This Essay argues that in assessing whether or not to move towards the U.N. panel’s proposed model that champions regional actors and ad hoc coalitions over the U.N. itself, the international community must weigh the marginal costs and benefits of this plan. This essay follows the U.N. panel’s call for the international community to derive lessons from the past by examining three case studies where regional actors and ad hoc coalitions, rather than the U.N., have embarked on peace enforcement missions. It argues that if the international community chooses to follow the U.N. panel’s recommendation on deferring to regional actors or ad hoc coalitions, it should prepare for fewer peace enforcement operations, of shorter duration, and at times motivated by regional politicking. The international community should also be aware that the benefits of the panel’s recommendation—swift and decisive action and a somewhat increased ability for the U.N. to adhere to its principles of consent, impartiality, and nonuse of force—will be counter-balanced by fewer controls on regional actors’ profiteering and human rights abuses and a lack of guarantee as to the length of the mission.
Delegating Peace Enforcement Missions- But to Whom? What the U.N.'s Recent Recommendation Reveals About Today's Crisis in Legitimate Actors for Robust Peace Operations,
Mich. L. Rev. Online
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_online/vol115/iss1/1