This Article takes a more functional approach to reconciling preemption doctrine with Chevron when Congress has not expressly delegated preemptive authority to an agency, an approach that considers a variety of concerns, including political accountability, institutional competence, and related concerns. The Article assumes that federalism values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority and autonomy, are important and can be protected through political processes." It argues that although Congress's "regional structure" might hint at great sensitivity to state concerns, it actually may lead Congress to undervalue some federalism benefits that are more national in nature. Meanwhile, executive agencies generally have significant incentives to take state concerns seriously. Agencies are politically accountable through the President and also may wish to maintain cooperative relationships with states.
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Mendelson, Nina A. "Chevron and Preemption." Mich. L. Rev. 102, no. 5 (2004): 737-800.