The Spy Who Came in From the Cold War: Intelligence and International Law

Simon Chesterman
New York University School of Law

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The fact spying on other countries violates their law is far different from the assertion that the activity itself is illegal, as if
some skulking shame of criminality were attached to the enterprise. Our spies are patriots.¹

Spying, as the cliché has it, is the world’s second-oldest profession,² yet a profusion of state practice has been tempered by the regular denunciation of intelligence gathering, expulsion or execution of agents, and sporadic demands for nonrepetition of such activities.³ This is due in part to the nonreflexive manner in which governments approach the subject: we and our friends merely gather information; you and your type violate sovereignty. Most domestic legal systems thus seek to prohibit intelligence gathering by foreign agents while protecting the state’s own capacity to conduct such activities abroad.

What, then—if anything—does international law have to say about the subject? A surprising amount, though the surprise comes largely from the fact that the issue tends to be approached indirectly: intelligence is less a lacuna in the legal order than it is the elephant in the room. Despite its relative importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few treaties that deal with it directly.⁴ Academic literature typically omits the subject entirely, or includes a paragraph or two defining espionage and describing the unhappy fate of captured spies.⁵ For the most part, only special regimes such as the laws of war address intelligence explicitly. Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently in the legal regimes dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control. Whether custom can overcome this dearth of treaty law depends on how one conceives of the disjuncture between theory and practice noted above: if the vast majority of states both decry it and practice it, state practice and opinio juris appear to run in opposite directions.

4. The major exception to this is a small number of classified agreements governing intelligence-sharing between allies. See infra note 97.
How one defines intelligence is, of course, crucial. Clearly, where espionage (running spies or covert agents) or territorially intrusive surveillance (such as aerial incursions) rises to the level of an armed attack, a target state may invoke the right of self-defense preserved in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Similarly, covert action that causes property damage to the target state or harms its nationals might properly be the subject of state responsibility. Some classified information might also be protected as intellectual property under the World Trade Organization-brokered Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. It might also conceivably be protected by the right to privacy enshrined in some human rights treaties. By contrast, intelligence analysis that relies on open source information is legally unproblematic.

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8. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] For example, article 39(2) provides that “[n]atural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such information: (a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question; (b) has commercial value because it is secret; and (c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.” Id. A broad exception in article 73, however, states that nothing in the agreement shall be construed (a) as requiring a Member “to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests;” (b) as preventing a Member “from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests,” specifically with regard to fissionable materials, arms trafficking, or actions undertaken “in time of war or other emergency in international relations,” or (c) as preventing a Member from taking action pursuant to “its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.” Id.

9. Article 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides that no one shall be subjected to “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. Insofar as human rights law might limit surveillance, it generally—but not always—does so on the basis of the infringement of an individual’s rights rather than on the basis that information itself is protected. Case law in this area is most developed in the European Union. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the European Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807 (2005). A distinct approach, with its foundations in a dissent by Justice Brandeis, holds that rather than simply constraining the collection powers of the state, private information itself must be protected. See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
“Secret intelligence”—information obtained through covert collection activities—includes two forms of intelligence that have remained essentially unchanged since World War II: information individuals divulge either wittingly or unwittingly, known as human intelligence (HUMINT), and communications intercepts or other electronic intelligence, known as signals intelligence (SIGINT). A newer subcategory is photographic or imagery intelligence (IMINT), now dominated by satellite reconnaissance. Other specialized INTs exist, but these three will comprise the focus of the present Article.  

The foregoing definition of intelligence exists alongside a broader understanding of the term as the analytical product of intelligence agencies that serves as a risk assessment intended to guide action. This reflects an important distinction that must be made between intelligence collection and analysis. Though collection may be covert, analysis generally draws upon a far wider range of sources, most of which—frequently the vast majority—are publicly available, or “open.” The structure of most Western intelligence services reflects these discrete functions: the principle has evolved that those who collect and process raw intelligence should not also have final responsibility for evaluating it. The top-level products of such analysis are known in the United States as estimates; in Britain and Australia they are labeled assessments. Intelligence analysis, in turn, is distinct from how such analysis should inform policy—a far broader topic.

This Article will focus on the narrower questions of whether obtaining secret intelligence—that is, without the consent of the state that controls the information—is subject to international legal norms or constraints, and what restrictions, if any, control the use of this information once obtained. Traditional approaches to the question of the legitimacy of spying, when even asked, typically settle on one of two positions: either collecting secret intelligence remains illegal despite consistent practice, or apparent tolerance has led to a “deep but reluctant admis-

10. See Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War 61–81 (1996). Wider definitions of intelligence are sometimes used, such as “information designed for action,” but this would appear to encompass any data informing policy at any level of decisionmaking. See generally Michael Warner, Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence, 46(3) STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE (UNCLASSIFIED EDITION) (2002), available at https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article02.html.

11. See Herman, supra note 10, at 111–12.

sion of the lawfulness of such intelligence gathering, when conducted within customary normative limits." Other writers have examined possible consequences in terms of state responsibility of intelligence activities that may amount to violations of international law. Given the ongoing importance to states of both intelligence and counterintelligence, such issues may never be resolved conclusively. There is little prospect, for example, of concluding a convention defining the legal boundaries of intelligence gathering, if only because most states would be unwilling to commit themselves to any standards they might wish to impose on others.

A re-examination of this topic is overdue, nonetheless, for two discrete reasons. The first is that indirect regulation, as will be argued is the case with intelligence, is an increasingly important phenomenon in international affairs. Treaties and customary international law are now supplemented by various nontraditional forms of normative pronouncements, ranging from standards set by expert committees or coalitions of nongovernmental organizations to the activities of less formal networks of government or trade representatives. It is possible that academic treatment of intelligence may illuminate some of these more recent developments and vice-versa. Part I of this Article examines these issues by first sketching out what legal regimes define the normative contours of intelligence collection—prohibiting it, preserving it, and establishing the consequences for being caught doing it—before turning to the issue of whether less hierarchical regulatory structures may be emerging.

While Part I considers the collection of intelligence, Part II discusses questions of how intelligence can and should be used. A second reason why the status of intelligence in international law is important concerns the manner in which its products are increasingly invoked in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. Though during the Cold War the

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14. Delupis, supra note 6, at 61–63.
15. A similar argument might have been made concerning human rights or the laws of war—and demonstrably contradicted in the existence of elaborate international regimes in each area. Collection of intelligence as it is understood here is unusual, however, in that it explicitly or implicitly tolerates the violation of the laws of other states. This may be contrasted with the emerging practices governing the use of intelligence discussed in Part II.
United Nations regarded intelligence as a "dirty word," international cooperation in counterterrorism today depends on access to reliable and timely intelligence that is normally collected by states. Long undertaken discreetly in support of conflict prevention or peace operations, the practice of sharing intelligence with the United Nations has risen in prominence following its explicit use in justifying the war in Iraq in 2003. Intelligence information has also begun to affect the rights of individuals through the adoption of targeted sanctions regimes intended to freeze the assets of named persons, with limited disclosure of the basis on which such individuals are selected. Problems have also emerged in the context of international criminal prosecutions, where trials must be concluded under procedural rules that call for disclosure of the sources of evidence presented against defendants.

In an anarchical order, understanding the intentions and capacities of other actors has always been an important part of statecraft. Recent technological advances have increased the risks of ignorance, with ever more powerful weapons falling into ever more unpredictable hands. At the same time, other advances have lowered the price of knowledge—vastly more information is freely available and can be accessed by far larger numbers than at any point in history. Secret intelligence is thus both more and less important than during the Cold War, though for present purposes the key issues are the changed manner in which it is being used and by whom. The patchwork of norms that had developed by the end of the Cold War provided few answers to such new and troubling questions; they tended to emphasize containing the threat posed by intelligence collection rather than exploiting it as an opportunity. This reflected the relatively stable relationships of the Cold War between a limited number of "players" in a game that was, at least in retrospect, relatively well understood. Recent practice has seen the emergence of new actors and new norms that govern the use of intelligence in multilateral forums, as the purposes to which intelligence may be employed continue to change.

I. Collecting Intelligence

Espionage is nothing but the violation of someone else's laws.¹⁸

The legality of intelligence-gathering activities is traditionally considered in three discrete jurisdictions: the domestic law of the target state, the domestic law of the acting state, and public international law. Prosecution or the threat of prosecution of spies by a target state under its own laws should not necessarily be understood as an assertion that the practice as such is a violation of international law; given that most states conduct comparable activities themselves, it may more properly be understood as an effort to deny information to other states or raise the costs of doing so effectively. Such inconsistencies have led some commentators to conclude that addressing the legality of intelligence gathering under international law is all but oxymoronic.¹⁹

At the most general level, this is probably true. It is instructive, however, to examine the manner in which intelligence has come to be approached indirectly as a subject of regulation. Most legal treatment of intelligence focuses on wartime espionage, which is considered below in Part A. In addition, however, intelligence arises as an issue on the margins of norms of nonintervention and noninterference, as well as being tacitly accepted (within limits) as a necessary part of diplomatic activity. These cases are considered in Parts B and C respectively. Part D examines a more unusual situation in which some arms control treaties actually prohibit counter-intelligence efforts that might interfere with verification by one state of another's compliance. Part E explores the process of intelligence sharing between states. These rules do not map a complete normative framework for intelligence gathering. They do, however, sketch out some of the context within which intelligence gathering takes place, supplemented over time by emerging customary rules and, perhaps, a normative sensibility within the intelligence community itself.

¹⁸  U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence, Part 5: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 1767 (1975) (statement of Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to CIA Director).
¹⁹  Daniel B. Silver (updated and revised by Frederick P. Hitz and J.E. Shreve Ariail), Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in National Security Law 935, 965 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2005). Cf. Christopher D. Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A Functional Approach, 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1091, 1092 (2004) ("[I]nternational law neither endorses nor prohibits espionage, but rather preserves the practice as a tool by which to facilitate international cooperation. Espionage functionally permits states not only to verify that their neighbors are complying with international obligations, but also to confirm the legitimacy of those assurances that their neighbors provide.").
A. Wartime Treatment of Spies

Hugo Grotius, writing in the seventeenth century, observed that sending spies in war is "beyond doubt permitted by the law of nations." If any state refused to make use of spies, it was to be attributed to loftiness of mind and confidence in acting openly, rather than to a view of what was just or unjust. In the event that spies were caught, however, Grotius noted that they were usually treated "most severely.... in accordance with that impunity which the law of war accords."

This apparent contradiction—allowing one state to send spies and another state to kill them—reflects the legal limbo in which spies operate, a status closely related to the dubious honor associated with covert activities generally. The brutality of the response also reflected the danger posed by espionage and the difficulty of guarding against it. Some authors thus argued that states, though they might conscript individuals to fight as part of a standing army, could not compel anyone to act as a spy. From around the time of the U.S. Civil War, traditional rules were supplemented by an unusual and quite literal escape clause: if caught in the act of espionage, spies were subject to grave punishment, but if they managed to return to their armies before being captured, they were entitled treatment as prisoners of war and were immune from penalties meted out to spies.

This was the position articulated in the Lieber Code, drafted by the jurist and political philosopher Francis Lieber at the request of President Abraham Lincoln and promulgated as General Orders No. 100 for the Un-

20. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 655 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646).
21. Id.
23. This view continues today. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27–10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 77 (1956) (recognizing "the well-established right of belligerents to employ spies and other secret agents for obtaining information of the enemy. Resort to that practice involves no offense against international law. Spies are punished, not as violators of the laws of war, but to render that method of obtaining information as dangerous, difficult, and ineffective as possible.").
24. See, e.g., H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 406 (1st ed. 1861) ("Spies are generally condemned to capital punishment, and not unjustly; there being scarcely any other way of preventing the mischief they may do. For this reason, a man of honor, who would not expose himself to die by the hand of a common executioner, ever declines serving as a spy. He considers it beneath him, as it seldom can be done without some kind of treachery.") (quoting Emmerich de Vattel).
25. L. OPPENHEIM notes an example that may suggest a longer history for this provision: "A case of espionage, remarkable on account of the position of the spy, is that of the American Captain Nathan Hale, which occurred in 1776. After the American forces had withdrawn from Long Island, Captain Hale recrossed under disguise, and obtained valuable information about the English forces that had occupied the island. But he was caught before he could rejoin his army, and was executed as a spy." 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 161 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) (emphasis added).
ion Army in 1863. A spy was a person who "secretly, in disguise or under false pretense, seeks information with the intention of communicating it to the enemy."\(^{26}\) Such persons were to be punished "with death by hanging by the neck, whether or not he succeed in obtaining the information or in conveying it to the enemy."\(^{27}\) Treasonous citizens, traitors, and local guides who voluntarily served the enemy or who intentionally misled their own army all were to be put to death.\(^{28}\) This series of capital offenses precedes a remarkable coda: "A successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his own army, and afterwards captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his acts as a spy or war-traitor, but he may be held in closer custody as a person individually dangerous."\(^{29}\)

A similar position was adopted in the 1874 Declaration of Brussels, an effort at codifying the laws of war that was never ratified by participating states but was nonetheless an important step towards the eventual adoption of the Hague Regulations. "Ruses of war" and measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy were considered permissible, but a person who acted clandestinely or on false pretenses to obtain such information received no protection from the laws of the capturing army.\(^{30}\) A spy who managed to rejoin his own army and was subsequently captured, however, was to be treated as a prisoner of war and "incur[red] no responsibility for his previous acts."\(^{31}\) Similar provisions are found in the Oxford Manual produced by the Institute of International Law in 1880.\(^{32}\)

Both the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations largely reproduced the text of the earlier documents, though they made clear that even "[a] spy taken in the act cannot be punished without previous trial."\(^{33}\) Further


\(^{27}\) Id.

\(^{28}\) Id. arts. 89, 91, 95, 96, 97.

\(^{29}\) Id. art. 104.


\(^{31}\) Id. art. 21.

\(^{32}\) Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International [The Annual of the Institute for International Law], Oxford, Eng., Sept. 9, 1880, Les Lois de la Guerre sur Terre [The Laws of War on Land], arts. 23–26, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/140?OpenDocument (provides that individuals captured as spies cannot demand to be treated as prisoners of war, but no person charged with espionage shall be punished without a trial; moreover, it is admitted that "[a] spy who succeeds in quitting the territory occupied by the enemy incurs no responsibility for his previous acts, should he afterwards fall into the hands of that enemy.").

procedural safeguards were added in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which provided that protected persons accused of being spies in occupied territory lose rights that would be prejudicial to the security of the occupying state, but require both a trial and a six-month waiting period before a death sentence can be carried out.\textsuperscript{34} In any case, such persons were to be “treated with humanity.”\textsuperscript{35} The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977, broadly restated the basic position embraced since the Lieber Code: “[r]uses of war are not prohibited,”\textsuperscript{36} but persons engaging in espionage are not entitled to the status of prisoner of war unless they return to their armed forces before being captured.\textsuperscript{37} The Protocol added further fundamental guarantees that apply even to spies, such as being treated “humanely” and elaborating further guarantees for trials of alleged spies.\textsuperscript{38}

FULL/150?OpenDocument. See also id. art. 24 (noting that ruses are allowed); id. art. 29 (providing definition of spies); id. art. 30 (requiring spies caught in the act to be tried before punishment); id. art. 31 (explaining that “[a] spy who, after rejoining the army to which he belongs, if subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.”). Virtually identical provisions appear in Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, arts. 24, 30, 31, adopted Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. 227, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/195?OpenDocument.


35. Id. art. 5.


37. Id. art. 46 (“(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Conventions or of this Protocol, any member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who falls into the power of an adverse Party while engaging in espionage shall not have the right to the status of prisoner of war and may be treated as a spy. (2) A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces. (3) A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of the Party on which he depends, gathers or attempts to gather information of military value within that territory shall not be considered as engaging in espionage unless he does so through an act of false pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner. Moreover, such a resident shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured while engaging in espionage. (4) A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that territory shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs.”).

38. Id. arts. 45(3), 75.
Spies, therefore, bear personal liability for their acts but are not war criminals as such and do not engage the international responsibility of the state that sends them. This highly unusual situation is compounded by a kind of statute of limitations that rewards success if the spy rejoins the regular armed forces. Such apparent inconsistencies may in part be attributed to the unusual nature of the laws of war, a body of rules that exists in an uneasy tension between facilitating and constraining its subject matter. But it also reflects the necessary hypocrisy of states denouncing the spies of their enemies while maintaining agents of their own.

B. Nonintervention in Peacetime

The laws of war naturally say nothing of espionage during peacetime. Espionage itself, it should be noted, is merely a subset of human intelligence: it would seem that SIGINT (such as intercepting telecommunications) and IMINT (such as aerial photography) are either accepted as ruses of war or at least not prohibited by the relevant conventions. Rules on air warfare were drafted by a commission of jurists in 1922-23 to extend the Hague Regulations to persons onboard aircraft, but this was an extension of jurisdiction to cover the activities of airborne spies rather than a prohibition of aerial surveillance as such.

The foundational rules of sovereignty, however, provide some guidance on what restrictions, if any, might be placed on different forms of intelligence gathering that do not rise to the level of an armed attack or violate other specific norms. The basic rule was articulated by the

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39. See, e.g., In re Flesche, 16 Ann. Dig. 266, 272 (Special Ct. of Cassation, 1949) (finding that espionage "is a recognized means of warfare and therefore is neither an international delinquency on the part of the State employing the spy nor a war crime proper on the part of the individual concerned").

40. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF JUNE 8, 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12, 1949 562 (Yves Sandoz, Christopher Swinarski, & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). This bears out, perhaps, dramatic representations of the deniability that surrounds state-sponsored covert activities. See, e.g., W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, ASHENDEN: OR THE BRITISH AGENT 4 (1928) ("There's just one thing I think you ought to know before you take on this job. And don't forget it. If you do well you'll get no thanks and if you get into trouble you'll get no help. Does that suit you? ").


42. The general norm of nonintervention has evolved considerably over time: during the nineteenth century (at a time when war itself was not prohibited), it was considered by some to embrace everything from a speech in parliament to the partition of Poland. P.H. Winfield, THE HISTORY OF INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 130 (1922).
Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1927 *Lotus* case as follows: "the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State." This would clearly cover unauthorized entry into territory; it would also cover unauthorized use of territory, such as Italian claims that CIA agents abducted an Egyptian cleric in Milan in February 2003 in order to send him to Egypt for questioning regarding alleged terrorist activities, as well as the use of airspace to transfer such persons as part of a program of "extraordinary renditions."

A key question, therefore, is how far that territory extends. In addition to land, this includes the territorial waters of a country, which may extend up to twelve nautical miles from the coast. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, protects innocent passage through the territorial sea but specifically excludes ships engaging in acts aimed at "collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the


43. The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 18 (Sept. 7). States may, however, exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts by non-nationals directed against the security of the state, understood to include espionage. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(3) (1987) ("a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests."). The commentary provides that "[i]nternational law recognizes the right of a state to punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its territory by persons who are not its nationals—offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., espionage, counterfeiting of the state's seal or currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before consular officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws." Id. cmt. f ("the protective principle").

44. See, e.g., Italy Seeks Arrests in Kidnapping Case, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2005 at A5 (describing abduction of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr as part of the CIA's program of "extraordinary rendition" and claims that after his transfer to Egyptian custody he was tortured). The chances of an actual trial seem slim: Adam Liptak, Experts Doubt Accused C.I.A. Operatives Will Stand Trial in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005 at A8 ("Of the 13 names mentioned in the warrants of people being sought for arrest, research indicates that 11 may be aliases. Public records show that some of the names received Social Security numbers in the past 10 years and that some had addresses that were post office boxes in Virginia that are known to be used by the C.I.A."). In 1960 the Security Council stated that forced transnational abduction is a "violation of the sovereignty of a Member State . . . incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations." S.C. Res. 138, U.N. Doc. S/RES/4349 (June 30, 1960) (criticizing abduction of alleged war criminal Adolf Eichmann by Israel from Argentina, but imposing no formal sanction of the conduct).

coastal State." On the high seas—that is, beyond the territorial waters—no such restriction exists.

The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation affirms that every state enjoys complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, understood as the land and territorial waters. Though the convention deals primarily with civilian aircraft, it includes a general prohibition on state aircraft flying over or landing on the territory of another state without authorization. Deliberate trespass by military aircraft other than in cases of distress may, it seems, be met with the use of force without warning: when the Soviet Union shot down a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft 20,000 meters above Soviet territory in 1960, the United States protested neither the shooting nor the subsequent trial of the pilot.


48. Id. art. 3.

49. Major John T. Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REV. 255, 291–92 (1985) (“it is apparent that civil and military aircraft are treated differently by custom and by necessity. In the case of military aircraft, there is a much lower threshold in terms of the use of force. The unprotested U-2 incident in 1960 supports the proposition that force may be applied without warning against a military aircraft that has intruded into the territory of another state on a definite and deliberate military mission.”).

50. Designed in the 1950s to fly over restricted territory at an altitude of at least 70,000 feet, the U-2 was beyond the reach of the existing set of anti-aircraft guns and missiles used by the U.S.S.R. or China. Francis Gary Powers had orders from the CIA to take off from Pakistan with the intent to cross over Soviet territory and land in Norway. After Powers’ plane went missing, the U.S. Government announced on May 1, 1960, that one of two meteorological observation planes belonging to NASA was missing near Lake Van, close to the Soviet border. On May 5, Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that a U-2 had been shot down; Lincoln White, a State Department spokesperson, made a statement that the plane referred to by Khrushchev may have been the missing NASA plane. White later stated on May 6: “There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace and there has never been.” Wright, U-2 Incident, supra note 12, at 837. Prior to the Powers incident, the U.S. Government had consistently denied that it was conducting such flights. These claims retained some element of plausibility in light of government practice to disavow knowledge of action undertaken by agents. Once it was clear that Powers had not been killed, however, the U.S. Government was caught in a lie. Demarest, supra note 41, at 340–41. On May 7, Khrushchev stated that “I fully admit that the President did not know that a plane was sent beyond the Soviet frontier and did not return.” Wright, U-2 Incident, supra note 12, at 838. The State Department subsequently issued a statement that the flight “was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane’ and was justified because of the need ‘to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain’ in order to lessen the danger of surprise attack on the free world, but, as a result of an inquiry ordered by the President, ‘it has been established that in so far as the authorities in Washington are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights.’” Id. at 838. A summit was canceled over the issue, which ended up briefly on the agenda of the UN Security Council. After much debate, a final resolution was adopted appealing to governments...
When a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet over the South China Sea in April 2001, China claimed that such surveillance, even beyond its territorial waters, was a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which requires that a state flying over or navigating through the exclusive economic zone of a country (extending up to 200 nautical miles beyond the coastline) have “due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State.” Chinese authorities allowed the distressed plane to land on Chinese territory but detained its crew for eleven days and dismantled much of the plane. The same norms would apply to unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the two U.S. craft that crashed in Iran during 2005.  


52. The incident took place on Apr. 1, 2001, approximately 70 nautical miles southeast of China’s Hainan Island, in the airspace above a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone that is claimed by China. The damaged Chinese fighter jet crashed into the sea, killing its pilot, while the American surveillance plane was also damaged and forced to land at a Chinese airstrip. China and the United States offered differing accounts as to who was responsible for the collision, each alleging dangerous maneuvering by the other state’s pilot. Chinese authorities justified their actions during and following the incident by claiming that its limited economic jurisdiction over a 200-mile coastal zone gave it authority over the spy plane before and after the collision. The United States argued that 25–30 Mayday distress calls were made prior to the emergency landing, justifying the alleged intrusion on Chinese territorial sovereignty. The United States further claimed that both the EP-3 and its crew were sovereign property; consequently, the aircraft should not have been boarded or examined in any way, and both the crew and the plane should have been returned immediately. The Chinese demanded an apology; the United States replied with a letter that it was “very sorry.” The Chinese also made a claim for $1 million in reparations, which was met with a “non-negotiable” offer from the United States of $34,567. This issue was never settled. See Margaret K. Lewis, Note: An Analysis of State Responsibility for the Chinese-American Airplane Collision Incident, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1404 (2002); Eric Donnelly, The United States-China EP-3 Incident: Legality And Realpolitik, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 25 (2004) and sources there cited.  

There is no prohibition, however, on spying from orbit. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the Outer Space Treaty), provides that "[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."\(^{54}\) The treaty therefore does not prohibit surveillance satellites, and no state has formally protested their use.\(^{55}\) One problem that has emerged with new generations of high-flying aircraft such as scramjets is that there is no agreed definition of where airspace ends and outer space begins.\(^{56}\)

Other potential approaches to regulating space-based surveillance activities have had limited success. A separate convention requires registration of satellites and other objects launched into space. Information is to be deposited "as soon as practicable" with the UN Secretary-General concerning the basic orbital parameters of the object and its "general function."\(^{57}\) This provides considerable leeway for reporting on spy satellites and the information provided tends to be very general indeed: in 2004 the United States registered thirteen launches, twelve of which were described as "[s]pacecraft engaged in practical applications and uses of space technology such as weather and communications."\(^{58}\)


\(^{55}\) McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 13, at 434 (citing Eisenhower's policy of distinguishing passive satellite intelligence gathering from aerial incursion); D. Goedhuis, The Changing Legal Regime of Air and Outer Space, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 576, 584 (1978) ("[I]t is now generally recognized that, as reconnaissance satellites operate in a medium which is not subject to the sovereignty of any State their use is not illegal."); M.E. Bowman, Intelligence and International Law, 8(3) INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 321, 331 n.10 (1995) ("Today, 'spy' satellites are so common the United Nations expects nations merely to register their space objects, giving specified information about the object, including a general description of its function."). See also North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 230 (Feb. 20) (Lachs, J., dissenting) ("[T]he first instruments that man sent into outer space traversed the airspace of States and circled above them in outer space, yet the launching States sought no permission, nor did the other States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer space, and in it, came to be established and recognized as law within a remarkably short period of time."). Cf. Bruce A. Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization 29–30 (1986) (comparing outer space to the high seas).

\(^{56}\) See, e.g., Goedhuis, supra note 55, at 590; Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Historical Summary on the Consideration of the Question on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/769 (Jan. 18, 2002).


In 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted fifteen “Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space,” though this was limited to remote sensing “for the purpose of improving natural resources management, land use and the protection of the environment.”\(^\text{59}\) Such activities are to be conducted on the basis of respect for sovereignty and not in a manner detrimental to the legitimate rights and interests of the state whose territory is the subject of investigation. The scope of the principles was clearly intended to exclude, among other things, surveillance and military satellites.\(^\text{60}\)

Today, satellite photographs are widely available commercially through services such as Google Earth. Though some states have occasionally expressed concerns about the prudence of making such images available, there has been little suggestion that either the collection or dissemination of the material is itself illegal.\(^\text{61}\)

Interception of electronic communications raises more complicated issues.\(^\text{62}\) The use of national intelligence in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq war, for example, was not limited to spying on Saddam Hussein’s regime. As the United States and Britain sought support for a resolution in the Security Council authorizing an invasion, a translator at the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) leaked an email that outlined plans by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) to mount a “surge” against the other thirteen members of the Council. This message, sent between the U.S. and British signals intelligence agencies, revealed a concerted effort to tap into the office and home telephone and email communications of delegations on the Council in order to collect information on their positions on the debate over Iraq, including alliances, dependencies, and “the whole gamut of information that could give U.S. policymakers an edge in obtaining results favorable to U.S. goals or to head off surprises.”\(^\text{63}\) Though some expressed shock at the revelation, most diplomats in New York assume that U.S. and other intelligence services routinely intercept their communications. One Council


\(^{60}\) Id.

\(^{61}\) See, e.g., Google Faces Terror Claim, MERCURY (Hobart, Australia), Oct. 17, 2005, at 12 (Indian President Abdul Kalam expressing concern about the new Google Earth service providing terrorists with maps of potential targets).

\(^{62}\) The International Telecommunications Convention of 1973 provides, on the one hand, that members will take “all possible measures, compatible with the system of telecommunication used, with a view to ensuring the secrecy of international correspondence.” International Telecommunication Convention art. 22, Oct. 25, 1973, 1209 U.N.T.S. 255. Nevertheless, they “reserve the right to communicate such correspondence to the competent authorities in order to ensure the application of their internal laws or the execution of international conventions to which they are parties.” Id.

Intelligence and International Law

A diplomat, when asked by a reporter in a telephone interview whether he believed his calls were being monitored, replied dryly, "Let's ask the guy who's listening to us."\(^{64}\)

The response to such revelations has tended to be pragmatic rather than normative. A 1998 report to the European Parliament, for example, warned bluntly that the NSA routinely intercepted all email, telephone, and fax communications in Europe.\(^{65}\) Six years later, the EU committed eleven million euro over four years to developing secure communications based on quantum cryptography (SECOQC), which would theoretically be unbreakable by any surveillance system, specifically including the U.S.-led ECHELON network.\(^{66}\)

C. Diplomatic and Consular Relations

Diplomacy and intelligence gathering have always gone hand in hand. The emergence of modern diplomacy in Renaissance Italy underscored the importance of having agents to serve as negotiators with foreign powers, and a chief function of the resident ambassador soon became to ensure that "a continuous stream of foreign political news flow[ed] to his home government."\(^{67}\)

Current treaty law on diplomatic relations implicitly acknowledges this traditional intelligence-gathering component of diplomacy and seeks to define some of the limits of what is acceptable. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations includes among the functions of a diplomatic mission "[a]scertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State . . . ."\(^{68}\) The Convention also provides for receiving state approval of military attachés, presumably in order to ascertain their possible intelligence functions.\(^{69}\) This is consistent with the

69. See id. art. 7 ("Subject to the provisions of Articles 5, 8, 9 and 11, the sending State may freely appoint the members of the staff of the mission. In the case of military, naval or air attachés, the receiving State may require their names to be submitted beforehand, for its approval."); see also Michael Hardy, Modern Diplomatic Law 28 (1968).
relatively common practice of having identified intelligence officials in certain diplomatic missions for liaison purposes.

Other provisions are clearly intended to prevent or at least limit intelligence gathering. The receiving state may limit a mission's size and composition, and its consent is required to install a wireless transmitter or establish regional offices. The freedom of movement of diplomats may be restricted for reasons of national security. More generally, diplomats have a duty to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and not to interfere in its internal affairs. In addition, "[t]he premises of the mission are not to be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of general international law or by any special agreements in force between the sending and the receiving State." Regardless of their activities, the person of the diplomat, the mission's premises, and diplomatic communications are inviolable. Temporary detention of diplomats accused of espionage is fairly common, but there are no recorded cases of prosecution for espionage.

70. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, art. 11. See Rosalyn Higgins, UK Foreign Affairs Committee Report on the Abuse of Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges: Government Response and Report, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 138–39 (1986) (stating that "involvement in espionage or terrorism is likely to lead to the imposition of specific ceilings 'since the mission has no need for those "diplomats" whose activities are not properly diplomatic'"); GRANT V. MCCLANAHAN, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, PROBLEMS 163 (1989) (arguing that in practice article 11 has been invoked out of a "conviction that spying was the real function of too many of the members of the mission").

71. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, art. 27(1).

72. Id. art. 12.

73. Id. art. 26.

74. Id. art. 41(1). It has been argued that the requirement that persons enjoying diplomatic immunity have a "duty ... to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State" supports a theory that collection of secret intelligence by diplomats violates international law. Delupis, supra note 6, at 69 (citing Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, art. 41(1)). This line of reasoning is untenable; it would make virtually any violation of the laws and regulations of the receiving state a violation of international law. For an early view, see Summary Records of the 10th Meeting, [1958] 1 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 148, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958 (in which Grigory I. Tunkin distinguishes between the existence of an obligation and the possibility of coercion).

75. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, at art. 41(3).

76. Id. arts. 22, 27, 29, 31.

77. Cf. U.S. v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984) (determining first that an individual was not automatically covered by the Vienna Convention because of his employment in an embassy building and then accepting the State Department's determination as to whether the individual was a diplomatic agent). For examples of detentions, see Steven Greenhouse, Bold Iranian Raid on French Craft Heightens Gulf Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1987, § 4, at 4; Paul Lewis, France Proposes 2 Sides Evacuate Embassy Staffs, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1987, § 1, at 1 (reporting that French police surrounded the Iranian embassy for five days in an attempt to question a bombing suspect; Iran retaliated by circling the French embassy in Tehran); Michael R. Gordon, Russians Briefly Detain U.S. Diplomat, Calling Her a Spy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A8 (report of detention on the way to alleged meeting with agent;
Instead, the traditional remedy for overstepping the explicit or implicit boundaries of diplomacy is to declare a diplomat *persona non grata*, normally prompting a swift recall of the person to the sending state.78 Though the Vienna Convention does not require reasons to be given,79 the formula typically used by the receiving state is that a diplomat has engaged in “activities incompatible with their diplomatic status.”80

The norms in place, then, both implicitly accept limited intelligence gathering as an inevitable element of diplomacy and explicitly grant an absolute discretion to terminate that relationship at will. A practice nevertheless has emerged of states justifying their actions with reference to appropriate and inappropriate activities. The possible normative content of this practice is most evident in the cases of retaliatory expulsions (technically the naming of diplomats *persona non grata* prior to recall). Some have claimed that, where an expulsion is seen as unwarranted, the sending state may “retaliate” by expelling an innocent diplomat from a mission in its own territory.81 This norm sometimes extends to situations where diplomatic immunity may not be applicable: though the days of

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78. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, art. 9(1). A person may be declared *non grata* prior to arriving in the receiving state. Id. If the sending state refuses or fails within a reasonable period to recall the person, the receiving state may refuse to recognize them as a member of the mission. Id. art. 9(2). This may apply to large numbers of persons: in 1971 Britain expelled 105 Soviet intelligence officers at once. Michael Herman, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age: Theory and Practice* 41 (2001). See generally Eileen Denza, *Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* 64 (2d ed. 1998).

79. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 68, art. 9(1).

80. See, e.g., Irvin Molotsky, *U.S. Expels Cuban Diplomat Who Is Linked to Spy Case*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, § 1, at 18 (requiring a Cuban diplomat to leave the United States within seven days due to activities “incompatible with his diplomatic status.”).

81. Denza, supra note 78, at 66 (noting that expulsion is not subject to control by objective assessment of reasons or evidence and as such “retaliation cannot be said to be a contravention of the Convention”); Delupis, supra note 6, at 59 n.35. See, e.g., Bill Keller, *Moscow Expels U.S. Attaché in Response to “Provocation,”* N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989, at A14 (while accusing U.S. diplomat of particular acts of spying, USSR gave earlier expulsion of Soviet diplomat for spying as the expulsion’s cause); Robert Pear, *U.S. Charges Russian with Spying and Says He Will Be Sent Home*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1989, at A10 (Soviet diplomat is named *persona non grata* for accepting sensitive information from an American). In March 2001, following revelations of espionage by Robert P. Hanssen, the United States demanded that four Russian diplomats leave the United States in ten days and ordered a further 46 alleged intelligence officers to depart by July 1, 2001. The Russian government swiftly identified four U.S. diplomats who were required to leave within ten days and 46 others required to exit by July 1, 2001. See Patrick E. Tyler, *Russia’s Spy Riposte: Film Catches Americans in the Act*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at A10. See also McClanahan, supra note 70, at 163 (describing mutual expulsions in 1986 with the United States and Soviet Union maintaining “numerical parity” on reciprocal charges of intelligence activities).
trading spies across Berlin's Glienicke Bridge at midnight are over, for-
eign agents may be expelled by the target state rather than prosecuted in
order to ensure that the state's own "diplomats" are treated similarly.82

D. Arms Control

One of the reasons for the unusual treatment of espionage in diplo-
matic relations is the principle of reciprocity—the recognition that what
one does to another state's spies will affect that state's treatment of one's
own agents. The underlying assumption of this arrangement is that intel-
ligence collection is an important or at least an unavoidable component
of diplomatic relations. This is even truer of a fourth body of interna-
tional law that casts light on the regulation of intelligence gathering:
arms control. Arms control poses a classic prisoners' dilemma, where a
key mechanism for avoiding the negative costs associated with a lack of
trust is to ensure a flow of information about the other party's actions.83
Intelligence can provide this information, and arms control regimes ex-
hibit innovative means of protecting it.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, intelligence was essential to stra-
tegic arms limitation negotiations between the United States and the
Soviet Union.84 The inability to reach agreement on a verification re-
gime, such as on-site inspections, had for some time stalled agreement
on a test ban and arms limitation, even as space-based surveillance in-
creased access to information on the conduct of other parties. Eventual
agreement depended not on a verification regime but rather on protection
of that surveillance capacity. In the end, the same text was used in the
two agreements concluded in Moscow in May 1972: the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty and the SALT I Agreement. Both embraced the euphe-
mism "national technical means of verification" for the intelligence
activities of the two parties:

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner

82. John S. Beaumont, Self-Defence as a Justification for Disregarding Diplomatic
Immunity, 29 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 391, 398–401 (1991) (discussing the importance of careful
treatment of diplomats due to the principle of reciprocity); Steven Erlanger, U.S. Will Ask
Former Soviet Republic to Lift Diplomat's Immunity in Fatal Car Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1997, at A15 (quoting officials to the effect that, in general "foreign spies are simply expelled,
to insure that American spies, when caught, are treated equally.").

83. See, e.g., Joseph Frankel, Contemporary International Theory and the
Behavior of States 93–100 (1973) (discussing game theory in international relations); John
K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory:
The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsi-

84. Herman, supra note 10, at 158–59.
consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.\(^{85}\)

These provisions effectively establish a right to collect intelligence, at least with respect to assessing compliance with the arms control obligations. Although there is no formal elaboration of such a right, the text strongly implies that such activity is or can be consistent with “generally recognized principles of international law.” It then prohibits interference with such activities and limits concealment from them. Drawing on Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s analytical approach to rights, this amounts to a claim-right (or a “right” stricto sensu) for state A to collect intelligence on state B’s compliance, as state B is under a corresponding duty not to interfere with state A’s actions.\(^{86}\) This may be contrasted with the treatment of spies in the laws of war, discussed earlier, where state A may have a liberty to use spies—state B is unable to demand that A refrain from using spies but is not prevented from interfering in their activities.

Subsequent U.S.-Soviet arms control treaties tended to follow or extend the approach used in the ABM Treaty. The 1987 Intermediate-Range

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\(^{86}\) Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays 27–64 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) (the author distinguishes two separate uses of the word “right”: (i) a claim-right, which has an enforceable duty as its correlative, and (ii) a privilege (commonly renamed “liberty” in the subsequent literature), which corresponds not to a duty but to a no-right (i.e., the lack of a claim-right that something not be done)).
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), for example, affirmed the basic text quoted above and added a right to make six requests a year for the implementation of "cooperative measures" to enable inspection of deployment bases for certain road-mobile missiles. These measures consisted of opening the roofs of all fixed structures and displaying the missiles on launchers in the open, which was to happen within six hours of the request and continue for a period of twelve hours, presumably to enable satellite observation. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Text also required the parties to limit the use of encryption or jamming during test flights of certain missiles.

The Open Skies Agreement followed a more regulated approach that established a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its participants. Rather than guaranteeing noninterference with unilateral intelligence collection, the agreement provides for a defined quota of flights using specific airplanes and photographic technology that must be commercially available to all state parties. Imagery collected is made available to any other state party.

The use of intelligence in the ways described here serves two functions. In addition to being an important means of monitoring specific factual questions, such as compliance with disarmament obligations, ensuring a regular supply of intelligence itself may serve as a confidence-building measure. The United States has demonstrated willingness to use its own intelligence in this way in conflict mediation, as when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger offered Egypt and Israel U-2 overflight imagery as a means of guarding against a surprise attack following

88. Id.; see, e.g., Letter of Submittal (report on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to President Ronald Reagan) from George P. Schultz, U.S. Secretary of State (Jan. 25, 1988), http://www.defense.gov/acq/acic/treaties/inf/inf_lett.htm ("The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification.").
91. Id. arts. III–VI. The official certified U.S. Open Skies aircraft is the OC-135B (a military version of the Boeing 707). As of June 2005 there were 34 state parties: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States.
92. Id. art. IX.
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Similarly, intelligence briefings of both India and Pakistan were helpful in averting war over Kashmir in 1990.

E. Multilateral Intelligence Sharing

As intelligence has become a more common and accepted part of foreign policy—notably as it moved from being a wartime activity to one conducted in peacetime, or at least in cold as opposed to hot wars—communities of intelligence officials have emerged. This is clearest in the case of intelligence sharing alliances. Intelligence services tend to regard their relationships with counterparts in other countries in terms of concentric rings. The inner ring includes those countries with which an established relationship is built on history, trust, and shared protocols for handling information. The closest such relationships derive from formal intelligence alliances established during the Second World War, notably the relationship between the United States and Britain, later expanded to include Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. A second tier embraces trusted governments with common interests. For the United States this


94. HERMAN, supra note 10, at 157. See also OPEN SKIES, ARMS CONTROL, AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY 244 (Michael Krepon & Amy E. Smithson eds., 1992) (discussing aerial inspections used as a confidence-building mechanism by the United Nations along the Iran-Iraq border and in Lebanon).

95. CHESTERMAN, supra note 66, at 19.

96. Id.

97. The reach and capacity of this network remains the subject of speculation, but its basic history is now essentially a matter of public record. In 1947 the United States and Britain signed the United Kingdom-USA Intelligence Agreement (UKUSA); Australia, Canada, and New Zealand signed protocols the following year. The agreement forms the basis for a signals intelligence alliance that links the collection capacities of the NSA, Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters, Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate, the Canadian Communications Security Establishment, and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau. Comparable to the burden sharing by the United States and Britain in the Second World War, the five UKUSA countries assumed responsibility for overseeing surveillance of different parts of the globe. They also agreed to adopt common procedures for identifying targets, collecting intelligence, and maintaining security; on this basis, they would normally share raw signals intelligence as well as end product reports and analyses. See generally JEFFREY T. RICHELSON & DESMOND BALL, THE TIES THAT BIND: INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UKUSA COUNTRIES—THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND (1985). The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is the closest—so close that it is said that “home” and “foreign” contributions can be difficult to distinguish. HERMAN, supra note 10, at 203. Though almost certainly an exaggeration, the hyperbole reflects the deep and longstanding ties that emerged from the Second World War and were formalized at the beginning of the Cold War. Id. Compare Martin Rudner, HUNTERS AND GATHERERS: THE INTELLIGENCE COALITION AGAINST ISLAMIC TERRORISM, 17 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 193, 201 (2004) (describing reciprocity pact between UKUSA signals intelligence agencies).
might include other NATO allies such as France (intelligence relationships are always more robust than their political counterparts), while for a country like Australia, it might mean Japan or Singapore. Specific interests at times encourage unusual candor: intelligence may be shared between nuclear powers that would not be shared with non-nuclear allies. Beyond this is an outer ring characterized less by relationships than by a series of opportunistic exchanges. Revealingly, states that cannot keep secrets are often lumped in with those from whom secrets must be kept.

The process of intelligence sharing varies but typically involves an exchange of information, analysis, or resources. The "quid" may be access to translation and analytical assistance or the use of strategically important territory; the "quo" might take the form of sharing the fruits of this labor, training, or the supply of related equipment. Intelligence may sometimes be treated as a kind of foreign assistance, and its withdrawal may be used as a kind of punishment. For the majority of countries, the most important partner in any such relationship is the United States. Despite having the largest intelligence budget of any country—approximately forty-four billion dollars per year—even the United States relies on some assistance from countries such as the United Kingdom in relation to the Near and Middle East, Australia in relation to Southeast Asia, and various other countries that support its global signals intelligence reach. A specific agency may be given the formal role of coordinating external intelligence relations, usually the national human intelligence service—the CIA, Britain's Secret Intelligence Service


99. In early 1985, for example, New Zealand's newly elected Labor government announced that it would no longer allow U.S. nuclear-armed or -powered vessels access to its ports. In response the United States threatened, among other things, to curtail signals intelligence sharing. Duncan H. Cameron, Don't Give New Zealand the Anzus Heave-Ho, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1986, at 1. The relationship was quietly restored soon afterwards. Canada has more recently suffered similar exclusion from limited intelligence following its stance on the Iraq war.


(SIS), commonly known as MI6,\(^\text{102}\) the Australian Secret Intelligence Service,\(^\text{103}\) Israel’s Mossad,\(^\text{104}\) and so on.

Burden sharing tends to be tactical, but the Second World War saw a broad division between the use of British and U.S. signals intelligence capacities to monitor Europe and the Far East respectively.\(^\text{105}\) This unusual arrangement formed the basis for a longstanding relationship between the United States, Britain, and the three “Old Commonwealth” countries of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Standing links exist between the signals intelligence agencies of the “five eyes” community rather than between their respective intelligence communities as a whole; in part this is driven by the functional nature of the relationship, in part by what one former intelligence official terms the rise of a kind of “technical freemasonry in which national loyalties merge into professional, transnational ones.”\(^\text{106}\)

Multilateral intelligence sharing remains unusual, in part due to concerns about how sensitive information will be handled, but also due to the ways in which bilateral intelligence sharing itself can be used to further the national interest. Nevertheless, the practice of ad hoc intelligence sharing in multilateral forums has grown significantly and will continue to do so. This is important both for the question of what rules govern the use of intelligence, discussed in Part II, but also for how the emerging international intelligence community establishes norms for what is acceptable and what is not.

Evidence of such emerging norms is, naturally, difficult to investigate and problematic to disclose. Nonetheless the development of shared protocols for handling signals intelligence, commitments to share virtually all of that information, and claims that these networks are not used to intercept communications of one’s own or one’s partner’s nationals suggest the possibility of other norms. A different kind of influence was made public in a Canadian freedom of information case that, among other things, examined whether U.S. practice should be a model for Canadian law in this area. Canada’s reliance on the United States for much of its intelligence led the court to conclude that Canada should be especially wary of loosening its information security laws:

> [T]he United States’ position is very different from our own. The United States is a net exporter of information and this exercise is

\(^\text{102}\) Intelligence Services Act, 1994, c. 13, s. 1 (Eng).
\(^\text{103}\) Intelligence Services Act, 2001, s.6(1)(d) (Austl).
\(^\text{106}\) Herman, supra note 10, at 208.
supported by a massive intelligence gathering network. Canada, in contrast, is a net importer with far fewer resources. In these circumstances, it makes sense that Canada should have a greater concern about its allies’ perception of the effectiveness of its ability to maintain the confidentiality of Sensitive Information.  

Shared understandings of the “rules of the game” also derive from the interaction of opposing intelligence agencies—epitomized by the practice of exchanging captured agents during the Cold War—and help to explain the manner in which diplomats with an intelligence function are treated, in individual cases and in how perceived illegitimate treatment of diplomats by one state may lead to reprisals against innocent diplomats from that state. In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests the existence of shared sensibilities on the part of these diverse actors, if not explicitly in the form of a code of conduct then as a kind of professional ethic.

It is important not to overstate the significance of these norms. The term “intelligence community,” for example, is most commonly used to refer to just one state’s intelligence agencies as a group—frequently it is invoked in an aspirational sense, with rhetoric being used to mask conflicts over resources and influence that divide the agencies concerned.

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107. Ruby v. Can. (Solicitor General), [1996] 136 D.L.R. (4th) 74, 96. A further indicator of how such intelligence relationships can influence not merely the domestic legal position but, perhaps, foreign policy, was implicit in the explanation given by Prime Minister John Howard for Australia’s decision to join the United States in the March 2003 invasion of Iraq: “[t]here’s also another reason [to commit Australian forces] and that is our close security alliance with the United States. The Americans have helped us in the past and the United States is very important to Australia’s long-term security . . . . A key element of our close friendship with the United States and indeed with the British is our full and intimate sharing of intelligence material. In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism there is nothing more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence. This is a priceless component of our relationship with our two very close allies. There is nothing comparable to be found in any other relationship—nothing more relevant indeed to the challenges of the contemporary world.” John Howard, Prime Minister of Austl., Address to the Nation (Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech79.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2006). The Prime Minister was correct about the importance of these intelligence-sharing relationships, even if too much credit was placed in the accuracy of U.S. intelligence on Iraq.


109. See sources cited supra note 81.

110. Cf. McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, supra note 13, at 372 (“In unorganized processes, standards are frequently set by the intelligence producers themselves, both as an expression, in a group code, of personal demands for quality and integrity as well as for strategic purposes: the value of intelligence and the ongoing valuation of intelligence producers are commensurate with their dependability.”).

111. Rivalries may arise between domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, or between civilian and military agencies. For examples of the former, see Michael Smith, The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage 12 (2003) (“The rivalry between the domestic and foreign services over who controls counter-intelligence derives not from the
Nevertheless, norms do appear to shape the way various intelligence agencies behave. Writing in 1995, a U.S. naval officer suggested that there are limits of behavior for intelligence officials that "create definable customary international norms...To those who must work with these subjects, the norms are real, the boundaries tangible, and the consequences of exceeding them unacceptable—personally and professionally, nationally and internationally." The suggestion that customary international norms had formed was probably overstated, but the notion that there are both personal and professional consequences for violating norms with national and international dimensions rings true.

It is also necessary to be wary of drawing conclusions based on a period of great power rivalry. The Cold War "game" of espionage was a U.S.-Soviet game played in conditions of relative equilibrium with an expectation of repeat encounters. Each side had a clear interest in cultivating norms that would protect their own agents in the event of capture. The "war on terror" presents a different strategic context of asymmetric conflict and no comparable doctrines of balance of power or containment. This changed context may partially explain U.S. policies such as the invocation of the "unlawful combatant" category and open discussion of traditional security role but from the potential for gathering exceptionally valuable intelligence. The information provided by well-placed double agents can justify budgets and earn knighthoods. It may even lead eventually to high-profile defections—the ultimate intelligence success. No agency would like to see its main rival gain the credit for an intelligence scoop that could have been its own.


113. Despite much commentary to the contrary, this is in fact an old debate. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31–35 (1942) (holding that German nationals arrested by FBI agents in the United States while operating undercover could be tried by military commissions). The Court stated, inter alia, that "By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals." Id. at 30–31 (footnotes omitted). The Court later went on to hold that "By a long course of practical administrative construction by its military authorities, our Government has likewise recognized that those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of..."
whether to allow U.S. agents or their proxies to engage in torture: there is little prospect of prisoner exchanges with al Qaeda, let alone establishing any kind of diplomatic relations. It is noteworthy, however, that these U.S. policies have been protested most strongly by the uniformed military, in significant part due to the expectation that such decisions may endanger U.S. servicemen and women captured in the field, in particular special forces who may themselves one day be termed "unlawful combatants." This may be contrasted with the U.S. spy plane incident of April 2001, where the United States and China negotiated an outcome—presumably due to the costs of attempting to resolve the dispute through force and the expectation that there would be an ongoing relationship between the two countries.  

A number of international legal regimes are therefore relevant to intelligence, but typically indirectly and at times with contradictory effects. The laws of war allow intelligence gathering but also severely punish its practitioners. The norm of nonintervention limits the activities of one state in the territory of another but has failed to keep pace with technological advancements that render traditional territorial limits irrelevant. Diplomacy has long tolerated intelligence gathering but includes established guidelines for limiting its intrusiveness. Arms control regimes effectively establish a right to collect specific intelligence necessary to the success of the relevant agreement. In each case, intelligence collection is recognized as a necessary evil, something to be mitigated rather than prohibited. The remedies for violation of these norms also reflect this balance: spies in war may be punished without the sending state incurring responsibility; violations of the norm of nonintervention are limited to traditional conceptions of territorial sovereignty; diplomatic impropriety is addressed through removal of diplomatic status; interference in intelligence collection undertaken as part of an arms control regime would undermine the main intended result of that regime—trust.

It is unclear whether the partially intersecting series of legal obligations, rights, and liberties discussed in this Part add up to a coherent

unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the law of war has been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally been accepted as valid by authorities on international law that we think it must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this Government. . . ." Id. at 35–36. For approving commentary on the case, see Charles Cheney Hyde, Aspects of the Saboteur Cases, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 88 (1943) (supporting the decision on the basis that it removes the anomalous status of spies in international humanitarian law); for a critique, see Richard R. Baxter, So-called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951) (arguing that the anomaly is well supported by authority and results from the legality of both espionage and the punishment of spies).

114. See sources cited supra note 52.
legal framework within which intelligence collection takes place. Practice has very much led theory in this area and states have obviously been reluctant to establish a single regime that would impose undesirable limits on their own freedom of action. It is apparent, nonetheless, that the piecemeal and indirect approach to regulation of intelligence collection establishes some normative guidelines that supplement the domestic legal constraints that are the primary source of rules for intelligence agencies.

The significance of these guidelines might be considered in at least two different ways. The first is that they provide a set of basic red lines that, even if unenforced, help to avoid anarchy. An analogy might be drawn with speed limits that are loosely enforced: even without policing, heavy traffic on a highway with a theoretical speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour may assume an actual average speed of, say, sixty-five miles per hour. Such “rules of the road” might correspond to the treatment of territorial borders during the Cold War, when Soviet and U.S. surveillance aircraft would push the limits of what was acceptable by making slight incursions into one another’s airspace—a practice subsequently legitimized and regulated more formally in the Open Skies Treaty. It may also be a useful analogy for the manner in which diplomats have sometimes tested the boundaries of acceptable conduct without being declared persona non grata.

A second possibility would be to interpret the guidelines as providing “rules of the game.” The metaphor of a game is appropriate not simply because it is one frequently embraced by the intelligence literature and the actors themselves, but also because it suggests a kind of community that generates, adapts, and internalizes rules. The notion of spies and other intelligence actors developing their own norms has lagged far behind the traditional military conceptions of honor, chivalry, and so on in part because espionage in particular was long held to be deficient in precisely these areas.

The change in the normative context within which intelligence is collected has broadly coincided with a shift in the norms concerning how intelligence is used. Far from being an evil to be tolerated and mitigated, intelligence collection and sharing is becoming an integral part of collective security. This may be a natural approach to multilateral counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation activities, but use of intelligence in international forums has exposed it to new forms of legal scrutiny as it

116. See BEST supra note 22.
expands from serving the traditional function of threat assessment to being treated as a form of evidence.

II. USING INTELLIGENCE

Interested policymakers quickly learn that intelligence can be used the way a drunk uses a lamp post—for support rather than illumination.¹¹⁷

Six weeks before the United States and the United Kingdom, together with Australia and Poland, commenced military operations against Iraq in March 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United Nations Security Council to make the case for an invasion. Weapons inspectors had been on the ground in Iraq for almost three months and found no evidence of a "smoking gun" that might have served as a trigger for war. Senior figures from the Bush administration continued to assert, however, that there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein's regime continued to manufacture weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN resolutions. Powell's presentation was intended to explain that certainty, drawing upon an impressive array of satellite images, radio intercepts, and first-hand accounts. "My colleagues," Powell said, "every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence."³¹⁸ Though he did not speak during the meeting, George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, sat behind Powell for the entire eighty-minute presentation—an apparent effort to dispel perceptions of discord in the U.S. intelligence and defense communities about the threat Iraq posed, but also underlining the unprecedented nature of this public display of the fruits of U.S. espionage.

Legal questions concerning how the United States came to possess such detailed intelligence on Iraq understandably are not the primary focus of analysis of the Iraq war and its aftermath. Similarly in late 2005 the provenance of a "stolen laptop" with information concerning Iran's nuclear program was challenged not on the basis of its admissibility but rather its credibility. Indeed, there were some suggestions that proof of genuine theft would actually enhance the laptop's importance by demon-

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Demonstrating that evidence improperly obtained at least had not been fabricated.\(^\text{119}\)

Elaborate protections exist in most jurisdictions to distinguish between the collection of intelligence and evidence of criminal acts, the most basic being that distinct agencies pursue such activities and prosecuting authorities are constrained in using intelligence information to inform or support a criminal investigation.\(^\text{120}\) As there are no comparable sets of agencies or procedures at the international level, analogies between the use of intelligence in international forums and the use of dubious evidence in domestic criminal proceedings must be drawn with caution. This Part nevertheless explores how intelligence is currently used in international bodies—most prominently the United Nations—as a basis for the exercise of coercive powers. The question of preemptive military action, such as U.S. arguments in support of its policy against Iraq, presents the hardest case and may be more susceptible to political than legal remedies.\(^\text{121}\) But the exercise of two other forms of coercive power by the Council suggests the beginning of a legal framework for considering intelligence in international forums: freezing the assets of individual terrorist financiers and issuing indictments before international tribunals.\(^\text{122}\) This Part will consider each of these three areas in turn.

**A. Preemptive Military Action**

Over two years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, London’s *Sunday Times* published a secret memorandum that recorded the minutes of a meeting of British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s senior foreign policy and security officials. Convening eight months prior to the invasion, their discussion of Iraq policy focused more on Britain’s relationship with the


\(^{120}\) Within the United States, this has sometimes been referred to as the “wall” between intelligence and criminal investigations. The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act and a series of court decisions have substantially breached this divide, leading some to express concerns about potential violations of civil liberties. *See, e.g.*, *In re Sealed Case No. 02-001*, 310 F.3d 717, 724–26 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). *See* J. Christopher Champion, Special Project Note, *The Revamped FISA: Striking a Better Balance Between the Government’s Need to Protect Itself and the 4th Amendment*, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1671 (2005) (calling for a new FISA standard); Richard Henry Seamon and William Dylan Gardner, *The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement*, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2004–05) (challenging perceived myths about the “wall”); James B. Comey, Fighting Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, Address Before the University of Richmond Law School (Apr. 15, 2005), 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 403 (2006) (defending the ability to share information between intelligence and law enforcement actors).

\(^{121}\) *See e.g.*, CHESTERMAN, supra note 66.

\(^{122}\) For a discussion of intelligence sharing in other international organizations, see *id.*
United States than on Iraq itself. John Scarlett, head of the Joint Intelligence Committee, began the meeting with a briefing on the state of Saddam’s regime. This was followed by an account of meetings with senior officials of the Bush Administration from Sir Richard Dearlove, head of MI6, known as “C.” His report was summarized in the memorandum as follows:

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and [weapons of mass destruction]. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The [U.S. National Security Council] had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.  

Selectivity and apparent manipulation of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq war has been the subject of considerable discussion, as has the failure to plan for post-conflict operations. This Section examines a somewhat different issue to which less attention has been paid: how comparable intelligence might be used in bodies such as the Security Council in the future in order to authorize, sanction, or condemn the use of force.

Prior to Colin Powell’s February 2003 presentation there had been much talk of an “Adlai Stevenson moment,” referring to the tense scene in the Security Council in October 1962 when Stevenson, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, confronted his Soviet counterpart on its deployment of missiles in Cuba. “Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?” Stevenson had asked in one of the more dramatic moments played out in the United Nations. “Don’t wait for the translation! Yes or no?” “I am not in an American courtroom, sir,” Zorin replied, “and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does—” “You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now,” Stevenson interrupted, “and you can answer yes or no.

123. Memorandum from Matthew Rycroft, Downing Street Foreign Policy Aide (July 23, 2002) (printed in Michael Smith, Blair Planned Iraq War from Start, SUNDAY TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 7).

124. In addition to the reports cited earlier, see also KERR GROUP, INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS ON IRAQ: ISSUES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 2–3 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2004), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20051013/kerr_report.pdf (“In an ironic twist, the policy community was receptive to technical intelligence (the weapons program), where the analysis was wrong, but apparently paid little attention to intelligence on cultural and political issues (post-Saddam Iraq), where the analysis was right.”).
You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly. I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room.” Zorin did not respond. In a coup de théâtre Stevenson then produced poster-sized photographs of the missile sites taken by U.S. spy planes.125

This exchange highlights the problem Powell confronted four decades later and a key dilemma in the use of intelligence in bodies such as the United Nations. Powell was presenting intelligence intended to demonstrate Saddam Hussein’s noncompliance with previous Security Council resolutions. His audience heard, however—and was intended to hear—evidence. This was perhaps necessary given the various audiences to whom Powell was speaking: the members of the Council, the U.S. public, and world opinion more generally. But it meant the onus subtly shifted from Iraq being required to account for the dismantling of its weapons to the United States asserting that such weapons were in fact in Iraq’s possession. Lacking evidence as compelling as Stevenson’s, Powell persuaded only those who were already convinced.126

The fact that U.S. and U.K. intelligence was essentially wrong on the central question of Iraq’s weapons programs naturally dominates consideration of this issue, though it bears repeating that Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), also suspected that Iraq retained prohibited weapons.127 Ambassador Zorin was correct, of course, that the Council is not a courtroom; it lacks the legitimacy and procedural guarantees necessary to establish guilt or innocence. Nonetheless, as Stevenson replied, it may function as a chamber in the court of world opinion. In such circumstances, the limitations of intelligence as a form of risk assessment intended to guide action may conflict with the desire of policymakers to


126. See, e.g., Adlai E. Stevenson III, Different Man, Different Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A25. Cf. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, Briefing of the Security Council: Inspections in Iraq and a Further Assessment of Iraq’s Weapons Declaration (Jan. 9, 2003), http://www.unmovic.org (“in order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must present credible evidence. It cannot just maintain that it must be deemed to be without proscribed items so long as there is no evidence to the contrary.”).

127. HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 264 (2004) (“Like most others we at UNMOVIC certainly suspected that Iraq might still have hidden stocks of chemical and biological weapons.”).
use intelligence—like the proverbial drunk at the lamppost—a

It is important to distinguish between two legal contexts in which intelligence might be introduced to the Council to justify the use of force: as the basis of an ex ante determination that a threat to international peace and security that requires enforcement action under Chapter VII, or as an ex post facto explanation of the exercise of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. The Charter does not offer a complete definition of self-defense, providing only that Article 51 does not impair the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.” With respect to Security Council action, the only formal requirement to invoke the enforcement powers of Chapter VII of the Charter is a determination that a “threat to the peace” exists and that nonforcible measures would be inadequate. In neither case is there an indication of what evidence, if any, must be adduced in order to justify a claim of self-defense or recourse to Chapter VII. Thus, when the United States in 2003 presented evidence of Iraq’s alleged violations of past Council resolutions, no procedures were available for evaluating the veracity and accuracy of that evidence or, indeed, for making any independent findings of fact.

These problems are not new to the United Nations. In the area of self-defense, the emergence of nuclear weapons led to sustained debate as to whether the requirement for an armed attack to occur should be taken literally. “Anticipatory self-defense” became a controversial sub-theme in academic treatment of the subject, which typically cites Israel’s actions in the Six-Day War of 1967 and its destruction of Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. The normative impact of these cases is debatable, however. The 1967 war provoked mixed views in the General Assembly. The Osirak incident, which successfully derailed Iraq’s nuclear program for some years, is viewed positively today but was unanimously condemned at the time by the Security Council as a clear violation of the Charter. Commentators occasionally cite other incidents, but states themselves have generally been careful to avoid articulating a right of self-defense that might encompass the first use of

128. See Hughes, supra note 117.
129. U.N. Charter art. 51 (providing, inter alia, that such action be “immediately reported” to the Council).
130. Id.
131. Id. arts. 39, 42.
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force, even if they have been unable or unwilling to rule it out completely.134

One year after the September 11 attacks, the United States released a National Security Strategy that justified and elaborated a doctrine of pre-emptive action.135 The document emphasized a new strategic reality in which nonstate actors that are not susceptible to deterrence pose an increasing threat to countries like the United States. Raising the specter of a terrorist or rogue state attack using weapons of mass destruction, it stated that the United States would act pre-emptively to “forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries.”136 This sparked vigorous debate about the limits of such a policy, particularly when combined with the stated aim of dissuading potential adversaries from hoping to equal the power of the United States and when followed so swiftly by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (though the formal basis for that war was enforcement of Security Council resolutions).137 In part due to the difficulties experienced on the ground in Iraq, the rhetoric from the White House toned down significantly over the following years, though there remains a significant need for greater consideration of the circumstances in which self-defense might legitimately be invoked against a nonstate actor or a state manifestly insusceptible to deterrence.138

In 2004 the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change attempted to address this problem by drawing a line between the issue of pre-emptive action and the even more radical notion of preventive war. Where the former is broadly consonant with earlier arguments for a right of anticipatory self-defense, the latter is a direct challenge to the prohibition of the use of force itself. The Panel concluded that a state may take military action “as long as the threatened attack is imminent,

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134. See generally Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks 97–108 (2002). During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, John F. Kennedy acknowledged that nuclear weapons meant that “[w]e no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril.” Nevertheless, the United States sought to justify the subsequent blockade of Cuba not on the basis of self-defense, but rather on the regional call for action from the Organisation of American States. Abraham Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis 62–66 (1974).


136. Id. at 15.


no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate." This glossed over the many legal questions concerning anticipatory self-defense discussed earlier but was intended to discredit the larger evil of a right of preventive war. If good arguments can be made for preventive military action, with good evidence to support them, the Panel concluded, these should be put to the Security Council, which has the power to authorize such action.40

But is the Council in a position to assess such evidence and make such decisions? The history of Council decisionmaking when authorizing military action does not inspire confidence: it has been characterized by considerable flexibility of interpretation, tempered mainly by the need for a preexisting offer from a state or group of states to lead any such action.41 There have been attempts to make Council decisionmaking more rigorous, including efforts to limit the veto power of the five permanent members, but these remain the most politicized of all questions raised in the United Nations.42

An alternative approach would be to improve the analytical capacity of the UN Secretariat, enabling it to advise the Council, or to develop some kind of fact-finding capacity that could report independently on developing situations. Member states historically have been wary of giving the United Nations an independent voice, maintaining a general divide between governance and management responsibilities: governance remains the province of the member states, while management falls to the Secretariat. This theory has never been quite so neat in practice. The best example of the ambiguity that frequently obtains is the role of the UN Secretary-General. In theory the chief administrative officer of the United Nations,43 the Secretary-General also functions as the chief diplomat of the United Nations. The sole power given to the Secretary-General in the Charter is that of bringing to the attention of the Security


140. Id. ¶ 190. The Panel continued: "If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment—and to visit again the military option." Id.

141. See generally CHESTERMAN, supra note 42.


143. U.N. Charter art. 97.
Council any matter that, in his or her opinion, threatens international peace and security.\textsuperscript{144} Common sense suggests that the Secretary-General’s opinion should ideally be informed, but common sense rarely determines the structure of international organizations.\textsuperscript{145}

Proposals to develop general analytical capacities at the United Nations have tended to be abortive or short-lived—a concerted reform effort in 2000 proposed an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS).\textsuperscript{146} The new body was to be formed by consolidating the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ Situation Center and the handful of policy planning units scattered across the organization, with the addition of a small team of military analysts.\textsuperscript{147} From the moment EISAS was referred to as a “CIA for the UN” it was dead as a policy proposal. Some states expressed concern about the United Nations appearing to involve itself in espionage,\textsuperscript{148} but the real concern appeared to be the potential for early warning to conflict with sovereignty. Following so soon after unusually blunt statements by the Secretary-General on the topic of humanitarian intervention in September 1999,\textsuperscript{149} the defenders of a strict principle of noninterference found a receptive audience. The Secretary-General stressed that EISAS “should not, in any way, be confused with the creation of an ‘intelligence-gathering capacity’ in the Secretariat,” but would merely serve as a vehicle to ensure more

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{144} Id. art. 99.
  \item \textsuperscript{145} The very first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, suggested that this must encompass the power “to make such enquiries or investigations as he may think necessary in order to determine whether or not he should consider bringing any aspect of [a] matter to the attention of the [Security] Council under the provisions of the Charter.” U.N. SCOR, 1st Sess., 2nd Series, 70th mtg. at 404 (1946), reproduced in \textit{5 Repertory of United Nations Practice} 177, U.N. Sales No. 1955 V.2 (VOL.V) (1955).
  \item \textsuperscript{148} Brazil, for example, noted that “the Secretariat should not be transformed into an intelligence-gathering institution.” U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/55/SR.21 (Mar. 16, 2001).
  \item \textsuperscript{149} Kofi Annan, \textit{The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General} 37–46, U.N. Sales No. E.00.I.2 (1999).
\end{itemize}
effective use of information that already exists.\textsuperscript{150} In an effort to save at least the idea of system-wide policy analysis, he later proposed a unit half the size and without media monitoring responsibilities,\textsuperscript{151} but even this has failed to generate any traction.\textsuperscript{152}

It is possible, then, that the Council's consideration of the threat Iraq posed in late 2002 and early 2003 was as effective as could be expected. The intelligence the United States provided, though it produced no Adlai Stevenson moment, was an attempt to use the Council as a forum for decisionmaking as well as a vehicle for advancing a foreign policy agenda. Indeed, one reason the United States was prepared to share so much intelligence was that—whatever the outcome of discussion in the Council—the human and technical sources of that intelligence were not going to remain in place much longer.

Yet it remains striking that the three countries most active in the initial hostilities had significantly different assessments of Iraq's actual weapons of mass destruction capacity. Drawing upon similar but more limited material than that available to the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, Australian assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were more cautious and, as it happened, closer to the facts. This was true on the issues of sourcing uranium from Niger, mobile biological weapon production capabilities, the threat posed by smallpox, Iraq's ability to deliver chemical and biological weapons via unmanned aerial vehicles, and links between al Qaeda, Iraq, and the September 11 terrorist strikes in the United States.\textsuperscript{153}

While there is clear resistance to the creation and maintenance of an authoritative international intelligence unit that exists to gather and analyze evidence, states continue to use such evidence to justify preemptive strikes. A multilateral approach to intelligence sharing might not get beyond using a body such as the United Nations as a forum, but even that—if done effectively—would mark a significant advance on current practice.


B. Targeted Financial Sanctions

State authorities have directed greater energy toward improving checks on the use of information in imposing targeted financial sanctions. In part this is due to the more diffuse set of interests at stake in the process of listing and de-listing individuals for sanctions as opposed to justifying military action. More importantly, it is because implementation of sanctions requires the cooperation of many states acting in ways that may be susceptible to judicial review in national courts.

Concerns about the humanitarian consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions, in particular those imposed on Iraq from 1990,154 led to efforts to make them “smarter” by targeting sectors of the economy or specific individuals more likely to influence policies—or at least confining sanctions to ensure that those who bore the brunt of their consequences were also those perceived as most responsible for the situation that led to their imposition.155 This utilitarian approach to minimizing suffering gave rise to different concerns, however, as the identification of individuals (and, in some cases, their immediate families)156 for freezing assets suggested a shift in the way that sanctions were being used.

Though other taxonomies are possible, sanctions tend to be imposed for one of three reasons. First, sanctions may be intended to compel compliance with international law, including acceding to demands by a body such as the UN Security Council. Second, sanctions may be designed to contain a conflict, through arms embargoes or efforts to restrict an economic sector that is encouraging conflict. Third, sanctions may be designed primarily to express outrage but may not support a clear policy goal; they are sometimes invoked as a kind of default policy option, where something more than a diplomatic plea is required but a military

response is either inappropriate or impossible. Targeted sanctions were initially a subspecies of the first type, employed in an effort to coerce key figures in a regime to comply with some course of action by restricting their ability to travel or access their assets. As sanctions came to be applied in the context of counterterrorism, however, they began to approximate the second type: assets were frozen not to force individuals to do or refrain from doing anything, but rather as a prophylactic measure against future support for terrorism.

There is no burden of proof as such for imposing sanctions through a mechanism such as the UN Security Council. The Council, having determined the existence of a threat to the peace, is empowered to decide what measures should be taken “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” These nonforcible measures are broadly defined:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

There is a qualitative difference, however, between using economic sanctions as a measure intended to maintain or restore international peace and security in the sense of containing or ending a conflict, and freezing an individual’s assets indefinitely on the basis that he or she might at some unspecified point in the future provide funds to an unidentified terrorist network. The recent practice of freezing individuals’ assets has also gone well beyond leading members of governments or

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157. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated, “getting sanctions right has [often] been a less compelling goal than getting sanctions adopted.” Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Reviews Lessons Learned During ‘Sanctions Decade’ in Remarks to International Peace Academy Seminar, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7360 (Apr. 17, 2000). This statement echoed earlier comments by Lloyd Axworthy. See Cortright and Lopez, Sanctions Decade, supra note 155, at ix.

158. See generally, Press Release, Secretary-General, supra note 157.


161. U.N. Charter art. 41. Article 42 provides that “[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Id. art. 42.
armed groups (such as the Angolan rebel group UNITA and Afghanistan’s Taliban) that are the target of Security Council demands, to embrace a far wider category of “individuals and entities associated with” al Qaeda as designated by a committee of the Security Council.\(^{162}\)

By the end of 2005 this committee had frozen the assets of 347 individuals and 119 entities.\(^{163}\)

Most criticism of the targeted sanctions regimes focuses on alleged violations of the rights of persons whose assets have been frozen, or the inappropriateness of the Security Council “legislating” by issuing binding orders of general application without adequate checks on its powers.\(^{164}\) Underlying such human rights and administrative law concerns is the question of how the Council uses information in such circumstances. As that information is frequently sourced from national intelligence services, addressing those concerns must take account of the classified nature of the material. This is relevant at two discrete stages: listing or designation of individuals and entities and the de-listing process. Discussion here will focus on the most active committee—concerned with al Qaeda—but many concerns apply to the other Security Council committees managing lists for Sierra Leone,\(^{165}\) Iraq,\(^{166}\) Liberia,\(^{167}\) the Democratic Republic of the Congo,\(^{168}\) and Côte d’Ivoire.\(^{169}\)

The sanctions regime that is now used to freeze al Qaeda-connected assets worldwide was initially established in October 1999 to pressure the Taliban regime to surrender Osama bin Laden for prosecution following his indictment in the United States for the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.\(^{170}\) Resolution 1267 established a committee (the 1267 Committee) to oversee implementation of the sanctions, including the power to “designate” the relevant funds to be frozen.\(^{171}\)

In December 2000, the regime was expanded to apply to bin Laden himself and “individuals and entities associated with him as designated by the

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163. The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda Organisation as Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee, U.N. Security Council Comm. Established Pursuant to Res. 1267 (2005), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm (listing 142 individuals and one entity belonging to or associated with the Taliban, and 205 individuals and 118 entities belonging to or associated with al Qaida) [hereinafter New Consolidated List].
171. Id. ¶ 6(e).
Committee, including those in the Al-Qaida organization.\textsuperscript{172} In January 2002, following the September 11 attacks and the successful military operation in Afghanistan, the sanctions regime was further expanded through the removal of the geographic connection to Afghanistan and any time limit on its application.\textsuperscript{173}

The criteria for inclusion on the list have been left intentionally vague. The threshold established by the Council (being "associated with" Osama bin Laden or al Qaeda) was low and ambiguous. Only in January 2004, with the passage of Resolution 1526, were member states proposing that individuals to be listed called upon to provide information demonstrating such an association.\textsuperscript{174} The same resolution "encourage[rd]" member states to inform such individuals that their assets were being frozen.\textsuperscript{175} In July 2005—almost six years after the listing regime was first established—Resolution 1617 required that when states proposed additional names for the consolidated list they should henceforth provide to the Committee a "statement of case describing the basis of the proposal."\textsuperscript{176} This did not affect the more than 400 individuals and entities that had been listed without such a formal statement of case.\textsuperscript{177} The same resolution "[r]equest[ed]" relevant States to inform, to the extent possible, and in writing where possible, individuals and entities included in the Consolidated List of the measures imposed on them, the Committee’s guidelines, and, in particular, the listing and delisting procedures . . . .\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{173} S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002) ("Decides that the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above will be reviewed in 12 months and that at the end of this period the Council will either allow these measures to continue or decide to improve them, in keeping with the principles and purposes of this resolution.").
\textsuperscript{174} S.C. Res. 1526, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004) ("Calls upon all States, when submitting new names to the Committee’s list, to include identifying information and background information, to the greatest extent possible, that demonstrates the individual(s)’ and/or entity(ies)’ association with Usama bin Laden or with members of the Al-Qaida organization and/or the Taliban, in line with the Committee’s guidelines").
\textsuperscript{175} Id. ¶ 18.
\textsuperscript{177} Prior to S.C. Res. 1617 the committee had listed 142 individuals and one entity associated with the Taliban, and 180 individuals and 118 entities associated with al Qaeda. See New Consolidated List, supra note 163.
\textsuperscript{178} S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 176, ¶ 5. Notification procedures vary between the committees. The al Qaeda/Taliban and Iraq committees advise member states of new listings and add information to their websites. The Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire committees, by contrast, rely on press releases, notes verbales, and less frequent changes to their websites. None of the committees directly notifies the targets of sanctions. WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STRENGTHENING UN TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES 30 (2006), http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf [hereinafter STRENGTHENING UN SANCTIONS].
This incremental approach to constraining the discretion of the Committee is suggestive of the manner in which its activities came to be seen as more than a simple sanctions regime. When Resolution 1267 was first passed, sanctions targeted specifically at the Taliban regime were intended to minimize collateral harm to the population of Afghanistan; in the wake of September 11, sanctions became a means of restricting the flow of terrorist finances. Over time, it became clear that freezing the assets of individuals or banks indefinitely raised concerns both in terms of the rights of the affected individuals and the accountability structures for the exercise of this power. By September 2005, a United Nations summit of world leaders called upon the Security Council to “ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions.”

Such limited protections may be contrasted with the elaborate safeguards incorporated within the ad hoc tribunals established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, also creatures of the UN Security Council. The resolutions establishing each tribunal contained in their respective statutes elaborate protections for the accused, including a presumption of innocence, a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charge against him or her, and the opportunity for a fair trial including legal assistance and the opportunity to question witnesses. Convicted persons also enjoyed a right of appeal over errors of law and fact.

Sanctions are not a form of criminal punishment as such—a point that is frequently emphasized by defenders of the regime and those

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179. As the High-Level Panel noted in December 2004, “The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and possibly violate fundamental human rights norms and conventions.” High-Level Panel Report, supra note 139, para. 152.

180. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement. Humanitarian exemptions presently allow individuals whose assets have been frozen to purchase basic expenses, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other financial assets or economic resources. S.C. Res. 1452, para. 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002).


184. Id. art. 25.
tasked with implementing it.¹⁸⁵ In Yusuf and Kadi, a pair of judgments issued in 2005 by the European Court of First Instance, this characterization as preventive rather than punitive was important in determining that the practice, described as "a temporary precautionary measure restricting the availability of the applicants’ property," did not violate fundamental rights of the individuals concerned.¹⁸⁶ The court noted that "freezing of funds is a precautionary measure which, unlike confiscation, does not affect the very substance of the right of the persons concerned to property in their financial assets but only the use thereof."¹⁸⁷

Nevertheless, once an individual is included on the list it is difficult to be removed. Prior to January 2002 there was no official procedure for managing the sanctions regime. Resolution 1390 (2002) requested the Committee to "promulgate expeditiously such guidelines and criteria as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation" of the sanctions regime.¹⁸⁸ In August 2002 a policy for de-listing was announced by the Chairman of the 1267 Committee, requiring a listed person to petition his or her government of residence or citizenship to request review of the case, putting the onus on the petitioner to "provide justification for the de-listing request, offer relevant information and request support for de-listing."¹⁸⁹ That government was then expected to review the information and approach the government(s) that first listed the person on a bilateral basis "to seek additional information and to hold consultations on the de-listing request."¹⁹⁰ The Committee adopted guidelines implementing this approach in November 2002.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁵. See, e.g., Analytical Support & Sanctions Monitoring Team, Third Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Res. 1526 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, para. 41, U.N. Doc. S/2005/572, (Sept. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Third Report on Al-Qaida and Taliban Individuals] ("United Nations sanctions programmes have not required their targets to have been convicted by a court of law. The consent of the Security Council (whose members also make up the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), as well as other sanctions committees) is all that is required under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.


¹⁸⁷. Case T-306/01, Yusuf, at ¶ 299; Case T-315/01, Kadi, ¶ 248.


¹⁹⁰. Id. para. 2.

of residence or citizenship chooses not to request review of the case, there is no provision for an alternative means of petition. The Liberian sanctions regime, by contrast, allows for an individual to petition the relevant committees in “exceptional cases.” Two individuals duly submitted petitions that were received by the committee but rejected on the merits.

In practice the Committee itself has little direct input into listing or de-listing, instead ratifying decisions made in capitals on the basis of a confidential “no-objection” procedure. Under this procedure a proposed name is added to the list if no member of the Committee objects within a designated period. Until 2005 this period was forty-eight hours; it was recently extended to five days. In practice, the amount of information provided to justify listing and identify an individual or entity varies. There has been some progress from the days when the Angola Sanctions Committee regarded the nom de guerre “Big Freddy” as sufficient identifying information, but statements of case vary considerably. The average statement of case on the 1267 Committee runs to about a page and a half of information, with some considerably longer. At the other extreme, one statement of case requesting the listing of seventy-four individuals included a single paragraph of justification for the entire group. The capacity of members of the Committee to make an informed decision on whether to agree to a listing depends significantly on their access to intelligence information, either through their own services or their relationship with the designating state. In the absence of some national interest in a situation, however, there is little incentive to challenge a specific listing.

192. But see Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council and Comm’n, ¶ 113–123, 2006 E.C.R. II-0000; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council, ¶ 143–153, 2006 E.C.R. II-0000 (concluding that member states of the European Union are bound to respect the fundamental rights of persons within their jurisdiction insofar as this does not impede their proper performance of obligations under the UN Charter). Member States are “required to act promptly to ensure that such persons’ cases are presented without delay and fairly and impartially to the Committee, with a view to their re-examination.” Wrongful refusal by the competent national authority to act in this way would properly be the subject of judicial review. Hassan, ¶ 120; Ayadi, ¶ 150. In the present cases, the applicants had made no such allegations. Hassan, ¶ 123; Ayadi, ¶ 153. Cf. Case T-306/01, Yusuf, at ¶ 317; Case T-315/01, Kadi, ¶ 270.


194. STRENGTHENING UN SANCTIONS, supra note 178, at 29. Other sanction committees have different waiting periods: three days for the 1518 Committee (Iraq); two days for the 1521 Committee (Liberia); and two days for the 1572 Committee (Côte d’Ivoire). Id.

195. Id.

196. Id. at 26 (note that a hold was placed on this group of 74).
Various reform proposals to improve the listing and de-listing process have been developed, including the ongoing work of the 1267 Committee's Monitoring Group, proposals by member states, and policy options being developed by independent bodies. To date no court has held the regime invalid, though ongoing litigation in European courts may threaten such an outcome. In addition, unlike other sanctions regimes, it appears unlikely that political developments will lead to the termination of the al Qaeda/Taliban list, as was the case in 2002 when sanctions against UNITA officials were terminated following the death of Jonas Savimbi and the end of Angola's civil war. As the years pass, the fact that assets may never be unfrozen will lead some to conclude that the regime is in effect, if not in name, a form of confiscation. At present, for example, there is still no agreement on what to do with the frozen assets of an individual who dies.

A basic point of argument is whether any improved procedure should incorporate an independent assessment of the evidence used to justify inclusion on the list. The Danish government (which held an elected seat on the Security Council for 2005–06) proposed an ombudsman-type institution, while the Swiss government has supported a review panel with representatives of the listing and challenging states. Other

197. Analytical Support & Sanctions Monitoring Team, Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Resolution 1526 Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities § V(D) ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. S/2005/83, (Feb. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Second Report on Al-Qaida and Taliban Individuals] (proposals from the Monitoring Group (previously the Monitoring Team) generally stress making existing mechanisms more effective, such as allowing individuals to notify the Committee if their state of residence or citizenship fails to forward their application for de-listing); Third Report on Al-Qaida and Taliban Individuals, supra note 185, ¶ 55 (requiring states to forward application for de-listing to the Committee); Id. ¶ 56 (allowing any state to petition Committee for de-listing).

198. See, e.g., STRENGTHENING UN SANCTIONS, supra note 178.

199. See, e.g., Case T-315/01, Kadi; Case T-306/01, Yusuf. Both cases are being appealed. Other cases have been settled, sometimes through the de-listing of individuals.


proposals include an administrative review panel comparable to the UN Compensation Commission\textsuperscript{203} or Kosovo's Detention Review Commission,\textsuperscript{204} or more formal judicial proceedings comparable to the appeals process in the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.\textsuperscript{205}

Little progress has been made on such discussions, in part because the human rights and administrative law arguments encouraging independent review have been dismissed as essentially irrelevant to the counter-terrorist agenda of the Committee. When the ad hoc tribunals were established, for example, the UN Office of Legal Affairs was deeply involved.\textsuperscript{206} By contrast, the 1267 regime was established without reference to the Legal Counsel at all; when a member state suggested that the Counsel should be consulted, it was told that there were no legal issues involved in listing or de-listing.\textsuperscript{207}

As indicated earlier, the pressure to change is likely to increase, if not through courts striking down asset freezes then through member states refusing to implement them. The main barrier to such reforms, however, is not simply resistance to the human rights arguments or a general reluctance to constrain the discretion of the Security Council by reviewing its decisions.\textsuperscript{208} Rather, it is the fact that in many ways the Council and its Committee are not actually making the relevant

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\textsuperscript{203} The UN Compensation Commission was established in 1991 to process compensation claims for damage suffered as a direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. See UN Compensation Commission Home Page, http://www.unog.ch/uncc (last visited Sept. 12, 2006).

\textsuperscript{204} Detention Review Commission, supra note 202.

\textsuperscript{205} See International Tribunal Statute, supra note 183.


\textsuperscript{207} Confidential communication, Jan. 24, 2006.

\textsuperscript{208} An irony of the ongoing debates concerning targeted financial sanctions is that greater procedural guarantees are likely to be available under regimes designed to have more limited humanitarian consequences than comprehensive sanctions such as those imposed on Iraq in 1990. Indeed, the threshold for such sanctions already appears to be higher than that required for the Council to authorize the use of force. See infra Conclusion.
decisions. As the European Court of First Instance observed in the *Yusuf* and *Kadi* cases, any opportunity for an individual whose assets are frozen to respond to the veracity and relevance of facts used to justify that action is definitively excluded: "Those facts and that evidence, once classified as confidential or secret by the State which made the Sanctions Committee aware of them, are not, obviously, communicated to him, any more than they are to the Member States of the United Nations to which the Security Council’s resolutions are addressed." Though the obligation to respect procedural constraints is normally clear when a state is seeking to exercise coercive powers over one of its own nationals, it is less clear that such obligations translate to international bodies as a matter of law, and it is certain there is unwillingness to do so in fact.

The general reluctance to share intelligence within an international organization such as the United Nations suggests that a more productive means of challenging specific listings may draw upon the bilateral intelligence relationships described in Part I. Because the United States proposes the majority of listings, a country’s relationship with the United States will therefore be crucial. From the adoption of formal de-listing procedures in November 2002 until December 2005 only two individuals were de-listed. One was a British citizen and the other was a resident of Germany. Both were removed from the list only after intense lobbying by their respective governments, and in one case de-listing was linked to cooperation with the authorities in investigations of terrorist activities.

Such a practice, which favors the citizens and residents of allies of the United States, is unsustainable. Indeed, there are already indications

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210. See, e.g., Comments from Alexander Downer, Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Questions Without Notice: National Security: Terrorism*, 17 HANSARD (2003) 22146, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/dailys/dr051103.pdf ("In some cases the 1267 committee will not provide a consensus, because one or two members of the Security Council may have a particular view about a particular organisation which is not shared by other members of the Security Council. It might equally be that a member of the Security Council—and there are cases in point here—has very specific intelligence but is not prepared to share that intelligence.").
211. See supra Part I.E.
212. *Bin Laden’s Ex-Bodyguard Is Taken Off Lists of Terrorists*, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A7 (Shadi Abdalla removed from list). Similarly two Swedish nationals of Somali descent, Abderisak Aden and Abdi Abdulaziz Ali, were removed from the list in August 2002 not because of an error in the listing but because "they submitted information, evidence, sworn statements first that they had no knowledge that the al Barakat businesses that they were associated with were being used, either directly or indirectly, to finance terror. And second, they submitted evidence, documents and sworn certification that they had severed all ties with al Barakat, that they had disassociated themselves fully and completely with al Barakat." *Update on Tracking Financial Assets of Terrorists Briefer: Jimmy Gurule, Undersecretary Of Treasury For Enforcement*, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (LEXIS), Sept. 9, 2002.
that in countries not in a position to lobby the United States effectively—unlike the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, Sweden, or Switzerland—sanctions are already being implemented selectively. It now seems probable that the greatest hindrance to the regime's effectiveness will not be challenges from courts but the reluctance of states to add to the list. This first emerged as a problem in late 2002, with some states citing practical and legal constraints preventing them submitting the names of individuals and entities under ongoing investigation, or expressing concerns about the legality of listing individuals prior to a judicial finding of culpability.

213. See the discussion of the Aden and Ali cases, supra note 212.

214. In January 2006, two Swiss nationals were removed from the consolidated list. New Consolidated List, supra note 163, ¶¶ QI.F.52.01 and QI.M.51.01.


217. Second Report of the Monitoring Group, supra note 216, ¶¶ 26–27; Third Report of the Monitoring Group, supra note 216, ¶ 17; Second Report on Sanctions Against Al-Qaida, supra note 216, ¶ 22 (“Those countries that were aware of the [listing] requirements relied heavily on the exemption clause in the resolution, referring to the possibility of compromising investigations or enforcement actions. This appeared to the Group to be more in the nature of an excuse than an actual impediment to providing such names.”). The exemption clause refers to the humanitarian exemptions described supra note 180.

218. Second Report on Sanctions Against Al-Qaida, supra note 216, ¶¶ 19–20 (Kuwait, Yemen, and Morocco all cited the absence of a judicial finding as the reason for not submitting the names of suspected al Qaeda members who had already been arrested). See also
This debate would profit from closer examination of the history of intelligence sharing with international organizations, especially in the context of implementing regimes such as weapons inspections in Iraq. Effective use of intelligence by such organizations depends on both a demonstrated ability to receive confidential information appropriately and a capacity to assess its accuracy, relevance, and implications.219

C. International Criminal Prosecution

The use of intelligence in international criminal prosecution highlights the tension between the competing objectives of national security and international legitimacy even more starkly than with the use of force and targeted sanctions. The ad hoc international criminal tribunals—which have had to balance the need to protect sources and methods, the rights of the accused, and the integrity of the tribunal itself—constitute an area in which there is now some measure of experience in drawing upon sensitive information to implement Council decisions. The tension is deeper because the national interest that leads a state to share intelligence is likely to be less compelling than in the previous situations. At the same time, the evidentiary threshold for securing a conviction in an international tribunal is considerably more rigorous than that needed to justify asset freezes or military strikes.

Access to intelligence, in the sense used here of information obtained covertly, need not be central to the prosecution of an individual before an international tribunal, but it will frequently be very useful. The nature of situations that fall within the jurisdiction of such tribunals and their limited investigative capacity makes traditional collection of evidence difficult. Intelligence may be a source of leads for interviews with potential witnesses; it may also provide important contextual information that deepens an investigator’s understanding of a case. This demand for intelligence may also correspond to a potential supply: if the situation is a conflict zone, there will often be a number of governments collecting intelligence for their own purposes. In some circumstances these governments may be willing to share at least part of that intelligence with investigators, if not to produce it in open court.220 At times


219. See Chesterman, supra note 66, at viii.

this discretion may be exercised capriciously. During the Rwandan
genocide, for example, the commander of the remaining UN forces in
Kigali was informed that the United States had learned of plans for his
assassination: "I guess I should have been grateful for the tip," Roméo
Dallaire later wrote, "but my larger reaction was that if delicate intelli-
gence like this could be gathered by surveillance, how could the United
States not be recording evidence of the genocide occurring in Rwanda?"

The question of whether and how intelligence can and should be
used in international criminal prosecution arose shortly after the estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY). South African judge Richard Goldstone, the first Chief Prosecu-
tor of the Tribunal, realized the importance of having access to
intelligence, especially from the United States. The problem was how to
reconcile necessary procedural protection of defendants' rights with the
desire of states providing intelligence to avoid compromising their
sources and methods. Rule 70(B) of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure
and Evidence addressed this issue providing as follows:

If the Prosecutor is in possession of information which has been
provided to the Prosecutor on a confidential basis and which has
been used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence,
that initial information and its origin shall not be disclosed by
the Prosecutor without the consent of the person or entity pro-
viding the initial information and shall in any event not be given
in evidence without prior disclosure to the accused.

221. Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity
in Rwanda 339 (2003). Dallaire had previously testified before the Organization of African
Unity panel that produced its own damning report on the genocide: "Really, there is a UN
Secretariat, there is a Secretary-General, and there is the Security Council, but my belief is
that there is something above all these. There is something above the Security Council. There
is a meeting of like-minded powers, who do decide before anything gets to the Security Coun-
cil. Those same countries had more intelligence information than I ever had on the ground;
and they knew exactly what was going on." Int'l Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, Rwanda: The Preventable Gas-

222. See Richard Goldstone, Remarks: Intelligence and the Use of Force in the War on
Terrorism, 98 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 147, 148 (2004). U.S. law, for example, requires the
President to certify that procedures are in place to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
sources and methods connected to any information that might be shared with the United Na-
tions. 50 U.S.C. § 404g (a)(1) (2003). This may be waived if the President certifies that it is in
the national interest to do so. 50 U.S.C. § 404g(a)(2) (2003).

223. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Rules of Procedure and Evidence rule 70
legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev37e.pdf. A frequently overlooked aspect of this provision is the
A further provision was later added to include a national security exemption from the general obligation to produce documents and information.\textsuperscript{224}

Louise Arbour, who succeeded Goldstone as Chief Prosecutor, later observed that Rule 70 had been extremely useful: "It is, frankly, and we have to live in a realistic world, the only mechanism by which we can have access to military intelligence from any source."\textsuperscript{223} That utility had been especially important in the early days of the Tribunal. As its work moved from investigations to trials, the dangers of accepting classified information became apparent, as doing so prevented the Prosecutor from using the information and could curtail the rights of the defense.\textsuperscript{226} Such candor about the use of intelligence indicates how much has changed from the days when intelligence itself was a dirty word in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{227} Indeed, the ICTY now recruits junior professional staff (P-2 and P-3) for the position of "intelligence analyst."

In the negotiations leading to the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), a number of delegations also stressed the importance of including provisions for protecting national security information.\textsuperscript{228} As in the ICTY, the Rome Statute allows the Prosecutor to conclude agreements not to disclose documents or information obtained "on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating new evidence. . . ."\textsuperscript{229} The openness with which the issue was discussed demonstrated the increasing acceptance of intelligence issues as an important part of the work of the court, reflected in open briefings on the topic\textsuperscript{230}}
and the creation of posts within the Office of the Prosecutor requiring experience in handling and analyzing military intelligence.  

The ICC also provides for a national security exception to requests by the Prosecutor or the court for information or assistance, though it takes the form of a complex mechanism, based in part on an ICTY Appeals Chamber decision in the Blaskic case, intended to encourage a state invoking the exception to disclose as much as possible. "Cooperative means" are first encouraged to reach a resolution through modifying the request or agreeing on conditions to protect the threatened interest. If such means fail and the state refuses to disclose the information or documents, the state must notify the Prosecutor or the court "of the specific reasons for its decision, unless a specific description of the reasons would itself necessarily result in such prejudice to the State's national security interests." If the court nevertheless determines that the evidence is relevant and necessary for the establishment of the guilt or innocence of an accused, it may refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, if the Security Council referred the matter to the court, to the Council. An important departure from the Blaskic formula is the apparent reversal of the presumption that states are obliged to disclose information; in the ICC Statute the emphasis is on the right of states to deny the court's request for assistance. In Blaskic this obligation was linked to the use of Chapter VII by the Security Council in establishing

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233. ICC Statute, supra note 229, art. 72.

234. Id. art. 72(5).

235. Id. art. 72(6).

236. Id. arts. 72(7)(a)(ii), 87(7). The court is also authorized to “make such inference in the trial of the accused as to the existence or non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate in the circumstances...” Id. art. 72(7)(a)(iii). In limited circumstances the court may order disclosure. Id. art. 72(7)(b)(i).

the Tribunal. As the ICC lacks such coercive powers, specific obligations to disclose information may require action by the Council on a case-by-case basis. The Blaskic case also demonstrates the importance of intelligence in providing exculpatory evidence, the release of which led on appeal to a drastically reduced sentence for the defendant and a grant of early release.

Though most attention to intelligence and international criminal prosecution tends to focus on the difficulty of obtaining evidence in a form that may be presented in court, in some circumstances the problem may be that there is too much support for using such information. This may call into question the independence of the proceedings, as was alleged in the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2004. A defense motion argued that the Prosecutor’s independence had been compromised by the close relationship between its Chief of Investigations and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In its response, the Office of the Prosecutor drew a distinction between its dual obligations to investigate and prosecute, emphasizing the important role of external assistance during investigations while distinguishing such assistance from taking instructions from any entity. Rule 39 of the court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, for example, provides that in the course of an investigation the Prosecutor may seek “the assistance of any State authority concerned, as well as of any relevant international body including the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).”


240. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Motion Seeking Disclosure of the Relationship Between the United States of America's Government and/or Administration and/or Intelligence and/or Security Services and the Investigation Department of the Office of the Prosecutor, ¶ 4 (Nov. 1, 2004). The motion asserted that the Prosecutor had "worked with and/or at the behest of and/or in conjunction with" the FBI. Id. This was said to be contrary to Article 15(1) of the Statute, which prohibits the Prosecutor from "receiving instructions from any Government or from any other source." Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 15(1) (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.

241. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Prosecution Response to Sesay’s “Motion Seeking Disclosure of the Relationship Between the United States of America’s Government and/or Administration and/or Intelligence and/or Security Services and the Investigation Department of the Office of the Prosecutor,” Section III (Nov. 16, 2004). The Prosecution relied on Rules 8 (C), (D), and (E); 39; and 40 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which make reference to assistance from other states, as well as the Blaskic decision, which noted that international tribunals “must rely upon the cooperation of States.” Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, ¶ 26.

setting what appeared to be an unusually high burden of proof, rejected the defense motion on the basis that it had not demonstrated a "master-servant" relationship between the FBI and the Office of the Prosecutor.\footnote{243}

Protecting the integrity of intelligence sources is likely to be important to the medium-term success of international tribunals generally and the International Criminal Court in particular. Soon after the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC in March 2005,\footnote{244} the Secretary-General transmitted a sealed list of fifty-one individuals named by the UN International Commission of Inquiry as suspects of grave international crimes.\footnote{245} It appears that neither the Secretary-General nor the members of the Council knew the contents of this list and transmitted it to the Prosecutor of the ICC unopened.\footnote{246} Developing procedures for maintaining confidentiality will help to build trust on the part of those who might provide intelligence to the ICC. At the same time, the independence of the ICC and its ad hoc cousins depends on more than avoiding a "master-servant" relationship with the intelligence agencies of the United States. Avoiding even the impression of inappropriate relationships will depend on diversifying the sources of intelligence and strengthening the capacity to receive and analyze them with a critical and impartial eye.

This points to two larger caveats on increasing access to intelligence, whether in an international tribunal or in the Security Council and its committees. The first is that intelligence may be overvalued. Officials with limited past access to intelligence sometimes attach disproportionate weight to information bearing the stamp "secret," or which is delivered by the intelligence service of a member state. Since any such material will normally be provided without reference to the sources and methods that produced it, credulity must be tempered by prudence. A second caveat is the corresponding danger of undervaluing unclassified or open source material. Intelligence is sometimes likened to quality journalism; a reasonable corollary is that good journalists frequently produce material that is comparable to the intelligence product of some services. The United Nations itself collects large amounts of information and analysis, though it is not organized systematically. In addition, non-governmental organizations are increasingly providing better and timelier

\footnote{243}{Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Sesay Motion Seeking Disclosure of the Relationship Between Governmental Agencies of the United States of America and the Office of the Prosecutor, ¶ 43 (May 2, 2005).}
\footnote{244}{S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).}
\footnote{245}{Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005).}
\footnote{246}{Confidential interviews at the United Nations, New York City (June 2005).}
policy analysis than the United Nations and, on occasion, its member states.\textsuperscript{247}

The use of intelligence, then, creates both opportunities and dangers. Though it is improbable that states will come to regard it as a kind of international "public good" to be provided to international organizations for collective security purposes,\textsuperscript{248} effective multilateral responses to the threats of proliferation and terrorism will depend on intelligence sharing, while international criminal prosecution will continue to rely on such support at least for the purpose of investigations. The danger is that passivity on the part of the receiving body will undermine the legitimacy of multilateral institutions and processes through either the reality or the perception of unilateral influence. This in turn may implicitly shift the question from how intelligence is used to how it was collected in the first place.

\textbf{III. Conclusion}

"The ethic of our work, as I understand it, is based on a single assumption. That is, we are never going to be aggressors... Thus we do disagreeable things, but we are \textit{defensive}. That, I think, is still fair. We do disagreeable things so that ordinary people here and elsewhere can sleep safely in their beds at night. Is that too romantic? Of course, we occasionally do very wicked things." He grinned like a schoolboy. "And in weighing up the moralities, we go in for dishonest comparisons; after all, you can’t compare the ideals of one side with the methods of the other, can you now?...

"I mean, you’ve got to compare method with method, and ideal with ideal. I would say that since the war, our methods—ours and those of the opposition—have become much the same. I


mean, you can’t be less ruthless than the opposition simply because your government’s policy is benevolent, can you now?” He laughed quietly to himself. “That would never do,” he said.249

The Spy Who Came In from the Cold, John le Carré’s novel of Cold War espionage and betrayal, paints a bleak picture of intelligence as a question of ends rather than means. Control, the head of Britain’s SIS, explains the “ethic of our work” to Alec Leamas in the course of recruiting him to protect an important East German spy. In the screen version, when Leamas realizes that he has been manipulated into condemning a good man and saving a bad one, he resigns himself to the changed moral context in more terse language: “Before, he was evil and my enemy; now, he is evil and my friend.”250 After a final double-cross, however, in which his lover is killed, Leamas turns his back on a waiting colleague and allows himself to be gunned down on the eastern side of the Berlin Wall.251

This Article began with the question of whether any defined parameters exist in international law that regulate the collection and use of secret intelligence. Given widespread state practice in the area, the question is sometimes said to be moot.

Still, it has become clear that a normative context does indeed exist within which intelligence collection takes place. That context draws on the various legal regimes that touch on aspects of intelligence work, but also on the emerging customs and practice of the intelligence community itself. This was true even during the Cold War, but in the post-Cold War era the purposes for which intelligence is used have begun to change. As the discussion of bilateral intelligence relationships showed, intelligence sometimes functions as a form of currency—a fungible item that may be exchanged for other intelligence, foreign aid, or the avoidance of penalties. The value of any currency, however, depends on its scarcity. This is especially true of intelligence, where its value may be inversely proportional to its use: knowing something secret may be more important than acting on it, if to act would reveal the fact of one’s knowledge. Since September 11, 2001, however, many states have significantly increased their intelligence exchanges with respect to counter-terrorism information in particular.

250. The Spy Who Came In from the Cold (Martin Ritt, Paramount Pictures 1965). Cf. Le Carré, supra note 249, at 246 (“‘There’s only one law in this game.... Mundt is their man; he gives them what they need.... I’d have killed Mundt if I could, I hate his guts; but not now. It so happens that they need him.’”).
251. Id. at 254–56.
It would be premature to say that a regime regulating the use of intelligence has already emerged, though its contours may be coalescing. Ironically, perhaps, legal controls on the use of intelligence in international forums become stronger as the potential consequences of using it are more limited. There is no formal check on the Security Council's authority to use force against a perceived threat to international peace and security, and the criteria for evaluating a state's claim to be acting in self-defense are ambiguous at best. In the case of targeted financial sanctions, stricter limits have been imposed on a sanctions regime that freezes the assets of a few hundred people, with elaborate humanitarian exemptions, than were applied to the comprehensive sanctions accused of killing half a million Iraqis. As for international prosecution, the single alleged war criminal receives by far the greatest protection from dubious recourse to intelligence sources.

This is not to suggest that legal accountability is the only manner in which the exercise of coercive power may be constrained. Other means include negotiation constraints, checks and balances, the threat of unilateral action, and so on, pointing to an important distinction between legal and political accountability. Legal accountability typically requires that a decisionmaker has a convincing reason for a decision or act. Political accountability, by contrast, can be entirely arbitrary. The UN Security Council was created as an archetypically political body, but as its activities have come to affect individuals, the demands for legal forms of accountability will increase.

Shortly after the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004, the Council passed a resolution condemning the attacks, which it stated were "perpetrated by the [Basque] terrorist group ETA." The resolution was adopted despite German and Russian efforts to include in the text the modifier "reportedly" to reflect uncertainty about this attribution, which appeared to be intended to bolster the Aznar government's chances in a national election to be held three days later. It was soon established

252. In an election, for example, voters are not required to have reasons for their decisions—indeed, the secrecy of the ballot implies the exact opposite. John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation 131 (Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes & Bernard Manin eds., 1999). These forms of accountability may be seen as lying on a spectrum, with other variations possible. In a legislature, for example, individual legislators may have specific reasons for voting in favor of or against a piece of legislation, sometimes demonstrated through speeches made before or after it was adopted, but if such reasons are inconsistent, it may be unclear what significance is to be attributed to them. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 15 (2005).


that the uncertainty was well-founded, though even the subsequent arrest of Islamist extremists did not prompt a correction, an apology, or even a statement from the Council.255

As the Council has begun to act in the sphere of counterterrorism and counter-proliferation, its dependence on intelligence findings has introduced slightly different legitimacy problems. There are few consequences for the Council itself when it is wrong. Entrusted to deal with "threats" to international peace and security, it cannot be expected to function as a court of law—though it is no longer tenable to pretend that it does not at least function as a kind of jury. The latter role has been expanded with the Council's move into areas where the determination of a threat to the peace is far more complex than tracking troop movements across international borders. This is only part of a larger transformation in the activities of the Council: instead of merely responding to such threats, it increasingly acts to contain or preempt them. Its expanding responsibilities have ranged from listing alleged terrorist financiers for the purposes of freezing their assets to administering territories such as Timor-Leste and Kosovo. These activities have prompted calls for greater accountability of the Council, or at least wider participation in its decision-making processes.

A useful thought experiment is to consider what would have happened if the Council had accepted Colin Powell's February 2003 presentation at face value, voting to authorize a war to rid Iraq of its concealed weapons of mass destruction. For President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, the absence of weapons was a political embarrassment that could be survived. For the Council, it would have undermined the one thing that the United Nations could bring to the issue: some small amount of legitimacy.

Intelligence today is more than a necessary evil. In the absence of any multilateral capacity to evaluate threats from and calibrate responses to the dangers of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, international organizations will be forced to rely on intelligence their member states provide.256 This reliance adds weight to the view that collection of intelligence is more than tolerated, and may actually be encouraged. The use of intelligence, however, remains inconsistent, as do the opportunities to limit the "wicked things" sometimes done in the name of benevolent policy. As practice continues and increases, so will demands

256. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino & William J. Broad, Atomic Agency Sees Possible Link of Military to Iran Nuclear Work, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1 (quoting IAEA report on Iran's alleged nuclear activities "which officials say was based at least in part on intelligence provided by the United States").
for more effective political and legal mechanisms to avoid abuse and protect valid interests. In the meantime, intelligence will continue to exist in a legal penumbra, lying at the margins of diverse legal regimes and at the edge of international legitimacy.