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Anglo-Saxon' and 'Teutonic' Standards of Justice

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"Anglo-Saxon" and "Teutonic" Standards of Justice.—In *The Kaiser Wilhelm II*, 230 Fed. Rep. 717, the British shipbuilding firm of Harland & Wolff filed a libel against the steamship *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, owned by the North German Lloyd, a German corporation, for repairs made on the ship in libelant’s shipyard in England. This suit was commenced before the United States entered the war, and the court made an order dismissing the libel on the ground that Great Britain and Germany had each enacted laws forbidding its subjects from making any payments to the subjects of the other, and as these enactments were merely declaratory of the common law of nations, neutrality would be best preserved by applying them to litigation in a neutral court. This order was reversed on appeal, for the reason that the vessel had been enabled to seek protection in an American port through the very repairs the libelant had made, and the lien which the libelant had upon the vessel would be lost if the cause were dismissed. 246 Fed. Rep. 786.

But while this appeal was pending the United States entered the war as an ally of Great Britain against Germany, and the vessel was taken over by the United States government. These facts, under the admiralty practice, came properly before the court on the appeal, and it was held that justice to both litigants could best be secured by retaining jurisdiction until after the war, so that the German owner might have an opportunity to litigate its
rights in case relations with this country were hereafter resumed, and the rights of the United States government might be determined in relation to the rights of the British lienor. In explaining this decision the court, made up of Buffington, McPherson and Woolsey, circuit judges, proceeded to say:—

"In following this course, and protecting the unprotected rights of an absent German citizen while this country is at war with the Imperial Government of its country, we are impelled by three all-sufficient reasons: First, the innate sense of fairness, decency, and justice, which respects the rights of an enemy; second, the broad principles of international intercourse, which leads courts and nations that believe in international rights, to be the more careful to observe them toward belligerents; and lastly, because the awarding to this German citizen, with whom our country is at war, the careful preservation until times of peace of its rights is in line with those high ideals of Anglo-Saxon justice which led the British courts years ago, in Ex-parte Boussmaker, 13 Vesey, 71, decided in 1806, to allow the claim of an alien enemy to be proved in time of war and the dividends held by the British court until peace. Indeed, the fact that our country is now at war with Germany is all the more reason why this court should most scrupulously award to this German citizen those international and equitable rights which no fair-minded people ever deny even to their enemies in times of war."

In contrast with Germany's cynical, brutal and systematic policy of denying all rights to its enemies in time of war, this striking illustration of the moral quality underlying the Anglo-Saxon common law brings out into strong relief the reason for the world war and the immense issue at stake.

E. R. S.