This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a background of the system of presidential oversight of regulation through OIRA review. Part II analyzes: (1) the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA, (2) a broad array of agency avoidance tactics, and (3) corresponding response options (especially in a repeat-player relationship). Part III argues that response options to agency avoidance should not be unquestioningly pursued or rejected. Instead, they should be evaluated using many of the same principles OIRA employs in reviewing agency regulation, including a systematic consideration of the benefits and costs of particular response actions and a comparison with alternatives.
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Mendelson, Nina A. "Responding To Agency Avoidance of OIRA." J. Weiner, co-author. Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 37, no. 2 (2014): 448-521.