I recently published a long article' discussing a variety of topics from Joseph Raz's The Morality of Freedom.2 The article was part of a symposium on Raz's work in the Southern California Law Review. Raz responded' to the articles in that symposium, including my own. From a perspective which surveys the whole range of views on political philosophy, Raz's view and mine look very similar. Even so, we find many things to disagree about, which neither of us would regard as merely matters of detail. For the most part, we at least share a common understanding of our disagreements. But there is one set of issues we disagree about and where we seem to lack even a common understanding of the disagreement. These are issues about how authoritative directives function as reasons for action, and about whether, when we follow authority in the proper way, we can be said to "obey" it.
Regan, Donald H. "Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of 'Obey': Further Thoughts on Raz and Obedience to Law." Canadian J. L. & Juris. 3 (1990): 3-28.