A Sign of "Weakness"? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325

Dianne Otto
The University of Melbourne

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl

Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl/vol13/iss1/4
A SIGN OF "WEAKNESS"?
DISRUPTING GENDER CERTAINTIES
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

'Dianne Otto*

INTRODUCTION • 114
I. THE BACKDROP OF A CENTURY OF
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM FOR PEACE • 119
II. THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN’S INCLUSION AS
EQUAL PARTICIPANTS IN CONFLICT-RELATED
DECISION-MAKING • 128
III. THE IMPACT OF RESOLUTION 1325 ON WOMEN’S
PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING IN PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS AND POST-CONFINT ACTION
RECONSTRUCTION • 139
IV. REASSESSING ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION AND
STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE WITH
RESOLUTION 1325 • 157

CONCLUSION • 173

One of the greatest challenges is harnessing the energy and
activism that many women exhibit in informal [peace build-
ing] activities and translating that into their participation
and influence in formal activities.¹

Kofi Annan (2002)
United Nations Secretary-General

[W]e [women] can best help you [men] prevent war by not
repeating your words and following your methods but by
finding new words and creating new methods. We can best

¹ The Secretary-General, Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-
E.03.IV.1 (2002) [hereinafter Secretary-General’s Study].
help you to prevent war by not joining your society [for the prevention of war] but by remaining outside your society but in co-operation with its aim.  

Virginia Woolf (1938)  
Feminist novelist and peace activist

INTRODUCTION

Women now have a long history of organizing internationally to achieve international peace and security. Women's international movements for peace have been characteristically anti-militarist and have, almost invariably, asserted a strong link between the enjoyment of gender equality and peace. A courageous and much maligned early testament to this transnational solidarity was The Hague Congress of Women, held in 1915 during World War I, which was attended by women from both sides of the conflict. The intrepid Congressional participants risked being branded as traitors by sending delegations to speak with European governments. They were hoping to bring the conflict to a quick conclusion by giving neutral governments information on what politicians were thinking in the warring countries. Their efforts failed because, as was repeatedly explained to them by government officials in the many countries they visited, making the first move towards negotiations would be seen as a sign of “weakness” on the part of the warring country and would put them at a disadvantage when it came to settling the terms of peace. The Congress also established an international

3. The International Council of Women established the International Standing Committee on Peace and International Arbitration in 1899. Its establishment was inspired by the 1899 intergovernmental conference on peace and disarmament at The Hague. Leila J. Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement 15–19 (1997). Other international women’s organizations, which formed initially to promote women’s suffrage, also took up the issue of peace. For example, the International Council of Women, established in 1888, established its first standing committee, Peace and International Arbitration, in 1899.
4. Lela B. Costin, Feminism, Pacificism, Internationalism and the 1915 International Congress of Women, 5 Women’s Studies International Forum 301, 310 (1982). A total of 1136 women attended from twelve countries, including Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Germany, Hungary, and the United States. Expressions of support came from women’s groups in a further ten countries including Argentina, South Africa and India, then a British colony.
6. Costin, supra note 4, at 313.
committee, renamed the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 1919, which has enjoyed remarkable longevity. The durability of WILPF demonstrates the continuing power of the belief that women's shared identity, as women, provides a powerful foundation for mobilization against armed conflict and in pursuit of nonviolent methods of securing the peace. Yet, there has always been disagreement among feminists about how to theorize women's solidarity in the cause of peace and about what it is that women, as women, might bring to conflict resolution processes. At the heart of these debates has been disquiet about the reliance on essentialist and imperial representations of women as pacifying and civilizing influences because these representations, ironically, bear an unsettling resemblance to the gender stereotypes that sustain militarism and women's inequality. Whether it is possible to work with the male/female dichotomy of gender in a way that takes us beyond the stereotypes is a question that lies at the heart of my discussion.

The other question that animates my discussion is reflected in United Nations (“U.N.”) Secretary-General Kofi Annan's complaint that women's efforts to promote peace have usually taken place outside formal systems of military decision-making and international dispute resolution. Whether it is possible to do otherwise, and work against militarism from within the institutions that are invested in its continuation, is the second point of contention with which I am concerned. On the one hand, the positioning of women's peace activism outside the mainstream is a measure of the dominance of “male” thinking in military institutions. From this point of view, it would seem imperative that women's peace activists find their way into the mainstream if ever the hegemony of the conventional wisdom that international security depends ultimately on military power is to be dislodged. On the other hand, a location on the outside can be viewed as a position of strength. Like Virginia Woolf, many have argued that working for peace from within the formal systems of political, economic, and military power

---

7. Rupp, supra note 3, at 28–29. The Committee was initially called the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, but was renamed the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The League's website may be viewed at the following web address: http://www.wilpf.int.ch. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, http://www.wilp.int.ch (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
8. Secretary-General's Study, supra note 1, ¶ 179.
10. Woolf, supra note 2.
results in cooption.\textsuperscript{11} Several decades after Woolf’s “letter,” situated in a very different imperial history, a similar view was famously expressed by Audre Lorde when she observed that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.”\textsuperscript{12} The strategy of separatist organization is driven by the belief that the problems of male domination and armed conflict are so interconnected and mutually reinforcing that women’s participation in mainstream institutions of war (and peace) would have the effect of authorizing, rather than destabilizing militarism.

In light of these divergent views, recent feminist efforts to engage with the U.N. Security Council, the seat of the world’s superpower(s) with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,”\textsuperscript{13} could be considered either imperative or foolhardy. However unlikely, these efforts have borne some fruit as evidenced by the statement of the Security Council President, Bangladeshi Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdury, on International Women’s Day in 2000, which linked peace “inextricably” with gender equality.\textsuperscript{14} Several months later the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (the Resolution) which called for, \textit{inter alia}, the increased participation of women in decision-making related to the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict, promising new opportunities for entry into the “master’s house.” Since its adoption, the Resolution has provided a focus for continuing engagement between the Council and women’s peace and human rights advocates. Remarkably, the Resolution has also become a grassroots tool for women’s peace advocates. Unlike any other Council resolution, it has been translated into dozens of languages and distributed as a flyer to far-flung communities in West and Central Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe, where many peace advocates have found it to be a source of

\textsuperscript{11} Rupp, \textit{supra} note 3, at 88 (“women in the international organizations tended to view their outsider status in a positive light, focusing on independence from traditional political parties as a sign of superiority.”). \textit{See also} Georgina Ashworth, \textit{The Silencing of Women}, \textit{in Human Rights in Global Politics} 259 (Tim Dunne & Nichola J. Wheeler, eds., 1999).


\textsuperscript{13} U.N. Charter art.24, para. 1.


hope. The popularization of the Resolution is due to the efforts of a coalition of NGOs, the NGO Working Group on Women, International Peace and Security, in which WILPF has taken the lead.

I want to examine whether efforts to implement the Resolution suggest new ways to address the old problems to which I have alluded: the reliance on stereotyped gender representations to rally women in the cause of peace and the vexed strategic question of how movements for transformative change might influence the mainstream institutions of international law and politics. The first concerns the way that the category of gender is deployed by women's peace activism and by international institutions as they respond to it. My question is whether it is possible to rally women to promote peace, while also challenging the gender dichotomies that underpin the notion of a distinct women's contribution to peace; whether there are "disruptive" gender identities that can form an emancipatory basis for solidarity between women and men in the cause of peace. The second problem is whether the pacifist and equality goals of women's peace movements can best be pursued from outside or within mainstream institutions, systems of location which carry their own gendered dichotomies. The long experience of women's peace activism suggests that the most that can be achieved is a position that is partially inside. Rather than treating partial entry as a failed attempt at full inclusion, my suggestion is that this position might provide a foothold for resistive activity; that it may be possible to use this "in-between" space to remain accountable to anti-militarist "outside" movements while also working from the "inside" to transform military practices and ideologies. This suggestion has important implications for the ongoing struggles for a non-militarized peace and women's equality, and for future feminist efforts to influence and shape international institutions and their practices in law and politics.

I begin, in Part I, by outlining the broader context of the aspirations of feminist peace activists, supplemented by a review of more recent work of feminist academics, in international relations and international law, who have sought to critically inform and complement this activism by

16. Five organizations were initially involved in the NGO Working Group on Women, International Peace and Security: the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF); International Alert; Amnesty International; Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and The Hague Appeal for Peace. They have since been joined by six others. See http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/wg.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).

17. It is interesting to note that the membership of WILPF was divided on the issue of support for the League of Nations. Yet, this organization never managed to resolve the question. Rupp, supra note 3, at 213.
building its theoretical groundings. In Part II, I examine the representations of gender that have been used over the last century to urge the greater participation of women in decision-making processes related to international peace and security and their effects. What emerges is a complete disconnect between the numerous formal pledges by states to increase women’s participation and their translation into practice. In Part III, I explore whether efforts to promote women’s increased participation in formal conflict-related decision-making through urging the implementation of Resolution 1325 have enjoyed more success. Using the examples of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, I find slow and unstable progress towards women's inclusion in formal decision-making processes, which stands in striking contrast to the flourishing of women’s “outside” peace activism.

Finally, in Part IV, I return to my questions of representation and strategy. While some hopeful signs of disruptive gender representations have emerged from efforts to implement the Resolution, I conclude that the difference that women's participation is allowed to make remains limited by stereotypical understandings of gender and is directed towards improving the effectiveness of the United Nation’s existing peace-building processes rather than “finding new words and creating new methods” to prevent war. For this trend to change, I argue that gender needs to be employed as an “analytic” category to destabilize the reliance of military discourse on hierarchical ways of gendered thinking, and that peace movements need to be organized around “multi-gendered” identities. With respect to strategy, I conclude that while the Resolution has enhanced women’s “outside” activism, problems attending the institutionalization of feminist ideas have emerged, which demand careful attention to understanding the dangers as well as the possibilities of the “in-between” space gained by way of the Resolution. My discussion is haunted by a conundrum, which is the theoretical and strategic challenge at its heart: that women mobilize, as women, to demand their inclusion in peacemaking processes on the basis of their present gendered experience, as mothers, as victims, and, more broadly, as individuals marginalized from elite power structures, yet the feminist agenda for peace requires disrupting those same gender identities because they have served to legitimate militarism and women’s exclusion from military decision-making. Until feminists understand how this conundrum can be addressed, the “master’s house” will remain heavily defended against gender disruptions.

18. Woolf, supra note 2, at 143.
I. THE BACKDROP OF A CENTURY OF WOMEN’S
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM FOR PEACE

Calling for women’s increased participation in conflict resolution and peace negotiations is only one component of more comprehensive feminist visions for attaining and maintaining international peace and security. While women’s political participation was of central importance to the women who met in The Hague in 1915 because of their involvement in women’s suffrage movements, the twenty resolutions they adopted outlined a wide-ranging program for bringing the “the madness and horror of war” to an end and building a “permanent peace.”

Without wanting to deny the many different and often conflicting feminist approaches to questions of international peace and security, there is little doubt that the plan developed by the Congress of Women has been very influential. Two of the goals identified in the 1915 resolutions will be my starting point for an overview of the issues that have drawn women together internationally in the cause of peace for nearly a century and for outlining more recent developments in feminist theory that have highlighted the critical role played by gender discourse in sustaining structural inequalities and militarism. The goals are, first, to address the global patterns of inequality and injustice that create the insecurities that lead to armed conflict and, second, to bring the interlinked projects of militarism and women’s inequality to an end. This overview provides a context for my discussion, in Part II, of a third enduring goal of The Hague Congress, which was to achieve the participation of women in formal conflict resolution and peacemaking processes. It explains to what ends women have sought such participation.

In identifying the cause of war in global patterns of inequality, The Hague Congress resolutions clearly rejected the Hobbesian view of war’s inevitability. They agreed that war was not usually brought about by


the wishes of the majority of the population but by "groups representing particular interests."22 In this vein, Jane Addams, the Chair of the Congress,23 identified the nation-state as one source of insecurity and called for a "new internationalism" that would replace the nationalism that leads to so much human suffering and destruction.24 The permanent peace envisaged by the Congress included the control of foreign policy by democratic systems that ensured the equal representation of women and men25 and the establishment of a permanent International Conference, guided by the "principles of justice, equity and good will" whereby the interests of "subject communities," as well as the interests of states, could be recognized and attended to without resort to military force.26 Their goals were deeply democratic, and they firmly believed that women's participation in formal decision-making processes would result in fundamentally different decisions being made. Some of their proposals were reflected in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's proposals, presented at the Versailles Peace Conference, for a new international organization.27

Neither the idea that a sustainable peace depends on changing the national and imperial systems that perpetuate political, economic, and social inequalities,28 nor skepticism about notions of security that are framed exclusively in terms of the security of states, are unique to feminism.29 But unlike other accounts, feminist critiques introduce gender as

23. WILTSHER, supra note 5, at 87. Jane Addams was also the first international president of WILPF and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931, which she shared with Nicholas Murray Butler, who promoted the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See Harriet Hyman Alonso, Nobel Peace Laureates, Jane Addams and Emily Greene Balch: Two Women of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 7 J. WOMEN'S HIST. 6, 11-16 (1995).
26. Id. at Res. 11(b).
29. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COMMON SECURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL (1982); Lloyd Axworthy, HUMAN SECURITY: SAFETY FOR PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD, SUMMIT AM. INFO NETWORK, Apr.
a category of analysis, which enables a deeper understanding of the persistence of inequality. Gender can be utilized as an explanatory tool in a number of ways. Historically, its usage has been as a biological category, whereby gender "differences" and inequalities are explained and justified as a product of nature, as innate and unchangeable. In the early years of the international women's peace movement, gender was often deployed as a biological category, such as when women's pacifism was explained as inherent in their capacity for motherhood. Over the centuries, feminists have challenged the immutability of biological explanations by reconstituting gender as a social category, treating gender differences as socially produced and therefore fluid and contestable. As a social category, gender is not synonymous with embodied men and women, but a dynamic construct that is socially and culturally contested. In calling for women's political participation, The Hague Congress participants also used gender in its social sense, by refusing to accept the conventional wisdom that women are, by nature, unsuited to participating in the public realm of political and legal affairs. By the mid-1990s, the official definition of "gender" in the U.N. system had become a version of gender as a social category, although the biological version was retained in the term "sex."
Gender also operates as an analytic category, as a discursive system whereby meanings and values are attributed to matters that are completely detached from gendered bodies. For example, when the World War I European leaders explained that seeking a mediated resolution of their dispute would be a sign of "weakness," they were relying on a gendered dichotomy that associates weakness with femininity to legitimize their rejection of mediation in favor of the use of force, which is associated with masculinity. Dichotomized ideas that are associated with gender, like strength and weakness, are also organized hierarchically so that the masculine option is valued more highly than the feminine. Associating a course of action with weakness immediately gives the alternative course the connotation of strength. Thus gendered dichotomies provide a powerful means of shaping what appear to be "common sense" choices. Joan Scott describes gender in its analytic sense as "a persistent and recurrent way of enabling the signification of power in the West, in the Judeo-Christian as well as the Islamic tradition." Gendered significations are commonly utilized to promote war and silence its critics. Cynthia Cohn has used the example of calculations by U.S. military analysts in a training exercise, who rely on significations associated with gender and sexuality to valorize military resolve as a measure of masculine virility and to dismiss humanitarian concerns about the destruction of civilian food and power systems as "wimpish." Thus, gender works to signify power often in close relationship with other analytic categories like sexuality, empire, nation, race, and class.

Employing gender as an analytic category helps to deepen The Hague Congress participants' analysis of the causes of war and the problems that attend security when it is framed exclusively in terms of the security of states. This deployment of gender can be seen in Spike Peterson's urging that security be radically rethought in the knowledge that gendered identities and ideologies play a role in (re)producing and disguising structural insecurities. Her genealogy of the modern nation-

34. Scott, supra note 30, at 44.
35. Cohn, supra note 9, at 237.
37. See Tickner, supra note 24, at 128 ("[G]enuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations . . . . " ); see also V. Spike Peterson & Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues 115–16 (2d ed. 1999); Jan Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics 105–06 (1996).
state shows that it is not only socially gendered in terms of which sexed bodies hold positions of power, but also analytically gendered in the way it "institutionalizes and reproduces (through sanctions, cultural forms, education, policy, regulation, law) the legitimization of social hierarchy." She argues that other forms of identity need to be conceived as political in order to make a radical reframing of security possible. The "new internationalism" proposed by The Hague Congress participants suggests one such alternative identity. My interest here is in exploring new gender identities that would contribute to this project.

The insights of feminist theory make it clear that structural hierarchies of power are not only enforced by the violence of militarism, but perpetuated discursively by gendered ideologies, practices, and traditions. The operation of gender, in conjunction with other analytic categories, helps to naturalize global patterns of inequality and justify security as the maintenance of this order by military means. It follows that working toward a non-militarized form of international peace and security depends not only on addressing unjust social relations in a material sense, but also on contesting the narratives and practices that have sustained them. As Michel Foucault, the author of ideas that have both enriched and challenged feminist thinking, once observed, while certain ways of thinking can have hegemonic effects, they also have within them the possibilities of resistance and transformation. An equitable, and therefore peaceful, international order relies on engaging with these possibilities and contesting the discursive support that hierarchies of gender lend to military solutions.

A second feature of the agenda for change adopted by the women at The Hague was the belief that militarism—the belief system that supports and legitimates the organized military control that states exercise, individually and in alliances, in the name of order and security—not only props up the inequitable order globally, but is central to perpetuating women's inequality. Therefore, their goals were implacably anti-militarist. They rejected any suggestion that security could be achieved by military means, dismissing the possibility that war could be "humanized" through

39. Id. at 39 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 32.
the further development of legal and customary conventions, a view that has since been born out amply. Instead they advocated universal disarmament, proposing as a first step that governments assume control of the arms industry so as to eliminate private profit from the production of armaments and suggesting that any resort to arms be countered by "social, moral, and economic pressure." To this end, they proposed the establishment of a number of other international institutions, including a permanent Court of International Justice to resolve legal disputes and a permanent Council of Arbitration and Investigation to settle economic disagreements.

The anti-militarism of the early decades of the international women's peace movement was sorely tested as fascism threatened to engulf Europe in the 1930s, although many, like Woolf, remained steadfastly opposed to war and WILPF continued to pursue its pacifist goals. Eventually, it was opposition to the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and the intensifying nuclear arms race that revived the women's peace movement internationally. At the same time, a much expanded U.N. membership was reflected in a more diverse women's international community, assisted by the world conferences held during U.N. Decade for Women (1975–1985). The official reports of two of these conferences specifically noted women's support for disarmament. The 1980 Copenhagen Conference recognized the "active struggles" of "women all

44. Hague Resolutions, supra note 19, at Res. 12.
45. Id. at Res. 7.
46. Id. at Res. 11.
47. Id.
49. Id. at 215.
over the world” for peace and disarmament, and the 1985 Nairobi Conference acknowledged “the growing opposition of women to the danger of war, especially a nuclear war” and urged that “their support for disarmament must be respected.” While it was an achievement to have any matters concerning international peace and security discussed at a “women’s” conference, the assumption that all women support disarmament employs gender as a biological category, relying on the well-worn stereotype of women as naturally non-combative. Identifying disarmament as a “women’s” issue works in an analytic sense to devalue disarmament as a goal and, as a corollary, provides discursive support for militarism. This problem illustrates how difficult it is to avoid repeating the gendered signification of existing relations of power, even when setting out to challenge them.

More recent feminist analyses of militarism have confirmed how integral gender inequality is to the perpetuation of militarism and have highlighted the inter-dependence or “relational” quality of gender dualities. The gender identities privileged by militarism are not only valued for their “masculine” attributes, but also rely on a contrast with less valued “feminine” figures who lack military acumen because of their predisposition to peacemaking and conciliation, and their vulnerability and need for protection. In fact, the popular palatability of military discourse relies on strongly contrasting images of masculinity and femininity, which serves to marginalize pacifism because it is associated with

54. Cynthia H. Enloe, Feminists Thinking About War, Militarism, and Peace, in ANALYZING GENDER: A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 526, 537 (Beth B. Hess & Myra Marx Ferree eds., 1987) (“What is distinctive about feminist theorizing on militarization is that it posits gender—that is, social constructions of masculinity and femininity—as a critical factor in the construction and perpetuation, and therefore the possible reversal, of that process.”); See also Tickner, supra note 24, at 38–40.
55. Scott, supra note 30, at 29.
56. See Peterson, supra note 38, at 49–56, for an extended discussion of the operation of the gendered protected-protector hierarchy in which gendered states are described as “protection rackets.”
the feminine.\textsuperscript{57} Although increasing numbers of embodied women are assuming military roles, the potentially disruptive effects of these gender transgressions are managed discursively by more nuanced distinctions, such as not allowing women soldiers to be officially deployed on the “front line.”\textsuperscript{58} The gendered moorings that have always given militarism a sense of coherence and inevitability become unstuck, however, if gender is understood as a social category, as fluid, contestable, and not predictably hierarchical. The power of gender as a social category was implicitly acknowledged in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action when it recognized that “[p]eace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men,”\textsuperscript{59} words that were later repeated by the President of the Security Council on International Women’s Day in 2000.\textsuperscript{60} Understanding militarism as a process through which militarized forms of masculinity and femininity are socially produced provides the hope that conditions can be created under which gender identities might be “nonmilitarized,”\textsuperscript{61} thereby removing some of the discursive tools that make armed conflict possible. Understanding gender as a social category makes it possible to see that achieving women’s equality will contribute to militarism’s demise; appreciating gender’s power as an analytic category makes it clear that gender equality is indeed “inextricably linked” to the achievement of a non-militarized peace.

The relational quality of gender dualities—that notions of masculinity and femininity are interdependent and mutually reinforcing—is an important insight because it means that ideas about women, as well as ideas about men, are implicated in sustaining the hegemony of military ways of thinking.\textsuperscript{62} This insight explains why women’s peace movements can be embraced by military institutions and militarized societies. So long as their aspirations and activities remain within the bounds of what is considered “womanly,” the dualisms of gender that support military ways of thinking are reinforced by such movements rather than contested. Kept within “feminine” limits, advocacy for peace

\textsuperscript{57} Lynda E. Boose, \textit{Techno-Muscularity and the “Boy Eternal”: From the Quagmire to the Gulf}, in \textit{Gendering War Talk} 67, 69–70 (Miriam Cooke & Angela Woollacott eds., 1993).


\textsuperscript{60} U.N. Press Release, \textit{supra} note 14.

\textsuperscript{61} Enloe, \textit{supra} note 54, at 531.

\textsuperscript{62} See Cynthia Enloe, \textit{The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War} 15 (1993) (emphasizing the part that women play in maintaining these dichotomies by looking to men for protection).
may be entirely consistent with a discourse that gives rise to the need for
peace activism in the first place. It follows that unless women’s peace
advocacy disrupts the gendered anchorages of militarism, it runs the risk
of authorizing the same systems of militarism and inequality that it seeks
to oppose. As Cynthia Enloe has said, challenging militarism means go-
ing “against the grain” of prevailing gender conventions.63

A final word needs to be said about the women who gathered to-
gether in The Hague in 1915 and their vision. The early international
women’s organizations grew out of Europe and North America and the
vast majority of the active participants were elite women who could af-
ford the time and expense of international travel.64 Their perspectives
were all too often skewed by assumptions about European and Christian
superiority.65 Many of the participants carried with them a history of
engagement in the project of European imperialism66 and understood
themselves as “offering a hand to their more oppressed sisters.”67 While
women of color from the West and women from colonized territories
challenged this orientation on many occasions,68 it was slow to change.
It remains important that women’s peace advocates are aware of how the
“postcolonial” present continues to be informed by the discursive heri-
tage and heterogeneous practices of colonialism as they pursue feminist
agendas from outside and within international legal and political institu-
tions.69 Anne Orford suggests that feminist contributions to
international law have been welcomed for only two purposes, both of
which facilitate the continuing project of imperialism: for “giving voice”
to the victimized women of the Third World and for “design[ing] rules
that contribute to the protecting or saving of other women.”70 I would
add a third contribution to her list of what feminists have been allowed,
which is to promote “peace,” a purpose which, as I will argue, has also
been narrowly conceived as a womanly concern so as to avoid challenging

63.  Id. at 259.
64.  Rupp, supra note 3, at 52–60.
65.  Id. at 55–60.
66.  Clare Midgley, British Women, Women’s Rights and Empire, 1790–1850, in Women’s
Rights and Human Rights: International Historical Perspectives 3, 15
(Patricia Grimshaw et al. eds., 2001).
67.  Rupp, supra note 3, at 75.
68.  Id. at 79. For example, women from India and Turkey took a stand against the prac-
tice of European-origin “settler” women representing them.
4, 14–19 (2005) (examining the imperial assumptions of liberal feminist internationalism).
70.  Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the
the foundations of militarism. Without thorough attention to the imperial heritage of feminism in the West and the continuing effects of this heritage, feminist peace movements can come to operate as servants of the regimes of power that they set out to oppose.

For nearly a century, international women's peace movements have pursued the two goals of addressing the structural causes of armed conflict and challenging the interdependent projects of militarism and women's inequality. Yet the reality of militarism and its adverse consequences for women and other marginalized groups remain. Since the end of the Cold War, the situation may even have worsened as opportunities for spreading militarized gender ideologies have multiplied with increased resort to collective military action, greater acceptance of the legitimacy of humanitarian (military) intervention, the formation of new militaries in Africa and Eastern Europe, and the increased number of peacekeeping missions that bring together militaries from around the world and involve them in a broad range of “peace-building” activities.  

How is this failure to be understood? Can it be explained by the reliance on stereotyped representations of women as natural peacemakers? Is it attributable to the fact that women's peace advocacy has taken place largely “outside” institutions of military and legal power? I now turn to these questions by outlining the historical struggle for women's inclusion in formal conflict-related decision-making and its institutional impact. This discussion provides a backdrop for my examination, in Part III, of efforts to implement Resolution 1325 and how the quandaries of women's continuing inequality and militarism's persistent hold on the deployment of gender in the cause of international peace and security are being tackled.

II. THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN'S INCLUSION AS EQUAL PARTICIPANTS IN CONFLICT-RELATED DECISION-MAKING

One of the strategies adopted by women's peace advocates, in pursuit of their vision of a permanent peace based on social justice, disarmament, and women's equality, has been to urge the inclusion of women in conflict-related decision-making, despite disagreement about how much can be achieved from “within.” I will trace the history of women's efforts to be included in international decision-making processes before Resolution 1325 was adopted in 2000 in order to examine

A SIGN OF "WEAKNESS"?

the way that ideas about gender, particularly about women's special contributions to peace, have been used to make the case for their formal inclusion. I trace the effects of women's peace activism in the official documents of the League of Nations and its successor, the U.N. I find that although the idea of increasing women's participation in conflict-related decision-making has received considerable formal endorsement, there is no evidence that this endorsement has led to any change in the practice of their exclusion. I suggest that the biologically-based "maternal" gender representations relied on by women's peace advocates may, unwittingly, authorize women's continuing exclusion because they do not disrupt the gendered ideologies and practices that maintain it. The alternative, of arguing for women's participation as a matter of equality, which deploys gender as a social category, raises another set of dilemmas for peace advocates.

My starting point is, again, the women who met at The Hague in 1915. Many of those attending the Congress believed the war would not have been declared if women had enjoyed the right to vote, and the resolutions they adopted sought to integrate women into decision-making processes around the world. The Congress called for representatives of "the people," including women, to be involved in the peace settlement at the end of the war,\textsuperscript{72} for women's enfranchisement to be required by the peace settlement,\textsuperscript{73} for women to be included in the deliberations of the new international institutions they were proposing,\textsuperscript{74} and, as I have already mentioned, for women to play an equal role with men in the democratic determination of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{75} They were convinced that "the combined influence of the women of all countries is one of the strongest forces for the prevention of war."\textsuperscript{76}

The idea that women's political empowerment would make such a significant difference to conflict-related decision-making comes from the understanding that women are different from men. The Hague Congress participants were influenced by "maternalist" accounts of this difference, whereby women believe themselves to be innately nurturing and pacifistic because of their capacity for motherhood. Jane Addams, an avid proponent of maternalism, argued that, as sustainers of life, women have a distinctive talent for "rationality," which they should use, as active citizens, to promote the evolution of methods of governance

\textsuperscript{72} Hague Resolutions, supra note 19, at Res. 18.
\textsuperscript{73} Id. at Res. 17.
\textsuperscript{74} Id. at Res. 11.b, 14.b.
\textsuperscript{75} Id. at Res. 14.
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at Res. 9.
that rely on the rule of law rather than force. The belief that women have a natural affinity for peace has a long tradition in European thought, and it continues to be very influential in contemporary women's peace movements. Maternal ideologies inspired the antimilitarism of the Madres and Abuelas of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the protests by Russian mothers against the war in Chechnya, and many of the women who participated in the Anglo-American antinuclear peace camps of the 1970s, like the one at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom.

The argument for women's participation on the understanding that gender differences are biologically determined sits uneasily with the feminist understanding of gender as a social category. The authors of an early WILPF pamphlet expressed this discomfort as a concern about the "sentimentalism" of appealing to women as "mothers and nurses of the race, as the natural guardians of life." In the 1930s, several articles in Jus Suffragii questioned the orthodoxy that women's "differently organized" nature accounted for sex-specific psychology. Several decades later, participants in the anti-nuclear peace camps also questioned this strategy when they found themselves standing shoulder-to-shoulder with women whose political analysis did not extend beyond the threat of nuclear war to their own, already privileged, children's lives. The problem is that the same biological representations of women, embracing their maternal roles in patriarchal family structures while men take care of public affairs and fight wars to protect them, underpin military discourse. Thus, maternalist ideologies have also proved to be at least as effective in rallying women as "patriotic mothers" to sponsor and sup-

78. See, e.g., Aristophanes, Lysistrata (Charles Theophiluss Murphy trans.), in Greek Literature in Translation 387 (Whitney Jennings Oates & Charles Theophiluss Murphy, eds., 1944).
80. The Argentinian example is often used in feminist international relations literature. See, e.g., Pettman, supra note 37, at 123–24; Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace 225–32 (1989).
81. Pettman, supra note 37, at 124, refers to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in Russia, which first formed in response to the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and was later reactivated because of the Russian assault on Chechnya.
83. RuPp, supra note 3, at 90.
84. Id. at 89.
85. Strange, supra note 48, at 216–17.
port war efforts and encourage their sons to fight as they have in mobi-
licizing mothers as "pacifists." 86

One redemptive feminist response to maternalism's biological de-
terminism has been to suggest that women's antipathy to militarism can be explained by their social experiences of mothering, which involve nonviolent social practices. 87 This deployment of gender as a social cate-
gory does the important work of disassociating "motherly" values from sexed bodies, which suggests that men who "mother" could also be peacemakers. 88 However, this idea sits uncomfortably with the claim that it is "women's" participation that will make a difference. Reconstituting maternalism as a social construction also does not explain those women who have been active in women's peace movements despite not being mothers. Ultimately, the continued attribution of a gender dichotomy to opposing values reinvigorates essentialist ideas about women and men, and "social values" easily slip into being understood as "women's values."

Another, more persuasive, explanation for women's widespread anti-militarism is that it is women's experiences in a broader sense which provide the basis for expecting that their participation will challenge the dominance of military thinking about security. Along these lines, Anne Tickner suggests that because women are typically positioned outside or on the peripheries of traditional power structures, they will prioritize the achievement of "justice" over the maintenance of "order." 89 She argues that women, drawing from their everyday social experiences of inequality, will prefer values of connectedness and interdependence over the notion that security depends on military readiness. 90 Her approach not only relies on social rather than biological explanations to account for the values that many women hold, but also invigorates multiple and fluid female identities that vary depending on locality and socio-political context. Even so, Tickner's reliance on gender identities that have been

87. Ruddick, supra note 80, at 221. For a development of similar ideas, see Carol Gil-
89. Tickner, supra note 24, at 134–35.
90. Id. at 128.
produced by relations of gender inequality legitimates dominant representations of gender hierarchy in arguing for women's inclusion instead of challenging them. This paradox highlights a conundrum, which lies at the heart of my discussion. On the one hand, women mobilize to demand their inclusion in peacemaking processes on the basis of perceived gender commonalities which arise from their present, gendered experience as mothers or, more broadly, as individuals marginalized from elite power structures. On the other hand, the feminist agenda for peace requires disrupting those same gender identities because they discursively legitimate militarism and women's inequality.

Despite the problems that I have outlined, biological explanations for women's peace advocacy have continued to be very influential in rallying women, as women, in the name of peace. Given this fact, and the centrality of maternal representations in the gender tropes that support militarism, it should come as no surprise that the idea that women have a special contribution to make to peace has frequently received formal support in "soft law" instruments. The "Spanish Resolution" adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1931, which called for increased cooperation with women's organizations in the "peace work" of the League, was based on the assumption that women had a natural affinity for this area of the League's activities. Pinpointing this assumption as a problem, Edith Rodgers, a member of Equal Rights International, responded to the Resolution by arguing that women "wanted 'more women in the delegations and as members of all the commissions,' not just ones the men deemed naturally 'feminine.'" The limited scope of the "Spanish Resolution" did not, however, improve its chances of implementation. The League steadily maintained its "dismal record on the inclusion of women," notwithstanding the Resolution and despite its founding covenant proclaiming that all positions in the League would be open to women.

91. The "Spanish Resolution," so-called because it was introduced by the Spanish delegation, was adopted by the 12th Assembly of the League of Nations on September 24, 1931. The Resolution was communicated to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armament in a Note by the Secretary-General, Conf. D. 75, Feb. 12, 1932. It read, "The Assembly, convinced of the great value of the contribution of women to the work of peace and the good understanding between the nations, which is the principle aim of the League of Nations, requests the Council to examine the possibility of women cooperating more fully in the work of the League." Id.
93. Id. at 217 (quoting Letter from Edith Rodgers to Helen Archdale (Oct. 7, 1931)).
94. Id. at 212.
95. League of Nations Covenant art. 7.
Following a similar trajectory, the U.N. General Assembly has also recognized on many occasions the importance of women's special contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. When it proclaimed 1975 as International Women's Year, the Assembly added the recognition of "women's increasing contribution to the strengthening of world peace" to the two themes of equality and development proposed by the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). Towards the end of 1975, the Assembly adopted two further resolutions which reaffirmed the importance of women's peace efforts. The first called "particularly [on] women's organizations and women's groups... to intensify their efforts to strengthen peace" and the second asked states to "vigorously' promote women's wider participation in strengthening peace." It should be noted, however, that none of these resolutions, including the earlier "Spanish Resolution," made any commitment to including women in formal peacemaking processes. Instead, they imply that women's contributions to peace are welcomed and valued provided they remain "outside" the mainstream decision-making processes of national and international political institutions. These resolutions all embrace the idea that women's difference from men makes them natural peacemakers.

With the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) by the General Assembly in 1979, an alternative basis on which to urge women's participation was given its imprimatur: that of women's equality with men. Equality was the driving rationale for the 1982 Declaration on the Participation of Women in Promoting International Peace and Cooperation, which urged the equal right of women to participate in all

97. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Introduction to The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945–1995 33 (vol. VI, 1995). The addition was proposed by the Greek and Guatemalan delegations who argued that women should be included in the two most urgent issues of the time—the search for peace and disarmament.
98. G.A. Res. 3519 (XXX), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. (Dec. 15, 1975) (calling on "women's participation in the strengthening of international peace and security and in the struggle against colonialism, racism, racial discrimination, foreign aggression and occupation and all forms of foreign domination.").
99. G.A. Res. 3521 (XXX), U.N. Doc. (Dec. 15, 1975) "Calling upon all States... to ratify international conventions and other instruments concerning the protection of women's rights... Request[ing] the Commission on the Status of Women to complete... the draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.").
100. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. (Dec. 18, 1979) (recognizing that the cause of peace requires "the full participation of both men and women in society").
aspects of society contributing to international peace and security and called for practical measures to achieve this goal. \(^{101}\) Promoting women's participation as a matter of equality is based on an understanding of gender as a social category and emphasizes women's common humanity (sameness) with men instead of their difference. An equality approach enables biological accounts of gender differences to be challenged and opens the possibility that gender hierarchies, like those that sustain militarism, can be questioned. However, the idea that women and men are "the same" sits uncomfortably with the proposition that women's participation will make a particular, anti-militarist contribution to conflict-related decision-making. Indeed, the 1982 Declaration made no claims about what difference women's increased representation in intergovernmental organizations might be expected to make. \(^{102}\) Following Tickner, \(^{103}\) it can be argued that women's experiences of gender inequality make it more likely that they will introduce counter-military perspectives into decision-making processes. However, this account does not fully grasp the fluidity of social constructions of gender or the diversity of women's social experiences, which intersect with many other markers of power. Therefore, an equality framework does not, by itself, capture what women's peace movements want to achieve through women's political participation.

The official reports from the U.N.'s World Conferences on Women draw on both rationales to call for the increased participation of women in conflict resolution processes, linking equality arguments with the idea that women have a different contribution to make. Significantly, they also endorse the need for women's participation in formal decision-making processes. For instance, the 1975 Mexico City Conference agreed that women play "a vital role" in the promotion of peace "in the family, the community, the nation and the world." \(^{104}\) It also called for women's equal opportunity to formally participate in strengthening international peace and security, notably making specific reference to women representing their countries in Security Council meetings. \(^{105}\) The

---

102. G.A. Res. 37/63, supra note 101, at arts. 11–12.
103. Tickner, supra note 24, at 134–35.
Nairobi Conference attendees agreed that it was “evident that women all over the world have manifested their love for peace and their wish to play a greater role in international co-operation, amity and peace among different states.”106 The conference report reiterates the earlier calls for increasing women’s participation in peace efforts107 and again makes reference to women’s “equal opportunity” to represent their countries in international forums like the Security Council.108 The Beijing Platform for Action (PFA) of the Fourth World Conference on Women devotes a chapter to the theme of women and armed conflict, noting that women are “still underrepresented” in efforts at conflict resolution and related decision-making,109 calling for their “equal” participation.110 The conference also promoted a new policy of “gender mainstreaming” across the work of the U.N., including in addressing armed conflict, which aims to ensure that all U.N. decisions, policies, and programs are informed by an analysis of their effects on both women and men.111

The reasons behind women’s admission to formal decision-making processes matter—whether it is because of a belief in their natural proclivity for peace or on the basis of their equality with men—because it affects the scope of the political agency that they will be “allowed.” If women are admitted on the understanding that their special contribution arises from their womanly instincts, it follows that their political agency will be limited to what is made possible by that representation and restricted to “feminized” tasks like picking up the pieces of community and family life in order to repopulate the nation112 and reintegrating overmilitarized sons, husbands, and lovers into the post-conflict society.113 In some contexts, the politically active figure of the anti-militarist mother may present an initially disruptive challenge to gender stereotypes, but unless this figure manages to destabilize the presumed certainties of gender in a more sustained manner, the performance of a maternal gender identity will remain trapped in the dichotomy upon which it relies. Alternatively, if women are admitted on the basis of equality with men, their political agency will not be so limited because the reason for their admission is not predicated on the belief that they will adopt any particular position. Yet, if the argument for women’s participation is reduced to a
formal question of numbers, the women's peace movement loses its rationale for promoting women's participation. It could be argued that the world conference documents promote a framework of substantive gender equality, which could foster many non-stereotyped possibilities for women, but I am not convinced. My concern is that the persistent biological foundationalism, evident in feminist thinking that posits a relationship between female embodiment and what will be contributed to decision-making, is a serious problem. It is a problem not only because it is inconsistent with understanding gender as a social category, but also because it continues to paint gender in "sharply dualistic confrontational categories" which undermines feminist efforts to recognize more plural gender identities.114

An alternative, disruptive response would frame arguments for women's inclusion in a way that challenges rather than reflects the status quo of gender dichotomies by deploying gender as an analytic category. Cynthia Cohn moves in this direction when she observes that "it is not simply the presence of women that would make a difference. Instead, it is the commitment and ability to develop, explore, rethink, and revalue those ['feminine'] ways of thinking that get silenced and devalued that would make a difference."115

Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin take a similar approach when they argue that the problem lies not just in the absence of women, but in the gendered nature of the discourse through which threats to international peace and security are named, assessed, and countered.116 The problem, as they describe it, is that thinking in dichotomous gendered terms "makes some [labeled feminine] courses of action impossible to contemplate."117 Engaging gender as an analytical category opens the possibility of refusing the significations that make war "men's business" and dismiss non-militaristic alternatives as indicative of weakness. The engagement of gender requires rejecting biological explanations for gender differences and situating women's movements for peace in the specificities of women's social experiences of gender, while also building on their histories of resistance to gendered and other forms of oppression and exploitation. Further, an analytic gender perspective recognizes that men as well as women can, and indeed must, be

115. Cohn, supra note 9, at 239.
117. Id. at 605.
engaged if the gendered ways of thinking that presently dominate security discourse are to be disrupted.

Since the Beijing Conference, the issue of women's participation in formal conflict resolution and peace negotiation processes has remained firmly on the U.N. agenda, as a result of the work of the CSW and women's NGOs in following up the commitments made in Beijing and the system-wide adoption of the policy of gender mainstreaming, yet change has remained elusive. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations ("DPKO") seminar on "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations," held in Windhoek, Namibia in May 2000, agreed that, despite the many formal commitments to the contrary, women had not been given a full role in peacekeeping operations and called for the principle of gender equality to "permeate the entire [peacekeeping] mission." Confirming this conclusion, the General Assembly's five-year review of progress towards implementing the commitments made in Beijing, held in June 2000, found "[t]he underrepresentation [sic] at all levels, of women in decision-making positions . . . in peacekeeping, peace-building, post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction" to be an obstacle. Soon after, on August 21, 2000, the Brahimi Report on U.N. peace and security operations was also released, which mandated a comprehensive review of U.N. peacekeeping operations, but made only two minor references to issues of gender. For many women's peace advocates, the Brahimi Report strengthened their conviction that the Security Council itself needed to be engaged in their struggle for inclusion.

In sum, despite repeated formal acknowledgments of the importance of women's participation in strengthening international peace and

---


security, this rhetoric has never translated into women's inclusion in formal decision-making processes. Yet at the same time, the work of women in informal peacemaking and peace-building has continued to flourish, pressing hard from the outside to influence the inside policies and practices of international institutions.

What prevents the translation of women's outside activism into participation and influence in formal activities? I have suggested that one barrier lies in the biological representations of gender upon which women's peace movements have relied, which are consistent with military ideologies and inconsistent with women's full and equal participation. I have also argued that equality arguments risk stripping the struggle for women's participation of its association with pacifist politics. These dilemmas return me to the question of whether alternative gender identities might help to promote a radical reframing of security. Is it possible to work with the dichotomy of gender in a way that will rally women in the cause of peace, and provide a rationale for their entry into formal decision-making processes, and enable challenges to militarism and women's inequality from the inside? Alternatively, does the idea that women have special contributions to make to peace need to be given up and replaced by a multi-gendered approach that engages men as well as women in the project of disrupting the gender hierarchies that sustain militarism? Indeed, if masculinity could be disconnected from armed conflict, and its converse in femininity disassociated from peace, a primary source of militarism's legitimacy would be removed. As Peterson has said: "[a]s long as we remain locked in dichotomies, we cannot accurately understand and are less likely to transform social relations: not only do oppositional constructions distort the contextual complexity of social reality, they set limits on the questions we ask and the alternatives we consider."

In Part III, I examine the experience of seeking women's increased participation through the implementation of Resolution 1325. I focus on its impact in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, which lays the groundwork for returning to these questions of multi-gendered representations and anti-militarist strategy in Part IV.

122. Peterson, supra note 38, at 54.
III. The Impact of Resolution 1325 on Women’s Participation in Decision-Making in Peace Negotiations and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Despite the urging of women’s participation in the Security Council at the Mexico City and Nairobi women’s conferences, the Council did not officially recognize that women had any role to play in conflict resolution, formally or informally, until the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000. The Resolution opened a new space for the pursuit of women’s participation in conflict-related decision-making and, through this space, for the promotion of feminist goals aimed at achieving permanent peace. I begin this section by outlining the content of the Resolution that relates to women’s participation and the high levels of activity it has generated within the U.N. system and outside it. Using the examples of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, I examine the impact of this activity on women’s inclusion in formal decision-making processes, finding that progress has been slow and the gains made precarious. I argue that while some “disruptive” representations of peace-promoting women have emerged, the slow progress towards involving women in formal decision-making processes has not led to noticeable improvements in women’s status more generally, as evidenced by the high levels of continuing gendered violence in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste and the limited success that women’s NGOs have had in ensuring that women’s rights are protected in the new constitutions. Yet women’s informal activities aimed at nonviolent conflict resolution and peace building have proliferated as a result of the new leverage provided by the Resolution.

The Open Debate of the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, which was held a week before the adoption of the Resolution, was attended by the representatives of over forty states who made supportive official statements. A striking feature of almost every one of these was the emphasis placed on the importance of women’s formal participation in decision-making processes. There was general agreement that women’s increased participation would make a difference for the realization of peace. As the Canadian Ambassador said, “We must address ourselves as well to the positive contribution that women—irrespective of their age, class, ethnicity, race or any other status—can
and do make to conflict prevention and to post-conflict peacebuilding."

Although most statements did not explicitly account for this difference, the implicit assumption was that gender in its biological sense provided the obvious explanation. The Ukrainian Ambassador's support, for example, relied on well-worn gender stereotypes when he stated, "In performing their tasks [in U.N. peacekeeping missions], women are perceived to be compassionate, unwilling to opt for force over reconciliation, willing to listen and learn and are widely seen as contributors to an environment of stability and morality that fosters the progress of peace."124

Some disruptive possibilities were also apparent, however, as in the statement by the Namibian Ambassador, who employed gender as an analytic category when he said that the "mindset, especially of men, must change and give way to new thinking and a new beginning for the U.N. in the field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping," including a role for women "as equal participants" in securing international peace and security.125 He welcomed women's participation on the premise that it will challenge the old ways of thinking about security, and appreciated that men too must be brought into the movement for change if the U.N. is really to make a new beginning in its efforts to secure international peace.

A week later, Resolution 1325 urged as its starting point the need for states to ensure the increased representation of women in formal decision-making processes related to the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflict.126 It also encouraged the Secretary-General to implement his plan to increase the participation of women in decision-making related to conflict resolution and peace processes and to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf.127 The Resolution goes further than the General Assembly resolutions to which I have referred with its explicit promotion of women's "formal" participation and inclusion of a refer-

---

124. Id. at 30 (quoting Mr. Volodymyr Krokhmal, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ukraine).
127. Id. at 2–3.
ence to women's equal participation in its preamble, but it does not follow CEDAW or the Namibia Plan of Action in urging the "equal" representation of women. In its failure to fully embrace a framework of gender equality, the Resolution falls a long way short of Ambassador Chowdhury's use of gender as an analytic category and his recognition that women's equality and peace are inextricably linked. It is also silent on the question of women's involvement in the Council itself. With regard to women's outside participation in informal processes, the Resolution predictably follows the earlier "soft law" instruments by recognizing its importance. It could hardly do otherwise. The Council made specific reference to consultation with local and international women's groups as a way of ensuring that its mission to take "gender considerations" into account was accomplished. It urges that the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements include measures that support "local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms." The specific mention of women's participation in the negotiation of peace agreements is particularly significant because, as Chinkin has observed, peace processes offer a "transformative moment to secure economic and social justice and human rights for all."

The Resolution's conviction that women have an "important role" to play in preventing and resolving conflicts and in peace-building echoes the resolutions of The Hague Congress women and the earlier international instruments, but the Council is not explicit about how it understands gender in this context—whether the difference women can make is biologically, socially, or analytically grounded. This ambiguity leaves plenty of room for biological explanations to remain influential, although it should be remembered that the U.N. has officially thrown its lot in with those who understand the category of gender as a social construct, although not without controversy.

128. Id., pmbl. para. 5 ("[S]tressing the importance of their [women's] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and solution.").
131. Id. § 8(b).
134. See U.N. Gender Perspective, supra note 33, ¶ 16.
135. See, e.g., Doris E. Buss, Robes, Relics and Rights: The Vatican and the Beijing Conference on Women, 7 SOC. AND LEGAL STUD. 339 (1998); Dianne Otto, Holding Up Half
The Resolution has prompted a great deal of institutional activity within the U.N.\(^{136}\) Two important studies were produced, which examined the impact of armed conflict and its aftermath on women and, in this context, women's work towards peace. The Secretary-General's Study, which was specifically requested by the Resolution,\(^{137}\) reviews the activities of the U.N. and its specialized agencies, funds, and programs, in light of Resolution 1325.\(^{138}\) The study confirms that women have seldom been included in formal peace processes\(^{139}\) and reports that women who have tried to make a contribution have often not been taken seriously.\(^{140}\) The second, an independent study commissioned by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), examines similar subject matter but adopts a feminist research methodology by basing its analysis on interviews with women victims and survivors of armed conflict.\(^{141}\) This study reports the "wholesale exclusion of women from peace processes,"\(^{142}\) despite the numerous formal commitments in resolutions...
and agreements to increase women's participation. The authors are nevertheless hopeful about change and observe, optimistically, that the Resolution has given a new "political legitimacy" to the long history of women's peace activism.

However, the most astonishing outcome from the Resolution's adoption has been its productivity as a focus for feminist peace advocates, both within the U.N. system and outside it. Women's peace activists have had unprecedented contact with the previously disinterested Security Council as a result of annual Arria Formulas, as well as through a number of open debates and round-tables. The NGO Working Group has worked tirelessly to publicize the Resolution outside the U.N., aiming to reach everyone who may want to use it to promote women's efforts towards peace. The eagerness of local women's groups, in the midst of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, to embrace the Resolution and the possibilities it offers has been particularly striking. The Working Group's website lists fifty-eight countries and regions in which the Resolution has been used to support initiatives in the context

143. See id. at 84 ("Time and time again women described the wonderful documents that had been created and signed—and the failure to implement most of what had been promised.").
144. Id. at 3.
145. Arria Formula meetings were initiated in 1993 by the Venezuelan Ambassador to the U.N., Diego Arria. They are an informal arrangement that allows the Security Council to be briefed, in private, by NGOs on a variety of issues on the Council's agenda. Arrias have been held more frequently since 1999. See James Paul, The Arria Formula, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/mtgsetclarria.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
of women, peace, and security. This picture of women's peace activism is a far cry from the Euro-American domination of the early decades of the international women's peace movement. Despite this extensive engagement, the "new legitimacy" ascribed to women's peace efforts by the UNIFEM study has been very slow to translate into women's formal political participation. Any progress so far has been due, in large part, to the extensive mobilization of local and transnational women's networks, rather than the efforts of the Council, as the following discussion of the examples of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste shows.

Afghanistan, which became the first major testing ground for the Resolution, provides a salutary example of the precarious nature of the developments in women's formal participation. It is telling that only a small number of women's peace groups in the United States thought to use the Resolution to argue that consultation with women should inform the Administration's decision-making about how it would respond to the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. This experience resonates with the characterization of the Resolution as yet another feminist contribution to international law that has been welcomed for the limited purpose of contributing to "saving" or "protecting" Third World women. The picture is, however, more complicated. Following the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, the Council adopted a number of resolutions concerned with rebuilding the country. In an unpromising start, no reference was made to Resolution 1325, despite the fact that the Taliban's abuses of women's rights had been widely acknowledged for many years, and the Council had alluded to them in previous resolutions. It was not until much later, when domestic support for the war in Afghanistan was waning, that


150. The NGOs WILPF of the United States and Code Pink used Resolution 1325 as a lobbying tool in their post-September 11th campaigns.

151. See generally Orford, supra note 70, at 56–63 (discussing the paternalistic role that feminism may take with respect to Third World Women).


protecting women became part of the formal justification for the occupation.

In the face of this institutional inertia, the Resolution provided important leverage for an unprecedented mobilization of women, including Hollywood celebrities, grassroots women’s rights activists, politicians, and U.N. ambassadors, to demand that women be included in the political negotiations that followed the U.S. occupation. As a result of these efforts, six women were eventually included in the Bonn Conference held in December 2001, where the first stage of these negotiations took place, despite the initial plan to include women only at a later stage. In a lucky coincidence, the NGO-sponsored Afghan Women’s Summit for Democracy, which aimed to promote the Resolution in the post-Taliban negotiations, was held in Brussels at the same time, drawing together about forty women from Afghanistan and the Diaspora. This coincidence enabled three of the women attending the Bonn Conference to travel between the two meetings and consult with other women about the official negotiations. As a result of all these efforts, the Bonn Agreement included a commitment to the eventual establishment of a “broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic, and fully representative government,” and two women were appointed to the thirty-member Interim Administration as the Ministers for Women’s Affairs and Health. However, several key cabinet posts and many other positions of power were given to brutal warlords and military commanders who had fought against the Taliban.

156. *Id.* at 254–55. Six women attended, three of them as delegates and three as observers. See also Secretary-General’s Study, *supra* note 1, ¶ 195 (noting that women were still full delegates in two of the parties attending the peace negotiations and advisers in the other two parties).
158. Neuwirth, *supra* note 155, at 255. The NGOs were Equality Now, the European Women’s Lobby, V-Day, the Centre for Strategic Initiatives of Women and The Feminist Majority.
159. *Id.*
161. *Id.*, Annex IV. The two women appointed to the Interim Administration were Dr. Sima Samar (Vice-Chair and Minister for Women’s Affairs) and Dr. Suhaila Seddiqi (Minister for Public Health).
interim government was therefore dominated by representatives of local military factions, who were entrenching their power with the support of the United States and its allies.\textsuperscript{163} It appeared that the “transformative moment” had been squandered, despite the determined efforts of a transnational women’s peace network.

The Bonn Agreement called for women’s participation in the Emergency Loya Jirga, planned for June 2002, which was to elect the transitional government that would rule until the elections, at that stage mooted for 2004.\textsuperscript{164} As a result, about 200 women from all regions were involved in this crucial meeting, as the Secretary-General’s Study notes with approval.\textsuperscript{165} However, most of the decisions about the final form of the interim government took place behind closed doors, which enabled Afghanistan’s military and warlord factions to, in many ways, further increase and legitimize their hold on power.\textsuperscript{166} These developments led to disillusionment of many civilian representatives since it had become clear that international actors were more interested in negotiating with military factions than with more legitimate representatives of the Afghan people.\textsuperscript{167} Undoubtedly many of the women, whose attendance was the result of so many national and international efforts, were among those who felt disheartened by this experience. The outcome was a setback for those seeking to increase women’s political participation in Afghanistan. The military “mindset” had again trumped the alternatives. Lost from view was the vision outlined at the Afghan Women’s Summit in Brussels, which sought to “bring back democratic values through education and culture”\textsuperscript{168} and pressed the Security Council to rapidly deploy a peacekeeping force and immediately disarm the warring factions.\textsuperscript{169}

The experience in Timor-Leste, which is widely considered to be a “success story” of the Resolution, provides a more hopeful account. After its adoption, the Resolution was used by women to promote their formal participation in the rebuilding of Timor-Leste, following the devastating violence wrought by militias loyal to Indonesia after the in-

\textsuperscript{163} Id.
\textsuperscript{164} Joel Brinkley & Carlotta Gall, Afghans Delay Vote a 3rd Time; Assembly Elections Moved to September, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 18, 2005, News, at 5. The elections had initially been postponed until May 2005, and then postponed again until September 2005.
\textsuperscript{165} Secretary-General’s Study, supra note 1, ¶ 195.
\textsuperscript{166} Killing You, supra note 162, at 17.
\textsuperscript{167} Id.
\textsuperscript{169} Neuwirth, supra note 155, at 259.
dependence referendum on August 30, 1999. As in Afghanistan, utilization of the Resolution occurred despite the failure of the Security Council to refer to it in resolutions relating to its missions in East Timor. While the Council's original mandate for the U.N. Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) preceded the adoption of Resolution 1325 by twelve months, it did refer to the importance of including personnel who had training in the "gender-related" provisions of international law, anticipating some aspects of the Resolution. Yet when only three women were included in the fifteen member National Consultative Council, established by UNTAET in December 1999 to assist the Transitional Administrator, many women's groups felt they had been excluded. At a workshop called "Women's Liberation in the Transition to Independence" held in February 2000, women agreed that they had not been included in important decision-making by either the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) or UNTAET, and criticized the "marked gender bias in the recruitment of UNTAET staff at the higher management level." From this point, local women's organizations began concerted lobbying for their inclusion in formal decision-making processes, leaving no doubt about the significance they attached to their political participation.

The First Congress of Women of Timor Loro Sae, which was held June 14–17, 2000, brought together more than 500 women from every


172. S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999); see Hilary Charlesworth & Mary Wood, Women and Human Rights in the Rebuilding of East Timor, 71 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 325, 329 (2002) (observing that this was the first time that such a reference was made in the mandate of a comparable body).


174. Id. at 8. The workshop was organized by Fokupers, a women's rights NGO founded in 1997, and the Sahe Institute for Liberation, an NGO specializing in popular education and policy advocacy.

175. Id. (quoting from Women's Liberation in the Process of Ukun Rasik An (self-government) Workshop Results, February 2000).

176. Id.
district.  

The Conference adopted a Platform for Action for the Advancement of the Women of Timor Loro Sae, which identified women’s participation in decision-making as one of the priorities and included a statement that called for UNTAET to “fulfill the United Nations commitment to gender equity.” The Conference also formed Rede Da Mulher Timor Loro Sae (REDE), a national network of women’s organizations committed to the advancement of women. In a letter to the Security Council’s Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security on October 24, 2000, REDE admonished the Council for failing to officially invite Timor-Leste to participate in the session, and criticized the U.N. presence as creating a “double battle” for women who “must combat our own society’s views of the role of women . . . while at the same time continuously advocate to the UNTAET and the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) for policies and hiring practices that include women.” The determined women’s lobby eventually succeeded in having thirteen women included in the thirty-three member National Council, which was established in July 2000 to advise the Transitional Administrator on legislative matters.

Following this major achievement, women’s activists organized a national campaign to promote the election of women to the Constituent Assembly, which was to draft East Timor’s new constitution. Many local women’s groups lobbied for a quota that would guarantee at least thirty percent of the seats to women, but this proposal was rejected by the transitional government on the advice of the U.N. Department of Political Affairs. Even without the assistance of a quota, twenty-four women were elected to the eighty-eight member Assembly (twenty-seven percent) in August 2001. When the Constituent Assembly re-

---

177. Id.
179. Charlesworth & Wood, supra note 172, at 333.
180. See id.; Kent, supra note 173, at 8–9;
184. Rehn & Sirleaf, supra note 141, at 81.
placed the U.N.-supervised transitional administration on May 20, 2002, two of the elected women were given ministerial responsibilities and a third was appointed to a vice-ministerial position. However, numbers can be deceptive. The UNIFEM report suggests that at least one political party later replaced the woman who was first on its parliamentarians list with a man who had been lower on the list at the time of the election and Kirsty Sword Gusmao, wife of President Xanana Gusmao, reported that women parliamentarians are often “locked out” by their male colleagues. Despite their electoral success, the new women politicians have gained only partial entry into formal decision-making processes.

At the same time as women’s efforts to be formally included in post-conflict decision-making were meeting with some measured success, the vast majority of women in both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste continued to feel powerless and insecure as a result of the public and private gendered violence that becomes normalized in militarized societies. As the Secretary-General’s Study observes, women’s inequality persists, and may even deepen, in post-conflict societies. In Afghanistan, particularly outside Kabul, violence against women was increasing at an alarming rate instead of abating as the transitional government became more established. Sexual violence was being perpetrated not only by family members but also by local commanders, militias, and police. The UNIFEM study confirmed that women were feeling “neither secure nor safe.” These developments continued to prevent women’s access to political participation, in addition to education, health care, and employment. In March 2004, two and a half years into the U.S. occupation, the New York Times reported that increasing numbers of young Afghan women were committing suicide in order to escape the cruelties they were forced to endure because of traditional

186. Id. at 2.
187. REHN & SIRLEAF, supra note 141, at 81.
192. REHN & SIRLEAF, supra note 141, at 2.
family practices and conservative Islamic beliefs that countenanced forced marriages and domestic violence. How is it that this state of affairs could be ignored or tolerated by the Afghan Transitional Administration and the International Security Assistance Force? It suggests that women's partial political inclusion has had no impact at all on the priorities of powerbrokers in Afghanistan.

In Timor-Leste, where the people had endured decades of brutal suppression by the Indonesian military, violence against women was also prevalent in the post-conflict environment, as violent crimes perpetrated against women constituted forty percent of all officially reported offences in December 2001. The UNTAET Gender Affairs Unit estimated that domestic violence affected thirty percent of the female population, while the 2004 report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights found that “[d]omestic violence, rape, attempted rape and sexual assault [were] common crimes across the country.” These figures are likely to be a substantial underestimation of the true levels of violence against women, since women in the male-dominated culture of Timor-Leste, as elsewhere, are unlikely to feel very confident about making a complaint, especially when the justice system is poorly developed. In Timor-Leste, the trend has been to pressure women into dealing with these offences through traditional dispute resolution systems, which also need to change before they are likely to deliver justice to women. As in Afghanistan, this situation raises fundamental questions about the priorities that are pursued in the name of peace-building and whether a small increase in women's political participation can hope to challenge them.

Against the backdrop of widespread violence, many local women felt excluded from, or unable to participate in, the same transitional de-
cision-making processes into which other women were making inroads. In Timor-Leste, an Oxfam study found that women, especially those in rural areas, faced substantial impediments to having their voices heard during the political transition. These impediments included high levels of illiteracy, lack of access to information about the transitional authority, transportation problems, and the conservative patriarchal culture of Timor-Leste, which combined to undermine women’s capabilities in public roles.

To this list can be added other obstacles identified by Chinkin in her discussion of women’s involvement in peace agreements, including the Bonn Agreement: security issues, lack of resources to attend, and the lack of childcare provision. Chinkin makes the point that the allocation of power during peace negotiations is usually confined to those parties who have been involved in the fighting, which is well borne out by the experience of Afghanistan. This arrangement repeats the lack of value attributed to women’s efforts during the conflict, whether as members of resistance movements or as grassroots leaders who hold communities together and promote peace through informal means. Institutionalizing the fractures of the conflict in the new governing structures also means that the post-conflict society remains militarized.

The result of all these impediments is that it tends to be the more privileged women who are able to lobby for, and then take up, the formal participation opportunities opened by the Resolution. If women’s participation is limited to those already privileged by the current arrangements of power, it runs the risk, however well-intentioned, of contributing to the imperial project of military security by continuing to “protect” rather than “empower” most women. In Timor-Leste, some local women voiced their frustration with the preoccupation of various UNTAET bodies with the “number” of women participating in them, suggesting that this conceived of women’s empowerment in “excessively narrow terms.” This frustration highlights one of the dangers associated with institutionalizing or mainstreaming a feminist agenda, which is that the political content can be lost in its conversion to bureaucratic goals. Sally Baden and Anne-Marie Goetz describe this process in the


201. Id.; See also, Kent, supra note 173, at 9–10.


203. Id.

204. Charlesworth & Wood, supra note 172, at 339.
context of mainstreaming gender into development programs, showing how gender analysis can be reduced to an "interesting statistical variable" that suits institutional needs and thereby becomes stripped of its concern with realizing human rights and social justice. 205

It is important to remember that the number of women involved in decision-making is not, by itself, an accurate indicator of women's empowerment in society. The Rwandan experience, which is often held up as a shining example of women's increased formal participation, 206 is instructive in this regard. The first election following the genocide saw women winning thirty-nine of the eighty seats in the lower house of Parliament, fifteen more than the thirty percent quota that had been reserved for them.207 While this result is partly due to the work of women's rights advocates, it is also a reflection of Rwandan demographics, where women outnumber men by a ratio that may be as high as seven to one according to some estimates.208 Yet despite women's majority representation, men retain the most powerful positions in the government and patriarchal traditions remain strong in Rwandan domestic life.209 Clearly, any assessment of the effects of women's political participation must look behind the empirical data to the economic, social, political, cultural, and legal status of women, particularly those who are the least privileged.

Despite these problems of elitism, bureaucratic dilution, and institutional resistance to women's effective participation in formal decision-making processes, women's informal participation in peacemaking and peace-building has continued apace. In both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, local women came together to draft charters of women's rights, which they hoped would educate their communities and influence the formal negotiation of their new constitutions. In Timor-Leste, the 2000 Congress of Women established a working group to undertake a broad community consultation in order to draft a Women's Charter of

205. Baden & Goetz, supra note 114, at 22.
208. Id. If this demographic had been accurately reflected in the election, women would have won seventy of the eighty seats.
209. Id.
Rights, which was later presented to the Transitional Administrator with ten thousand supporting signatures. In addition to seeking the prohibition of discrimination and the adoption of positive measures to promote equality, the Charter identified specific guarantees that were of paramount importance: the elimination of all forms of violence against women; the equal participation of women in public and political life, including in traditional decision-making processes; state provision of reproductive health care for women; and regulation of the dowry (bride price) system. The mix of general equality measures and explicit guarantees of women’s rights underlines the importance of supplementing equality provisions with measures that address the specificities of women’s position of gender disadvantage.

In Afghanistan, Women for Afghan Women (WAW) organized a conference for forty-five ethnically diverse women, from every region of the country, including both educated and undereducated women, to come together in Kandahar, from September 2–5, 2003, to draw up the Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights. Like the women in Timor-Leste, the participants took the view that an equality clause in the constitution, while necessary, would not be enough, and consequently the Bill identified sixteen rights and five additional demands of importance to women. Their top three priorities were education, health care, and security in public and in the home. They publicly presented the document to President Hamed Karzai who assured them that their rights would be explicitly included in the new constitution and announced that half of his fifty appointees to the Constitutional Loya Jirga would be women. Members of the drafting commission also indicated that the women’s

215. Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights, supra note 213.
217. Sultan, supra note 214.
Bill would be included, except for the provision that set a minimum age of marriage, which they said would be implemented by legislation. The women also distributed copies of their Bill of Rights throughout the country in order to build support for it. In addition to seeking guarantees of equality and the recognition of specific women’s rights, the women in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste gave at least as much weight to economic and social rights as they did to civil and political rights, reflecting an acute awareness of the importance of the indivisibility of human rights for women.

Notwithstanding the efforts of women’s groups to breathe feminist life into the constitutional debates, and the urging in Resolution 1325 that all actors ensure that there is constitutional protection for the human rights of women and girls, the outcomes in both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste were disappointing. Women held about twenty percent of the 500 seats of the Constitutional Loya Jirga in Afghanistan, but this did not stop the Chair, Sibghatullah Majaddedi, from making it clear to female delegates at the beginning of the proceedings that “[e]ven God has not given you equal rights because under his decision two women are counted as equal to one man.” The proceedings were also marred by a general atmosphere of corruption and fear. Malalai Joya, one of the female delegates, challenged the participation of “criminals” who she said should be tried for their crimes against the Afghan people, but then had to rely on protection from the U.N. because of death threats. Remarkably, the new Constitution of Afghanistan, adopted on January 4, 2004, was a qualified advance on the draft that had been released in November 2003, which did not recognize women’s equal rights under the law or grant women full rights of citizenship, despite the earlier assurances about including women’s rights. The final Constitution declares that “the citizens of Afghanistan—whether man or woman—have equal rights and duties before the law,” but there is no explicit prohibition of sex discrimination and all provisions are made subject to

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Resolution 1325, supra note 15, ¶ 8(c).
221. Sultan, supra note 214.
223. Sultan, supra note 214.
224. Id.
225. Constitution of Afghanistan art. 22.
the teachings of Islam. There are only four references to women, none of which grant women rights as autonomous subjects. In one provision, female heads of households are not credited with agency in their own right, but are referred to as "women without caretakers" and are guaranteed assistance in the protective mode of helping a vulnerable and dependent group. The advice of the drafters of the Afghan Women's Bill of Rights to explicitly spell out women's equality and rights went unheeded.

Unfortunately, it took only a few days for the worst fears of women's rights advocates to be realized. Officials in Kabul had lifted a ban on women singing on state television, citing the new Constitution's protection of women's equal rights. When old footage of the well-known singer Parasto was aired, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court immediately protested to the Minister for Information and Culture. The ban was re-imposed, just days after it had been lifted, because the Chief Justice insisted that it was consistent with the new Constitution's requirement that no laws can be contrary to the beliefs of Islam. On the other hand, the Constitution does reserve for women twenty-five percent of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga (the People's House of the new bicameral Assembly) and the president must appoint additional women to sit in the Meshrano Jirga (the Elders' House), although there is no reference to women's participation in local government structures. The quotas open important new possibilities for women's political participation, although increasing the number of women, without also guaranteeing women's equality and rights, may not be empowering women; it may instead further institutionalize their secondary status.

The new Constitution of Timor-Leste, adopted in March 2002, also takes a much weaker approach to women's equality and rights than that proposed in the Women's Charter of Rights. Women are guaranteed

226. Id. art.3 declares that "no law can be contrary to the scared religion of Islam and the values of this Constitution."; see also Sultan, supra note 214.

227. The first reference to women requires effective programs for "balancing and promoting" their education, Constitution of Afghanistan art. 44, while the second guarantees "women without caretakers" the necessary assistance. Id. art. 53. The other two references reserve seats for women in the new bicameral legislature. Id. arts. 83, 84

228. Id. art.53.


230. Id.

231. Human Rights Watch, supra note 222.
formal equality with men by references to "equality of opportunities"\textsuperscript{232} and "the same rights and duties in all areas of family, political, economic, social and cultural life."\textsuperscript{233} However, formal equality fails to recognize that women, in some situations, may need to be guaranteed rights that are different from those that men enjoy in order to realize substantive equality.\textsuperscript{234} Further, the Constitution requires that the law "promote equality in the exercise of civil and political rights,"\textsuperscript{235} which falls well short of international human rights law guaranteeing the "enjoyment" of equality. One Charter provision that was included in the name of women's rights gives the police additional powers to enter homes at night if they have reason to believe that there is a serious threat to life or physical integrity.\textsuperscript{236} Unfortunately, if experience elsewhere is instructive, this may prove to be another instance of women's rights being used as a pretext for diminishing the general enjoyment of civil rights, which, again, suits certain institutional purposes and is unlikely to improve women's lives.

In sum, in both Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, engagement with the Resolution has helped prompt a shift away from women's total exclusion from formal political participation to their precarious partial inclusion, leading to the limited recognition of women's rights in the new constitutions. In both cases, this shift would not have occurred without the extensive mobilization of women domestically and internationally to push for women's inclusion. Yet there remain real questions about the extent of power that women have gained and whether they are able to influence the agendas and priorities of mainstream political, legal, and military institutions from the "inside." There are many indications that women's inclusion has been more of an exercise in appearances rather than one of substantive change, with effects that are barely discernable in the lives of less privileged women. This experience is not confined to Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. In fact, as I have said, Timor-Leste is widely regarded to be one of the success stories of the Resolution. Four years after the adoption of the Resolution, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council, draws the following conclusion: "Despite significant achievements, major gaps and challenges remain in all areas, including, in particular, in relation to women's

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor § 6(j).
\item \textsuperscript{233} Id. ¶ 17.
\item \textsuperscript{234} See generally, Dianne Otto, 'Gender Comment: Why Does the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Need a General Comment on Women?', 14 CANADIAN J. OF WOMEN & L. 1, 45–51 (2002).
\item \textsuperscript{235} Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor § 63, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{236} Id. at § 37, cl. 3; see Charlesworth & Wood, supra note 172, at 339.
\end{itemize}
participation in conflict prevention and peace processes . . . and representation of women in decision-making positions.” This conclusion, or something like it, could have been drawn at any time in the past century, despite the determined efforts of women’s peace activists to increase women’s political participation in conflict and security issues and the periodic formal endorsement that their efforts have received.

Yet the Resolution has been extraordinarily productive in providing a focus for women’s peace activism outside formal institutions and processes. The Secretary-General’s 2004 report acknowledges that “the women’s movement has made major contributions to building partnerships for peace,” and mentions in particular the Mano River Women’s Peace Network and WILPF. Indeed, it seems clear that the small shifts in women’s formal inclusion would not have occurred without the efforts of women’s movements. However, the Secretary-General’s question as to how this energy and activism can be translated into women’s participation and influence in formal activities remains unanswered. This paradox returns me to my earlier questions about whether women’s peace advocacy needs to be rethought. I have suggested that one barrier to women’s formal participation, and its effectiveness, lies in the essentialist biological representations that women’s peace advocates have relied upon. I have floated, as an alternative, the idea of organizing on the basis of gender disruptive identities. But what disruptive representations of women and men might form the basis of women’s solidarity in such a project? Would such a move necessitate giving up the claim that women have an anti-militarist contribution to make and therefore bring an end to women’s separate organizations? Would it be even more difficult for the ideas of a less stereotypical women’s peace movement to be taken seriously by mainstream institutions of military and imperial power? These are the questions of representation and strategy to which I now return.

IV. REASSESSING ISSUES OF REPRESENTATION AND STRATEGY IN LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE WITH RESOLUTION 1325

In order to make an assessment of what can be learned from the experience of implementing the Resolution, I turn first to examining whether there are any traces of the broader anti-militarist and emancipatory goals of international women’s peace movements, as outlined in

237. Secretary-General’s 2004 Report, supra note 206, ¶ 4; see also id. ¶ 28.
238. Id. ¶ 27.
Part I, evident in the text of the Resolution or emerging as a result of the partial formal inclusion of women in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and elsewhere. Finding few such traces, I ask whose project the small increases in women's participation assists, if it is not a feminist project. Finally, I discuss what the experience of working with the Resolution has to teach about the problems of representation and strategy. With respect to gender representations, I find some hopeful shifts, although gender representations of "men" in the cause of peace remain lacking. With respect to strategy, I suggest that the sites for feminist peace advocacy opened up by the Resolution, located partly within formal systems of decision-making, could be more fully utilized as gender-disruptive locations.

I return first to the text of the Resolution in order to examine its relationship with the broader goals of the international women's peace movement. While the Resolution clearly affirms the importance of women's participation in conflict-related decision-making, when measured against the movement's other aspirations it is seriously wanting. No reference is made to identifying or addressing any of the underlying structural causes of armed conflict, despite the Council's earlier recognition that "non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian, and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security," nor is there room for questioning how "security" and "order" are understood. A single reference is made to conflict "prevention" in the limited context of urging women's participation in related decision-making. Instead of looking to address underlying causes, the gaze of the Resolution is firmly fixed on the immediate post-conflict period with its concern to promote a "gender perspective" in the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements and to introduce a "gender perspective" into peacekeeping operations. While these openings make it conceivable that women could seize the "transformative movement" and grasp the opportunity for improving the status of women during the transitional period, which might then be reflected in the post-conflict society, the narrow temporal focus of the Resolution is limiting. In seeking to "manage" the resolution of armed conflict, rather than transform the military "mindset" and its attendant gendered significa-


241. Id. ¶ 8.

242. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
A SIGN OF "WEAKNESS"?

tions of power, the Resolution does not challenge the existing ways of thinking as hoped for by the Namibian Ambassador during the Open Debate that preceded adoption of the Resolution. 243

The Resolution’s failure to make any reference to the goal of general disarmament is especially edifying, 244 given the emphasis of the international women’s peace movement on disarmament and the Council’s own responsibilities under the U.N. Charter to establish systems to regulate arms. 245 When it is remembered that states consistently recognized women’s leading role in disarmament at the world conferences on women, this omission is sadly instructive. In Nairobi, for example, states called for women to actively support “the halting of the arms race, followed by arms reduction and the attainment of a general and complete disarmament,” 246 and, as recently as 1995 in Beijing, states undertook to “work actively towards general and complete disarmament.” 247 The Resolution’s failure to promote disarmament deprives women’s peace advocates of leverage to pursue one of their most important goals. Further, the Resolution gives no indication that the Council might be ready to rethink its approach to security in other ways that have received endorsement at world conferences by, for example, recognizing the importance of developing nonviolent forms of conflict resolution or of fostering a culture of peace. 248 The Resolution also fails to insist on women’s equality. 249 While it makes a general call for measures that respect the human rights of women and girls in peace agreements, it does not acknowledge that women’s equality and peace are “inextricably linked.” Thus, the Council refuses the insight that women’s inequality is deeply implicated in the processes and impacts of militarism and, when put together with the absence of references to disarmament and building a culture of peace, it becomes evident that women’s participation is imagined as enhancing the militarized world order.

Overall, the Resolution’s use of the language of “gender” is sparing, preferring instead to use the term “women.” While in many instances

244. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 15, ¶ 13 does make reference to the disarmament of ex-combatants in the context of demobilization and reintegration, but this provision is not the same thing as general disarmament.
247. Beijing PFA, supra note 59, ¶ 28. See also id. ¶ 143(f)(i) (suggesting governments undertake to “[w]ork actively towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”).
248. Id. ¶¶ 148–51.
this terminology may be appropriate, as when talking about increasing
gender's representation in decision-making, it has the effect of confining
much of the Resolution's focus to embodied women, which avoids rec-
ognizing that there will also be implications for “men” if the Resolution
is to be fully implemented. Instructively, the Resolution is at its strong-
est when it seeks to address the negative impacts of armed conflict on
women, which draws on protective gender stereotypes. For example,
parties to armed conflict are urged to “respect fully international law”
pertaining to the protection of civilian women and girls, to take “spe-
cial [protective] measures” and to end the impunity that attaches to
gendered violence. The Council also reaffirms its “readiness” to con-
sider the “special needs” of women and girls when considering collective
measures taken under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. While of course
the Council must address women's everyday gender realities, in the ab-
sence of a strong commitment to equality, the Resolution risks
reconstituting the gendered dualisms that underlie militarism and
women's inequality. Where the Resolution does use the language of
“gender,” as in requiring a “gender perspective” to be incorporated and
“gender considerations” to be taken into account, it opens the possi-
bility of engaging gender in its social or analytical sense. Yet, other parts
of the Resolution work against this possibility by conflating “gender”
with “women,” when referring to the need to “protect women and girls
from gender-based violence” and describing the incorporation of a
“gender perspective” into constitutions as ensuring respect for the “hu-
man rights of women and girls.” Treating “gender” as synonymous
with “women” fails to recognize the relational quality of gender repre-
sentations. If ideas about women are to change, ideas about “men” must

250. Id. ¶ 9.
251. Id. ¶ 10.
252. Id. ¶ 11. See also id. ¶ 12 (taking into account the “particular needs” of refugee
women and girls); id. ¶ 8(a) (giving attention to the “special needs of women and
girls during repatriation and resettlement”).
253. Id. ¶ 14. Measures employed under Article 41, to give effect to Security Council
decisions, are those that do not involve the use of armed force, including economic
sanctions, the curtailment of communications and the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions. U.N. Charter art. 41.
254. Id. ¶ 5 (advocating for the incorporation of a “gender perspective” into peace-
keeping operations and peace agreements respectively).
255. Id. ¶ 15 (referring to the need for Security Council missions to take “gender consid-
erations” into account); See also id. ¶ 7 (calling for “gender-sensitive” training for
peace-keeping personnel); id. ¶ 17 (asking the Secretary-General to report progress
on “gender mainstreaming”).
256. Id. ¶ 10.
257. Id. ¶ 8(c).
also change. This insight must be embraced before the transformative potential of the category of gender will be realized.

With such minimal assistance from the Resolution, has the Resolution provided the “watershed political framework” that the UNIFEM experts predicted?\textsuperscript{258} Have the emancipatory goals, which have animated women’s international peace activism for nearly a century, been furthered by the achievement of small increases in women’s formal participation? In relation to the goal of addressing the patterns of inequality and injustice that create global insecurities, the experience of Timor-Leste and Afghanistan indicate that women’s contributions have been thwarted by the imperial and military terms by which international peace and security has always been understood. In Afghanistan, these terms, defined more by the United States than the Security Council, have prioritized the placation of warlords and private militias over ensuring the safety of women and the effective participation of civilian women and men in shaping the post-conflict society.\textsuperscript{259} In Timor-Leste, while the focus of women’s rights advocates was on their democratic participation, the World Bank was determining the shape of the national economy, opening one of the poorest countries in Asia to foreign direct investment and deciding that its public infrastructure would be kept small.\textsuperscript{260} Opportunities for the newly elected women politicians to question the way that things are done were circumscribed by the partial nature of their inclusion.

The experiences in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste also provide a salutary lesson in the Council’s lack of interest in the interlinked projects of achieving women’s equality and ending militarism. Both countries remain heavily militarized. In Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition allowed local war lords to entrench their power.\textsuperscript{261} This fact has made progress towards disarmament, demobilization, and redeployment painfully slow, despite attractive monetary incentives, and contrary to the proclamation by U.S. military chief Lieutenant-General David Barno, in October 2004, that there was an “end of the rule of the gun” in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{262} Many U.S., U.N., and Afghan officials believe that the security problems will only be solved by the creation of a new Afghan army.\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{258.} REHN \& SIRLEAF, supra note 141, at 3.
\textsuperscript{259.} Killing You, supra note 162, at 18; see also, id. at 72.
\textsuperscript{260.} ORFORD, supra note 70, at 135.
\textsuperscript{261.} Killing You, supra note 162, at 11.
\textsuperscript{263.} Killing You, supra note 162, at 13.
The democratic vision outlined at the Afghan Women’s Summit in Brussels has disappeared from view. In Timor-Leste, the solution to continuing problems with security is also seen to lie in the creation of a national defense force. One of the three program areas of the U.N. Mission of Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET), which succeeded UNTAET when Timor-Leste gained independence in 2002, is to provide support to security and stability. The lack of capacity of the Timorese defense force has provided the justification for several extensions of UNMISET’s mandate. The Council’s unquestioning endorsement of the idea that long-term security can only be guaranteed if state-controlled militaries are in place means that the post-Cold War spread of militarization, deeper into everyday life, continues apace. In this environment of militarized peace, women’s demands for recognition of their equality and rights in the new constitutions have, in both countries, been watered down and, despite the Resolution’s strong support for preventing sexual violence in the aftermath of armed conflict, women’s insecurity has worsened in Afghanistan and continues to be a massive problem in Timor-Leste. Meanwhile, the Security Council has been preoccupied with building new militaries and state institutions.

If the transformative goals of international women’s peace movements are not being furthered by the increased participation of women in conflict-related decision-making, then whose project is being advanced? Some clues are apparent from the comments of Condoleeza Rice, in her visit to Afghanistan as U.S. Secretary of State in March 2005. She emphasized Afghanistan’s transition to democracy at every opportunity, saying that the country’s “commitment to the democratic enterprise is inspiring,” while at the same time announcing another de-

266. UNMISET mandates were extended by four resolutions: (1) S/RES/1473(Apr. 4, 2003), (2) S/RES/1480 (May 19, 2003), (3) S/RES/1543 May 14, 2004), and (4) S/RES/1573 (Nov. 16, 2004). UNMISET remained in place until May 20, 2005, when it was replaced by a one-year follow-on Special Political Mission (UNOTIL) by S/RES/1599 (Apr. 28, 2005).
268. Julie Mertus, Improving the Status of Women in the Wake of War: Overcoming Structural Obstacles, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 541, 547–548 (2003). In the context of Kosovo, Mertus points out that women’s enjoyment of formally recognized rights still depends on the willingness and capacity of the state to acknowledge and respond to rights claims and on women overcoming other deterrents, such as a lack of legal literacy, cultural and social ostracism, and lack of access to legal processes due to their caring responsibilities.
A SIGN OF "WEAKNESS"?

The schedule for her seven hour visit included a roundtable discussion with women, described by the State Department as the "new democracy leaders." Yet, the democratic process was clearly severely compromised, disarmament was a failure, the power of many warlords remained unchecked, women's security had worsened across the country, and the United Nations had released a report three weeks earlier that found the living standards in Afghanistan to be among the lowest in the world. In much the same way as President Bush had earlier shown a belated concern with women's rights in Afghanistan in order to shore up waning domestic support for his military campaign, Rice's comments illustrated the continuing importance of gender as a technology of imperial power. The appearance of "saving" Third World women from the undemocratic traditions of their own men is used to legitimate the U.S. juggernaut "war on terror." In Timor-Leste, the relatively high number of women participating in formal political processes has brought the U.N. mission a great deal of international credos. However, both my examples illustrate the dangers of cooption that attend such participation, which can help to authorize the existing practices of militarism instead of furthering feminist goals. As Orford has aptly cautioned, "feminism ends up facilitating the existing projects and priorities of militarised economic globalization in the name of protecting and promoting the interests of women." The examples of Timor-Leste and Afghanistan show that increasing the presence of women in decision-making mechanisms will not, in itself, challenge the typical "mindset" and lead to different decisions being made. Unless women's participation is able to foster a fundamental questioning of the gendered assumptions that underpin militarism,

269. Brinkley & Gall, supra note 164.
270. Id.
militarism will retain its discursive dominance.\footnote{275} As the NGO Working Group, quoting Canada's International Development Agency, reminded the Security Council on the second anniversary of the adoption of the Resolution, "[p]eacebuilding is a two-fold process requiring both the deconstruction of the structures of violence and construction of the structures of peace."\footnote{276} The challenge is to resist being drawn into the service of the military projects of the Council while also utilizing the new spaces for women's political participation to further feminist goals. In Foucault's terms, rising to this challenge involves the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" that are produced by hegemonic discourses,\footnote{277} which brings me back to my questions of feminist representation and strategy in the cause of peace and what new insights have emerged from engagement with the Resolution.

I will turn first to the representations of women that have been associated with the Resolution. In many situations, women continue to organize on the basis of their shared concerns as mothers, seeking to learn the fate of their children who have disappeared,\footnote{278} preventing conscription of their children,\footnote{279} or providing support for each other to raise children who are without fathers, or orphaned, or born of rape. However, contemporary forms of maternal organizing have tended to be situated and specific to local circumstances, rather than triggered by universal claims about all women.\footnote{280} The maternal figure has thus become a shifting rather than a static identity that can assume importance when it is contextually appropriate. In addition, many other representations of women in the cause of peace have emerged, showing women as local leaders, community activists, educators, household heads, workers, service providers, and bearers of human rights.\footnote{281} The Secretary-General's urging that women's "energy and activism" in informal peacebuilding be harnessed into formal activities is one expression of this

\footnotesize{275. See Dianne Otto, Challenging the 'New World Order': International Law, Global Democracy and the Possibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372, 412–3 (1993).}


\footnotesize{278. Secretary-General's Study, \textit{supra} note 1, \S 170.}

\footnotesize{279. REHN & SIRLEAF, \textit{supra} note 141, at 77.}

\footnotesize{280. See Secretary-General's Study, \textit{supra} note 1, at 166–67.}

\footnotesize{281. See, e.g., Secretary-General's Study, \textit{supra} note 1, at 53–58; REHN & SIRLEAF, \textit{supra} note 141, at 76–77.}
shift. These representations, including some of the maternal tropes, have resistive possibilities because they originate in women's active agency, rather than from the protected and injured representations that have sustained militarism. They also build from grassroots realities, which locate the representations in specific histories of women's struggles for equality, working against the imperial tendencies of western feminism and liberal internationalism.

However, despite these “outside” representational shifts, the difference that women's formal participation is expected to make has continued to rely on “womanly” stereotypes, which feminize certain tasks by assigning them to women, like helping to pacify and civilize militarized men, building bridges between former belligerents, and rebuilding shattered communities. Even the UNIFEM experts fall into this trap when they explain, “[w]hen women are there, the nature of the dialogue changes” because “women's concerns” like education, health care, jobs, and land will be discussed, which arise from “their rootedness in their communities.” Not even the UNIFEM study imagines this conceptualization to be disruptive of the mindset of the U.N.'s approach to conflict resolution and peacekeeping, which the Namibian Ambassador so hopefully anticipated. Instead, as Sandra Whitworth has observed, UNIFEM has joined with other U.N. agencies and some NGOs in promoting the idea that women's distinctive contribution will increase the effectiveness of the U.N's existing conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. This way of thinking values women's contributions when they are focused on “womanly” concerns, notably with the practical issues of everyday survival. My point is not intended to doubt the importance of these concerns, and if women's participation does succeed in bringing them to the fore, then that is a considerable achievement. However, the problem lies in limiting the contributions expected from women to feminized issues, which reinstates the earlier essentializing scripts of maternalism. Bureaucratic efficiency arguments hijack the disruptive potential of the new representations of women that have been associated with the Resolution and reduce the purpose of women's participation to achieving technocratic goals.

282. Secretary-General's Study, supra note 1, ¶ 212.
283. See, e.g., Secretary-General's Study, supra note 1, ¶ 178; Rehn & Sirleaf, supra note 141, at 77–8.
284. Rehn & Sirleaf, supra note 141, at 79.
The limiting effect of gender stereotypes can also be seen in the Secretary-General's explanation of gender mainstreaming in the context of women, peace, and security:

A focus on gender mainstreaming in conflict and post-conflict situations involves recognizing that women, girls, men and boys participate in and experience conflict, peace processes and post-conflict recovery differently. These differences and inequalities should be understood and taken into account in all responses to conflict prevention, conflict situations and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.286

His approach reduces gender to “different experiences,” implicitly drawing on gender as biology, and frames the solution as taking these differences into account. He reduces gender mainstreaming to the technocratic exercise of factoring in gender differences, and leaves out the most important part of the definition of gender mainstreaming, which identifies the ultimate goal as gender equality.287 In the same way, the Resolution’s new space for women’s formal participation has been reduced to ensuring that women’s different experiences are taken into account in the transition to a militarized peace, which remains insecure for everyone.

In the process of reducing women’s contribution to their different experience and needs, gender is reduced to biology. Women’s experience is understood as a fixed and stereotypical construct, which ensures that the diverse representations of women produced by women’s activism are formally cordoned into a narrow range of women’s “different” concerns. Yet many contemporary women’s peace advocates have taken great pains to emphasize that they are engaging gender as a social category, like the UNIFEM experts who say:

This report does not claim the universal innocence of women, nor does it argue that women are inherently more peaceful, or that men are more warlike. Grappling with the concept of

286. See Study of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
287. Secretary-General’s Study, supra note 1, ¶ 13 (repeating the definition of gender mainstreaming adopted in the ECOSOC agreed conclusions 1997/2 as “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality”).
gender avoids these stereotypes, and leads to an examination of the different roles assigned to men and women in making war and peace.  

It would have been useful if the experts had explained what they meant by “grappling” with gender because social explanations of gender are highly susceptible to biological encroachment. The importance of utilizing gender as a social category is that it opens up the social prescriptions attached to the bodies of women and men to contestation, yet this point has been lost in the Resolution's institutionalization. None of the legal and policy documents produced in the implementation of the Resolution have questioned the representations of men and masculinities that attend men's participation in conflict-related decision-making processes. Even the much vaunted gender-sensitizing training materials produced by Canada and the U.K., for retraining militaries as peacekeepers, manage to ignore the relational quality of gendered identities. The training, instead, aims to improve the peacekeeping skills of military peacekeepers and thus also employs an efficiency rationale. Without active contestation of gender dualities and hierarchies, the “mindset” will never change and the purportedly social understanding of gender will blur with the biological certainties that have legitimated militarism and women's inequality.

If the discursive limits on what women are able to contribute through their formal participation are to be overcome, the gender representations that underpin women's activism need first to break through those limits. This point brings us back to our central conundrum, which is that women have mobilized, as women, on the basis of their presently gendered experience, which in a gendered world reflects their inequality as women. As I have argued, there is a contradiction in seeking to be included with the aim of fostering transformative change, on the wings of the same gender identities that have legitimated militarism and women's inequality. Even if this is understood as an effort to reverse the hierarchies, to turn “signs of weakness” like seeking mediation or compromise into “signs of strength,” the rigidities of gender as a dichotomy are still relied upon and the myth that anti-militaristic ways of thinking

289. Canada and the United Kingdom have jointly financed the production of training materials on gender for military and civilian personnel engaged in peacekeeping, in collaboration with the Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada. The materials are available online at http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org.
290. See Whitworth, supra note 285, at 139.
are uniquely available to women continues to be perpetuated. One solution, suggested by Peterson and Runyan, is that ultimately, the goal must be to "ungender" world politics. They describe this as a two-fold process: "adding women to the existing world politics power structures and transforming those very power structures, ideologically and materially." The transformation they imagine involves rejecting gendered dichotomies and reorganizing relationships in every sphere of life in cooperative and mutually respectful ways. In a similar vein, Tickner also proposes that the goal is to build an approach that is "non-gendered," that transcends gender as a category of analysis and builds security around notions of connectedness and interdependence. She suggests we need non-gendered identities, like that of the "mediator," which are not constructed from relations that depend on gender inequality. The problem with the idea of eliminating gender as an organizing concept is that everything is always already gendered. I doubt that non-gendered identities are discursively possible because gendered significations of power are so central to many ways of thinking. This centrality can be seen in the examples of moving "beyond" gender that Peterson, Runyon, and Tickner use, which value attributes like mediation and cooperation that consistently fall on one side of the gender dichotomy, despite their valiant attempts at "ungendering."

My view is that it would be more fruitful to make the most of gender's fluidity, rather than seeking to transcend it; to subvert its hierarchies and scramble its rigid attribution of dichotomy, rather than discarding all the creativity, desire, and emancipatory possibilities that gender differences make possible. This process will require entirely jettisoning the use of gender as a biological category and fully embracing gender as a category of social and analytical analysis. If women's movements for peace could disrupt the certainties of gender, it would follow that the discourse of militarism, which has been built on those certainties, would also be disrupted. A start has been made with the diverse grassroots representations of women that have been associated with the Resolution, which build from women's local agency and activism, rather than from their need for protection or salvation. Such empowered female identities suggest that a reconceptualization of what women can contribute to peacemaking and peace-building processes may also be possible. The refusal of many women to respect the divisions of an armed conflict and organize instead across factions and clans, as

291. Peterson & Runyan, supra note 37, at 214.
292. Id. at 237.
293. See Tickner, supra note 24, at 132–4.
294. Id. at 139.
Hague Congress women and many others have done, sets a hopeful precedent. If women can form alliances for peace across “enemy” lines, then surely there is the potential for women to organize in a way that disrupts gender certainties—as a coalition of “bad” and “good” mothers, for example; as “disreputable” and “respectable” women; as hybrid and unruly in their gender identifications; across the different respectabilities and privileges of class, race and sexuality. Multiplicitous representations of women that refuse dichotomous classifications would make it impossible to discursively prescribe “womanly” and “manly” contributions to peace negotiations and thus challenge the underlying hierarchical assumptions upon which existing ways of doing things depend.

Finally, perhaps the most difficult aspect of the conundrum facing women’s peace activists is that radically reframing security cannot be identified as a project that is unique to women. If militarism is to be challenged, men too must be engaged and non-military forms of masculinity must be valued. Does the necessity to include men then portend the “death” of women’s autonomous organizing? Not necessarily. As long as it is meaningful for women to organize as women in the cause of peace, their autonomous organizing should and will continue, likely for a very long time given the context of a world that persists in defining “women” primarily in terms of their biology. However, in their advocacy for peace, women need to refuse biological essentialisms and hold fast to the insight that gender is a socially constructed category. They also need to find ways to work with men, and transgendered people, in coalition or partnership and in ways that are disruptive of gender certainties. Gender needs to be engaged as an analytic category in order to set in motion a revaluation of the marginalized ways of thinking that suggest alternatives to militarism, which are by no means unique to embodied women. For women’s participation to make a transformative difference, women and men must find ways to breathe life into the Resolution so that it can be used to challenge the ideas that war and masculinity are intertwined and that women are the peacemakers. Women’s peace advocacy needs to imagine a “multi-gendered” transformation rather than one that is gender-free.


296. Baden & Goetz, supra note 114, at 34.
I now turn to my second question of strategy: whether it is possible to work against militarism and women's inequality from within the institutions that are invested in their continuation or whether mainstream institutions are best influenced from the outside by "finding new words and creating new methods." In many ways, the "inside" engagement with the Security Council has been productive for international women's peace activism in a number of fora. First, the continuing interaction with Council members has provided important openings for dialogue, although the formality that attaches to these occasions can be limiting. Second, the new infrastructure of U.N. supportive mechanisms, prompted by the Resolution, also brims with possibilities. Many parts of the U.N. system have been engaged in developing policies and programs associated with the Resolution, and full-time gender advisers have been appointed in most peacekeeping operations, as well as in the DPKO. Third, the General Assembly eventually expressed its support in 2003 when it referred approvingly to Resolution 1325 in its own resolution promoting women's increased participation in conflict resolution.

However, as I have indicated, the Resolution has been even more productive outside the formal systems of the U.N., creating a focus for women in many countries to assert the importance of their inclusion in conflict resolution and peace processes. In turn, this activism has given impetus to the developments within the U.N. system. The Secretary-General's 2004 Report on implementation acknowledges the "major contributions" of the "women's movement" and, as I have said, makes specific reference to the Mano River Women's Peace Network and WILPF. The question is whether these developments are evidence of cooption or whether they signal institutional change. Perhaps it is too early to tell, but one lesson that can be drawn from this experience is the importance of both outside and inside organization for change; pursuing transformative goals within mainstream institutions depends, above all, on a productive relationship with outside activism.

As these developments have taken place, many of the problems attending institutionalization have become apparent. I have alluded to the tendency to reduce feminist agendas to a set of bureaucratic targets, assessed according to performance indicators and efficiency checklists.

297. WOOLF, supra note 2, at 143.
299. Secretary-General's 2004 Report, supra note 206, ¶ 31.
301. Secretary-General's 2004 Report, supra note 206, ¶ 27.
rather than against the social justice and equality goals of women's peace movements. Jacqui True describes this propensity as coming from the "business case" for gender mainstreaming, linking market ideologies to the way that feminist agendas have been institutionalized. The problem lies not only in how the U.N. system has responded to feminist demands, but also in how feminist agendas have been reshaped by supportive bureaucrats in an attempt to obtain a response from the Council or other official actors. The UNTAET Gender Affairs Unit's (re)interpretation of the Platform for Action adopted by the 2000 Congress of Women provides an instructive example. Charlesworth and Wood found that many women's NGOs in Timor-Leste were unhappy with the "wide discrepancies" between their Platform and the Gender Unit's implementation version, which they felt displayed an "imperial" attitude. Whitworth has suggested that the discrepancies may be due to the Unit's attempt to make the Platform "useable" within the institutional framework of the United Nations in order to increase the chances of its adoption by UNTAET. If Whitworth is correct, this example illustrates the difficult choices that "inside" engagement can pose and how easy it is to be swept along by bureaucratic goals; indeed, it supports the cooption thesis.

Compounding matters further is the lack of political will to implement the Resolution. A gender analysis conducted by OSAGI of the 264 reports made by the Secretary-General to the Security Council between January 2000 and September 2003 found that less than eighteen percent made multiple references to gender concerns and that, overall, the majority of the references related to women as victims of conflict rather than as "potential dynamic actors." The analysis also found no noticeable difference in the (lack of) awareness of gender issues as a result of the adoption of the Resolution. An analysis of the Security Council resolutions adopted over the same period found that less than fifteen percent contained language on women or gender issues. The Secretary-General's 2004 Report notes that the figure from January

304. WHITWORTH, supra note 285, at 138.
306. Id.
307. Id.
2000 to June 2004 was slightly higher, while his 2005 Report puts the figure lower at approximately fourteen percent—hardly a promising progression. To the Council's credit, it did finally request that the Secretary-General prepare an action plan for implementation of the Resolution, which was presented to the Council in October 2005. The plan is the result of wide consultation and details specific outcomes to be achieved between 2005 and 2007, including ensuring women's full participation in peace processes and in designing post-conflict reconstruction and governance frameworks.

Yet, in the larger context of U.N. reform, the Secretary-General has forgotten his pledge to ensure women's full participation. In Larger Freedom identifies "security" as one of the three pillars of the United Nations, along with development and human rights. Yet there is not a single reference to women's participation in conflict resolution in the security proposals aimed at achieving "freedom from fear." Further, the absence of the United Nation's traditional coupling of "peace" with "security" suggests that the post-Cold War turn to spreading militarism is not at issue. How can one make sense of the disconnect between efforts to implement the Resolution and institutional change, when only five months earlier the Secretary-General expressed his intention to "analyze the obstacles and missed opportunities for women's full participation in peace negotiations and develop strategies accordingly"?

The silence threatens the small space that women's peace movements have managed to carve out as a result of their efforts to implement the Resolution.

In sum, at best women have gained a precarious new space from which to promote feminist goals, a space that is only partially inside the formal institutional processes of the United Nations. Despite the dangers of cooption, the bureaucratizing effects of institutionalization, and the vagaries of shifting political agendas, I do not think there is really a choice about "inside" engagement, especially now that "gender" has po-

308. Secretary-General's 2004 Report, supra note 206, ¶ 6.
312. Id. objectives B.1 and E.3.
314. Id. ¶¶ 74-126.
315. Secretary-General's 2004 Report, supra note 206, ¶ 30.
political and legal effects as a formal consideration in the shaping of institutional policies and programs. Precisely because of the concrete effects of feminist activism, feminists need to engage critically with the results and learn how to work with and multiply the possibilities that have been created, as well as avoid and mitigate the dangers. But inside engagement does not mean that “outside” organization is no longer important; quite the reverse. Every moment in the life of the Resolution has shown the crucial importance of outside support from women’s movements for peace, locally and globally, for inside change. The experience of the Timor-Leste Gender Affairs Unit shows how crucial it is that those working from the inside of mainstream institutions remain linked with and accountable to the outside base of grassroots women’s movements. Those working from outside, and from within, need to value and protect the “in-between” location that has been opened up and develop a better understanding of what might be possible from such a site. Otherwise, there remains a good case for the argument that refusing to join the “master’s” project is the best way to work towards the prevention of war.

Conclusion

Nearly a decade of international efforts by women to promote a permanent peace, based not on militarism but on social and economic justice and women’s equality, has been given a new focus by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325. This new focus has been productive for feminist activism both within the U.N. and outside it, in local communities and in national and international NGOs. However, to paraphrase Foucault, no strategy is without its dangers. The danger of the Resolution can be seen in the way that emancipatory agendas can be turned to the service of global regimes of power by deploying gender as a biological category and reducing its transformative vision to a set of bureaucratic techniques and measurements. By such means, the category of gender can be used for purposes that are antithetical to feminism; to legitimate the hierarchies and inequalities of the global order, rather than disrupt them.

Despite the dangers, some small unsteady steps have been taken towards increasing the participation of women in formal decision-making.

316. True, supra note 302, at 387.
related to conflict resolution and peace-building. There has also been some measured progress towards including “women’s” issues in peace agreements and protecting women's rights in the new constitutions of post-conflict societies, as the examples of Afghanistan and Timor-Leste show. However, none of this “inside” progress would have been possible without the “outside” efforts of local and international feminist peace and human rights organizations, which have inspired and sustained those working from the inside. Furthermore, these developments have little chance of improving the lives of most women unless activists and decision-makers alike are able to break out of the rigid dichotomies of gender that have helped to discursively constitute militarism as indispensable to peace. As experience has already shown, despite the persistent lobbying of NGOs and the growing number of women with decision-making power, even the immediate threats to women's security in transitional and post-conflict societies remain unchecked, and women's insecurity may even worsen.

So what can be learned from this experience? I have argued that unless issues associated with representation and strategy are addressed, the pacifist goals of international women's peace movements, expressed powerfully by The Hague Congress of Women in 1915 and informed since then by the vision and work of many others, will remain marginalized by the mainstream discourses and institutions of militarism, despite the adoption of the Resolution and the activity that it has generated.

With respect to representational issues, it is clear that the presence of women in formal decision-making structures is not in itself enough to reshape gendered regimes of power. Women's presence needs to be an empowered presence if it is to make a difference; they must be able to question militarism and promote alternative perspectives that would previously have been dismissed as “a sign of weakness.” For this transformation to happen, women need to break out of the limitations imposed on them by the idea that they are there to represent a narrow range of “women’s” interests associated with gender as a biological category. A creative and situated (re)crafting of the representations of women that urge women’s participation is necessary, reworking the injured, maternal, and imperial identities that result from and perpetuate women’s inequality. Women's solidarity in the cause of peace needs to build on their resistive agency and on an understanding of the richness of gender in its social and analytical forms, in order to contest the power that women's masculine “protectors” have assumed as their due. There is early evidence of such shifts in the new female representations associated with the Resolution, but they need to be strengthened and multi-gendered so that the certainties of gendered dichotomies are refused.
This restructuring could be done by embracing compliant and unruly representations of women and forging alliances with gender-disruptive men.

Questions of strategy, another subject of continuing debate between feminists, have also been illuminated by the experience of the Resolution. It is clear that “finding new words and creating new methods” may not be possible from within institutions of power, but this goal was never going to be easy. The Resolution has opened up an “in-between” space, making it possible for women engaged in formal decision-making processes to retain a close association with grassroots women’s movements. “Harnessing” the energy and activism that women’s organizations devote to informal peace-building activities, as the Secretary-General proposes, and bringing them into formal activities should never be allowed to replace women’s informal peace activism. As research prompted by the Resolution is confirming, women are everywhere “taking risks” in their local communities to promote “alternative ways of organizing security and building the peace.” Without careful accountability to such grassroots movements, the radical potential of women’s peace agendas will not survive the disciplining force of institutionalization.

The long history of women’s international peace activism has given birth to Resolution 1325. Those who have sought to have its implementation shaped and informed by its feminist history have been confronted by the fault-lines of gender-based activism: how the category of gender interrelates with other hierarchies of power; how to acknowledge the relational quality of gender and engage men in feminist projects; how not to repeat the hierarchical dualisms that underpin militarism and women’s inequality; how women’s autonomous activism can influence mainstream political and legal institutions; how to engage with bureaucratic agendas without cooption; and how to imagine women as full subjects in mainstream political and legal discourses. These fault-lines can be both overwhelming and revitalizing because they necessitate continued critical self-reflection. However, it is never “a sign of weakness” to engage in challenging new thinking about old categories and taken-for-granted ways of getting things done. This Resolution could easily have gathered dust in the archives of Security Council failures of vision and hope. Instead, women’s peace activists have attempted to make it their own, achieving some hard-won successes and generating many new lessons from which to learn.

318. Rehn & Sirleaf, supra note 141, at 2.