United
States in a favorable light before public opinion. To put it nega-
tively, the Department of State wished to avoid being placed in the position that it had been in the spring when the USSR unilaterally suspended nuclear testing. Another motivation was a desire to explore and follow up a seemingly favorable first step toward a measure of arms control. Put in simplest fashion, this meant exploring Soviet intentions (calling the USSR's bluff, if that is what it was) or, more hopefully, proceeding with constructive negotiations. Mr. Dulles himself inclined toward nuclear test ban negotiations as he viewed the changing role of nuclear weapons in military strategy and the developing "nth country problem." Although not at all sanguine about Soviet intentions or the outcome, he seemed to favor exploring arrangements, including a test ban, which might ultimately offer some assurance, not only against a deliberate nuclear attack but also against accident and miscalculation which could unleash nuclear war. The wish to exploit the agreement at the Conference of Experts for a move toward arms control was particularly strong in the American scientific community, and it no doubt had an impact on the President's Science Advisory Committee and was expressed by the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. In addition, many scientists were deeply troubled by the problem of fallout. The Central Intelligence Agency favored any move which might introduce more openness into Soviet society. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, however, were convinced that a test ban, as an isolated measure of arms control, would endanger American security.

Beyond the basic disagreement on the wisdom of a test ban, there was also a disagreement as to whether the United States should continue testing nuclear weapons while the negotiations were in progress. The principal protagonists in this dispute were the Department of State, which argued that the United States should cease testing the day that the negotiations began, and the Department.

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2Robert Gilpin argues that the fact that John A. McCon discussed the role of the AEC on July 1, 1958, "removed from the policy debate a strong opponent of a nuclear test ban," (American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 199). Even though Mr. McCon may have opposed a nuclear test ban less than Admiral Strauss, neither he nor the AEC favored a test ban as an isolated measure of arms control in these discussions.
of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, which held that testing should continue until the coming into force of a treaty. A compromise solution involving a moratorium covering only atmospheric testing was mooted for a while, but ultimately abandoned on the ground that such a move would not be properly understood by public opinion.

After consensus had been achieved within the Administration, on August 21, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was informed of the action which the United States planned to take. Although the members of the Committee could present their views, it was then so late that they could not alter the course of American policy.3

Allied views were also a factor. Perhaps the French view was the most important; at least it was the most clearly formulated and was argued with the greatest force. France was determined to push ahead with its plans for the development of an independent nuclear capability, and, as a consequence, continued to oppose a test ban as an isolated measure of arms control. Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville reiterated the French position to President Eisenhower on August 21. In essence, the United States chose to downgrade seriously or perhaps even to ignore the French position.

The American response to the successful conclusion of the Conference of Experts—specifically President Eisenhower's statement of August 22—was a product of this melange of views. After it was drafted in Washington, the statement was taken to New York for Mr. Dulles' approval and then was released to the public. It was also immediately transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The statement proposed the inauguration of negotiations for a test ban treaty and also defined the initial American negotiating position. The most important part of the statement was contained in the following paragraphs:

The United States, taking account of the Geneva conclusions, is prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report.

3Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 199.
If this is accepted in principle by the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, then in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations.

As part of the agreement to be negotiated, and on a basis of reciprocity, the United States would be further prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the beginning of each year: (A) the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures such as the United States has long sought. The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests.

Our negotiators will be instructed and ready by October 31 this year to open negotiations with other similarly instructed negotiators.

As the United States has frequently made clear, the suspension of testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons is not, in itself, a measure of disarmament or a limitation of armament. An agreement in this respect is significant if it leads to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitation and reduction of fissionable material for weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. It is in this hope that the United States makes this proposal.4

The British statement which was issued almost simultaneously was similar.5 The October 31 date for the opening of diplomatic negotiations and the inauguration of the one-year moratorium meant that the United States would have over two months to continue the test series which was then in progress. However, if the USSR accepted the Western invitation to engage in diplomatic negotiations, the United States was pledged not to test nuclear weapons in any environment for a period of twelve months after October 30. This decision to engage in a moratorium prior to the achievement of a test ban treaty proved to be crucially important, and some

5See ibid., pp. 311-13.
have argued woefully misguided. The rationale for the decision, which was developed mainly by the Department of State, was that such action was necessary because of the pressure of public opinion and to create the most propitious atmosphere for the diplomatic negotiations. The opposition of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense to the decision was partly mollified by limiting the moratorium to twelve months.

The implied suggestion that detonations for peaceful purposes should be dealt with separately in the agreement, while safeguarding the American Project Plowshare, would pose difficult problems of discrimination. How could the purpose of an explosion be determined and how would it be possible to be certain that a device allegedly designed to produce a huge natural cavity would not also have military applications?

Perhaps the most important part of the statement concerned the conditions under which the United States—and the United Kingdom also—would be willing to cease testing nuclear weapons. The United States held to its earlier position that a test ban could only be regarded as one of several measures of arms control or disarmament, and as in earlier proposals, the United States sought to enforce this link by making the test cessation conditional on progress in other fields. In essence, President Eisenhower’s statement was very similar to that which Harold Stassen had made on August 21, 1957, before the London session of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. The only differences were, first, that since the technical talks which Mr. Stassen had called for had already occurred, they could no longer be listed as a condition for extending the test cessation for a second twelve month period. Secondly, Mr. Stassen had implied that the only condition for making the test cessation permanent would be the achievement of a production cut-off, in addition of course to the condition that the test ban monitoring system be functioning effectively. President Eisenhower’s statement opened up the possibility of several conditions. In some ways the American position as stated by President Eisenhower could be interpreted as indicating a lesser propensity to negotiate on the test


7See supra p. 18.
ban issue than could be inferred from Mr. Stassen's statement two years earlier.

The requirement that a test cessation be conditional on achieving progress in other fields of arms control or disarmament was inserted in President Eisenhower's statement at the insistence of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Department of State did not favor this position, but agreed to it in the process of mutual accommodation.

Why the requirement was stated so vaguely, however, rather than in terms of specific disarmament measures, is not clear. Perhaps the vagueness was a negotiating tactic, a device for gaining bargaining strength and maintaining flexibility. The vagueness may also have stemmed from the fact that by this time the difficulties involved in linking a test cessation with a production cut-off and possibly with a requirement for the transfer of fissionable materials from weapons stockpiles were widely recognized, and there were therefore cogent arguments against maintaining this particular link. Rather than substitute some other measure immediately, it may have seemed wiser to await the outcome of other developments then in progress relating to arms control and disarmament. At that time, a technical conference concerning measures for the prevention of surprise attack was a distinct possibility. Also, the question of the uses of outer space was scheduled for discussion at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, which would open in September. Both of these discussions would deal in some fashion with the launching of missiles, among other things. It was thought that controlling the launching of missiles would require control measures of roughly comparable scope to those needed to monitor a test cessation; and controlling technological developments with respect to delivery vehicles on the one hand and warheads on the other might be regarded as equivalent measures. Consequently, some may have hoped that a link between missile controls and a controlled test ban could be established.

There are also two other possible explanations for the vagueness of the link. It may have stemmed from inability to reach agreement within the Administration or from a lack of preparation.

8See Seymour Melman (ed.), Inspection for Disarmament, pp. 18-25, and passim.
Perhaps it was both. Assuming that there were strong arguments against the old position, discovering alternative measures of arms control with which a test ban could be linked would require a considerable amount of analysis. If a test ban alone would prove disadvantageous to the security interests of the United States, what other measures of arms control might serve as adequate compensation? What types of controls would these measures require? These were questions which could not be answered simply, or without detailed analyses of the technical as well as of the political and military aspects, and at that time the United States government was ill-equipped to conduct such analyses. Mr. Stassen's staff had largely been dispersed even before his resignation in February 1958. It is true that other offices had responsibility for American policy concerning arms control and disarmament; within the Department of State, the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy Affairs, and within the Department of Defense, the Office of International Security Affairs. However, both of these offices had relatively small staffs, and, as their titles indicated, they also had other responsibilities. In addition, many of the personnel were directly involved in the Conference of Experts. Thus, there was hardly any manpower available for broad planning. Moreover, there was no group which could do technical analyses quickly and on a continuing basis. Mr. Stassen had relied on task forces comprised principally of nongovernmental experts, and if the appointment of the Bethe Panel was indicative of a policy, it appeared as if this technique would be continued. There seemed to be no alternative, since the Department of State did not have any technically qualified scientists among its personnel, and since the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology was quite small and the Science Advisory Committee was only a part-time group. However, the device of convening a special panel is relatively cumbersome, and it is not likely to be utilized unless a problem is clearly identified. Although cooperation of scientists in private employment is clearly indispensable, the panel of this type does not lend itself to systematic advance planning aimed at exploring a variety of longer range contingencies. The vagueness in the American position therefore probably was the result of disagreement on the old link and inability to conceive of a new one.
The Holifield Dissent

The subtleties of President Eisenhower's statement, though, were largely ignored in public discussion in the United States. In the public view, the statement was generally regarded as an unambiguous invitation to negotiate a test ban. There was, however, at least one exception to the general euphoria. On August 22, shortly after the President's statement was released, Representative Chet Holifield read two statements into the Congressional Record. After generally expressing his approval, he went on to say that he was "gravely troubled" by the inclusion of the principle that a test cessation would be dependent on progress being made in other areas of arms control. He pointed out that the statement was "unclear" and "susceptible of different interpretations," and asserted that if the condition were maintained he had "little hope for the completion of a nuclear testing agreement." He continued:

I regret that I must state that the inclusion of the "one package" requirement as a contingency for nuclear weapon test cessation on a step-by-step basis casts a reflection on the sincerity of the President's statement. It seems to be a tragic continuation of the futile and abortive Dulles philosophy which has failed to establish, in world opinion, our sincerity in the search for world peace.

It is this fatal lack of vision, this holding back, this being dragged into the future which is killing our influence throughout the world.

His statement was about as harsh a criticism of American policy as could be imagined. Interestingly, none of the major American newspapers or wireservices reported it. The Tass correspondent, however, noticed it and it was reported in Pravda.10

II

Interim Sparring

The Bombardment on Quemoy and Matsu

In the interval between the issuance of President Eisenhower's statement of August 22 and the opening of the Geneva test ban

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negotiations on October 31, all interested parties sparred for position. Chronologically, the first relevant event was Communist China's commencement on August 23 of heavy bombardment of the offshore island groups of Quemoy and Matsu. On that day the islands were hit by some fifty thousand shells within a period of two hours. The crisis which this action touched off continued until late October.

It is impossible to know whether or not the Chinese Communist action was in any way related to the developments concerning a test ban. The People's Republic of China had for some time been engaged in a military build-up in the Fukien Province opposite Taiwan, and an increasing number of air and naval clashes between the Communists and the Nationalists occurred during the late summer. The Chinese Nationalist government had declared a state of emergency on Taiwan as early as August 7. It is therefore conceivable that the bombardment was unrelated to the events in Geneva and Washington.

On the other hand, the People's Republic of China would be affected by a test ban. The Conference of Experts had after all proposed a global system of control posts. Moreover, a test ban might affect Communist China's ability to develop an independent nuclear capability in the same sense that it might have an impact on France's program. If the three nuclear powers agreed to a test ban, public opinion throughout the world would probably strongly oppose any attempt by other states to test nuclear weapons. The three nuclear powers presumably would also have a strong interest in seeing that other states did not test because it might upset the delicate balance of trust and calculation of advantage on which a test cessation would rest. Thus, a test ban conceivably could freeze the situation in Eastern Asia in which Communist China would continue to face nuclear equipped American forces without having such weapons of its own.

Communist China and the USSR apparently had discussed the question of the former's obtaining a nuclear capability from time to time. The Chinese have claimed that the two governments signed an agreement on October 15, 1957, relating to new technol-

11See Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (1962).
ogy. The Chinese claim that the terms of this agreement obligated the USSR to provide the People's Republic of China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data relating to its manufacture. The USSR has neither confirmed nor denied the existence of this agreement. If in fact such an agreement existed, it is significant that it was signed after the breakdown of the London negotiations. The Soviet Union may well have agreed to sign the agreement only after it became clear that the prospects of obtaining a test ban at that point were rather remote.

Immediately prior to the bombardment of the off-shore islands, Nikita Khrushchev visited Peking from July 31 to August 3 and held extensive talks with Mao Tse-tung. Soviet Defense Minister R. Y. Malinovsky and his Chinese counterpart, Marshall Peng Teh-huai were present at the discussions. Rumors circulated in the West that the USSR had promised to supply its ally with nuclear weapons. If such matters were discussed at these meetings, in the light of subsequent developments and Chinese claims about the 1957 agreement, it seems more likely that in return for assistance in developing a nuclear capability, the USSR insisted on gaining some control over China's military establishment. Whether or not it was at these meetings, it is fairly clear that the USSR made such a demand sometime in 1958. Once the possibility of a test ban increased, as it did with the progress of the Conference of Experts, Soviet leaders may well have reasoned that they should proceed cautiously with the implementation of the 1957 agreement. The Chinese, on the other hand, probably saw a test ban and the degree of East-West détente that it would imply, as an obstacle to their gaining an independent nuclear capability, and to achieving their broader political objectives.

For these reasons, the timing of the Chinese bombardment of the off-shore islands is of particular interest, as is the reluctance with which the USSR supported the action. The Chinese move was certainly an expression of independence from the USSR, and

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14See Alice Langley Hsieh, supra note 12, at 111-13.
it also may well have been a warning of opposition to a test ban, and more broadly to an East-West détente.

Regardless of its motivation, however, the action by Communist China would certainly have had implications for the test ban negotiations. Among other things it strengthened the forces in the United States which opposed the recognition of Communist China, and thus would complicate the problem of bringing that state into any agreement which might be negotiated.

The Initial Soviet Reaction

The first official reaction by the USSR to President Eisenhower's August 22 statement was an interview which Chairman Khrushchev gave to a Pravda correspondent, which was published on August 29.\textsuperscript{15} In this interview, Chairman Khrushchev asserted that:

The statements of the United States and United Kingdom governments show that these Governments are continuing to seek every possible loop-hole in order to avoid an immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests. This becomes especially clear if we consider the reservations and manifestly far-fetched conditions which the Governments of the Western Powers attach to their proposals.

He objected to the fact that the initial suspension would be limited to one year. "It is obvious to everyone . . . that such a brief suspension of tests is completely meaningless, since one year is precisely the time required for preparing the next series of tests." To the extent that it would require at least a year of preparation for the United States and the United Kingdom to carry out test series as extensive as those conducted in 1958, his time estimate was correct.

He also objected to the two requirements which the Western powers listed as conditions for extending the moratorium on testing. He considered the requirement that a control system should be "installed and working effectively" was "an artificial one, since it has long been known that modern science guarantees the possibility of detecting any nuclear explosions and therefore control over the observance of an agreement on the discontinuance of tests is

\textsuperscript{15}UN Document A/3904, pp. 3-9.
readily feasible." Did he mean to say that an international network of control stations was not necessary, that existent national systems were sufficient? Chairman Khrushchev's amplification of this statement compounded the ambiguity. He argued that "the conclusions of the conference of experts fully confirm the correctness of the point of view which the Soviet government has always maintained on this question and demonstrate the falseness of the position of the Western Powers." But he then went on to say that the Soviet government agreed with all of "the conclusions and recommendations in the report of the conference concerning a system of control. . . ." The exact implications of these statements were far from clear, and a doubting mind on the Western side could with little difficulty interpret them as being most evasive.

Chairman Khrushchev also attacked the other requirement concerning "satisfactory progress" with respect to other measures of arms control:

But as everyone knows that it is the Governments of the Western Powers and those Governments alone which, by persistently adhering to a policy based on an armaments race and atomic blackmail, have year after year frustrated the achievement of agreement on matters of disarmament. In view of this situation, how is it possible to believe that they really want a discontinuance of tests when they put forward such a condition?

Again, anyone convinced of the basic reasonableness of the Western position over the years with respect to disarmament and arms control, could easily regard his remarks as ominous.

Despite his harsh comments, Chairman Khrushchev agreed that the negotiations should start October 31. However, he proposed that the negotiations should be held in Geneva, rather than in New York as the Western powers had suggested. He also proposed that the negotiations should be limited to two or three weeks. Finally, he flatly stated that the USSR was "completely unable to accept the reservations and conditions which the Western powers attach to their statement of readiness to participate in the negotiations, since to accept them would be to foredoom the negotiations to failure."

The following day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a note to the American Embassy in Moscow accepting the proposal that negotia-
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tions should begin October 31 and repeating Chairman Khrushchev's suggestions with respect to the place and duration of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{16} The Chairman's interview with the \textit{Pravda} correspondent was attached. For the next two months, the USSR and the United States argued, through various exchanges of notes and statements, about the nature of the forthcoming negotiations.\textsuperscript{17} In these exchanges, the USSR suggested that the conference should be at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and also sought to limit its duration. A time limitation would have created a public expectation that agreement could be reached promptly, and presumably would have subjected the Western delegations to considerable public pressure. The Soviet government would not have been subjected to corresponding pressure from its own public opinion in view of its control over its domestic mass media and public spokesmen. Both Soviet suggestions were refused. The Soviet Union also continued to protest the requirements which the Western powers listed for extending the moratorium and to argue that the purpose of the conference should be "to conclude an agreement on the permanent discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests . . . and to establish an appropriate control system for the enforcement of such an agreement." The Western powers, on the other hand, refused to drop their conditions, and always referred to the forthcoming conference as "the meeting on suspension of nuclear tests and establishment of an international control system." These differences were never entirely resolved.

\textit{Continued Testing of Nuclear Weapons}

As these exchanges went on, both sides also maneuvered to gain advantages in nuclear weapons development. With at least a temporary cut-off date on further testing in prospect, where the development race would end became an important consideration, both in reality and in a symbolic sense. The United States and the United Kingdom test series were pressed forward. Additional shots, originally planned for a later period, were added to the American series then in progress. The effort came to be dubbed "Operation Deadline." In his interview with the \textit{Pravda} correspondent, Chairman Khrush-

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{17}See UN Documents 3940, 3956, and 3973; and U.S. Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1005 (September 29, 1958), p. 503.
cherv said that because of the continued testing by the United States and the United Kingdom, the USSR was released from the obligation which it had unilaterally assumed the previous March, and on September 30, the Soviet Union in fact resumed testing. Between that date and October 25, the USSR conducted fourteen explosions. Seven of these were in the megaton range. These tests were probably designed both to advance the USSR's knowledge of nuclear weapons, and for their psychological effects. The Soviet resumption of testing would clearly put the West under a certain pressure by making a test ban agreement appear more desirable. It might also intimidate the uncommitted who in turn would increase the pressure on the West for a test ban.

On October 7, Foreign Minister Gromyko, extending the concept of East-West parity to a new sphere, asserted that the USSR had the right to continue testing until it had matched the number of tests conducted by the United States and the United Kingdom since March 31, the date on which the Supreme Soviet had adopted the decree resolving to discontinue testing in the Soviet Union. His statement had ominous implications for the possibility of establishing a moratorium at the beginning of the negotiations, for it was almost inconceivable that the USSR could match the number of Western tests by October 31. Nonetheless, the Western powers continued to plan that their testing would cease by October 31, and the last American shot was detonated shortly before midnight on October 30. As of that date, according to a later official American tabulation, the United States had set off 174 announced nuclear detonations, the United Kingdom, 21, and the USSR, 53. Neither the United States nor the USSR had announced all of their shots. Of the American announced shots, 66 had been conducted in 1958. The Soviet Union had detonated 23 of its announced shots in that year.

The Thirteenth General Assembly: Arena for Sparring

The General Assembly of the United Nations, which opened its thirteenth session on September 16, was another arena for East-West sparring in the period immediately preceding the Geneva test ban negotiations. Several subjects relating to disarmament and arms

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control were on the agenda, and the discussion and action on these subjects in the Assembly had direct and indirect implications for the forthcoming Geneva conference.

Although the provisional agenda of the thirteenth General Assembly included a general item entitled, “The Question of Disarmament,” on September 15, the day before the Assembly opened, the USSR proposed that a specific item, “The Discontinuance of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Tests,” should be added to the agenda.\(^{19}\) In its supporting memorandum, the USSR stressed its view:

... that the question of the discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests should be separated from the general disarmament programme and resolved independently and at once, and that it should not be linked with other disarmament problems on which substantial differences exist among the States.

Clearly, one motivation for the Soviet action was again to bring pressure to bear before the opening of the Geneva Conference against the Western insistence on linking a test ban with other measures of disarmament.

One other part of the Soviet memorandum is also of special significance. It contained the statement that “consideration and positive solution” of the problem “would constitute the first important step towards the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons,” and then went on to say that it would also “create favourable conditions for the solution of other important disarmament problems.” Obviously the USSR and the Western powers had somewhat different expectations and hopes concerning the consequences of a nuclear test ban. The USSR seems to have hoped that the most important consequences of a test ban would be a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union had advocated over the years. The effect of such a prohibition would of course have been to neutralize the American nuclear superiority. The Western powers on the other hand—insofar as such broad generalizations are possible—appear to have had in mind other measures of arms control and disarmament. These and other differences between the two sides were delineated and exposed in the course of the ensuing debate in the Assembly.

\(^{19}\)UN Document A/3915, p. 1.
When the Assembly's Political Committee held its first meeting on October 8, Ambassador Zorin maintained that the question of nuclear testing should be discussed first and settled before other questions relating to disarmament were brought up.\textsuperscript{20} As supporting arguments, he cited the urgency of the issue, the need to affect "the course and outcome of the Geneva negotiations," and the ineffectiveness—demonstrated in his view in past sessions—of combining all disarmament items in one discussion. Ambassador Lodge, on the other hand, argued for a combined discussion, maintaining that the issues "were interrelated."\textsuperscript{21} He allowed, however, that delegates would "be free to discuss the items separately and in any order they wished." The issue of whether a link should be maintained between the test ban and other steps toward disarmament thus arose again in a procedural-tactical context at the very outset of the proceedings. After three days' debate, the Committee adopted an American compromise proposal, which provided that all items relating to disarmament should be discussed together in a general debate, but that the decision on the priority of consideration of draft resolutions should be postponed until the conclusion of the general debate.

For all practical purposes, the General Assembly's handling of the test ban issue and all other questions relating to disarmament was completed before the Geneva negotiations were really underway. The Political Committee concluded its work on these matters on November 4, and that same day the plenary session adopted the resolutions which the Committee recommended. In both forums, resolutions relating to the cessation of nuclear testing were voted on first. The Political Committee voted on these resolutions on October 31, the day the Geneva negotiations opened. In a sense then, the Assembly's action can be regarded as an adjunct to negotiations which were conducted outside of the United Nations. Certainly, most of the Member States, and especially the participants in the Geneva negotiations, regarded the Assembly proceedings in this light.

In all, six resolutions relating to nuclear testing were submitted to the Political Committee. Both India and the USSR submitted resolutions on October 5. The Soviet draft, after repeating in the preamble the opinion often expressed by Soviet spokesmen that a

\textsuperscript{20}UN, General Assembly, First Committee, \textit{Official Records} (13th Session), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 4.
cessation of nuclear tests would be a first important step "towards the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons," called upon all states to halt nuclear tests, recommended that the nuclear powers "enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between them," and called upon all states "to accede to that agreement." Since the draft resolution made no mention of controls, it could be regarded—like the Western statements of August 22—as a retrogression from an earlier position, that is from the position the Soviet Union had taken in 1957 during the London session of the Disarmament Subcommittee and the twelfth Assembly.

There is also another interesting aspect of the Soviet proposal. One of the hoped-for effects of a test ban would be that it would serve to prevent the dispersion of nuclear weapons; that it would ease the so-called "nth country problem." Concern about this problem was probably one of the motivations for Soviet policy on nuclear weapons testing. To the extent that such a brief draft could provide an indication of the USSR's attitude, it seemed to imply that the rest of the world should go along with whatever the three nuclear powers decided regarding a test ban.

The Indian resolution also called for an immediate suspension of the testing of nuclear weapons. However, the cessation was envisaged as a transitional step "pending an agreement at the forthcoming conference among the States concerned in respect to the technical arrangements considered necessary to ensure the observance of the discontinuance of such tests." The "nth country problem" was handled by requesting the participants in the Geneva negotiations to report back to the General Assembly so that it could take steps to extend the agreement to all other states, which meanwhile were requested not to test.

Since both resolutions called for an immediate and essentially unconditional cessation of tests, they were unacceptable to the Western powers. Therefore, on October 10 the United States together with sixteen other countries—all of which were involved in NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, or OAS—tabled an alternative proposal. It first urged the parties to the Geneva negotiations to "make every effort to reach an early agreement on the suspension

24 UN Document A/C. 1/L. 205.
of nuclear tests under effective international control." Then, perhaps as a concession to the other side, and certainly as a concession to the pressure of world opinion, it urged the parties to the negotiations not to test nuclear weapons while the negotiations were in progress. This could involve a longer suspension than had been envisaged in President Eisenhower's August 22 statements, but it was not as extensive a commitment as one not to test "pending an agreement," the formulation embodied in the Indian proposal. The seventeen-power resolution also called attention to the importance of the forthcoming technical conference on surprise attack. It lauded the effectiveness of the technical approach to negotiations and expressed the hope that it would contribute to the creation of "a balanced and effectively controlled world-wide system of disarmament." The resolution provided that the UN should render assistance to the Geneva negotiations and asked the parties to the negotiations to keep the world organization informed. Interestingly, the draft resolution contained no provision relating to the "nth country problem."

There were two major attempts during the course of the Political Committee's consideration of these matters to discover some compromise which might lead to a unanimous decision. India, in company with thirteen other countries—including Pakistan, which was also a sponsor of the seventeen-power resolution—submitted a modified version of its resolution. The principal changes were to urge a cessation of nuclear weapons tests "until agreement is reached," rather than pending an agreement, and to insert mention of controls. Even as modified, however, the resolution was unacceptable to the United States and the United Kingdom.

France also opposed the Indian resolution for the same reasons motivating the two Western nuclear powers as well as for other reasons, the most important of which concerned the resolution's treatment of the "nth country problem." French delegate Jules Moch stated that France would only agree to discontinue its nuclear weapons development program if "the 'atomic powers' should immediately cease to increase and begin to reduce their stockpiles under international control." Perhaps the French attitude explains

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why the seventeen-power resolution skirted this problem. Significantly, France was not one of the seventeen sponsoring powers, and when that resolution was put to the vote, France abstained.

Austria, Japan, and Sweden offered the other compromise proposal. Their draft resolution merely expressed the hope that the Geneva negotiations would be successful, asked the parties to the negotiations to report whatever agreement might result from the negotiations to the Assembly, and asked the Secretary General to provide such assistance as the Geneva conference might request.

After a long procedural wrangle about the order in which the resolutions should be voted, it was decided (45-25 with 11 abstentions) to give priority to the seventeen-power proposal reflecting the Western view, which was adopted by a vote of 49 to 9 with 11 abstentions. Only the Soviet bloc opposed the resolution. The compromise proposal submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden was voted on immediately thereafter and adopted by a vote of 52 to 9 with 10 abstentions. Only the first operative paragraph of the revised Indian resolution was voted on, and it was rejected 36 to 26, with 19 abstentions. The remainder of the proposal was withdrawn, as was the entire Soviet proposal. In the plenary session the seventeen-power resolution was adopted 49 to 9 with 22 abstentions, and the resolution submitted by Austria, Japan, and Sweden was approved 55 to 9, with 12 abstentions. The revised Indian proposal, which was reintroduced, was rejected, 27 to 41, with 13 abstentions.

The other draft resolution relating to nuclear testing which the General Assembly considered dealt solely with the dispersion of nuclear weapons capability. It was proposed by Ireland. After asserting that such a dispersion would aggravate international tension and make it more difficult to attain general disarmament, the resolution provided for the creation of an ad hoc committee to study the dangers inherent in this course and to recommend appropriate measures for averting these dangers. Only the paragraph containing the assertion was put to a vote, and it was adopted 37 to 0, with 44

27 UN Document A/C. 1/L. 213.
28 UN, General Assembly Resolutions 1252 A and B (XIII).
29 UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th Session), p. 430.
30 UN Document A/C. 1/L. 206.
abstentions, including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After this vote, the resolution was withdrawn.

In addition to the resolutions relating to nuclear testing, three other resolutions concerning arms control and disarmament were considered by the Assembly. One of these was a Soviet proposal which recommended that France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States should reduce their military budgets by from ten to fifteen percent and devote some part of the savings to economic development projects.31 This proposal was rejected in the Political Committee by a vote of 10 to 39, with 32 abstentions. The other two resolutions were both sponsored by India and Yugoslavia. One gave the Assembly’s blessing to the forthcoming technical talks concerning surprise attack.32 The other provided for the reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission so that it would include all UN Member States.33 Both resolutions were adopted without opposition; there were, however, a few abstentions in each case.

One other issue on the agenda of the thirteenth Assembly had implications for the Geneva negotiations, the Peaceful Use of Outer Space. Whether or not and under what conditions the development of missiles was controlled would have implications for the control or development of nuclear explosives. It will be recalled that the USSR requested the inclusion of an agenda item on this subject as early as March 1958. However, at that time, and in the original proposal which it submitted to the Assembly, the Soviet Union insisted that the question of a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes must be linked with “the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States, primarily in Europe, the Near and Middle East and North Africa.”34 In other words, the Soviet Union took the position that it would only renounce its head start with respect to the development of ballistic missiles with intercontinental range, if the United States dismantled most of its military bases abroad. There is a striking parallel between the Soviet attitude with respect to the control of missiles, an area of weaponry in which it seemed to be ahead, and the United States attitude

31UN Document A/C. 1/L. 204.
32UN Document A/C. 1/L. 211.
33UN Documents A/C. 1/L. 210 and Rev. 1 and 2.
34UN Document A/C. 1/L. 219.
toward the control of nuclear explosives, an area of weaponry in which it held the lead. It is interesting and perhaps significant that the Soviet proposal did not mention bases in Eastern Asia. Perhaps this implied a willingness by the USSR to have American power used to check that of the People's Republic of China in East Asia. In any case, the link between the control of missiles and the elimination of overseas bases was completely unacceptable to the United States and the USSR was fully aware of this.

The Western twenty-power proposal on this issue was modest. It merely called for the creation of an ad hoc committee with a broad mandate to explore the question of the peaceful uses of outer space.

Eventually the USSR agreed to drop the condition that work toward the elimination of foreign bases must accompany that concerning limiting the uses of outer space. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union and the United States could not agree on the composition of the ad hoc committee; the Soviet Union insisted on parity of representation between East and West, a concept which the United States refused to accept. In the end, the Assembly adopted a revised version of the twenty-power proposal which provided for the creation of an ad hoc committee of eighteen—three from the Soviet bloc, twelve affiliated with the Western alliance system, and three neutrals—and the USSR announced that it would refuse to participate in the new body. In view of this refusal, if any work were to be done prior to the next session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1959, when the composition of the ad hoc committee could again be reviewed, it would have to be done in the technical conference on measures to prevent a surprise attack. This conference, it should be noted, would be composed—by agreement of all concerned, including the United States—on the basis of parity.

If the thirteenth session of the General Assembly can be regarded as a preliminary round to the Geneva negotiations, the United States and the West emerged with a slight lead. At least the Assembly had been kept from going on record as favoring an unconditional cessation of nuclear testing, and thus prejudging the outcome

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35UN Document A/C. 1/L. 220.
37UN, General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Official Records (13th Session), p. 616.
of the Geneva talks. On the other hand, the United States had backed a proposal calling for a suspension of nuclear testing as long as the negotiations continued, which was different and went somewhat further than President Eisenhower's statement of August 22. One analyst has argued that this resolution later became an important obstacle to the United States resuming testing after the expiration of the initial twelve months' moratorium. 38

The origin of the inconsistency between the President's statement and the United States support of the UN resolution is not clear. At least three alternative explanations are possible. The inconsistency may have been a conscious concession, considered and agreed in Washington by the governmental agencies concerned, perhaps in response to pressures from friendly delegations reported to the State Department by the United States delegation to the Assembly. \( ^{39} \) As such it may have been agreed to by the AEC and the Department of Defense without much thought of the consequences because no one expected the negotiations to last as long as a year. Again, the inconsistency may have resulted from a failure in the coordination between the United States delegation on one hand, and the Department of State and other agencies of the government on the other. Finally, it may have reflected an effort by some individuals within the United States government to use the United Nations as an instrument in bureaucratic infighting for the purpose of forcing an adjustment in the American position against the opposition of their colleagues. Since the Department of State contained the highest proportion of individuals favoring an intensive exploration of test ban possibilities, and since it was in the best position to control the American stand in the UN, the last interpretation has a degree of plausibility. Incidents of this sort occur when policy objectives are not clearly articulated and when disagreements among the governmental agencies concerned are glossed over in general policy statements which do not provide sufficient guidance in new


\(^{39}\) As a matter of law the delegation receives instructions from the President through the Secretary of State. In practice, the instructions are formulated in the Department of State which is also responsible for clearance with other agencies concerned. Not infrequently, the delegation suggests to the Department that its instructions be modified.
tactical developments, such as the situation in the General Assembly, requiring specific and prompt action.

The fact that the discussion of limiting the development of missiles would be confined to the forthcoming technical conference on measures against surprise attack was another significant outcome of the thirteenth session of the Assembly.

**Domestic Sparring**

As this maneuvering for position was in progress on the international level, there was also considerable sparring on the domestic level within the United States. Although no simple description is adequate, perhaps the best way of briefly describing what happened would be to say that the individuals who questioned the wisdom of a test ban, having been somewhat nonplussed by the events of the summer, sought to bring their views to the fore.

Perhaps the most significant effort of this group was an article by Professor Henry A. Kissinger entitled "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," which appeared in the October 1958 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. It was the lead article, and that issue of the magazine was published in late September, coincidentally with the opening of the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. During the debate in the First Committee, Soviet bloc delegates cited the article as proof that the United States was not really interested in a test ban. Similar Soviet attempts to impugn American motives on the basis of citations from the public debate became a common feature of the Geneva negotiations. Doubtlessly, this was a negotiating and propaganda device. However, it may also have been more than that. In the early fall of 1958, any shrewd analysis of the American position would have to take account of the views which Mr. Kissinger expressed. On the basis of his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in 1957, he was a widely respected authority, and it was clear that his views would receive at least a respectful if not a sympathetic hearing by a number of influential people within and outside of the government.

Mr. Kissinger asserted that when the Conference of Experts had concluded that it was technically feasible to detect nuclear weapon tests, the United States had been forced "to make a critical
policy decision, although only its technical aspects had been fully explored." He then went on to question whether a complete suspension of nuclear testing was desirable. He argued that the United States "should deal with the health hazard by ending tests which produce appreciable fallout," but that it "should agree to a complete ban only as part of a general disarmament agreement which includes conventional weapons." He described the technical difficulties and uncertainties which were involved in detecting and identifying nuclear explosions and pointed out that these would be compounded in the case of a closed society, such as the USSR. He also illustrated how difficult it might be to obtain credible evidence of a violation of a test ban agreement and raised the fundamental question of what action the United States could and would take if a violation occurred, a problem which was unresolved when the American delegation went to Geneva and which was to plague American representatives in the Geneva negotiations. He raised the possibility that the Soviet Union "might use a temporary cessation to prepare tests of superior weapons," an interesting thought which raised serious questions about the wisdom of accepting a moratorium before a treaty was signed. His basic arguments, however, concerned the wisdom of a test ban agreement from the point of view of American military policy. He made the point that a ban on nuclear testing might well lead to a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and argued that unless the United States and the West generally were willing to increase substantially their conventional forces (or unless Soviet bloc conventional forces were decreased), such a prohibition would cripple the defenses of the West. He maintained that advances in the development of nuclear weapons would benefit the West. Finally, Mr. Kissinger analyzed the strategic problems which confronted NATO and suggested that they could be solved through the development of a NATO nuclear striking force. As a policy for the Geneva negotiations, Mr. Kissinger suggested that the United States:

... should invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. committee which would immediately set a maximum dosage of permissible fall-out from testing well below the level

brought about by recent tests. The U.N. committee should then assign a quota to the United States and its allies and another to the Soviet bloc on a 50 - 50 basis. (Since most of the potential 'fourth' Powers are in the West, this would be a considerable concession to the U.S.S.R.) For two years all Powers would agree to register with the U.N. all tests which involve fall-out and both sides would agree not to exceed their quota. During those two years the quota would be progressively reduced, ultimately to zero. Afterwards, unless there were by then a general disarmament agreement, nations would remain free to conduct surface tests of 'clean' weapons, underground tests and tests in outer space, so long as they did not cause fall-out. Technical experts from both sides would agree on an adequate inspection system, which would be relatively simple.42

It is impossible to state the extent to which Mr. Kissinger's article reflected or influenced the views of individuals in responsible positions; certainly the initial American position in the Geneva negotiations bore little resemblance to his recommendations. However, his article was a persuasive statement of the doubts which some felt about the wisdom of a comprehensive test ban as a single measure of arms control or disarmament. It served as a rallying point for individuals who shared these concerns. Thus the article was both a symbol of the fact that the argument within the United States about the course of American policy concerning this issue was far from settled and also an instrument in this continuing battle.

The Surprise Attack Conference

Even though chronologically it occurred after the Geneva negotiations opened, the technical conference on surprise attack—formally known as "The Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack"—which met from November 10 to December 18, 1958, must also be viewed as an element in the background of the test ban negotiations. The Conference recessed after six weeks with no concrete achievements mainly because the two sides failed to agree on its purposes.43 The United States sought to discuss methods of con-

42Ibid., p. 16.
43For a more extensive analysis of the technical conference on surprise attack see: Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, pp. 464-88. See also the report of the Conference: UN Document A/4078.
trolling missiles, long-range aircraft, tactical aircraft, ground forces, missile-launching submarines, other naval forces, and other possible instruments of surprise attack, and in that order. The USSR, on the other hand, sought to discuss such matters as the creation of zones of inspection and the reduction of military forces in Europe, including the denuclearization of Germany. The USSR refused to discuss the items which the United States raised on the ground that such discussion would involve divulging secret information which would be useful to the West without giving the Soviet Union any compensating advantages in return. In addition, Soviet delegates said that the USSR would not agree to discuss the establishment of controls on missiles until nuclear weapons had been banned. The American delegates, in contrast, who viewed this conference as another Conference of Experts, refused to discuss the matters raised by the USSR on the ground that they involved "political" issues not appropriate for consideration in a technical conference.

In essence, the two sides were concerned about different problems. So far as American policy in the Geneva test ban negotiations was concerned, the first essential implication of this denouement was that the USSR probably would not negotiate for controls on missiles—on means of delivery of nuclear weapons—except in the context of a board agreement covering several measures of arms control or disarmament. In other words, the concession which the USSR made on this point at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly would not hold up in a more concrete negotiating situation than the Assembly, and the USSR still insisted on maintaining a link between controlling missiles and other measures of arms control. A second implication was the underscoring of the USSR's concern about the possibility of the German Federal Republic's obtaining access to nuclear weapons. Putting it in a different way, the conference emphasized that the USSR was concerned about a very specific "nth country problem."

The Opening Atmosphere

Despite the optimistic expectations arising from the agreement at the Conference of Experts, the real setting for the Geneva Conference was still the unrelieved Cold War atmosphere of deep distrust and mutual suspicion in which the motives of the other side were constantly questioned and scrutinized, with every doubt in-
variably resolved against rather than in favour of the other side's good faith. Despite the generally recognized dangers of a nuclear catastrophe, the atmosphere was clearly not conducive to decisions involving the risks entailed in an immediate diminution of national power, in return for longer range benefits conditioned more or less on the continuing good faith of the other side. On entering the negotiations, the Soviet Union appeared to aim at obtaining an immediate, permanent, and far-reaching commitment from the West, with minimum control machinery. The United States, while apparently willing to give a qualified commitment, demanded guarantees against evasion which would lift the "iron curtain" substantially and which could not be frustrated unilaterally, and perhaps also further measures of arms control. Both sides appeared to question each other's sincerity in desiring to give any genuine commitment with respect to a test ban. The Soviet Union sought to find confirmation of its suspicions in the open public debate continuing in the United States on the wisdom of the test ban; the Western suspicions on the other hand fed on the unrestrained resort to propaganda by the Soviet Union's indiscriminately seeking to generate pressures on the West. As the negotiations opened, this pervading atmosphere made it exceedingly difficult for the two sides to cut through the underbrush of tactical and propaganda positions developed in the preliminary sparring and to start real negotiations. All in all, the setting was not auspicious.

III

The Initial Phase of the Geneva Negotiations

The Selection and Preparation of the American Delegation

As soon as the USSR agreed in its note of August 30 that negotiations concerning a test ban agreement should begin on October 31, and while the preconference maneuvering for position was in progress, the United States began preparations for the opening of the talks. The first step was the appointment of a delegation. James J. Wadsworth was chosen as the U.S. representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador. Prior to 1953, he had been engaged in the management of various business enterprises and had held a variety of public offices, including membership in the New York State Assembly from 1931 to 1941. When the new adminis-
DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS

The administration took over in 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Mr. Wadsworth, a Republican, to the office of deputy representative of the United States to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. In this capacity he had participated in various negotiations involving arms control and disarmament and nuclear energy. However, by self-admission, he was not in any sense a technical expert in the subject matter of the test ban negotiations. In fact, during the course of the conference he sometimes emphasized that he did not understand the technical intricacies which were involved. Ambassador Wadsworth's greatest strength was his skill in advocacy and his personal relationships. Robert F. Bacher, a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and one of the Western delegates at the Conference of Experts, was chosen as his deputy. In addition, the American delegation included: senior advisors from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission; two Congressional advisors, Senator Albert Gore, with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey as his alternate (both Democrats); Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Republican); and a number of special advisors.

Unlike the Conference of Experts, which consisted of Eastern and Western panels, the Geneva negotiations would be comprised of delegations from the three nuclear powers, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In practice, however, as the Soviet representatives constantly pointed out, there were only two sides. The two Western delegations hardly ever differed in the public sessions of the Geneva talks. The principal British delegate was David Ormsby-Gore, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. He

44The advisers to the American delegation were: Charles C. Stelle, Department of State; Alfonzo P. Fox, Lt. Gen., USA (retired), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; George M. Kavarnaugh, Atomic Energy Commission; all titled senior advisors; and Vincent Baker, Department of State; Robert G. Baraz, Department of State; Stephen Benedict, USIA; Hans Bethe, PSAC; Darcey Brent, Department of State; Harold Brown, Atomic Energy Commission; Charles E. Collett, Col., USAF, Department of Defense; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Richard Latter, RAND Corporation; Doyle L. Northrup, Department of Defense; David H. Popper, American Consulate General, Geneva; Luther Reid, Department of State; Malcolm Toon, Department of State; Paul Toussaint, Department of State; Henry S. Villard, American Consulate General, Geneva; and Secretary of the Delegation, Virgil L. Moore, American Consulate General, Geneva.
The Opening of the Diplomatic Negotiations

had been a delegate at the 1957 London session of the UN Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. The British delegation included several others from the Foreign Office, but interestingly no ranking scientists or high level officials from the Atomic Energy Authority or the Ministry of Defense.

As has already been mentioned, Ambassador Semen K. Tsarapkin was appointed as the chief Soviet delegate.45 Yevgeni K. Fedorov was his principal technical assistant. Dr. Fedorov had been the Chairman of the Eastern panel at the Conference of Experts and Mr. Tsarapkin had been a member of the panel. The Soviet delegation also included additional scientists and other diplomats who had had previous experience in disarmament negotiations. The composition of the Soviet delegation reflected a consistent Soviet policy of generally continuing to use the same diplomatic and scientific personnel in disarmament negotiations. This policy has facilitated continuity and has avoided the laborious process of "educating" new persons. The American practice, followed by both the Republican and Democratic administrations, has been in striking contrast: new personalities, frequently lacking any related knowledge or experience, have been regularly placed in responsible negotiating or policy-making positions requiring almost instant action.

In the relatively short time available after its appointment, the American delegation and other officials prepared a position paper which ultimately was approved by the Committee of Principals. This paper, which was about ten pages in length, reiterated the basic elements of the August 22 statement, which became the core of the American negotiating position. The paper outlined the major issues which could be anticipated and formulated an American position on each of these. It was in no sense a draft treaty. Many issues were covered only generally and some hardly at all. The progress in other areas of arms control that would be required if the test moratorium were to be extended was not defined, any more than in the President's statement of August 22. A variety of technical problems were not worked out. Interestingly, the position paper suggested that the United States might, at some appropriate stage in the negotiations, introduce the concept that the treaty should only cover explosions above a certain yield level. In pre-

45See supra p. 57.
paring the paper, the scientists and the Department of State personnel tended to work separately on different problems and without a great deal of interchange.

Whether or not the position paper constituted adequate preparation is a difficult question, and one which can be examined better at a later stage, after the actual negotiations have been reviewed. It is necessary though at this point to consider why the preparations were not more extensive. Partly, it was again a matter of time. Less than two months elapsed between the time that the delegation was appointed and the time that they had to depart for Geneva. In addition, the lack of detail in the position paper was partly a matter of tactics; it was thought that the American position should be developed in the context of the Soviet position as expressed in the negotiations, and in any case there was the general maxim of not displaying one's hand too early in the game. Further, the nature of the American preparation was related to the interim sparring that went on in this period. Since it takes two to reach an agreement, the seriousness with which one views one's task is partly a function of one's perception of the seriousness of the opposite party. Viewing the course of events, an American justifiably could have some reservations about Soviet intentions. Finally, it must be said that American preparation was not more advanced because certain key officials were unwilling to do more and, above all, because it would have been difficult to get agreement in the Committee of Principals on a more precise document. The cleavages concerning the wisdom of various courses among the individuals and agencies represented on the Committee were too great to allow more than an agreement on broad and rather vague principles. Of course, these difficulties could have been resolved by directive from the President, but they were not.

Opening Controversies

As has already been mentioned, there was also something less than full agreement between East and West on the objective of the Geneva negotiations. The debate about this continued until the last hour. The final note on the subject was sent from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy and face to face controversy occurred the moment the conference opened.

It took an informal, off-the-record meeting lasting three hours,
on Saturday, November 1, 1958, to achieve agreement on the title of the conference. Even after that the parties disputed the meaning of the title, “The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.” The United States held that discontinuance meant “suspension” while the Soviet Union interpreted it as meaning essentially “cessation.” There was more to the dispute than mere semantics, a basic issue was at stake, the question of whether a test cessation would or would not be permanent and unconditional, and both sides sought to have the title reflect their position.

There were also other procedural differences at an early stage. The USSR wanted the meetings to be open, but ultimately agreed to the Western proposal that they should be closed. The Soviet Union also suggested that the Conference should grant hearings to representatives from nongovernmental organizations. Mr. Tsarapkin advanced this as a general suggestion and made a specific proposal that the representatives from the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy—an international group with membership in several Western countries which strongly opposed the testing of nuclear weapons—should be heard. The Western powers refused to accept the Soviet proposal, arguing that representatives of nongovernmental organizations could make their views known to the various delegations separately.

Through both proposals the Soviet Union sought to use worldwide public pressure against the testing of nuclear weapons as a way of influencing the Western position in the negotiations. Although the Conference decided not to grant hearings to these representatives the Soviet delegation felt free not only to talk to them but—despite the agreed procedure—to hold formal press conferences as well, obviously in order further to stimulate public pressures. In practice, even though the Soviet Union accepted the Western position that the Conference should be private—that is, that attendance should be limited to the representatives of the three nuclear powers and the Secretary General of the United Nations, that the records of the meetings should not be published until the participating states agreed, and that only brief communiques should

46GEN/DNT/PV. 2, pp. 3-4.
47GEN/DNT/PV. 1, p. 8.
48GEN/DNT/PV. 7, p. 3.
be issued—the Soviet Union continued to play for the support of public opinion.

For example, at the first meeting of the Conference the Soviet Union submitted a short draft treaty (which will be analyzed in more detail later) providing for an immediate, permanent and unconditional cessation of nuclear weapons tests.\(^{49}\) Within a few days, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations gave the text of the proposal to the press, and it was subsequently published in a number of Western papers, although not in Soviet papers. Sharp Western protests in the Conference provoked first a defense of the action by Mr. Tsarapkin, and then the interesting statement, made, as he put it, purely of his "own volition, that the Soviet delegation has not handed the text of the draft agreement to anyone."\(^{50}\) Thus, despite an action for which his government could be held accountable, he sought to safeguard his own personal reputation with his negotiating partners.

Subsequently, the Western delegations also sought to rally public opinion to their side, and thereby to buttress their position in the Conference. In fact, Western techniques may even have been somewhat more sophisticated, leaks to the press were made with considerably more subtlety. Two points, however, must be made. The first is that the USSR initiated the practice, and in a most blatant fashion. The second is that the play for public opinion was necessarily confined almost entirely to efforts to influence opinion in Western and uncommitted countries. Because of the rigid controls of the press in communist countries, their citizens could read only what their governments approved. Some Western radio broadcasts may have reached citizens of these countries, but the effects were clearly negligible. Thus, although both sides had a more or less equal opportunity to influence people in uncommitted areas, the battle for "home opinion" was quite unequal. Moreover, the principal Soviet policy-makers needed to be concerned about the "home opinion" much less than the Western governments. The USSR could seek to undermine the strength of the Western delegations, while the West did not have the same opportunity. For the West, this part of the battle had to be defined principally in terms of

\(^{49}\)GEN/DNT/1.  
\(^{50}\)GEN/DNT/7, p. 10.
countering Soviet efforts. In negotiations involving an issue charged with as many emotional implications as that of nuclear testing, this difference was quite important.

**Continued Soviet Testing of Nuclear Weapons**

Although these Soviet efforts to play upon public opinion in the opening stages of the Geneva negotiations may have put the Western powers under some constraint, another Soviet action was even more bothersome to them. On October 30, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the "Question of the Cessation of Nuclear Tests," which was transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations the following day, the day that the Geneva Conference opened.\(^{51}\) The statement asserted, as Foreign Minister Gromyko had done previously, that because of the continued testing of nuclear weapons by the Western powers after the USSR had unilaterally renounced further testing on March 31, and because of the unacceptable nature of the Western proposal for a one-year suspension of further tests, the USSR had the right to continue testing until it had completed as many experiments as the United States and the United Kingdom combined had undertaken since March 31. The statement went on to say:

> This is just the line of action the Soviet Government will pursue, in its concern for the security of the Soviet people, so long as the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will persist in wrecking agreement and raising repeated obstacles to an agreement on the immediate stopping of the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons for all time.

On November 7, the United States Atomic Energy Commission announced that the USSR had detonated two "relatively low-yield" devices in Siberia on November 1 and November 3; that is, after the Geneva negotiations had opened. The USSR's previous shots that fall had been conducted at a different proving ground. In addition, the November shots were at a different height from the immediately preceding series. The new shots seemed to be tests of

\(^{51}\)UN Document A/3973.

\(^{52}\)See Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1958*, p. 78.
relatively unsophisticated weapons. They may well have been planned principally for their psychological effect.

Immediately after the AEC's announcement, President Eisenhower issued a statement in which he said that although the Soviet action relieved the United States of its unilateral obligation, under his proposal of August 22, not to conduct further tests, it would continue the suspension "for the time being," and he "understood that the United Kingdom would also."

The Western delegations also raised the issue of the Soviet tests in the Geneva Conference on November 7. Although Mr. Tsarapkin replied immediately, over two weeks later, on November 29, he read a formal declaration, which probably should be considered the USSR's official reply. The declaration essentially restated the October 30 statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It asserted the right of the USSR to continue testing, and then said: "This is exactly what the Soviet Government is doing, since it is concerned about its country's security." However, after November 7, 1958, neither side announced a nuclear explosion on Soviet territory, until the USSR publicly abrogated the moratorium in the fall of 1961, and there is no publicly available evidence that the Soviet Union conducted tests during this period.

There are several unanswered questions concerning the episode. For example, why did the Soviet Union not announce the tests, or why did the United States wait until November 7 to make its announcement? Were the two shots attempts to test the efficiency of the Western national detection systems? The most plausible interpretation seems to be that the Soviet action was a warning that the USSR would not be bound by any cut-off date unilaterally proclaimed by the West and also an attempt to bully the Western governments into agreeing to the Soviet version of a test ban through playing on Western anxieties concerning the relative state of weapons development and on the widespread public fear of the consequences.

53GEN/DNT/15, pp. 3-11.
54Earl H. Voss, however, maintains that "the Defense Department finally recognized that clandestine testing probably had been occurring in the Soviet Union." (Nuclear Ambush, p. 512.) It is difficult to know how to evaluate his conclusion. It seems clear that some suspicious seismic signals were recorded during this period, but these obviously did not constitute incontrovertible evidence of clandestine nuclear detonations.
of further testing. If this was the Soviet goal, the action did not succeed. Nor did it result, on the other hand, in widespread public condemnation of the USSR for testing after the opening of the Conference.

The Controversy Concerning the Agenda

The basic conflict between the two sides manifested itself in the controversy over the agenda of the Geneva Conference. The dispute about the agenda began during the opening session and continued to occupy the Conference for three weeks. Finally, on November 21, the Conference implicitly dropped the idea of attempting to reach agreement on an agenda, and launched into a substantive discussion without any formal agenda.

In reality, the discussion on the agenda was a substantive discussion, for it involved attempts on both sides to influence the outcome under the guise of settling mere procedural issues. The essential issue at stake was whether the discussion of a control organization would precede, accompany or follow the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet proposal—mirroring those that it had advanced since the very first post-Second World War negotiations on arms control and disarmament—was that the first item on the agenda should be “Conclusion of an agreement on the cessation, by States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons, of tests with such weapons.” After that, according to the Soviet proposal, the Conference would approve provisions concerning the control organization to monitor such an agreement. The Conference would finally prepare a report to be submitted to the participating governments and the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the Western view—again resembling Western reactions in the past—such an agenda could well result in an unmonitored test ban, since the obligation not to test would be adopted prior to agreement on the control system. In any case, the Soviet agenda would have the effect of making it difficult to condition the cessation of testing on the establishment and effective operation of a control system and on progress in other areas of arms control or disarmament.

In the agenda proposed by the United States, the order of the first two items was reversed, and, in addition, the agreement on the

58GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 5.
“discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests” would not be adopted until the Conference had decided on interim measures to bring the agreement and control system into operation. Mr. Tsarapkin initially took the attitude that to proceed in this fashion would be “tantamount to talking about pointless matters, since it is proposed to create a control system before any agreement is reached about what is to be controlled.” He added that the nature of the control system would depend on the nature of the agreement concerning the cessation of the tests, and then asserted that a one-year moratorium would be an insufficient period of time even to establish a control system. He argued that the conditional moratorium proposed in President Eisenhower’s August 22 statement was a way of creating loopholes so that the Western powers could resume their testing programs.

Both sides offered revised versions of their proposals. The revisions were all in the direction of formulations which would allow simultaneous discussion of the nature of the agreement and the nature of the control system, although the Soviet proposals were always somewhat ambiguous in this regard. In the end, however, once the quest for an agenda was abandoned, this was in fact the procedure which the Conference followed. In terms of distance from opening positions, ignoring the question of whether or not these were justifiable, the outcome represented probably a greater concession on the part of the USSR than on the part of the West.

**The Initial Soviet Proposal**

The same issues that were involved in the dispute about the agenda arose in the discussion of the draft treaty which the Soviet Union tabled during the opening session of the Conference. The proposal was both brief and simple. Its provisions were:

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America,

Pursuing the aim of putting a check to the nuclear

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56 Ibid., p. 11.
57 Ibid., p. 19.
58 See GEN/DNT/PV. 7, pp. 11-12, 17-18; GEN/DNT/PV. 9, pp. 3-4; and, GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 4.
armaments race and to the further improvement and creation of new, even more destructive types of these weapons of mass destruction,

Endeavouring to take a practical step towards the 'urgent objective of prohibiting atomic weapons and eliminating them from national armaments,' as indicated by the United Nations,

Being moved by the desire to eliminate forever the danger to the life and health of the population of all countries of the world resulting from experimental explosions of nuclear weapons,

Have decided to conclude for these purposes the present Agreement and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America solemnly undertake not to carry out any tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type from the date on which the present Agreement is signed.

Article 2
The three Governments undertake to promote the assumption by all other States in the world of an undertaking not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type.

Article 3
For the purposes of keeping observation on the fulfillment of the undertaking contained in Article 1 of this Agreement, the States Parties to this Agreement shall institute machinery for control.

The above-mentioned control machinery shall have at its disposal a network of control posts set up in accordance with the recommendations of the Geneva Conference of Experts.

Article 4
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America agree to the installation on their territories and also—in the case of the United States of America and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland—on the territories of their possessions and trust territories, of an agreed number of control posts.

Article 5

This Agreement shall continue indefinitely and shall enter into force immediately after it has been signed.59

This proposal paralleled the Soviet suggestions for the agenda of the Conference, and also the Soviet draft resolution submitted to the thirteenth session of the General Assembly. It also resembled tactics often previously employed by the USSR. It would have resulted in the signatory states signing an agreement not to test nuclear weapons at a point when they had achieved only a vague agreement in principle on the nature of a control system. This draft treaty, in combination with the Soviet actions at the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, and the Soviet proposal with respect to the agenda of the Geneva Conference, clearly made many in the West wary of Soviet intentions and doubtful about the Soviet willingness actually to accept a control system. The Soviet position therefore served to strengthen the fears and also the hand of those within the United States who questioned the wisdom of a test ban. It also made those who favored a test ban somewhat reluctant, at this stage, to press their position with vigor. In the opening days of the Conference, it was difficult to argue that concessions should be made to the Soviet position in the interest and hope of reaching an agreement. Whether the initial Soviet position would have been different if President Eisenhower's statement of August 22 had been more acceptable to the USSR is an interesting subject of speculation. If the Conference of Experts could be interpreted as a concession to the West on the part of the USSR, the August 22 statement contained no compensating concessions to the Soviet position. Whether the statement was wise from the point of view of American security interests is one question. Its impact on the USSR is a separate, although related, question.

The Soviet draft treaty has a number of other interesting aspects. First, no mention was made of other measures of disarmament. Secondly, there was no mention of possible sanctions against

59GEN/DNT/1.
a violation of the agreement. Thirdly, it was confined to the three nuclear powers. Fourthly, it attacked the "nth country problem" by fiat, so to speak. The only possible implication of Article 2 would have been that the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR would have been obligated in some way to see that their allies and neutral states too should agree not to conduct nuclear weapons tests. Immediately, this meant France and China and possibly at a later date, West Germany. Finally, since the "agreement" would have gone into effect immediately upon signature, so far as the United States was concerned, it would have circumvented the requirement of consent by the Senate to ratification. No doubt, the choice of the word "agreement" was intentional.

Although the Western delegates raised most of these points in the debate, their criticisms centered on the vagueness of the provisions concerning control in the draft agreement. The initial Soviet response was that the problem of control had been settled by the Conference of Experts—the report of that Conference contained recommendations for a control system with which the USSR agreed—and that a separate document could be prepared containing the "technical details relating to the control system." The Western powers regarded this as an inadequate reply since it did not provide for the tight connection that they desired to see established between the obligation not to test and the establishment and effective operation of a control system.

On a more fundamental level, the Soviet response raised a problem which was to become increasingly troublesome for the Western powers during the course of the negotiations. The question concerned the status and significance of the report of the Conference of Experts. To what extent was it the basis for the Geneva Conference? Was it the final formulation of the control system, or merely an initial recommendation? To what extent could the system recommended in the report be supplemented or altered without destroying the basis for the negotiations? It will be recalled that the Western panel had refused to discuss a number of issues at the Conference of Experts on the ground that they were political. How should these matters now be treated? In addition, the report of the

60GEN/DNT/PV. 2, p. 31.
Conference of Experts contained no recommendations concerning a system for the detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes. Just as the Western states lacked a clear conception at the outset concerning the function of the Conference of Experts, when the Geneva negotiations began, they were uncertain about the status which they were willing to assign to the report. But while the Soviet proposal raised this problem, it did not do so in a critical fashion, and at this stage not much attention was devoted to the issue.

_Senator Gore's Reaction_

Senator Albert Gore, who was a member of both the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and who had been appointed as a Congressional Adviser to the United States delegation, attended the Geneva negotiations for a week during the early period when attention was focused on the controversy about the agenda and on the Soviet draft agreement. The experience left him profoundly disturbed. On his return to Washington in mid-November, he voiced his concerns publicly,\(^{61}\) and also sent a private memorandum to President Eisenhower. In Senator Gore's view, the USSR's actions relating to the Conference, including the draft agreement which it had tabled, were ample grounds for suspicions of Soviet motives. He doubted that the USSR was actually willing to accept adequate control measures, and he had concluded that the USSR's ambition was merely to weaken United States deterrent strength, and particularly to inhibit the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, he felt that the USSR was winning widespread public sympathy by its behavior and that the Western position was not being properly understood. The conclusion that the Western position was incapable of receiving widespread public support was implicit in his argument.

He proposed that the West should adopt a new position. In his memorandum to the President he suggested that the President should:

... announce the unconditional and unilateral cessation of all nuclear tests in the earth's atmosphere for a specific period, say three years, ask similar action by other nuclear powers and suggest that the Geneva Conference proceed immediately to negotiate a treaty among the nuclear powers for a permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests. 62

His public recommendations were similar. Both publicly and privately he argued that stopping atmospheric tests would eliminate most of the danger of radioactive fallout. He also asserted that existing national detection systems had demonstrated their effectiveness in detecting atmospheric tests. This was a most interesting assertion in view of the official American insistence then and later on an international control system. Of course, at this point the official American position was not addressed to the question of a ban limited to atmospheric tests. After an atmospheric ban was signed, Senator Gore felt that the conference could go on to explore the more complex questions of inspection and control involved in a total ban. Senator Gore thought that shifting the United States position in this way would make it more attractive to public opinion and might possibly lay the groundwork for a successful conference in Geneva, or, at least, mitigate or save the United States from blame for its failure.

It is impossible to know whether Senator Gore's experiences at the Geneva Conference spawned these ideas or whether his experiences merely reinforced views which he had previously held. Certainly the ideas had been expressed before in the debate which had gone on within the United States. However, Senator Gore's expression of his ideas at this point was crucially important, and probably exerted some pressure on the USSR—if it was interested in a comprehensive test ban—to modify the Soviet position so that it would be more acceptable to the West. At the same time, Senator Gore's opinions also cast doubt upon the extent to which the efforts of the American delegation in Geneva would be supported within the United States, and particularly within the Senate, which would have to consent to the ratification of any treaty. Mr. Tsar-
apkin, citing the reports of Senator Gore's statements, raised these doubts in the Geneva Conference.\textsuperscript{63}

However, there is no evidence that the Senator's actions provoked a formal reappraisal within the Eisenhower Administration of the American position at this time. The Administration had in a sense considered the possibility of a partial ban when the moratorium decision was made and had rejected it on the ground that stopping tests in only some environments would be misunderstood by public opinion. Moreover, it was thought that the USSR was only interested in a comprehensive test ban. Finally, many in the Department of State strongly wanted the world to experience the establishment and operation of an international control system, and it could be argued that the likelihood of this occurring would be less if Senator Gore's suggestion were adopted. In the same vein, one of the gains that the CIA saw resulting from a test ban was that it would "open up" the USSR.

Just as Americans could be concerned about the USSR's motivations, Soviet analysts could with some justification have reservations about the American position. A casual reading of the popular press would have revealed the deep division within the United States about the wisdom of discontinuing tests of nuclear weapons. In view of this, as was suggested earlier, the August 22 statements of the Western powers could be interpreted as not indicating a serious intention to negotiate a test ban agreement. Senator Gore's statement could have had the effect of reinforcing the reservations which Soviet analysts might have had. Although it is impossible to weigh accurately the advantages and costs which would accrue to each side, it is probably true that the USSR would not benefit as much from a partial test ban as it would from a total cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It was the United States, not the Soviet Union, which expressed great interest in the development of tactical nuclear weapons and in testing such devices underground. Putting it in a different way, American military leaders viewed tactical nuclear weapons as a way of compensating for the USSR's superior strength in conventional forces. Because of this superiority the USSR showed little interest in tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, probably neither the opening position of the Western powers in

\textsuperscript{63}\textit{GEN/DNT/PV. 10}, pp. 8-9.
the Geneva negotiations—that is, the August 22 statements—nor Senator Gore's suggested alternative were very appealing to the USSR, and by mid-November, Soviet leaders, if they had any intrinsic interest in the problem, could—perhaps justifiably—begin to question whether the United States would accept an agreement which would also be acceptable to the USSR. If, on the other hand, the Soviet elite was merely interested in using the negotiations as a device to inhibit the weapons development programs of the West, they could interpret the course of events as indicating a need for some concessions to prolong the discussions.

The Soviet Concession

Since the opening positions of the two sides seemed basically incompatible, the initial task of the negotiators was to see if the gap between the two could be narrowed so that there would at least be a chance of reaching an agreement. In essence, this is what happened in the Geneva Conference during the period from the opening on October 31, 1958, until the second recess began on March 19, 1959, or during the first seventy-two meetings of the Conference.

The process actually began even before the attempt to reach an agreement on an agenda was abandoned. Starting at the fifth meeting, on November 6, the Western representatives began to outline their concept of a control organization. Mr. Ormsby-Gore led off by outlining his conception of the general functions of a control organization.64 A week later, following the announcement that the USSR had continued testing after October 31, the United States tabled a "Working Paper Outlining a Treaty on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions Including Establishment of an Effective Control Organization."65 As in the August 22 statement, the duration of the obligation not to test nuclear weapons was made conditional on satisfactory progress in the establishment and effective operation of a detection and identification system and on satisfactory progress "in reaching disarmament objectives to be agreed."

Perhaps in response to the description of the control organiza-

64GEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5.
65GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8.
tion which was contained in these working papers and the verbal explanations which accompanied their presentation, or perhaps as a reaction to Senator Gore’s statements, or maybe as an independently planned tactic, on November 29 Mr. Tsarapkin read a Declaration in which inter alia the Soviet government announced its willingness to have the basic provisions regarding control embodied in the text of the test ban agreement.66 The Declaration in its entirety was a curious mixture. It started out as a defense of the USSR’s continued testing of nuclear weapons, shifted to an attack on the position of the Western powers in the Geneva negotiations, mentioned, almost in passing, the new Soviet willingness to have one document instead of two, and concluded with the submission of a revised version of the draft agreement which the Soviet Union had introduced the day that the negotiations had begun. The most basic change was the insertion of a new article stating that the provisions for a control system would be attached to the agreement as a protocol which would enter into force simultaneously with the agreement. In addition, the final article now stated that the agreement would enter into force immediately after it had been “rati­fied” by the parties “in accordance with their constitutional procedures.” However, the obligation not to test would start on the date that the agreement was signed. Apart from these changes, the draft agreement was identical with the original version. Neverthe­less, the basic concession was sufficient to narrow the gap considerably between the Soviet position and that of the West. The USSR had again agreed that control was necessary as a part of any test ban agreement, and it was at least back to its 1957 position concerning this matter. With this concession, the actual negotiations began.

What Parties to the Treaty?

One week later, on December 6, 1958, the Conference adopted Article I of a Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. Three more articles were adopted before the Conference adjourned on December 19 for a brief Christmas recess, and another three were adopted before the second recess began on March 19, 1959. These agreed articles dealt in part with noncontroversial for-

66GEN/DNT/PV. 15, pp. 3-11.
malities, such as the registration of the treaty with the United Nations. Other parts, however, concerned more basic issues.

Perhaps more important than the number of agreed articles was that both sides began to exchange views in detail on their concepts of a test ban treaty and a control organization, and to narrow their differences. In this respect, the Conference was unlike any other postwar political negotiations on disarmament.

One of the first issues to be explored and settled was whether or not states other than the three nuclear powers would be allowed to adhere to the agreement and to have membership in the control organization. It will be recalled that the Soviet draft treaty mentioned only the three nuclear powers. The Western powers, on the other hand, from the outset envisaged a more inclusive organization. The issue arose concretely first in the discussion of Article I; should it read, “Each of the Parties to this Treaty agrees . . . .” as in the American draft, or should it read, “The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America solemnly undertake . . . .”, as in the Soviet version. Several issues were involved:

1) the degree of security which would result from the system depending on how many and which states were included;
2) methods of handling the “nth country problem”;
3) the distribution of political power within the control organization; and
4) the timing of the test ban.

For the Western powers the first, or first two, aspects seemed to be the most important. The problem of China apparently loomed large in their considerations, although the United States delegation, like the American experts at Geneva a few months earlier, was under instructions not to mention the People’s Republic of China. Nonetheless, it was widely known that the USSR had conducted explosions—apparently employing TNT—on the territory of the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the ability to detect nuclear

67GEN/DNT/12.

68See the exchange between Senators Gore and Humphrey: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Hearings: Disarmament and Foreign Policy, 86th Congress, 2d Session (1959), p. 10.
tests in the USSR depended to some extent upon having control posts on mainland China. The USSR, on the other hand, seemed to be mainly concerned about the last issue, the timing of the test ban. It agreed to the Western phraseology only after it had received assurances from the Western powers that including other states would not cause a delay, that the treaty would enter into force as soon as it had been ratified by the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Presumably, the original Soviet stand was at least partly motivated by the known opposition of France to a test ban.

The same issues were involved—and were settled in a similar way—in the discussion of Article II, which obligated the parties to the treaty to establish a Control Organization and to cooperate with it.

The "nth country problem" also came up in connection with the Soviet proposal that the treaty should contain an article binding the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to "promote the assumption by all other States in the world of an undertaking not to carry out tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any type." This had been article two in the original Soviet proposal. Significantly, Mr. Ormsby-Gore's question whether the treaty would be abrogated if, despite the best efforts of the signatory states, another state conducted a nuclear weapons test, went unanswered. The Western powers argued that they could not accept an obligation of this nature. In part, it violated Western concepts of cooperation among sovereign states. Further, the Western powers too were bothered by the position of France. So far as this phase of the Conference was concerned, the "nth country problem" was handled by agreeing to mention it in the preamble, agreeing that the Control Organization should be open to other states and that there should be an article on accession by other states, and agreeing to this rather mild commitment in Article I, "to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear test explosions anywhere." In essence, what was ruled out was aiding another state to conduct a nuclear test explosion by

69GEN/DNT/PV. 20, p. 6.
70GEN/DNT/1, p. 25.
71See Tsarapkin's vague statement: GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 16.
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giving it technical or material assistance. The transfer of nuclear weapons for stockpile purposes, an important issue with respect to NATO, was not ruled out.

Differing Concepts Concerning a Control Organization

More profound differences between the two sides developed as they began to discuss the structure and nature of the proposed Control Organization. The Western powers envisaged an organization which would consist of a small executive body or commission composed of the three nuclear powers and a few other states, a conference which would include all parties to the treaty, an internationally staffed detection and identification system including the basic components recommended by the Conference of Experts and certain other features, and a chief executive officer.\(^{72}\) In the Western view, the Control Organization should, with only a few exceptions, either operate automatically on the basis of pre-established technical criteria or on the basis of some form of majority voting.

The original Soviet concept of the Control Organization was quite different.\(^{73}\) The detailed proposal which the USSR tabled had no provisions for a conference or a chief executive officer. The central headquarters of the detection and identification system would be staffed on the basis of parity between East and West, and control posts would be manned by the citizens of the territories where they were located, except that there would be one “controller” from the other side. All important decisions would require the agreement of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

An even more fundamental difference between the positions of the two sides concerned what action the Control Organization might take in the event of a suspected violation. The USSR argued that if one of the three nuclear powers—and implicitly any state—refused to allow an investigation of a suspicious event, the only conceivable action would be for the Commission to report this disagreement to the states which were parties to the treaty and to the Security Council of the United Nations.\(^{74}\) Although the Western

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\(^{72}\)See GEN/DNT/PV. 5, pp. 4-5; GEN/DNT/PV. 8, pp. 5-8; GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp. 4-5; GEN/DNT/PV. 17, pp. 5-9; GEN/DNT/13; and GEN/DNT/22.

\(^{73}\)GEN/DNT/19, pp. 16-18.

\(^{74}\)See GEN/DNT/PV. 13, pp. 19-20; and, GEN/DNT/PV. 24, pp. 6-7.
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Delegates were always somewhat vague about their expectations, they made it clear that the Soviet position was unacceptable, and implicitly seemed to demand that the Control Organization should be able to obtain incontrovertible evidence that a nuclear explosion had occurred. In the case of a suspected underground explosion, this would have meant an on-site inspection, the only means of obtaining definite proof. The Western position seemed to reflect some uncertainty about the problem.

Taken at face value, the two different conceptions reflected different interests and fears, and paralleled the broad approach of the two sides toward international organization. The West wanted to avoid creating a Control Organization which the East could obstruct and the East wanted to avoid creating an international organization which the West might use against the interests and opposition of the East. In essence, the opening positions of the two sides on these matters were such that they were obviously unacceptable to the other.

Some progress was made, however, prior to the Christmas recess, in reducing the distance between the two positions. After the Western powers had stated several times that the chief executive officer would be responsible to the Commission and would generally act under its directives, and that some decisions of the Commission would require the agreement of the three nuclear powers, the USSR accepted this formulation of Article III, which was suggested by Mr. Ormsby-Gore:

The Control Organization established under Article 2 of this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission'; a Detection and Identification System, hereinafter referred to as 'the System'; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as 'the Administrator'; and a Conference of Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as 'the Conference'.

In particular, the USSR sought and received Mr. Ormsby-Gore's assurance that the Administrator could not initiate an on-site in-

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75 See GEN/DNT/PV. 13, p. 12.
76 See GEN/DNT/PV. 22, pp. 13, 22, and 28; GEN/DNT/PV. 23, pp. 23-24; and GEN/DNT/PV. 24, pp. 31-32.
77 See GEN/DNT/PV. 21, pp. 5-6.
78 GEN/DNT/PV. 24, p. 31.
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specification of a suspicious but undetermined underground event without a specific directive from the Commission. The Conference also agreed on a text of Article IV, which specified that the Commission should consist of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States as permanent members and four states elected for two-year terms by the Conference.

The most basic differences, however, remained unresolved when the Conference recessed on December 19, 1958, and even some of the apparent agreements were in actuality merely formulations which concealed wide disagreements. For example, even though it was agreed that there should be an Administrator, his powers remained undefined, and although it was agreed that the Commission should consist of seven states, the principles which should govern the selection of the four elected members and the voting procedures of the Commission were not determined.

Differences on Other Issues

There were other differences between East and West, which had been apparent even before the opening of the Geneva negotiations, concerning the link between a test ban treaty and other measures of disarmament and also the duration of the Treaty. Mr. Tsarapkin kept pressing the Western delegates for an indication of what specific measures in other areas of arms control would be required for the continuance of the test moratorium. The Western delegates, however, were only able to say that the specific measures would have to be accepted by the Conference and that eventually they would submit a detailed paper. That was the extent of their instructions. Mr. Tsarapkin also repeatedly made the point that the USSR would only agree to a permanent cessation of nuclear tests, not a temporary and conditional cessation as suggested in the Western proposals.

Even so, as East-West conferences go, the Geneva Conference had an unusual record of achievement when the first recess began on December 19, 1958.

80GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 26; and GEN/DNT/PV. 6, pp. 18, 19.
81GEN/DNT/PV. 3, pp. 10, 12, 13; GEN/DNT/PV. 4, p. 9; GEN/-DNT/PV. 10, p. 7; and GEN/DNT/PV. 15, p. 7.
IV

A Major Reverse and Some Lesser Advances

_The New Data_

When the Conference resumed on January 5, 1959, the American delegation requested that a brief informal meeting should be held immediately prior to the formal session. At that time, Mr. Wadsworth informed Mr. Tsarapkin, and through him the Soviet government, that during the underground tests which had been held in Nevada in October 1958, new data had been obtained which indicated that it would be more difficult to identify underground nuclear explosions than had previously been believed. In other words the conclusions of the Conference of Experts now seemed to be excessively optimistic in the light of further experimental evidence. Specifically, the United States government now believed that:

a) The method for distinguishing earthquakes from explosions by the direction of first motion is less effective than previously estimated.

b) The number of earthquakes per year equivalent to a given yield is about double that previously estimated.82

In practical terms, if the new data were valid, it would mean either that the capability of the system proposed by the Geneva Conference of Experts to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions would not be as great as had been expected—roughly the threshold would be raised from 5 to 20 kilotons—or that to obtain the same capability, a greater number of control stations and on-site inspections would be required. In the informal session Ambassador Wadsworth introduced the information and requested that it be considered. Later, in the formal session, he merely introduced it. That same day, the President’s Science Advisory Committee released a public statement which contained similar information, although it had considerably less technical detail.83 The Department of Defense issued a more detailed release on January 16, 1959.84

The implications of this action were devastating. Reflecting on

82GEN/DNT/25.
84Earl H. Voss, Nuclear Ambush, pp. 255-56.
his experiences as a negotiator on arms control and disarmament measures in his book published in 1962, James Wadsworth wrote that "it spread a pall over the negotiations from which they never completely recovered." For the opponents of a test ban treaty in the West, the new data provided convincing proof of the wisdom of their position. On the other hand, the Soviet Union could interpret the new data as an indication that the West was now raising the ante in terms of opening up the USSR, and Mr. Tsarapkin charged that the data had been introduced to justify sending ten times as many on-site inspection groups as the Conference of Experts had contemplated. The stark outline in which the new data was presented, and the fact that it was not accompanied by a definite proposal for action allowed all parties to draw whatever inferences they might.

Why then, in the face of these obvious implications, did the United States submit the data in such raw form? Why did it not request an adjournment of the Conference during which the data could be properly evaluated from the technical viewpoint and, what is perhaps even more important, concrete proposals could be elaborated for the necessary modification of the detection and identification system?

There are several answers. In the first place, President Eisenhower's immediate reaction on being informed of the new data (which will be treated in more detail later) was that the United States government must tell the "truth" to its negotiating partners and the American public. Secondly, it would have been impossible to keep the new data secret. Many seismograms yield data for the public domain. Moreover, the scientists and politicians opposing a test ban obviously perceived the value of the new data as powerful ammunition in support of their cause, and they could have leaked it through Congressional or other channels with even more serious consequences on the Geneva Conference. Since past experience had shown that the Administration was not willing or able to control interventions of this sort—and they were encouraged from Congressional quarters—there was little risk involved for the persons concerned. Another and perhaps more important reason for the

86See Wadsworth's frank statement in this regard GEN/DNT/PV. 50, p. 16.
hasty submission may have been the conclusion reached by several within the Department of State that it would have been impossible to obtain agreement within the government on reasonable proposals to accompany the submission of the new data. Mr. Dulles, who had become increasingly convinced of the advantages of a controlled test ban, although skeptical of Russian motives, was taken aback by the new data. It will be recalled that the American delegation was never given concrete guidance on the threshold problem so that apparently there was no agreed policy on the subject which could now be reviewed in the light of the new knowledge and all other relevant technical and political-military considerations. Under the circumstances, any proposals based on the new data on which an agreement could have been reached among the agencies concerned through regular process of coordination would probably have called for such far-reaching modifications of the scheme developed by the Conference of Experts that their submission in Geneva might well have spelled the doom of any further negotiations. And Mr. Dulles was not prepared to take a strong stand and bring the matter before the President. Hence, the decision to submit the new data in unevaluated form appeared to be the least of several evils.

Viewing it from a slightly different perspective, the new data is a reflection on the rather casual way in which crucial decisions were taken in the United States in the spring and summer of 1958. At that time, as was shown earlier, it was a matter of common knowledge, at least among American scientists, that the conclusions with respect to detection and identification of underground explosions rested on extrapolations from one case. In an environment where there had been just one less case, high altitude, the Conference of Experts had refused to make a recommendation.

In Geneva, during the formal session on January 5 in which the new data was offered, Mr. Wadsworth suggested that the Conference should appoint an *ad hoc* working group of technical experts to discuss the problem of high altitude detection. He recalled the absence in the Report of the Conference of Experts of a recommendation concerning this environment, and asserted that this gap had to be closed. He went on to say that he believed that
"good use" could be made of such groups "in getting forward with our negotiations." Mr. Tsarapkin's response was lightning quick:

Mr. Wadsworth's last remarks with regard to high-altitude explosions . . . only confirm our view that we should not at this Conference depart from the starting point which we have already taken as the basis for our discussion, that is to say, the conclusions worked out by the meeting of experts at Geneva last summer. 88

Obviously, both men had the problem of the new data in mind. Two days later, Mr. Wadsworth formally proposed that the Conference should convene a technical working group to study the implications of the new data. 89 Mr. Tsarapkin's immediate response was negative. 90 He argued that to convene a technical working group would merely delay the progress of the Conference, that new information could always be discovered, and that political negotiations had to have a fixed basis, in this case the Report of the Conference of Experts. He asserted that after the Control Organization was established, it could take steps to cope with the new data but that in the present form the "preliminary and hastily prepared document" did not call for study. Moreover, he affirmed the belief, often stated by Soviet scientists at the Conference of Experts, that the progress of science would make the process of detection and identification of nuclear explosions easier rather than more difficult.

Roughly, this is where the controversy stood when the second recess began on March 19, 1959. The United States outlined the various alternative ways in which the Conference might attempt to cope with the new data, but its basic proposal continued to be that an ad hoc technical working group should be convened. 91 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to deprecate and refuse any consideration of this proposal.

The Darkening Atmosphere

Meanwhile, the atmosphere surrounding the Geneva Conference darkened. Within the United States, domestic opposition to the

88 Ibid.
89 GEN/DNT/PV. 31, p. 7.
90 Ibid., pp. 8-13, 22-26.
91 See GEN/DNT/PV. 52, pp. 4-8.
test ban increased. After the new data was released, various congressmen and administration officials spoke out against a comprehensive test ban as an isolated measure of arms control. Some of these had taken this position from the outset, and they asserted that the new data confirmed the wisdom of their position. Others apparently changed their position on the basis of the new data. And there was silence at the White House.

In Geneva, the speeches became more acrimonious. Both the USSR and the United States issued statements from their national capitals blaming the other for the impasse. While four articles had been adopted in the first twenty-eight meetings of the Conference, none was adopted from the twenty-ninth until the seventy-second, and then, on the last day before the recess, three articles were hastily accepted.

The Conference continued to discuss the various issues relating to the nature of the Control Organization, but the differences between the two positions seemed to be even more implacable than they had been before the Christmas recess.

**Dropping the Link**

The atmosphere, however, was brightened somewhat when on January 19, 1959, Mr. Wadsworth opened the thirty-seventh session of the Conference by announcing that the United States would "no longer insist that the duration of the treaty be made conditional upon progress in other fields of disarmament." Mr. Ormsby-Gore made a similar statement immediately thereafter. In other words, "the link" had been formally dropped.

Obviously, before this action could occur in Geneva, the Committee of Principals had to agree to new instructions for the American delegation. Certain key Congressmen were also involved in the reformulation of the American position, although the issue was basically decided within the Administration. In this intra-administration struggle, the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission continued to insist on the wisdom of maintaining "the link." Secretary of State Dulles, in opposition, argued that insistence

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93 GEN/DNT/PV. 72, *passim*.
94 GEN/DNT/PV. 37, p. 6.
on the link was muddying the waters, harming the public image of the United States by making it more difficult to prove to public opinion that the Soviet Union was really unwilling to accept adequate control measures—a fact which in his view had been established by Soviet actions since the Conference of Experts and particularly by the nature of Soviet participation in the diplomatic conference thus far. The President decided in Mr. Dulles' favor. Perhaps one reason that AEC and Department of Defense officials did not strenuously object to this decision to "drop the link" and to negotiate for a separate test ban treaty was their feeling that it was unlikely that an adequate treaty could actually be achieved in any event. This could explain the paradox that at a time when the disclosure of the new data had lessened even further the value of a test ban treaty in the eyes of the individuals who had insisted on "the link," those same individuals acquiesced in dropping the link.

As is invariably the case when a controversial issue is considered within the United States government, the debate on the link "radiated" beyond the governmental chambers. The arguments in support of dropping the link, made for internal consumption, minimized the value of the link from the American viewpoint and the import of these arguments was, of course, not lost on the USSR. This made it more difficult for the United States delegation in Geneva to present the abandonment of the link as a real and important Western concession. Nevertheless, after the Western announcement of this concession, the outlook for the negotiations appeared to improve slightly. Two days later, the USSR stated its willingness to allow more than two foreign "controllers" at control posts,95 and eventually suggested the number of four or five.96 The Western powers, on their part, developed their concept of an "international staff" so that it allowed the possibility of citizens of countries which were allied with and friendly to the host country serving at control posts there as part of the foreign contingent.97 In addition, they agreed that the administrative staff would be comprised completely of host country nationals. The differences between the two sides on the composition of the Commission and

95GEN/DNT/PV. 39, p. 10.  
96GEN/DNT/PV. 47, p. 3.  
97GEN/DNT/PV. 42, pp. 29-31.
on that organ's voting procedures were also narrowed somewhat. But no move was made toward settlement of the basic question of whether or not the Control Organization would be able to take action against the wishes of one of the three nuclear powers. Nor was significant progress made with respect to a variety of other subsidiary issues.

*The West Tables an Article on Duration*

Throughout this phase of the Conference the Soviet Union constantly brought up the question of the duration of the treaty. Finally, on March 10, 1959, the United States tabled this article:

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.98

A party would have an “inherent” right to withdraw and be relieved of its obligations (it is not clear whether necessarily with immediate effect with respect to all obligations) if the treaty provisions, including the control system provisions, were not fulfilled, or were violated by another party or presumably also by an organ set up under the treaty. The violations which would give rise to the right to withdraw were not defined; nor was there a provision for an automatic termination of the treaty in case of certain treaty violations. Thus the determination of the existence of the circumstances warranting withdrawal was left to each party but presumably would have to be made in good faith.

In his book, Ambassador Wadsworth viewed this article as a built-in “three-way stretch” girdle of support for the continuation of the treaty. If one of the three nuclear powers parties to the treaty were to refuse cooperation in any way—in the development and maintenance of the control system or in observing other financial, political, or technical provisions of the treaty—either of the other two could withdraw; this right, he argued, would constitute a strong deterrence against any violation at least as long as the continuation

98GEN/DNT/PV. 70, p. 3.
of the treaty was considered in the national interest by all the powers concerned.\(^9\)

The Soviet Union, of course, had already had considerable evidence that the United States did not intend to limit the test cessation to a twelve-month period. At the thirteenth session of the General Assembly, the American delegation had voted for a resolution urging that the moratorium should continue as long as the negotiations continued.\(^10\) And in January 1959, President Eisenhower, in his budget message, pointedly refrained from asking for funds for the conduct of nuclear weapons tests during the fiscal year 1960.\(^11\) However, by tabling the article on duration the United States formally accepted the Soviet position that a test ban treaty should be of indeterminate duration.

Two sessions later, at the last meeting before the Easter recess, the Soviet Union accepted this article. It also accepted an article proposed by the United Kingdom authorizing negotiation of agreements between the Control Organization on one hand and the United Nations and any future disarmament body on the other, and a United States proposal relating to the periodic review of the control system. The former article was a purely formal matter, although it did have implications for the relationship between the Control Organization and the United Nations. The latter article was somewhat more significant in that it provided for a mandatory review of the effectiveness of the system two years after the coming into force of the treaty and the possibility of annual reviews thereafter.\(^12\) In a sense, this provision could be interpreted as a response to the "new data," since it indicated the possibility of changes in the detection and identification system proposed by the Conference of Experts, which was to be embodied in the treaty.

To sum up the outcome of this opening stage of the Geneva Conference, the two sides dropped conditions which were obviously unacceptable to the other. The Western concessions concerning the link with other measures of disarmament and the duration of the treaty could—at least in terms of the negotiations—be regarded as

\(^12\)See GEN/DNT/44.
the equivalent of the Soviet willingness to accept a Control Organization and some system of control, and to have one treaty instead of two. On the other hand, when the Conference began its Easter recess on the afternoon of March 19, many basic differences concerning the nature of the Control Organization remained unresolved. Indeed, the progress which had been made in this area since January 5 was almost imperceptible. Moreover, the USSR continued adamantly to oppose the convocation of a technical working group to examine the new data. Whether or not the Conference was on balance nearer to a treaty than it had been at the time of the first recess was debatable. In any case, there were now two broad areas of controversy: one relating to technical data, going to the very basis of the negotiations, and the other relating to the Control Organization. Chapters V through VIII will deal with the former, Chapter IX with the latter.