Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure

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TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: YOUNG WOMEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE PRAXIS OF PLEASURE

Bridget J. Crawford*

INTRODUCTION • 100

I. THIRD-WAVE FEMINISM • 106
   A. Origins of Third-Wave Feminism • 106
   B. Major Writings of Third-Wave Feminism • 109
   C. Principal Ideas of Third-Wave Feminism • 116
      1. Dissatisfaction with Earlier Feminists • 116
      2. Multiple Nature of Personal Identity • 118
      3. Joy of Embracing Traditional Feminine Appearance and Attributes • 120
      4. Centrality of Sexual Pleasure and Sexual Self-Awareness • 122
      5. Obstacles to Economic Empowerment • 122
      6. Social and Cultural Impact of Media and Technology • 123
   D. Principal Methods of Third-Wave Feminism • 124
      1. Personal Story-Telling • 125
      2. Coalition-Building • 127
      3. Harnessing and Interpreting Media • 127

II. THE SEX WARS OF THE SECOND WAVE • 133
   A. Pornography is a Feminist Issue • 133
   B. Dominance Feminism and Pornography’s Harms • 136
   C. Liberal Feminism and Censorship’s Harms • 138

III. THE THIRD WAVE TAKES ON PORNOGRAPHY • 139
   A. Pornography as Sexual Expression • 141
   B. Pornography as Performance • 147
   C. Pornography as (Just Another) Exploitation • 150
   D. Pornography as the Praxis of Pleasure • 152

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IV. THE THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST AGENDA • 155
V. TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY • 158
   A. Third-Wave Feminism and the Law • 158
      1. Pre-Legal Third-Wave Feminism • 158
      2. Limited-Means Third-Wave Feminism • 160
      3. Limited-Ends Third-Wave Feminism • 161
      4. Extra-Legal Third-Wave Feminism • 162
   B. Third-Wave Feminism and the Power of Culture Work • 164

CONCLUSION • 167

INTRODUCTION

Feminists are ugly, boring, and shrill, according to their critics. The media stereotype feminists as anti-beauty, anti-pleasure, and anti-fun. Many young women today shun the feminist label, not wanting to be lumped in with the bra-burning, hairy-legged, strident “women’s libber” of the 1970s. Young women who do identify themselves as feminists go to great lengths to explain how their brand of feminism is different from the feminism of their mothers. This self-

1. Writer Anna Quindlen quotes one professor as saying that “[t]here are a lot of homely women in women’s studies . . . . Preaching these antimale, antisex sermons is a way for them to compensate for various heartaches—they’re just mad at the beautiful girls.” Anna Quindlen, And Now, Babe Feminism, in “BAD GIRLS”/“GOOD GIRLS”: WOMEN, SEX, AND POWER IN THE NINETIES 4 (Nan Bauer Maglin & Donna Marie Perry eds., 1996) (quoting Clark University Professor Christina Hoff Sommers).
2. See, e.g., Kathleen Trigiani, As Long as Men Like Mr. Mars and Venus Exist . . . , 3 FEMINISTA! No. 8, http://www.feminista.com/archives/v3n8/trigiani.html (“[I]f I had to admit that Andrea [Dworkin] had a valid point or two, would my friends think I was anti-sex, anti-men, anti-pleasure, and anti-free speech?”).
3. As Tucker Carlson, the conservative former co-host of the CNN program Crossfire, has said, “The traditional anti-fun feminist point of view is that of course men are bad, and they make women do bad things.” Crossfire (CNN television broadcast Nov. 20, 2002) (statement of Tucker Carlson).
4. According to a 2001 Gallup Poll, 23% of surveyed respondents consider themselves feminists. Compare Gallup Poll, June 11–17, 2001 (Q 30: “Do you consider yourself a feminist, or not?”), with 1999 Gallup Poll, Feb. 3–7, 1999 (26% of those surveyed consider themselves feminists); Gallup Poll Feb. 5–11, 1986 (10% of respondents surveyed self-identify as a “strong feminist,” 46% self-identify as feminist, 28% identify as not a feminist, 4% identify as anti-feminist and 13% cannot say); Gallup Poll, Dec. 17–19, 1992 (33% of people surveyed consider themselves feminists); Gallup Poll, Oct. 10–11, 1991 (30.40% of people surveyed consider themselves feminists). One CBS poll reports that 22% of women said that being called a feminist would be considered an “insult.” Carey Roberts, Feminine Mystique, or Feminine Mistake?, RE-NEW AMERICA, Feb. 14, 2006, available at http://www.renewamerica.us/columns/roberts/060214. But see Women’s Equality Poll: 1995, Peter Y. Harris Research
proclaimed “third wave” of feminists consists of women who are too young to have taken part in the “second wave” of 1970s activism, let alone the “first wave” of nineteenth-century advocacy for women’s rights. These third-wave feminists bemoan the older generation’s perceived monopoly on feminist leadership and its failure to articulate a broadly inclusive (or even relevant) feminist movement. The popular press and academic disciplines other than law have remarked on this incipient body of third-wave feminist writings, but legal scholars have

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The word “feminism” is a twentieth-century term that describes a particular subsection of woman suffragists. See Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern Feminism 3 (1987) (“The appearance of Feminism in the 1910s signaled a new phase in the debate and agitation about women’s rights and freedoms that had flared for hundreds of years. People in the nineteenth century did not say feminism. They spoke of the advancement of woman or the cause of woman, woman’s rights, and woman suffrage.”).

6. See Lillian S. Robinson, Subject/Position, in “Bad Girls”/“Good Girls,” supra note 1, at 177, 182 (“All contemporary feminisms are anchored in the notion of breaking silence. The problem is that the feminism that went public in the late 1960s and early 1970s ... broke silence about the systemic oppression of women, however we named the system, whereas the newer ‘third wave’ seems inclined to break silence chiefly about oppressions perceived or experienced within feminism itself.”). At least one commentator notes that the third-wave’s self-proclaimed generational conflict is “over-hyped,” insofar as “many third-wavers have a past association with Ms., a bastion of second-wave feminism. Women of color in the third wave in particular very carefully portray themselves as contiguous with their foremothers and borrow heavily from their theoretical work.” Jennifer Gilley, Writings of the Third-Wave: Young Feminists in Conversation, 44 Reference & User Serv. Q. 187, 191 (2005).

7. See, e.g., Jennifer Baumgardner & Amy Richards, Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future 219 (2000) (describing young feminists’ critique of older feminists’ ideas such as “Take Our Daughters to Work” day).

8. See Ginia Bellafante, Feminism: It’s All About Me, TIME, June 29, 1998, at 54; Louise Story, Many Women at Elite Colleges Set Career Path to Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES,
been slow to notice it.\textsuperscript{9} This Article explores the contours of third-wave feminism and suggests the ways in which legal theory might be enriched by it.\textsuperscript{10} 

To date, third-wave feminist writing has focused primarily on non-legal (and non-theoretical) aspects of female sexuality, economic mobility and the multi-faceted nature of racial, ethnic, class and gender identities. Third-wave feminist writers also acknowledge and emphasize the role of culture, media and technology in shaping those identities. These writers tend to take a broad view of "women's issues" by connecting traditional feminist concerns such as reproductive freedom and discrimination in employment with broader justice movements for workers, immigrants, gays and lesbians and other disadvantaged groups.

Notwithstanding their interest in social, political and economic-justice issues, third-wave feminists do not write from an explicitly legal perspective. They approach problems of gender inequality as organizers, activists, writers, or scholars in disciplines other than law.\textsuperscript{11} Third-wave

\textsuperscript{9} This lag in legal scholarship is not unique to the ideas of the third wave. As Martha Chamallas notes, "[l]egal feminism has borrowed heavily from [other disciplines], sometimes taking years to incorporate themes that interdisciplinary scholars outside the law have already explored." MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 16 (2d ed. 2003).

\textsuperscript{10} By virtue of the year of my birth, 1969, I admittedly fall into the demographic category associated with third-wave feminists. Although this may explain my initial attraction to the writings of women and men in my age cohort, this article neither embraces nor rejects third-wave feminist ideas or methods. My aim is to explain and critique third-wave feminist writings in order to integrate them into the intellectual history (and future) of feminist jurisprudence. Third-wave and other feminist traditions value the first-person narrative (see, e.g., infra Part I.D.1), but I intentionally use a traditional, scholarly format in order to reach my intended audience of legal scholars.

\textsuperscript{11} For example, in the introduction to Rebecca Walker's foundational volume of personal essays by third-wave feminists, she notes that the authors are "an eclectic gathering of folks: a fundraiser for women's organizations, a lawyer, a videomaker, an actor, a cultural critic, a professor, a musician, a director of special projects for a film company, a student, a writer of children's books, and yes, among others, two men and a 'supermodel.'" REBECCA WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO TO BE REAL: TELLING THE TRUTH AND CHANGING THE FACE OF FEMINISM xxvi (Rebecca Walker ed., 1995).
feminist writers focus on social change, not on legal issues, strategies or theories. Similarly, or perhaps because of this absence of legal theorizing in third-wave feminist writing, contemporary law scholars have not yet posited any relationship between third-wave writings and feminist legal theory. Using pornography as the central focus, this Article explores the main themes of third-wave feminism and interrogates the claim that third-wave feminism departs in substance and method from its predecessors. Third-wave feminist writing offers a new perspective on familiar issues like pornography, but must be integrated into a larger jurisprudential framework in order to make a meaningful contribution to feminist legal theory and praxis.

Part I of this Article explores the general themes of third-wave feminist writings. The Article begins with an overview of third-wave feminist literature and its predominant concerns. These concerns are (1) dissatisfaction with earlier feminists; (2) the multiple nature of personal identity; (3) the joy of embracing traditional feminine appearance and attributes; (4) the centrality of sexual pleasure and sexual self-awareness; (5) the obstacles to economic empowerment; and (6) the social and cultural impact

The one lawyer who contributes to the volume writes not about legal issues but about being a young woman starting a career. See Min Jin Lee, Pushing Away the Plate, in id. at 87.

12. Third-wave feminist writers are not generally preoccupied with the analysis of formal legal issues, but nevertheless, their work is full of what Paul Shiff Berman and Austin Sarat, among others, call “law talk,” or “the use of legal concepts in everyday language. Such talk includes abstract (and often inchoate) ideas of street justice, due process, civil disobedience, retribution, deterrence, and rights, all of which are frequently invoked both in public discussions and dinner-table conversations alike.” Paul Schiff Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes Toward a Non-Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis, 13 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 95, 102 n. 21 (2001). See also Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients 24–25 (1995) (“'Law talk'... is... the way in which lawyers and clients characterize the nature, operation, and efficiency of legal institutions and characterize the motivation and competence of legal actors. Such talk is deployed strategically and sets the context within which lawyers and clients make decisions about their cases.”); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1687 (1989) (“[L]aw talk of the divorce lawyer's office may be partially responsible for the common finding that people who use legal processes tend, no matter how favorable the results of their encounter, to have a less positive view of the law than those with no direct experience. Law talk in the divorce lawyer's office, as it interprets the internal workings of the legal system, exposes law as failing to live up to the expectations which people have about it.”) (footnote omitted).

of media and technology. Textual analysis reveals third-wave feminists' reliance on non-legal tools for remedying gender inequality. Although third-wave feminists acknowledge the law's role in women's historical advancement, they do not articulate a meaningful role for the law in achieving gender equality now or in the future. Their methods instead are (1) personal story-telling; (2) coalition building; and (3) harnessing and interpreting media.

Part II provides a brief overview of the history of feminist debates on pornography. Pornography has been a divisive issue for second-wave feminists. Historically second-wave feminists have taken up strong ideological positions on either side of what have been called the "sex wars."

On the one hand, so-called "pro-regulation" feminists like Catharine MacKinnon16 claim that pornography "is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an institution of gender inequality." Model ordinances drafted by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin define as sex discrimination any coercion into pornography, assault due to pornography and defamation through pornography. On the other hand, so-called "pro-sex" feminists like Lisa Duggan, Nan Hunter and Carole Vance oppose restrictions on pornography as evidence of constraining and puritanical sexual norms. Both in popular culture and academic


18. ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY & CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY, app. D (1988) ("It is sex discrimination to defame any person through the unauthorized use in pornography of their proper name, image, and/or recognizable personal likeness.").

TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

arguments, many characterize the feminist debate on pornography as a struggle between the (bad) forces of censorship and the (good) freedoms of the First Amendment. 20

After examining the second-wave debate on pornography in Part II, Part III details and critiques third-wave feminist writings on pornography. Although they claim to have a fresh perspective on the issue, third-wave feminists' emphasis on the individual consumer's role in the interpretation of pornography is in some ways an extension of the arguments of the "pro-sex" second-wave feminists. Third-wave feminists fail to acknowledge the possibility that pornography harms either the women who are involved in its production or those who consume it. Third-wave feminists view pornography as disconnected from law and the legal system. 21

Part IV pulls back from third-wave writings on pornography to explore the stated third-wave feminist social and political agenda. The third wave's substantive goals organize into five subsets: politics, education, health, the economy and—somewhat amorphously—law. The least developed of these is law. Apart from broad aspirations for equality between women and men, it is not clear what role third-wave feminists imagine the law should play in improving women's lives.

Part V suggests four explanations for the absence of meaningful consideration of the law in most third-wave writings. One hypothesis is that third-wave writing is pre-legal; third-wave feminists simply have not thought enough about the law in order to articulate its function in achieving third-wave feminist aims. Another hypothesis is that third-wave feminists take a limited-means view of the law, i.e., that the legal system has inherent limitations in what it can accomplish for women. A third possibility is that third-wave feminists take a limited-ends view of the law, i.e., that the accomplishments of second-wave feminists (largely achieved through the legal system) have failed to translate into enough change (or enough of the right kind of change) in women's lives. Finally, third-wave feminists may take an extra-legal view of change, seeking to abandon the law entirely, and instead transform society through culture. The Article concludes by suggesting how this extra-legal approach may set the stage for the development of a vibrant third-wave feminist legal theory.


21. See infra Part III.
I. Third-Wave Feminism

A. Origins of Third-Wave Feminism

Clarence Thomas's appointment in 1991 to the United States Supreme Court was a watershed event in the history of American feminism. Shortly after Thomas's nomination, Anita Hill, a professor at University of Oklahoma School of Law and a former colleague of Thomas's at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleged that Thomas had spoken with her about pornographic films, bragged of his own sexual abilities and asked her for dates. At first, the Senate Judiciary Committee did not respond to Hill's allegations of sexual harassment. When the Committee did raise the allegations with Judge Thomas and held formal hearings, some observers perceived a lack of sensitivity on the part of the all-male senators. Women all over the country who witnessed the televised hearings became outraged at what they perceived as mistreatment of Hill by the "all-male club" of the Senate Judiciary Committee.


He spoke about acts he had seen in pornographic files involving such matters as women having sex with animals, and films showing group sex or rape scenes . . . . On several occasions Thomas told me graphically of his own sexual prowess . . . . One of the oddest episodes I remember was an occasion in which Thomas was drinking a Coke in his office, he got up from the table, at which we were working, went over to his desk to get the Coke, looked at the can and asked, "[w]ho has put pubic hair on my Coke?" On other occasions he referred to the size of his own penis as being larger than normal and he also spoke on some occasions of the pleasures he had given to women with oral sex.

Id.

24. Id. at 38.

25. Id.

26. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, The Thomas Nomination: The Senate and Sexism; Panel's Handling of Harassment Allegation Renews Questions About an All-Male Club, N.Y.
Writing in angry response to the Thomas hearings, then-twenty-two-year-old writer Rebecca Walker proclamation in the pages of Ms. magazine that the Senate proceedings “were not about determining whether or not Clarence Thomas did in fact harass Anita Hill. They were about checking and redefining the extent of women’s credibility and power.” Walker exhorted “all women, especially the women of my generation,” to harness their angry responses to Anita Hill’s treatment and “translate [those responses] into tangible action.” Walker then outlined her plan for large-scale resistance to misogynist behaviors, through words and actions. She encouraged women “of [her] generation” to take Anita Hill’s “dismissal” as a spur to “political power,” urging young women, “[d]o not vote for [men] unless they work for us. Do not have sex with them, do not break bread with them, do not nurture them if

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2007] TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 107

Times, Oct. 8, 1991, at A1. Linda L. Ammons comments that the Thomas hearings “illustrate how a well-respected, established black woman is vulnerable to attack when she challenges the veracity of a soon-to-be-appointed justice of the United States Supreme Court. Justice Thomas used racial imagery . . . to deflect attention from the disputed facts of his alleged misconduct . . . . Hill received the verbal lashing of senators, and was portrayed not just as unworthy of belief, but as mad (a jezebel-sapphire combination).” Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 1003, 1066 (1995).


29. Id. at 86-87.

30. Id.

31. In the same article, Walker describes two other experiences that she does not link explicitly to the Thomas confirmation hearings. See id. First she relates a conversation with “the man I am intimate with” in which the man expressed concern about Thomas’s civil rights record. Id. Walker, in her own words, “launched into a tirade,” asking, “When will progressive black men prioritize my rights and well-being? When will they stop talking so damn much about ‘the race’ as if it revolved exclusively around them? . . . I need to know, are you with me, or are you going to help them try to destroy me?” Id. Although the identity of those “trying to destroy” Walker is not immediately obvious, one may surmise that she refers to men generally. See id.

In the second experience, Walker describes the rage she feels at hearing a man on a train speak loudly how he “fucked that bitch all night and then I never called her again,” and the “girlies over there, you know that ho. Well, I snatched that shit up.” Id. When she angrily tells the man to cease his vulgar boasting, the man reacts negatively, accusing Walker of overreacting. Id. In describing the other people traveling on the train, including a mother and her daughter with “brown skin . . . glowing and smooth,” Walker explains that her thoughts are “how I can transform the situation, of all the people in the car whose silence makes us complicit.” Id.
they do not prioritize our freedom to control our bodies and our lives.”32 She then abruptly ended the article with the portentous proclamation, “I am not a postfeminism feminist. I am the Third Wave.”33

Historically speaking, Walker’s article was the first to envision and call for a vibrant, active “third wave” of feminism as a generation-based movement.34 Walker envisioned the accretion of political power to women generally, and to young women in particular. Other writers and activists subsequently adopted Walker’s “third wave” label and began to name older feminists, not men or society in general, as the stumbling block to success for the women’s movement.35 For the most part, the third wave has been defined by reference to the age of its participants, i.e., those who came into a political consciousness in the 1980s and 1990s.36 The next section provides an overview of the writings and writers who responded to or adopted Walker’s third-wave label.

32. Id. Walker’s exhortation echoes Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, whose anti-war strategy involved withholding sexual congress from men. In that play, the character exhorted that it “[d]oesn’t matter what they threaten to do—even if they try to set fire to the place—they won’t make us open the gates except on our own terms.” ARISTOPHANES, LYSISTRATA, 189 (Alan Sommerstein trans., Penguin Books 1973).

33. Walker, supra note 28, at 86–87. Some scholars have noted that Walker’s “use of the word ‘I’ highlights the third-wave’s focus on individualism, but also its reluctance to speak in an assumed—and potentially false—solidarity.” Gilley, supra note 6, at 189; see also Astrid Henry, Not My Mother’s Sister: Generational Conflict and Third-Wave Feminism 43 (2004) (“In calling for a new wave, Walker does not speak in a collective voice . . . . An early expression of what was to become a common theme within third-wave discourse, Walker’s essay does not attempt to speak in the name of other women.”). Generally the “wave” image is used to “denote continuity of movement containing swells and troughs rather than discrete, isolated periods of political involvement.” Gilley, supra note 6, at 188.

34. The phrase may have its intellectual origins in Alvin Toffler’s classic socio-scientific text, The Third Wave, in which he argues that history can be broken into three waves: the first being agrarian, the second being industrial, and the third being information-oriented. See ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 13–14 (1980). “The Third Wave” was also the intended title of a volume of feminist essays on race relations to be published by the Kitchen Table Press. This book, to be called The Third Wave: Feminist Perspectives on Racism, was never published, but “the phrase survived, albeit largely without common knowledge of its antiracist roots.” Gilley, supra note 6, at 189. Some writers locate the origins of third-wave feminism in the “Riot Grrrl” movement of the same period. See, e.g., Lisa B. Rundle, Grrrls, Grrrls, 19 HERIZONS No. 1, June 22, 2005, at 31 (“The punk-rockin’, hard-talkin’ ladies [associated with Riot Grrrls] claimed the stage, screamed about the realities of their lives, threw ‘look pretty’ way off the priority list and revolutionized young women’s relationships to the powerful world of popular music.”).

35. See infra Part I.A.

36. Gilley, supra note 6, at 188; see HEYWOOD & DRAKE, supra note 5, at 4 (defining third-wave feminists as those born between 1963 and 1974); see also DIFFERENT WAVELENGTHS, supra note 8, at xvi (“I feel feminist but do not fit into a second (i.e.,
TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

B. Major Writings of Third-Wave Feminism

In the roughly ten years following the Thomas confirmation hearings, several academic and popular books echoed, responded to or expanded Walker's call for a new role for young women within the feminist movement. The first of these books was Naomi Wolf's popular text, Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How It Will Change the 21st Century, published in 1993. In that book, Wolf rejects a "victim feminism" that claims men are responsible for women's problems. She embraces instead a "power feminism" in which women seize power that they, just like men, naturally desire. Other authors advocated variations on Wolf's brand of feminism. Writers called this new feminism "babe feminism" or "do-me feminism.

Describing campus feminism in the early 1990s, Katie Roiphe, for example, claimed that date-rape was an over-reported phenomenon, a false claim advanced frequently by college-age women who had sexual intercourse with a man and later starting in the 1960s and 1970s and continuing into the backlash 1980s) or third-wave (i.e., argued by some as beginning in the 1990s) description. I am barely a baby boomer and too young for the second wave, and not quite a member of Generation X, making me too old for the third wave.


38. Wolf, supra note 22, at xvii ("[V]ictim feminism... casts women as sexually pure and mystically nurturing, and stresses the evil done to these 'good' women as a way to petition for their rights. The other, which I call 'power feminism,' sees women as human beings—sexual, individual, no better or worse than their male counterparts—and lays claim to equality simply because women are entitled to it."). That power feminism was later criticized as "not a 'new school' in feminism, but rather a very old school imbedded in whiteness, privilege, 'beauty,' and consumerism of which the mainstream media has always been in favor." Walker, To Be Real, supra note 11, at 17.

39. Quindlen, supra note 1, at 4 ("[C]hange is far from over; there's still plenty to do, and much of it will be working with our male friends... It's babe feminism—we're young, we're fun, we do what we want in bed—and it has a shorter shelf life than the feminism of sisterhood. I've been a babe, and I've been a sister. Sister lasts longer.").

40. Tad Friend, Yes, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1994, at 48. Quindlen has described these women as having "an agenda heavy on sex when and how they want it, with no guilt, no regrets." Quindlen, supra note 1, at 3–4. But see Maureen Dowd, How To Snag 2,000 Men, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at A23 ("Now we have bimbo feminism, giving intellectual pretensions to a world where the highest ideal is to acknowledge your inner slut. I am woman, see me strip.").
Some scholars categorize Wolf and Roiphe with Walker as among the initial third-wave feminists. In 1995, two volumes of personal essays appeared that became a model for much of the third-wave writing that has followed. The first of those volumes, edited by Rebecca Walker herself, is entitled *To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of Feminism*. In Walker’s words, the essays are intended to be “personal, honest and record a transformative journey taken.” That journey is one of reconciling one’s politics and sometimes contradictory lives and practices. The volume’s essays range from an account of “How Does a Supermodel Do Feminism?” to discussions of male sexuality, marriage, the internet, hip-hop music and racial identity. In *To Be Real*, men and women describe their personal experiences of a “new feminism,” one that Walker claims is:

> [L]ike a welcome sign to my generation of young women, allowing us to at once differentiate ourselves from our feminist mothers and at the same time achieve mainstream power in our careers and love lives. It allows us the self-righteousness of

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41. Katie Roiphe, *The Morning After: Sex, Fear and Feminism on Campus* 79–80 (1994). Roiphe’s denunciation of “victim feminism” is echoed by Camille Paglia: “We cannot have this scenario being projected of male rapaciousness and brutality and female victimage. We have got to make women realize they are responsible, that sexuality is something that belongs to them. They have an enormous power in their sexuality. It’s up to them to use it correctly and to be wise about where they go and what they do.” *Camille Paglia, Sex, Art and American Culture* 267 (1992). Wolf, Roiphe, and Paglia are highly influential on third-wave feminist writing insofar as “[n]early every third-wave book critically engages and debunks as reactionary or anti-feminist all three of these writers; yet their construction of a rigid, self-righteous victim feminism versus a fun and liberating power feminism is a caricatured version of themes that resonate in much of third-wave writing.” Gilley, *supra* note 6, at 188.

42. See Gilley, *supra* note 6.


44. *Id.* at xxxvii.

45. *Id.* (As an editor, Walker says that, “I wanted to know more about how people reconciled aspects of their lives that they felt ashamed of with politics they believed in. I especially wanted to hear experiences of people attempting to live their lives envisioning or experiencing identities beyond those inscribed on them by the surrounding culture.”).


47. See Jason Shultz, *Getting Off on Feminism*, in *To Be Real*, *supra* note 11, at 107.


49. See Mocha Jean Herrup, *Virtual Identity*, in *To Be Real*, *supra* note 11, at 239.


51. See Danzy Senna, *To Be Real*, in *To Be Real*, *supra* note 11, at 5.
being political activists without the economic sacrifice or social marginalization that has so often come along with that role. It is a feminism no longer on the defensive, with a fun, playful aesthetic that acknowledges the erotic and narcissistic pleasure women receive from beautifying themselves, a pleasure not to be denied.\footnote{Id. at 16.}

The “fun, playful” third-wave feminist who likes beauty and power serves as the antidote to the socially-marginalized activist of the preceding generation. One third-wave feminist offers that the third wave of feminism is so different from its predecessors that,

Maybe a national billboard campaign needs to be launched. We need giant signs above every campus and freeway that read: “Hey America! Don’t be afraid of the word ‘feminist’! It doesn’t mean man-hating or being humorless! There is a new thing called ‘third wave’ feminism that will open the door so you can embrace politics by being who you are!”\footnote{Kristina Sheryl Wong, Pranks and Fake Porn: Doing Feminism My Way, in CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 296.}

From its origins, third-wave feminism has defined itself principally by reference to its difference from the feminism that preceded it. Parts III and IV of this Article question the accuracy of that self-description.\footnote{See infra Parts III, IV.}

The second volume of personal essays published in 1995 is \textit{Listen Up: Voices From the Next Feminist Generation.}\footnote{Listen Up is similar to Walker’s \textit{To Be Real} in that its essays are largely personal. Writing in the preface to the second edition, editor Barbara Findlen explains that “[w]hen \textit{Listen Up} was first published in the spring of 1995, there were few outlets for young feminist voices . . . . Part of the impetus for doing the book . . . was to create a visible, public forum for our experiences as young feminists, and to affirm our presence.”\footnote{LISTEN UP: VOICES FROM THE NEXT FEMINIST GENERATION (Barbara Findlen ed., 1995).} The anthology includes essays from writers of different backgrounds. In “Bringing Feminism a la Casa,” Daisy Hernández asks, “How do you go off to college, learn about feminism in English and then bring it back to a working-class community where women call their children in from the street at night

\footnote{Kristina Sheryl Wong, Pranks and Fake Porn: Doing Feminism My Way, in CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 296.}
in every language—except ‘standard’ English?" In “Woman Who Clears the Way,” Lisa Tiger describes the reaction of her Native American community to the news that she is HIV-positive, and the experiences that led her to become a social activist. Listen Up is full of stories of women who acknowledge, struggle with and incorporate feminism into their everyday lives.

In 1997, two years after To Be Real and Listen Up, a third volume of essays on third-wave feminism appeared. The professor-editors of Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism claim that their volume “picks up” where Listen Up and To Be Real “left off” by “[f]using the confessional mode of earlier popular feminism with the more analytic mode that has predominated in the academy since the 1980s.” The essays of Third Wave Agenda “give an emotional life and a personal stake sometimes missing from academic writing, while maintaining an analytic focus.”

By 1997, then, Rebecca Walker’s proclamation of a third wave of feminism was being taken seriously by academics who sought to integrate the personal story-telling of young women with formal studies of feminist and cultural theories. As in To Be Real and Listen Up, Third Wave Agenda portrays third-wave feminism as “a movement that contains elements of second wave critique of beauty culture, sexual abuse, and power structures while it also acknowledges and makes use of the pleasure, danger, and defining power of those structures.” These themes were explored further in two academic journals, Hypatia and Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society, which devoted entire

58. Id. at 209.
59. Id. at 153, 156-58.
60. Third Wave Agenda, supra note 5.
62. Id. For a critical perspective on Third Wave Agenda, see Barbara Ryan, Feminism for the 21st Century, NWSA J., 12:1 at 185 (Mar. 22, 2000) (Heywood & Drake “speak of anger as a difference for their generation (the older generation is characterized by exhilaration and fatigue). This is puzzling because anger was prevalent in the early years, and contemporary feminists have often been faulted for it.”). According to Barbara Ryan, third-wave authors “often feel the need to frame things in the wider vision they have (i.e., that was lacking among older feminists).” Id.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 27-33.
64. Several minor anthologies adopted personal story-telling as a vehicle for defining third-wave feminism. See Colonize This! Young Women of Color on Today’s Feminism (Daisy Hernandez & Bushra Rehman eds., 2002).
65. Third Wave Agenda’s personal story-telling and academic framework also was adopted by the editors of Catching a Wave, supra note 4.
66. Heywood & Drake, supra note 5, at 3.
67. 12 Hypatia No. 3, Summer 1997.
68. 27 Signs 575 (Spring 1998).
issues in 1997 to young women and feminism. By 1997, third-wave feminism was being articulated in formal, theoretical and academic terms.69

The trend toward academic study of third-wave feminism relaxed somewhat in 2000 with the publication of Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism and the Future.70 This book, written by Jennifer Baumgardner and Jennifer Richards, two young activists/writers, is perhaps the most widely-quoted third-wave feminist text. In it, Baumgardner and Richards attempt to define feminism71 and articulate formal goals for contemporary feminism.72 Their thirteen-point “manifesta,” or agenda for young feminists, includes reproductive rights,73 equal access to health care,74 making workplaces “responsive to an individual’s wants, needs, and talents,”75 and passing an Equal Rights Amendment.76 Baumgardner and Richards explain that for the women of the third wave, feminism “is like fluoride. We scarcely notice that we have it—it’s simply in the water .... The only problem is that, while on a personal level feminism is everywhere, like fluoride, on a political level the movement is more like nitrogen: ubiquitous and inert.”77 For Baumgardner and Richards, the

69. Among the first full-length academic treatments of third-wave feminism are HENRY, NOT MY MOTHER’S SISTER, supra note 33, at 43, and DIFFERENT WAVELENGTHS, supra note 8. In 1999, two such volumes appeared. The first was THE BUST GUIDE TO THE NEW GIRL ORDER, representing outstanding essays from the first six years of the publication of Bust, which started as a ‘zine but then became a glossy magazine. THE BUST GUIDE TO THE NEW GIRL ORDER (Marcelle Karp & Debbie Stoller eds., 1999). That volume started off with the editor’s exhortation, “Wake up and smell the lip-gloss ladies: The New Girl Order has arrived!” Id. at xv. The second volume from that year was JOAN MORGAN, WHEN CHICKENHEADS COME HOME TO ROOST: MY LIFE AS A HIP-HOP FEMINIST (1999). I leave these out of the main text’s discussion because they are not texts that future writers respond to explicitly. Nevertheless, their themes are important and echoed by later third-wave feminist authors. For criticism of THE BUST GUIDE TO THE NEW GIRL ORDER, see Jessica Reaves, The BUST Guide to the New Girl Order, Ms., August/September 1999, at 92 (reviewing THE BUST GUIDE TO THE NEW GIRL ORDER, calling it “unpleasantly glib” and full of “haphazard observations and first-hand accounts”).

70. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7.

71. “[F]eminism has three components. It is a movement, meaning a group working to accomplish specific goals. Those goals are social and political change—implying that one must be engaged with the government and laws, as well as social practices and beliefs. And implicit in these goals is access to sufficient information to enable women to make responsible choices.” Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).

72. Id. at 278.

73. Id. at 279; see infra Part IV.A.

74. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 280.

75. Id.

76. Id. at 281.

77. Id. at 17–18.
problem with feminism, then, is that women simultaneously take it for granted and dismiss it for lacking vitality. Third-wave texts that followed Manifesta explore this tension between ubiquity and inertia. Young writers attempt to define and reinvigorate young women’s relationship to feminism through a variety of themes such as young women’s sexual attitudes, marriage, motherhood, Jewish identity, Asian identity, and the role of women of color in the feminist movement, among other topics.

In 2004, two professors published an anthology of third-wave feminist writings, *Voices of a New Generation: A Feminist Anthology*. The academic editors of this anthology acknowledge their explicitly pedagogical aim. They compiled the text in response to requests from students in their women’s studies courses for “voices similar to their own [that] were never heard. [The students] wanted to hear from others deeply concerned about the same issues, others of their own generation, scholars other than those widely anthologized, and voices generated

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78. As one commentator describes it, third-wave women have grown up in an era “knowing about feminism and benefiting from its gains, such as Title IX access to sports programs, entrance to higher education and access to reproductive health care. Many third-wave writers talk about how their feminist mothers or fathers gave them the sense of entitlement that made them feel feminist struggle might no longer be necessary. This prevailing notion led to the idea that we are in a post-feminist age.” Gilley, supra note 6, at 188.


84. See, e.g., *Colonize This!, supra note 64.*


86. *Introduction* to *Voices of a New Generation: A Feminist Anthology* xiii (Sarah Weir & Constance Faulkner eds., 2004).

87. *Id.*
from a greater diversity of backgrounds." 88 The editors state their "hope that this volume both validates and challenges students and offers others new ways of understanding how younger women see themselves in the world in the twenty-first century." 89 Voices includes essays on "Hip Hop Feminism: From Butches to Queens and the Varied Experiences in Between," 90 "On the Complications of Negotiating Dyke Femininity," 91 and "Developing a Feminism Identity: A Father’s Role." 92 The essays address the importance of making feminism inclusive by recognizing the relationship between women’s oppression and economics, 93 increasing awareness of the complexity of racial identity, 94 and building coalitions across racial and ethnic groups. 95 As in To Be Real, published nine years before, in Voices the reader learns that the new generation of feminism embraces beauty and the power of women’s sexuality. 96 From these pages, one surmises that third-wave feminists might advocate for women’s equality with men, but they intend to do so while also celebrating women’s differences from men. 97

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Denise Cooper, Hip Hop Feminism: From Butches to Queens and the Varied Experiences in Between, in Voices of a New Generation, supra note 86, at 53.
93. One author calls for the creation of "an economic paradigm in which the experience of oppression and the struggle for liberation lead to a reevaluation of priorities within our communities and at the global level." Brenda Anibarro, Mujerista Economics: The Creation of a New Economic Paradigm, in Voices of a New Generation, supra note 86, at 3.
95. Camellia Phillips, Taking a Stand on Stolen Ground: The Need for Feminist Movements to Support American Indian Sovereignty, in Voices of a New Generation, supra note 86, at 128. Coalition-building is not original to the third-wave; second-wave feminists did and do recognize its importance, as well. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Merit Badges for the Revolution, Ms., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 94 ("[I]t is clear to me that we can’t fight racism, homophobia, poverty, and patriarchy as separate battles.").
96. See, e.g., bell hooks, Beauty Laid Bare, in To Be Real, supra note 11, at 164 ("Beauty can be and is present in our lives irrespective of our class status. Learning to see and appreciate the presence of beauty is an act of resistance in a culture of domination . . . ."); Rebecca Walker, Lusting for Freedom, in Listen Up, supra note 55, at 20 ("Sex can also be power because knowledge is power, and because yeah, as a girl, you can make it do different things: I can give it to you, and I can take it away. This sex is me, you can say. It is mine, take it.").
97. See, e.g., Daisy Hernandez, Bringing Feminism a la Casa, in Listen Up, supra note 55, at 209–211.
C. Principal Ideas of Third-Wave Feminism

From a survey of the major extant third-wave feminist texts, six central third-wave feminist themes or concerns emerge: (1) dissatisfaction with earlier feminists; (2) the multiple nature of personal identity; (3) the joy of embracing traditional feminine appearance and attributes; (4) the centrality of sexual pleasure and sexual self-awareness; (5) the obstacles to economic empowerment; and (6) the social and cultural impact of media and technology. This section explores in detail each of these themes.

1. Dissatisfaction with Earlier Feminists

Third-wave feminists are dissatisfied with earlier feminists and the movement they have created. Young women perceive older feminists as being unwilling to relinquish control of leadership positions to younger feminists, revealing in some sense the emptiness of a feminist process that values collaboration and coming to voice. Young women are frustrated by being told that they lack the necessary activism and leadership

98. This interest in media and technology has been overlooked or ignored by Women's Studies professors who mention third-wave feminism in their courses. See, e.g., Third-Wave Feminism, http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jemjones/Thirdwaveoutline.html (last visited June 1, 2006) (link from home page for Rutgers University course on Women, Culture and Society, Spring 2006, taught by Professor Jennifer M. Jones).

99. On women's relationship to men, Catharine MacKinnon has remarked that “[t]he measure of closeness often seemed to be the measure of the oppression.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Consciousness Raising, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 86, 94 (1989). Third-wave complaints appear to be directed mostly at their “oppressive” foremothers, perhaps indicating the closeness of the relationship.

100. See, e.g., Sara Boonin, Please—Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Building a Feminist Movement on College Campuses for Today, in CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 149 (“Older mentors must be willing to share experience and knowledge while welcoming the input and co-leadership of younger feminists.”). At least one feminist writer suggests that this reluctance to share power is a problem of liberal women’s organizations, not conservative ones. See Gilman, supra note 22, at 61. Of the conservative Independent Women’s Forum, Gilman notes that:

[T]he women of the IWF . . . have been supremely welcoming to younger women, accepting them, allowing them their own opinions, training them, grooming them for power, and pushing them into the spotlight. With all due respect to my older sisters, the second wave has by and large not done this with the third-wave . . . . [W]e have not been courted or trusted with positions of great visibility to the extent that young conservative women have.

Gilman, supra note 22, at 69.

101. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 94.
characteristics to take on positions of responsibility at mainstream feminist organizations.  

Interestingly, though, at the same time that third-wave feminists assert their own frustration with having few or no feminist leadership positions, they reject the same observation if made by outsiders: "[T]he fact that no one in our generation is yet considered to be a feminist 'queenpin' is the product of ageism in the media and the movement; young women, apart from a few easy-to-control tokens, are not given credit for the leadership they are already showing." Third-wave feminists further critique second-wave feminists for "focusing... on little girls (specifically their self-esteem) rather than tackling the challenge of working with young-adult women." This focus on positive self-esteem for young girls is, according to third-wave feminists, an avoidance technique used by second-wave feminists unable or unwilling to confront a growing generational divide in feminism.

Third-wave feminists also decry the lack of diversity in the second wave of feminism. If first- and second-wave feminism sought an accretion of rights and power to women as a group, third-wave feminism

102. As one third-wave feminist laments:

Unfortunately, most of the books that have been published about feminism in this generation have tried to convince readers that young women are somehow lacking in activism and are even antagonistic to the feminists who came before them. This was counter to what I saw every day... [F]eminism is out there—manifesting itself in individual people’s lives, and often in the lives of people who don’t even know they’re living it.

BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at xxvii.

103. Gilman suggests that liberal feminists borrow some techniques from conservative women’s organizations like the Independent Women’s Forum:

Maybe what we need are some “on-call” girls. Some fabulous media sluts of our own. Why not forge an arsenal of well-coached sharpies who know how to stand and deliver in front of a camera in eight seconds? Why not welcome younger women into the fold without making them pass some political correctness litmus test? Why not set aside identity politics and infighting and focus on our bigger adversaries?

Gilman, supra note 22, at 69.

104. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 36. On leadership, Baumgardner and Richards say, “[T]rue leaders, after all, aren’t waiting for the media or anyone else to anoint them. They are identifying problems and mobilizing people to participate in the vision for change—even if the media and funders don’t recognize them as leaders.” CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 163.

105. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 49.

106. See, e.g., id. On the difficulties facing girls of high school age, see, e.g., Christine Doza & Jennifer Kornreich, Bloodlove, Ms., May/June 1995, 37, 38–39 (“High school is the single most dangerous place for a girl to be. Once we hit 13 or 14 we realize that in this world the men we are associated with, not our own actions, make us who we are... Male teachers treat girls like property, like victims, like last-class citizens and no one seems to care.”).
seeks recognition for the individual.\(^\text{107}\) As one writer explains, third-wave feminism is in part "a response by women of color and others who felt homogenized by a movement defined by the goals of middle-class, white women."\(^\text{108}\) Their writing is motivated by a desire to "introduce some of the ideas of woman of color feminism to women who have thought feminism is just a philosophy about white men and women and has nothing to do with our communities [of color]."\(^\text{109}\) One young woman explains her personal evolution in thinking about feminism, writing, "I have felt that the feminism I am 'inheriting' doesn't represent me or my life."\(^\text{110}\) Young women are reluctant to identify with the stereotype of the second-wave feminist, instead claiming to create "a joyful culture that makes being an adult woman who calls herself a feminist seem thrilling, sexy, and creative (rather than scary, backbiting, or a one-way ticket to bitterness and the poorhouse)."\(^\text{111}\)

2. Multiple Nature of Personal Identity

Third-wave writers are divided on the utility of "woman" as a category. On the one hand, third-wave writers are demonstrably aware of discrimination against women and call for an end to double standards in sexual heath and awareness,\(^\text{112}\) for the continued availability of birth con-

\(^\text{107}\) Rebecca Walker highlights the ways in which feminist theory and praxis conflict when she describes her edited volume of third-wave feminist stories as evidence of young women's commitment to "being real (refusing to be bound by a feminist ideal not of their own making) and telling the truth (honoring the complexity and contradiction in their lives by adding their experiences to the feminist dialogue)." Rebecca Walker, *Introduction to To Be Real*, supra note 11, at xxxiv.

\(^\text{108}\) Wong, supra note 53, at 295 (summarizing description of third-wave feminism given by professor in whose class the author was guest lecturing). This third-wave claim is ahistorical, insofar as it is not unique to third-wave feminism. Many second-wave feminists also have engaged and do engage in a vigorous critique of feminist activism and theory as essentialist. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, *Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory*, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, *Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms)*, in *STEPHANIE M. Wildman, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA* 85 (1996).

\(^\text{109}\) Bushra Rehman & Daisy Hernandez, *Introduction to Colonize This!*, supra note 64, at xxvii.

\(^\text{110}\) Pollit & Baumgardner, *supra* note 4, at 309.

\(^\text{111}\) *BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra* note 7, at xx.

\(^\text{112}\) Item Four on the "Thirteen Point Agenda" advocated by Baumgardner and Richards is: "To bring down the double standard in sex and sexual health, and foster male responsibility and assertiveness in the following areas: achieving freedom from STDs; more fairly dividing the burden of family planning as well as responsibilities such as child care; and eliminating violence against women." *Id.* at 279.
trol,\textsuperscript{113} and for more recognition for traditionally "female" roles such as caretaking.\textsuperscript{114} On the other hand, some third-wave writers claim that their brand of feminism "recognizes that the differences among women are as substantial as the differences between women and men: the category of 'woman' is no longer the identity worth examining."\textsuperscript{115} In this analysis, categories such as gender and race lack "meaning and resonance."

As a theoretical move, stripping gender of its meaning allows third-wave feminists to take a broad approach to defining women’s issues: "Third wavers, who came of age in the late twentieth century and after . . . [are] concerned not simply with 'women's issues' but with a broad range of interlocking topics . . . ranging from protests of the World Economic Forum and welfare reform to activism on behalf of independent media outlets."\textsuperscript{116} Theoretically, though, if they reject gender as a category that can unify women, third-wave feminists are left with only a generational label: "In rejecting a notion of collective sisterhood, but without adopting another mode—familial or otherwise—to supplant it, [third-wave feminists] remain within the mother-daughter relationship, albeit as only children to a controlling 'mother' feminism. 'Sisterhood is powerful' has seemingly been replaced by a new slogan: 'Daughterhood is powerful.'\textsuperscript{117} As a theoretical movement, third-wave feminism then appears devoid of substance and looks no different than other movements organized around youth.

\textsuperscript{113} Item Three on the "Thirteen Point Agenda" is: "To make explicit that the fight for reproductive rights must include birth control . . ." \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{114} Item Eleven on the "Thirteen Point Agenda" is: "To make the workplace responsive to an individual's wants, needs, talents. This includes valuing (monetarily) stay-at-home parents, aiding employees who want to spend more time with family and continue to work . . ." \textit{Id. at} 280.

\textsuperscript{115} Rory Dicker & Alison Piepmeier, \textit{Introduction to Catching a Wave}, \textit{supra} note 4, at 9–10.

\textsuperscript{116} Senna, \textit{supra} note 38, at 15.

\textsuperscript{117} Rory Dicker & Alison Piepmeier, \textit{Introduction to Catching a Wave}, \textit{supra} note 4, at 9–10. It is not clear, however, that anti-globalism activists share the third-wave view of its relationship to feminism:

Third wave feminists have started talking about a new script for sexuality, but I have heard little talk of the price of patriarchy in politics and in our organizations and communities. The anti-globalization movement has raised some of these issues through anti-authoritarian organizing, yet its spokespeople give no credit to its origins in feminism.

3. Joy of Embracing Traditional Feminine Appearance and Attributes

Third-wave feminists embrace make-up, feminine styles of dress and traditional “girlie” behaviors. If the second wave’s famous slogan, “the personal is political,” turned every personal grooming decision into a political one, then third-wave feminists have made no decision political. Academic articles have been written, for example, explaining how it is possible to wear thong underwear and still be a feminist since “feminism isn’t about what choice you make but the freedom to make that choice.” Similarly, traditionally female activities like knitting and cooking can become sources of positive self-image for women.

In celebrating the traditional aspects of femininity, however, at least some third-wave feminists do so self-consciously and with tongue in cheek to explore the contours of gender identity. For example, one young woman describes her primary identification with a male gender role, albeit within the context of playful femininity:

It opens up a variety of different doors, different things I can do because I can still access the ‘girly’ parts of feminine identification, only I’m doing it from a campy, gay-boy perspective

119. With tongue-in-cheek style, Katha Pollit refers to the decision to shave one’s legs as “that old perennial” illustration of how the personal is political. Pollitt & Baumgardner, supra note 4, at 319. Although Pollit can make light of the second-wave slogan, she also insists on its usefulness of the next generation of feminists:

One distinction I think doesn’t get made often enough or clearly enough, however, is between choices that may be a little sexist in origin (shaving one’s legs—that old perennial!) but are basically harmless and choices that have serious implications for the course of one’s life and for the lives of others. “You go, girl!” is a good slogan. But it’s not the only thing women need to hear. They also need to hear, from time to time, that old, infuriating saying of the hairy-legged ancients: the personal is political.

Id.


121. Gilley, supra note 6, at 190. See also Ana Marie Cox et al., Masculinity Without Men: Women Reconciling Feminism and Male-Identification, in THIRD WAVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 181 (third-wave feminists reject the “debilitating way in which we’ve thought about” the feminine). As one writer explains, “[c]rocheting and cooking and the like aren’t only about making pot holders and a lentil stew, but are about creating a culture outside of the mainstream . . . . Crafts can be a way to express yourself even if culture doesn’t support that.” Jennifer O’Connor, Riot Prrrls: Cast off Your Stereotypes, HERIZONS, June 22, 2005 at 16, 18 (acknowledging that “this idea of honoring the work done in the home is nothing new” and echoes second-wave efforts to value women’s home labor).
rather than the traditionally feminine one. So it puts a very different spin on, you know—if I want to wear makeup or I want to dress up femme, I'm being like a gay man in drag, rather than identifying with a traditional, feminine culture.\footnote{122}

One third-wave feminist proclaims her pleasure at participating in . . . male culture, and enjoying it, and implicitly rejecting conventional feminine culture, and rejecting a sense of femininity that I found really constricting growing up. For me, then, it's partly a kind of negative identity, in the sense that it's not so much that I want to be male-identified, it's that I don't want to be feminine-identified in the kinds of ways I've learned about it.\footnote{123}

Third-wave feminists are also aware that traditional feminine appearance may increase their vulnerability to harassment by men. One graduate student explains that she used to wear dresses to class, but when a professor repeatedly sexually harassed her, "[e]ssentially, I said to myself, 'Oh, this is what's gonna happen if I play the 'femme' role. Men will feel free to do this to me.' It wasn't funny anymore . . . ."\footnote{124} Female attire can make one feel sexy, but vulnerability comes with that sexiness.

Third-wave feminists have an ambivalent relationship to the second-wave feminists who would celebrate women's different voices and women's ways of knowing.\footnote{125} Female attributes may be wonderful according to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{122}{Ana Marie Cox et al., \textit{Masculinity Without Men: Women Reconciling Feminism and Male-Identification}, in \textit{Third Wave Agenda}, supra note 5, at 180–81.}
  \item \footnote{123}{\textit{Id.} at 180. Catharine MacKinnon might read this reluctance to identify with women as the ultimate evidence of how insidious sexism is. On black women's identification with black men, MacKinnon says, "I sense here that people feel more dignity in being part of any group that includes men than in being part of a group that includes that ultimate reduction of the notion of oppression . . . the white woman . . . . How the white woman is imagined and constructed and treated becomes a particularly sensitive indicator of the degree to which women, as such, are despised." Catharine A. MacKinnon, \textit{From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?}, 4 \textit{Yale J.L. & Feminism} 13, 21–22 (1991).}
  \item \footnote{124}{Ana Marie Cox et al., \textit{Masculinity Without Men: Women Reconciling Feminism and Male Identification}, in \textit{Third Wave Agenda}, supra note 5, at 184.}
\end{itemize}
some second-wave feminists; third-wave feminists celebrate feminine-identification at the same time that they associate it with weakness.

4. Centrality of Sexual Pleasure and Sexual Self-Awareness

Third-wave feminists advocate sexual awareness for girls and women who should take charge of their own sexual satisfaction. Rebecca Walker, for example, writes of the need for sex education for girls in her essay *Lusting for Freedom.* She says that the "question is not whether young women are going to have sex, for this is far beyond any parental or societal control. The question is rather, what do young women need to make sex a dynamic, affirming, safe and pleasurable part of our lives?" One young feminist explains her decision to open a sex-toy business as motivated by an "urgency to create models of female sexual agency—to make feminism relevant to women's lives . . . . Offering women the opportunity to shop for sex toys, to make their sexual desire primary, is an example of sex-positive feminism at work." Third-wave feminism celebrates the centrality of sexual pleasure and the woman who knows how to achieve it.

5. Obstacles to Economic Empowerment

When looking beyond purely personal satisfaction to larger economic and social issues, third-wave feminists tend to look broadly at causes of inequality. The lack of opportunities for meaningful employment is a predominant theme in third-wave feminist writing. Third-wave writers pointedly critique second-wave feminists:

Second wave feminism helped bring about professional self-sufficiency for women, and their work paved the way for new feminisms, such as that being constructed by young women of the post-baby boom generation. But postmodernism and the new global economy have brought on concerns about the ho-

126. *E.g.*, Robin L. West, *The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory*, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 211 (1987) ("The root of our difference may be that our lives are relational rather than autonomous, which is reflected in our needs and has its roots in our reproductive role.").


128. *Id.* at 23.

mogeneity of the so-called bourgeois white feminism of the second wave.... [T]o what extent must feminism revamp itself in the wake of the new global economy? What can we learn from second wave feminism as we face an economy driven by profits, with workers edged out by technology and global competition?130

In third-wave feminism, women’s economic empowerment is recognized as a historically familiar issue, but it is articulated as facing a unique twenty-first century challenge in a globalized era.131 Third-wave feminist commitment to the study and improvement of women’s economic position, however, remains somewhat elusive.132 Although economic equality issues appear on lists of third-wave feminist concerns,133 they remain largely unexamined in third-wave writings.134

6. Social and Cultural Impact of Media and Technology

Third-wave feminists focus much critical attention on popular culture and its meaning. They dissect television shows135 and music136 in

130. Michelle Sidler, Living in McJobdom: Third-wave Feminism and Class Inequity, in THIRD WAVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 27. One scholar criticizes Michelle Sidler’s perspective as ahistorical: “[T]here is talk of the economic disparity facing the generation of twentysomethings. This seems to be a major complaint. But I wonder how many people in the past were not economically disadvantaged in their twenties. Michelle Sidler argues that the problem is not longer patriarchy, but capitalism, with a new playing field of class instability. Here I find a lack of historical perspective. Early contemporary feminists spent a lot of time critiquing capitalism; and does anyone really think patriarchy has ended?” Barbara Ryan, In the Canon’s Mouth: Dispatches from the Culture Wars, 12 NWSA J. No. 1, Mar. 22, 2000, at 181–86.

131. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 20–21 (“We have inherited strategies to fight . . . the wage gap, and the pink-collar ghetto of low-wage women’s work from the Second Wave, which identified these issues. Together, we are still working on them. And we have modern problems of our own. Prominent third-wave issues include . . . globalization.”).


133. CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 6.

134. See, e.g., infra Part I.D.1.


136. See, e.g., Melissa Klein, Duality and Redefinition: Young Feminism and the Alternative Music Community, in THIRD WAVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 207; Jen Smith, Doin’ It for the Ladies—Youth Feminism: Cultural Productions/Cultural Activism, in THIRD WAVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 226; Jeff Niesel, Hip-Hop Matters: Rewriting the Sexual Politics of Rap Music, in THIRD WAVE AGENDA, supra note 5, at 239; Gwendolyn D. Pough, Love Feminism, but Where’s My Hip Hop?: Shaping a Black Feminist Identity, in
particular for meaning and implication. Third-wave feminists Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake describe media savvy as "a key to political struggle." Jennifer Pozner, another third-wave writer, asserts that "[c]ontrol of the media is the single most important issue of our time." This is because all people rely on the media for information about our government and society and because the media informs our personal preferences and tastes.

Third-wave feminists acknowledge the particular role that the media has played in presenting a particular image of feminism. On one level, some third-wave writers seem to subscribe to the belief that second-wave feminism is "puritanical, repressive and homogeneous" even as they acknowledge that "such a picture is a distortion that relies on a reductive rendering of an incredibly varied social movement." Third-wave feminists admit that their understanding of the feminism of the 1970s and 1980s is distorted, but nevertheless accept that distortion as a powerful cultural force for today's feminism.

D. Principal Methods of Third-Wave Feminism

Just as media awareness is an important theme of third-wave feminist writing, it is incorporated into third-wave feminist methods. The principal methods of third-wave feminism are (1) personal story-telling; (2) coalition building; and (3) harnessing and interpreting media. The first two methods are familiar from the second wave of feminism and its aftermath, but sustained engagement with the internet, television, and music is unique to the third wave.

Colonize This! supra note 64, at 85; Kristina Gray, I Sold My Soul to Rock and Roll, in Colonize This! supra note 64, at 257; Shani Jamila, Can I Get a Witness? Testimony From a Hip Hop Feminist, in Colonize This! supra note 64, at 382; Eisa Davis, Sexism and the Art of Feminist Hip-Hop Maintenance, in To Be Real, supra note 11, at 127; Denise Cooper, Hip Hop Feminism: From Bitches to Queens and the Varied Experiences in Between, in Voices of a New Generation, supra note 86, at 59.

137. Leslie Heywood & Jennifer Drake, We Learn America Like a Script: Activism in the Third-wave; or, Enough Phantoms of Nothing, in Third Wave Agenda, supra note 5, at 51.


139. Id.

1. Personal Story-Telling

Ever since consciousness-raising was adapted from socialist or-"izers, women's accounts of their own lives have formed the backbone of much feminist thought and political action. Throughout the second wave, these consciousness-raising groups were a primary means of feminist networking. In these groups, "[w]omen's lives are discussed in all their momentous triviality, that is, as they are lived through. The technique explores the social world each woman inhabits through her speaking of it, through comparison with other women's experiences, and through women's experiences of each other in the group itself." Third-wave feminists have continued the consciousness-raising tradition. The editors of one prominent collection of third-wave writings even claims that the book's structure embodies 1970s-style consciousness-raising, insofar as the essays are grouped in a way that mirrors the process of consciousness-raising itself. We decided to use this organizational pattern as a way first to highlight the social inequalities in the world today then to politicize our readers to take action. Because these inequalities are so often obscured, the first step to a feminist consciousness is to recognize the status of women in the world.

The personal stories of third-wave feminists are compelling and allow the reader to identify with any one or more of the authors. Through the process of identification, a reader can label her own concerns as

141. See FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 22 (Mary Becker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001) (consciousness raising "had originally been used to organize the poor by encouraging them to talk about their problems with each other in order to see the systemic social causes of their oppression and the need for political solutions").

142. MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 86.

143. Id. MacKinnon has explained the purposes of consciousness-raising in these terms:

The point of the process was not so much that hitherto-undisclosed facts were unearthed or that denied perceptions were corroborated or even that reality was tested, although all these happened. It was not only that silence was broken and that speech occurred. The point was, and is, that this process moved the reference point for truth and thereby the definition of reality as such. Consciousness raising alters the terms of validation by creating community through a process that redefines what counts as verification. This process gives both content and form to women's point of view.

Id. at 87.

144. Dicker & Piepmeier, INTRODUCTION TO CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 115, at 5.
belonging to a larger group of political issues. This “personal frontier” is the main occupation of third-wave feminists.  

Third-wave feminism’s reliance on story-telling is one of its greatest strengths and its greatest weaknesses. The story-telling is appealing because it draws the reader in and helps to personalize feminism, an explicit aim of third-wave feminism.  

Yet story-telling at times seems to comprise the entirety of third-wave feminism. At least in one third-wave author’s view, “[A]s a third waver, there is no need for radical action or strategy to support the movement. Militant action is not needed to promote the third wave; instead, the experiences of young women construct the third wave.”  

But if experience constructs the third wave, then third-wave feminism is nothing more than a collection of individual stories. Narrative collections do not translate easily into political strategies or legal theories. In this way, third-wave feminism seems more like a literary form than a social movement or a basis for enriching feminist jurisprudence.

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145. In her dialogue with Katha Pollit that forms the afterword to CATCHING A WAVE, Jennifer Baumgardner says that, “I guess I’m sensing that the personal frontier is where my generation is doing most of its work...and that is important work. Just as important as the law-changing/tenure/first-woman-president stuff, because how we conduct our personal lives (what speaks to us, what we value) represents us directly—that is why the personal is political.” Pollitt & Baumgardner, supra note 4, at 316.


146. One third-wave text, LISTEN Up, was written in response to demands from students for stories that resembled their own. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

147. Roxanne Harde & Erin Harde, Voices and Visions: A Mother and Daughter Discuss Coming to Feminism and Being Feminist, in CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 116, 119.

148. Some scholars critically link third-wave feminists’ emphasis on the individual with larger economic conditions: “It’s not just a coincidence that the marketable, media-friendly, Third-Wave feminist emphasis on individual action dovetails nicely with our capitalist economy’s prescription for success. We live and work within an econ-
2. Coalition-Building

Coalition-building is one of the principal methods employed by third-wave feminists. On the one hand, third-wave feminism's goals are defined by and must operate in "a world of global capitalism and information technology, postmodernism and post colonialism and environmental degradation." For that reason, third-wave feminists often focus on "mak[ing] feminism as inviting as possible to a broad range of people." Alliances between like-minded people become incredibly important in the struggle to achieve any goal. On the other hand, one of the possible dangers of making feminism palatable to as many people as possible is the risk of "emptying feminism of its political content." If "[c]oalition politics is replacing definitional politics," then it is possible that third-wave feminism has limited independent meaning; perhaps it does not even advocate a woman-specific agenda.

3. Harnessing and Interpreting Media

Generally, third-wave feminists use popular formats (in lieu of academic ones, for example) to disseminate their message. This seems motivated at least in part by a desire to "be a part of the culture they critique." Third-wave feminists' reliance on material culture as a means of communicating arises out of familiarity with technology and

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150. Id. at 18.
151. Alliance, rather than inflexible group membership, is a third-wave method. See, e.g., Emi Koyama, The Transfeminist Manifesto, in Catching a Wave, supra note 4, at 244, 257 ("Transfeminism asserts that it is futile to debate intellectually who is and is not included in the category 'woman'; instead we must act—now—and build alliances.")
153. Gilley, supra note 6, at 191.
154. Id. at 191.

Third-wavers . . . are not interested in being confined to academics, nor do they feel academic feminism gives them the freedom to theorize in new ways. For this reason, third-wave writings have been published by popular presses, and uses witty titles and catchy graphics whenever possible to draw in the average reader.

Id.
They use the media itself to explore the media's themes. For example, one woman explains that she uses video to investigate ideas of "exoticism, marginality and homophobia," and that her video work helps her understand "the link between media activism, representation, and creative expression." If third-wave feminists were initially known for do-it-yourself fan magazines in the 1990s, the "zines" of that era gave way to websites in the twenty-first century. Young feminists, including those who identify as part of the third wave and those who do not, use personal blogs.

155. See, e.g., Jocelyn Taylor, Testimony of a Naked Woman, in To Be Real, supra note 11, at 219, 220 (describing the author's "media activism, representation, and creative expression" as part of "a multiracial group of video beginners who developed a video project incorporating dialogues about exoticism, marginality, and homophobia").

156. Id. Interestingly, Taylor traces the origins of her interest in the power of video to her activism as part of ACT-UP, the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power. That group used camcorders and recording equipment to "document demonstrations and to protect protesting civilians from dirty dealings by the police." Id.

157. See, e.g., Edna Kaeh Garrison, U.S. Feminism-Grrrl Style! Youth (Sub)Cultures and the Technologies of the Third Wave, 26 FEMINIST STUD. 141, 158 (2000) ("[T]he women at Kinko's or at work putting together her/their zine(s) to distribute to girlfriends and other girls who write for copies all represent moments of convergence between democratized technologies and a networked, fractured form of Third Wave feminist differential consciousness."). See also Kelly Wooten, Women's Zines in the Sarah Dyer Zine Collection (July, 2002) (unpublished Master's paper, UNC Chapel Hill), available at http://ils.unc.edu/MSpapers/2786.pdf (describing historical context and importance of 'zines; research guide to 'zine collection in the Sallie Bingham Center for Women's History and Culture at Duke University).

158. Self-published feminist 'zines were employed by women in the early 1990s who began to protest sexism in the punk music scene. These women called themselves "Riot Grrrls." See Gilley, supra note 6, at 190. The phrase is considered to be a "spontaneous young-feminist reclamation of the word 'girl' . . . at least partially derived from a phrase of encouragement popularized by young American black women in the late 1980s: 'You go guuuuurl!'" Garrison, supra note 157, at 141. (2000). The Riot Grrrls made photocopies of their own work that they distributed at music venues. Gilley, supra note 6, at 191. For examples of contemporary feminist on-line publishing, see, e.g., Trivia: Voices of Feminism, http://www.triviavoices.net (literary journal) (last visited June 1, 2006).

organization websites and other web pages to disseminate their particular messages. Interestingly, these messages may or may not appear overtly feminist. Many third-wave feminists subscribe to the belief that "feminist politics can be shared with the world if it is carefully disguised in the mass media."

Consider, for example, Big Bad Chinese Mama, a website created by Kristina Sheryl Wong, an Asian-American artist and activist. Wong uses her website as a way to communicate complex ideas about feminism in subtle and playful ways. This site is meant to be a spoof of mail-order brides and internet pornography. The homepage proclaims:

Inside are contained the "demure lotus blossoms," the "geishas," the "oriental sluts"—whatever you had imagined in your patriarchal, colonialist longings. These women will take you by storm (and will kick your ass). Yeah, you've seen mail order bride sites before, you may have even surfed over to an Asian porn site, but never in your wildest culturally commodifying sick sexual desires, have you been schooled by women (womyn) like this!

So, go ahead Mr. Smartypants. Come on in! After all, us "Orientals" are known for our hospitality and genteel demeanor. We aim to please . . . .

Because of the internet's ability to reach the broadest range of people, Wong uses the internet, rather than traditional art shows or art publications, to explore stereotypes of Asian-American women. She

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160. See, e.g., Third-Wave Foundation, http://www.thirdwavefoundation.org (last visited June 1, 2006). The Third-Wave Foundation is "a feminist, activist foundation that works nationally to support young women and transgender youth ages 15 to 30. Through strategic grantmaking, leadership development, and philanthropic advocacy, we support groups and individuals working towards gender, racial, economic, and social justice." About Us, http://thirdwavefoundation.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).


162. Wong, supra note 53, at 296. For an example of third-wave feminism's interest in cultural analysis, see Angie Manzano's discussion of the movie CHARLIE'S ANGELS. Manzano, supra note 148, at 10 (CHARLIE'S ANGELS as presenting a brand of feminism that is "watered down, it's easy to sell, and it leaves you feeling empty.").

163. Welcome to the Home of the Big Bad Chinese Mama!, http://www.bigbadchinesemama.com (last visited June 1, 2006).

164. Id.

165. Wong, supra note 53, at 299. Wong explains,
asks her friends and classmates to pose as fake “brides” and then posts spoofs of ads for Asian mail-order wives. The women come from a variety of backgrounds and choose the way they are represented. Wong and her collaborators also prank call massage parlors and post the recordings of the calls to the website. These recordings are intended to give visitors to the website “a glimpse of the sex industry as well as the male, euro-centric values it caters to and works under . . . . I also want to show that it’s ok to laugh at certain injustices instead of feeling constantly offended and disempowered by them.” Wong is honest about the ways in which she uses technology to disseminate her message to a perhaps-unsuspecting audience. She says that she deliberately structures her website so that when people search for pornography, they will be directed to her site.

The technology of the internet makes it an appealing vehicle for feminist activism. The web is accessible around-the-clock to a global audience and has the potential to reach people who might not have access or choose to access other feminist resources. For example, the “Ask Amy” page of the website Feminist.com gives information for rape survivors, women who believe they have been a victim of discrimina-

Art has the potential to be more broadly accessible than other forms of communication . . . . While live performance and literature can play a role in a cultural critique, the demographics of their audiences limit their potential. When people participate in an Asian American-themed event . . . . they generally are already interested in Asian American issues. I wanted to reach people who had neither an existing interest in nor a concern for Asian American women and their politics.”

Id.

166. Id. at 301–02.
167. Id. at 302.
169. Wong, supra note 53, at 303.
170. Id. at 304 (“I sought traffic in unorthodox ways because I wanted to get hits from people who were not familiar with Asian American women’s issues. I cut and pasted a meta-tag from a porn site into my site so that when people searched words for porn, they would be led to my site.”).
171. On the accessibility of the internet, Wong says that having a website initially made her feel vulnerable because visitors could access and interpret my thoughts and images whenever they wanted. However, it was liberating to have this presence on the Web because all the work is accessible twenty-four hours a day, and this approach is not as exhausting as day-to-day activism. It was exciting to know that my words and ideas can be found even when I was sleeping.

Wong, supra note 53, at 305.
tion, those suffering from eating disorders, people who want to start their own businesses and students doing reports on women's history.\textsuperscript{172} The web has the ability to reach more people than any traditional print media. Wong, for one, recognizes the ability of the internet to disseminate feminist messages ("even when I am sleeping").\textsuperscript{173} Yet third-wave feminists do not grapple seriously with the internet's ability to disseminate pornographic—and sometimes brutally so—images of women and children.\textsuperscript{174}

The same technology that is beloved by third-wave feminists has altered the way in which Americans consume pornography. When the film \textit{Deep Throat} was released in 1972, people went to movie theaters to see it.\textsuperscript{175} Then, when the videocassette recorder became widely available in the 1980s, people were able to go to a store and rent a pornographic video that they could view in their own homes.\textsuperscript{176} It is no longer necessary to even leave home to watch pornographic movies. The consumption of pornography has been entirely privatized. An estimated sixty-six percent of American homes have cable television, and a significant percentage of these homes have access to adult channels like \textit{Playboy} and \textit{Spice}.\textsuperscript{177}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Feminist.com, Ask Amy, http://www.feminist.com/askamy/ (last visited June 1, 2006).
\item \textsuperscript{173} See Wong, supra note 53, at 305.
\item \textsuperscript{174} On legal issues related to sting operations that seek to catch adults who use the internet to prey on children, see for example Audrey Rogers, \textit{New Technology, Old Defenses: Internet Sting Operations and Attempt Liability}, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 478 (2004).
\item \textsuperscript{175} Not just men went to the film: "Lots of rising young executives, as well as the usual middle-aged settled ones, took their respectively appropriately annexed women to see it." Catharine A. MacKinnon, \textit{Linda's Life and Andrea's Work}, in \textit{FEMINISM UNMODIFIED}, supra note 17, at 128.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n 2005 Mid-Year Industry Overview, May, 2005 (citing Nielsen Media Research), http://www.ncta.com/industry_overview/CableMid-YearOverview05FINAL.pdf. An estimated 69\% of households with cable television have premium access. \textit{Id}. (citing Kagan Research LLC (2004)). See also Marc Gunther, \textit{Why a la Carte Cable TV is a Nutty Idea}, Feb. 13, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/13/magazines/fortune/pluggedin_fortune/index.htm (claiming that 72 million people subscribe to cable television). Of course cable providers are not the only ones who benefit from providing adult films over the television. Hotel chains derive up to seventy percent of their room-based profits from pay-per-view adult films that are purchased by an estimated 50\% of their guests. Steve Kroft, \textit{60 Minutes: Porn in the USA} (CBS News television broadcast, Nov., 2003).
\end{itemize}
Television is just one source of pornographic material in homes in an era when discovering one's father's *Playboy* magazine seems quaint. More than half of American homes have internet access and adult content comprises an estimated two percent of all content on the web. Ten years ago, there were approximately 28,000 sex sites on the internet; that number almost certainly has increased. Popular internet search engine companies report that "sex" is the most frequently searched term and that "pornography" is the fourth most-searched for term.

Consumers of internet-based pornography do not necessarily conform to the stereotype of the lonely social misfit who searches for pictures of naked women. According to surveys, between sixty-six and seventy-seven percent of those who visit adult sites are male and up to thirty-three percent are female. The average consumer of internet pornography is forty-one years old and has an annual income of $60,000. An estimated forty-six percent of visitors to adult internet sites are married. Furthermore, the consumption of pornography has become so


185. Id. (citing a 2001 Forrester Research Report).
normalized that between twenty-eight and thirty-nine percent of workers with internet access logged on to adult-content website during the month of January 2001.  

People report subjectively that they feel negatively impacted by pornography. For example, as a result of a partner's use of pornography, forty-two percent of adults surveyed report that they feel insecure and forty-one percent report that they feel less attractive.  

Eighty percent of visitors to sex sites self-report that their pursuit of adult content on the internet negatively impacts their employment or personal life. Some report newfound problems with sex addiction after seeing adult content on the internet.

Apart from any challenges in evaluating with precision the extent of the online pornography industry, these statistics indicate at a minimum that pornography is widely available and widely consumed. Yet third-wave feminists seem uninterested in the scope and prevalence of pornography. Unlike second-wave feminists before them, third-wave feminists do not define pornography as a legal problem per se. Part II will provide historical background on the "sex wars" of feminism's second wave to provide a context for a discussion of third-wave writings on pornography in Part III.

II. THE SEX WARS OF THE SECOND WAVE

A. Pornography is a Feminist Issue

In the early 1980s, feminist lawyer and law professor Catharine MacKinnon joined with author Andrea Dworkin to introduce anti-pornography legislation in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Indianapolis.

189. Id. (citing a statement of Al Cooper, a therapist at San Jose Marital Services and Sexuality Center, who conducted a survey in 2000).
190. MINNEAPOLIS, MN., CODE § 139.10 (1983).
Indiana. Both proposed laws sought to define pornography as a violation of civil rights, and came to stand for a type of feminism known as


192. The model ordinance provided that individuals or groups of individuals may bring a variety of claims for injury relating to "pornography," defined as:

the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or words that also includes one or more of the following:

a. women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or
b. women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or pain; or
c. women are presented as sexual objects experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest, or other sexual assault; or
d. women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or
e. women are presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or
f. women's body parts—including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks—are exhibited such that women are reduced to those parts; or

g. women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or

h. women are presented in scenarios of degradation, humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual.

Model Anti-Pornography Ordinance § 2(1). The possible causes of action are as follows:

1. Coercion into pornography. It is sex discrimination to coerce, intimidate, or fraudulently induce (hereafter, "coerce") any person into performing for pornography . . . .

2. Forcing pornography on a person. It is sex discrimination to force pornography on a person in any place of employment, education, home, or any public place . . . .

3. Assault or physical attack due to pornography. It is sex discrimination to assault, physically attack, or injure any person in a way that is directly caused by specific pornography . . . .

4. Defamation through pornography. It is sex discrimination to defame any person through the unauthorized use in pornography of their proper name, image, and/or recognizable personal likeness . . . .

5. Trafficking in pornography. It is sex discrimination to produce, sell, exhibit, or distribute pornography, including through private clubs . . . .

Id. § 3.
"dominance feminism." Generally, dominance feminism focuses on how differences between men and women are coded as inequality and how the legal system institutionalizes that inequality. Although dominance feminism has had a substantial impact on academic and popular thought, it has not translated successfully into laws against pornography. The Minneapolis city council adopted the MacKinnon-Dworkin legislation, but the mayor later vetoed it. Similarly, Indianapolis adopted the legislation but a federal court subsequently declared it to be unconstitutional. The remainder of this Part describes the philosophical arguments made against pornography by MacKinnon and Dworkin, and examines the counterclaims of MacKinnon's and Dworkin's critics.

193. See, e.g., Becker, et al., supra note 5, at 105-18; CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 18-19.
194. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 9, at 18-19 ("Dominance theorists developed a critique of liberalism, including liberal feminism. They argued that rather than increasing women's power, well-established concepts such as privacy, objectivity, and individual rights actually operated to legitimate the status quo. This more radical brand of feminist legal theory called for a major transformation of the law to eradicate the domination of women as a class.").
195. Id. at 19 ("A principal project of radical feminism as applied to law described how the legal system had failed to protect women's bodily integrity."); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified, supra note 17, at 40 ("The dominance approach centers on the most sex-differential abuses of women as a gender, abuses that sex equality law in its difference garb could not confront.").
198. See DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 191, at 95. After a different form of the ordinance was introduced and passed by the city council, the mayor of Minneapolis vetoed the legislation a second time. Id.

[If true equality between male and female persons is to be achieved, we cannot ignore the threat of equality resulting from exposure to audiences of certain types of violent and degrading material. Materials portraying women as a class as objects for sexual exploitation and abuse have a negative impact on "the individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance."

Butler, S.C.R. at 497.
B. Dominance Feminism and Pornography’s Harms

In her 1987 book, *Pornography: Men Possessing Women*, Andrea Dworkin makes two principal arguments against pornography. First, she claims that pornography sexualizes violence against women:

In the system of male sexual domination explicated in pornography, there is no way out, no redemption: not through desire, not through reproduction. The woman’s sex is appropriated, her body is possessed, she is used and she is despised: the pornography does it and the pornography proves it. The power of men in pornography is imperial power . . . . [M]en are the army; penises and their symbolic representations are the weapons; terror is the means; violence is the so-called sex.

In Dworkin’s analysis, pornography is not merely a visual image; it is a “system” of men’s “domination” of women. It is actual and cultural violence that men do to women. Dworkin’s second claim is that pornography encourages men to be sexually violent and that women are the principal victims of this violence. She says that male identity is tied to violence and that pornography reveals the extent of this tie: “Pornography reveals that male pleasure is inextricably tied to victimizing, hurting, exploiting; that sexual fun and sexual passion in the privacy of

201. Id. at 23.
202. Id.
203. Dworkin, supra note 200, at 51. There have been several studies that have attempted to measure the relationship between exposure to sexual images and aggression. See, e.g., Mike Allen et al., A Meta-Analysis Summarizing the Effects of Pornography II: Aggression After Exposure, 22 Hum. Comm. Res. 258 (1995) (finding that “consumption of material depicting nonviolent sexual activity increases aggressive behavior, and that media depictions of violent sexual activity generates more aggression than those of nonviolent sexual activity”); Mike Allen et al., Exposure to Pornography and Acceptance of Rape Myths, 45 J. of Comm. 5, 19 (1995) (reporting that “exposure to pornography, at least in experimental settings, increases the acceptance of rape myths”). Laboratory studies have been criticized as bearing limited or no predictive value with respect to actual human behavior. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1635, 1665 (2005); Edward Donnerstein et al., The Question of Pornography: Research Findings and Policy Implications 72 (1987); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “the” Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1182 (1993); William K. Layman, Violent Pornography and the Obscenity Doctrine: The Road Not Taken, 75 Geo. L.J. 1475, 1491 (1987); R. Geen & E. Donnerstein, Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews 31 (1983).

204. Dworkin, supra note 200, at 51.
the male imagination are inseparable from the brutality of male history." For Dworkin, pornography can never be just an image; it is a means by which men exploit women.

Like Dworkin, MacKinnon sees women as sexual victims of men. She describes sexuality as something that happens to women, not something that women are genuinely capable of embracing for their own personal fulfillment:

Pornography... eroticizes the dominance and submission that is the dynamic common to them all. It makes hierarchy sexy and calls that "the truth about sex" or just a mirror of reality. Through this process pornography constructs what a woman is as what men want from sex. That is what the pornography means.

To the extent that any particular woman would suggest that she enjoys certain sexual practices, MacKinnon would question the extent to which these desires are authentic:

All women live in sexual objectification the way fish live in water... Women seem to cope with sexual abuse principally by denial of fear... Women who are compromised, cajoled, pressured, tricked, blackmailed, or outright forced into sex (or pornography) often respond to the unspeakable humiliation, coupled with the sense of having lost some irreplaceable integrity, by claiming that sexuality as their own. Faced with no alternatives, the strategy to acquire self-respect and pride is: I chose it.

She does not believe, then, that a woman ever chooses freely to participate in pornography. To MacKinnon, pornography is one more way in which women's inequality is reinforced by men, culture and the media. She claims that pornography is a form of sex discrimination "because of


its role in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for discrimination.”
It “eroticizes hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality.”

C. Liberal Feminism and Censorship’s Harms

In 1984, a group of women organized as the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT) in response to the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinances. In the litigation over the Indianapolis ordinance, FACT filed an amicus brief asserting that the ordinance was unconstitutional. First, FACT argued, the statute was void for vagueness under the First Amendment. Second, because pornography was a special type of political speech, it should be protected. Third, the law perpetrated impermissible gender stereotypes that would lead to a “sexual double standard.” Specifically, “[b]y defining sexually explicit images of women as subordinating and degrading to them,” and by claiming “hair-trigger male susceptibility to violent imagery,” women become “vulnerable to exploitation” and lose the ability to contract for sexual and non-sexual relationships on a free and independent basis. FACT’s constitutional claims about pornography as protected speech are grounded in an overall suspicion about government censorship. As Ellen Willis opined, “In a male supremacist society, the only obscenity law that will not be used against women is no law at all.”

208. MacKinnon, supra note 206, at 178.
209. Id. at 172.
210. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 20, at 32.
212. Id., at 106–11.
213. “[S]ome feminist antipornography activists have unwittingly promoted pornography to the level of high-value political speech by criticizing it on the basis of its sexist ideology rather than on the traditional ground of indecency and desire.” Just as feminists argued in the 1970s that “the personal is political,” there is nothing more “gender-political than the sexual fantasies” pornography promotes. Mariana Valverde, Book Review—Money, Sex, and Speech: the Law of Speech and Law as Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1677, 1690–91 (2001).
214. FACT Brief, supra note 211, 120.
215. Id. at 103–05.
216. Id. at 129.
217. Id. at 130.
218. Id. at 131–32.
Apart from constitutional grounds, women who oppose antipornography legislation also resist it on the grounds that prohibitions on pornography could "make a lot of women ashamed of their sexual feelings and afraid to be honest about them."\textsuperscript{220} In this analysis, opponents of the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinance construe pornography as reflective of women's unrevealed sexual desires, if not their stated practices. If women are able to explore their sexuality with honesty and without judgment (with pornography somehow reflecting or informing that sexuality), then to condemn pornography is to condemn women as well. Thus some second-wave feminists and their allies came to see the anti-pornography ordinances as a type of negative judgment of women.\textsuperscript{221} Such a judgment is especially undesirable in a feminist framework that is built on believing women's own accounts of their experiences\textsuperscript{222} and increasing women's "pleasure and joy," not their misery.\textsuperscript{223} This emphasis on personal pleasure and the desire to be free from a particular normative view of "correct" social practices is a theme that dominates third-wave feminist writings.\textsuperscript{224} The next Part examines and critiques third-wave feminist writing about pornography.

III. The Third Wave Takes on Pornography

This Part explores third-wave writings on pornography as a way of illuminating third-wave feminist themes and methods. Because

\textsuperscript{220} Id. at 462.


\textsuperscript{222} \textit{See generally} MacKinnon, supra note 99, at 86 (describing consciousness raising groups in the 1970s in which "[w]omen's lives are discussed in all their momentous triviality, that is, as they are lived through. The technique explores the social world each woman inhabits through her speaking of it, through comparison with other women's experiences, and through women's experiences of each other in the group itself.").


\textsuperscript{224} There is a certain way in which third-wave feminism itself can be seen as an intellectual response to the so-called "sex wars" of the second wave. Kathryn Abrams, for example, credits Camille Paglia, Katie Roiphe and Naomi Wolf, among others, as having "reanimated the sex wars themes" with work that critiques state regulation and the portrayal of women as victims. Abrams, supra note 15, at 305. Third-wave feminists respond to the themes these authors raise. \textit{See discussion infra} Part III.C.
pornography was and is a divisive issue within feminism, third-wave writings on the subject also highlight the salient differences between second- and third-wave feminism. Third-wave writings on pornography are frank and daring. They celebrate a bold and sophisticated female sexuality. For the most part, young feminists seem to approach pornography from any one or more (or some combination) of four distinct perspectives: (A) pornography is a form of sexual expression; (B) pornography is a type of performance subject to multiple interpretations by both its actors and consumers; (C) pornography is a non-unique way in which women are sexually and economically exploited; and (D) pornography is a healthy part of an overall sex-positive agenda. Although no third-wave author situates pornography within the context of the larger feminist debate, third-wave writers implicitly reject the harms-based approach advocated by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. At the same time, however, to the extent that they embrace pornography, third-wave writers do not respond to second-wave feminist arguments about free speech, either. Third-wave feminists for the most part appear unconcerned with the broad social effects of readily-available pornography and, notwithstanding their overall media savvy, have yet to grapple seriously

225. See, e.g., Merri Lisa Johnson, Pearl Necklace: The Politics of Masturbation Fantasies, in JANE SEXES IT UP, supra note 129, at 311, 313 (describing a female author’s self-stimulation while imagining herself as a fellated man as a way to “acknowledge the way U.S. culture shapes my fantasies into scenes of dominating women, displacing my orgasm onto the male sex organ, and simultaneously to guard my right to fantasize freely, to come at whatever cost”). On the masturbation emphasis in third-wave writing, Jennifer Baumgardner says that she wishes “the Girlie feminists ... would organize as well as they onanize . . . .” BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at xx.

226. See, e.g., Shannon Bell, Liquid Fire: Female Ejaculation & Fast Feminism, in JANE SEXES IT UP, supra note 129, at 327 (explicitly describing the author’s evening at a sex club, ending in her own display of female ejaculation).

227. See, e.g., Gwendolyn D. Pough, Do the Ladies Run This . . . .?: Some Thoughts on Hip-Hop Feminism, in CATCHING A WAVE, supra note 4, at 232–238 (“What would happen if we had feminist MCs moving millions toward a critique of gender that motivated them toward change?”).

228. See, e.g., Katherine Frank, Stripping, Starving & the Politics of Ambiguous Pleasure, in JANE SEXES IT UP, supra note 129, at 171, 202 (asking, “Who owns the signs of femininity? Those of us who employ those signs in daily practice for pleasure, for security, as part of our jobs? Men? Women?”).

229. See infra Part III.A.

230. See infra Part III.B.

231. See infra Part III.C.

232. See infra Part III.D.

233. See supra Part II.B.
with the power of the internet to transform the way pornography is produced, distributed and consumed.

A. Pornography as Sexual Expression

In her essay, *Giving It Up: Orgasm, Fear, and Femaleness*, Donna Minkowitz reveals the sources of her sexual arousal as masturbation, reading real-life stories of rape and torture and viewing pornography.\(^{234}\) In Minkowitz's view, these are equally valid ways of connecting with one's sexual feelings. In describing masturbation, Minkowitz says that "[w]hen I touch myself, I am waving a red flag at a bull. Forcing, soothing and seducing myself through this nightmare might be the most macho thing I've ever done."\(^{235}\) The "nightmare" in Minkowitz's analysis is the process of connecting with one’s sexual and sometimes out-of-control feelings, being turned "into an animal being I don't recognize."\(^{236}\) For Minkowitz, masturbation is "macho" insofar as it requires a certain willingness—what she calls "full-bodied bravery"\(^{237}\)—to acknowledge and explore one's own sexuality. In other words, a woman acts "macho" when she touches herself and becomes willing to seek personal pleasure when historically, "[m]en, church, state, and art have told us for centuries that we're disgusting when we get out of control—bestial, dirty as only the body can be dirty."\(^{238}\) For Minkowitz, "forcing, soothing, and seducing"\(^{239}\) the sexual self is an act of rebellion against traditional rules for acceptable female behavior.

After describing her masturbation experiences, Minkowitz immediately asks, "How can women give it up enough to let someone see us writhe, claw, moan, and beg, the bitches in heat we've fought forever not to become?"\(^{240}\) Her language is provocative but her meaning is not clear. At one level, by "giving it up," Minkowitz appears to mean sexual arousal. She asks how can women become *aroused enough* (that is, adequately) to actualize their sexual selves in the way that Minkowitz does through masturbation. In this reading, Minkowitz's reference to "bitches in heat" may be a self-conscious wink at the reader, an intentional use of

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235. Id. at 80.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 79.
239. Id. at 80.
240. Id. at 79.
animal imagery to describe women's historically unexpressed sexual desire.\footnote{Minkowitz also describes masturbation as a form of self-induced temporary insanity (or self-induced dehumanizing): “I understand why nineteenth-century doctors warned that masturbators would go mad or revert to a more primitive life-form, and why the religious right still believes this. When Dr. James Dobson of Focus on the Family warns that sexual liberation will provoke an epidemic of rape, ‘cross-species fetuses,’ and even serial murder, he could be speaking straight out of my fears.” Id. at 80.}

At another level, though, Minkowitz uses the phrase “give it up” in a sense more consistent with common slang, i.e., a woman’s yielding sexual access to her body.\footnote{In modern slang, the phrase typically means: (1) “to give in to one’s sexual urges in a quick manner; usually referring to females;” (2) “have sex;” or (3) “give sex to.” Urban Dictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=give+it+up (last visited June 1, 2006).} If this is the sense in which Minkowitz uses the phrase, then her question may be how can women engage in enough (that is, sufficient) sexual intimacy so as to reveal one’s authentic self (“the bitches in heat we’ve fought forever not to become”\footnote{Minkowitz, supra note 234, at 79.}) to another person.\footnote{Minkowitz describes the physical connection of sexual intimacy as accompanied by “the equally discomfiting demand for emotional connection.” Id. at 81.}

A third possible formulation of Minkowitz’s question is how (that is, by what methods) can women “give it up,” whether that means to become aroused adequately or often enough. To that question, Minkowitz’s writing offers an unexpected answer: through violent sexual images. Minkowitz reports feeling sexually stimulated by reading about rape and torture: “Is it horrible to say that reading about real-world rape and torture sometimes turns me on? Some accounts make me sick, some make me angry, and still other accounts make me sick, angry, and aroused at the same time. On some occasions, arousal is the only emotion I feel. Is that inhuman of me?”\footnote{Id. at 79. Writing in the foreword to the volume, Gloria Steinem says that Minkowitz’s “explanation of being sexually excited by accounts of prison attacks and the rape with a baseball bat of a retarded girl ... makes me as sorrowful as reading about a gay person, someone who is Jewish, or a person of color who finds homophobic, anti-Semitic, or racist violence to be a sexual turn-on.” Gloria Steinem, Foreword to To Be Real, supra note 11, xiii, xxi. Steinem attempts to blunt this criticism of Minkowitz by saying that Minkowitz’s essay “warns us against making others feel criticized for conditions they didn’t create.” Id. at xxi. Yet Minkowitz’s essay does not in fact sound that warning. Although Minkowitz asks rhetorically, “[i]s that inhuman of me?” her essay is confident and defiant; she does not reveal any particular fear of being criticized. Minkowitz, supra note 234, at 79. If anyone criticizes, it is Steinem who seems to do so by implying Minkowitz is unaware of the sexist cultural}
about violence is not consistently negative (making her sick or angry)\textsuperscript{246} or consistently positive (making her aroused);\textsuperscript{247} she reports a range of responses.\textsuperscript{248}

Based on her own experience, Minkowitz holds out consumption of pornography as a possible means by which women may be able to confront and possibly decouple the relationship she perceives between sexual arousal and violence.\textsuperscript{249} Minkowitz ascribes to pornography a harmless role in sexual fantasy and explicitly rejects any connection between the consumption of pornography and violence against women.\textsuperscript{250}

context that informs Minkowitz's fantasies. \textit{See} Gloria Steinem, \textit{Foreword to To Be Real, supra note} 11, at xxi.

\textsuperscript{246} Minkowitz, \textit{supra} note 234, at 79.

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{248} She then interrogates this link between arousal and violence:

But why would arousal feel like torture to begin with? When I first began exploring my own obstreperous numbness, I thought I might have been sexually abused as a child. Now I conjecture it may have more to do with a less dramatic occurrence: getting hit. Whenever I remember a fist coming down on me, I sense myself losing control of my own body, feeling things happen to its surfaces and vitals that I have no ability to order and no capacity to stop. To have another person make you experience pain against your will is to experience enormous helplessness: even if we can't control anything else in the world, we can usually control our own bodies, and losing that control to another person can make you feel like you have lost everything, lost utterly, ceased, in a way, to be a human being. \textit{Id.} at 81-82.

Being hit as a child made Minkowitz feel like she had no control over the "surfaces and vitals" of her own body. \textit{Id.} Minkowitz thus experiences in sexual pleasure the same sense of loss of bodily control that she had when being hit as a child. She feels unable to "order" or "stop" her sexual response. \textit{Id.} at 81. Sexual pleasure is painful: "The first time my girlfriend goes down on me, it feels almost like pain. But it is not pain. It is—too much. Being in need and out of control like this feels all wrong. It's as though an insect stung me there, or maybe I broke something. This can't be a natural feeling. I can't imagine voluntarily repeating this." \textit{Id.} at 79-80.

Because of the loss of control over one's own body, Minkowitz's feelings of sexual excitement are frightening at the same time that they are pleasurable. Feelings of pleasure coexist with feelings of threat: "One lover told me, 'When you come, you put your hands in fists.' I'm not surprised that my need for defense is so great at a time when forces I can't control are turning me into an animal being I don't recognize." \textit{Id.} at 80. For Minkowitz, being hit and being sexual both amount to a loss of control over one's own body.

\textsuperscript{249} \textit{See} id. at 84-85.

\textsuperscript{250} \textit{See} id. at 83-84. At least one other third-wave writer views pornography as an appropriate outlet for sexual frustration. Freya Johnson describes a situation in which she was kissing another woman in a heterosexual bar and she was approached by a man who was aroused by this sight: "[A]ll these straight men were staring at us. They couldn't believe what they were seeing, and I was totally enjoying the fact that they were watching us and seeing this, and this one guy came up to us and he said, 'Oh
Commenting on Catharine MacKinnon's suggestion that Serbian soldiers were influenced by pornography to mass-rape Bosnian women, Minkowitz rejects the notion that pornography dehumanizes the consumer. She says instead that pornography humanizes the consumer by allowing him or her to embrace sexual fantasies:

"[T]here is a difference between feeling and action that MacKinnon fails to see: namely, the difference between getting turned on by images of domination, and getting turned on by such images and then raping people. And the difference between me and those Serbian prison guards is that although I may have similar sexual responses [to pornography], I am not going to rape or brutalize anyone. Through letting myself experience orgasm and S/M, I've learned that I can trust myself to feel whatever desires I have. Faced with temptation, I do not become that fictive beast whose conduct has no limits."

Minkowitz draws a bright line between feeling (arousal in viewing pornography) and action (rape). She acknowledges that she and the Serbian soldiers might have similar arousal responses to pornography,

my God, I can't believe this,' and he was totally going off, and I'm like, 'What's the matter—you're just so turned on you don't know what to do with yourself, or what?' I mean it's not something I would ever say generally, but I was sort of performing, enjoying the fact that they were watching us. And he said, 'Yeah, something like that,' and I'm all, 'Go rent a video,' you know, just completely over the top." Ana Marie Cox et al., *Masculinity Without Men: Women Reconciling Feminism and Male-Identification, in Third Wave Agenda*, supra note 5, at 178, 187-88 (quoting Freya Johnson). Johnson's suggestion is that the aroused man could and should relieve his sexual frustration through the consumption of pornography. *Id.*

251. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, *Turning Rape Into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide*, Ms., July-Aug. 1993, at 28 ("When pornography is . . . normal, a whole population of men is primed to dehumanize women and to enjoy inflicting assault sexually . . . . Pornography is the perfect preparation—motivator and instruction manual in one— for . . . sexual atrocities.").

252. Minkowitz rejects the notion that "[b]ecause these men have let go their humanness enough to fantasize about having sex with animals, about *women* having sex with animals . . . they have turned into uncontrollable rape-beast whose ethics are the ethics of the jungle." Minkowitz, supra note 234, at 84.

253. *Id.* This cathartic view of pornography is shared by scholars who believe that pornography "may allow partial relief of unfulfilled or unrealizable desires." Claude Crépault & Marcel Couture, *Men's Erotic Fantasies, 9 Archives Sex. Behav.* 565, 566 (1980).

254. Rebecca Walker rejects a relationship between violence in the media and violence in everyday life as a false tenet of second-wave feminism. Walker, supra note 11, at xxxi ("[I]f I didn't think violence on TV translated into real-life violence, if I didn't believe in the essential goodness of women's culture, I thought I might be perceived as betraying 'The Movement' rather than celebrating it.").
and even suggests some understanding of the "temptation" to "become that fictive beast." But for Minkowitz, arousal does not necessarily translate to violence because of her openness to her own feelings. It is the experience of sexual feelings in all forms, she suggests, that is the key to maintaining a moral compass. Minkowitz therefore implies that Serbian soldiers raped Bosnian women because they had excess of sexual desire, not a particular desire to brutalize women. But viewing rape as the product of excess desire, or the result of not fully experiencing sexual feelings, is to adopt the point of view of the male consumers of pornography, not the women who were raped by them. Minkowitz's focus on the sexual arousal felt by viewers of pornography allows her to ignore the rapes that followed its consumption, at least by Serbian soldiers. By framing pornography as a source of sexual satisfaction, not one of the many conditions contributing to women's inequality, Minkowitz then can adopt an implicitly anti-censorship view. She concludes her article with

255. Minkowitz, supra note 234, at 84.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Minkowitz explains women's reluctance for intimacy as motivated by a concern over losing one's moral focus: "That is why our identity is an identity of incoherence, and why it's so hard to give it up to the other's mouth or her hand or just the universe watching as you lose control by yourself. Losing control of our sexual feelings can be so devastating that we fear we'll lose something even more central to us: our moral integrity." Id. at 83.

When we ask whether rape, sexual harassment, and pornography are questions of violence or questions of sexuality, it helps to ask, to whom? What is the perspective of those who are involved, whose experience it is—to rape or to have been raped, to consume pornography or to be consumed through it. As to what these things mean socially, it is important whether they are about sexuality to women and men or whether they are instead about "violence,"—or whether violence and sexuality can be distinguished in that way, as they are lived out.

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex and Violence, in Feminism Unmodified, supra note 17, at 85, 87.

260. Minkowitz incorrectly reads MacKinnon to suggest that "if people ever get the sexual satisfaction we really want [through pornography], we will not be able to stop ourselves from taking it by force." Minkowitz, supra note 234, at 84.
the warning that "[w]hatever humanness is, it is not about smothering the bundle of emotions society has called 'the beast' that dwells inside us." 261

Although Minkowitz disagrees with MacKinnon's connecting pornography and violence, Minkowitz implicitly acknowledges, as MacKinnon does explicitly, that sex and violence are intertwined. 262 Yet third-wave writings in general would suggest that sexual violence does not constitute women's experience. The third wave portrays women as sexually independent, confident 263 and aware of "that doubtful sexual naif still crouching inside many grown women." 264 Where MacKinnon sees heterosexuality as "the predominant social arrangement that fuses this sexuality of abuse and objectification with gender in intercourse, with attendant trauma, torture, and dehumanization, organizes women's pleasure so as to give us a stake in our own subordination," 265 third-wave feminists conceive of heterosexuality as an identity more easily resisted. 266

261. Id. at 85.

262. MacKinnon critiques the cultural tendency to treat sex and violence as wholly separate:

The mutual exclusivity of sex and violence is preserved in the face of this evidence [that men experience violence as sex] by immunizing as "sex" whatever causes a sexual response and by stigmatizing questioning it as repressive, knowing that what is thereby exempted includes humiliation and brutality and molestation and murder as well as rape by any definition.

Catharine A. MacKinnon, Introduction to Feminism Unmodified, supra note 17, at 1, 6.

263. One writer describes the third-wave feminist as having a "smart-ass take-no-shit anarcha-orgasmic feminist persona." Merri Lisa Johnson, Jane Hocus, Jane Focus: An Introduction, in Jane Sexes It Up, supra note 129, at 1, 3.

264. Id. at 11.


266. As Rebecca Walker explains, third-wave feminists "fear that the identity will dictate and regulate our lives, instantaneously pitting us against someone, forcing us to choose inflexible and unchanging sides, female against male, black against white, oppressed against oppressor, good against bad." Walker, supra note 11, at xxxiii. Alternate forms of sexuality and self-identity are celebrated and embraced. See, e.g., Herrup, supra note 49, at 240 ("I started to realize that sexual liberation isn't a simple matter of asserting that a particular sexuality is okay. Liberation has to do with challenging the very forces that categorize sexuality in the first place. That is why in the last year or so I have moved from identity politics to a new domain of ambiguity. 'Accept the ambiguities' has become my personal mantra. I repeat these words not to invoke their action, but to cast their spell and release the magic that comes from engagement with uncertainty.").
B. Pornography as Performance

In their essay, *Porn Power: Sex, Violence, and the Meaning of Images in 1980s Feminism*, Kegan Doyle and Dany Lacombe, two self-described "pro-porn feminists," argue against the categorical condemnation of pornography on the grounds that some women enjoy viewing pornography and that consumers of pornography play an active role in its interpretation. Doyle and Lacombe's analysis is infused with a post-modern sensibility and commitment to believing women's accounts of their own experience.

Doyle and Lacombe explicitly acknowledge the pervasiveness of pornography in contemporary culture. They acknowledge that many people—men and women—report that they enjoy pornography. Doyle and Lacombe specifically refer to women's ability to interpret pornography: "[W]omen actively consume mainstream porn—resisting, twisting, and sometimes subverting it." Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 199. Yet their argument about the sophisticated consumer's approach to pornographic material likely would apply to men as well.

In evaluating third-wave writings (not Doyle & Lacombe particularly), one critic says that "the post structuralist, postmodernist language is beyond tedious much of the time." Ryan, supra note 62, at 181.

Doyle and Lacombe suggest that pornography has infiltrated aspects of our culture beyond the print and films sources that traditionally are considered pornographic. Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 191 ("The presence of pornographic codes in genres as different as hard- and soft-core porn, advertisement, Hollywood cinema, and even science makes radical feminists' calls for censorship seem misguided at best, authoritarian at worst.").

The authors quote Nina Hartley, a "self-defined feminist porn star," as saying that appearing in pornography "provides a physically and psychically safe environment for me to live out my exhibitionist fantasies . . . [T]he medium allows me to explore the theme of celebrating a female sexuality." Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 198 (quoting Nina Hartley, *Confessions of a Feminist Porno Star*, in *Sex Work: Writings by Women in the Sex Industry* (Delacoste & Alexander eds., 1987)).

The authors also cite Candida Royalle, an "ex-porn star," as an example of someone who has developed a successful pornographic film company that produces "romantic fantasies with an emphasis on heterosexual women's sexuality." Id.
culture from within—or, if nothing else, respects those who enjoy life within that mainstream. Instead of dismissing pornography as categorically bad, the authors accept pornography as omnipresent and the source of stated pleasure for some people. This claim is echoed by those who have worked as nude dancers. As one woman says of her dancing, “I... thought I was experimenting with an aspect of my erotic self. There was a part of me that liked performing, liked having a captive audience who would only watch me.” Performance is described then as a type of power and self-involvement.

Doyle and Lacombe reject the notion that women are victims of pornography and attribute to them instead a significant role in its interpretation: “We must recognize that women actively consume mainstream porn—resisting, twisting, and sometimes subverting it.” In other words, pornography has no fixed meaning but acquires meaning only through the interpretation of the person who views it. This emphasis on the role of the viewer grows out of postmodern theory that questions the existence of a singular text with fixed and independent meaning. In the postmodern world, pornography has only the meaning that the consumer supplies. The authors’ claim for a subversive power of the consumer of pornography is a common, if minor, theme in third-wave feminist writings.

At the same time that pornography has no fixed meaning, the postmodern framework of Doyle and Lacombe posits that the images

276. Id. at 189.
277. The authors seem to be reacting, at least in part, to a perception that earlier feminist condemnations of pornography contravened feminist principles: “The grimly ironic truth is that while feminists claim of being silenced, they themselves were silencing others” who had positive experiences in the production of pornography. Id. at 197.
278. Taylor, supra note 155, at 222–23.
279. Jocelyn Taylor says that, “I believed that stripping (even though I was stripping for men) was allowing me to discover more of my own sexual agency.” Id. at 223.
280. Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 199.
282. This approach to pornography grows out of feminist film theory from the early 1980s, which highlighted the context in which pornography was made. Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 191–92 (“The feminist understanding of pornography as a way of seeing, a gaze, was a more sophisticated approach to sexist imagery than that of radical feminists for two reasons. First, rather than reducing porn to the truth of sex (man’s violence), it directed our attention to the context that makes the production and consumption of sexist images possible... Second, it emphasized, at least potentially, the viewer’s activity in the production of meaning in pornography.”).
283. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 136, at 208 (“Our politics reflect a postmodern focus on contradiction and duality, and reclamation of terms. S-M, pornography, the words cunt and queer and pussy and girl—are all things to be reexamined or reclaimed.”).
themselves contribute to the formation of women's identities. In interpreting pornography, women both supply their own meaning and become constituted by that meaning. For that reason, pornography by definition cannot falsely portray women's sexuality: "[i]dentity is always provisional, precarious, incessantly in formation." For Doyle and Lacombe, all human desires have been shaped by culture insofar as "[s]ubjects, in fact, are created in and through a multiplicity of social relations, relations which they also reproduce and, at times, transform.

Doyle and Lacombe's approach to texts is consistent with what political scientist Jane Flax has described as "embeddedness and dependence of the self upon social relations as well as the partiality and historical specificity of this self's existence." Therefore any categorical

284. Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 195. The authors further assert that, "to pine for some healthy subjectivity, some pure (ahistorical) self, as do [some second-wave feminists], is naive and politically disastrous." Id.

285. Id. Third-wave feminists make a similar claim about young women's understanding of feminism itself. While they recognize that they caricature second-wave feminism, that caricature is in some ways unavoidable:

   It would be nice to believe the women have a transparent relationship with feminism, but, like everybody else our understanding of feminism is filtered through the media. While we understand that we are operating in the realm of stereotypes, these representations were nevertheless instrumental in forming our ideas of what it would mean to be feminists. Growing up, we internalized these stereotypes, and today we are still negotiating them when we call ourselves feminists.

Ana Marie Cox et al., Masculinity Without Men: Women Reconciling Feminism and Male-Identification, in Third Wave Agenda, supra note 5, at 179.

286. Flax, supra note 281, at 626. The socially and historically contingent self is in direct opposition to the traditional Enlightenment belief in "[t]he existence of a stable, coherent self" or a fixed meaning for names and language. Id. For a feminist application of postmodernist theory to the study of law, see, e.g., Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law 88 (1989) (arguing that "[l]aw is not a free-floating entity, it is grounded in patriarchy, as well as in class and ethnic divisions . . . . Law cannot resolve these structures of power, least of all when we recognize that its history and the history of these divisions coincide."). The emphasis on gender as performance is a consistent theme of third-wave feminists:

   One way that the third-wave distinguishes itself from the second wave is through its emphasis on paradox, conflict, multiplicity, and messiness. This generation's feminism is often informed by postmodern, poststructuralist theories of identity; as a result, we are able to see the constructed nature of identity as well as the ways in which gender may be a performance that may be manipulated and politically altered as it is performed. Because this theoretical framework calls into question the very idea of a unified self, it allows for a playful incorporation of performed identities, even when they contradict each other.

condemnation of pornography is a condemnation of women themselves, according to Doyle and Lacombe. To them, "[m]ass culture does not simply victimize women, and anybody that claims that it does belittles the vast majority of women, whose desires, fantasies and subjectivities are irretrievably bound up in it."\(^{287}\) Pornography should be resisted and interpreted, but not eliminated,\(^{288}\) insofar as censorship, not pornography, poses a more significant threat to women's well-being.\(^{289}\)

C. Pornography as (Just Another) Exploitation

Third-wave feminists tend to see pornography as one of the many ways that women are subject to "[c]onstant sexual appraisal."\(^{290}\) That appraisal takes many forms, including sexual harassment on the street and in the work force, as well as sexual abuse.\(^{291}\) In this sense, third-wave writer Melissa Klein would agree with Catharine MacKinnon that "[p]ornography not only teaches the reality of male dominance. It is one way its reality is imposed as well as experienced. It is a way of seeing and using women."\(^{292}\) Klein, like MacKinnon, recognizes what MacKinnon calls "[a]ll the ways in which women are suppressed and subjected—restricted, intruded on, violated, objectified."\(^{293}\)

Where Klein might disagree with MacKinnon, however, is on the subject of whether women's violation becomes "the meaning and content of femininity."\(^{294}\) Klein suggests that abuse and harassment do

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287. Doyle & Lacombe, supra note 267, at 199.
288. "Associated with sexism, pornography can be resisted; equated with men's evil sexuality, it can only be repressed." Id. at 192.
289. Id. at 199 ("[I]t is not so much pornography that endangers women but censorship.").
290. Klein, supra note 136, at 218. One third-wave feminist explains her suspicion by saying that, "Governmental and local authority as it pertains to women, queers, and Black folk has caused me to develop a healthy disrespect for this nation's generic brand of morality thinly masked by the law." Taylor, supra note 155, at 234.
291. Klein, supra note 136, at 218–20. Klein especially bemoans the lack of meaningful employment opportunities for young people, and "the types of low-paying jobs in which sexism is an undercurrent." Id. at 219. She describes a six-month period of employment as cocktail waitress in which, "I knew that my being hired and the amount of money I would make in a nightclub depended on my ability to look cute and to chat in a friendly, flirtatious manner with drunken men. To accomplish this, I had to endure guys trying to put tips down my shirt and asking if they could lick Jello shooters off my breasts." Id. at 219–20. See also Sidler, supra note 130, at 25–26 (describing her friends' experiences with "McJobs" in which they worked "in part-time or temporary positions with no benefits and no hope of advancement.").
292. MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 130.
293. Id. at 6.
294. Id.
not necessarily define women, or at least not in the way that MacKinnon believes they do.\(^{295}\) Instead, in Klein's model, women's experiences of intrusion and violation allow them to approach pornography as a potential profit center: "Because young women often feel exploited in the workplace," Melissa Klein says, "we see sex-trade work in less black-and-white terms than older feminists do. We reason that because our bodies are appropriated through looks and comments anyway, we might be better off at least profiting from it."\(^{296}\) As one woman who worked as a nude dancer further explains, "In an economic system where women face unequal job opportunities, sex-work is one way women can get ahead (maybe even enjoy themselves in the process)."\(^{297}\)

In Klein's analysis, pornography is a way for women to benefit financially from the inevitable exploitation of women. By describing pornography and other sex-work as ways of "exploiting our exploitation,"\(^{298}\) Klein extends the third-wave feminist and postmodern sensibilities articulated by Doyle and Lacombe.\(^{299}\) Pornography is subject to interpretation by not only the viewer,\(^{300}\) but also by those whom Catharine MacKinnon calls the "pornographed."\(^{301}\) Thus notwithstanding whatever meaning that a consumer, or even society, might ascribe to a pornographic picture or film, Klein holds out the possibility that it is the performer, not the consumer (or perhaps in addition to the consumer) who engages in exploitation.\(^{302}\)

By positing the performer in pornography as the exploiter, not the exploited, third-wave feminism extends and complicates a traditional second-wave feminist critique of pornography. If Catharine MacKinnon claims that pornography "constructs what a woman is as what men want from sex,"\(^{303}\) Melissa Klein suggests that, at least in some cases, pornography is a woman's way of constructing herself.\(^{304}\) Specifically

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295. Id.
296. Klein, supra note 136, at 220.
297. Frank, supra note 228, at 199.
298. Klein, supra note 136, at 220.
299. See supra notes 284–287 and accompanying text.
300. Id.
301. MacKINNON, supra note 175, at 128 (describing the film Deep Throat as one "in which Linda [Marchiano] was pornographed . . . ").
302. Professor Celine Parreñas Shimizu makes a similar point about Asia Carrere, a pornographic film star who has built an entire business around her own performances. Celine Parreñas Shimizu, Queens of Anal, Double, Triple, & the Gang Bang: Producing Asian/American Feminism is Pornography, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 235, 236 (2006).
303. MacKinnon, supra note 206, at 171.
304. Klein, supra note 136, at 220.
pornography is the medium through which a woman may exact maximum financial benefit from men by constructing herself as men want her to be.

The force of this third-wave perspective on women's agency may depend largely on the circumstances in which pornography is made, and it may not be possible to make general statements about women's agency or lack thereof without further information about who profits from the pornography industry. Third-wave feminists themselves also frame sexwork as being contingent on a woman's self-dissemblage:

Every time I stripped for men I was stripping myself of emotional response. Yeah, I could get off on dancing, on just feeling my body move to the music, but I realize I was marionetting, performing for an audience from which I maintained considerable distance. When I thought my body was being appreciated, it was actually performing for someone else's pleasure. When I thought I was making money, I was selling myself to the nonerotic: trading cold cash for true emotion and feeling. I don't know how long it took me to realize that a Black woman is not likely to find her liberation in a Mafia-owned strip joint.  

Notwithstanding the failure by third-wave feminists to contextualize the production or pornography, these writings nevertheless add value to the feminist conversation about pornography. By conceiving of women as the exploiters, not the exploited, third-wave feminists shift the focus of the pornography critique to differences in power and economics.  

D. Pornography as the Praxis of Pleasure

At the same time that third-wave feminists acknowledge the potentially exploitative aspects of pornography, third-wave feminists have

305. Taylor, supra note 155, at 236.
306. Frank, supra note 129, at 220.
limited or no affinity for censorship of any kind. They is a “pro-sex” agenda that is more likely “to celebrate female-centered pornography than to censor male-centered porn.” One writer explains this as a reaction to the Reagan-Bush era’s cuts of arts funding and the withholding of federal funds from exhibits considered by some government officials to be in poor taste.

Third-wave feminists reject the notion that there is a “correct” form of artistic expression. Particularly in the case of art, that which is degrading in some respects can nevertheless be enjoyed. For example, a particular song’s lyrics might present women in a negative light, but the same song might have the “fattest, most addictive beats known to humankind.” As one writer explains, “I don’t fit into a puritanical, dualistic feminism that recognizes only indignant innocence . . . or un-enlightened guilt.” A pluralistic feminism instead recognizes joy in music with a pleasant beat but unpleasant lyrics, and the possibility that one might genuinely enjoy music that also degrades women.

Because third-wave feminism embraces this pluralistic view, third-wave writers seem reluctant to label any form of sex-work—whether pornography, prostitution or stripping—as entirely “bad” for women. Writing about her experiences as a nude dancer, Katherine Frank acknowledges that stripping “reinforces male privilege and entitlement to the detriment of women’s practical and emotional investments in their non-stripper bodies.” At the same time, however, she sees stripping as a way to “pay the rent” and gain financially. Similarly, in a study of prostitutes in Madison, Wisconsin, Kirsten Pullen describes prostitutes’

308. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 136, at 221 (distinguishing “young punk” (third-wave) feminists from “older, Dworkin-MacKinnon feminists”).
309. Id. at 221.
311. Davis, supra note 136, at 131.
312. Id. (describing her internal conversation over whether to buy an album with “‘positive’ messages I already knew nestled into” it or “bluesy misogyny over the fattest, most addictive beats known to humankind”).
314. Id. at 199.
work as "offering adventure, community, and financial rewards," while at the same time acknowledging that prostitutes themselves feel the need to be secretive about their work, because of the stigma associated with prostitution. Third-wave feminists do not categorically dismiss sex-work, but they recognize it as multi-faceted—problematic yet profitable to some women.

Notwithstanding the sex-positive tone of third-wave writings on sex-work, there is a way in which third-wave feminists acknowledge how female submission has been fetishized as what is sexy. As Catharine MacKinnon describes, "[f]or the female, subordination is sexualized, in the way that dominance is for the male, as pleasure as well as gender identity, as femininity. Dominance, particularly by men, and submission, principally by women, will be the ruling code through which sexual pleasure is experienced." But for third-wave feminists, the analysis does not stop with the dominance critique. It advocates a potentially subversive role for the so-called dominated female. As Katherine Frank says, "My performance in the strip club ... reinforces certain stereotypes, ideals, and privileges even as it destabilizes and challenges others. As I discipline and adorn my body, then ritually disrobe in front of an audience for money, I obey and disobey norms of femininity, sometimes at intervals, sometimes simultaneously." The transgressive female is one who asserts her right to profit commercially from her own body and to enjoy her own sensuality. For third-wave feminists, por-

316. Id. at 210 ("The narratives that emerge from my interviews suggest that some women working as prostitutes are caught between the sexual autonomy and financial independence sex work offers, and the stigma attached to whoring, experiencing a degree of newfound freedom but in a necessarily covert form.").
317. Some feminists reject the notion that profiting from pornography makes it empowering to women: "No matter how much we would like to use feminism to justify our choices, feminism cannot be interpreted to encompass any risky, self-hating, violent thing a woman does to herself, or takes money for doing, or pays someone to do to her. Feminism does not value women's subordination and women's pain." Amy Winter, Feminism and the Politics of Appearance, 34 OFF OUR BACKS, Nov. 1, 2004, at 11-12.
320. The extent to which an exotic dancer herself enjoys stereotypical "sexy" behavior is suggested by Katherine Frank's account of her trip with friends to a nightclub: "I had to learn to censor my movements anew. Prancing, tossing my hair, and sensuously caressing my torso and breasts—movements I originally adopted for an audience but which had since become mine, part of the music and the dancing—were
ography is sexual expression, performance, exploitation and pleasure all at the same time. Against this multi-faceted backdrop, the next Part explores the stated goals of third-wave feminism.

IV. THE THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST AGENDA

Third-wave writers Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards designed their thirteen-point agenda, or "manifesta," as a self-consciously foundational document for twenty-first century feminists.\(^{321}\) Baumgardner and Richards’s preamble begins, "When in the course of thirty years of uninterrupted feminism . . . it becomes evident that a single generation can only go so far, it behooves the next generation to pick up the reins and articulate the plot that will move their cause forward."\(^{322}\) This language echoes the second-wave Declaration of Sentiments\(^{323}\) at Seneca Falls in 1848 (which Declaration was itself modeled on the Declaration of Independence).\(^{324}\) According to Baumgardner and Richards, contemporary feminism needs a clear articulation of goals “[i]n order to have a government that responds to the Third-wave [sic], rather than a society by the few for the few.”\(^{325}\) The third-wave "manifesta" nominally contains thirteen agenda items.\(^{326}\) Several of those items, however, bundle together

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321. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 278.
322. Id. The 1848 Declaration of Sentiments began similarly:

> When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the people of earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to such a course.

1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 70. Compare DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:

> When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

323. See 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 322, at 70.
324. The first Women’s Rights Convention in United States history was held at Seneca Falls, New York on July 19–20, 1848. This convention typically is considered to mark the beginning of the woman suffrage movement. See, e.g., AILEEN KRADITOR, IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890–1920 I (1965).
325. Id.
326. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 278–81.
related issues. Although Baumgardner and Richards themselves do not break down the agenda items into categories, their substantive goals fall into five subsets: politics, education, health, economics and law.

The manifesta's political goals arise out of a perceived third-wave feminist need to become a more coherent political group. Baumgardner and Richards phrase this as a desire to "out unacknowledged feminists . . . so that Generation X can become a visible movement, and, further, a voting block of eighteen- to forty-year-olds." In order to become a more cohesive group, feminists need to acknowledge a common goal of equality and commit to "supporting one another in our efforts to gain the power to make our own choices." In the Baumgardner-Richards framework, political activism is imagined as a bond between oneself and one's community.

The manifesta's educational goals relate mostly to the history of feminism and diversity in self-expression. Baumgardner and Richards proclaim a need to "have access to our intellectual history and women's history; for the classics of radical feminism, and womanism, mujerista, women's liberation and all our roots remain in print; and to have women's history taught to men as well as women as a part of all curricula." Baumgardner and Richards want to "support and increase the visibility and power of lesbians and bisexual women in the feminist movement," and emphasize "that there is nothing to be gained—and much to be lost—by downplaying their history." Third-wave feminists want to reach out in particular to young girls, to "liberate" them from "slut-bashing, listless educators, sexual harassment and bullying at school." Absent from the third-wave feminist educational goals are any

327. See, e.g., id. at 279. The third agenda item, for example, includes several related goals: (a) "[t]o make explicit that the fight for reproductive rights must include birth control;" (b) "the right for poor women and lesbians to have children;" (c) "partner adoption for gay couples;" (d) "subsidized fertility treatments for all women who choose them;" (e) "freedom from sterilization abuse;" and (f) "to support the idea that sex can be—and usually is—for pleasure, not procreation." Id.

328. Id. at 278 (agenda item 1).

329. Id. at 280 (agenda item 12).

330. Id. at 280 (agenda item 7: "[t]o practice 'autokeonony' ('self in community'): to see activism not as a choice between self and community but as a link between them that creates balance").

331. Id. at 279 (agenda item 5).

332. Id. (agenda item 6).

333. Id.

334. A perceived emphasis on young girls' self-esteem by second-wave feminists is something that Baumgardner and Richards themselves criticize earlier in their book. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

335. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 280 (agenda item 10).
specific, concrete proposals for how to, for example, increase access to early childhood educational programs, diversify admission to higher education or guarantee quality school systems for all children. The manifesta has more strong rhetoric than it does specific proposals.

The manifesta's health action items are access and coverage for health care. Baumgardner and Richards want all people to "have equal access to health care, regardless of income, which includes coverage equivalent to men's and keeping in mind that women use the system more often than men do because of our reproductive capacity." They want to eliminate double standards in "sex and sexual health" and to increase male participation in reducing venereal diseases and planning for contraception. But the authors do not specify how to make health care more available or how to increase male participation in disease and pregnancy prevention.

The manifesta's economic goals are similarly amorphous. Apart from a general desire to "make the workplace responsive to an individual's wants, needs, and talents," the authors do not explain exactly what changes they would like. Without any exploration of how their goals could be achieved, Baumgardner and Richards call for an increase to the minimum wage, greater opportunities for part time work and compensation for parenting activities. But how this is supposed to happen is not immediately obvious. It is not clear, for example, what role third-wave feminists imagine for the government versus private employers.

The manifesta's goals for the law are more extensive than those in any other category, but not any more specific. Given that third-wave feminist writing in general is non-legal in nature, the authors' emphasis on the law is somewhat surprising. Baumgardner and Richards's list of legal goals mirrors the broad subjects that traditionally have been the source of second-wave concern and action: increasing reproductive freedom,
eliminating violence against women, achieving equality in the workforce and securing constitutional guarantees of equality. They also tack on the goals of women's participation in the military and an equal rights amendment to the United States Constitution, both of which have been the subject of substantial opposition from many people, including thoughtful feminists. Yet apart from broad goals, Baumgardner and Richards do not detail their vision for the law or how it will assist in achieving third-wave feminist goals. The next Part offers four explanations for the absence of meaningful consideration of the law in third-wave feminist writings.

V. TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

A. Third-Wave Feminism and the Law

1. Pre-Legal Third-Wave Feminism

One explanation for third-wave feminists' inattention to law is that their writing is pre-legal. That is, third-wave feminists do not articulate a clear role for law in an ideal society because they have not fully considered (or do not fully understand) how the law could be harnessed to achieve third-wave feminist goals. For the most part, third-wave writers come from backgrounds in publishing or social activism, not law.

345. Id. at 279–80 (agenda item 4: “eliminating violence against women” and agenda item 10: “[to liberate adolescents from . . . violence in all walks of life . . .”).

346. Id. at 280 (agenda item 11: “equalizing pay for jobs of comparable worth” and agenda item 9: “[for women who so desire to participate in all reaches of the military, including combat, and to enjoy all the benefits (loans, health care, pensions) offered to its members for as long as we continue to have an active military”).

347. Id. at 281 (agenda item 13: “[to pass the Equal Rights Amendment so that we can have a constitutional foundation of righteousness and equality upon which future women’s rights conventions will stand”).


349. See, e.g., Contributor Biographies, in TO BE REAL, supra note 11, at 285–290 and Contributors, in LISTEN UP, supra note 55. Even to the extent that there are third-wave feminists who are trained as lawyers, they may be at the early stages in their careers and are not yet engaged in the type of impact-litigation that commonly is
Baumgardner and Richards’s aim to “make explicit that the fight for reproductive rights must include birth control” may be an effective rallying slogan, but the authors do not evaluate the existing state of the law and how the current jurisprudential framework may or may not be adequate for achieving this goal. They lack detailed understanding of the law has not yet filtered into third-wave feminism and vice versa.

The third wave’s pre-legalism may arise at least in part from its methodological reliance on the first-person narrative. By claiming that “the personal is political,” second-wave feminists mean that an individual woman’s life experiences follow from imbalances in the relationship between men and women. A second-wave feminist thus comes to a political consciousness through self-description. In contrast, third-wave feminists reject a meta-narrative that organizes all women's experiences. If for the second-wave feminists, the personal is political, then the political is personal for third-wave feminists. That is, one’s personal preferences or desires have no single inherent meaning or cause. As Rebecca Walker explains, young feminists “fear that identity will dictate and regulate our lives, instantaneously pitting us against someone, forcing us to choose inflexible and unchanging sides, female against male, black against white, oppressed against oppressor, good against bad.” To recognize political consequences of personal choices is too difficult and ideologically constraining, Walker suggests: “[c]onstantly measuring up to some cohesive fully down-for-the-feminist-cause identity without contradiction and

associated with “feminist lawyering.” See, e.g., Min Jin Lee, Pushing Away the Plate, in To Be Real, supra note 11, at 89 (“I am a lawyer. I am a lawyer. I am a lawyer. I recite this like a mantra for two interlocked purposes: to state affirmatively that I am a female white collar professional and to justify the negative statement belying my mantra, that I am just a young woman who has no idea what she is doing in this shiny glass building in Manhattan. I start my second diurnal chant, I belong here, I belong here, I belong here.”). Instead, the ability to bring important litigation on behalf of women remains in the hands of traditional women’s rights groups more commonly associated with the second wave such as, Legal Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund) and the Women’s Rights Project of the ACLU. This is perhaps not surprising given the staggering cost of legal education, and recent graduates’ concomitant need to take highly-paid corporate and other positions not typically associated with cause-lawyering. See, e.g., University of North Carolina School of LawAnnual Tuition and Fees for 2006–2007, http://www.law.unc.edu/PASstudents/PASstudentsPage.aspx?ID=27&Q=2 (citing total budgets of $29,796 for in-state residents and $42,214 for out-of-state residents) and Estimated Living Expenses (standard single student budget).

350. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 279.
351. See supra Part I.D.1.
352. Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in Notes from the Second Year: Women’s Liberation (Shulamith Firestone & Anne Koedt eds., 1970).
353. See, e.g., supra note 148 and accompanying text.
354. Walker, Introduction to To Be Real, supra note 11, at xxxi.
messiness and lusts for power and luxury items is not a fun or easy task. So for third-wave feminists, the personal is just that—the subjective reporting by one person of her or his experiences and preferences.

2. Limited-Means Third-Wave Feminism

Pre-legalism, or the failure to consider the law, may not be the only explanation for third-wave feminists' relative silence about the law. It may be that third-wave feminists have considered the law, but that they reject the law as a viable means for achieving change. After all, the equal protection litigation of the 1970s resulted in a lower standard of scrutiny for gender discrimination cases than for racial discrimination cases. The Equal Rights Amendment failed in 1982 when a sufficient number of states did not ratify it. To young women in the twenty-first century, the law's limited ability to affect social change is obvious. Young women acknowledge, as Justice Ginsburg has, "the limits of the judicial role in the republic the United States Constitution serves." Yet these women have not, for the most part, taken up Justice Ginsburg's challenge to seek change from state and national legislatures. In the face of individual state ballot initiatives against same-sex marriage and in favor of highly restrictive conditions on abortion, third-wave feminist writings convey no optimism about the law's power and promise.

355. Id.
356. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional an Air Force policy granting spousal benefits to a married male service-member, but requiring married female service-member to show that she provided more than fifty percent of her husband's support, in order to receive spousal benefits), Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (finding no equal protection violation where employer's insurance policy excludes pregnancy as a covered disability, as state employer had legitimate interest in thus structuring insurance program), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (articulating an intermediate scrutiny standard for gender discrimination cases).
357. See, e.g., MANSBRIDGE, supra note 348.
359. Id. ("The logical progression from the 1970s litigation, it seems to me, is to another arena, not to the courts with their distinctly limited capacity, but to the legislature.").
TOWARD A THIRD-WAVE FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY

3. Limited-Ends Third-Wave Feminism

Another possible explanation for third-wave feminists' apparent lack of developed interest in law is that they are dissatisfied with the result of second-wave feminist legal reform efforts. In other words, if feminists of the 1970s made the workplace more open to more women, third-wave feminists may believe that these changes made women's lives worse, not better. Third-wave feminists are the literal daughters of second-wave feminists; they grew up watching their mothers struggle to balance careers and families. They watched their mothers work a "second-shift" and are deeply ambivalent about what the law has accomplished for women. The press today refers to an "opt-out revolution" among young women who, having received elite educations, choose to become mothers instead of working outside the home, or at least to postpone working outside the home until their children are older. This "opt-out revolution" has inspired an angry backlash from second-wave feminists like Linda Hirshman, who claims that by opting out, young women are rolling back the accomplishments of their foremothers. But it is not clear that third-wave feminists want equality on the same terms that their mothers did.


363. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Oct. 26, 2003, at 42 ("Many high-powered women today don't ever hit the glass ceiling, choosing to leave the workplace for motherhood. Is this the failure of one movement or the beginning of another?"). See also Lynette Clemenson, Work vs. Family, Complicated by Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at G1 ("Around the country black women are opting out of the "opt-out" debate, the often-heated exchange about the compatibility of motherhood and work.... [I]nterviews with more than two dozen women suggest that the discussions as portrayed in books and the news media often lack the nuances and complexities particular to their experience.").

364. LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR WOMEN OF THE WORLD 1-2 (2006) ("'Choice feminism,' the shadowy remnant of the original movement, tells women that their choices, everyone's choices, the incredibly constrained 'choices' they made, are good choices.... A movement that stands for everything ultimately stands for nothing").

365. For example, in an interview with the New York Times, Rebecca Walker described her message to young women:

I keep telling these women in college, "You need to plan having a baby like you plan your career if it's something that you want".... Because we haven't been told that, this generation. And they're shocked when I say that.
Even in the workplace, third-wave feminism seems to be distrustful of what the law has accomplished for women. The assertion that women should have the right to paint their fingernails in the boardroom invites a return to the sexualized workplace that Catharine MacKinnon and others saw as a form of institutionalized oppression of women. But the legacy of MacKinnon and others, third-wave feminists imply, is an image of women as victims. Third-wave feminists want to see themselves as powerful individual actors who are capable of social change.

4. Extra-Legal Third-Wave Feminism

Feminists have a rich tradition of using the media to promote themselves, and third-wave feminists are squarely within that tradition. Although third-wave feminists may appear to ignore the law, reject its methods or reject its accomplishments, they are very much engaged in a transformative project. Through writing, art, video, dance, and music, third-wave feminists communicate messages about the importance of women and their experiences. This type of cultural work can, in some sense, be seen as a necessary pre-condition to an evolution in the law. Just as the Harlem Renaissance preceded the Civil Rights movement, third-wave engagement with culture may be a precursor to the

I'm supposed to be like this feminist telling them, "Go achieve, go achieve." And I'm sitting there saying, "For me, having a baby has been the most transformational experience of my life."


366. BAUMGARDNER & RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 140 (quoting BUST magazine founder Debbie Stoller saying, "[m]aybe we should be painting our nails in the boardroom").

367. Id. at 108-09 (critiquing "women's magazines" for stories of "the über-victim, a woman (or man) who has truly been victimized but whose story has been cosmetically enhanced for the magazine . . . .").

368. For example, although Janet Halley does not explicitly acknowledge third-wave feminist writings, and is herself not within the demographic typically considered third-wave, Halley shares a similar view. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 14 (2006). Halley critiques feminists and others for "the profound commitment . . . to an understanding of themselves as utterly without power." Id.


370. See supra Part I.B.

371. Describing the relationship between cultural work and social change, Regina Austin draws this parallel between third-wave feminism and the Harlem Renaissance. See Regina Austin & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Mary Joe Frug's Postmodern Feminist Legal
law's adoption of some third-wave feminist ideas. To the extent that the law is informed by culture and culture informs law, third-wave feminism should be important to legal scholars. Yet it remains to be seen how a third-wave feminist jurisprudence might develop. Aspects of third-wave feminism may appeal to progressives and conservatives alike. The full substantive ramifications of third-wave feminism cannot be predicted with certainty.

Manifesto Ten Years Later: Reflection on the State of Feminism Today, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 14 (2001). Austin explains,

I do not mean to suggest that Rebecca Walker is part of a wave of feminist writers and cultural workers whose achievements will match those of the Harlem Renaissance, but there are parallels between our time and that. Now, like then, social problems seemed to have receded in importance, and mass protests have died down; as a result, the culture wars have heated up. The fiercest race and gender battles being fought today are occurring along the cultural front lines.


372. For a discussion of the interaction between law and culture, see, e.g., for example, RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE (2000) and POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW (2006).

373. Consider, for example, the issue of internet regulation. The Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998) (COPA) sought to criminalize the knowing internet posting "for commercial purposes" of material that is "harmful to minors." Id. § 231(a)(1). When the American Civil Liberties Union and other groups questioned COPA's constitutionality, the United States Supreme Court agreed, saying that the government had not shown that less restrictive measures were available to prevent minors from accessing internet pornography. Ashcroft v. Amer. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004). Although no third-wave feminist group was represented in the suit or filed any supporting briefs, it can reasonably be expected that third-wave feminists would oppose COPA and any other laws that have the effect of restricting adults' ability to access the internet. They believe that the consumer has an unlimited ability to interpret and give meaning to pornographic images. See supra Part II.B. Any governmental attempts to block access to those images therefore would be impermissible. Id.

It is not obvious, however, how third-wave feminists would evaluate legislation, including COPA, that attempts to protect minors from sexually explicit internet content. On the one hand, third-wave feminists seem to take the view that adults cannot stop children from engaging in adult or adult-like activities. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. According to third-wave feminists, adults should create positive conditions in which children can engage in a variety of sexual activity, not limit that activity. Id. Yet it is not clear that such analysis should be applied to regulation of children's access to the internet. The third-wave feminist viewpoint fails to take into account the way in which the internet can expose children to extremely violent, degrading and illegal images. It is a means by which children can be lured into harmful illegal activity. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Through His Webcam, a Boy Joins a Sordid Online World, NY TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at A1. The third-wave feminist faith in the consumer's interpretive abilities, then, may not apply to children, insofar as they lack
Methodologically, third-wave feminism makes three important, immediately useful contributions to feminist jurisprudence. Third-wave feminism emphasizes the importance of women's subjective experiences, the ability to import multiple levels of meaning and irony to particular images and to safeguard themselves from predatory behavior. For that reason, third-wave feminists may support internet controls designed to protect children.

To take another example, consider a possible third-wave feminist approach to domestic violence. Every state provides some legal protection for battered women. See, e.g., Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, *Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law*, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801 (1993). But the effectiveness of domestic violence laws depends largely on local implementation. Some jurisdictions have a "mandatory prosecution rule" which provides that the decision to bring charges against a batterer is discretionary in the prosecutor, not the victim. Donna Wills, *Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution*, 7 UCLA Women's L.J. 173 (1996-1997). This policy has been called "the enlightened approach to domestic violence prosecutions," insofar as it "takes the decision of whether or not to prosecute the batterer off the victim's shoulders and puts it where it belongs: in the discretion of the prosecutors whose job it is to enforce society's criminal laws and hold offenders accountable for their crimes." *Id.* In other words, once a victim has reported domestic violence, she or he loses any ability to control whether the perpetrator is prosecuted. Critics of mandatory prosecution point out that such policies do not necessarily lead to a reduction in domestic violence. See, e.g., David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, *The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems and Effects*, in *LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION* 127, 151-57 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) and Robert C. Davis et al., *The Deterrent Effect of Prosecuting Domestic Violence Misdemeanors*, 44 Crime & Delinq. 434, 441 (1998). Furthermore, critics claim, "mandatory interventions reinforce the battered woman's psychic injury and encourage feelings of guilt, low self-esteem, and dependency ... [mand]atory interventions may have the ironic effect of realigning the battered woman with the batterer." Linda G. Mills, *Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention*, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 550 (1999). That is, by taking out of a woman's hands the ultimate decision whether to prosecute her batterer or not, domestic violence laws reduce women's agency. In a mandatory prosecution regime, a woman would not be free, for example, to decide to "ignore" or "overlook" the battering for her own idiosyncratic reasons.

Third-wave feminists' consistent emphasis on the importance of individual choice and preference could be translated into a critique of mandatory domestic violence prosecution policies. If the law takes seriously the notion that women's autonomy and decision-making must be respected, then the law should permit individual women to decline to pursue cases against their batterers. This extension of the third-wave philosophy has a certain egalitarian appeal, but it also fails to recognize that women do not always have equal power in their relationships with men, and that such inequality in power can lead to decisions (such as a decision to stay with a batterer) that may be appropriate in the victim's own judgment. Yet what the victim considers appropriate (or tolerable) may not be tolerable in a society that chooses not to condone violence against women. The third-wave outlook is in this sense at odds with mandatory prosecutions rules' larger statement of social values.
including sexual expression. It rejects rigid gender roles and imagines a powerful role for the internet in coalition-building.

The sense that one gets from reading third-wave feminist writing is that these feminists work actively to maximize their own happiness, and, to the extent that they act to maximize a man's happiness, they do so only as the result of a negotiation or a conscious decision that such other-satisfaction will lead to self-satisfaction. Third-wave feminists thus make the case for hedonism. Robin West has critiqued traditional feminist legal theory as defining "out of existence" the "subjective, hedonic aspects" of women's differences from men and from each other. West further says that "neither radical nor liberal legalism—nor their feminist derivatives—aim for happiness or well-being directly." Third-wave feminists do. Yet at the same time, third-wave feminists reject West's contention that women act mostly in satisfaction of others' desires. West claims that, unlike classic liberal actors who maximize their own happiness,

many women, much of the time, consent to transactions, changes, or situations in the world so as to satisfy not their own desires or to maximize their own pleasure, as liberal legalism and liberal legal feminism both presume, but to maximize the pleasure and satiate the desires of others, and that they do so by virtue of conditions that only women experience.

374. See supra Part I.D.1.
375. See supra Part I.C.2.
376. See supra Part I.D.3.
377. See, e.g., Allyn & Allyn, supra note 48, at 144-149 (describing complicated negotiations and thought-process pursuant to which a husband and wife both decide to take on a mutually-invented last name, instead of the husband's last name, the wife's last name, a hyphenated version or some variation on more familiar solutions). See also Merri Lisa Johnson, Fuck You & Your Untouchable Face: Third Wave Feminism & The Problem of Romance, in Jane Sexes It Up, supra note 129, at 13-50 (author's critical self-evaluation of behavior that yields greater pleasure to her male partner than to her).
378. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wisc. Women's L. J. 81 (1987), reprinted in 15 Wisc. Women's L.J. 149, 155 (2000). West argues that groups she calls "liberal-legal feminist theorists" (who want more choice for women) and "radical-legal feminist theorists" (who want women to have more power) are too outwardly focused, and "[c]onsequently, and unsurprisingly, neither liberal nor radical feminist legal critics have committed themselves to the task of determining the measure of women's happiness or suffering." Id. at 155.
379. Id. at 156.
380. Id. at 161-62.
Although they embrace West's call for attention to women's "hedonic lives," third-wave feminists reject the suggestion that women act with a false consciousness. Third-wave feminism values an individual's account of his or her own experience and trusts it as accurate. This emphasis on the first-person narrative may account, at least in part, for third-wave feminists' approach to pornography. That is, the only autobiographical account that will make it into a book of third-wave feminist writing is one told by the person with enough education, authority, and mental and cultural resources to write it. Those who have been brutalized by the sex trade are not likely to write first-person accounts for popular or academic anthologies edited by those who are not engaged in day-to-day work with these survivors.

Third-wave feminism's interest in and reliance on the internet suggests a rich vehicle for international coalition-building around women's issues. Consider, for example, the story of Mukhtar Mai, the Pakistani woman whose gang rape a village court had sanctioned as punishment for her brother's alleged "crime" of sexual relations with a woman outside his own caste. Ms. Mai brought a legal action against her rapist and won a significant damage award that she then donated to local schools. Largely on account of the distribution of Ms. Mai's story through internet sites, listservs and the electronic media, her case became an internationally-championed cause. Similarly the internet helped rally international opinion in support of Amina Lawal, the

381. Id. at 149.
382. Robin West, like Catharine Mackinnon (see supra note 207 and accompanying text), believes that women's accounts of their own experience must be approached with some skepticism. West says, for example, that "[a]n injury uniquely sustained by a disempowered group will lack a name, a history and in general a linguistic reality. Consequently, the victim as well as the perpetrator will transform the pain into something else, such as, for example, punishment, or flattery, or transcendence, or unconscious pleasure." West, supra note 378, at 153.
383. See supra Part I.D.1.
384. See, e.g., supra Parts I.A.-B.
386. See, e.g., THIRD WAVE AGENDA: BEING FEMINIST, DOING FEMINISM, supra note 5.
woman whom an Islamic religious court in Nigeria sentenced to death by stoning for giving birth to a non-marital child. Given the general trend of United States feminist legal theory toward interest in international women’s issues one can reasonably predict that third-wave feminists will be involved in increased international coalition-building around women’s issues.

CONCLUSION

Third-wave feminism is largely a reactive critique that fails to advance its own positivistic view of how its goals should be accomplished. Theoretically, third-wave feminism currently lacks an analytic legal framework. Third-wave feminists respond to incomplete and distorted images of second-wave feminism. Their indictment of second-wave feminism has led to a significant tension between older and younger feminists, and division among young feminists themselves. Gloria Steinem, for one, has said that when reading third-wave feminist writings, she feels “like a sitting dog being told to sit.” Women younger than Steinem, who might be on the younger cusp of second-wave feminism, but who do not fit the demographic description of the third wave,


391. Chamallas, supra note 9, at 21 (noting trend in domestic feminist scholarship that attempts “to connect to the growing global feminist movement and to agitate for an expansion of women’s rights that is explicitly linked to international human rights. This genre of feminist and critical race feminist scholarship is decidedly less theoretical, grounded in the recognition of the dismal material situation of women worldwide and an urgent desire to address violence against women on a global basis.”). See also Judy Rebick, Charting a Map for Humanity, 19 HERIZONS 5, June 22, 2005 (“a core value of third-wave feminists is that global change is needed for women to achieve equality”).

392. Steinem, supra note 245, at xxii.
report that they feel adrift between the competing waves. And some even younger women, perhaps articulating the most decidedly third-wave stance of all, state that they do not want to self-identify as part of a third wave of feminism, because that identification implies a group affiliation or branding that should be rejected in favor of a true third-wave embrace of individualism.

So one is left with the sense that third-wave feminism is a helpful elaboration of some of the issues first raised by earlier feminists, but that it is not so decidedly different from what has come before. Third-wave feminism's emphasis on personal pleasure, the fluidity of gender roles, the internet and coalition-building contribute to the feminist conversation, but third-wave feminists have not yet altered the terms and conditions of that conversation. The writings of third-wave feminists are not well known to or understood by feminist lawyers or scholars. Extrapolating legal theories and methodologies from non-legal, third-wave feminist writings lays a foundation for an incipient third-wave feminist jurisprudence. It remains for lawyers and legal theorists to take up the challenge from this generation of young women and to develop an account of the law's ability to enhance women's autonomy and well-being.


394. Among one group of self-identified feminist law professors, there is strong showing, but not a majority, of third-wave feminists. See, e.g., Feminist Law Professors, http://feministlawprofs.law.sc.edu/ (last visited April 8, 2007) (intended to be a "web log community for feminist law professors"). The professors listed in the blog's right-hand page are those who "self-identify as feminists" and have chosen to be listed there. Of the 62 who are listed as of June 1, 2006, 30 were born in or after 1960; 21 were born in or after 1966; 25 were born between 1963 and 1973. Id. Depending on how one defines the third wave, this means that the blog roll includes either 21 or 25 self-identified feminists who, by virtue of their age, fall into the category of "third-wave feminists." See, e.g., Heywood & Drake, supra note 5, at 4 (third-wave feminists are those whose birthdates fall between 1963 and 1973). Compare id., with supra note 328 and accompanying text (third-wave voting block to be comprised of eighteen- to forty-year-olds).